Developing a Decolonisation Practice for Settler Colonisers: A Case Study from Aotearoa New Zealand

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Lorenzo Veracini suggests that the coloniser does not yet know ‘how settler decolonisation should appear’. I offer in response an account of how settler decolonisation has appeared in Aotearoa New Zealand and developed over the past three decades, particularly within the field of what I call ‘education work’. This article reports a case study of how Pakeha and other non-indigenous groups began to contribute their own stream of decolonisation work to the efforts of indigenous Maori. Pakeha decolonisation practice has developed through continual adjustments in theorising the local situation in response to Maori analysis, and through undertaking interventions co-intentionally with Maori. Specific features of a Pakeha decolonisation practice, as I have experienced it, include (i) revisiting history, (ii) responding emotionally, (iii) undertaking collective cultural work, and (iv) working toward mutually agreed relationships with Maori. Framing each of these as types of decolonisation ‘work’ – ideological, emotional, cultural and constitutional work – I suggest how a decolonisation practice for settler colonisers could appear.

The message [from Maori] was clear: start by educating yourselves and your own people. If Maori were going to receive justice, Pakeha had to change.¹

Indigenous scholar Linda Smith reminds us that decolonisation originally referred to the formal process of handing over the instruments of governance to the indigenous inhabitants of a colony.² However, in former colonies where the colonisers now form a majority settler population, the indigenous experience is one of continuous and ongoing processes of colonisation, exemplified in indigenous poet Bobbi Sykes’ iconic rejection of the phrase ‘post-colonial’ to describe contemporary Australia: ‘What? Have they left?’
In respect of the indigenous experience of such continuity between coloniser and settler, I adopt the term ‘settler coloniser’ throughout this article. Thus, decolonisation in the former colonies of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States is more usefully considered a ‘long-term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological divesting of colonial power’. With other indigenous activists and scholars, Smith insists that the part to be played by the settler coloniser is to cease perpetuating the colonising of indigenous peoples by these means.

Thus, this study responds to a central concern in settler colonial studies – to explore ‘distinct ways out of structurally dissimilar situations’, that is, to theorise decolonisation specifically in situations where colonialism is now held in place less by external military or economic control than by internal processes of majoritarian democracy and by an ideological consensus of a benign, and inevitable, colonisation. The question becomes how, in settings such as the Anglophone majoritarian democracies of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, may the critical settler participate in an agenda of decolonisation?

Early decolonisation theorists were sceptical about the coloniser undertaking decolonisation themselves. More recent theorising remains sceptical. Reflecting on evidence that suggested shifts in political direction have not proved sufficient to change bureaucratic, cultural and psychological formations, Patrick Wolfe concluded that settler colonialism has remained ‘impervious to regime change’.6

Albert Memmi emphasised the impersonal nature of structural relations between coloniser and colonised, and directly implicated the psychology of the coloniser in the outcomes of colonisation. He considered that the coloniser maintains the status quo through usurpation, falsification and conceit. The psychology of the coloniser who accepts the part of colonialist is that of a ‘usurper’ who:

needs to absolve himself [...] He endeavours to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would extinguish memories – anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation into legitimacy.
As a final act of distortion, to justify and reassure himself, the coloniser achieves a double reconstruction of the colonised and himself, by seeing himself as custodian of the values of civilisation and history, as someone who brings light to the colonised darkness. The colonialist can now ‘relax’, and ‘live benevolently’ since the colonised could only be grateful to him. Applying Memmi’s institutional and psychological analysis to Aotearoa New Zealand, the legal and political actions undertaken by Pakeha from 1840 to the present can be seen as examples of such distortions and conceits to achieve legitimacy. For the coloniser who becomes a settler, usurpation and falsification become a permanent process. Further, the ensuing social order receives personal and psychological legitimation by the majority of settler colonisers. The early theorists of colonisation emphasised the racism inherent in colonial systems ‘as a consubstantial part of colonialism’.

Memmi allowed that some colonisers may ‘vow not to accept colonisation’, but he was pessimistic about their political impotence. He considered them to be in an ‘impossible historical situation’. Observing his own Jewish community in 1950s North Africa supporting the colonisers, Memmi articulates the conflict experienced by the critical or self-rejecting coloniser. This study offers an answer to a question left unaddressed by Memmi – is the self-rejecting coloniser in an impossible historical situation when they live in a majoritarian democracy?

This paper presents the part played by a social movement of critical and activist settlers in a majoritarian democracy who developed a decolonisation practice among their own cultural group. In doing so, the paper examines the process and practices with which settler colonisers may begin to participate in the work of bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological decolonisation. In particular, this paper focuses upon educational work undertaken by activist Pakeha educators in recent decades.

A BENIGN COLONISATION?

Aotearoa New Zealand, in concert with other Anglophone former colonies, has a history of oppressive colonisation that structures
Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’.

contemporary relationships. From the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the British-appointed governors and later settler governments proceeded as though they had been granted sovereignty over a subject people, drawing political and constitutional justification from an English treaty draft in which the British gain sovereignty. Alienation of land through confiscation and the courts, and assimilationist policies in education, health and social services has left Maori economically dispossessed and struggling to maintain cultural institutions. Maori political movements have been characterised by a restless search to recover their lost sovereignty.¹¹ From the early 1900s, by which time Maori were a minority, Maori politicians made attempts to improve the situation through representative democratic processes but with little success against an indifferent settler majority. Settler dominance had become, in Morgensen’s terms, ‘naturalised’.¹² Indeed, Pakeha complacency at the triumph of British government and civilisation is discernible in early texts.¹³ By 1940, at the centenary of the signing of the treaty, Pakeha speechmakers were able to boast of the ‘best race relations in the world’.

