Nasution:

Total People’s Resistance and Organicist Thinking in Indonesia

by

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Melbourne

December 2005
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or equivalent institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of this thesis.

Barry Turner
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank and acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Professor Ken Young to the development and completion of this thesis. Ken has faithfully and conscientiously guided me over many years. We have both experienced changes in our lives and places of employment during this period and I have always been most grateful for his consistent and unfailing support that encouraged me to persevere. In particular, I would like to thank him for the scholarly rigour that he sought to implant in me, and for his many valuable insights that greatly assisted me.

At Swinburne University of Technology, I would like to particularly thank Professor Michael Gilding and Associate Professor Pam Green for their support and encouragement, particularly in the final stages of the project.

I am grateful to Greg Barton, who was a colleague at Deakin University in the early 1990s, for the moral guidance and support that reinforced my resolve to undertake this project. The substance of the thesis has changed markedly from those early discussions, but Greg’s insight and encouragement were very important in getting the work started. Greg Fealy was also a very useful sounding board at this time.

The late Herb Feith was kind enough to assist me in compiling materials and recommending people to interview in Indonesia. Most importantly, he directed me towards the work of David Bourchier, which inspired me to examine factors other than instrumental ones that encouraged A.H. Nasution to embrace corporatist / functional forms of interest representation.

Professor Daniel S. Lev was very helpful in sharing his knowledge of 1950s Indonesian politics and personalities with me.

At the Australian Defence Force School of Languages I was fortunate to work for Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Ken Brownrigg. In a subsequent posting as Defence Attache in Jakarta, Ken was unfailingly supportive and helpful.

The late Ian MacFarling’s doctoral research into how Alfred Stepan’s “new professionalism” model of military intervention applied to the Indonesian Army inspired me to seek to apply it in this thesis. Although the conclusions I reached were different than Ian’s, I gained a great deal from his thesis and from lectures he gave at the ADF School of Languages.

Bob Lowry’s research into the Indonesian Army was also very useful and I greatly appreciated documents he provided to me from his archives.

My current management at RMIT University have also been most helpful and supportive. I would like to thank Michael Singh, Mary Vasilakakos and Christopher Ziguras for encouraging me and permitting me to take periods of leave that were essential to writing up the thesis.
Similarly, I would like to thank my long-term colleagues Filomena Lo Schiavo and Michelle Loeser for supporting me and covering for my absences.

A number of people assisted me in finding information in Indonesia. They include members of the Kolopaking family and Professor Rahayu Surtiati in particular. Ron Witton, Sofia Mansour and Pak Setyadi from the Bahtera email discussion forum were of very great assistance in tracking down details on Nasution’s family, as was Tantono Subagyo who kindly sought information on Nasution’s father-in-law from Professor Soejono. Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Pamurahardjo and Brigadier-General (Retired) Suhario Padmodiwiryo provided invaluable information. Mas Hardoyo, at the request of Herb Feith, was kind enough to put me in touch with Pamurahardjo.

In recent years I learnt a great deal about Indonesian Army culture from lecturing at the Pusdiklat Bahasa (Centre for Training and Education – Languages). I am grateful to the military and civilian staff for the great kindness they showed me during those visits. This helped me to keep in mind that many, if not most, members of the TNI do not conform to the more negative images that have emerged in recent times from East Timor, Aceh and other trouble spots.

Mavis Clifford read and commented upon the manuscript. I would like to thank her for taking an interest in my work and for the valuable suggestions she made.

Of course, apart from Ken Young, none of the above people is responsible in any way for the contents of my manuscript and its shortcomings.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My late father and mother profoundly influenced me in all aspects of my life but my father was particularly responsible for my thirst for education. His formal education was cut very short by osteomyelitis that resulted in his spending extended periods of his childhood in hospital. He was a very great man who was unfailingly kind and honest. He admired education and sought to inform himself as much as he could about politics, and our dinner table was the scene of many heated exchanges on issues of the day that inspired a life-long interest in politics that ultimately led to me undertaking this thesis.

My wife, Glenys, has been an absolute rock of support for the thirty-five years of our married life and throughout the years I have spent on this thesis. I thank and acknowledge her kindness, common sense and tolerance. My children, Stephen and Sharon, have also been a source of great happiness and pride and I would like to thank and acknowledge them as well.
NOTES ON SPELLING AND TRANSLATION CONVENTIONS

Names of Individuals and Organisations

The spelling system of the Indonesian language has been subjected to a number of changes over the past century, and this has made the task of according spelling conventions to names in this thesis somewhat complex. Originally, Dutch spelling conventions were applied but some of these were changed in the 1940s. For example, the Dutch-derived oe was replaced by the English-derived u.

The spelling system was “perfected” in 1972 and the remaining Dutch-derived conventions were dropped. For example the Dutch-derived sj, tj and dj were replaced with sy, j and j. However, the spelling of Indonesian names is highly idiosyncratic. Many Indonesians chose to retain the Dutch spelling of their names but references to them in the media and other texts often adopt the new conventions. Many organisations emerged and disappeared at different points of this continuum, leaving the spelling of their names in something of a limbo.

While striving to spell names consistently throughout the thesis, I have elected to retain the previous Dutch-influenced spelling where individuals themselves did so or where individuals and organisations died or disappeared before spelling reforms took place.

Translation from Indonesian

In translating materials from Indonesian into English I have had to choose between an idiomatic or literal approach. As Mildred L. Larson defines the term:

Idiomatic translations use the natural forms of the receptor language, both in the grammatical constructions and in the choice of lexical items. A truly idiomatic translation does not sound like a translation. It sounds like it was written originally in the receptor language. Therefore, a good translator will try to translate idiomatically. This is his goal. ¹

Nevertheless, Larson also goes on to note:

However, translations are often a mixture of a literal transfer of the grammatical units along with some idiomatic translation of the meaning of the text. It is not easy to consistently translate idiomatically. A translator may express some parts of his translation in very natural forms and then in other parts fall back into a literal form. ²

Ultimately, I have adopted the second approach. Where I have felt that naturalness was as important as accuracy I have translated as idiomatically as possible, but in a few cases I have been concerned to be as accurate as possible and have employed more of a literal approach.

I have also tried to adopt a register-based approach. For example, where I have translated newspaper headlines I have adopted the register appropriate to this type of text in English.

² Ibid., p. 19.
In some cases, my translations do not accord with those in previous publications and research. For example, most texts refer to Nasution’s Military Administration of 1949 as the Military Government. The term used in Indonesian is *pemerintahan*, which I believe is more accurately translated as “administration”.
ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that General Abdul Haris Nasution, the most influential military strategist that Indonesia has produced, developed an elective affinity between his strategies for “people’s resistance” and an organicist vision of the proper relations between the state (including the military) and society that led to the Indonesian Army’s formulation of a unique, pervasive and highly durable means of military intervention in politics, the economy and society.

Organicism is a stream of political thinking that views state and society as a single organic unity. Corporatist / functional modes of interest representation are often associated with organicist thinking.

Nasution’s “people’s resistance” strategies emerged during the armed struggle for national independence (from the Dutch) in the second half of the 1940s. The thesis argues that unlike the “people’s war” strategies that emanated from the political left at roughly the same time, Nasution’s concepts were designed to uphold organic “traditional” authority structures and depoliticise the national struggle. Associated with these strategies was a system of territorial commands that shadowed and supervised the aristocratically led civilian administration.

The form of military intervention that grew out of this elective affinity reached its peak during the New Order regime of former President Suharto (1966 – 1998), when the army used its “people’s resistance” doctrines and their associated territorial commands to control the population and the regime championed state-sanctioned corporatist / functional modes of interest representation.

The identification of this elective affinity is a major point of departure from previous political biographies of Nasution. Another is the emphasis placed on Nasution’s family and personal life, particularly in the early chapters.

This thesis explains how personal and family influences encouraged Nasution towards organicist thinking. It identifies how, in the early 1950s, Nasution idealised his “people’s resistance” strategies and the support given to him during the armed struggle by organic “traditional” authority figures. It shows how Nasution’s elective affinity between organicist thinking and “people’s resistance” infused the interventionist doctrines that the army began to develop in the mid-to-late 1950s.

In recent years the Indonesian Army has distanced itself from corporatist / functional forms of interest representation and has largely retreated from an active involvement in politics. Nevertheless, the thesis identifies a continuing adherence within the Army leadership to Nasution’s system of territorial commands and concepts of “people’s resistance” that cannot readily be reconciled with democratic processes.
GLOSSARY

abangan syncretic/nominal Muslims, influenced by pre-Islamic beliefs
adat customary practices, law
AHM Military Law Academy
Akademi Hukum Militer See AHM
aliran stream or current - of belief / religion / ideology
anak child, subordinate, protege
angkatan generation, cohort, branch of the armed forces
Angkatan ‘45 Generation of ‘45
Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil See APRA
APRA Army of the Just King
asrama dormitory style living quarters / pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist school
bapak father, appellation for older / more senior man, title
before name of older / more senior man
bapak-anak Father-child [relationship]
Badan Keamanan Rakyat See BKR
Badan Kerja Sama Cooperation Bodies
Badan Kerja Sama Sipil Militer Civil-Military Cooperation Bodies
Bekas Pejuang Islam Bersenjata Muslim Former Armed [Freedom] Fighters
Badan Pembina Potensi Karya See BPPK
Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia See BPUPKI
Bandung lautan api Bandung sea of fire
Barisan Pemuda Youth Brigade
Barisan Tani Indonesia See BTI
BB European branch of the territorial civil service
Bersiap! Get ready!
Binnenlands Bestuur See BB
Binter Territorial Management
BKR People’s Security Agency
BPUPKI Preparatory Body for Indonesian Independence
BPPK Body for the Fostering of Functional Potentials

BTI Indonesian Peasants’ League
Budi Utomo Noble Endeavour (priyayi-based organisation for the advancement of Javanese society)
Bupati Regent / Head of Regency (Kabupaten) Administrative Area
buruh labourer / manual worker
Camat Head of Kecamatan Administrative Area
Corps Reserve Officieren See CORO
CORO Reserve Officers Training Corps
Darul Islam Abode of Islam (muslim movement)
Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan See Dep Hankam
Dep Hankam Department of Defence and Security
desa rural village
Dewan Nasional National Council
Dewan Pertahanan Daerah See DPD
diplomasi diplomacy (negotiations and diplomatic measures)
DPD Regional Defence Council
dwi fungsi dual function (of the armed forces during the Suharto period)
FDR People’s Democratic Front
FNPIB
Front Nasional Pembebasan Nasional Irian Barat
Front Demokrasi Rakyat
fungsional
golongan
golongan fungsional
golongan karya
Hizbullah
Hokokai
IJTP
Inspektorat Jenderal Territorium dan Perlawan Rakyat
gerpolek
gotong royong
hankamrata
hanrata
hansip
Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia
IPKI
jalan tengah
Kabupaten
karya
karyawan
kawula gusti
Kebatinan
West Irian National Liberation Front
See FNPIB
See FDR
functional
group
functional group
functional group
Army of God (militia)
People’s Loyalty Organisation
Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance
See IJTP
guerrilla (warfare), politics and (the) economy
mutual assistance / cooperation
total people’s defence and security
total people’s defence
civil defence
See IPKI
League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence
middle way (policy of the army)
Regency Administrative Area – see also Bupati
work, function
worker, functionary
servant-master / patron-client / unity of outer–inner world / macrocosmos-microcosmos
Javanese Mysticism / Mystical Beliefs
Kecamatan Administrative Area (sub-district of a Kabupaten or Kotamadya)

Keibodan Vigilance Corps

kekeluargaan family or family-like relationship

kelurahan village administrative district (headed by a lurah)

kemerdekaan independence, freedom

Kenpeitai Military Police

Keresidenan See Residen

Kewedanaan See Wedana

KL Royal (Netherlands) Army

KNIL Royal Netherlands Indies Army

KNIP Central Indonesian National Committee

Kodam Military Area Command

Kodim Military District Command

KODM Military District Command

Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat See Kostrad 1

Komando Daerah Militer See Kodam

Komando Distrik Militer See Kodim

Komando Onder Distrik Militer See KODM

Komando Rayon Militer See Koramil

Konstituante Constitutional Assembly

Korem Military Provincial Command

Komando Resort Militer See Korem

Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat See Kostrad 2

Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat See KNIP

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger See KNIL
Koninklijk Leger
See KL
Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij
See KPM
Konsepsi Politik
Political Conception
Koramil
Military Sector Command
Kostrad ¹
Army Strategic Reserve Command
Kostrad ²
Army Strategic Command
Kotamadya
Municipality (mid-sized city)
KPM
Royal Shipping Company
laskar
irregular soldier/unit
Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia
See LVRI
Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional ¹
See Lemhannas ¹
Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional ²
See Lemhannas ²
Lemhannas ¹
National Resilience Institute
Lemhannas ²
National Defence Institute
Lurah
Village Head
LVRI
League of Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia
Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia
See Masjumi
Markas Besar Komando Jawa
See MBKJ
Masjumi
Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations
MBKJ
Java Command Headquarters
merdeka
Independent, free
mufakat
consensus
murba
common, ordinary, the proletariat
Muslihat
trick, ruse, tactics, strategy
musyawarah
consultation
Nahdatul Ulama
see NU
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<td>NICA</td>
<td>Netherlands Indies Civil Administration</td>
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<td>NU</td>
<td>Council of Muslim Scholars</td>
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<td>organisasi masa</td>
<td>see ormas</td>
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<td>ormas</td>
<td>mass organisation(s)</td>
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<td>Pager Desa</td>
<td>Village Guerrilla Troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>contraction of Bapak – appellation for older / more senior man</td>
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<td>pamong desa</td>
<td>village administration personnel (lit. guardians of the village)</td>
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<td>pamong praja</td>
<td>civil service (after independence – lit. guardians of the state)</td>
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<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Five Principles (of the Indonesian state)</td>
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<td>Commander</td>
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<td>Panglima Besar</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>pangreh praja</td>
<td>civil service (before independence – lit. rulers of the state)</td>
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<td>Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya</td>
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<td>Pasukan Gerilya Desa</td>
<td>See Pager Desa</td>
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<td>Pasundan</td>
<td>Sundanese (West Java ethnic group) area</td>
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<td>PDRI</td>
<td>Emergency Government of the Republic of</td>
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pejuang
Pembela Sukarelawan Tanah Air
Pembela Tanah Air
Pembinaan Teritorial
Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
Pembinaan Teritorial
Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
pemuda
Pemuda Rakyat
Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia
Penguasa Militer
pepolit
Perbepsi
Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia
Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Bersenjata Seluruh Indonesia
Persatuan Perjuangan
pertahanan sipil
pesantren
Pesindo
Peta ¹
Peta ²
PIR
PKI
Indonesia
(freedom) fighter
See Peta ¹
See Peta ²
See Binter
See PDRI
See PRRI
youth
People’s Youth (PKI-associated mass organisation)
See Pesindo
(Martial Law) Military Authority
political education
All Indonesia Association of Former Armed Fighters
Indonesian Unity Party (later merged with Budi Utomo to form Parindra)
All Indonesia Association of Former Armed Fighters
See PP
armed struggle
See Hansip
Muslim boarding school – see also santri
Indonesian Socialist Youth (organisation)
Volunteer Defenders of the Homeland
Defenders of the Homeland
Greater Indonesia Union Party
Indonesian Communist Party
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<td>Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence</td>
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<td>priyayi</td>
<td>Javanese aristocratic / administrative class</td>
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<td>PRRI</td>
<td>Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Indonesian Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>re-dan-ra</td>
<td>reorganisation and rationalisation (of the army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rechtshoogeschool</td>
<td>Law School – predecessor to the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republik Indonesia</td>
<td>See RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republik Indonesia Serikat</td>
<td>See RIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residen</td>
<td>Head of a Residency administrative district (Keresidenan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIS</td>
<td>United States of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukun Tani</td>
<td>Farmers’ Organisation (Parindra-affiliated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rust en orde</td>
<td>peace and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>santri</td>
<td>orthodox practicing Muslim / student in a traditional Muslim boarding school (pesantren)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinendan</td>
<td>Youth Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sekbergolkar</td>
<td>Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya</td>
<td>See Sekbergolkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semangat</td>
<td>spirit / fighting spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>See Seskoad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia</td>
<td>See SOBSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Indonesia</td>
<td>See SOKSI</td>
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</table>
Seskoad  Army Staff and Command School
Siliwangi  West Java Division / Military District
sinoman  mutual assistance / cooperation
sishankamrata  total people’s defence and security system
SOBSI  Central All Indonesia Workers Organisation (PKI-associated union)
SOKSI  Central All-Indonesia Organisation of Functionaries (military-backed union)
Staf Umum Angkatan Darat  See SUAD
STM  Military Sub Territory
SUAD  Army General Staff
Sub Territorium Militer  See STM
Surya Wirawan  Parindra youth wing
T & T  Territorial Command (lit. Troops and Territorial Command)
Tentara Keamanan Rakyat  See TKR ¹
Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat  See TKR ²
Tentara Nasional Indonesia  See TNI
Tentara Pelajar  Student Army
Tentara Republik Indonesia  See TRI
Tentara dan Territorium  See T & T
TKR ¹  People’s Security Army
TKR ²  People’s Salvation Army
TNI  Indonesian National Army
TRI  Army of the Republic of Indonesia
Volksraad  People’s Council (powerless parliament formed by the Dutch)
Wedana  Head of an administrative area known as a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kewedanaan</th>
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<tr>
<td>wehrkreis</td>
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<tr>
<td>military district</td>
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ONE - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In this thesis I shall examine the Indonesian Army’s support for and gradual appropriation of organicist and corporatist thought in the mid-1950s through its “total people’s resistance” strategies and apparatus. Organicist concepts were introduced by leading Indonesian legal experts from the Javanese aristocratic / administrative class who advocated the adoption of a constitutional and political system that drew upon what they perceived as traditional customs, values and authority structures. “Total people’s resistance” (perang rakyat semesta) is the term that was coined in Indonesia to describe the largely guerrilla-based struggle for national independence from the Netherlands in the mid-to-late 1940s. My aim is to identify important elements of compatibility between “total people’s resistance” and organic “traditional” values and authority structures that facilitated linkages between the two and led to the emergence of a unique style of military intervention in Indonesian society, in the political and economic areas, and in social life more broadly, including aspects of culture.

I shall focus on the life experiences and political socialisation of the then Army Chief of Staff, Abdul Haris Nasution, and how they influenced the strategies for “total people’s resistance” he developed in Indonesia’s armed struggle for independence against the Dutch and transformed from the mid-1950s into a powerful means of military intervention in politics. I shall argue that an important aim of this political intervention was to preserve what he portrayed as organic “traditional” values by opposing what he saw as divisive imported ideologies that thrived in the liberal democratic political system that Indonesia adopted in 1950, weakening the parties (and the Indonesian Communist Party in particular), distancing grassroots Indonesians from the political parties, and attempting to impose Nasution’s socially conservative political orientation on the population under the banner of nationalism.

I shall draw attention to Nasution’s reliance on the aristocratic civil service and village administrations of the day in his strategies for “total people’s resistance”. During the Dutch colonial period in Java, members of the pangreh praja (or “rulers of the state” as the indigenous corps of civil servants was known before the more democratic sounding title of pamong praja was adopted after proclamation of independence) were recruited from the indigenous aristocracies. In Central and East Java, the homelands of the Javanese ethnic group, pamong praja officials were drawn from the priyayi or aristocratic administrative class.

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1 Organicism, corporatism and “‘total people’s resistance’” will be discussed and defined in the body of this chapter.
The priyayi are one of three major Javanese socio-cultural-religious cleavages known as priyayi, abangan and santri that Clifford Geertz identified in his groundbreaking study, *The Religion of Java*. According to Geertz, these cleavages formed the basis for the division of Javanese society into parties and mass organisations. Geertz observed that the santri tended to be more devout in following Muslim religious practices, while members of the abangan and priyayi groups tended to be syncretic in their Muslim belief systems and practices, to retain some pre-Islamic practices and thought and to be more concerned with Islamic ritual than with its theology or doctrine. According to Geertz, members of the priyayi (Javanese nobility or "administrative" class) adhered to a higher culture than the abangan Javanese masses and tended towards more refined syncretic religious practices. Most members of this group, like the abangan masses, were adherents of Islam but tended towards syncretic religious practices and were heavily influenced by the pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist and animistic religious influences.

It is well known that Nasution was socially conservative and centred upon the army, which he transformed into a powerful political force in the 1950s. However, the reliance Nasution placed upon the largely aristocratic civil service of the 1940s in his strategies for “total people’s resistance” has not been previously closely examined.

I shall examine aspects of Nasution’s personal life, and his marriage into a prominent Javanese aristocratic family in particular, and his association with other Javanese aristocrats before, during and after the “people’s resistance” campaign against the Dutch to throw extra light upon this reliance on “traditional” authority structures in his strategies. I shall go on to describe Nasution’s transformation of these strategies into powerful means of military social intervention in the 1950s. I shall also show that although Nasution and his fellow officers outgrew this older aristocratic group, whose position in society was weakened from the early 1950s, the strategies he developed in the 1940s and transformed into means of military intervention in politics and the economy in the 1950s continued to reflect organic “traditional” values that were associated with this group.

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2 Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. A number of researchers have questioned aspects of Geertz's pioneering work. For example, Robert Hefner has pointed out that the term abangan itself is not used uniformly throughout Java and that "the cultural distinction itself is often not supercharged with the political significance noted in a few regional studies". See R. Hefner, *Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 3. Members of the other major ethnic group on the island of Java, the Sundanese of West Java, tend to follow a relatively orthodox type of Islam, as do the large Muslim communities on such major “outer islands” as Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
In this introductory chapter I shall describe the origins of “total people’s resistance” and organicist thinking in Indonesia and provide a brief account of the processes through which these two strands of military intervention emerged during the 1940s and 1950s. I shall then outline the origins of the thesis and provide a fuller explanation of the lines of argument that I shall pursue.

“Total People’s Resistance”

By the 1940s the Netherlands had maintained a presence in the Indonesian archipelago for more than 300 years and been the colonial power in the main islands for much of this time before being defeated in 1942 by the Japanese, who in turn occupied the archipelago throughout the remainder of the Second World War. The Dutch sought to return and resume colonial rule after Japan’s capitulation in August 1945. However, the charismatic Javanese nationalist, Sukarno, had jointly declared Indonesia’s independence with the Sumatran, Mohammed Hatta, on 17 August 1945 and a national army and a wide assortment of militia groups began to emerge soon after. There ensued more than four years of negotiation and armed conflict before the Dutch relinquished the colony in December 1949.

The Indonesian Army (Indonesian National Army - Tentara Nasional Indonesia / TNI) considered itself the army of a state that had been attacked by an external aggressor but was forced to confine its activities to the level of guerrilla warfare because of lack of sophisticated weapons and technical skills. Nasution, who played the major role in formulating concepts of “total people’s resistance” in the armed struggle, described “total people’s resistance” in the armed struggle as “… total guerrilla war using non-cooperation and scorched earth which was successful in bringing to a deadlock the enemy’s colonial war.” 3

Nasution was deeply conservative. He abhorred the unruly public unrest that characterised much of the opposition to the Dutch, particularly in the early stages of the conflict. He acted firmly, where he was able, to rein in and disarm guerrilla groups operating outside the control of the army while feeling compelled, nevertheless, to concentrate on guerrilla warfare. His concern to exert tight army control over guerrilla forces is evident in the lack of a role for political parties or civilian politicians in his strategies for “total people’s resistance” that accorded no role to political parties or civilian politics. Rather, his strategies provided for army commanders, with the assistance of the pangreh praja and traditionally appointed village heads (lurah) to mobilise all possible civilian

3 A.H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Jakarta, Information Service of the
resources in total support of the armed struggle.

The conflict with the Dutch ended in mid 1949 but not as a result of the armed conflict alone. The persistence of a group of leaders in pursuing negotiations with the Dutch and international pressure that was brought to bear upon the colonising power complemented the guerrilla struggle.

In the negotiations with the Dutch that led to their recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, a liberal democratic and parliamentary constitution providing for a federal state was adopted. The federal constitution was discarded in 1950 in favour of a similar document that provided for a unitary state. In both situations Sukarno continued as President, albeit in a largely figurehead role.

The Indonesian Army that had fought the Dutch became the core force of a new national army and Nasution was appointed its Chief of Staff. Nasution set about trying to develop the army into a more professional force while maintaining the army’s “total people’s resistance” apparatus. However, he ran into concerted opposition from within and outside the army. Frustrated at opposition from within the Parliament, he played a leading role in an anti-parliament show of force in 1952 (the 17 October 1952 Affair) following which, the Minister for Defence suspended him from duty. He regained the leadership in late 1955.

Upon being reappointed by Prime Minister Burhanuddin Harahap (after a reconciliation with Sukarno) in late 1955, Nasution made a number of changes to the Army Headquarters structure including the establishment of an Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance (Inspektorat Jenderal Territorial dan Perlawanan Rakyat – IJTP). The research that I shall outline in this thesis shows that within months of Nasution’s reappointment an officer from this new Inspectorate became involved in a somewhat clandestine manner in forming a youth front that was based on the youth mass organizations of the four largest political parties. On the basis of this activity, in mid-1957 Nasution launched an initiative to form a corporatist body or functional group known as the Youth-Military Civil-Military Cooperation Group (Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda-Militer – BKSPM).

The civil-military cooperation group initiative grew into an attempt to establish and manage a number of civil-military cooperation bodies that were intended to separate the mass organisations of the day from their parent political parties and place them under the control of the army. At the time the army was not the dominant power within the state but nevertheless exercised considerable authority because the government of the day had conferred martial law powers on it in early 1957.

Armed Forces, undated, p. 20.
to deal with escalating regional crises. The Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance managed the BKS initiative until it was upgraded into a new branch of the Army General Staff (*Staf Umum Angkatan Darat – SUAD*) in 1961.

In 1958 Nasution established a committee that set in train a process that eventually transformed his “total people’s resistance” strategies into a highly pervasive doctrine known as the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management that was aimed at mobilising populations down to the grassroots in support of the army’s political objectives. These revised doctrines remained essentially in place for more than forty years. Although in recent years the army’s “total people’s resistance” strategies and the territorial commands that have underpinned them have been challenged by reform minded Indonesians, they continue to be supported and maintained by the current army leadership.

**Corporatist Means of Interest Representation and Organicist Political Theory**

The imposition of corporatist forms of interest representation has often been associated with organicism, a political theory that emerged in 19th Century Europe. Organicism repudiated ideas from the Enlightenment such as individual rights and the open contestation of ideas. David Bourchier, who has traced organicist thinking in Indonesia, writes that the 19th Century European organicists:

… rejected what they saw as the ‘mechanistic’ philosophies and doctrines of the Enlightenment in favour of an ‘organic’ conception of law, society and the state. Societies were for them not collections of individuals with inalienable human rights but harmonious wholes, bound together by the force of custom and tradition. Law, they maintained, could not be imposed from outside. Rather, it had to grow organically out of the history and circumstances of specific communities – to express their *Volksgeist* [authentic spirit of the people].

While corporatist forms of interest representation are present in many liberal democratic societies, corporatism of an authoritarian nature is indelibly associated with the powerful and destructive

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romantic fascist movements of the 20th Century, such as Mussolini’s Fascist regime in Italy, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

All of these regimes can be described as organicist and organicism is often associated with corporatism. Carlos Yordan concludes that when corporatism is associated with organicism it is antithetical to individual freedom:

The former type of social organization [organicism] is similar to that of a corporation, where all parts work to achieve the interests and needs of collective life, while the latter [atomism] provides a social framework, where individuals can freely actualise their needs and interests. In this sense, the corporatism ethos of organicistic societies does not allow individual freedom. The individualistic society, on other hand, is rooted in its recognition of individual freedoms. 6

Corporatist groups that are found in authoritarian regimes are sometimes known as state-sanctioned corporatist bodies. Under such regimes the state severely limits freedom of association and social groups are forbidden from freely forming organisations that represent their interests to the state. Only organisations that faithfully follow a particular ideology or agenda are permitted to exist.

Supporters of more authoritarian forms of corporatism often claim that corporatist means of interest representation accord a role to the naturally occurring authentic forces of society, such as groups that represent people with shared occupations or functions (functional groups). They contrast such groups favourably with movements formed on the basis of political parties and ideologies.

