Disincentives for communicating risk: a risk paradox

Search Swinburne Research Bank

Home

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/94940

Title: Disincentives for communicating risk: a risk paradox
Author(s): Schmidt, Cameron; Dart, Philip; Johnston, Lorraine; Sterling, Leon; Thorne, Peter
Abstract: Problems with the risk management in medium to large software projects have been well documented. For major software projects to be completed successfully, an open and cooperative attitude towards risk must be maintained. Despite this significant incentive, project stakeholders frequently conceal risks. This article identifies reasons in three key areas for such behaviour, and suggests approaches that reduce the motivation for this behaviour thereby providing a basis for effective risk management. Examples drawn from a study, undertaken by the authors, of a medium-sized industry project are used to illustrate many of these issues.
Publication type: Journal article
Source: Information and Software Technology, Vol. 41, no. 7 (May 1999), pp. 403-411
Publication year: 1999
FOR Code(s): 0803 Computer Software; 0806 Information Systems
Keyword(s): Project management; Risk management; Software procurement; Software projects
Publisher: Elsevier BV
ISSN: 0950-5849
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0950-5849(99)00011-7
Peer reviewed