The economic and social order in Aotearoa New Zealand is held in place by a hegemony based on the notion that indigenous sovereignty was ceded and images of a benign colonisation. A settler coloniser majority now marshals new arguments such as multiculturalism and global economic imperatives to continue to deny indigenous claims and title.

However, this hegemony is not seamless, and there are always sites in which alternative political outlooks may be proposed.¹⁴ Maori have consistently challenged the notion that by signing a treaty with the British their leaders ceded sovereignty over their country. In the 1970s, modern media began broadcasting to perplexed Pakeha viewers the Maori protest marches and occupations contesting continuing land and cultural loss. The complacent settler view was further disturbed by the publication of several books which took a less self-serving view of settler history.¹⁵ Maori protest and challenge continued, and in 1985 the Waitangi Tribunal began hearing Maori claims of Treaty breaches and making recommendations for compensatory settlements. During the 1980s, a series of formal reviews critical of the impact of Pakeha institutions on Maori
wellbeing set in train institutional reforms. Contemporary Pakeha debate and scholarship is now turning towards the signed treaty text in the Maori language, *Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840*, in which ‘tino rangatiratanga’ (sovereignty) is retained by Maori, and ‘kawanatanga’ (a more limited power of governorship) is granted to the British.

During these years, a Pakeha antiracism movement began listening to Maori critiques, and learning about the history and texts of the Treaty of Waitangi. The movement has provided a sustained challenge to the contemporary social order.

**A COGNITIVE PRAXIS APPROACH**

The ‘cognitive praxis’ approach to social movements, suggested by sociologists Eyerman and Jamison, guides my attempt to address the question of how settler decolonisation may appear. Cognitive praxis is the theorising and practices developed by a social movement in the context of local intellectual history and political culture, which in turn shapes the movement’s ‘project’ for change. I will follow particularly the praxis around educational work undertaken by activist Pakeha educators. Education work occurred alongside acting as allies to Maori in public protest, contributing to institutional reforms, writing submissions on draft laws and lobbying for policy and law changes.

Since I was myself a member of anti-racism and Treaty educator groups, I was able to use an insider action research approach over several years to gather material for publication and archiving in national archives. I was also able to verify and extend aspects of the written records through consultation with longstanding activists in the Auckland region, giving my account a northern focus. Similar and unique theorising occurred in groups all over the country, through interaction at annual gatherings, newsletters and working together on projects.

I construct a genealogy of decolonisation praxis among Pakeha in Aotearoa New Zealand, retracing the mutual dependencies between the praxis and its contexts in the four decades from 1960-2000. To affirm the credibility of the genealogy, I foreground primary sources such as ephemera and reflective writing by fellow activists, and draw upon the theory they used at the time. Following the
cognitive praxis approach, I asked of the records: What were key contextual and intellectual influences in the early theorising of the antiracism/Treaty movement? What were key developments in practice?

A GENEALOGY OF ANTIRACISM AND TREATY THEORISING

Theorising about the local situation developed in concert with taking action to change it. In my interpretation, the key theoretical and practical steps were to:

1) perceive the injustice of the Maori position and attempt to ‘help’;
2) listen to Maori and Pasifika challenges about pervasive racism, and search for new theory to fit the local situation;
3) begin to use an institutional racism analysis to develop theory and strategy about Pakeha responsibility for the racist outcomes of New Zealand’s institutions;
4) develop an antiracism education practice for Pakeha;
5) listen to Maori calls for Pakeha to understand the Treaty;
6) adopt the Maori vision of the ‘honoured Treaty’ as a strategic goal to remedy structural, institutional and cultural racism;
7) undertake a nationwide education project for Pakeha to revisit colonial history and learn about the Treaty;
8) engage with communities and organisations working to implement the guarantees of the Treaty agreement;
9) listen to Maori critique of the limits to institutional change, and their insistence on the primacy of the Maori text of the Treaty;
10) turn eventually to a project of constitutional change based on the implications of the kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga clauses in *Te Tiriti o Waitangi*. 

Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’. 
These steps are points along a developing and continually emerging praxis, in which each step represents a response to the success or failure of previous theorising and interventions. At each point, activists responded to feedback from Maori, and equally, to shifts in government and public discourse, and to new legislation.

1960S: AN ASSIMILATIONIST APPROACH

Pakeha awareness of racism as injustice emerged in a new way when the rugby union acquiesced to a ‘white’ All Blacks team to tour South Africa in 1960. There were widespread protests under the slogan ‘No Maoris No Tour’, bringing together churches, unions, Maori committees and organisations, public servants, students and staff of several universities and teachers’ colleges.\(^{20}\)

In 1961, assimilation policies aimed at Maori in previous decades were evaluated in the Hunn Report, revealing that Maori were not achieving in education, employment, housing and health.\(^{21}\) For Pakeha attuned to racism in international sport, the report brought startling news that New Zealand had racist policies in place, and that sustained coercive force had been applied to Maori to assimilate in these areas. Mitzi Nairn, former Director of the Conference of Churches Programme on Racism, recalls that this was the first time that official information had been published suggesting to Pakeha that all ‘is not as rosy as our myths suggest’.\(^{22}\)