Organicism and Corporatism in Indonesia

In February 1957, Sukarno advocated that interest representation be channelled through functional groups, rather than parties, when he made an impassioned call for the formation of an extra-parliamentary Dewan Nasional or National Council that would include representation from functional groups in society. He implied that functional groups were a more authentic form of interest representation than parliament and the cabinet, arguing that liberal democracy (“Western democracy”) had failed in Indonesia because it was “… not a democracy which is in harmony with out spirit…” He portrayed functional groups as a means of establishing a bridge between the

cabinet and “the bustling society, the dynamic and active society”. 7

Sukarno made his speech, which he described as his Political Conception (Konsepsi Politik), eleven years after organismism had been introduced into Indonesian political discourse in May 1945 by the customary law (hukum adat) expert, Professor Supomo. In 1957 Sukarno was being advised by Professor Djokosutono, a noted constitutional law expert and close colleague of Supomo, with whom he had co-authored a two-volume work on adat law.

Supomo’s Organicist Initiative

At the time of Supomo’s initial advocacy of organismism (in May 1945) Nazi Germany had capitulated and Japan was subject to increasing military pressure from the Allies. As defeat became more likely, the Japanese sponsored preparations for Indonesia to be granted independence within the framework of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Supomo’s advocacy of organismism was made in a speech to the Japanese-convened Preparatory Body for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – BPUPKI). Perhaps because of the particular context of the Japanese occupation, he made favourable references to Nazi Germany 8 and Imperial Japan. 9 Nevertheless, Supomo appears to have held organicist views from the time that he studied law in the 1920s at Leiden University in the Netherlands.

Bourchier writes that “… the Leiden School belonged to a specific tradition of legal philosophy stemming in particular from the German romantic movement of the early 19th Century.” Bourchier also notes that key thinkers of this movement “… rejected ‘western’ (i.e. French) notions of democracy based on universal suffrage and social contract theory, favouring instead the notion of an “organic” state based on a corporatist (as opposed to an individualistic) model of representation.” 10

In his speech to the BPUPKI Supomo referred to 18th and 19th Century European philosophers, Spinoza, Adam Muller and Hegel but did not describe how or to what extent the views of these

9 Ibid., p. 89.
three philosophers had informed his particular theory of the state. While Marsillam Simandjuntak traces links between Supomo’s thinking and the works of Hegel (David Bourchier describes them as ‘tantalising parallels between Supomo and Hegel’s concepts of the state), Bourchier is of the opinion that the influence of the Leiden scholars, led by Professor van Vollenhoven, seems to have had the most influence on Supomo and other young Indonesians who studied law there. 

Supomo’s version of organicism was as follows:

According to this thinking the [role of] the state is not to guarantee the interests of individuals or groups, but to guarantee the interests of the whole of society as a unified entity. The state is a societal structure that is integral. All of its groups, all of its components, all of its members are closely linked to each other and constitute a unified societal entity that is organic. What is most important in a state based on integral thinking is the way of life of the people in their entirety. The state does not side with the strongest group, or the largest one. It does not focus upon the interests of the individual. Rather, the state guarantees the wellbeing of the whole of the people as a unified entity that cannot be divided. 

Customary Law, Traditional Structures / Values and Organicism

Supomo was the principal drafter of Indonesia’s first constitution (the 1945 Constitution). In keeping with the European organicist view that law “.. had to grow organically out of the history and circumstances of specific communities ..” he stressed the importance of traditional customary law structures and values. He made it clear that he regarded individualism and the open contestation of ideas leading to voting as contrary to the norms of Eastern civilisation. He harked back to what he saw as the cooperative norms of the Indonesian rural village (desa), such as gotong royong or mutual self help (communal working bees to assist in such projects as building a house or a mosque) and decision-making through an exhaustive process of consultation leading to consensus (musyawarah sampai mufakat), rather than political campaigns and voting.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 101
18 Ibid., p. 91.
19 Ibid., p. 91
Supomo advocated the traditional collectivist concept of *kekeluargaan* (the family principle). His idea of *kekeluargaan* entailed the various members of society (the national family) working cooperatively in accordance with their roles in society. Families tend to be hierarchical (more so in Supomo’s day) and implicit within this vision was a repudiation of such ideas as equality and individual rights. Rather, he envisaged members of the national family taking on mutual obligations aimed at fostering and preserving the harmony and welfare of society, in accordance with their status and/or occupation.

Supomo also championed the concept of *kawula-gusti*, derived from ancient Javanese philosophy, explaining it in almost mystical terms:

… the spirit of inner life, the spirituality of the Indonesian people is characterised by and has the aim of achieving unity of life, the unity of *kawulo* and *gusti*, i.e. unity between the outer world and the inner spiritual world, between microcosmos and macrocosmos, between the people and their leaders. All of the people as individuals, groups of people in a community and other groups from that community and all communities that interact in life in the world as a whole are regarded as having their own separate places and obligations in life (*dharma*) according to their basic nature and all of this is directed at a balance of the spiritual and physical world. Human beings as individuals cannot be separated from other individuals or from the outside world, from groups of people, indeed from all groups of creatures, everything is mutually interactive and mutually connected, everything influences everything else and their lives are linked to each other This is the totalitarian idea, the integralistic idea of the Indonesian people, which really exists in authentic constitutional structures.

Supomo’s studies at Leiden University undoubtedly influenced him in his identification of these “traditional” values. Bourchier writes that the Leiden scholars had “discovered” that there were some basic similarities in *adat* law throughout Indonesia and they held to the idea that:

… a nation’s law and government should reflect its unique culture and traditions. The other was that Indonesian culture is quintessentially communally-oriented, spiritual and harmony-loving – the mirror image of mainstream western culture, which the Leiden scholars saw as individualistic, materialistic and conflict-ridden.

Supomo “… saw inherent value in what he perceived to be the traditional status quo, perhaps because his own “status quo” was one of relative privilege as a member of the Javanese syncretic Muslim *priyayi* aristocratic class. On Java, the Dutch colonial regime had adopted a policy of engaging with the *abangan* (syncretic Javanese Muslim) masses through the intermediation of

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20 *Ibid.*, various, e.g. p. 91.
21 *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 90. Supomo went on to say: “This is the totalitarian idea, the integralistic idea of the people of Indonesia that is achieved also in an original constitution.” I shall discuss Supomo’s use of “totalitarian” and “integralistic” later in this chapter.
priyayi who occupied such aristocratic / administrative positions as Bupati (Regent), Wedana (District Head) and Camat (Sub-District Head). Over time the Netherlands colonial regime formalised this arrangement by organising such officials into an Inland Administration (Binnenlands Bestuur) where the senior appointments of Governor and Resident (heads of Residencies) were filled by the Dutch and the lower ranks (from Bupati down) were occupied by a “native” civil service (pangreh praja). Until the end of the Dutch period the position of Bupati was generally hereditary, while the lower pangreh praja ranks reflected administrative functions in the earlier Javanese kingdoms and continued to be filled by members of the priyayi class. 24

In addition to acting as guardians of high Javanese culture and traditions, the pangreh praja had functioned as tax collectors and suppressors of criminality. This latter function sometimes included the suppression of nationalists, such as Sukarno, through networks of spies and informers.

Children of pangreh praja families who were educationally qualified and had mastered sufficient Dutch were able to enrol in Dutch schools and obtain a high quality education. Because of their relative Westernisation and the syncretic nature of their beliefs they were often regarded with suspicion by more orthodox Muslims (santri). The Japanese occupation government had given more latitude to Muslim political interests. Many members of the pangreh praja were also concerned about the rise of Western-style political parties that promised equality and individual human rights and advocated the open contestation of ideas. It is likely that Supomo and many others of his class were primarily concerned at protecting their privileged positions in the face of a tidal wave of chaotic and potentially damaging change. 25 Indeed, it is probably not going too far to speculate that Supomo had similar fears to members of establishment groups in other countries, such as Germany and Japan in the 1920s, who saw

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24 J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Authority in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1961, pp. 14-18. Legge describes the various administrative forms that were in effect throughout the Indies and the efforts of a number of cabinets in the 1950s to unify and reform the bureaucracy and separate its functions from regional legislative bodies.
25 Bourchier, Op. Cit., p. 80. Bourchier writes: “What Supomo wanted more than anything was to preserve the aristocracy-linked administrative apparatus of the colonial era intact. His ‘integralist state’ is best seen as an attempt to ward off both political Islam and those within the nationalist movement who were inspired by democratic principles, which he saw, quite rightly, as a threat to the status quo inherited from the Dutch colonial state and maintained, in large part, through the Japanese occupation.”
organicism as a means of protecting themselves against what they saw as the intrusion of alien and destructive ideas.

The Constitution

The final outcomes of the BPUPKI’s deliberations were not as Supomo had advocated in May 1945. As it became increasingly likely Japan would be defeated by the Allies, power flowed towards the Indonesian nationalists and away from the occupation government. In May Supomo had interchangeably used the terms “totalitarian” and “integralistic” to describe his organicist ideas. By the time Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 he had replaced these terms with *kekeluargaan*. 27

Supomo encountered opposition from members of the BPUPKI who were concerned that the proposed constitution lacked any reference to basic human rights or whether sovereignty was to reside in the people or the state. 28 While Sukarno liked to resort to indigenous imagery, he was not content for the state and its legislative apparatus simply to emerge from within the “volksgeist” of an Indonesian rural village as organicist thinking seemed to call for. Rather, he was concerned to adopt an inspirational approach in arousing the people to embrace the Indonesian nationalist ideology that he had shaped over many years. 29

Moreover, Sukarno had to contend with proponents of establishing an Islamic state or at least ensuring that the new Constitution gave Islam a special place in national life (both of which Supomo flatly rejected). Indonesia was a multi-ethnic society in which over 90% of the population were adherents of Islam 30 but there were substantial numbers of Christians, Hindus and Buddhists with Christians in the majority in some Eastern and South Eastern Islands and Hindus making up nearly all the population of Bali.

On 1 July 1945 Sukarno gave an historic address in which he put forward his *Panca Sila* or Five Principles formulation as the philosophy of the new state. While resorting to indigenous imagery in summing up the Principles as a *gotong royong* formulation, he was highly creative in

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26 Supomo’s speech to the BPUPKI, Simandjuntak, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 89, 90
28 See *Ibid.* pp. 86-94 for a discussion on the tensions that emerged within the BPUPKI over such issues as human rights, people’s sovereignty and whether the legislatures would resolve debates through voting.
attempting to bridge and incorporate all the proposals put forward by the various factions in the BPUPKI. The five principles were:

Nationalism (*Kebangsaan*)
Internationalism or Humanitarianism (*Internasionalisme atau peri-kemanusiaan*)
[Decision-making through] Consultation and Representation (*Musyawarah dan perwakilan*)
Social Welfare (*Kesejahteraan sosial*)
Ketuhanan (*Belief in God*)

In view of the tensions on whether and how to incorporate a recognition of Islam in the Constitution, the final *Sila* was the most significant. Sukarno had formulated an abstract noun incorporating a word for God (*Tuhan*) that is used by adherents of Christianity and Islam but more by the former than the latter (Indonesian Muslims more frequently choose the Arabic term *Allah*). The term *Ketuhanan* was actually quite vague, and no doubt intended to be so. Although *Ketuhanan* may be translated as Belief in God, as above, it can also mean: “to display the characteristics of God” or “(everything) that is associated with God”. 31

The complexity of Sukarno’s thinking in arriving at the term *Ketuhanan* is apparent in the following remark by an Indonesian admirer on the eve of his 100th birthday in 2001:

Bung Karno 32 took some time before he included *ketuhanan* within the system of his “philosophy”. Apparently he needed to consider the status of the other religions so that he could include a wider basis of *ketuhanan* than just Islam. 33

*Ketuhanan* was reworded to become *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*. The three additional words are generally translated as “The One”. However, a literal translation “Who / Which is the Most One and Only” indicates the highly expressive yet abstract nature of the formulation. That all three additional words were derived from Sanskrit, rather than Arabic, perhaps further satisfied members of the BPUPKI who were concerned at the possibility of Indonesia becoming an Islamic state. Sanskrit is associated with Javanese traditional beliefs that emerged from the Hindu-Buddhist empires of the pre-Islamic era whose culture still informs that of the modern *priyayi* class.

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32 A widely used affectionate term for Sukarno which literally translates as Brother Karno. The term Bung / Brother became very popular during the revolution (as the struggle against the Dutch from 1945 until 1949 became known) as it indicated a spirit of togetherness and comradeship.
Organicism and the Final Version of the Constitution

In other areas though, organicist thinking was largely sidelined in the final version of the constitution. For example it states that sovereignty resides within the people. As Bourchier points out, this is “… a philosophy which contradicts directly the integralist or organicist idea that the state and society are essentially one and the same.” 34

The 1945 Constitution also provides for voting in the legislatures (Article 2 (3), contradicting Supomo’s advocacy of what Bourchier describes as “village style” consensual decision making15 (musyawarah sampai mufakat). On the other hand, it did not guarantee individual rights or provide for parties and elections. 36

Bourchier concludes that the constitution embodies “…contradictions between integralism and popular sovereignty …” and that this “… laid the foundations for later disagreements and confusion about what the ‘founding fathers’ had intended.” 37

Although the 1945 Constitution was formally adopted at the time of the Proclamation of Independence, its effective life was very short. The capitulation of Japan left the pangreh praja interests, who had been close to the Japanese, exposed as a rising tide of demands from other sectors of the community, particularly from the pemuda (youth), became overwhelming. The social democrat, Sutan Sjahrir, who had been imprisoned by the Dutch for his nationalist activities in the 1930s but had subsequently refused to cooperate with the Japanese occupation government, was favoured by many of the pemuda. Sjahrir was obviously much more acceptable to the Allies, who entered Indonesia within weeks of the capitulation, than Sukarno and the other leaders who had cooperated with the Japanese.

These factors led to Sjahrir being appointed Prime Minister (a post not provided for in the Constitution) a few weeks after the Proclamation of Independence. He presided over a multi-party system and his cabinet was responsible to a parliamentary body (the Central National Indonesian Committee – Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat)

After the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 organicism largely fell out of fashion in Europe and Japan but continued to have currency in some other parts of the world, notably in some states in

35 Ibid., p. 94
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 93.
Latin America and in Indonesia.

**Corporatism in 1950s Indonesia**

By the time President Sukarno proposed the formation of a National Council in early 1957 both he and the Army Chief, Nasution, were becoming increasingly strident in their opposition to parliamentary democracy. There had been chronic cabinet instability since the declaration of independence. Moreover, serious regional unrest that had broken out in a number of important regions of the Republic was escalating into a full-scale rebellion against the central government. The economy was in a prolonged state of malaise.

Nasution resumed leadership of the army in late 1955 after being suspended from active service because of his involvement in the 17 October 1952 Affair. During his period of suspension Nasution published accounts of the struggle against the Dutch in which he castigated the parties and praised “traditional” authority structures at the village level. He founded and led a political vehicle for army officers and aristocratic pamong praja allies known as the Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI - League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence) that was unsuccessful in the first general elections held in Indonesia (1955). President Sukarno, who saw that Nasution’s views on parliamentary democracy were congruent with his own, reappointed him Chief of Army Staff at the end of that year.

As early as January 1955 Sukarno had declared that Indonesia would have a gotong royong (mutual self-help) democracy, rather than Western-style democracy based on majority rule (which he termed majoricracy). Sukarno’s anti-parliamentary rhetoric became more strident after long awaited general elections were held in September 1955. Prior to the elections it was hoped a more stable grouping of political parties might emerge. However, no clear winner emerged and the number of parties in parliament actually increased from 20 to 28.

It was under such circumstances that organicist thinking resurfaced in Indonesia. Tentatively at first and then with growing momentum, Indonesia’s liberal democratic structures were overturned and in mid-1959 Sukarno reinstated by decree the constitution that Supomo had played a large part in drafting when he first advocated organicism in 1945.

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The Army Leadership and the Corporatist Initiative

By now, Professor Djokosutono was advising both Sukarno and Nasution. As Bourchier remarks, Nasution proved highly receptive to the organicist ideas that underpinned the functional group idea and the army went on to become the leading exponent of corporatist thinking in Indonesia.

As previously mentioned, the army’s first “functional group” initiative entailed the establishment of a group of so-called Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerja Sama), the first of these being the Youth-Military Civil-Military Cooperation Body. It originated from within the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance (Inspektorat Jenderal Teritorum dan Perlawan Rakyat - IJTP), which was intended to assist Nasution in the application of martial law powers.

The stated aim of the BKS-PM was to assemble the youth of Indonesia on the basis of shared function, rather than ideology: something that was clearly in accordance with the functional group concept. It also accorded with the idea of organicism as a political system that perceives that what is good for society as a whole is knowable and can be realised through strong leadership that identifies and draws upon authentic interest groups within the society. Nasution saw the BKS-PM as a means by which the army could unite divergent aliran (societal currents) in pursuit of what he perceived as the national interest. 39

Nasution went on to establish a number of other functional groups, the largest being the Worker-Military (BKS Buruh-Militer – December 1957) and the Peasant-Military (BKS Tani-Militer – September 1958) cooperation groups, and placed them under a new umbrella organization, the West Irian National Liberation Front (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat – FNPIB)

Nasution and the Communist Party

Growing regional unrest was not the only threat to the nation that Nasution had on his mind. In Germany organicism developed in the 1920s and 1930s in response to a perceived threat from Marxist movements. In mid-1950s Indonesia there was intense rivalry between his conservative army leadership and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) and Nasution clearly had in mind using the BKSPM to compete with this party at the village level. By 1957 the army was locked in a struggle with the PKI for the hearts and minds of the younger
By the mid-1950s the Party was taking full political advantage of an intensifying dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch over the status of the territory of West Irian. In the negotiations that led to the transfer of sovereignty the former colonial power had insisted that this territory should not be part of the Republic of Indonesia and the question had been left open for later resolution.

This was a major issue for Sukarno, and the PKI forged an alliance with the President by campaigning strongly against the Dutch, a development that added to the army leadership’s unease. In late 1957 political agitation against Dutch companies in Indonesia led to one of the most cathartic and durably significant events in modern Indonesian history: the seizure of Dutch assets in Indonesia. The PKI’s SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia – All Indonesia Central Organisation of Workers) played the leading role in the confiscations but the army leadership quickly assumed control of them, obtaining an independent source of funding and gaining a foothold in important sectors of the national economy.

Class-Neutral Language

From their new vantage points as managers of the confiscated enterprises, army officers went on to establish a large functional group, Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (The All-Indonesia Central Organisation of Functionaries - SOKSI). As indicated by its similar name, SOKSI was intended to function as a counterpart to the PKI’s SOBSI. The class-neutral term karyawan contrasted starkly with SOBSI’s buruh (worker) in their respective names and indicated the considerable gulf in approach between SOKSI and SOBSI.

In 1964 SOKSI played a major role in establishing a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya – Sekber Golkar) which later became known by the acronym Golkar. However, by this time Sukarno had become concerned about the army’s growing political power and assertiveness, including its appropriation of the functional group concept.

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The Army Ascendant

A major factor in the army’s increasing assertiveness was its increased unity and prestige after Nasution quickly succeeded in suppressing a CIA-sponsored regional revolt in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia. Regional insurrections began to emerge after a federal structure, which had been agreed in negotiations with the Dutch, was disbanded in 1950 in favour of a unitary state.

A series of rebellions broke out in areas where minorities (such as Eastern Islands Christians) felt they had been betrayed and feared dominance by the Javanese ethnic group. The most pervasive and threatening insurgencies were those associated with attempts to establish an Islamic State. In West Java a movement known as Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) was conducting a campaign for an Islamic State.

In 1957 and 1958 two major revolts broke out in Sulawesi and Sumatra. Their origins included a perceived domination by Javanese and continuing perceptions that expenditure on development within Java was at the expense of foreign exchange earning outer islands.

These rebellions were sponsored by the United States Central Intelligence Service, which was becoming alarmed at the rise of the PKI and its association with Sukarno. Nasution mounted a surprisingly effective land, air and sea campaign that quickly suppressed the rebellions, greatly strengthening his command of the army. In 1962 Nasution finally suppressed the Darul Islam insurgency, further adding to his track record as a successful military leader.

Nasution was not just concerned with these purely military matters. Throughout the late 1950s he began to feel his way towards a formula in which the army would share power with the President while not seeking to become the dominant power in the state. Arguing that the Indonesian Army must follow a "middle way" or jalan tengah, he asserted that the Indonesian Army was not a tool of the state like those in Western countries and was also unlike armies in Latin America which had assumed total political power. While the Indonesian Army would not attempt to take over the government, its non-military skills should be used to assist in developing the nation. Military officers had to play a role in determining policy at all levels of government. Nasution warned that if the armed forces were not included in the administration of the state they would be "like a volcano which must certainly erupt at some time in the future".  

Nasution also moved to strengthen the army’s system of territorial commands, that had existed in various forms since the armed struggle against the Dutch, extending it downwards into society right to the village level. He fostered the transformation of “total people’s resistance” strategies into a means of military intervention that was based on a form of defence known as territorial warfare.

From the early 1960s the army began to make a concerted effort to use its territorial commands as a basis for a systematic form of military intervention by developing a doctrine known as “Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management”. Unlike more stereotypical cases of military intervention that entailed soldiers emerging from their barracks and taking over the government, Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management provided for army territorial commanders to intervene in economic, political and social affairs on the grounds that it was part and parcel of their involvement in external defence and/or internal security duties.

“Territorial Management” required army officers to know their areas of operation intimately, including the social and political forces that needed to be “managed” by the army. In countering insurgencies, the revised doctrine of territorial warfare concentrated on obtaining the support and assistance of local communities in order to wage a campaign of “total people’s resistance”.

**Different Types of Forces**

During this period Nasution did not confine himself to the expansion and intensification of his “people’s resistance” strategies. Nasution had tried unsuccessfully to develop a combination of mobile offensive and territorial forces in the 1940s. In the late 1950s he gradually asserted army headquarters control over the infantry, artillery and cavalry assets of the territorial commands and in 1961 brought a number of them into a new centrally controlled force called Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat – Army Strategic Reserve Command). Kostrad remains in existence, operating in tandem with territorial forces that retain the function of mobilising populations to carry out “total people’s war”.

**The Army as a Functional Group**

Meanwhile the army leadership continued to work on the corporatist initiative. Nasution supported Sukarno when he reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by decree in 1959 and declared that Indonesia’s political system would henceforth be known as Guided Democracy. He was rewarded

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42 In 1963 the word “Reserve” was dropped and the force became known as the Army Strategic Command.
when the President and his advisers interpreted the 1945 Constitution in such a manner that its provision for the representation of groups was extended to the branches of the armed forces, which were granted the title and status of functional groups within society. This led to the armed forces being accorded a guaranteed proportion of seats in the legislatures. It “legitimised” moves by Nasution to move away from the Western concept of the army functioning as a tool of the state with no role in politics to a “middle road” whereby the military officers would take part in the processes and organs of government while not staging a military coup.

The Decline of Army Corporatism – and Nasution

The ascendancy of army-backed corporatism was short-lived. One factor in its decline was that, as Bourchier points out, for Sukarno corporatism was not a sufficiently dynamic concept. Nasution, of course, saw it as a socially conservative concept that suited his emphases on competing with the PKI and supporting *pamong praja*-associated socially conservative interests.

Another reason for Sukarno’s increasing lack of interest in corporatism from the late 1950s was that he saw it as benefiting the army much more than him. In 1960 Sukarno took action to curb the growing influence of the army by absorbing the West Irian National Liberation Front into a new National Front. Nasution attempted to resist this directive but was forced to dissolve the BKS project when martial law was lifted in 1963.

In 1962 Sukarno moved to undermine Nasution’s position by changing Nasution’s appointment from *Panglima* to Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Therefore, operational command and control gravitated to the service commanders who were formally accountable to the President. The position of Armed Forces Chief of Staff held relatively little power and Nasution’s other position of Minister for Defence was also lacking in real influence.

In 1960 Sukarno coined the term NASAKOM (*Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme* – Nationalism, Religion, Communism) to describe what he saw as a synthesis of ideas that could move Indonesia forward in a more dynamic yet harmonious manner. The inclusion of the term Communism in the formula was, of course, alarming to conservative officers such as Nasution.

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44 Nasution stated that whether they were dissolved or not, the work of the West Irian National Liberation Front and the *Badan Kerja Sama* would continue. The link between these institutions and concepts of territorial warfare was underlined when it was announced that the BKS would work through the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People's Warfare. David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Singapore, New York, Oxford University
The formula did not mention functional groups or the army and after 1962 the language of functional groups was absent from Sukarno’s speeches. Rather, he relied increasingly on the PKI for support as he became preoccupied with military adventures such as “seizing back” West Irian. Corporatism became the preserve of the army and the establishment of the Sekber Golkar organization in 1964 was very much a rear-guard action to preserve as much as possible the gains made earlier.

**Army – Sukarno Tensions**

Although many officers, such as the new Army Commander, General Yani, were personally loyal to Sukarno, Nasution’s removal from operational command and control signalled the beginning of a period of increased tension between Sukarno and the army that was to culminate in Sukarno’s downfall. The West Irian issue was at once beneficial to the army as it literally placed it in the front line, but many army leaders could see that a successful outcome would also benefit the PKI that had campaigned strongly on the issue since the mid-1950s.

Sukarno mounted a campaign of international negotiations and military action and in 1962 the Dutch, under pressure from the Kennedy administration, agreed to hand the territory over to Indonesia pending an “act of free choice” supervised by the United Nations. Following his success with West Irian, in 1963 Sukarno moved to “confront” the newly independent state of Malaysia. By this time, a number of senior army figures, including General Yani, were concerned that the campaign would benefit the PKI by diverting the army’s attention into a probably unwinnable campaign against a technically superior British force in Malaysia. As Confrontation wore on the economy descended into chaos with prices increasing rapidly, inflation spiralling out of control, a severe shortage of consumer goods and the massively rising national debt. The PKI launched “unilateral” actions in support of land reform that led to open fighting in rural Java, particularly with Muslim groups.

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Ibid., p. 173.

In 1969 Opsus (Operasi Khusus), a foreign liaison and political manipulation unit located within Kostrad, manipulated the plebiscite with the result that West Papua (Irian Jaya) was officially ceded to Indonesia.

In August and September 1964 the Opsus organization was tasked by the Kostrad Commander, Suharto, (under the direction of Yani) to open secret contacts with British and Malaysian officials. In November 1964 Opsus officers travelled to Bangkok to conduct secret negotiations to limit Confrontation. That the army was prepared to conduct its own foreign policy initiative reflected the suspicions and tensions that marked the final years of Guided Democracy.
Internationally, Indonesia was becoming increasingly alienated from the West. Sukarno pulled out of the United Nations in January 1965 and developed closer relations with Beijing. In May 1965 the leaking of a telegram sent to London by the British Ambassador (the so-called Gilchrist letter) raised suspicions that the army was now so unhappy with the state of affairs that a Council of Generals had formed which might, in cooperation with the British, topple the regime.

With Sukarno’s blessing, the PKI sought to establish its own military wing by forming a "Fifth Force" of volunteers (in addition to the army, navy, air force and police). The air force leadership backed the Fifth Force concept while the navy tentatively joined the army in opposing it. Beijing promised to provide arms for the establishment of the Force and in July 1965 the air force began training civilians from the PKI's mass organisations at its Halim air base outside Jakarta.

The “Coup” of 30 September 1965

Finally, on the night of 30 September 1965 tensions came to a head. In what appears to have been a pre-emptive move by supporters of Sukarno and the PKI to head off a coup by the army leadership, troops from Sukarno’s Palace Guard went to the residences of Yani, and five other senior generals, requesting them to accompany them immediately to a meeting with the President. Those who resisted were killed on the spot while the others were abducted and murdered at Halim air base, allegedly by volunteers being trained by the air force under the Fifth Force program. An attempt to abduct Nasution failed when he managed to escape from his house.

On the following day General Suharto (who remained in command of Kostrad but had not been included in the list of generals to be abducted) moved to establish control of the army. A drawn-out process ensued that culminated in the end of Sukarno's long tenure as president and the establishment of the New Order, the regime that Suharto led for 32 years. During this period army officers organised and incited student and other street protests against Sukarno, demanding that he be put on trial for suspected involvement in the “coup”, and elements of the army and certain Muslim interests carried out widespread killings of people suspected of Communist Party membership or involvement. By the end of the 1960s the PKI, which had been one of the largest Communist parties in the world, was all but physically eliminated.

Organicism, Corporatism and the New Order

As the New Order regime grew in confidence and experience it increasingly harnessed itself to an organicist / corporatist agenda. It was during the New Order period that the somewhat moribund
Golkar organization was transformed into an election campaigning vehicle for the regime. Meanwhile, the regime moved towards replacing pluralist forms of interest representation with functional groups.  

