On the security bounds of CMC, EME, EME+ and EME* modes of operation

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/2606

Title: On the security bounds of CMC, EME, EME+ and EME* modes of operation
Author(s): Goi, Bok-Min; Phan, Raphael C.
Abstract: Since 2002, variants of two tweakable block cipher modes of operation, CMC and EME, have been presented by Halevi and Rogaway that are suitable for encryption of disk sectors. In this paper, we show that the security bounds given in their proofs are tight, and hence complement the security proofs of the designers. In particular, we show how to distinguish the CMC, EME, EME+ and EME* modes from random tweakable permutations with negligible effort and 2n/2 chosen plaintexts, where n is the block size in bits. Further, we point out that both modes leak secret information via side-channel attacks (timing and power) due to the data-dependent internal multiplication operation.
Publication type: Conference paper
Research centre: Swinburne University of Technology. Sarawak School of Engineering
Source: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, 10-13 December 2005, Beijing, China, pp. 136-146
Publication year: 2005
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin
ISBN: 3 540 30934 9
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11602897_12
Peer reviewed