As a result, protestors against racism in sport joined organisations like the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), with Maori and Pakeha, secular and religious members. These organisations set up homework centres for Maori children and provided support in court. Although sympathetic to Maori, the activists’ interventions nevertheless remained within an assimilationist framework, summarised by Nairn as: ‘we will all try harder and be more sincere and it will come good, the Maori people will catch up’.\(^{23}\) She remembers: ‘We wasted a lot of time in the 1960s trying to make an old analysis work’, and recalls that their analysis and praxis felt increasingly inadequate.\(^{24}\)

In 1967, the Kotahitanga Movement, a long-standing Maori unity movement for self-determination and the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, was revived in response to further land alienating
legislation. In 1968, a new radical Maori newsletter *Te Hokioi* began to publicise an unacceptable situation, and the newly formed Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) revealed discrimination in housing, employment, sport and politics. Their revelations of ongoing colonial oppression and cultural loss alerted activists that interventions such as homework centres needed to be run in ways that maintained (and re-introduced) Maori cultural forms. ‘Helping’ and ‘meaning well’ could be dangerous offers by the coloniser group, since Pakeha people assumed Pakeha cultural norms, and their involvement further eroded Maori language and culture.

1970S: AN ANTIRACISM ANALYSIS

Critical analyses from overseas now opened up new possibilities. The report of the Kerner Commission about racial unrest in the U.S. helped identify institutional racism as the basis of white power.\textsuperscript{25} The same analysis was being offered by Black Power leaders in the U.S., particularly Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael. Along with other American theorists, they interwove their analysis of structural and institutional racism with critiques of historical colonisation, and of the resulting internal colonialism affecting both Native and Black Americans.\textsuperscript{26} Local understanding grew of how institutional, cultural and personal forms of racism operate, and how the impact of historical colonisation may be structured into a contemporary democracy.\textsuperscript{27}

The growing black consciousness in America and South Africa influenced Maori and Pasifika activists, and books by Frantz Fanon and Paulo Freire, critical of colonisation in North Africa and South America, were widely read.\textsuperscript{28} Pakeha activists began asking themselves a previously unimaginable question: ‘Is oppression happening in our country?’\textsuperscript{29}

To theorise an active response to oppression by their own group, Pakeha activists found Freire and Antonio Gramsci useful, among others. Gramsci’s notion of modern societies held in place by ideological consensus helped us appreciate our particular task. As Michael Billig explains, ideology comprises the habits of behaviour and belief that combine to make any social world appear to those who inhabit it as the natural world: ‘By this reckoning, ideology operates to make people forget that their world has been historically
constructed’. Gramsci recommended pitting an ‘educational politics’ against a colonial hegemony. Freire recommended ‘conscientising’ dialogue with others to reveal and name the situation. Freire’s notion of the ‘cultural labour’ required to allow the conscientised person to enter a ‘demythologised reality’ helped to focus Pakeha attention on the need for collective cultural change.

Alongside Maori and Pasifika groups, Pakeha activists began to develop a practice that was identified, after Freire’s visit to New Zealand in 1974, as ‘co-intentional processes of education and action’. Drawn from liberation theory, ‘co-intentional’ refers to the oppressed and the coloniser working towards the same end in different ways according to the unique needs of each group, and with each group taking responsibility for their own work. While indigenous groups might work on cultural restoration and asserting legal and constitutional claims, settler groups might undertake institutional reform and re-education about their self-serving myths.

In 1975, a Maori Land march against further land alienation arrived at the New Zealand Parliament under the banner ‘Not an Acre More’. By the late 1970s, widely televised occupations at Bastion Point and Raglan golf course further highlighted historical claims of land alienation. By the late 1970s, Pakeha antiracism activists were undertaking analyses of institutional racism, and embarking on small-group antiracism education with communities and workplaces. Maori, Pasifika and Pakeha groups in Auckland formed a joint educational arm called New Perspectives on Race (NPR) to offer what amounted to ahistorical antiracism work. As Nairn explained of the mid-1970s, ‘We did not yet have the material with which to re-examine New Zealand’s history. We hadn’t indigenised our approach to the New Zealand situation’. As in the 1960s, Pakeha theorising was proving inadequate – an awareness of oppression caused by contemporary institutional racism did not explain many of the challenges presented by Maori. The need for education about the history of our local situation was growing urgent.

Nevertheless, in these early collaborations, practices were developed that would serve later decolonising work well. With institutional racism on the agenda for both indigenous and coloniser activists, discussions turned to how their groups could work safely together. Pakeha were told how difficult and destructive their
individualism was when working in coalition. Pakeha needed to become conscious of the ways in which they operated so as not to exhaust, manipulate or sabotage indigenous energies. Guided by feminist praxis for consciousness raising and collective action, Pakeha groups made collectivity a conscious project, and included feminist values of accountability and emotionality in their practice. For instance, the Pakeha in NPR resolved on a ‘principle of acting collectively for support, to keep each other honest, to guard against “stars”, and individual lack of accountability, and in recognition that the end of the process was empowerment [of Pakeha] [...] to make changes’. Colleagues’ methods were critiqued where these appeared to immobilise rather than empower towards action for change.

Following the small-group format of American white-on-white antiracism work made emotional support available, as activists or workshop participants became acquainted with new, acutely uncomfortable information about the coloniser worldview. Activists and educators increasingly realised that they needed to work in Pakeha-only groups with Maori and Pasifika activists acting as ‘consultants’ or monitors:

> It became obvious that [mixed groups] blurred responsibilities. The primary dominant group responsibility is to unlearn and dismantle its dominating institutions and social constructions, such as institutional and cultural racism. We kept hearing this quite clearly from the consultants.