The New Order’s first general elections were held in 1971 and Golkar, making its first appearance in the polls, garnered some two thirds of the vote. This was a pattern that was repeated in all the subsequent elections held under the New Order regime.

As the regime cemented itself in power it “simplified” the parties into two, with one (the United Development Party or Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) representing the Muslim vote and the other (the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party) acting as an amalgam of the old nationalist and non-Muslim religious parties. Ostensibly as part of the regime’s concern to maintain stability, these parties were forbidden to organise or campaign below the Sub-District (Kecamatan) level, while Golkar (which maintained the façade that it was not actually a party) was free to do so and was greatly assisted by bureaucrats and army personnel.

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48 In December 1969, the Minister for Home Affairs issued a regulation under which functional group representation in the central and regional provincial assemblies would be "purified" in that functional group members in local representative councils were to be prohibited from retaining membership in political parties. The regulation stated that functional group representatives had to be "neutral" and to represent "the entire population". This was an important line of continuity with earlier efforts by the army leadership of the late 1950s to rely upon functional groups, rather than the ideologically and religiously based parties, for a means of interest representation that was in tune with the nature of Indonesian society. All of the previous trades unions were forced to amalgamate into the Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesia Union of Workers). As was the case with the choice of karyawan, the word pekerja (worker) was a class-neutral one, replacing buruh (manual worker / labourer). Led by New Order loyalists, these groups were given a monopoly of interest representation within their industry or societal sectors and the regime actively suppressed independent organisations that attempted to compete with them.

49 Golkar’s victory was due in no small part to manipulation and even intimidation on the part of the regime. The important roles of the OPSUS organisation and that of Amir Machmud as Minister for Home Affairs in Golkar's victory in the general elections of 1971 have been discussed in M. Nishihara's *Golkar and the 1971 General Elections*, Ithaca, NY, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1972, and Ken Ward's *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study*, Clayton, Vic, Centre for Southeast Studies, Monash University, 1974.

50 This focus on the bureaucracy and the army was formalised in the 1970s when Golkar emerged as a three-pronged “ABG” organization. The letter “A” stood for ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), the then name of the Armed Forces. “B” stood for “Birokrasi” or the “Bureaucracy” while “G” stood for Golkar - the state-supported functional groups.
The “Dual Function” of the Military

Nasution and Suharto fell out in the early New Order period and Nasution became a strident critic of the regime. However, Nasution’s ideas were further developed into means of military intervention as the regime sought to establish its presence in virtually all areas of national life. For example, the doctrine that underpinned the interventionist role of the armed forces throughout the Suharto period was known as the dual function or dwi fungsi. According to the dwi fungsi doctrine, the armed forces had a socio-political function in addition to their defence and security function. Of course, dwi fungsi had not appeared overnight but emanated from such influences as Nasution’s “middle way” pronouncement of 1958 and the “management” side of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management he had fostered in the early 1960s.

The dwi fungsi concept, like the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, was unusual in that it implied that the Indonesian Armed Forces had an ongoing interventionist role. Unlike many armed forces that had gained political power elsewhere, the armed forces never said that they intended to participate in political, administrative and economic processes for a limited period of time before returning to the barracks.

The dwi fungsi was widely applied in Indonesian politics and the economy. In the later period of the New Order, the Armed Forces had 75 seats in the national parliament. Serving and former armed forces officers dominated provincial governorships and lower level district head positions. Thousands of armed forces members were seconded to so-called karya or functional positions within the civil service and government enterprises. Many commands and units had substantial commercial interests. Large numbers of armed forces officers were uniformed lawyers, politicians and bureaucrats. The armed forces were as much a political organisation as a military force.

“Total People’s Resistance” during the New Order

Nasution’s revamping of territorial commands into a highly pervasive shadow administration was extended to the grassroots level of society. A new level, the Village Non-Commissioned Officer or Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa) was added to the territorial structures. This was intended to extend the army’s intelligence gathering and societal control capabilities right down to the village level. This initiative accorded with Nasution’s concern about ensuring the loyalty (or at least obedience) of “traditional” administrative structures in the struggle against the Dutch and was in line with the New Order regime’s attempts to quarantine villagers from the influence of the parties.
Territorial Commanders and Assistance to Golkar

Now that the army was clearly an integral part of the government, it intensified the political support it gave to the regime’s election machine. During the New Order, territorial commanders became increasingly involved in suppressing opposition to the regime and mobilising support for Golkar at election time. Until the end of the Suharto regime the army continued to place a great deal of emphasis on preparing officers for such “socio-political” tasks, and to accord rapid promotion to officers who demonstrated outstanding “socio-political” skills.

Integralism Rediscovered

The regime also began to resurrect organicist political theory in support of its repressive agenda. Earlier in this chapter I noted that in Supomo’s May 1945 speech to the BPUPKI he had advocated an integralistic state in which “… all groups, all components, all of its members are closely linked to each other and constitute a unified societal entity that is organic. 51 The term had been largely forgotten until the 1980s when the New Order began an attempt to repopularise the concept. 52

The integralistic state concept gave rise to considerable debate and opposition by Indonesians who were concerned that this was a final step by the regime in formally removing all political rights and the rule of law. With hindsight, the integralistic state concept was the last initiative by the New Order to further its organicist and corporatist objectives. The debate persisted right up to the time when the New Order regime fell in 1998 in the midst of the Asian economic crisis.

The Demise of the New Order

President Suharto had appeared to lose his touch in dealing with social and economic problems. Corruption, which had become established during the Sukarno years, was widely and even

52 “Few Indonesians had heard of ‘integralist’ theory at the time. It came from a speech by Professor Supomo, a customary law expert, who in the Japanese-sponsored constitutional deliberations of 1945 had outlined his vision of a state in which harmony, mutuality and reciprocity prevailed between rulers and ruled. According to the integralist theory of the state, which Supomo associated with the thinking of Spinoza, Hegel and the 19th century German romantic Adam Muller – but which he stressed was also inherent in Indonesia’s “traditional constitutional order” – all groups in society formed an organic unity. In a state based on integralistic principles, Supomo argued, there would be no need for any political rights, separation of powers or indeed any distinction between state and society.” Bourchier, Op. Cit., p. 2.
flamboyantly practised at all levels of the regime, from the first family down.

For much of the regime’s tenure the economy had performed well and although much of the benefits had been garnered by the Jakarta elites, enough trickled down through society to give the New Order a degree of performance legitimacy. This soon came to an end as the economy nosedived and Suharto faced mounting criticism that culminated in widespread civil unrest, riots, and killings of demonstrators by the army. His resignation ushered in a new period of reform or reformasi in which pent-up demands for democracy began to be implemented.

Reformasi

After the fall of Suharto, the army leadership attempted to show that it was in tune with the subsequent reform or reformasi era, stating that they would no longer attempt to “occupy” but to “influence”, and would avoid direct involvement in “practical political activities.” 53 For example, officers assigned to karya appointments were given the option of resigning from government service or seeking a change of status. After the 1999 general elections the armed forces parliamentary group or fraksi of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) was reduced from 75 to 38 members and the allocation of parliamentary seats to TNI members was discontinued after the 2004 general elections.

The reformasi period was at first marked by the instability of the erratic and eccentric President Habibie (1998-1999) and then Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), although some profound changes were initiated, including amendments to the 1945 Constitution that transferred greater power from the Presidency to the legislatures and legislation conferring greater autonomy upon the regions. A degree of stability has been achieved with the advent to the Presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri, a daughter of the late President Sukarno. However, the regime and the secular basis of the state were attacked by the Jemaah Islamiah terrorist group and, as will be discussed later, after its initial show of support for reformasi, the army has begun to dig in its heels against internal reforms and the Megawati government was disinclined to force the issue. In late 2004, a former Lieutenant-General, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was elected President. At the time of writing this thesis it was too early to attempt to assess how he would relate to the military.

Golkar and Corporatism in Post-Suharto Indonesia

The army did not maintain its links with Golkar after Suharto’s fall. In a new doctrine entitled *Paradigma Baru* (New Paradigm – October 1998) the army pledged that it would no longer take part in practical politics. This entailed severing its former association with Golkar. For its part, Golkar moved quickly to sever its links with both the bureaucracy and the armed forces. It relinquished its former claim to special status as an association of functional groups and registered as a political party. Golkar shook off a surprising amount of the opprobrium that surrounded it at the end of the Suharto period by coming second to Megawati’s PDI-P party in the general elections held in 1999 and gaining more votes than any other party (but not a parliamentary majority) in the 2004 parliamentary elections. The network of corporatist institutions developed during the New Order also lost their special status as state-sanctioned functional groups, and civil society has grown in strength in the post-Suharto period. 54

“Total People’s Resistance” in Post-Suharto Indonesia

While organicism and corporatism have distinctly fallen out of fashion in post-New Order Indonesia, “total people’s resistance” has not. After the resignation of President Suharto, a few apparently reform-minded senior officers who opposed the interventionist role of the army (of whom the most prominent and vocal was the late Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah) urged that the territorial system be dismantled and that the army focus its attention on more conventional forms of external defence. A more conservative officer, the Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, argued for a phased reduction in the commands.

The army moved slowly in making changes (certain lower level territorial appointments, notably the presence of non-commissioned officers at the village level, were abolished). Responsibility for internal security was transferred to the Police Force, which had been a branch of the Armed Forces, and the Police Force civilianised. The lack of an internal security role (apart from a residual responsibility to support the Police in carrying out these duties) was a particular blow to the proponents of the territorial command system.

54 As *The Economist* points out: “… trade unions, NGOs and other pressure groups … have proliferated throughout the country.” “Survey: Indonesia - Time to Deliver”, *The Economist*, 9 December 2004.
The army did some policy work on converting the New-Order period Sishankamrata (Total People’s Defence and Security System) doctrines to Sishanrata (Total People’s Defence System), in recognition of the new policies that gave primary responsibility for internal security to the State Police. However, regional conflicts and the situation in the northern-most province of Aceh in particular not only provided a rationale for reform in this area to be quietly “put on the backburner” but actually led to the creation of a new Military Area Command (Komando Daerah Militer – Kodam) 55 in the rebellious province of Aceh in early 2002.

Before his untimely death, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah was sidelined and subjected to considerable pressure (although this was not solely as a result of his anti-territorial stance) 56 and the army leadership has strongly and frequently defended the territorial structures and territorial management role as being indispensable in maintaining national unity. 57

The army’s territorial structures retain the potential to be used as powerful instruments of social control that cannot readily be reconciled with democratic processes. In my research into the origins of these structures and doctrines I have identified a number of factors that have made them unusual and significantly increased their potential to be used as means of intervening in politics.

55 As will be discussed in Chapter Ten, The Kodam is the most senior level of the army’s network of territorial commands that Nasution developed during the struggle against the Dutch. Nasution formed the Kodam level of command in the late 1950s when he sought to exert greater central control over his regional commanders, more effectively shadow the civil service, and monitor and control the activities of the PKI.

56 After the resignation of President Suharto, General Agus Wirahadikusumah was a prominent advocate for dismantling territorial command structures and ending such practices as seconding military officers to appointments in the bureaucracy. He was seen by many senior officers to be closely aligned to President Abdurrahman Wahid in his efforts to place the army on a more professional footing. His unpopularity in such circles increased when he disclosed corrupt practices in army businesses and foundations and reached a peak in late 2000 when the then Army Chief of Staff, General Tyasno Sudarto, convened a meeting of senior officers to oppose what they suspected was a plan by President Abdurrahman Wahid to promote Agus to Chief of Army Staff when Tyasno’s term expired. The leading news magazine Tempo used the term “Threatened Coup d’Etat” on the cover of its 9-15 October 2000 issue. In the end, the President did not promote Agus but the incident was an indication of the army leadership’s growing concern about reform to the army, including its territorial structures, and its intention to protect what it saw as the army’s corporate interests.

This Chapter and the Remainder of the Thesis

The background survey offered in this chapter is essential for understanding the extent to which the armed forces nurtured, developed and implemented corporatist socio-political structures and their associated integralist (or “organicist”) doctrines. While these developments reached maturity in the New Order period after Nasution had been forced to the margins (indeed, into opposition), it was he, more than any other leader, including even Sukarno, who articulated, fostered and persevered in bringing these conservative ideas, institutions and practices to the centre of an otherwise polyvalent Indonesian polity. His personal political socialization, his intimate connections through marriage (rather than personal origins) to the pamong praja social elite, his experience and career as a soldier, and his ability to synthesise, then articulate his ideals placed him in a singular and central role in the growth of military-sponsored corporatism in Indonesia.

Exactly how that came about will be examined in detail in later chapters. The broader historical context has been established here, so I can now turn to a discussion of the existing literature, including its lacunae, and to the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of my research. Chapter Two will discuss literature and methods, and Chapter Three theory.
The Origins of the Thesis

The origins of this thesis can be traced to the period 1969 - 1972 when I was a member of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) staff at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and to my subsequent involvement in intelligence duties in the ADF. My posting to Jakarta coincided with a strengthening of the army’s commitment to territorial warfare / “total people’s resistance” and I continued to observe developments in this area during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time I saw the Indonesian Army’s commitment to its concepts of “total people’s resistance” as the main point of difference between it and Western forces, such as the ADF. I acquired a small library on the history of the Indonesian revolution and traced the emergence of these doctrines.

My interest in this subject and the political situation in 1950s Indonesia was renewed in the early-to-mid 1990s when I led a group of simultaneous interpreters at a conference on Indonesian democracy in the 1950s and 1990s. I researched the history of corporatism and the functional group movement in Indonesia with a view to writing a thesis on this topic. At the time, Golkar, the New Order regime’s parliamentary and election vehicle that had been founded in 1964 to represent army-sponsored corporatist bodies, was the dominant political organisation in Indonesia. The New Order regime tightly restricted channels of interest representation to state-sanctioned corporatist bodies.

I gradually shifted my focus as I became aware of the important role the Indonesian Army’s territorial warfare/”total people’s resistance” apparatus had played in forming and managing functional groups during the Sukarno years. I also became aware of the impact of this apparatus and these strategies on other aspects of military intervention in Indonesia, and noticed that there was a paucity of research into this subject. I read a number of Nasution’s publications and became aware of the importance he placed on these strategies.

I became particularly interested in Nasution. I concluded that he was one of the most influential figures in Indonesian political history and arguably the most significant figure in Indonesian military history. His ideas for a limited but powerful political role for the army ushered in the *Dwi Fungsi* doctrine of the New Order period that was the backbone of the regime. His ideas on army-led “people’s war” and the structure of territorial commands that he introduced and institutionalised were an important and probably indispensable part of *Dwi Fungsi*. As mentioned earlier, unlike some other aspects of the New Order, the territorial commands and vestiges of territorial management continue to exist in Indonesia.

I concluded that there was a need for a better and more complete understanding of how these legacies of Nasution emerged, what their political underpinnings were, how they were transformed into a means of military intervention in politics, the economy and society, and the
political thinking that was carried with them and reinforced during this process of transformation.

My interest was further aroused when I became Head of the Indonesian Department at the ADF School of Languages. My duties entailed liaison with TNI officers and visits to the Indonesian Department of Defence Language Institute in Jakarta. After leaving the School in 2000 I conducted interpreter training for this Institute on two occasions. Students were officers from the army, navy and air force as well as civilians from the Department of Defence. I was able to absorb the atmosphere of a TNI-run school and become close to some of the students and staff. Discussions with army officers in particular deepened my awareness of the continuing importance of people’s resistance doctrines in Indonesia.

Over time I became familiar with a number of features of territorial warfare / “total people’s resistance” in Indonesia that have made it a formidable form of military intervention. Some are widely known, such as the revolutionary origins of these strategies and the Indonesian Army’s use of its territorial commands to intervene in political and economic affairs and industrial relations.

I concluded that it was most significant that the concepts of territorial warfare / “total people’s resistance” that emerged during the armed struggle against the Dutch were firmly focused on the army, the pamong praja and “traditional” village administrations. Unlike the situation in China or Yugoslavia, the Indonesian Army was not bound to a particular ideology or political movement, apart from the somewhat obscure Pancasila formulation. Moreover, the army was not politically or ideologically tied to any of the civilian leaders or parties of the day, and (apart from a largely unsuccessful initiative by the Defence Minister in 1946) there were no political commissars in its ranks.

I also concluded that it was durably significant that the strategies for “total people’s resistance” that Nasution developed were applied against the Dutch in the absence of the civilian political leadership. When the Dutch attacked the Republican capital of Yogyakarta in December 1948 (which the Dutch described as a “police action”) President Sukarno and other members of the cabinet elected not to resist capture. However, the army leaders resisted capture and fought a campaign of “total people’s resistance” until a cease-fire was arranged in May 1949.

I also noticed that Nasution had sought to idealise his strategies for “total people’s resistance” in publications that he began to write in the early 1950s. Salim Said \(^1\) argues – correctly in my view - that the 1945 generation of army officers came to regard the period of military administration,  

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\(^1\) Salim Said is a well-known commentator on civil-military relations in Indonesia. His articles appear in the weekly Tempo magazine and in publications on art and culture. He is particularly known for his PhD thesis on the influence of General Sudirman on civil-military relations during the armed struggle against the Dutch that was published under the title: Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, North Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992.
when they administered their regions with complete autonomy from the civil leadership of the Republic and in partnership with the pamong praja and village administrations, as an example of "... an ideal-typical model of how government should be conducted, which has been a powerful influence on their behaviour ever since." I concluded that Nasution’s publications played a significant role in this process.

I became interested in David Bourchier’s “instrumentalist approach” in attributing “… a Dutch or Dutch-influenced legal education,” rather than Javanese cultural traditions, as the main source of Supomo’s ideas and of organicist thinking in Indonesia, particularly as he applied it to Nasution:

Taking an instrumentalist approach … helps explain the attraction of organicist formulas to pragmatic politicians like (the north Sumatran) Gen. A.H. Nasution, a keen builder of corporatist institutions from 1957 …

Drawing upon the advice of the “Dutch-influenced” constitutional law expert, Professor Djokosutono, Nasution undoubtedly adopted an instrumental approach in supporting corporatist thinking in the 1950s (achieving functional group status for the armed forces and developing the BKS initiative). However, my research was indicating that Nasution’s focus on the army, and to a lesser extent on organic pangreh / pamong praja administrative structures, accorded closely with his own socially conservative attitudes, and that there was also little doubt that he was influenced at a deeper level by the thinking of members of the pre-war Javanese administrative class who shared many of the cultural and political views that Professor Supomo voiced in the BPUPKI discussions of 1945.

This is not to say that Nasution was attracted to particularly Javanese organic values. Nasution was an ethnic Batak from North Sumatra. While he was advised by Djokosutono and associated very closely with conservative members of the Javanese elites, I concluded that he saw the organic “traditional” values and authority structures that he extolled as Indonesian, rather than particularly Javanese.

I was interested to note the attention David Bourchier gave to the ostensibly non-political Nasution’s very close interaction with conservative pangreh praja aristocratic circles when he studied in the West Java city of Bandung in the 1930s, and married into the prominent Gondokusumo family. His new father-in-law, Soenarjo Gondokusumo, was a leading light in the Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya - Greater Indonesia Party), whose leadership was heavily comprised of aristocratic Javanese. While being favourably disposed towards Japan, Parindra was prepared to cooperate with the Dutch while working towards "such moderate goals as a full Indonesian legislature".

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2 Ibid., p. 3.
4 As Anthony Reid puts it, in the late colonial period Parindra was a cooperating party [with the
Nasution came from a relatively humble background. He had been a teacher before becoming one of a handful of Indonesian officers in the KNIL in 1941. He deserted the KNIL after his unit was routed by the Japanese in East Java and made his way back to Bandung, where Soenarjo persuaded the Japanese not to treat him as a prisoner of war like other KNIL officers. He spent the rest of the occupation in the Bandung area.

Bourchier recounts fragmentary evidence that Nasution’s father-in-law had a strong political influence on Nasution in the pre-war period and during the occupation. He also notes that Nasution became active and soon occupied senior positions within Japanese militia organizations. In 1943 the Japanese established a large light infantry force that was known as Peta (Pembela Tanah Air – Defenders of the Homeland) which was to be the main source of officers for the Indonesian Army. Nasution refrained from joining this force, although he was connected to it through his work for the Japanese authorities.

Bourchier seeks to redress a lack of attention to organicist and corporatist influences the Japanese brought to Indonesia, devoting a chapter of Lineages of Organicist Political Thought to this topic. He describes the recruitment by the Japanese of Indonesian writers, such as Sanusi Pane, who sought explicitly to propagate organicist ideas that emanated from Japan. Bourchier also threads together accounts of Nasution’s association in the 1950s with pro-organicist thinkers, and with Djokosutono in particular. He discusses Nasution’s IPKI party’s affiliation with pamong praja interests:

When Nasution and a group of fellow officers formed IPKI in 1954, it was perhaps not surprising that he saw natural allies in the pamong praja, the Javanese aristocracy and the most conservative nationalist parties such as the PIR. [Persatuan Indonesia Raya - Greater Indonesian Union] While most of the leaders of the party were military men – either retired or decommissioned for having participated in the 17 October 1952 events – it also found a constituency among the royal families of Yogyakarta and several pamong praja families in West Java. Bourchier mentions Nasution’s strategies for “total people’s resistance” (he refers to Japanese occupation influences) but does not discuss them at any length.

I found further information on Nasution’s political socialisation from the 1920s to the 1950s and particularly his links with pamong praja-associated circles. I became interested in how Nasution’s political socialisation might have influenced his strategies for “total people’s resistance” and then impacted on Indonesian politics as these strategies were transformed into means of military intervention.


6 Ibid., pp. 118, 119.
7 Ibid., p. 118.
I found that Nasution clearly shared with conservative members of the *pamong praja* a concern for social stability in rural areas and that this greatly influenced his strategies for total resistance. In this respect, Nasution shared with the leaders of fascist movements in the 20th Century a deep concern about the possibility of chaotic change and even a communist revolution, while the conservative elites had interests in common with what Robert Paxton describes as the “possessing classes” of countries such as Germany and Italy, who accepted fascism into power “from above”. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, Nasution was not a fascist. Moreover, the “Guided Democracy” that his ideas did so much to create was not a fascist state, and the *pamong praja* were not “possessing classes” to anything like the same degree as the landholders and industrialists of Europe. Nevertheless, I found that a concern to protect entrenched privilege through maintenance of the social order was a striking element of his strategies.

He made detailed provision for "totalitarian" guerrilla governments backed by what he saw as traditional administrative structures (the villages – *kelurahan* - and *pamong praja* officials at the *kecamatan* (sub-district) level. Later, he idealised the support given by traditional sources of village authority in *Principles of Guerrilla Warfare* (published in the 1950s).

In his concern to maintain the “traditional” status quo Nasution’s strategies were diametrically opposite to people’s warfare strategies adopted by Communist movements such as Mao Tse Tung’s forces in China and the armed forces aligned to Ho Chi Minh’s Communist Party in Vietnam, where the armed forces were clearly subordinate to a parent political party. Moreover, whereas the leaders of these Communist movements had been concerned with overturning traditional social and political orders and values, Nasution’s planning for guerrilla warfare against the Dutch in the 1940s had sought the active assistance of "traditional" and "indigenous" leaders and he affirmed this stance in his many publications from the early 1950s. Moreover, both rhetorically and in their political strategies, Mao and Ho worked to mobilise the “class struggle” of poorer villagers (under Party direction) against wealthy peasants, landlords and traditional authority figures in rural areas. Nothing could be further from Nasution’s orientation.

Although my research led me to conclude that the strategies Nasution developed during the armed struggle against the Dutch were highly compatible with the organicist thinking espoused by Professor Supomo in 1945, I could find no evidence that Nasution was directly influenced by these debates. Indeed, he may not have been aware of them. Nor is there any evidence that he was unduly influenced by Japanese efforts to propagandise organicist political theory.

In later life Nasution frequently stated that the only ideology that he, as a soldier, subscribed to was the *Pancasila*. The attraction of *Pancasila* to the majority of Indonesians who oppose the idea of

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9 See, for example, Nasution’s Strategic Order No. 1 of 1948, *Perintah Siasat No: 1 Panglima Besar TNI*, Seskoad, Jakarta, Citra Lamtoro Gong Persada, 1981.
Indonesia becoming an Islamic state is that it is well meaning and vague. Different groups have used it over the years for their own purposes. For example, moderate Muslims have used it to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their more radical co-religionists and many Christians have used it to stress that Indonesia is essentially a secular state in which religious minorities have equal status. Similarly, members of ethnic minorities, such as Nasution, who were attracted to the metropolitan political culture of Jakarta have seen the Pancasila as an inclusivist formulation that accorded them the same rights as the numerically predominant Javanese.

Dwight King has argued that Pancasila is not even a rudimentary ideology given "... its original instrumental character (a compromise establishing limits on parties), lack of logical consistency (one, supreme God versus democracy), and lack of future orientation." and could perhaps best be described as an "anti-ideology". I concluded that Nasution used the Pancasila to cloak a political orientation that favoured what he saw as organic “traditional” formulas that applied throughout Indonesia and opposed “imported” values such as individual rights, freedom of association and the open contestation of ideas.

Nasution’s approach to military intervention was to use the precedent the army had set in leading “total people’s resistance” in the latter stages of the revolution to claim a leading position for the army within an organic society that was based on “traditional” values. At its heart, this approach to military intervention was aimed at preserving the indigenous social order that prevailed in the later colonial period that was under challenge from a number of quarters, not the least of which was the Communist Party.

My research showed that Nasution was deeply influenced by the cultural and political environment in which he found himself in Bandung in the 1930s and 1940s, by pamong praja-associated individuals with whom he associated in the people’s resistance campaign against the Dutch, and by similar pamong praja-associated political circles in the 1950s. I found that these associates of Nasution shared Supomo’s concern to preserve “traditional” values and authority structures and his distrust for individualism and the open contestation of ideas.

I realised that there were two important strands of military intervention that had emerged from Nasution’s embrace of organicist thinking and his transformation of his strategies for “total people’s resistance” into means of military intervention in politics and the economy in the 1950s. The first of these was his appropriation of corporatist thinking in the form of the BKS initiative, and the second was the inclusion of organicist precepts within the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

“Total People’s Resistance”, Organicist Thinking and This Thesis

I shall not further explore the origins and development of organicist thought in Indonesia in this thesis. Rather, I shall focus on the extent to which Nasution’s ideas reflected the cultural and political environment in which he found himself in the 1930s and 1940s, the thinking of pamong praja-associated individuals during the struggle against the Dutch, and that of conservative pamong praja-associated individuals in the 1950s. Rather than high organicist theory, I am interested in the origins of Nasution’s concern to preserve “traditional” values and authority structures and his distrust for individualism and the open contestation of ideas that he shared with his socially conservative associates.

I shall show that Nasution was not just a passive recipient of organicist theory. Rather, he had something of his own to contribute in the form of his “total people’s resistance” concepts. Nor shall I argue that the ascendance of organicism and corporatism, operating hand in glove with “total people’s resistance”, was an inevitable process. A large number of events and influences in Indonesian history over a sixty-year period could be cited to (at least in part) account for the rise of organicism and corporatism and the association of these concepts with the army’s strategies for “total people’s resistance”.  

In explaining the processes and events whereby Nasution’s concepts of people’s resistance became associated with organicist thinking and corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in particular, I shall draw upon Weber’s concept of elective affinity. My research will show Nasution groping and feeling his way towards a particular formula that (wittingly or otherwise) was to be his legacy to the New Order regime: the transformation of

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11 They include the privileged role accorded to traditional pangreh praja interests by the Dutch; the influence of the Leiden school on Indonesia’s first generation of lawyers, including the adat specialist Supomo; the rise of Sukarno, whose eclectic political orientation include collectivism; Nasution’s close contact with aristocratic circles in pre-war Bandung and his rise to prominence during the armed struggle against the Dutch; the particular events that led to the army concentrating on guerrilla warfare; military administration in 1949; political instability and economic malaise in the 1950s; Nasution’s and Sukarno’s disillusionment with liberal democracy; Sukarno’s increasing dominance of the political scene; and Nasution’s dogged if sometimes uncertain advocacy of conservative values that he considered important. If any one of these events or influences had been absent or altered the outcomes for organicism and “total people’s resistance” in Indonesia may well have been different.

12 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Unwin University Books, translated by Talcott Parsons, 1930, Max Weber sought to explain the emergence of modern capitalism in 17th Century England by drawing attention to what he described as an elective affinity between Protestant teachings and ethics (particularly those associated with Calvinism) and the capitalist mentality that was emerging at this time. The term elective affinity has its origins in alchemistry and had previously been used by Goethe in a novel (The Elective Affinities) that was first published in 1809. For a discussion of the history of the concept and an analysis of the ways in which Weber used this term see Richard Howe, “Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology within the Bounds of Pure Reason” in The American Journal of Sociology, Volume 84, Number 1, July 1978, pp. 366-385.
concepts that stemmed from his strategies for “total people’s resistance” and certain organic “traditional” values and authority structures into powerful and pervasive means of military intervention. This particular style of military intervention was intended to safeguard the social order against disturbance wrought by “imported” values and ideologies. It was presented in the name of national unity and under the banner of the helpfully obscure *Pancasila* formulation.

**Geographic and Temporal Boundaries**

This thesis covers the period from 1918 (the year of Nasution’s birth) until the early 1960s when his influence within the army and the wider world of politics suddenly waned. I shall focus on his young adulthood (the 1930s and the Japanese occupation period from 1942 – 1945), his involvement in the struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949), and the period in the 1950s when he began to idealise his total people’s strategies and transform them into means of military intervention.

The geographical focus of the thesis is the island of Java. This is because Nasution spent his most important formative years there, it was there that he was involved in the armed struggle, and it was in the capital of Jakarta that he accumulated and then lost political power in the 1950s and early 1960s.

**Approach to the Thesis**

The approach that I have adopted is focused political biography. By “focused” I mean that the scope of the thesis is necessarily selective. My aim in adopting this approach is to identify considerations other than instrumental ones that motivated Nasution to infuse elements of organicist thinking (reliance upon organic “traditional” authority structures) into his principles of “people’s war” in the 1940s, to embrace and associate with people’s resistance corporatist / functional forms of interest representation in the 1950s, and to transform these principles into a means of intervening in politics, the economy and society that embodied elements of organicist thinking.

As will be discussed later in this Chapter, other biographers have examined Nasution’s life over a longer period of time and have explored the influence on Nasution’s life of a large number of individuals and events. In this thesis I have concentrated on the influence of the Gondokusumo family and other people with a high Javanese *priyayi* background on Nasution’s political socialization during the 1940s and early 1950s.

As discussed in Chapter One, in the 1950s Nasution allied himself with “… the *pamong praja*, the Javanese aristocracy and the most conservative nationalist parties such as the PIR. [*Persatuan Indonesia Raya - Greater Indonesian Union*] and “the royal families of Yogyakarta and
several pamong praja families in West Java.” Nasution’s acquaintance with such figures began when he became involved with the Gondokusumo family and further developed during the “people’s resistance” campaigns of the armed struggle against the Dutch and particularly that of 1949.

The PIR’s platform mirrored important aspects of Professor Supomo’s 1945 speech to the BPUPKI. The PIR was paternalistic and integralistic in that it feared that without firm guidance from traditional authority figures the uneducated masses would easily be manipulated by political “demagogues” to vote against their own real and enduring interests.

That is why I have drawn attention to those with whom Nasution was closely associated during the highly formative years of his life and have identified and will focus upon particular points of similarity between their political views and the political thinking that underpinned the principles of people’s resistance Nasution developed during the 1940s.

I have identified a number of points of similarity between organicist elements within Nasution’s people’s resistance strategies and the views held by many people from this background. They include a desire to achieve independence from the Dutch while maintaining a high regard for traditional authority structures, a concern to uphold the sort of social stability that prevailed during the later period of colonial rule, and a fear that this social stability might be jeopardized (to the detriment of traditional authority figures) by the intense and sometimes radical political activity that erupted in the mid-1940s.

I have explored the continuing relationship between individuals who held PIR-type views and were associated with Nasution during the “people’s resistance” campaign of 1949, and their alliances with Nasution when he transformed these strategies into a means of military intervention into politics, economy and society in the 1950s. I have identified, in particular, the infusion of organicist thinking into the “people’s resistance” based Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, the management of an important aspect of Nasution’s embrace of corporatist / functional modes of interest representation (the BKS initiative) by his Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, and his association of the BKS initiative with his people’s resistance strategies.

In adopting this focused approach I realized there were advantages and disadvantages in focusing on one aspect of Nasution’s life. On the positive side, I believed Nasution’s “total people’s resistance” strategies and their associated territorial command structures were his most enduring legacies and I felt that such an approach would permit greater attention to be paid to this particular aspect of Nasution’s life and career. Nevertheless, I recognised that such a concentration could

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create a “tunnel vision” effect with the result that other important influences and events were brushed over or not mentioned at all. Moreover, focusing on these aspects of his life could have a distorting effect that could make it seem that events being described were somehow inevitable and just waiting to unfold.

I came to the conclusion that there was more to be gained than lost in associating the processes through which Nasution developed people’s resistance strategies and then transformed them into means of military intervention with his life experiences, political socialization, and the political orientation he arrived at later in life.

Departures from Previous Research

In associating Nasution’s evolving political orientation with an increasing attachment to these organic structures and values, and with his infusion of these values into his “total people’s resistance” strategies, my approach differs markedly from previous research. In particular, no other researcher has adopted the approach of tracing the evolution of these people’s resistance strategies into means of military intervention in politics, the economy and society, or identified the important elements of organicist thinking that underpinned them. Similarly, my approach of focusing on Nasution’s personal and family life, which provides particular insights into his political behaviour, differs markedly from those of other researchers.

Nasution’s Family and Personal Life

By Nasution’s family life I am referring principally to his “absorption” into the family of his wife, Johanna Sunarti Gondokusumo, from the time he was a KNIL cadet in Bandung in 1941. As I shall show in Chapter Four, for many years before this he had led a somewhat monastic existence, living in a succession of dormitory-type accommodation arrangements while he studied to be a teacher or worked in that profession away from his family in North Sumatra.

The Gondokusumo obviously made a major impression on him. They were warm, welcoming, aristocratic, wealthy and urbane. His eventual father-in-law, R.P. Soenarjo Gondokusumo, was a Dutch-educated political activist within the aristocratically led Parindra political movement. Soenarjo’s wife was a Dutch national who was also involved in the Indonesian nationalist cause. My research shows that Soenarjo not only took the young man under his wing but regarded him as a son and politically mentored him.

Nasution and Sunarti had a long, happy and close marriage. He was known to be puritanically monogamous and both opposed the ostentatious promiscuity of President Sukarno in the 1950s. He continued to be close to his wife’s family throughout his life and had a particular attachment for the West Java highlands city of Bandung where he met Sunarti and spent much of his youth.
By Nasution’s personal life, I am referring to the wider milieu to which Soenarjo introduced Nasution, and the *priyayi* figures he met when he was developing his “people’s war” strategies in the 1940s and developing them into means of military intervention that were linked with organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation and values in the 1950s. I have been concerned to identify and trace relations between Nasution and individuals from the Javanese aristocracy who held socially conservative views during this period.

An important point that I make in relation to Nasution’s adopted family and circle of acquaintances, and one that distinguishes this thesis from earlier research, is that they were cooperating nationalists and that by the early 1940s Nasution also held cooperating nationalist views. This group of nationalists has often been overlooked because the “non-cooperating nationalists” (epitomised by Sukarno and Hatta) came to power in the mid-1940s and largely swept them aside, as Jamie Mackie observes:

> Although much has been written about Indonesian nationalism during recent years, little attention has been paid to the group of so-called ‘cooperating nationalists’ or their efforts to extract concessions from the Dutch in the last years before the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941. This is hardly surprising, since they were not only unsuccessful at that time, but were also, for the most part, swept aside by the tide of events which brought the exiled non-cooperators, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others, to the centre of the stage. 15

Whether or not to cooperate with the Dutch was a fundamental question for nationalists during the later years of the colonial period. As Mackie writes, most of the cooperating nationalists were swept aside in the tide of events that were set in train by the Japanese invasion of the Indies. Had there been an orderly and gradual transfer of power, such as in the British colonies of Malaysia and India, the outcome might have been different.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, Nasution was as much a political figure as a military leader. It is therefore important that I make this point and place Nasution within one of the two major political categories of the late colonial period.

While there were differences in political outlook within the cooperating nationalist group and it would be unfair to describe most of them as mere stooges of the Dutch, it is fair to say that many in this group desired an orderly and gradual change in constitutional arrangements that would not threaten their own position in society or adversely impact on what they saw as the real welfare of the uneducated masses. Many of the conservative cooperating nationalists with whom Nasution was associated, including the Parindra leaders, had positive feelings towards Japan in the 1930s and cooperated closely with the Japanese during the occupation. They tended to have in common a desire to maintain the social status quo and some, like Supomo, sought to

draw upon paternalistic *kekeluargaan* organic structures in proposing constitutional arrangements for an independent Indonesia.

Like Nasution, many people from such backgrounds became dismayed by the tide of political activity – some of it from the political left - that swept through Indonesia after the proclamation of independence and gathered force again in the 1950s. The anxiety among the more paternalistic former cooperating nationalists heightened when their main party, the PIR, failed dismally in the 1955 general elections. I shall argue that the resumption of interest in organic “traditional” forms of interest representation that occurred in the middle of that decade, Nasution’s attraction to them, and his association of these forms of interest representation with his principles of army-led “people’s resistance” took place within this political context.

**Accessing Nasution and Sunarti**

I did not have the opportunity to interview Nasution, who was ill when I conducted research in Jakarta in the mid 1990s (he died in 2000). I have therefore been forced to rely to a considerable extent upon Nasution’s prolific accounts of his life and career, and those of his widow and other close associates.

Cribb warns about the problematic nature of Nasution’s many publications for those attempting to research his life and career:

> He was a prodigiously voluminous author, and he writes with unusual clarity, articulateness and plausibility. His topics are military, or military-political, and as one of Indonesia’s foremost soldiers for over two decades he features extensively in his own works. Although his tone is by no means modest, he refrains on the whole from exaggerating his own role in events, and indeed often portrays himself as having been a victim, outmanoeuvred and frustrated by the action of others. A corollary of this latter tendency, however, is that the Nasution world often seems to be inhabited by fools, knaves and those who agreed with Nasution, three mutually exclusive categories. In particular, he credits himself with insights and understandings which he appears to have developed only in hindsight. As a historian of his own ideas, therefore, he is distinctly unreliable. 16

While I agree with Cribb that Nasution was very concerned to burnish his own image, I have found that his later publications are sometimes disarmingly honest and revealing of his insecurities and perceptions of his own inadequacies.

In keeping with my aim of exploring the influence of particular individuals and events on the evolution of Nasution’s political orientation, I relied heavily on the most personal of his publications, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, and the first four volumes in particular. Perhaps because they deal with his youth and young adulthood, they are much more anecdotal than his earlier publications (and even the later volumes of *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*). While Nasution is

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reticent about his political socialisation and orientation, they nevertheless provide valuable insights into his formative years.

A body of information that was not available to previous researchers is Sunarti’s recently published account of her life with Nasution (Pak Nas dalam Kenangan) \(^{17}\) that she wrote with the assistance of two “ghost writers”, Ramadhan K.H. and Sugiastra Sirebawa. \(^{18}\) These “ghost writers” drew heavily on Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas and it was fairly easy to identify where they had assisted Sunarti and where the content was her own.

Allowing for the vagaries of hindsight and a desire to present Nasution and her family in a favourable light, these parts of the book were very useful and often unlike anything Nasution himself wrote. They describe her feelings for Nasution through revealing personal anecdotes of their early life together. She recounts the hardships they shared during the guerrilla struggle, including a harrowing account of a miscarriage she suffered when the Dutch attacked Indonesian forces in 1947 and the pain she endured as they sought shelter in a series of rural villages while Nasution led his guerrilla forces.

She reveals how close the relationship was between Nasution and her father, providing information that has only been speculated about in the past. It is from this account that I gained a much more complete picture of the very close familial relationship that developed between these two men.

**The Depoliticisation of “People’s War”**

The scholar whose approach is closest to mine is Robert Cribb, whose more recent publications (which appeared after I had determined on the line of argument I have pursued in this thesis) provide valuable insights into Nasution’s motivations in depoliticising “people’s war” and his reliance on “traditional” authority structures. Cribb comments insightfully that Nasution’s “…principal contribution to the theory of guerrilla warfare … was his technique for depoliticising it …” and that Nasution was concerned to depoliticise the army and prevent it from becoming a genuine “people’s army” along the lines advocated by people’s warfare strategists such as Vietnam’s General Giap. \(^{19}\)

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\(^{18}\) Ramadhan K.H. has the unfortunate distinction of being one of the two “ghost writers” of the remarkably hagiographic autobiography of former President Suharto (*Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya – Soeharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds*). *Pak Nas dalam Kenangan* was published by the TNI Centre for History and Tradition, giving rise to further suspicions of hagiography.

\(^{19}\) Cribb, 2001 *Op. Cit.*, p. 146. Another publication by Cribb where the lines of argument are similar to those I have developed in this thesis is: “From Total People’s Defence to Massacre: Explaining Military Violence in East Timor” in F. Colombijn and J.T. Lindblad (eds.), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, Leiden, KITVL Press, 2002, pp. 227 – 242
Cribb also argues that “Nasution’s remarks [made in early-to-mid 1950s in his Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, an encapsulation of his principles of guerrilla war and his interpretation of the war against the Dutch] about the organic relationship between the guerrilla and society were thus not made just for the sake of developing guerrilla strategies but also to claim for the army a direct relationship with the people, independent of the republican state, and so to establish a platform and justification for army involvement in politics.”

Like Cribb, I am interested in the values implied within Nasution’s “total people’s resistance” strategies. Where my approach differs most from Cribb’s is in my concern to identify how Nasution arrived at those values and to determine how the principles of “people’s war” that he developed were transformed into a means of military intervention in politics, society and the economy in the 1950s and early 1960s.

In particular, I have identified an association between “people’s war” and organicist thinking in Indonesia based on Nasution’s elective affinity between these two concepts. I have identified how Nasution translated his idealisation of depoliticised principles of “people’s war” that lauded an organic relationship between the army and traditional authority figures into a highly unusual form of military intervention in politics, economy and society. I have traced his use of these idealised principles (and their associated army apparatus) to support organic corporatist / functional forms of interest representation in the form of the BKS initiative of the mid-to-late 1950s. I have also traced the infusion of elements of organicist thinking of the type espoused by Supomo in 1945 and the paternalistic parties of the right (such as the PIR) within the codified version of Nasution’s idealised principles of army-led “people’s war”, the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

Earlier I remarked that in seeking to identify important elements of Nasution’s political socialisation and the influence of his family life in particular, I have traced the impact of Nasution’s emerging political orientation on the strategies for “people’s warfare” he developed in the 1940s, and their reliance upon organic “traditional” authority structures and values. I have also been concerned to identify and trace Nasution’s transformation of his particular formulation of “total people’s resistance” into a means of military intervention that absorbed and promoted organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in the 1950s.

**Previous Political Biographies**

My approach and line of argument in this account of the evolution of Nasution’s political thinking and its impact on Indonesian civilian and military politics differ from that of Ulf Sundhaussen and C.L.M. Penders in their 1985 political biography of Nasution entitled *Abdul Haris Nasution: A*

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Political Biography. 21 Relying extensively on interviews and the material Nasution had published by the early 1980s, these scholars nevertheless found it difficult to obtain specific information on Nasution’s political views and socialisation and had to rely on “a series of events and circumstances”. 22

Penders and Sundhaussen quote sparingly from Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas in their chapters on Nasution’s early life, perhaps because it was still incomplete at the time they wrote and they had already amassed other material. 23 Of course, they did not have access to Sunarti’s Pak Nas Dalam Kenangan and they did not delve deeply into Nasution’s association with the Gondokusumo family and other Parindra-associated figures.

This is evident in a particularly significant mistake that they made, given that they were writing a political biography. They refer to Nasution’s father-in-law as Djody (rather than R.P. Soenarjo) Gondokusumo. At the time of writing Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia Bourchier did not notice this and he also refers to Nasution’s father-in-law as Djody Gondokusumo. Bourchier later became aware of this error. 24

Djody Gondokusumo was a lawyer who founded the nationalist National People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Nasional - PRN). He was a member of parliament in the 1950s, and served a term as Minister for Justice before being convicted for corruption and pardoned by President Sukarno. He was no relation to R.P. Soenarjo Gondokusumo, whose family connections I shall discuss in Chapter Four.

A surprising omission from a political biography of Nasution is that they do not refer to Professor Djokosutono’s association with Nasution from the early 1950s. Again, this is particularly significant given the part played by Djokosutono in Nasution’s embrace of organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in the 1950s. It highlights the difference

22 In a similar vein to David Bourchier’s observation that Nasution seemed concerned not to reveal a great deal about his political socialisation in his publications and interviews (Bouchier, Op. Cit., p. 117), Penders and Sundhaussen write: “Nasution’s writings contain almost nothing about the early stages of his politicisation. But there are events and circumstances which allow one to follow his development in becoming both an ardent nationalist and a devout Moslem.” Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 65.
23 Sundhaussen had previously compiled a large amount of material on Nasution for his PhD thesis that was published under the title The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, Kuala Lumpur and New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.
24 Bourchier advised me of the error initially made by Penders and Sundhaussen (email dated 20 March 2005) in response to a question I raised on a discussion list. I realised that Djody Gondokusumo could not possibly have been Nasution’s father-in-law as Djody was born in 1912 and Nasution’s wife, Sunarti, was born in 1923 (after her father had studied in the Netherlands and returned to Indonesia). Some biographical information on Djody Gondokusumo can be found in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 417.
between their approach to a political biography and this thesis, centred as it is on Nasution’s affinity with “traditional” forms of interest representation.

Penders and Sundhaussen discuss the transformation of Nasution’s people’s resistance doctrines into means of military intervention in the 1950s. However, they do not explore in depth Nasution’s possible ideological / political motives in developing these doctrines.

For example, they disagree with the remark by the noted writer on guerrilla warfare, Walter Laqueur, that Nasution’s “… guerrilla handbook, written in 1953, reminds one of Mao with the politics left out.” They counter that the Indonesian struggle for independence was not so much a revolutionary civil war between proponents of rival ideologies as a national struggle against an external oppressor and that Nasution’s ideology of the time was not associated with a particular party or political movement but was based on nationalism.

While there is no doubt that this was how Nasution wished to portray himself, such an assertion does not account for Nasution’s profound social conservatism, his deep and abiding concern to restore order and stability to the often chaotic circumstances of the Indonesian revolution, his disdain and distrust for politicians (particularly of the radical variety), and his attachment to “traditional” values and means of interest representation.

Penders and Sundhaussen tend to portray Nasution as somewhat apolitical and do not always accord him a central position in the political manoeuvres that culminated in the transition to Guided Democracy. An example of their approach to Nasution’s involvement in politics is their argument that Nasution saw the 1945 generation of soldiers as “… the purest defender of the initial goals of the Revolution, not only because he had been fighting and risking his life for them, but because he had been committed to no other ideology but nationalism and the Pancasila.” However, as discussed in Chapter One, there was more to Pancasila than Sukarno’s claim that it represented a synthesis of values that were intrinsically “Indonesian”. It was a political compromise aimed at resolving tensions between proponents of organicism, liberal democracy and Islam in the 1945 constitutional debates. It is vaguely inclusivist, lending itself for use as a sort of common “national” vocabulary for people with different ethnic, religious and political orientations. Nasution used it in this manner, claiming no other allegiance but Pancasila while pursuing socially conservative objectives that had heavy organicist undertones.

Susan McKemmish’s unpublished 1975 MA thesis, A Political Biography of General Nasution, is the other scholarly account in English of Nasution’s career. She not only painstakingly researches

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26 Ibid., p. 47.
27 Ibid., p. 98.
a wide range of events and influences that impacted on Nasution but is particularly concerned to identify colleagues who were involved with Nasution and the parts they played in his career. She provides a balanced and nuanced portrayal of Nasution’s strengths and weaknesses, and offers insights into Nasution’s personality. Her work is particularly useful in explaining Nasution’s outsider status in the early 1950s vis-à-vis a large group of other officers who were linked with the Socialist Party, the shifting political allegiances in army headquarters leading up to the 17 October 1952 Affair, and Nasution’s frustration and lack of decisiveness as the crisis unfolded.

Perhaps the most useful aspect of her work, from my point of view, was her account of how Nasution shifted his political position after being dismissed as Chief of Staff in 1952. She carefully describes the emergence of Nasution’s strident anti-party stance and open dislike of the liberal democratic system while he was on the inactive list. Similarly, she recounts the influences and factors that led to Nasution’s rapprochement with Sukarno during 1955.

McKemmish’s approach differs from mine in that she does not explore Nasution’s relationship with the Gondokusumo family and other Parindra-associated figures, or mention the relationship between Nasution and Djokosutono. She does not explore the influence of Nasution’s political orientation upon his principles of “people’s war”, such as his reliance upon organic “traditional” authority structures.

Hendri Supriyatmono’s Nasution, Dwifungsi ABRI dan Kontribusi ke Arah Reformasi Politik (Nasution, the Dual function of the Armed forces and his Contribution towards Political Reformation) 29 emphasises Nasution’s role as a key political figure in the 1950s and the influence he exerted over Sukarno in the transition to Guided Democracy. He carefully traces Nasution’s successful efforts to persuade Sukarno and other powerful figures of the late 1950s to restore the 1945 Constitution. As discussed in Chapter One, the 1945 Constitution provided for a powerful executive presidency and contained sections that could be used to justify the army’s presence in politics through its categorisation as a (functional) group. He discusses Nasution’s contribution to the army’s adoption of a limited but powerful political role that culminated in the Dwi Fungsi doctrine of the New Order period.

Supriyatmono associates the BKS initiative with “total people’s resistance” 30 However, he provides no evidence for his assertion that these bodies were associated with “total people’s resistance”, and does not mention this aspect of the BKS initiative again. Unlike my approach in this thesis, he does not explore Nasution’s personal or family life or trace the evolution of “people’s resistance” into a means of military intervention in politics.

My approach also differs from these other biographers in that I have drawn upon two theoretical models in discussing Nasution’s transformation of his “people’s war” concepts into a means of military intervention during the 1950s and early 1960s. The first is Guillermo O’Donnell’s theory of the “Bureaucratic Authoritarian State”, which I have used to explain how the links between the BKS initiative and the army’s people’s resistance apparatus and concepts were an unusual and probably unique aspect of Nasution’s embrace of organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in the 1950s.

The second is Alfred Stepan’s “New Professionalism” theory, which I have applied to the army’s Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management that emerged in the early 1960s. I point to similarities between this doctrine and those adopted by other “new professional” forces from the 1960s but also point to the unusual nature of its links with “people’s resistance” and the infusion of organicist thinking within its precepts for territorial management.

Finally, my approach has inevitably and profoundly been influenced by my own background. During my military service and period at the ADF School of Languages I came to appreciate the profound differences between “professional” military forces and the Indonesian military, where I often spoke to groups of serving personnel on the history and ethos of the Indonesian Army. The vast majority of officers within the “arms” or combat elements of the ADF were understandably focused on technical military matters.

Those who were to be assigned to a period of service in Indonesia, where they were required to work with or analyse their Indonesian counterparts, were at first often inclined to view the Indonesian Army through the prism of their own particular experience. I felt it important to

30 “... it is understandable that Nasution gave priority to the formation - even to the point of accelerating to the maximum extent possible - of organisations which would become the forum or [means of] channelling such initiatives. Such policies were immediately implemented by taking steps that were generally [aimed at] placing the military group closer to the functional groups. In June 1957 [sic] a number of [sic] Civil-Military Cooperation Bodies were formed, meaning that this [took place] one month earlier than the formation of the Dewan Nasional. From Nasution’s point of view, the Civil-Military BKS were a joint working forum for the military and the functional groups or mass organisations, which would also reflect the close relations between the military and the civilians or between the TNI and the people, which at the same time was based on territorial warfare or “total people’s resistance”. However, it cannot be denied that the ‘political impact’ of the formation of the Civil-Military BKS was to strengthen or develop the image of the military (including) [the role of the military] as a part of the functional groups.” Supriyamono, Op. Cit., p. 99.
inform them more deeply about the army-led “people’s resistance” experience of the Indonesian Army, and the ramifications of that background and the existence of the territorial commands for the Indonesian Army’s involvement in politics and the economy. Of course, teachers often learn more than their students in such interchanges and these sessions greatly increased my awareness of the importance of the aspects of Nasution’s life and career that are the focus of this thesis.

I have also brought to the thesis my experience of service within a Western military organisation. This included an appreciation of the sometimes socially isolated existence of young military personnel who are away from their families and close friends – particularly those whose social skills are not highly developed - and the impact that welcoming and interesting families and individuals can have on them.

Perhaps because of my military background, in examining and discussing Nasution’s professional and life experiences and political socialization I was often struck by the differences between them and those of a typical Western military officer of a similar generation. I found that Nasution was as much a political figure as a military officer. His political organisation was the army and he had a deep interest in constitutional law that, as I shall argue in later chapters, evolved from his efforts to legitimise a leadership role for the army and the pamong praja in the “people’s war” against the Dutch and to institutionalise a political role for the army in the 1950s. He was a forerunner of the legion of army lawyers who sought to provide legal foundations for the political role of the army during the New Order regime.

I found that Nasution never seemed to have actually engaged or led troops in combat, apart from a relatively brief period in 1942 when, as a very junior officer in the KNIL, he played a rather passive role in the defence of the East Java city of Surabaya from the Japanese. His rapid promotion within the Indonesian military after independence was declared in 1945 and his own predilections meant that he was involved in highly political aspects of force development planning and developing doctrines that provided an administrative / political role for the army, rather than actual combat, from a very young age.

I also found that the strategies for “people’s warfare” that Nasution developed during this period entailed very few military insights or instructions regarding operational tactics and deployments and he did not have forces directly under his command and control during the decisive aspects of this phase of the struggle against the Dutch in 1949. Indeed, the “people’s warfare” that took place in 1949 was a relatively uncoordinated guerrilla affair and entailed very few set-piece military operations.

31 Nasution indicates that this is the case in a published interview entitled “Kita Belum Cukup Dewasa” in Para Tokoh Angkat Bicara, Book One, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, p. 63.
Nasution himself was not particularly interested in military technology, and contrary to assertions by Penders and Sundhaussen, he was not a keen scholar of the works of military theorists, such as Clausewitz. Rather, Nasution was something of a military intellectual with a keen interest in history, constitutional affairs and politics. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, from a young age he was self-sufficient, disciplined, and attracted to the ordered and ceremonial nature of military life. He was unusually interested in conserving the past, carefully preserving furniture and buildings from the colonial period and bemoaning their replacement during the more prosperous years of the Suharto presidency.

These aspects of Nasution’s life and career intrigued me and further stimulated my interest in exploring the influences that formed his personality and political orientation.

**Research into “Total People’s Resistance” in Indonesia**

As I remarked earlier, my account is the only one of its type in that it focuses on and traces the evolution of Nasution’s concepts of “total people’s resistance” from means of national defence and maintaining national order and stability in the 1940s to Nasution’s transformation of them into means of military intervention in the 1950s. It revises some of the accepted wisdom regarding the history of this highly pervasive and effective form of military intervention. In particular, it shows the linkages that developed between these principles and the organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation that Nasution embraced in the 1950s and it points to the influence of socially conservative thinking on the efficacy of “traditional” authority structures and means of resolving communal frictions in the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management that began to emerge as Nasution was suddenly stripped of most of his power in the early 1960s.

For some forty years, the most influential account of the Indonesian Army’s use of “total people’s resistance” as a means of military intervention has been Guy Pauker’s 1963 publication, *Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*. However, Pauker was an employee of the CIA-linked Rand Corporation and was interested most in events that took place from the time of his visits to Indonesia on behalf of Rand in the late 1950s. In particular, in line with the concern of the Rand Corporation about international communism, he was not only interested in but

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32 Ibid., p. 63.
36 For example, see Ibid., p. 46.
sympathetic towards attempts by the army leadership to counter the growing popularity of the
PKI.38

Pauker did not explore in any depth the origins of “total people’s resistance” in the revolutionary
period, or the earliest phase of its re-emergence in the mid 1950s. Indeed, he wrote: “Strange as it
may seem, the lessons of those years [of guerrilla warfare in the revolution] had apparently been
forgotten between 1950 and 1958.” 39 He did not mention (and was possibly unaware of) the
establishment of the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance
(Inspektorat Jenderal Territorium dan Perlawanan Rakyat – IJTP) in 1956 and its role in the
launching of the BKS initiative (Chapter One).