An ethic developed of Pakeha working together, and then ‘speaking with one voice’ when dealing with Maori.

**1980s: A PAKEHA TREATY EDUCATION PROJECT**

With practices of consultation and response in place among Maori, Pasifika and Pakeha groups, a major shift now occurred among the various streams of theorising. In 1981, the anti-apartheid movement achieved a mass mobilisation of New Zealanders against the tour of a South African rugby team that excluded South Africans of non-white
Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’. 

heritage. Many Pakeha felt that racism had been dealt a significant blow. But the counter-challenge from Maori activists was swift – what about domestic racism? Pakeha were challenged to ‘look to their own history for evidence of the racism they had so fiercely opposed on the anti-apartheid barricades’.41 Robert Consedine, jailed after the tour protests, met so many Maori in prison that he experienced an intense turning point in perspective:

While my work for Corso [a New Zealand charity: Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas] in the 1970s had kept my focus overseas, that experience, combined with the emotional impact of being in jail in 1981, brought into question all that I had assumed about poverty and racism. Why did I know so little about colonisation in New Zealand and what had happened to Maori?42

Antiracist Pakeha now undertook to ‘educate themselves about New Zealand history and to begin to dispel the myth that New Zealand had the best race relations in the world’.43 Pakeha began joining the annual protests at Waitangi initiated by Maori activist groups such as Waitangi Action Committee (WAC), under Kotahitanga banners including ‘The Treaty is a Fraud’.44 The Maori Council of Churches declared in 1983: ‘we question the celebrations which are held at the Treaty House which claim to speak of nationhood and unity but from our perspective speak of dominance and oppression’.45 In 1984, a major gathering was held at Ngaruawahia, with submissions that ‘the Treaty implied two sovereign peoples’ and calls to ‘teach the history of the treaty from a Maori perspective’.46 Dialogue in Maori circles, particularly between elders and younger activists, resolved that to respect the ancestors who signed the Maori text in good faith and intelligence the banner should become ‘Honour the Treaty’. In that year, Pakeha men’s and women’s groups organised the first Open National Gathering of Antiracism workers (its forerunner was called by lesbian feminists) to discuss ‘white racism in Aotearoa, Pakeha responsibility under the Treaty of Waitangi’, and ‘responses to the Hui at Turangawaewae, and communication, structure and networking in the movement’.47 Pakeha groups were coming to see
themselves as a connected social movement needing to develop with Maori a mutual agenda to honour the Treaty.

Pakeha, Pasifika and Maori groups all over the country were now responding to each other’s analyses and educational material. For instance, work by the Auckland Maori Council on laws that breached the Treaty was expanded by WAC into ‘timelines’ of oppressive coloniser legislation and widely disseminated in their circulars. These timelines were extended by community and tertiary educators to cover their diverse sectors, and have remained a key conscientisation tool for Pakeha and, in recent times, for other non-indigenous New Zealanders.

In the mid 1980s the focus became firmer around the Treaty as a dishonoured agreement between indigenous and coloniser peoples. Pakeha groups such as People Opposed to Waitangi (POW) formed coalitions with Maori groups, and included in their aims:

1) stop the [Treaty] celebrations;
2) encourage dialogue between all peoples within Aotearoa about the effects the Treaty of Waitangi on the whole population;
3) ensure [that] education of people about the Treaty of Waitangi happens year-round.

The Maori Council of Churches called for dialogue, healing and reconciliation between Pakeha and Maori regarding the Treaty of Waitangi. However, a major problem was that Pakeha knew virtually nothing about the Treaty, nor about the Maori experience of subsequent colonisation. The Director of the National Council of Churches’ Programme on Racism said in a letter to the Pakeha Caucus of the Waitangi Coalition:

It seems clear to me and others within the anti-racism network that a vital step in promoting a bi-cultural society is that pakeha spend some time and energy learning about and considering the obligations laid on pakeha people by the Treaty of Waitangi and responsibilities since then [...].

The upcoming sesquicentennial in 1990 helped focus official attention on the Treaty. The wide memberships of the various coalitions created a favourable climate in which to lobby the government for a national education programme. In 1985, a Core Group was formed of church organisations, union representatives, women’s organisations, and community and antiracism groups to plan for a ‘nationwide debate on the Treaty of Waitangi’ called Project Waitangi – Pakeha Debate the Treaty. The project’s intent was to inform Pakeha about ‘having a clear place in Aotearoa, a place determined by and conditional upon the honouring of the Treaty of Waitangi’. The (slightly abridged) aims of Project Waitangi were:

• That Pakeha will study and debate the Treaty of Waitangi in order to understand Pakeha commitments under the Treaty: by getting to know the texts and historical context, and examining misconceptions, fears and confusions about these commitments.

• That Pakeha will recognise Maori as tangata whenua [people of the land]: by learning about the meaning of tangata whenua in the Maori sense; by beginning to look at the basis of this country in terms of a tangata whenua/Pakeha contract for a shared nation; [...] [by examining] Pakeha status when the Treaty is honoured and what that will mean for all the institutions and structures in New Zealand society; [and by] beginning to look at Pakeha culture, tracing Pakeha history and ancestors.