Pauker does not seem to have identified Nasution’s attraction to traditional means of interest
representation and the repudiation of civilian politicians in his 1950s writings on “total people’s
resistance” and that are implicit in the principles he developed in the 1940s. Nor did he note the
embodiment of these ideas in the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

More recent work by Salim Said outlines aspects of the origins of “total people’s resistance” in the
revolutionary period. Said is particularly concerned to describe the impact on the army officer corps
of the period of military administration in Java from December 1948 until mid 1949. Said argues
that army officers came to view the military administration as "... an ideal-typical model of how
government should be conducted, which has been a powerful influence on their behaviour ever
since." 40

While Said goes on to attribute subsequent political behaviour on the part of the army officers of
the 1950s to the example set by Sudirman and the structures for military supervision of civilians
which emerged during the revolution, he does not explore the range of influences that came to bear
upon the emergence of “total people’s resistance” in the armed struggle, including “traditional”
values and means of interest representation.

Research into Organicist Thinking in Indonesian Politics

I noted earlier that my research establishes linkages between Nasution’s “total people’s resistance”
concepts and organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation. While Bourchier’s
research into organicism in Indonesian political thinking is fairly recent, in 1970 Feith and Castles

38 Pauker was born in Romania and migrated to the United States after the Second World War.
He became an academic at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and visited Indonesia on
behalf of this institution before joining the Rand Corporation in the late 1950s. Pauker appears
to have become an operative of the United States Central Intelligence Agency after he joined
Rand. See David Ransom, “Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia”, in S. Weissman
(ed.) The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid, Palo Alto, Ca, Ramparts Press. Pauker
died in 2003.
identified “Javanese traditionalism” as one of five “streams of thinking” in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965. 41 These authors conceded that this was “perhaps the most controversial” of these streams, having neither produced a charismatic leader nor won significant electoral support in its own right in the 1955 general elections. 42 Nevertheless, they pointed out that its influence had been pervasive, profoundly influencing the Java-based Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia – PNI) and Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Muslim Scholars – NU) - the party of Javanese santri 43) both of which were among the top four parties to emerge from the 1955 general elections, and “… most of all perhaps, the armed forces and police and the pamong praja or territorial administrative corps.” 44

David Reeve’s 1985 Golkar of Indonesia was particularly influential in focusing greater attention on Javanese “collectivist” political thinking. Reeve saw Supomo, as “… having derived his concept of integralism primarily from his study of customary law in Indonesian villages as well as from aristocratic Javanese principles of philosophy and statecraft.” 45

Reeve’s analysis of the origins of integralism in Indonesia differs from those of David Bourchier and Marsillam Simandjuntak. 46 As mentioned in Chapter One, Bourchier describes how, in response to the New Order’s attempts to popularize organicism and integralism, Marsillam Simandjuntak researched the influences on Supomo’s thinking and the extent to which

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41 They were communism, radical nationalism, democratic socialism, Islam and Javanese traditionalism. Feith and Lance Castles, Op. Cit., pp. 16, 17.
42 The major pamong praja-based party of the 1950s, the Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya (PIR -Greater Indonesian Union Party) was reduced to a tiny rump in the 1955 elections.
43 The PNI had its origins in 1927 in the Bandung Study Club, of which Sukarno was a highly influential member. The party was dissolved in 1931 after Sukarno was jailed by the Dutch for subversion. The PNI was revived in January 1946, without the involvement of Sukarno. Its core membership was drawn from members of the pamong praja and the Javanese abangan masses. The PNI gained 22.3% of the vote in the 1955 elections. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P - Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), whose most prominent member is former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, is generally regarded as the latest manifestation of the PNI.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is a Javanese Muslim association founded in East Java in 1926. It subsequently spread to other parts of Java and the outer islands but remains strongest in its East Java heartland. Representing a traditional Javanese santri version of Islam, rather than the more modernist Islam of the Muhammadiyah mass organization, during the Japanese occupation NU joined with Muhammadiyah in a Japanese-sponsored pan-Islamic organization, Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia – Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). NU split from Masjumi in 1952, seriously weakening that organization, and stood in its own right in the 1955 elections where it gained 18.4% of the vote. G.B. Clancy, A Dictionary of Indonesian History, pp. 61; 119, 20; 146, 147. NU no longer contests elections directly, being represented instead by its electoral vehicle the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB – National Awakening Party). Former President Abdurrahman Wahid is a former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama and was elected in the 2000 general elections under the PKB banner. See Chapter One for a discussion of the terms priyayi, abangan and santri.
46 Ibid.
organicism and integralism had found their way into the 1945 Constitution. While Bourchier notes that Marsillam provides some ‘tantalising parallels between Supomo and Hegel’s concept of the state, he is of the view that it was the Leiden scholars, led by Professor van Vollenhoven, who exerted the greatest influence on Supomo’s political thinking (rather than European philosophers such as Hegel, or Supomo’s later study of customary law and statecraft in Indonesia). 47

Bourchier takes the view that the “traditional” aspects of Indonesian society that Supomo identified as being “organic” were, in fact, intermediated through a particular Western prism:

… organicism in Indonesia was best understood as part of the structural legacy of colonialism which was developed and used as a political-ideological formula by sections of the elite which felt threatened by populist pressures. In treating organicism more in instrumental than cultural terms I have no wish to deny that some of its promoters (including Supomo) saw it as congruous with their own, genuinely held commitments to holistic philosophies. There is no doubt that Javanese cultural traditions, especially the notion of the ‘underlying unity of all things’ common to most strains of Javanese mysticism, helped sustain organicism and to give it some cultural legitimacy. Yet if we look at the history of organicist political ideology in Indonesia it is clear that what its theorists had in common was not Javanese mysticism – some of them were not Javanese at all – but as I have suggested above, a Dutch or Dutch-influenced legal education. 48

Bourchier’s Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia sought to place organicism within the mainstream of Indonesian political discourse. In collaboration with Vedi Hadiz, he has since published a reader in Indonesian political thinking (similar in format to the 1945-1965 study by Feith and Castles but covering the period of the New Order regime) in which these authors identify four main streams of political thinking: organicism, pluralism, Islam and radicalism. 49

In a similar vein to Feith and Castles’ concession that Javanese traditionalism was “perhaps the most controversial” of the streams of thinking that they had identified, 50 Bourchier and Hadiz write: “We use the term organicism in this book, perhaps controversially, to include the New Order’s brand of apolitical developmentalism.” They go on to describe how the regime managed to synthesise “… the archaism of traditionalists who looked to Supomo…” and “… the modernism of the regime’s technocrats…”:

Suharto’s official title as Indonesia’s ‘Father of Development’ (Bapak Pembangunan) symbolised this fusion of the two sets of ideas. While presiding over a program of rapid economic development, Suharto simultaneously presented his government as the guardian of the culturally authentic ‘village’ values of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus). Coupling developmentalism with the idea that the state and society were part of the same ‘big family’ enabled his government to constitute opposition to itself or to its

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 8.
development programs as not only disloyal, but also an affront to Indonesian cultural norms.\textsuperscript{51} Previous researchers appear not to have noticed that Nasution’s strategies for “total people’s resistance” in Indonesia were highly compatible with the organicist thinking espoused by Supomo in 1945, and particularly his emphasis on preserving “traditional” values and administrative structures and their distrust of individualism and the open contestation of ideas.

For example, Reeve does not address this issue in \textit{Golkar of Indonesia}. He describes the Army Chief’s behaviour in forming the BKS organizations as “...vigorous but derivative, grasping eagerly at the developments in Sukarno's political thinking.” \textsuperscript{52}

It is true that Sukarno initiated the functional group idea and Nasution was keenly seeking a political role for the army in a more authoritarian system that would retain Sukarno in the presidency. However, Nasution’s attraction to the functional group idea also emerged from a deeply rooted concern to preserve the pre-war social order from the challenges it was facing under liberal democracy.

Bourchier is curious about what political views Nasution had to contribute to his appropriation of corporatist thinking in 1950s Indonesia. As discussed in Chapter One, in \textit{Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia} he draws attention to the lack of information on Nasution’s political socialisation:

Much has been written about Nasution’s illustrious military career, both by scholars and by Nasution himself. I am interested here on the influences which shaped his thinking about politics, a topic on which Nasution himself has often been quiet, preferring to portray himself as non-political. \textsuperscript{53}

Bourchier draws attention to Nasution’s links with conservative \textit{pangreh praja} aristocratic circles when he studied in Bandung in the 1930s and married into the Gondokusumo family, and with Djokosutono and other socially conservative aristocratic interests in the first half of the 1950s. However, he does not explore or discuss Nasution’s strategies for “total people’s resistance”. \textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Research into the Emergence of Army-Backed Corporatism in Indonesia}

The various BKS and their umbrella body, the West Irian National Liberation Front, are generally thought to have been artificial and largely inconsequential constructs. For example, in a 1975 article entitled \textit{The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59}, the Indonesia-born and Singapore-based academic Yong Mun Cheong concluded that the BKS initiative was a failure.

The end result of it all was that the BKS activities largely consisted of working conferences and meetings. In the case of the BKS - \textit{Pemuda-Militer} (on which most information is

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 118.
available), meetings were held to discuss topics like security, the economy, and education. At other times, the BKS - *Pemuda-Militer* confined itself to issuing statements condemning the hula hoop craze that was beginning to sweep Indonesia around 1958. 55

Lev also concluded that the civil-military cooperation groups were failures:

The effort was not successful. Most parties had willingly allowed their subsidiary organisations to join the cooperation bodies at first, but they quickly became aware of the danger of doing so. After a year’s experience, the PKI declared that it would avoid further involvement in the cooperation bodies, and other parties were similarly inclined. Army leaders were never able to establish complete control over the various groups -- partly because the officers designated to work with them were often politically incompetent -- and the parties maintained their hold on the constituent organisations. 56

However, in this thesis I shall show that the BKS initiative did have wider ramifications. It pioneered the use of the “total people’s resistance” and functional group ideas as means of military intervention and linked them in the minds of the army leadership.

I have already noted that Hendri Supriyatmono associated the BKS initiative with “total people’s resistance”. 57 Writing some thirty years earlier, Lev also saw that territorial warfare was the conceptual basis of the BKS initiative. 58 However, other researchers have not followed up this aspect of Lev’s research.

For example, David Reeve discusses the emergence of the BKS initiative and the relationship between concepts of territorial warfare and the army's adoption of the functional group concept. However, he begins to associate territorial warfare doctrines with the army's adoption of the functional group concept from 1958, when Nasution set up an Army Doctrine Committee that advocated that territorial warfare become the army's core doctrine. 59 Reeve does not associate the initial formation of the BKS in mid 1957 with “total people’s resistance”.

As discussed in Chapter One, I shall show that the initiative was the first example of the “total people’s resistance” being used consciously by the army leadership as a means of military intervention in politics. Moreover, the BKS initiative established associations between corporatist thinking and the “apolitical” and army-centred and army-owned “total people’s resistance” apparatus.

Research for the Thesis

Because the vast bulk of my research concerned events that took place a half a century or more ago, it was appropriate to interrogate key sources of information with the tools of narrative history. I have attempted to apply a rigorous and nuanced approach to the large amount of material available to me, much of which was problematic in terms of its veracity and reliability. I have accessed a number of sources to test, refute, confirm and challenge my ideas.

Interviews

Although nearly all of those who were involved in Nasution’s early life and political socialisation had died or were unavailable for interview at the time I conducted my research, I was able to contact some of their descendants, such as Professor Rahayu Surtiati Hidayat (who is related to an aristocratic colleague and ally of Nasution, Sumitro Kolopaking) and Professor R.P. Soejono, the son of Soenarjo Gondokusumo’s prominent brother, the late R.P. Suroso. 60

Interviews I conducted with two former officers, Suhario Padmodiwiryo and Pamurahardjo, were particularly useful. Suhario provided valuable information on the application of “people’s resistance” in the 1950s, which was supplemented with elements from his autobiography Memoar Hario Kecik (Memoirs of Little Hario). 61 Pamurahardjo provided very useful information on the BKS initiative in 1957 and 1958.

On the recommendation of the late Herb Feith, I also interviewed Mas Hardoyo, a political detainee during the Suharto regime who had been a member of the PKI-associated Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth). He discussed with me the motives of the Pemuda Rakyat in affiliating with the Youth-Military BKS in 1957, broadly supporting Pamurahardjo’s account. Mas Hardoyo gave me contact details for both Pamurahardjo and Ismail Kartasasmita, another former political detainee who had fought the Dutch in East Java. Mr Kartasasmita’s account of the “people’s war” campaign of 1949 assisted me in developing a surer feeling for the period.

Newspapers

I also extensively consulted Indonesian newspaper archives from the 1950s that are held in the Australian National Library in Canberra. I was greatly assisted in this task by my Indonesian language skills and my experience as a military intelligence officer with many years of researching military affairs and organisations in Indonesia. Again, these archives gave me a surer feeling for the period. They provided a considerable amount of information on Nasution’s political activities during

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60 There is some confusion over the exact familial relationship between Suroso and Soenarjo. Suroso’s son (R.P. Soejono) states that Suroso was Soenarjo’s brother-in-law but Nasution refers to him as Sunarti’s uncle by blood (paman kandung). (Interview via letter and email, 1 April 2005.) Suroso is also described as such in Adi Prasetyo and Toriq Haddad eds., Op. Cit.
the 1950s, as well as other useful material. For example, I was able to use them to verify much of what Suhario and Pamurahardjo told me in interviews.

Documents

I was fortunate to gain access to Indonesian Army training documents that assisted my research into the army’s embrace of corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in the 1950s, and to some Indonesian Army Staff College training material that shed light on the infusion of organicist thinking within the army’s territorial warfare and territorial management doctrines. Greg Fealey (Australian National University) was kind enough to pass on to me documents surrounding the launch of the BKS initiative and Bob Lowry (Australian Defence Force Academy) sent me a very useful Indonesian Army document on the evolution of army headquarters structures up to and including the early 1980s.

Autobiographical Works

Previously I observed that while a disadvantage of coming later to this task than previous biographers of Nasution was my inability to interview him, I was in a position to benefit greatly from Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas and Sunarti’s Pak Nas dalam Kenangan. I was also in a position to benefit from a stream of first-hand accounts by retired officers from the 1945 Generation (the generation of officers who joined in the armed struggle against the Dutch after the proclamation of independence) that began to appear in the 1980s. The Indonesian armed forces have had in common with their counterparts in other countries a tendency to be closed and sequestered institutions. It is likely research into the army when they were still serving was circumscribed to some extent by this shared characteristic and a general unwillingness of army officers to discuss openly events of the day with researchers because of secrecy considerations and a fear that their careers might be adversely affected.

Of course, the accounts of these officers needed to be approached with caution as, like Nasution, many had particular causes and arguments that they wished to pursue. For example, Suhario was a left-wing officer who fled to Moscow because of his alleged involvement in the 30 September 1965 coup. He was imprisoned when he returned to Indonesia in 1977. Pamurahardjo fell out of favour with Nasution in 1958 when he was dismissed from the BKS initiative.

The most articulate and interesting biographical accounts were written by Tahi Bonar Simatupang, a KNIL cadet classmate of Nasution who rose to become Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the 1950s and who also wrote extensively on the history of the army and its role in politics. In a diary-based account of his “people’s war” experiences entitled Laporan dari Banaran (Report from Banaran), Simatupang described the functioning of the army’s territorial organization in the vicinity of Yogyakarta, Central Java, in the first half of 1949. While by no means an uncritical observer of the Republic’s resistance efforts, Simatupang provided a generally positive account of the resilience
and pervasiveness of the army’s territorial structures and its relations with the pamong praja: “The essence of the territorial organization was the pamong praja and military personnel who remained in these areas.” 62

In another publication, *The Fallacy of a Myth*, 63 Simatupang again provides insights into the military administration of 1949, and his account of the reliance of Dutch military strategists on German military theorists, notably Clausewitz (passed on to KNIL cadets such as Simatupang and Nasution in KNIL officer training and through study groups in the 1940s) is also useful and illuminating.

Senior military officers were not alone in publishing their memoirs. The retired pamong praja official and student army (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar – TRIP) veteran, Sudarno, has provided a valuable account of the military administration in East Java in *Sejarah Pemerintahan Militer dan Peran Pamong Praja di Jawa Timur Selama Perjuangan Fisik 1945-1950* (The History of the Military Administration and the Role of the Pamong Praja in East Java During the Period of Physical Struggle 1945-1950). He has contributed a valuable “primary” resource by compiling a number of instructions issued by pamong praja officials who took part in the military administration, accompanied by a narrative account of the background to them and how they were implemented. 64

**General Research into Nasution and Military Politics in Indonesia**

In addition to the more specialised resources on Nasution’s life and the emergence of organicism and “total people’s resistance” I also accessed the general research into Nasution and military politics in Indonesia. Ulf Sundhaussen’s *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967* is probably the best known account of the Indonesian Army’s first two decades. *The Road to Power* is particularly useful in its description of the flow of events that influenced the new army and its analysis of the historical forces and individuals that led to the army’s increasing intervention in politics.

Perhaps because Sundhaussen’s focus is on this broad sweep of events and influences he does not devote a great deal of attention to the specifics of the emergence of concepts of “total people’s resistance”. For example, he does not touch upon Nasution’s early development of people’s resistance strategies, which took place in West Java in the second half of 1947. He gives more attention to the guerrilla campaign of 1949 (the period of the military administration) but does not discuss the ramifications / political import of links between Nasution’s structures for army-led

“people’s resistance” and “traditional” pamong praja structures. Nor does he explicitly identify the exclusive ownership of “total people’s resistance” strategies by the army and its implementation of them in the absence of the political leadership.

Road to Power provides valuable information on the development of the army’s territorial structures and policies for people’s resistance in the early 1950s. For example, Sundhaussen provides a fairly comprehensive account of the army’s reemphasis of “total people’s resistance” from the late 1950s, including the reorganisation of Headquarters people’s resistance sections and territorial commands, and the emergence of the doctrine of territorial warfare and territorial management.

However, Sundhaussen does not discuss BKS organisations of the mid-to-late 1950s and the role of the territorial apparatus in this initiative. Nor is his research concerned with the compatibility of these emerging doctrines and structures with “traditional” values and means of interest representation as advocated by leading organicist thinkers and Professor Djokosutono in particular.

I have already referred to some recent publications on Nasution and “people’s warfare” by Robert Cribb. His Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 is also a very useful account of events that took place within Nasution’s Siliwangi Command, and Cribb comments insightfully on Nasution’s dealings with the often unruly irregular armed units of the day (laskar), the central government and the Dutch.

Ruth McVey’s “Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army” provides an insightful account of the emergence of the officer corps. I found her research to be particularly useful where she identified the insularity of the Indonesian Army from overseas doctrinal influences and training advisors. To my mind, this was an important precondition for the army’s development of its own highly distinctive Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. McVey discusses the emergence of “total people’s resistance” as a means of military intervention but only in passing as it is not the focus of her research.

Finally, Benedict Anderson’s Java in a Time of Revolution describes the role of the younger generation in the Indonesian revolution. His account of the end of the occupation period and the

66 Ibid. Cribb provides an insightful account of Nasution’s allegiance to the central government (rather than the army headquarters), his tacit support early in the revolution for negotiating with the Dutch, his intense ambition to develop more professional armed forces in West Java and his concern for social stability, discipline and order within the military.
first eighteen months of the revolution graphically describes how particular social and political forces, particularly the politicised youth, grew disillusioned with both the Japanese and the cautious attitudes of the nationalist leaders. He portrays the first phase of the revolution as one in which more radical forces that might have brought about a social revolution struggled with moderate and conservative elements before being finally suppressed. As a social conservative, Nasution participated in this struggle and I gained valuable insights from Anderson’s account of what was at stake for the social conservatives / political moderates of the period as they sought to ensure that the revolution remained on a nationalist, rather than a social, trajectory.

**General Research into Indonesian Politics in the 1950s**

Herbert Feith’s *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 69 is a seminal work. He outlines a number of characteristics of constitutional democracy that he regards as preconditions for its survival, including civilian supremacy over the military and a commitment by most members of the political elites to the symbols of constitutional democracy and the extent to which they were lacking in Indonesia in the first half of the 1950s.

He describes the brief ascendancy of a small group of Western-educated Indonesians who had the technical skills to operate a modern routinised state (“the administrators”) and the growing disillusionment of those who harked back to the heady days of the revolution and yearned for more integrative organic symbols that might restore meaning to their lives (“the solidarity makers”). He evocatively chronicles a period of economic decline, political instability, increasing regional unrest and gathering disillusionment with the system inherited from the Dutch. He describes how two major centres of influence that were largely sidelined by the formulas of constitutional democracy, President Sukarno and the army, gradually formed a political alliance and worked together to undermine liberal democracy. He provides an insightful account of the motives and aspirations of army leaderships of the time.

Daniel S. Lev’s *The Transition to Guided Democracy* 70 is another classic work that describes Indonesia’s transition from liberal to guided democracy in the second half of the 1950s. Lev emphasises the emergence of the PKI as a growing threat to the other parties as a major factor in this process. He provides valuable information on the motivations and actions of the army leaderships of the mid-to-late 1950s, and emphasises the key role that Nasution played in the move towards guided democracy.

Of particular relevance to this thesis is Lev’s account of the BKS initiative (noted earlier) in which he identified territorial warfare as its conceptual basis, the rationale for the initiative being the need to assemble and unite the various forces throughout the country to prevent

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further political and ideological fragmentation. 71 However, Lev does not further explore this association.

Structure of the Thesis

With the exception of Chapter Three, this thesis follows a broadly chronological structure. In Chapter Three I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of a number of models and theories of military intervention that emerged from the 1950s to the 1970s. I argue that while aspects of them are relevant to the Indonesian case, organicist political theory and particularly its emphasis on “traditional” values and means of interest representation provides a more valuable tool for understanding the style of military intervention in Indonesia. In discussing the army’s appropriation of corporatist thinking in Indonesia (the BKS initiative), I examine Guillermo O’Donnell’s “bureaucratic authoritarian” theory, 72 and I apply Alfred Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm to the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. 73

I argue that the “bureaucratic authoritarian” theory is useful in understanding the conditions that led to the army’s sponsorship of corporatism in Indonesia by establishing quasi-state corporatist bodies and the motives of the army leadership in doing so. However, in that this theory seeks to describe and explain fully-fledged military regimes it is not entirely relevant to the emergence of army-backed corporatism at a time when the army was not yet the dominant power in the state. Moreover, it does not account for the leading role played by the army’s “total people’s resistance” apparatus and strategies.

Similarly, Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm (which also has Latin American origins) is useful in describing how armies with an “old professionalism” focus (a focus on technical military skills with associated development of doctrine and training systems) became diverted towards “new professionalism” (a focus on “nation building”, internal security and an unrestricted management role in politics and the economy) with the encouragement of the United States. However, I argue that the Indonesian case was not an example of a military force turning away from “old professionalism” but one in which the military had never acquired such characteristics and was transforming strategies that were at the heart of its identity into means of military intervention.

Essentially, Chapters Four to Eight will be concerned with identifying influences, other than “instrumental” considerations, that contributed to Nasution’s attraction to the military, his concern for social order, and his embrace of the organicist formulas advised by Djokosutono in the 1950s. In Chapter Four I discuss Nasution’s youth and the highly formative years he spent in

71 Ibid., pp. 65-6.
Bandung as a student teacher, KNIL officer and trainer of Japanese paramilitary organizations, and his relationship with Soenarjo Gondokusumo.

I identify Nasution’s attraction to the cooperating stream of the nationalist movement and his very close association with R.P. Soenarjo Gondokusumo and others in the non-cooperating movement. I point out that he displayed no interest in disturbing the indigenous social order that prevailed in the late colonial period. I outline the political values of the cooperating nationalist Parindra organisation and particularly its attempts to achieve gradual change through a paternalistic approach to assisting the poor to improve themselves while seeking to develop an awareness of nationalism among them. I identify a close association between R.P. Soenarjo Gondokusumo’s and Dr Sutomo, the founder of Parindra. I explore Sutomo’s interest in assisting the poor to represent themselves to the colonial authorities by seeking to develop “traditional” self-help systems, rather than attempting to implant foreign ideas.

I draw attention to similarities between this form of political activity and the “Javanese traditionalism” stream identified by Feith and Castles in their categorization of streams of political thinking in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965, 74 and to similarities with the idealised and paternalistic version of village culture that was an important element of Supomo’s thinking. I lay the ground for a discussion in later chapters of Nasution’s emphasis on the importance and authenticity of “traditional” village administrative structures both in his planning for people’s resistance in the 1940s, and in his idealisation of these strategies as he transformed them into means of military intervention in the 1950s.

I also examine Nasution’s involvement with the Japanese in the occupation period. I note Soenarjo’s pro-Japan attitudes (and that of other Parindra leaders) and Nasution’s own interest in Japan before World War Two. I show that Nasution had an unusually intense interest in mobilising and training young people within Japanese-sponsored youth movements. While there is no concrete evidence that Nasution was deeply influenced by Japanese fascist thinking (indeed he appears to have found the Japanese increasingly repugnant), I conclude that he obviously learnt a great deal about mobilising populations for “people’s resistance” from the array of organizations the Japanese established for this purpose. Later in the thesis I shall draw attention to both the value of this experience when I describe his efforts to co-opt (into his Siliwangi Division) or demobilise irregular armed organisations in the mid-1940s, and to a line of continuity between Nasution’s attempts to mobilise the youth in the occupation period and his formation of the Youth-Military BKS in 1957.

In Chapter Five I continue to trace the evolution of Nasution’s political orientation. I argue that particular experiences from 1945 until 1948 were very important to Nasution’s political

74 They were communism, radical nationalism, democratic socialism, Islam and Javanese traditionalism. Feith and Castles, Op. Cit., pp. 16, 17.
socialisation. I argue that whereas he had previously shown no interest in disturbing the social order he now became concerned to maintain it in the face of the politicisation of society and widespread civil order. I go on to contend that Nasution’s experience of waging guerrilla warfare began to instil in him an attachment to “traditional” values and authority structures, particularly at the village level. I show that these found their way into the strategies for “total people’s resistance” that he developed from the rural Javanese hinterland after the Dutch offensive in mid 1947.

I argue that these strategies became very important to Nasution at a personal level. They saved his reputation and the existence and reputation of his Siliwangi Division after the Dutch routed it in 1947. I introduce aspects of his personal life that indicate that this period was particularly important to him in more than a professional sense. I show that he and Sunarti went through a period of considerable emotional intensity that left a lasting impression on them as they moved from hamlet to hamlet while Nasution sought to redirect his forces into guerrilla warfare in the second half of 1947. I draw attention to the indelible imprint this experience of living with rural villagers had on Nasution and Sunarti, and conclude that it laid the foundations for Nasution’s disregard for the parties and reliance upon organic “traditional” authority structures in the “people’s war” strategies he began to develop in late 1947 and early 1948.

In Chapter Six, which covers the period from January 1948 until January 1949, I continue to argue that particular experiences during the struggle against the Dutch instilled in Nasution an attachment to “traditional” values and authority structures and a disregard for the parties. I describe how Nasution further developed his strategies for “total people’s resistance” during 1948 while serving as Deputy to Sudirman in Yogyakarta, and saw them put into practice in the field in 1949 when he declared a military administration throughout Java (in the absence of the political leadership). I draw attention to the particular emphasis he placed on the village and the village leadership. I show that it was during this period of military administration that Nasution’s ideas for “total people’s resistance” became associated with “integralistic” political leaders when Nasution formed an association with conservative senior pamong praja figures in Central Java. I point out that these pamong praja associates became strong supporters of Nasution in the 1950s when he became a strident critic of the parties and formed his IPKI organization.

I place particular emphasis on his tireless work compiling instructions and regulations for the military administration and his lack of direct involvement in commanding troops or combat activities. I point out that the experience he gained in developing these regulations no doubt stimulated an interest in legal and constitutional issues that he showed from the early 1950s when he established the Military Law Academy (which later went on to play a leading role in developing the legal and constitutional format for the New Order) with the involvement of Djokosutono.
I conclude that the period of military administration was vitally important for Nasution. His planning for a guerrilla campaign preserved Republican sovereignty and the existence of the army in large sections of the Javanese hinterland. Returning to my discussion of cooperating nationalism, the participation of loyal elements of the pamong praja and village administrations while the non-cooperating leaders submitted to capture by the Dutch resulted in something of a reversal of images.