• That Pakeha will study the history of New Zealand since 1840, and by coming face to face with our history, will begin to move towards a genuine bi-cultural and eventually multi-cultural society: by studying the Treaty and the subsequent land dealings and legislation that go against the whole meaning and essence of the Treaty, becoming aware of the true history of this country; [...] [by recognising] the history of racism personal and institutional; by becoming aware of Pakeha culture and
feeling confident within it; by expressing feelings of threat or confusion about racism, going beyond guilt in coming to terms with racism; and by deciding to act, make goals, challenge racist structures and practices.53

Emotional and cultural issues surface when structural and cultural racism is confronted. The philosophy of conscientising dialogue is also evident in the encouragement of Pakeha people to become aware of critical new information, to debate it, and to make up their own minds. Project Waitangi's aims illustrate that Pakeha activists now accepted the Maori vision of the honoured Treaty as a strategic remedy for Pakeha racism. They had formulated their own project around this shared vision.

Seen by the government as a ‘middle ground approach’ to avoid the demands of radical groups like WAC and POW, the national education campaign received funding in 1986 for a small national office and a coordinator to be maintained until 1990.54 The project resourced the existing antiracism groups with educational material and training, and encouraged further groups of activist educators to offer education for Pakeha.55 By 1988, there were 22 groups offering Treaty education for Pakeha around the country.56

The major institutional reviews of this time presented a clear Maori viewpoint of historical, institutional and cultural racism. They both drew upon and contributed to the activist educators’ work and helped create a context in which Pakeha professionals and service workers felt challenged to learn about the Treaty, its history and the impact of colonisation.57

The early ethics of co-intentional praxis such as ‘action by members of the oppressor group should be consultative’ had flourished by the late 1980s into praxis about relationships between Pakeha and Maori as implied in the Treaty.58 Many groups strengthened their ethics around consultation with, and accountability to, Maori. For instance, Otepoti Project Waitangi published a baseline for their numerous member groups:

Because our actions against racism have consequences for Maori people, we must be accountable to them. We
seek to work in consultation with [local Maori groups]. Sometimes we may need to consult with other Maori groups affected by our actions [...] well before the time we take any action. Decisions will be made through discussion.  

Once a Pakeha activist group began working closely in a consultative relationship with a Maori group, they became more likely to take account of the consultants’ advice and to appreciate their aspirations for the future.

Typical practices used by Treaty educators at this time were:

1) **Building relationships with an independent Maori group or individuals who acted as funded monitors to the delivery of antiracism and Treaty education.** Members of a Maori monitoring group, usually groups who were themselves involved in activism and education, were invited to attend antiracism/Treaty education aimed at Pakeha, and to co-facilitate where they deemed fit. Maori monitors ensured that a Maori perspective on the Treaty and colonisation was observed, and led separate caucuses for Maori participants when they deemed necessary. For instance, the differing emotional responses for Maori and non-Maori participants when creating a timeline of settler government legislation often required work in separate caucuses, as did the early phases of strategic planning for change in an organisation.

2) **Consulting with Maori within a sector or organisation prior to undertaking educational work.** Activist Treaty educators also sought briefing from Maori staff of an organisation planning a Treaty workshop. Maori staff often gave guidance about issues of concern for them, helped the educators identify desirable outcomes, and sometimes chose to act as monitors and caucus leaders within a workshop.

Relying on all these developments in theorising and praxis, most activist anti-racism/Treaty educators in the 1980s and 1990s used
essentially the same pedagogical approach: firstly, facilitating responses to a critical revisiting of New Zealand’s colonial history; secondly, encouraging a sense of collective Pakeha responsibility for the structures and procedures of their organisations; and, finally, supporting them to undertake personal and professional actions for change.

The plan for a two-day workshop that was delivered in 1989 as professional development for early childhood educators is typical of the time:

1) Timeline of Aotearoa New Zealand’s history compiled by course participants [...] *five sheets of paper [...] rotated between five small groups formed for this exercise.*

2) Discussion of the colonisation process evident in the history of Aotearoa New Zealand and how this process becomes engrained (sic) in a country’s institutions – *in the large group.*

3) Discussion of the invisibility of Maori history and the fact that it was not represented in the school history books that course participants had read [...] *in the big group.*

4) Definition of racism and institutional racism by the facilitator [...] *discussed in one large group.*

5) The facilitator outlines the institutional racism inherent in the education system [...] *participants discussed this in small groups.*

6) *These small groups then discussed the implications [...] for the early childhood sector of the education system.*

7) *The larger group then discussed their collective and individual commitments to working in an antiracism way.*

Six participants interviewed several months later reported feeling ‘apprehensive’ beforehand, as they feared that their values and beliefs would probably be challenged: ‘I felt threatened and on guard’. They commented that they knew very little of Maori and Pakeha early history, and experienced strong reactions to this realisation. One noted: ‘I discovered how little I know and I was angry about this’, while another said she was appalled at her ‘ignorance, in fact ashamed of it really’. Participants described how their empathy was aroused: ‘The historical events gave credence to the emotional
response that I feel now, about the injustices of the system that has kept the Maori race at a low ebb'. The workshop also brought Pakeha culture into critical focus for many participants. One commented: ‘We are a dominating culture all the time, and repressing the other cultures, not just Maori. I would like to see more understanding’. Affirming and claiming cultural identity at the beginning of the workshop appeared to be a critical part of the process. One participant explained: ‘I would have been shattered [...] but with my own culture strengthened I felt I could cope [...] better’.

Participants agreed that the workshop had a profound effect upon them: ‘It was more than just evangelising, it was not that at all [...] I found it spine tingling in that it was so revealing’. Several came to a critical understanding of the impact of a colonial version of history: ‘It was useful to have a reminder that we don’t always look at the other’s history; that we always have British history thrust in front of us’. As a result, attendees felt emotionally drained: ‘We all went home quite exhausted, because it is an emotional thing, because you are all the time inwardly digesting stuff’. Over time, attendees were able to consider the impact of this new information:

There just seemed to be an overall suppression of Maoridom right from the Treaty, as though we had signed it with the Maoris and that would keep them quiet and get on with our way [...] It was Pakehas that made the decision [...] It was things like that I found hurtful.\(^{62}\)

In 2001, similar evaluations were reported from Treaty workshops held with public service organisations. For instance, a staff developer commented: ‘What I had vaguely felt to be unjust I now knew to be real. Although shocked, I felt a sense of relief at knowing the truth and a real challenge to do more in future’. A Director General of a government ministry observed that as his staff learned about ‘the injustices inflicted upon Maori by the government of New Zealand’, the realisation that their knowledge of the true situation has been so sketchy tends to make people suddenly
more open to viewing things in a different way, and receptive to the idea that their presumptions of the equality of the treatment of Maori and non-Maori have been all wrong.\textsuperscript{63}

1990S: PREPARING FOR CULTURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

As Pakeha activists and educators drew upon contemporary scholarship and Treaty jurisprudence, they came to appreciate the issues of historical interpretation involved and to theorise their preference for the Maori version of the Treaty (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). Educators began to use various devices in workshops to legitimate the Maori text, such as arguing for its pre-eminence as the document under discussion by Maori during 1840, the number of signatures, the contra proferentum principle in international law (a rule of contractual interpretation that goes against the proffering party), and the link with terminology from the 1835 He Whakaputanga declaration.

During the 1990s, efforts to reform institutions got underway. Changes were made to mission statements, policies, programmes and staffing. A few organisations changed their constitutions to reflect Te Tiriti o Waitangi, notably churches and women’s, adult education and health services, while others sought Maori partner organisations with which to build a Treaty-based relationship.\textsuperscript{64}

However, Maori consultants insisted that restructuring Pakeha institutions to provide services for Maori did not constitute an adequate reading of what Te Tiriti promised – according to their reading it guaranteed that Maori would retain self-constituted polities to which settler institutions would relate.\textsuperscript{65} The ongoing difficulty of making changes to monocultural institutions highlighted that Pakeha were continuing to draw on colonial ideologies to maintain the status quo.\textsuperscript{66}

Discourse in government institutions began to erode the meaning of useful terms such as ‘biculturalism’ and ‘partnership’, using them to justify further denial of Maori interests. These co-options stimulated Pakeha Treaty workers to begin emphasising the bilateral nature of the Treaty agreement. In Network Waitangi, the successor to Project Waitangi, we settled on using the terms
‘relationship’ between two sovereign parties or ‘Treaty-based relationship’, in order to focus on the constitutional relationship envisaged by the Maori leaders who had signed.\textsuperscript{67}

In the mid-1990s, the Waikato/Bay of Plenty-based Kawanatanga Network proposed that Pakeha prepare themselves for a bi-lateral constitution through changes to their deepest cultural values.\textsuperscript{68} Their key theorist, John Kirton, saw that changing institutional outcomes was not enough if the settler coloniser group remained in control. Another step was needed:

\begin{quote}
We face making changes to our institutions and to our collective ways of being in that order. This is not about us being personally less monocultural, or more ‘culturally sensitive’ [...] it is about ourselves constructing and using collective discourse of relationships and ‘ways of being’ that generally are unlike Pakeha/Tauitiwi [an inclusive term covering all post-Treaty immigrants] today use in public arenas.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

The strategic focus on the Treaty, which in the first place required Pakeha to appreciate the past relationship between coloniser and indigenous peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand, now required Pakeha to contemplate their future relationship with Maori. The practices of critically analysing past colonisation and intervening in institutional racism in the present now gained a visionary, future-oriented thrust. This stage of theorising, which continues into the present, addresses the connections between cultural and constitutional racism.

By 1997, Network Waitangi had spent two years at national gatherings agreeing on resolutions for a report to the United Nations Treaty Rapporteur. They introduced their formal resolutions with: ‘an insistence that Te Tiriti o Waitangi, as an ongoing covenant between the Crown and Iwi/Hapu, be the basis for our constitutional relationship’.\textsuperscript{70} Their press release effectively summarises the strategic focus of the Treaty movement as it had developed by the late 1990s:
A commitment to Treaty of Waitangi-based constitutional change was endorsed at the weekend by a national conference in Wellington of Pakeha involved in treaty education and related issues [...] such a constitution would fully recognise the position of Maori as Tangata Whenua, and non-Maori as Tangata Tiriti. The practical effect of such a move could mean that national decisions were made on an equitable, or consensus, basis between the Treaty partners.\textsuperscript{71}

2000 AND BEYOND: TE TIRITI ON THE AGENDA

In 2000, a national conference to bring together ‘tauiwi communities to affirm the Treaty of Waitangi and explore the future of Aotearoa’ gave Treaty-honouring organisations the opportunity to present their journeys of institutional and constitutional change.\textsuperscript{72} Refugee and migrant leaders took the opportunity to formulate a Treaty education project with Pakeha educators using second language methods.\textsuperscript{73} The Tangata Tiriti-Treaty People day is the best attended workshop at New Zealand’s largest migrant service centre in Auckland. It receives positive feedback for revealing ‘what really happened’ and ‘why Maori are angry’.\textsuperscript{74} Many newer settlers relate their learning to awareness of colonisation in their home countries and elsewhere.