Those pamong praja figures who had worked with the Dutch were now able to claim impeccable nationalist credentials, while many of the non-cooperators were tainted in the eyes of those who were present (hadir) during the military administration and armed struggle. Nasution went on to idealise this period in terms of the army developing an organic relationship with the people and “traditional” forces in society while the politicians had submitted to capture and were engaged in negotiations with the Dutch that were to introduce the liberal democratic constitution of 1950.

In Chapter Seven, which covers the early years of the 1950s, I concentrate on the difficulties Nasution encountered and the personal turmoil he experienced when he relocated from Yogyakarta to Jakarta to take up the post of Chief of Staff of the Army. I examine the problems he encountered in operating within a much more routinised, hierarchical and politicised “peace-time” environment and the delicate position in which he found himself in dealing with a large Netherlands Military Mission that had remained in Indonesia to train the army.

As was the case in 1948, Nasution set out to reorganise and rationalise the army, provoking widespread opposition within the army and the parliament. I show that by 1952 Nasution was under considerable stress as he strove to cope with all these influences, becoming enmeshed in the 17 October 1952 Affair that culminated in his dismissal.

I draw attention to Nasution’s continuing commitment to “people’s resistance” before his dismissal and to the survival of the army’s territorial apparatus and concepts into the 1950s. I show that during Nasution’s period on the inactive list he began to idealise his principles of army-led “people’s resistance” from the revolution in such a way that he emphasised the reliability and authenticity of organic “traditional authority structures” and criticised the parties for, as he portrayed it, their fickle behaviour and absence from the “people’s war” campaign of 1949.

I emphasise that unlike strategists of the left who had emphasised class struggle, Nasution sought to portray the struggle against the Dutch as one in which narrower ideological and sectarian interests were subsumed within the banner of an all-embracing nationalism. I argue that this was part of a process that saw him gradually embrace organic “traditional” values as an alternative to liberal democracy and the party system.
In Chapter Eight I continue to emphasise the importance of the military administration of 1949. Again, I draw upon Nasution’s cooperating nationalist roots by identifying connections between Nasution and senior pamong praja colleagues of that time, their support for him in developing the IPKI organisation, and his growing association with Djokosutono. I examine the links between them and what they each hoped to gain from their association.

I describe how Nasution’s idealised version of the guerrilla struggle / military administration permeated the campaign material he developed for his IPKI organization. I also show that this aspect of Nasution’s strategies for “total people’s resistance” was in a similar vein to Sukarno’s increasing calls for organic and integrative approaches to national leadership.

In the following two chapters I describe how in the period after Nasution’s reinstatement he transformed his people’s resistance strategies and apparatus into two strands of military intervention: the BKS initiative and the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. Both were infused with organicist thinking. I argue that while Nasution was no doubt motivated to embrace organicist thinking because of its “instrumental” worth, a no less important factor was that it accorded with fundamental aspects of his political orientation.

In Chapter Nine I describe how acquisition of functional group status by the army legitimised the role Nasution was seeking for it as a political force in its own right and the functional group idea opened up the possibility of the army forming functionally based corporatist groups of its own on the basis of the mass organizations of the parties. I show that the organicist formulas President Sukarno was advocating from the mid-1950s (on the advice of Djokosutono) accorded with Nasution’s own deeply held anti-party feelings.

The main point that I make is that the initiative set a powerful precedent. This was the first attempt by the army to use its people’s resistance principles and apparatus to intervene directly in politics and in associating organicist thinking with “people’s resistance” as a means of military intervention in politics and the economy.

I argue that this was a process that had its roots in Nasution’s depoliticisation of “people’s war” in the 1940s and his idealisation in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and his IPKI platform of an organic relationship between traditional authority figures and the army in the “people’s war” campaigns of the revolution. Nasution’s version of “people’s war” was highly compatible with organicist thinking and with corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in particular, based as they were on denying the relevance of parties and ideologies.

I compare the initiative with O’Donnell’s “bureaucratic authoritarian” model and conclude that similar conditions to those present when state-sanctioned corporatism was introduced in Latin America applied at the time of the BKS initiative. However, the army was not yet the predominant power within the state – an important precondition for the foundation of a “bureaucratic
authoritarian” regime, and this was a major reason for the failure of the initiative.

I argue that although the BKS initiative did not achieve Nasution’s immediate aims, it was important for the reason outlined above and because it and other similar ventures provided a cadre of officers from within the “total people’s resistance” apparatus who went on to nurture army-backed corporatist bodies until a military-backed regime came into power in the late 1960s.

In Chapter Ten I discuss the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, and its organicist elements in particular. I show that this Doctrine provided for the army to influence various forms of political behaviour and profoundly influenced the repressive political behaviour of the New Order regime.

I show that important elements of this doctrine, such as antipathy towards “imported” ideas such as communism, liberalism and individualism, were highly consonant with organicist thinking. I argue that this doctrine was the codified form of the “people’s war” principles Nasution had begun to develop in the 1940s. In particular, I argue that the roots of this highly pervasive and enduring doctrine can be found in Nasution’s depoliticisation of “people’s war” in the revolution and his idealisation in the 1950s of an organic relationship between the army and traditional authority figures during the struggle against the Dutch.

I continue to draw upon Nasution’s cooperating nationalist origins and his loyalty to organic “traditional” structures by drawing attention to his successful attempt in the late 1950s to rescue the pamong praja from legislation that would have introduced democratically elected regional bodies and leaders, thereby rendering the corps mere bureaucratic tools of regional assemblies. However, I also point out that by this time the new Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management provided for army officers to supplant the leadership role of the pamong praja.

I discuss the Doctrine in the light of Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm and note a number of similarities. However, I also note the Doctrine’s association with the army’s “total people’s resistance” concepts and apparatus was highly unusual and probably unique to the Indonesian case of military intervention.

I discuss the current (2004) army leadership’s continuing adherence to Nasution’s territorial concepts. This includes their adamant adherence to territorial structures and principles in the face of pressure that they be discarded, a strong commitment to an all-embracing nationalism that they expressed through a strong commitment to maintain the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia against forces that they saw as working towards national disintegration, and a disdain for and distrust of civilian politicians and politics.

In Chapter Eleven I briefly discuss Nasution’s oppositional role vis-à-vis the New Order regime and his apparent regrets that the Regime had misused the interventionist doctrines that he pioneered in the 1950s.
THREE - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the early 1950s George Kahin drew attention to the concern expressed in October 1945 by Indonesia’s first Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir, that “feudalism and supernationalism” were the prerequisites for fascism. Sjahrir’s warning was highly prescient. As discussed in Chapter Two, from the time of the armed struggle against the Dutch Nasution sought to emphasise the common bond and imperative of nationalism, rather than a particular political ideology, and the type of military intervention that became entrenched in Indonesia (particularly in the New Order period) contained elements that are often associated with fascism, including the ascendancy of organicist/corporatist thinking and the flirtation of the New Order regime with “integralism”. In particular, the army’s approach to organising civilian populations to wage “total people’s resistance” reflected a disdain for pluralist democracy on the part of Nasution and like-minded officers in the army, and an idealisation of “traditional” rural life and values that have often been associated with organicist thinking.

From the mid-1940s until the end of the New Order regime the Indonesian Army was remarkably consistent in linking concepts of “total people’s resistance” with the preservation of apolitical “traditional” administrative structures and values. It did so in establishing territorial commands along the “traditional” administrative boundaries of the aristocratic pangreh praja corps of civil servants in the 1940s. Its enthusiastic support for corporatist thinking in the 1950s reflected a desire

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1 A noted American scholar who conducted research in Indonesia in 1948/49. His Nationalism and Revolutionism in Indonesia was a pioneering (and very sympathetic) account of the Indonesian national revolution.
2 Sutan Sjahrir, Perjuangan Kita. Cited from Kahin, Op. Cit., p. 165. Kahin noted Sjahrir’s concern that in view of “... the strongly surviving feudalistic heritage in the country...”, if the “nationalistic aspect” was so dominant that it excluded “...the internal democratic aspect...”, this “would lead to fascism.”. Ibid.
4 For example, there is a rich vein of such thinking in British political history. See Richard Moore-Colyer, “Towards Mother Earth': Jorian Jenks, Organicism, the Right and the British Union of Fascists”, Journal of Contemporary History, July 2004, vol 39, no. 3, pp. 353-371(19) which outlines the career of Jorian Jenks, a former activist with the pre-war British Union of Fascists and subsequently editor of the Soil Association’s journal Mother Earth. Jenks championed such idealistic notions of British rural life. “Hegelian Organicism, British New Liberalism and the Return of the Family State” in History of Political Thought, 2002, vol 23, no. 1, pp. 141-170(30) discusses the embrace of the “family state” by British “new liberals” of the nineteenth century. (The “family state” concept often proved to be too paternalistic for the liberal instincts of these thinkers.) The idea of the “family state” resonates strongly with Supomo’s championing of the concept of kekeluargaan in the 1945 PPKI debates (see Chapter One).
to weaken the parties (particularly the PKI) and promote what Nasution saw as apolitical traditional values and means of interest representation. The concept of the “floating mass” that was a central political feature of the New Order period had its origins in the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management of the early 1960s, when military planners sought to isolate grassroots Indonesians from “imported” and potentially divisive ideologies.

Because of these characteristics of “total people’s resistance”, in this chapter I will contend that organicist thinking is a particularly useful tool in seeking to understand and describe this type of military intervention in Indonesia. Associated political theories, the “bureaucratic authoritarian” theory of the state and “new professionalism”, both of which are derived from the experience of military intervention in Latin America, are also useful in understanding the motives of the army leadership in embracing organicist thinking and in particular, in establishing corporatist bodies (the BKS and other corporatism initiatives) from the late 1950s.

I shall argue that aspects of a number of theories and models of military intervention that were developed by Western comparative political scientists in the period of decolonisation that followed the Second World War are less relevant to the Indonesian Army’s association of “total people’s resistance” with organicism / corporatism but other aspects of them are useful in describing the emergence of military intervention in Indonesia, although they are less relevant to the linkage that developed between “total people’s resistance” and organicist thinking.

Early Research - Optimism about Military Intervention

In the period of decolonisation that followed the Second World War a number of Western political scientists began to focus on the causes of military intervention that had taken place in many of the new states. The conclusions they drew about the likely outcomes of this intervention were often optimistic. Indeed, some believed that military officers were a viable and perhaps even preferable alternative to the civilian leaderships that had emerged in many of the new nations. 5

5 See Lucien Pye “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization”, 1962. See also Edward Shils "The Military in the Political Development of New States”, 1962. As David Rapoport points out, nearly all the contributors to this influential volume were of the same mind. David Rapoport, “The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality and Impotence” in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej (eds), Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, p. 252, fn 1. Rapoport cites a number of political scientists who advanced such ideas, including Guy Pauker (“Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade”, 1959) whose work in Indonesia for the Rand Corporation, including his research into the Doctrine of Territorial and Warfare and Territorial Management, will be discussed in a
Much of this early literature canvassed the potential of armies as modernising forces in traditional societies. Prominent researchers of the day, such as Shils and Pye, believed that military officers were likely to succeed in the modernising of their societies through their training and experience in rational decision-making and their mastery of technology. Shils and Pye also looked with favour on the international outlook they associated with military officers, which they contrasted with what they perceived to be the inward focus of many civilian politicians. They noted that the participation of military officers in exercises with other countries and overseas training courses encouraged them to benchmark their performance against international standards. They thought that military officers might be more suited to the task of nation building in states where there was conflict between ethnic groups, because of the supra-national nature of many armies in multi-ethnic new nations.  

Another prominent researcher, Morris Janowitz, ascribed to military officers in new nations an “ethos of public service” combined with a “heroic posture”. In his major study, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Janowitz set out to answer such questions as “Why are military officers of new nations, as compared with those in Western industrialised societies more influential in domestic politics?” and “to what extent can this greater involvement be accounted for by particular sociological characteristics of the military profession.”

**Armies of National Liberation**

In 1962, Janowitz categorised the armies in new nations as either: “… *ex-colonial* armed forces, armed forces established during the struggle for *national liberation*, or *post-liberation* armies [that were] established after independence.” He found that armies of national liberation were comparatively rare with only four armies, or less than ten per cent of the armies of the new nations, falling into this category. One was the Indonesian Army.

Janowitz stated that the officer corps of armies of national liberation were “… almost completely middle class or lower middle class, without aristocratic elements.” In Burma, and to some extent in Indonesia, the national armies during World World War II recruited widely from university students. 

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6 A number of researchers, including Shils and Pye, pointed to the homogenising function of military forces in culturally and ethnically diverse societies where recruits from a range of ethnic, racial and religious groups were mixed together. Shils, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 23, 32; and Pye, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 80, 81, 83.

students who had never considered a military career.” 9 Janowitz noted a tendency on the part of such officers to have “deep political involvements” that they maintained after liberation was achieved, although “… career experiences are just as crucial in fashioning and developing these adaptive and politically involved officers. ” 10

Janowitz’s observation that very few officers in armies of national liberation were aristocrats is not entirely accurate in the Indonesian case. Sundhaussen has shown that the 1945 Generation officer corps included a good many members of the aristocracy who stopped using their titles in the egalitarian atmosphere of the armed struggle. 11 However, they tended to be relatively junior members of the priyayi class and very few high aristocrats joined the army. Sundhaussen also noted that many officers were drawn from different sections of the elites of the day, including religious leaders and teachers, 12 whose origins are perhaps closer to Janowitz’s middle class model. In a similar vein, Anderson writes:

There is convincing evidence to suggest that they [former PETA officers] were drawn predominantly from lower-level priyayi families, from the ranks of village and small-town schoolteachers, and from the kin of prominent rural kyai [Islamic clergy]. 13

McVey also writes that the officer corps of the revolutionary period was drawn from "... the more privileged strata of Indonesian society" although "... not from the highly advantaged group of the university-educated which served in the top nationalist leadership during the revolution ...." 14 However, this situation seems to have resulted from the relative lack of opportunities for higher education in the Japanese occupation and some members of the officer corps would have gone on to (or completed) university had the occupation not occurred. Students (some of whom were from aristocratic families) flocked to the army. Perhaps the most important thing to note here is Sundhaussen’s observation that “… people of lower social origin had, indeed, hardly any opportunity to be commissioned.” 15

Janowitz’s comments about the “deep political involvements” of officers in armies of national liberation applied to many in the Indonesian Army in the 1940s and 1950s, rather than just to

9 Ibid., p. 53.
10 Ibid., p. 47.
12 Ibid.
students (as he implies). The somewhat chaotic and undirected origins of the Indonesian Army gave individual units wide latitude and a high degree of independence from the central government. This led to a feeling among many officers that the army was self-created which in turn gave impetus to the emergence of a *pejuang* (freedom fighter) ethos: the belief that the army was essentially self-created and that Republican military personnel were freedom fighters, rather than professional soldiers. The *pejuang* ethos gave impetus to the “deep political involvements” that Janowitz comments on.

**A Weak Acceptance of Civilian Political Leaders and Political Institutions**

Some researchers noted that a weak acceptance by armies of the supremacy of civilian political leaders was sometimes associated with military intervention. For example, Eric Nordlinger observed that due to the often intractable problems faced by post-colonial states and the sometimes inordinately high expectations on the part of military officers, civilian political leaders found it difficult to gain or maintain their respect. 16 The problem was often exacerbated by a weak commitment on the part of both military and civilian elites to the forms of government inherited from their former colonising powers.

Nordlinger concluded that to avoid military intervention it was essential that the acceptance of civilian control by the military be "... internalised as a set of strongly held beliefs and values. 17 However, he also argued that an important quid pro quo was that civilians respected the military as a separate and different institution. 18 Janowitz observed that these two factors, the acculturation of military officers so that they fully accepted the civilian ethic and an instinctive awareness on the part of civilian politicians of limits on their involvement, were not acquired quickly or easily. 19

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17 "Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values - what might be referred to as the 'civilian ethic' - are attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticised stance even when in sharp disagreement with the government." *Ibid.*, p. 13.
18 "In its actions and statements the government respects the military's honour, expertise, autonomy and political neutrality. It does not slur the officer corps, interfere in professional military affairs, interject political considerations into the armed forces (e.g., by promoting officers because of their political loyalties), or use the army for domestic political advantage." *Ibid.*
19 "The democratic model is not a historical reality but an objective of political policy. Elements of the democratic model have been achieved only in certain Western industrialised countries, since it requires viable parliamentary institutions and broad social consensus about the ends of government." Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 3, 4.

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During the armed struggle against the Dutch and in 1950s Indonesia there was often a profound lack of such a ‘civilian ethic’ on the part of many military officers and a similar lack of appreciation by many civilian politicians that they should not intervene in military affairs and interject political considerations into the armed forces. The generation gap between the 1945 Generation of military officers and the generally older and better educated political leadership and the adherence of most of the latter to negotiation with the Dutch while the military officers generally favoured armed struggle contributed to this lack of a ‘civilian ethic’. Such factors and some new problems, including economic problems and a perception of political instability, were also important in the growth of military intervention in the 1950s and the adaptation of “total people’s resistance” into a means of military intervention.

Corporate Interests of the Military

A number of researchers noted that a common element in military intervention was a perception that civilian political leaders were acting contrary to the corporate interests of the military, such as by allocating insufficient funds to the military. Crouch has pointed out that feelings of grievance within armies over budget allocations are likely to be exacerbated where civilian politicians were perceived by military personnel to be inefficient, wasteful and/or corrupt, and if budgetary allocations were regarded as insufficient to deal with local insurrections or external threats.

In the 1950s budgetary limitations fuelled resentment within the officer corps, particularly in the outer islands where housing and other accommodation was of a very poor standard, and contributed to the United States-backed regional insurrections in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the late 1950s (the PRRI/Permesta rebellions).

Exposure to Guerrilla Warfare

Crouch also argues that prolonged and unsuccessful exposure of military forces to local insurrections or external threats may erode their confidence in civilian leaders. This is most likely to be the case where the prolongation of conflict is perceived as being the fault of civilian leaders. Armies involved in counterinsurgency operations may become dissatisfied with the performance of civilian leaders because they become aware of the conditions which have led to insurgencies taking

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20 As an example, Crouch has pointed to the adequacy of budgetary allocations to the Malaysian armed forces in explaining why military intervention had not taken place in that country. Harold Crouch, “The Military in Malaysia” in V. Selochan (ed.), The Military, the State and Development in Asia and the Pacific, Boulder, Westview Press, 1991, pp. 130, 131.
place and that the government seems to be doing little to remedy them.  

This was certainly the case in Indonesia where TNI units rarely operated above the level of guerrilla warfare in the struggle against the Dutch and then became involved in counter-insurgency operations against the *Darul Islam* movement in the 1950s. Nasution bitterly complained that a political decision to withdraw his Division from West Java in early 1948 (the Renville Agreement) contributed significantly to the rise of the *Darul Islam* movement in that Province. Writing about the same insurgency in the 1950s, Simatupang stated that a reluctance on the part of Muslim political leaders to openly condemn *Darul Islam* had hamstrung the army in dealing with the conflict.

Of course, total people’s resistance and counter insurgency operations are the opposite sides of the same coin. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the army began to reassert its role as mobiliser of the people in the mid 1950s when the Commander of the (Siliwangi Division) Tasikmalaya-based 11th Infantry Regiment, Major Suwarto, formulated an integrated military, economic and socio-political strategy to separate *Darul Islam* insurgents from local communities. In the early 1960s Suwarto went on to become the principal architect of the highly interventionist Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management and profoundly influenced the 1945 Generation of officers when he assumed leadership roles and propagated interventionist ideas in the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).

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22 As Crouch points out in discussing the Malaysian case, this may be mitigated where armies are recruited heavily from a particular ethnic group and pitted against insurgents from other groups *Ibid.*, p. 132.
General Theories and Typologies of Military Intervention

Attempts were made to construct general theories and typologies of military intervention. Nordlinger’s three typologies of interventionist or “praetorian” officers – “moderators”, “guardians” and “rulers” - are among the best known and are summarised below.

Moderators

Nordlinger’s “moderators” played a conservative role in political affairs by exercising veto options over the activities of governments and parties aspiring to govern. In exercising veto powers they might imply the possibility of a coup or actually carry out a coup to correct what they see as an anomalous situation.

The Indonesian Army has never mounted an outright coup. Rather, it has employed more limited or circuitous attempts when it has attempted to change governments, such as the 17 October 1952 Affair and the protracted three-year process through which General Suharto gradually supplanted President Sukarno. 26

Guardians

A further increase in the intensity of Nordlinger’s "moderator-type" behaviour might take place after such officers become accustomed to their interventionist role and increasingly impatient with the inability or unwillingness of civilian leaders to govern as they see fit. At this point they might assume greater powers and become “guardians”.

This paradigm partially describes the situation in Indonesia when the army entered into a power sharing relationship with Sukarno in the late 1950s. As discussed in Chapter One, the army assumed greater powers during this period, particularly through the imposition of martial law and guided democracy. There was a strong element of rivalry between Nasution and Sukarno that led to Nasution being sidelined to the relatively powerless position of Armed Forces Chief of Staff in 1962. Throughout Guided Democracy, the army was the junior partner due to Sukarno’s political adroitness and his use of the PKI as a counterweight.
Rulers

According to Nordlinger, the most extreme and rare form of military intervention in politics is the advent to power of ruler-type interventionist officers. Ruler-type officers plan to be in power for the long term on the grounds that only long-term military intervention can resolve the problems that beset the country. Accordingly, they do not (at least in the initial stages of their rule) indicate a time when they might step down. While in power, ruler-type officers often develop highly authoritarian regimes in which state-sanctioned mass organisations are developed and managed as channels for political participation. As David Jenkins has pointed out, the "ruler-type" phenomenon is strongly resonant of the former New Order regime in Indonesia. 27

Praetorianism

The term “praetorianism” came into common use in research into military intervention from the 1960s. For example, Nordlinger styled his “moderators”, “guardians” and “rulers” as “praetorian” officers.

The term was coined (in relation to contemporary military intervention) by David Rapoport and stemmed from the character and actions of the Praetorian Guard established by the Roman Emperor Augustus to protect him and his government. However, as Rapoport notes, over time the guard began to intervene in politics in a corrupt and venal manner. 28

Research into Military Intervention Questioned

By the late 1960s and early 1970s the optimism of some earlier researchers about the potential of military officers to reform and develop the new states had largely evaporated. For example, Werner Pfennig writes that while it might be possible to describe the military as being "modernisation-oriented" in terms of its equipment, many soldiers do not carry modernisation into the political arena

26 Features of a very complex and protracted process included Suharto’s thinly veiled use of duress to acquire from Sukarno powers to deal with the “threat” from the PKI in March 1966, before becoming Acting President in February 1967 and President in 1968.
28 “… the Guard acquired great independent power. It openly blackmailed governments that could not survive without purchasing its loyalty, and it set up and deposed emperors, often selling itself in the process to the highest bidder.” D.C. Rapoport, “A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types”, in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York, Free Press, 1962, p. 72.
as they may regard ideas and programs that are contrary to their own opinions as subversive. 29

Writing about military intervention in Indonesia, Salim Said questions a basic assumption regarding civil-military interaction that underlies much of the early research. He argues that the models proposed by these researchers are "... not fully satisfactory ..." in explaining intervention in Indonesia in that they presupposed the existence of an apolitical army which suddenly decided to intervene in the political process in some way. 30

Early researchers might have believed that military officers in new states would have basically similar characteristics to those that they perceived that their counterparts in industrialised Western nations possessed. In the event, while many had been trained in Western military academies and had been members of colonial armies, the influence of this training and experience was often abandoned when they became subjected to similar pressures to those that had shaped the civilian leaders they had deposed.

Military Intervention as a Discrete Phenomenon

From the 1960s, some researchers questioned a concentration on the characteristics of armies by researchers who sought to explain the phenomenon of military intervention. For example, according to Rapoport, praetorianism emerges when public authority disintegrates and governments “… are not sustained by strong sentiments or well-disciplined social groups that enable it to weather adversity or to pursue consistent policies.” 31 Faced with this decline in support for the ends of government, “to survive, government had to depend upon its coercive instruments, and praetorianism was the inevitable result.” 32

A praetorian state – as described by Rapoport – is one in which there is a complete absence of trust

30 “… they tend to assume that the political role of the military in the new states comes about as a result of intervention. By intervention the theories imply that a previously apolitical military suddenly grabs power from civilian politicians. They are mainly concerned with trying to explain why an apolitical military precipitously assumes a political role. … “Underlying this basic assumption is the belief, again rooted in the Western liberal tradition, that involvement of the military in politics is illegitimate. Consequently, many discussions of the role of the military in the Third World are no more than discussions of the failure of Western-style democracy.” Said, Op. Cit., p. 2.
both within the ruling elites and between the rulers and the ruled. Cynicism is widespread and no ruler can create the necessary institutional structures to facilitate a smooth succession of power. Governments that appear reasonably secure fall suddenly in response to an unanticipated event. There is no incentive for the large and idle masses to work for nobody can guarantee that they will retain the fruits of their labour. There is a breakdown in educational and other standards.\(^{33}\)

Rapoport saw the army as the focus of moves in support of and against governments in such states because it is: “… the most fruitful source for political intrigue, and the government conspires to promote its military supporters, while the opposition attempts to curry favour with the most strategically placed military men.”\(^{34}\) However, the army was but one of many sources of intrigue and was itself weakened by the disunity that such intrigue introduced into its ranks.\(^{35}\)

In 1968, Samuel Huntington observed that: “Some evidence supports these [Janowitz’s] connections [between the attributes of military officers and the likelihood of intervention], but other evidence does not.”\(^{36}\) Huntington was of the opinion that weak states were particularly susceptible to military intervention, but that this was not due to any particular characteristics that armies and military officers might possess but because all sectors of society had become politicised.\(^{37}\) Huntington found that analyses whose focus was the military, the clergy or the unions tended to “stress the high degree of politicisation” of such groups while failing to place a similar focus upon the politicisation of other societal groups.”\(^{38}\)

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 72.  
\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 73.  
\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 74.  
\(^{35}\) “By emphasising the army’s strength, contemporary discussions of praetorianism obscure the army’s weakness or vulnerabilities. We have no basis, consequently, for discussing the mutual interactions of government and soldiers which, ironically, was the concern of the classical view represented in the experience of Rome and the work of traditional political theorists.” Rapoport is explicit in repudiating Nordlinger’s concentration on armies as the well-springs of praetorianism: “… the concept which I reintroduced two decades ago has been refashioned to mean something else - the antithesis of civilian control…” D. Rapoport, “The Praetorian Army”, p. 253.  
\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 194. “Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicisation of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out of joint, not just the military.”  
\(^{38}\) Huntington’s description of a praetorian society is similar to that of Rapoport:
I agree with Huntington that military intervention in politics is a complex process involving more than the characteristics of armies. Nevertheless, I believe that aspects of the early research into military intervention are useful in that they provide a distillation of experiences of military intervention throughout the world that can be used to place the Indonesian experience of military intervention in a broader context. Two more recent theories of military intervention that seek to describe the affinity of some military forces with corporatist / functional modes of interest representation (the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” model) and the tendency of some armed forces to seek to engage in “nation building” to stave off radical movements of the Left (“new professionalism”) are particularly apposite to the Indonesian case.

The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model of the State

As stated in the introduction to this Chapter, I believe the bureaucratic-authoritarian model is useful in explaining the emergence of the BKS initiative. It was originally developed by Juan Linz from his study of the Franco regime in Spain 39 and was subsequently adapted by a number of scholars to the study of regimes in Latin America, of whom Guillermo O'Donnell is the most notable. 40

O'Donnell has described the following circumstances and influences which can lead to the replacement of pluralist structures of interest representation by a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in Latin America.

The Politicisation of the Popular Sector and Economic Decline

The first of O'Donnell’s preconditions for the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism is the advent of increasingly autonomous and often Left wing mass movements:

... the massive praetorianisation of Latin American societies, or the increased randomisation of their social relations; and social changes which stimulated the emergence and hypertrophic growth of complex public and private organisations. The former process resulted from the

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“In a praetorian society … not only are the actors varied, but so are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct action are found on the political scene. The techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes puts it, ‘When nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps.’ ” Ibid., p. 195.


increasing incapacity of pre-existing institutional frameworks to regulate the behaviour of diverse sectors of civil society. This expressed itself in growing levels of conflict, in the rapid political activation of the popular sector, in the articulation by this sector of goals and leaders increasingly autonomous vis-a-vis the state and the dominant classes, and in the limited capacity of the state to extract and allocate resources.  