I would summarise the general atmosphere in Aotearoa New Zealand as one of Pakeha grumbling and complaining about Maori claims and assertions, rather than a solid wall of public ignorance or resistance. The New Zealand Values Survey and other attitudinal surveys confirm a considerably higher level of public awareness of the Treaty and Maori experience of Pakeha colonisation than in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{75} An unpredicted consequence of greater awareness is that some high-profile politicians draw upon the English version of the Treaty to legitimate the status quo. The media has also emerged as a powerful tool of misinformation and reactionary response, and is now receiving critical attention.\textsuperscript{76} Official publications, while still glossing over the issue of sovereignty, now present colonial history as more conflicted than they did in the past.\textsuperscript{77} Organisations like the Race Relations Office and Human Rights Commission have undertaken to develop a human rights approach compatible with the Treaty.\textsuperscript{78} Requests for more education about the Treaty were consistent in a
nationwide Treaty Community Dialogue process sponsored by the Human Rights Commission. At least two political parties declare their commitment to the Maori text, and support the need to re-negotiate constitutional arrangements. The Waitangi Tribunal is currently reporting on a hearing (WAI 1040) to clarify the Maori and British views of the treaty at the time of signing. An upcoming constitutional review called by the government will no doubt encourage further developments in decolonisation praxis.

The hegemony of the ‘benign colonisation’ notion of 1960s New Zealand forced Maori protest and critique. By 2000, the praxis of Treaty education had helped facilitate the discourse and practices of ‘honouring the Treaty’ in the public, social service and professional sectors. Without the past four decades of decolonisation practice by Pakeha and other non-indigenous educators, the Maori focus on Te Tiriti would have remained incomprehensible to most Pakeha. In my interpretation, antiracism and Treaty education helped create alternative outlooks and practices towards a decolonised future.

DECOLONISATION WORK FOR SETTLER COLONISERS

Following Eyerman and Jamison’s argument that the reflective practice of social movements is a crucial source of both emergent theory and social innovation, I here reflect on how settler coloniser decolonisation could appear. The Aotearoa New Zealand experience illustrates how the intentional practice of a different, more negotiated, relationship between Pakeha and Maori activists shaped all other aspects of theorising and practice. By listening and responding to indigenous analysis and critique, the Pakeha educators undertook, and encouraged in workshop participants, the following key practices:

1. Revisiting the history of the settler coloniser relationship with indigenous people;
2. Sharing and supporting emotional responses to a shift in worldview about the colonial relationship;
Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’.

3. Building a critical sense of cultural collectivity among settler colonisers;


I conceive of decolonisation practices as ‘work’ in the sense of Freire’s ‘cultural labour’ required for change to an oppressive system, or the ‘cultural work’ described by community psychologist Verne McArthur. I describe below each of the four key practices as types of decolonisation work for settler colonisers – ideological, emotional, cultural, and constitutional work. Our praxis suggested that in a co-intentional decolonisation agenda, each aspect requires attention, and together they form an integrated decolonisation practice for settler colonisers.

RE-VISITING THE HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP: Ideological work for decolonisation

A key decolonisation practice for settler colonisers appears to be the ideological work of critically revisiting the history of their relationship with indigenous people in order to appreciate that colonial ideologies have shaped their worldview. Ideologies of a settler coloniser group’s history are self-legitimising, intended to obscure the violence, usurpations and distortions required to construct the present social order. The reassuring ideology that inevitable historical processes have delivered a benign outcome for indigenous people is confronted by a new, less comfortable worldview.

Ignacio Martin-Baro, a non-indigenous psychologist who worked with the people of El Salvador, identified ‘the recovery of historical memory’ as one of the urgent tasks of a Latin American liberatory psychology. Re-telling history provides the settler coloniser with necessary ‘alternative knowledges’ about the colonial past, just as it does for indigenous peoples. Key features for the settler coloniser appear to be that the revisited history puts a greater emphasis on the experience of indigenous people, and gives a less flattering portrait of themselves. Furthermore, the critical revisiting of history needs to be led by members of the settler coloniser group. Indigenous scholar Terry Kessaris reminds us how important it is for
white colonists’ voices to speak ‘to their own mob’ as allies with indigenous people. She notes that when beneficiaries of colonisation use critical counter-narratives, they tell the story of colonisation while helping to dismantle it.

**SHARING AND SUPPORTING EMOTIONAL RESPONSES: Emotional work for decolonisation**

Since re-telling history brings to settler colonisers notice of their ignorance and complicity, it creates both intellectual and emotional shock waves. Another key decolonisation practice for the settler coloniser appears to be the emotional work of responding to uncomfortable new information about society. They may experience many of the same emotions indigenous groups experience when undergoing critical conscientisation: anger and blame at how much has been hidden. However, more prominent for Pakeha learners were fear of change and feelings of responsibility and guilt about their cultural group asserting control of society to the detriment of Maori. Settler colonisers need quite some emotional assistance to accept that the cultural group to which they belong has been active in maintaining ignorance and racial oppression. Rather than expecting assistance from the indigenous people, Pakeha educators committed themselves to providing such support with settler coloniser collectives.