A "Social Impasse"

O'Donnell goes on to describe the emergence of a "social impasse" resulting from social and economic turmoil and a tendency on the part of the middle classes to opt for "... 'order and security' as a response to the political activation of the popular sector." These influences, in turn, contribute to a growth in the influence of the armed forces:

The "communist threat," acute political conflicts, and recurrent economic crises led the internal and external dominant sectors [of the economy] to see the armed forces as the last bulwark against social disintegration. Foreign aid programs and the pressures of diverse local sectors coincided with the aspiration of the armed forces to separate themselves from the praetorian state and from politicians, as part of the redefinition of their role in achieving "development" and eliminating "subversion" as prerequisites to "national security." As a corollary, nothing could be attained without the emergence of a strong state, which could only be brought about by the armed forces' putting a quick end to the praetorian period.

The Creation of Corporatist Structures

In the Latin American countries studied by O'Donnell corporatist structures became used by politically-interventionist military forces as means of regulating the articulation of social aspirations. In these societies the authorities created a series of state corporatist structures "... to incorporate the popular sector economically and politically ..." and "... to control or to prevent the emergence of autonomous organisational bases, leaders, and goals that might carry its political activation beyond the limits acceptable to the new bourgeois and state-based sectors."  

The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model and New Order Indonesia

In the late 1970s Dwight King drew attention to the relevance of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model to the study of the Indonesian New Order regime. King believed that this model was particularly useful in accounting for the New Order's consensually derived legitimacy base,
technocratic mentality, emphasis on programmatic economic planning and its efforts to limit pluralism through the imposition of state corporate structures. 45

A "technocratic mentality" distinguished bureaucratic authoritarian regimes from totalitarian regimes, which employed a "... more elaborated form of ideology..." Rather than undergoing a process of mobilisation such as in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the masses in bureaucratic-authoritarian states were isolated from the political processes except for essentially ritualistic exercises in the form of stage-managed general elections. 46

King stressed that "... limited pluralism [was] the most distinctive feature of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and research and analysis of this aspect is likely to be most revealing about how the bureaucratic authoritarian pattern of domination is maintained and about emergent sources of political change." 47 Limited pluralism was achieved through the use of "... repression, co-option and, typically, a network of corporatist organisations..." 48

While the model of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state was intended to be applied to working regimes rather than the Indonesian Army's early involvement in corporatism, two characteristics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model (the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in response to a perceived threat to the social status quo and the tendency of such regimes to establish corporatist structures as means of dampening and channelling societal aspirations) are useful in describing the forces and influences which contributed to the establishment and subsequent development of the BKS.

45 In recommending the bureaucratic model, King discounted earlier models used to describe New Order Indonesia, i.e. the patrimonial model (Harold Crouch argued in “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia” that the New Order regime was a patrimonial military regime in which patron-client ties were instrumental to the functioning of the state) and the bureaucratic polity model (that the military and the bureaucracy played a dominant role Thai politics) which was originally proposed by Fred Riggs in his study of Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s (Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity) and applied to Indonesia by Karl D. Jackson in the 1970s (“Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia”). In describing New Order Indonesia of the late 1970s as a bureaucratic-authoritarian state rather than conforming to either of these models, King attributed the regime's legitimacy base to such factors as power being exercised by "... the military as an institution ..." rather than by "... an individual ruler.". Bureaucratic authoritarian states employed a "... technocratic, bureaucratic approach to policy making." in which the accent was upon "... a consultative and consensual (and relatively predictable) decision-making process among a ruling group and the central role of a larger bureaucratic structure, not the military per se." King, Op. Cit., p. 110.

46 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
47 Ibid., p. 111.
48 Ibid.
The Applicability of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model to the Indonesian Army’s Embrace of Corporatism

At the time of Nasution’s attempt in 1957 to use his “total people’s resistance” apparatus to organise and manage corporatist bodies (the BKS initiative) the Indonesian Army was a decade away from establishing a military regime. Nevertheless, O’Donnell’s description of the conditions and influences likely to lead to the channelling of social aspirations through exclusivist state-sanctioned corporatist structures resonate with those that gave impetus to the BKS experiment in Indonesia.

The Regulation of Social Aspirations

In the last years of the Japanese occupation and after the proclamation of independence in 1945 there was an intense and rapid growth of political, social, cultural and other types of organizations. Several were political parties while many other organisations were attached to or affiliated with the parties. 49

The politicisation of the Indonesian masses had taken place in tandem with chronic cabinet instability and serious regional unrest. As discussed in Chapter One, by the mid-1950s many Indonesians, including President Sukarno and Nasution, were becoming concerned at this state of affairs and outspoken in their opposition to parliamentary democracy. In his address at the launch of the BKS - Pemuda-Militer in mid-1957 (Chapter One), Nasution spoke of his concern that society had fragmented into “various groups and streams of political thinking (aliran)” 50 and his pleasure that “the youth who represent the four (4) major aliran in our society” had agreed to work together through this organization. 51 Nasution clearly felt that parliamentary democracy had created a

49 According to the Indonesian Ministry of Information, in May 1949 41 parties were active in Java, four in Sumatra, 27 in East Indonesia and 10 in Borneo - a total of 82 Indonesian parties in addition to some 15 Dutch, Chinese and Arab political organisations which remained active at that time. Republik Indonesia Serikat, Ministry of Information, Political Parties, Armed Groups, Labour Unions and Youth Organisations in Indonesia, Djakarta (mimeo), p. 13. Extracted from Guy Pauker, “The Role of Political Organisations in Indonesia”, 1958, p. 134. 50 There are a number of definitions of aliran. Benedict Anderson defines it as “a distinctive, integrated cultural outlook, together with its organised and unorganised (but potentially organisable) adherents” (“The Idea of Power in Indonesian Culture”), fn 35. Feith defined the term as a “stream of political thinking” comprising a dominant party supported by various mass organisations representing the youth, labour, peasants, etc. (“Introduction” to Feith and Castles, Op. Cit.). For a discussion of the concept of aliran, see Irman G. Lanti, Back to the (Slightly Different) Future: Continuity and Change in Indonesian Politics, Visiting Researchers Series No 2 (April 2001), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Because the BKS organisations were intended to exert power over the mass organisations of the parties I have chosen to use Feith’s definition. 51 Amanat KSAD Dalam Pertemuan Program Kerja Sama Penguasa Militer - Pemuda Masa, 1957, pp. 1-2.
dangerously politicised and divided society and that the army’s initiative to corporatise mass organizations would restore the “traditional” status quo.

**Economic Decline**

In addition to the politicisation of the popular sector, there was evidence of economic decline in 1950s Indonesia. The Korean War had temporarily led to a boom in the price of commodities. However, when the war ended inflation and unemployment (which was given further impetus by a rapidly rising population) rose sharply. Conservative civilian and military elites became increasingly concerned about economic decline and rampant inflation.

**The Threat Posed by the PKI**

The growth of the PKI and its labour unions and other mass organizations was another factor that contributed to widespread concern among conservative Indonesians and contributed to the feelings of unrest in the regions that culminated in the PRRI / Permesta rebellion. PKI membership grew rapidly during the 1950s to the point where 1956 it claimed to have one million members and the other parties found it difficult to compete with its modern and disciplined methods and its vast array of mass organisations through which it reached down into village populations.

In the industrial relations fields arena the PKI’s SOBSI (The All-Indonesia Central Organisation of Workers - *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*) was particularly strong, and the party’s union muscle and expertise in organising down to the grass roots level contributed in no small part to its performance in the 1955 general elections and the 1957 regional, municipal and district elections.

While army commanders attempted to crack down on PKI activities in a number of parts of the country, they seemed powerless to stem the PKI's success in organising down to the village level.

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Nasution, like his counterparts in the Latin American states studied by O’Donnell, sought to constrain the PKI by establishing his BKS corporatist structures. 54

**Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and “Total People’s Resistance”**

As noted earlier, when Nasution established the BKS initiative the army was still ten years away from establishing a military regime. Another significant point of departure from the experience of the Latin American countries was that the Indonesian Army employed its “total people’s resistance” apparatus (the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance – IJTP) to launch and manage the BKS initiative. The army leadership sought to build on its experience of mobilising civilians to wage “total people’s resistance” against the Dutch as a rationale for seeking to detach the mass organizations from the parties and placing them under the influence of the army.

**New Professionalism**

Another political theory that emerged from the Latin American experience is Alfred Stepan’s “New Professionalism” model. It was linked with the Indonesian experience of military intervention by Ian MacFarling, who argued that Alfred Stepan’s “old professionalism/new professionalism” paradigms were highly relevant to the emergence of military interventionism in Indonesia. 55

Researching military intervention in authoritarian states in Latin America (and those of Brazil and Peru in particular) Stepan recalled a thesis on military professionalism that Samuel Huntington developed in the 1960s. Briefly put, Huntington argued that modern warfare had become so highly specialised and technically demanding that professional military officers had no time to involve themselves in social or political affairs to a significant extent. Rather, they were of necessity totally absorbed in their professional activities. These activities accorded them significant job satisfaction and most had no desire to become involved in politics. 56

A distinct and mutually agreed functional difference existed between political and military leaders.

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Military leaderships were indifferent to the values and ideological perspectives of civilian leaderships. Civilian control was exerted through this professionalisation of the military, which rendered it politically neutral and sterile in regard to issues outside the military sphere. 57

Stepan noted that by the end of the 1950s and early 1960s this situation began to change in a number of countries. Armed movements that pursued revolutionary war techniques (he mentioned China, Indochina, Algeria and Cuba) 58 had been successful in defeating conventional armies. To deal with this threat, the United States shifted the focus of its military assistance to Third World states from a focus on “old professionalism” to a “new professionalism” which was aimed at enhancing “internal security and national development”. 59

Stepan stated that in Brazil and Peru military officers had been highly professional in the “old” sense of the term. The armed forces of these countries had highly developed training systems for all ranks, including basic military academies for junior officers and staff colleges for more senior officers. They had well-developed defence doctrines and were in possession of and had been trained to operate military equipment which was directed against external threats.

This situation changed when the military forces in these countries began to focus on internal security and “nation building” activities. While retaining a highly professional approach, including the development of doctrine that was imparted through systematic training and education, the armed forces in these countries widened considerably the scope of their activities and doctrine. They began to take into account political matters that they believed would better enable them to deal with the political aspects of their internal security duties.

Rather than concentrating on external threats, the military schools became increasingly concerned with threats to internal security. The scope of their training activities and doctrinal development became so wide that they dealt extensively with the challenge of creating more favourable social conditions. The aim was to deprive insurgents of grievances they had exploited in seeking to mobilise populations in opposition to the political status quo.

The military’s growing concentration on internal security snowballed to the point where officers became highly politicised. Stepan describes “military role expansion and ‘managerialism’ in the

58 Ibid., p. 50.
59 Ibid., pp. 49, 50.
political sphere.” These developments were at the expense of the authority of civilian governments. In the table below Stepan points out the differences that emerged between the “new” and the “old” professionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function of military</th>
<th>Old Professionalism</th>
<th>New Professionalism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian attitudes toward government</td>
<td>Civilians accept legitimacy of government</td>
<td>Segments of society challenge governmental legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military skills required</td>
<td>Highly specialised skills Incompatible with political skills</td>
<td>Highly interrelated political and military skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of military professional action</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of professional socialisation</td>
<td>Renders the military politically neutral</td>
<td>Politicises the military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact on civil-military relations</td>
<td>Contributes to an apolitical military and civilian control</td>
<td>Contributes to military-political managerialism and role expansion</td>
</tr>
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Stepan described in some detail the “professional” approach adopted by military forces that emphasised an internal security role. After identifying the threat as an internal security one, these military forces employed previous “old professional” patterns of activity in seeking to counter it. They established surveillance and intelligence organisations and procedures that were oriented towards restoring internal security and redirected the focus of training institutions.

Stepan cited the diversion of attention of Brazil’s prestigious three-year Escola Superior do Guerra (ESG) or Superior War College towards internal security and nation building with the result that it became concerned with “… all phases of development and national security…”. The ESG began to attract large numbers of civilian students from government, industry and commerce, the judiciary, the medical profession and the Catholic clergy. It developed an ideology that stressed the “… close interrelationship between national security and national development. The doctrines taught at the college emphasised that modern warfare, either conventional or revolutionary, involved the unity,
will, and productive capacity of the entire nation.” 63

**The “New Professionalism” and Indonesia**

Similarities between Stepan’s description of the emergence of “new professionalism” in Brazil and Peru and the processes of intervention that unfolded in Indonesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s are easy to find. For example, like the military colleges in Brazil and Peru, from the early 1960s the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat* - Seskoad) became increasingly involved in developing doctrines of internal security and national development, including the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. A number of civilian lecturers were invited to lecture at the School on matters relating to national development. Undoubtedly they contributed to the Indonesian Army’s growing doctrinal development in the fields of internal security and national development.

In the New Order period, Indonesia’s Institute for National Resilience (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* – Lemhannas) was closer in function to Brazil’s *Escola Superior do Guerra* than Seskoad. Lemhannas was a training and doctrinal development institute for senior TNI officers and civil servants. It concentrated on the nexus between TNI’s socio-political and military functions within the wider framework of fostering receptiveness to modernisation while protecting and retaining Indonesian culture. 64 This institute developed a concept known as national resilience which is resonant of Stepan’s description of the Brazilian military’s efforts to create a harmony between nation building and defence and security. 65

As was the case with Brazil, the United States exerted influence on the development of policies that stressed an inter-linkage between national security and national development in Indonesia. From the late 1950s the United States, through the Rand Corporation and military personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, greatly influenced doctrinal development at Seskoad.

In these respects the history of the Indonesian Army since the mid-to-late 1950s resembles that of the Brazilian military’s slide into what Stepan has described as “new professionalism”. Indeed,

63 *Ibid*, pp. 54, 55.
64 As can be seen in the following statement by a former Governor of Lemhannas, Lieutenant General (Retired) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo: “… National Resilience consists of two aspects that are like two sides of the same coin, that is on one side there is prosperity and on the other side there is security. It is not possible for National Resilience to exist without the existence of national prosperity and national security.” See Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, *Kepemimpinan ABRI: Dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya*, Jakarta, Intermasa, 1996, p. 264, 265.
Stepan himself conjectures that “… either Brazil must be considered a deviant case, or one must suggest an alternative framework that is capable of incorporating Brazil, Peru … and, I suspect, a number of other countries, such as Indonesia, as the predictable outcome of the new paradigm.” 66

However, there is an important difference between the cases Stepan described and the Indonesian Army’s adoption of “new professionalism”. In Indonesia “new professional” characteristics were layered upon the foundations of a force that had never acquired “old professional” traits. Throughout the struggle against the Dutch, the TNI never developed beyond the level of guerrilla warfare. This was unlike the Brazilian experience, where the armed forces were thoroughly versed in “old professionalism”. It is even dissimilar to the experiences of other armies that waged campaigns of people’s war / territorial warfare, such as Mao Tse Tung’s forces and Tito’s Yugoslav Army.

As discussed earlier, unlike the more conventional forces of professional armies, guerrilla forces are not differentiated from society at large and are more inclined to involve themselves in politics. The continuation of a guerrilla culture within the Indonesian Army probably made the Indonesian Army officer corps more readily accepting of “new professional” teachings from the United States than those from “old professional” backgrounds who had seen themselves as technically trained professional soldiers whose main focus was external defence.

When the Indonesian Army began to absorb “new professionalism” in the late 1950s it had only been in existence for fifteen years and less than ten years had elapsed since the Dutch had recognised Indonesian sovereignty. Throughout much of the 1950s the army was wracked by leadership turmoil and serious insurgencies, one of which entailed forces loyal to the central government fighting rebel troops in Sumatra and Sulawesi. This left it all but rudderless in terms of doctrinal development. Materiel procurement was seriously obstructed by the declining economy.

Another significant point of departure was that the Indonesian Army had already begun to transform its own core principles of “total people’s resistance” into means of military intervention by the time it began to associate itself with the “new professional” ideas that were emanating from US military training institutions. Rather than simply adopting “new professionalism” as a discrete package, it layered “new professional” characteristics over these principles of “total people’s resistance”.

65 Ibid., p. 265.
In particular, the army began to use its formative experience of mobilising and leading civilians to assist it in waging “total people’s resistance” against the Dutch as a rationale for “preparing” the people to support the army in combating internal and external threats. Indeed, the army’s use of external defence as a rationale for military intervention was a particularly unusual aspect of the style intervention it developed around its “total people’s resistance” doctrines.

This association of the two interventionist concepts was important for the army’s assimilation of “new professionalism” because the rationale used by the army to “prepare” citizens for internal and external defence was tied to its formative experiences and core identity, and because Nasution and a number of his officers had a particularly strong commitment to these “people’s resistance” strategies.

**Organicism**

While the “bureaucratic authoritarian” and “new professionalism” models originated from particular circumstances in Latin American countries and resonate strongly with the Indonesian case of military intervention, the political “model” that most accurately and profoundly explains the army’s gradual linkage of “total people’s resistance” with its support for “traditional” means of interest representation is organicism.

This stream of political thought is particularly appropriate to the Indonesian case because organicist thinking emerged in that country as a product of the particular situation and conditions that prevailed when the Indonesian state and its army were formed. Moreover, unlike the “bureaucratic authoritarian” and “new professionalism” models, the type of organicist thinking espoused by Professor Supomo in his 1945 address to the Preparatory Body for Indonesian Independence is highly congruent with the model of “total people’s resistance” that emerged in Indonesia.

As discussed in Chapter One, Supomo referred to European organicist thinkers but placed greater emphasis on “traditional” Indonesian authority structures and modes of social interaction. He idealised “traditional” officials, particularly at the village level. In his address to the Preparatory Committee in 1945 he placed great emphasis on what he perceived as their role in safeguarding unity and “balance” within their communities. : 

According to the original character of Indonesian governmental systems, which up to the present can be seen within the village milieu, both in Java and Sumatra and the other islands of
Indonesia, the officials of the state are leaders who united in soul with the people and these officials are always obliged to hold tightly to unity and balance within their communities.

The village head, or the head of the people, is obliged to bring about an awareness of people’s justice, must always give form (Gestaltung) to the feelings of justice and the aspirations of the people. Because of this, the head of the people “holds the customary law” (a Minangkabau saying) in always paying attention to changes in his community and to this end always consults [bermusyawarah] with his people or with heads of families in his village so that spiritual ties between leader and people are continually fostered. In an atmosphere of unity between the people and their leader, between groups of people themselves, all groups are enveloped by a spirit of mutual self-help, family spirit [semangat gotong royong, semangat kekeluargaan].

According to this thinking the [role of] the state is not to guarantee the interests of individuals or groups, but to guarantee the interests of the whole of society as a unified entity. The state is a societal structure that is integral, all groups, all components, all of its members are closely linked to each other and constitute a unified societal entity that is organic. What is most important in a state based on integral thinking is the life of the people in their entirety as a unified entity that cannot be divided. 67

Nasution’s reliance on traditional authority structures in his “people’s resistance” strategies in the struggle against the Dutch might well have been a product of necessity in view of the situation he found himself in. However, by the time Nasution wrote of his guerrilla experiences in the 1950s he clearly had very similar views to those Supomo expressed to the BPUPKI on the need to maintain the unity of society around these structures and particularly village administrations (previously cited in Chapter One) and sought to idealise the links his strategies had sought to forge between the army and traditional authority structures. 68

In championing organicism, Supomo was clearly concerned to avoid social divisions: “What is most important in a state based on integral thinking is the life of the people in their entirety as a unified entity that cannot be divided.” 69 This also accords closely with Nasution’s desire to put an end to what he saw as dangerous divisiveness by launching the BKS initiative: “… at the present time our people are fragmented into various groups and (aliran).” 70 and “… this was not the aim and intention of the struggle of the people of Indonesia. The fruits of our struggle were for all the Indonesian nation.” 71

It was perhaps paradoxical that Supomo, who epitomised the urban, educated Indonesian,......
idealised “traditional” village structures and values. In adopting Nasution’s model of “total people’s resistance”, the 1945 Generation officer corps took on a similarly paradoxical role. Although by no means a peasants’ army (at the officer level), the relatively well-educated and generally city-based TNI officers adopted “people’s warfare” strategies and doctrines. In Indonesia, “total people’s resistance” allocated “the people” a subordinate role to the army and the pamong praja.

It is highly likely that Nasution and many other officers saw nothing incongruous in such an arrangement because they perceived the pangreh praja / pamong praja as a form of indigenous administration that pre-dated the colonial period. It was a highly pervasive system that they had grown up with and with whom many had family associations.

In Chapter One I noted Bourchier’s observation that Supomo “… saw inherent value in the “traditional” status quo,” and commented that Supomo’s own “status quo” was one of relative privilege as a member of the priyayi class. Because of the particular social and educational conditions in the Netherlands East Indies towards the end of colonial rule it is highly likely that the vast majority of members of the officers of the 1945 Generation felt similar attachments, although they may not have thought them out and articulated them in the same way as the adat law specialist Supomo.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 1945 Generation Indonesian Army officer corps was more aristocratic in its composition and included more members of other elites than is generally realised. Very few peasants or people from a similar background gained entry to the officer corps.

The lack of representation of officers from lower socio-economic levels can be partly explained by the paucity of opportunities for education for such Indonesians. Kahin writes that in 1940,

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71 Ibid.
72 The pangreh / pamong praja was not as “traditional” as many Indonesians had come to believe. During the last century of colonial rule the Dutch “regularised” the aristocratic rulers into a subsidiary bureaucracy of the Netherlands Indies civil service. The colonial regime began to institute wide-ranging reforms to the pangreh praja after the protracted and costly Java War (1825-1830) led by Prince Diponegoro. The Dutch institutionalised the principle of hereditary succession to the post of Bupati and members of the corps lost the last vestiges of their autonomy. Ann Kumar, “The Peasantry and State on Java: Changes of Relationship, Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries” in Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Canberra, Australian National University, 1980, p. 584.
1,130 Indonesian students graduated from Mulo schools (which offered a Western education from years 7 – 9). Only 240 Indonesians graduated from high school. These are appallingly low figures when the population of the archipelago at the time (just over 60 million) is taken into account.

Almost as significant is the almost total absence of a capitalistic Indonesian “middle class”. Kahin describes this “middle class” as “tiny” with the vestiges of its “capitalist element” in decline and giving way to a “… much larger group made up of government clerks, administrative officials (mostly of a junior grade), and teachers basing their position on the newly available Western education, and in particular on their command of the Dutch language.”

Not only were officers drawn from a remarkably small pool of educated Indonesians. The lack of an ethnic Indonesian entrepreneurial “middle class” meant that a great many of them had connections of some sort with aristocratic families (many of whom were members of the pangreh praja) or were from families with lower socio-economic backgrounds who gained their incomes from the pangreh praja or directly from the colonial state in one way or another.

Another important factor in the apparent widespread support for Nasution’s strategies within the TNI is the degree of cultural, religious and ethnic homogeneity that existed within the officer corps by the end of the armed struggle. Although officers were by no means united around a single political ideology or held a particular view on how the army should evolve in the future, the typical officer to emerge from the struggle was a Javanese from the abangan section of the population rather than from the santri aliran. This was significant because the pangreh praja had been drawn from the abangan / priyayi section of the population and had often been regarded with suspicion and distrust by santri Indonesians (see Chapter One).

Throughout the armed struggle large numbers of santri Indonesians joined regular and irregular units, although at the outset most elected to join such irregular forces as the santri-counterpart to PETA, the Hizbullah (Army of God) youth militia. While Hizbullah was established by the

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76 Edward Shils places the Netherlands East Indies on a similar level to the Ottoman Empire in terms of its poor record in creating “a modern literary-political or a modern technical-administrative intelligentsia…” Shils, Op. Cit., p. 23.
77 Ibid., p. 29.
Japanese late in the occupation and training given to it was minimal, by the end of the Japanese occupation *Hizbullah* claimed some 50,000 members, although this figure was probably greatly exaggerated.

Although many *Hizbullah* units were absorbed into the TNI, by the late 1940s the army had become involved in countering insurgencies by Muslims who wished to establish an Islamic state and by the early 1950s there were relatively few *santri* officers within the army. A number of *santri* officers defected to the *Darul Islam* cause in West Java when S.M. Kartosuwiryo proclaimed an Islamic State of Indonesia in August 1949, while others left the army because of a reluctance to join in suppressing *Darul Islam*.

To the left of the political spectrum, the suppression of the PKI after the Madiun Affair purged many with leftist views from the army, effectively eliminating a potential source of criticism of Nasution’s reliance on the *pamong praja*. The cause of national Communism was dealt a severe blow when the national Communist, Tan Malaka, was killed by Republican forces in May 1949. Tan Malaka had seen himself as a rival to Sukarno for the position of President and written papers on guerrilla warfare in which he referred to “… aristocratic parasites of the Dutch.” Anthony Reid points out in executing him the army had "... eliminated their last serious rival to effective leadership of the resistance.”

These factors and influences no doubt contributed to the readiness of many 1945 Generation officer corps to follow Nasution when he turned to organicism in the 1950s and linked it with his idealisation of the links between the army and traditional authority structures during the “total people’s resistance” campaigns of the armed struggle. This is why I believe that organicism as espoused by Supomo and further developed by Djokosutono and embraced by Nasution is a particularly interesting prism through which to view the unusual and possibly unique style of military intervention that evolved in Indonesia.

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79 *Ibid.* In a similar vein, Van Dijk writes that in August 1945 the *Hizbullah* could only claim the 500 initial cadres as "... more or less properly trained members, scattered all over Java and Madura ..." C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1981, p. 74.
FOUR - NASUTION’S EARLY POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Chapters Four to Eight of this thesis will identify influences other than “instrumental” considerations that contributed to Nasution’s attraction to organic “traditional” values and his embrace of organicist political and constitutional formulas in the 1950s. In this chapter I shall discuss Nasution’s youth and the highly formative years he spent in Bandung.

I shall be particularly concerned to identify the influence on Nasution of his father-in-law, the Parindra identity Soenarjo Gondokusumo. Soenarjo’s political orientation and influence upon Nasution has not been dealt with by other researchers. Penders and Sundhaussen argue “…there can be no doubt that his father-in-law had some ideological impact on the young Nasution.” ¹ However, as discussed in Chapter Two, these researchers confused Soenarjo with Djody Gondokusumo. Although relying upon this misidentification by Penders and Sundhaussen, Bourchier was nevertheless substantially correct in viewing Nasution’s father-in-law through the prism of the Parindra movement:

Exactly how much [influence] he absorbed is unclear, but Nasution’s preoccupation with order, his defence of pamong praja interests, his antipathy to political Islam and communism, his suspicion of political parties in general and his doubts about parliamentary democracy are all consistent with the outlook of the Parindra elders. ²

Also in Chapter Two, I noted that Nasution’s widow, Sunarti, has published an account of their life together (Pak Nas Dalam Kenangan – Recollections of Pak Nas). I shall refer to Sunarti’s memoirs throughout this chapter and particularly the sections that deal with the relationship that developed between Nasution and her father. I shall also refer to Nasution’s own recollections.

Rather than accepting Nasution’s presentation of himself as essentially apolitical at this stage in his life, as previous researchers have done, ³ I shall explore his political socialisation by examining his association with the Gondokusumo family. Soenarjo Gondokusumo and his Parindra associates belonged to a movement of socially

² Bourchier, Op. Cit., p. 118. As noted earlier, on the basis of the error made by Penders and Sundhaussen, David Bourchier erroneously refers to Soenarjo as Djody Gondokusumo and states that like Djokosutono, Soenarjo was the recipient of a “…Dutch-influenced legal education” having studied at the Rechtshoogeschool (Law College) in Jakarta. Ibid., p. 8. Of course, Djody Gondokusumo followed this course of education but Soenarjo did not.
³ As discussed in Chapter Two, the major research into Nasution’s life and career was done by Susan McKemmish and Penders and Sundhaussen. (Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit.; McKemmish, Op. Cit.) They did not identify Nasution as a socially conservative cooperating nationalist or explored the similarities between his political outlook and members of this particular stream of the independence movement. They did not delve into Nasution’s association with the Gondokusumo family or seek to identify the particular political orientation of Soenarjo Gondokusumo.
conservative cooperating nationalists who unsuccessfully attempted “to extract concessions from the Dutch in the last years before the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941” and who were “for the most part, swept aside by the tide of events which brought the exiled non-cooperators, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others, to the centre of the stage.”