**BUILDING A CONSCIOUS COLLECTIVITY: Cultural work for decolonisation**

The cultural implications of revisiting history are different for settler colonisers and indigenous people. Addressing the oppressed, Martin-Baro explains that recovery of historical memory means ‘recovering [...] a tradition and a culture [...] rescuing those aspects of identity which served yesterday, and will serve today, for liberation’. In contrast, recovery of historical memory for a settler coloniser group implies critiquing those aspects of yesterday’s identity, culture and tradition which will not serve today for liberation from oppression. For instance, settler coloniser ideologies have the effect of naturalising indifference to the experience of indigenous peoples, while allowing the settler coloniser to espouse cultural values of equality, justice and human rights. Revisiting history challenges a settler coloniser’s internalised self-attributions of decency and
fairness, and gives a sense of urgency to reviewing their cultural inheritance. Indeed, as Freire notes ejecting the dominator’s values ‘must be achieved by a type of cultural action which negates culture’.89

Ideologies and practices, such as indifference and individualism, need to be recognised as cultural and as collectively maintained – hence the need for deliberately collective processes to change them. In Gramsci’s terms, just as hegemony is consensually produced, so must counter-hegemony be consensually produced. Coming to consider ourselves as a cultural collective helps settler colonisers take responsibility for the impact that settler colonial culture has on indigenous people.

PREPARING FOR AN ACCOUNTABLE, MUTUALLY AGREED RELATIONSHIP: Political and constitutional work for decolonisation

Mutually agreed relationships were both a practice and a goal in decolonisation work. A mutually agreed relationship with Maori, as recorded in Te Tiriti, was an overarching goal for Pakeha Treaty educators seeking a more hopeful future. The praxis of working in consultative and accountable relationships with indigenous activists became a search to develop a mutually agreed relationship between coloniser and indigenous groups. The entire development of a decolonisation practice for settler colonisers relies on responsiveness to the indigenous party. The indigenous view of the shared situation was the stimulus for seeking new practices to facilitate change. The indigenous agenda for change serves as a strategic check of practices and goals for the coloniser group. The political and constitutional work implied by indigenous aspirations leads settler colonisers beyond majoritarian processes and towards constitutional changes in their society.

CONCLUSION

The specific trajectory of decolonisation practice in Aotearoa New Zealand for settler colonisers can be attributed to the dialogue with Maori and Pasifika theorists and their analysis of colonisation. Pakeha activists came to view colonial racism as having its most devastating impact in its cultural and institutional forms. More
recently, we have come to appreciate the Maori call for constitutional transformation.

The undertaking by Pakeha to develop a decolonisation praxis that ‘transforms ourselves as well as transforming reality’ is expressed by Nairn as: ‘We need to become the Pakeha that Maori had in mind when they signed Te Tiriti’. Thus, I concur with Veracini’s suggestion that decolonisation for settler colonisers must emphasise a practice rather than a process. In contrast to the pessimism of the early theorists of decolonisation about the colonialis’t’s motivations and abilities, the local settler coloniser activists were highly motivated to seek change through conscious practice. Focusing on change to the culture and institutions of our coloniser group, we searched for other ways to be Pakeha than as Memmi’s colonialists. Theorising as self-critical colonisers, Pakeha Treaty educators positioned the settler coloniser group as potent agents for the task of divesting colonial power. These settler colonisers were theorising and practising the dismantlement of the colonial relationship in situ.

Beneficiaries of colonisation contributing to decolonisation work is a significant and much-needed form of liberatory work around the world. The New Zealand experience gives an example of how decolonisation practice for settler colonisers has and may appear in a particular political and cultural context. This article invites a conversation with practitioners of decolonisation work in other settings.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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NOTES

Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’.

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3 Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonising Methodologies*, p. 98.
7 Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, p. 52.
8 Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, p. 76.
19 I am indebted to Mitzi and Ray Nairn for sharing their recollections of early anti-racist praxis. Many crucial relational arrangements were only obliquely mentioned in written records.
28 ‘Pasifika’ is a term used locally to identify people with ancestry from the islands of the Pacific. The Polynesian Panthers was a Pasifika group active at this time.


35 Mitzi Nairn, personal communication.


43 McNamara, ‘The Treaty and the Discourse of Protest’.


45 Quoted in S. da Silva. ‘Treaty of Waitangi Education: A Policy Issue - Responding to Resuscitation; the Pakeha Treaty’.


53 Project Waitangi, ‘Resource Kit Parts 1, 2, 3, 4’ (1986-7), in Project Waitangi Inc. records (Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library Manuscripts & Archives).


61 Barron and Giddings, ‘Perspective Shift’, p. 12.


63 Consedine and Consedine, Healing our History, pp. 190-192.


70 Network Waitangi ‘The role of Tangata Tiriti/ Tauiwi Tiriti activists in the struggle for tino rangatiratanga’, Network Waitangi Newsletter, June (1997), in Project
Huygens, ‘Developing Decolonisation Practice’.


75 Paul Perry, Alan Webster, New Zealand Politics at the turn of the Millennium: Attitudes and Values about Politics and Government (Palmerston North: Massey University,1999).

76 Angela Moewaka-Barnes, Mandi Gregory, Tim McCreanor, Frank Pega, Jenny Rankine, Media and Te Tiriti o Waitangi 2004 (Tamaki Makaurau/Auckland: Kupu Taea: Media and Te Tiriti Project, 2005).


80 WAI 1040 Te Paparahi o te Raki (Northland Inquiry). Hearing of the Waitangi Tribunal, report pending.


82 Huygens, ‘Discourses for decolonisation’.

83 Eyerman, Jamison, Social Movements, pp. 161-162. See also Ingrid Huygens, Processes of Pakeha Change in Response to the Treaty of Waitangi (Saarbrucken: VDM, 2010).


86 Smith, Decolonising Methodologies, p. 34.


89 Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 16.