The Parindra leaders favoured evolution, rather than revolution, in achieving an independent Indonesia. They adopted a benevolent if perhaps paternalistic role in seeking to develop the educational and economic position of the uneducated masses. Their outlook was very different from that of the leading non-cooperator, Sukarno, who refused any form of cooperation or association with the Dutch government and sought to inspire the masses with a spiritual and philosophical vision of independence that was to be a “golden bridge” to an imagined country in which nationalism, Marxism and Islam were united in a syncretic amalgam and the small people (marhaen), rather than the forces of capitalism and the Indonesian bourgeoisie, would hold ultimate power.

In identifying Nasution’s political orientation at this stage in his life, I shall categorise him as a socially conservative cooperating nationalist. In doing so I shall draw upon Sunarti’s memoirs, where she describes an intensely close, lengthy and personal relationship between Nasution and Soenarjo. I shall argue that one of the reasons the association between Nasution and Soenarjo was so close was that Nasution, like Soenarjo, was a socially conservative “cooperating” nationalist. I shall show that Nasution never displayed any interest in overthrowing or even disturbing existing indigenous social structures. Rather, he was prepared to work within the colonial system while maintaining nationalist aims. Moreover, the only political organizations that Nasution is known to have had a direct contact at this stage in his life with were Pagoejoeban Pasundan (Sundanese Union) and Parindra. Both were elitist and socially conservative.

In particular, I shall explore the strand of Parindra activism to which Soenarjo Gondokusumo belonged. I shall show that the cooperating nationalist activists with whom Soenarjo associated in the 1920s eschewed imported ideologies in the form of political

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5 Ibid.
Islam and Communism. Rather, they were concerned to build upon organic “traditional” Javanese self-help customs at the village level to enable the poor to better represent themselves to the colonial authorities. As discussed in Chapter Two, Feith and Castles identified five “streams of thinking” in Indonesian politics in the period between 1945 and 1965. 8 I shall argue that the political activity of these activists clearly accorded with their “Javanese traditionalism” stream. 9

It is important that I make this point. As discussed in previous chapters, an idealised version of village culture was an important element of Supomo’s attachment to organicist ideas. Nasution stressed the importance and authenticity of organic “traditional” village administrative structures in his planning for “people’s resistance” in the struggle against the Dutch, and he idealised this aspect of the struggle in the early-to-mid 1950s in his accounts of the period and in the political material he wrote for the IPKI organisation.

I shall also examine Nasution’s involvement with the Japanese in the occupation period. Like a number of other Parindra leaders, Soenarjo was a cooperating nationalist in another sense, in that he was close to the Japanese occupation forces. I shall discuss Soenarjo’s pro-Japan attitudes (and that of other Parindra leaders) and Nasution’s own interest in Japan before World War Two.

It is well known that during the occupation Nasution built upon a pre-existing interest in paramilitary youth organisations and became a leader of the militant paramilitary mass movements the Japanese developed in Bandung. These latter organisations were intended not only as a means of fostering support within the younger generation but to serve as the basis of a system of “people’s resistance” that could be activated if the Allies attempted to retake the archipelago.

The paramilitary youth organisations established by the occupation government, like a number of other groups developed by the Japanese, were organised on state corporatist / functional lines. They were sanctioned by the occupation government, which forbade the emergence of functional rivals.

Again, it is important that I make these points. I shall draw upon this discussion in future chapters when I shall trace lines of continuity between the attempts of the Parindra leaders to develop forms of interest representation that were based upon organic “traditional” forms of interest representation, Nasution’s involvement in the corporatised

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8 They were communism, radical nationalism, democratic socialism, Islam and Javanese traditionalism. Feith and Castles, Op. Cit., pp. 16, 17. Although these researchers discussed the period 1945-1965 they included material from earlier periods, including translations of much earlier statements from Javanese culture and art. Ibid., pp. 180-188.

9 That Bourchier and Hadiz went on to categorise as organicism in their study of political thinking in the New Order period. Bourchier and Hadiz, Op. Cit.
youth movements of the occupation period, his strategies for “people’s war” in the struggle against the Dutch, and his attempt to establish army-backed corporatist forms of interest representation through the Youth-Military BKS and other initiatives.

Batak Origins

Nasution was born into the Mandailing branch of the Batak ethnic group of North Sumatra, to the South of Aceh. The Bataks are numerically insignificant in Indonesia, numbering just three million (out of a total population of almost 200 million) in 1992. However, they are widely known throughout the archipelago and since Independence they have always been prominent in academic, defence, political, legal and trade union affairs.

They are often regarded as having adventurous personalities and a direct, straightforward approach to personal interactions. On the other hand, members of the Javanese ethnic group tend to display an emphasis on maintaining an atmosphere of social peace or rukun. At the elite levels of society, Javanese are known for a highly refined and elaborate approach to etiquette.

While some Batak groups were evangelized during the colonial period, the Mandailing Bataks remained true to a relatively orthodox form of Islam. On the other hand (as discussed in Chapter One), in Java there are important socio-religious cleavages within the Muslim community. While these cleavages have become “blurred in recent times” the pre-war priyayi class, from whom the pangreh praja was formed, generally adhered to a refined and syncretic abangan form of Islam and the peasant masses to much less refined and elaborate


11 This is hinted at in the following Library of Congress description of the Batak: “Culturally, they lack the complex etiquette and social hierarchy of the Hinduised peoples of Indonesia. Indeed they seem to bear closer resemblance to the highland swidden cultivators of Southeast Asia, even though some also practice padi farming. Ibid.

12 This elaborate sense of etiquette and regard for status is clearly expressed in the Javanese language: “Many of the rules of etiquette center on the proper use of language, which is more problematic in Javanese than in most other languages. When addressing someone, Javanese speakers must choose from several different levels of politeness. These ‘speech levels’ comprise words that have the same meaning, but are stylistically different. For instance, among the Javanese variations of the word ‘now’ saiki is the least refined, while saniki is a little fancier, and samenika is the most elegant. Javanese has many such triads – so many that people cannot speak for long in Javanese without having to make a choice, at which time they must decide whether the situation is formal or informal and what the relations among the participants are.” Ibid.

13 Ken Young, “Political Geography”, Indonesia – The Structure and Drivers, 2004, paper presented to the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 29 June 2004. See Chapter One for a discussion of these terms.
syncretic practices. Only the more santri Javanese (often traders) adhered to a relatively “orthodox” form of Islam.

Many members of the priyayi class and particularly members of the pangreh praja were heavily exposed to Dutch culture and education. However, this often led to feelings of frustration and disappointment.

Education tended to heighten a perception that the colonial system was a form of institutional theft of Indonesia’s natural resources. Many educated Indonesians also found their categorization within the Netherlands Indies colonial “pecking order” as inlanders or natives profoundly insulting. They often felt slighted in their dealings with the Dutch and heavily discriminated against when they sought employment or promotion. Moreover, by the 1930s an increasing number of pangreh praja officials felt frustrated at being relegated to the status of junior and relatively powerless partner to the Dutch bureaucrats of the European Interior Administration (Binnenlands Bestuur).

The complexity of the situation facing these priyayi recipients of a high-quality Dutch education was often compounded by a sense of alienation from the majority of their own ethnic group. Although there was a strong tendency among novelists in the late colonial period to portray villages as calm, harmonious and in touch with nature, to many priyayi, the villages (where the vast majority of Javanese resided) were places of relative ignorance, privation and hardship. Similarly, although Supomo idealised the organic “traditional”...

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14 This period was recreated by the Javanese writer and academic, Umar Kayam, in his short story, Bawuk, about the daughter of a pre-war pangreh praja official who married a Communist and perished with him in the massacres of 1965. Umar Kayam writes hauntingly of the Dutch furniture in the pre-war family home, replete with marble table and ornate chiming clock, and of Bawuk and her siblings singing Ik Ben ein Klein Officier (I am a Little Officer) on the way to their Dutch school. He also recounts Bawuk’s father’s continuing sometimes uncomfortable adherence to Javanese elite culture, including a reluctant involvement in gambling at social events and consorting with an erotic dancer so as not to displease the Bupati. Umar Kayam, Sri Sumarah dan Bawuk, Jakarta, Pustaka Jaya, 1975.

15 Europeans were at the top of this system of racial stratification, followed by Chinese and other “foreign” Asiatics (Vreemde Oosterlingen), and then “native” Indonesians.

16 Kahin noted that in the late 1930s: “Except as teachers in private schools there were almost no openings within Indonesian society itself for Indonesians with a Western education.” Within the civil service, Europeans occupied 92.2% of higher appointments while 98.9% of lower positions were occupied by Indonesians. Kahin, Op. Cit., pp. 34, 5.

17 For an account of the growing unrest and attempts at political activism on the part of some members of the pangreh praja, see Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi, Singapore, Heineman (ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series), 1979, pp. 114-143.


19 As Umar Kayam illustrates in his historically based novel, Para Priyayi, it was possible for some villagers to climb the rungs of education and migrate to the cities where they sometimes prospered within the pangreh praja and founded a priyayi “dynasty”. To such Javanese the village was a place from which they had escaped and to which they had no
values of village (desa) society in BPUPKI meetings, he and members of his class overwhelmingly resided in cities or large towns (kota).

Sunarti grew up in a mixed-race family in the cities of Surabaya, Surakarta and Bandung. Her father was a high aristocrat who held the title of Raden Panji. He could trace his lineage to the East Java-based Brawijaya dynasty of the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit kingdom (12th to 15th centuries). Majapahit was something of a precursor to modern Indonesia, as it exercised influence over Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Maluku and some other coastal areas of Southeast Asia.

Soenarjo was a patih or chief minister to the bupati at Mojokerto (near Surabaya). Sunarti writes that because Soenarjo was involved in anti-government activities he was blocked by the Dutch from going on to become a bupati and exiled to the Netherlands with other nationalists, including Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (Suardi Surjaningrat). There he studied economics from 1917 to 1921. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro lived next door to the family of Soenarjo’s future wife, Maria Hendrika Rademaker, and introduced Soenarjo to her.

Maria Gondokusumo was warned by her uncle, an army Colonel who had served in Aceh, that she would have to tolerate primitive living conditions if she married an inlander (native). Instead, accompanied by her mother (who stayed in Indonesia) she found herself in the midst of a Dutch-speaking and well-off family of aristocrats. From the outset, Maria strongly identified with the inlander population and threw herself into social welfare activities, setting an example for Sunarti who devoted much of her life to such pursuits.

20 Communication in April 2005 with Professor Soeijono, a son of Soenarjo’s brother-in-law, R.P. Soeroso.
22 Ki Hadjar Dewantoro was also an aristocrat but from the Paku Alaman, the junior line of the Yogyakarta royal family. He had joined the nationalist movement primarily out of concern at the lack of educational opportunities for the native population and what he saw as the decline of Javanese culture during the colonial period. In the Netherlands he became impressed with the work of Maria Montessori and on his return to Indonesia he founded the Taman Siswa (Garden of Students) education system as a nationalist rival to the Dutch schools and a means of promoting traditional Javanese skills, such as dance and music.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 225.
The social and economic gap between the Gondokusumo family and the uneducated, impoverished masses was very wide, as Sunarti makes clear in her recollections of childhood:

Mother often took us children for walks in the villages. She told us stories about the actual situation in our homeland, but with the intention that we could see the real situation of the people. To see the utter deprivation would inspire us to try to find out why they lived in poverty when we became adults, and to find avenues to help them in various ways so that they could uplift the standard and dignity of their lives. 26

The Early Years

Nasution’s early life was different in more than a cultural and religious sense from the priyayi family into which he married. His early circumstances were much closer to the villagers Sunarti was exhorted to help than the relatively affluent urban lifestyle enjoyed by many priyayi families.

Nasution was born in December 1918 in the small rural town of Huta-Pungkut. His father was a small-scale peddler of various wares including textiles. He also sold rubber to Chinese traders in the larger cities of the area. Whereas Sunarti’s family owned a car and was clearly affluent by Western as well as Indonesian standards of the time, Nasution’s father transported the rubber that he traded in a hired truck or horse-drawn cart.

Nasution was influenced towards a military career by stories his father told him about the wars undertaken by Mohammed and in contemporary times by the Turks. 27 It may be significant that Nasution’s father was a great admirer of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Ataturk), the Turkish military and political leader, whose picture was the sole decoration in the Nasution home. McKemmish writes that Nasution “… and other young Muslims were inspired by the example of Mustafa Kemal and other Turkish military commanders.” 28

Nasution does not record if his father admired Ataturk for taking Turkey along a Western path towards modernisation, which included the disestablishment of Islam, but the Turkish leader’s approach to the separation of religion and state attracted attention around the world and it is hardly likely that Nasution had not heard of it by the 1930s. It is interesting that Ataturk’s “secular” approach to Islam accorded with Nasution’s devotion to Pancasila, 29 whose first principle carefully avoids giving a special place to Islam in political life. 30

26 Ibid., p. 7.
28 Ibid.
29 On this subject, Penders and Sundhaussen write: “Although the people [of Nasution’s home village] were aware that Kemal was a secularist, separating religion from the affairs of the state, his nationalism, his policy of modernising society in order to elevate it to the standards of Western societies, and his war of liberation against French-backed Greece earned him their admiration. It is of course hazardous now to state exactly to what extent
Nasution’s austerity and self-discipline were implanted in him from an early age. In keeping with the strong Muslim flavour of the Mandailing area Nasution attended a government school for natives (Hollandsch-inlandsch school) in the mornings and a Muslim school (Madrasah), where he learnt to recite the Koran by heart in the afternoons. From the age of 13 Nasution was separated from his family when he had to attend school at a village six kilometres from Huta Pungkut, staying with relatives.

Nasution was a brilliant and hard-working student and this was the key to his unusual movement up the rungs of the Netherlands Indies education, social and employment ladder. He won a scholarship open only to top primary students in each region to a Native Teacher’s Training School (Sekolah Raja) in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, in 1932. At the Sekolah Raja, Nasution embarked on a disciplined and somewhat militarised life, living in a carefully supervised dormitory (asrama):

The first-year students took it in turns to be the bell monitor, signalling time to get up in the mornings, to eat, to start school, go from one lesson to the other, rest, study in the evenings, eat, etc. Students also took turns to be the “officer of the week”, maintaining order and supervising at meal times. They were organised into sports, art and religious clubs and senior students ensured that juniors behaved well both inside and outside the school. Nasution, who has described this period as his boarding school years (masa asrama), continued living an austere lifestyle in various asrama for much of his youth and early adulthood.

The Sekolah Raja in Bukit Tinggi was closed due to financial constraints and he was one of only four out of 100 students who passed a strict screening test to continue teacher training at the Hogere Inlandsch Kweekschool native teacher training college in Bandung. There Nasution lived in an asrama for another three years.

Bandung was a cosmopolitan centre for education, including the Technische Hogeschool (now the Bandung Institute of Technology – Institut Teknologi Bandung). It was the home of Indies style art deco architecture. As an Australian visitor of the time has recorded, Bandung in the late 1930s and early 1940s was:

Nasution was impressed and influenced by Kemal. But in view of Nasution’s future politics and the kind of nationalism he exhibited, which closely resembles that of Kemal, one may assume that Kemalist thought had, consciously or unconsciously, a profound effect on him.” Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 66.

30 See the discussion of Sukarno’s discovery of Pancasila in Chapter One.
… a beautiful city of red-tiled white houses. But the glare of the red roofs is softened by a mantle of tropical green moss, laid there by the generous hand of nature.\(^{35}\)

The city is located in the relatively cool Priangan highlands of West Java and is surrounded by mountain scenery that the same observer described as “… the nearest thing on our globe to an Earthly Paradise.”\(^{36}\)

Although Nasution was quiet, reserved, studious and religious,\(^{37}\) he clearly enjoyed living in Bandung and retained a close attachment to the city and its surroundings throughout his life. However, he did not do well in the practical aspects of his teacher training where his austere and serious disposition failed to strike a chord with students.\(^{38}\) Rather, he was increasingly fascinated by history, and military history in particular.

On graduation in 1938 he returned to Sumatra where he gained employment at a private Dutch language school in Bengkulu (where Sukarno was in exile) for a few months. He then moved to Muara Dua in the Palembang district before moving again to Tanjungpraja, near the city of Palembang. Nasution had begun studying for the matriculation certificate available to graduates of Dutch Senior High Schools (Algemene Middelbare School – AMS) in Bandung and passed the examination while at Tanjungpraja.\(^{39}\)

In May 1940 the Germans invaded Holland and entry to the Military Academy (Koninklijk Militaire Academie - KMA) at Breda in The Netherlands was no longer an option. Alarmed at the looming threat from Japan, the Netherlands Indies Government established a Reserve Officer corps (Corps Reserve Officieren – CORO) and opened a branch of the Royal Military Academy in Bandung. An AMS matriculation certificate was a prerequisite for applying and Nasution was one of a dozen or so Indonesians to pass the tight selection tests.

\(^{35}\) Frank Clune, *To the Isles of Spice with Frank Clune: A Vagabond Voyage by Air from Botany Bay to Darwin, Bathurst Island, Timor, Java, Celebes and French Indo China*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1940, p. 158. In a somewhat similar vein, the novelist Achdiat K. Mihardja describes pre-war Bandung at night: “Before the war, the descending twilight made a breathtaking picture of the city: the electric lights were turned on in the streets, shops and houses … As time passed, light from thousands of globes grew brighter throughout the city, finally coalescing into a sea of illumination. People, cars, and other transport were on the move, like tiny fish in motion on the bed of a gleaming ocean. Red blouses, yellow dresses, gaberdine suits streamed along the footpaths in front of the brightly lit shops. Packards, Fords, Erskines and Willys glittered on the roadways, forcing Fongers, Raleigh and Humber bicycles and gigs to the kerb. People were right in saying that Bandung, the ‘Paris of Java’, began to come alive at 6 p.m.” Achdiat K. Mihardja, *Atheis*, St Lucia, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1972, p. 161.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 162.


On returning to Bandung to join the KMA Nasution found himself again living in an asrama. Since his time at the Kweekschool in Bukit Tinggi he had sought refuge from dormitory living where possible in the family homes of friends or relations. His new status as an officer cadet gained him entry to well-to-do indigenous social circles in the city and he became acquainted with a number of “cooperating” members of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

**Nasution and the Cooperating Nationalists**

Nasution began to empathise with the idea of cooperating nationalism while at the Teacher Training College in Bandung, where he found that the parents of a fellow student, Artawi, were both nationalists and members of a KNIL auxiliary organization. Artawi’s explanation for this seemingly paradoxical situation was that nationalists had to seize any opportunity to learn skills from the Dutch that could help their cause, including associating themselves with the repressive KNIL. Nasution writes that this inspired him to seek entry to the KNIL, even though entry to the Royal Military Academy in Breda was: “… tightly restricted to one person per year and only those from pamong praja families, etc., families that had been ‘of service’ to the Dutch.”

In Nasution’s final year in Bandung, he and Artawi often attended open meetings held by *Indonesia Muda* (Young Indonesia), however “… neither of us entered a particular organisation.” When in 1938 he was working as a teacher in Bengkulu, Sumatra, Nasution considered joining *Surya Wirawan*, the youth wing of Parindra, but never followed through:

> I discussed the matter on a number of occasions with the Head of Parindra in Bengkulu, only awaiting the right time, that is awaiting the “consolidation” of my work and accommodation arrangements.

Penders and Sundhaussen attribute Nasution's reluctance to become involved in the nationalist cause to such concerns as: "The failure of political parties to unite for the purpose of fighting for the independence of the country, and largely to split along religious-communal lines ..." and a lack of opportunity to "... learn and practice in a formal context the art of intellectual dispute." They also refer to Nasution's desire for professional advancement:

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Being a member of a political party would have made it difficult to find employment as a teacher, and impossible to join the army. 46

Mackie writes that “… we can too easily slip into the facile assumption that the nationalist cause was inexorably gaining in strength and popular support, hence that sooner or later it was bound to triumph because the Dutch would eventually have had to give way to demands for a significant degree of self-government - and ultimately independence.” 47 Research into Nasution’s early life reveals absolutely no evidence that he would have done other that cooperate with the colonial regime in some way had Dutch rule not been so suddenly and cathartically ended by the Japanese in 1942.

There is a world of difference between Nasution’s perhaps calculating “cooperating nationalism” and that of the romantic revolutionary and “non-cooperating nationalist”, Sukarno. Benedict Anderson has commented insightfully that prior to declaring Indonesia’s independence, Sukarno’s career had taken place “… physically and politically outside the state...” and was:

... built entirely on the mobilisation of popular forces (the nationalist movement) and in long-standing opposition to the colonial state. Not only had Sukarno never been an official of that state, but that he had been spied on by its informers, arrested by its police, tried by its judges, and imprisoned and internally exiled for almost eleven years by its top bureaucratic directorate. And many of those who spied on, arrested, and sequestered him - not to speak of those who steadfastly obstructed his political work in the periods when he was free - were Indonesian members of the state apparatus. 48

On the other hand, in the final years of Dutch colonial rule Nasution showed no interest in disturbing the indigenous social structures of the day. Rather, he was at home within the colonial government apparatus, including the repressive and internally focused KNIL. His only involvement with nationalist organizations was with socially conservative priyayi “cooperating nationalist” circles of the type epitomised by Parindra.

46 Penders and Sundhaussen state that in adopting this course, Nasution was in fact mainly concerned with serving his country: "Having made up his mind that he would serve his country in a professional capacity rather than as a party politician, he needed to gain entrance into the school system in order to be able to teach and influence the youth of his country, and into the cadet school to learn the profession of arms in order to fight for Indonesia's independence when the time arrived." Ibid., p. 67.


Nasution and Parindra

Parindra was the major cooperating nationalist party and the political organisation that Nasution had most do with. That it was prepared to cooperate with the Dutch is evident in the willingness of Parindra members to sit in the Volksraad (the Dutch-created embryonic legislative assembly which eventually consisted of Indonesian representatives who were indirectly elected through regional councils and colonial officials) and in other assemblies created by the Dutch. 49

Parindra was socially conservative and priyayi-based, and included many pangreh praja figures. 50 The party had its roots in the Budi Utomo (High Endeavour) organization. Founded in 1908 by a retired priyayi Javanese doctor, Wahidin Sudirohusodo, the aim of Budi Utomo was to find a synthesis between traditional Javanese culture and the modernity of the early twentieth century. He had been inspired by the victory of Japan over Russia in 1901, which debunked the myth of inherent white superiority.

Another leading member of Buti Utomo was Dr. Sutomo, a student of the STOVIA (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen) School for the Training of Native Doctors. Like Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Sutomo was critical of Western education because he saw it as introducing imported and undesirable influences. He also eschewed the other major imported influences of the day: communism and political Islam. 51

Budi Utomo was essentially an elitist priyayi organization. Sutherland observes that while it included “… more radical students such as Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo …” who “… pressed for wider social changes…” leadership positions were accorded to relatively conservative establishment figures and the organization sought to improve the lot of the poor without “… having to descend to their level. 52

Soon Budi Utomo was joined on the political stage by the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Association of Muslim Merchants), which was initially aimed at seeking to unsettle the economic dominance of the Chinese in business. This organization also soon became a nationalist political party (Sarekat Islam). There followed a number of other new parties and organizations including the PKI, which resulted from a split within Sarekat Islam in 1920.

49 A.K. Pringgodigdo comments that “This meant that Parindra was very clearly cooperative in its attitude.” A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia, 1977, Jakarta, Dian Rakyat, 1978, p. 123, f.n. 5.
50 As Anthony Reid puts it, in the late colonial period Parindra was a cooperating party which was "... conservative in socio-economic matters and looked with sympathy to Japan." Reid, Op. Cit., 1974, p. 9.
52 Sutherland, Op. Cit., 1979, p. 59. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was exiled to the Netherlands at roughly the same time as Soenarjo Gondokusumo.
The colonial administration sought to respond to the changing conditions by establishing the Volksraad. As noted earlier, only “cooperating” Indonesians – including members of Budi Utomo and (later) Parindra - sought to sit in the Volksraad, while those who refused to cooperate with the colonial system declined to participate.

In the mid-1920s Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir formed study clubs aimed at training a vanguard who could spread the cause of nationalism among the masses. In 1924, Dr Sutomo formed the Indonesia Study Club (Indonesische Studieclub) in Surabaya.

Although Sutomo intended his Study Club to become a national organisation, study clubs were formed in other locations as competitors, rather than sub-sections of the Surabaya group. Sukarno was First Secretary of the Bandung Study Club and he and his colleagues quickly decided on a policy of non-cooperation. On the other hand, “Sutomo’s study club regarded [cooperation] as a tactical weapon for use now and then in forcing the Dutch finally to yield to the demands of the Indonesians for a share of responsibility, and thus to further the principle of genuine cooperation.”

In 1926 and 1927 the PKI staged what turned out to be premature and failed revolts in West Java and West Sumatra and the party was quickly banned and its leaders exiled. In 1927, Sukarno and others established the “non-cooperating” Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia - PNI).

As Sutherland observes, the appeal of organisations such as the PNI “… to younger Western-educated Indonesians was much stronger that that of earlier parties. If the PKI had been too radical, Budi Utomo too ‘feudal’ and Sarekat Islam too santri or too kampung [village], the new organizations were intellectually acceptable and satisfyingly militant.”

In 1928, an Indonesian Youth Congress sought to give the Indonesian nationalist movement priority over regional youth movements that had emerged in the previous decades, such as Jong Java (Youth of Java), Jong Sumatrenen Bond (Youth of Sumatra), etc. The Congress took the historic step of adopting the “Youth Pledge” (Sumpah Pemuda) of “one country, one nation, one language” (Indonesian) and later in the same year Sukarno was arrested and subsequently exiled to the island of Flores and then to Bengkulu in West Sumatra. Other “non-cooperating” nationalists met a worse fate, being exiled to the Boven Digul prison in remote Papua until the Japanese invasion was imminent in 1942.

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In January 1931, Sutomo founded another cooperating party, Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian Unity Party), and in 1935 he merged Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia with Budi Oetomo to form Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra). The aim of the new party was to achieve the independence of Indonesia through cooperation with the Dutch (including acceptance of membership of the Volksraad). Sutomo died in May 1938 and was replaced by the relatively ineffective R. M. Hario Woerjaningrat, who was eclipsed by the Deputy Chairman M.H. Thamrin.

Under Thamrin’s leadership and in an atmosphere of heightening international tensions, Parindra began moves to form a federation of nationalist parties that became known as Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Gapi – Indonesian Political Federation). Gapi was ostensibly a loyal and moderate organization with the somewhat limited goal of seeking a parliament for the Indies, but it exhibited a new political toughness in its “bargaining attitude” with the Dutch authorities.  

By early 1939 Parindra claimed a membership of 4,500 members, although there was a surge to 11,000 members later that year as the outbreak of the Second World War gave cooperating nationalists more hope that international events might increase their bargaining position with the Dutch. In the 1930s Parindra had a number of newspapers and magazines while another ten Malay language newspapers and one Dutch-language magazine (Nationale Commentaren Hindia Belanda edited by Dr Ratu Langie) were sympathetic to Parindra.

Sutomo and “Traditional Javanism”

Earlier in this chapter I noted that Sutomo distrusted Western influences on Indonesian culture and sought to build upon what he saw as organic traditional structures, rather than those influenced by Communism and Islam. This became evident in the 1920s when he resigned from the municipal council of Surabaya (where the Gondokusumo family lived before moving to Bandung) as a protest at the impotence of the representatives of the native population. He then sought to build on traditional gotong royong systems known as sinoman.  

56 Ibid., p. 28.
57 Such as Soera Oemoem (Voice of the Public), Tempo, Bangoen (Arise), Soera Parindra (Voice of Parindra) and Soera Soerja Wirawan (Voice of Surya Wirawan).
58 The Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia) was known as Malay until the Youth Pledge of 1928 when it was renamed for nationalist reasons. It was often referred to as Malay until the Japanese occupation period.
59 There are many types of gotong royong systems in villages throughout Indonesia. For a description of three types of gotong royong in a rural village in Central Java in the 1950s, see Widjojo Nitisastro and J.E. Ismael, The Government, Economy and Taxes of a
The word *sinoman* is still used throughout Java to describe groups of young men who join together in communal activities. The mutual assistance aspect of *sinoman* was apparently highly developed in the urban villages of Surabaya in the final decades of Dutch rule and Sutomo drew upon it to develop organizations he termed *Raad Sinoman* or *Gemeente Raad Bangsa Indonesia* as alternatives to Dutch-imposed quasi-suburban governments (*wijkbestuur*) in the urban villages (*kampung*) of Surabaya.

Sutomo’s desire to build upon organic “traditional” structures and customs is also evident in his objective of advising and assisting the Indonesian masses to improve their lot through “self-help” organisations, such as the Parindra-affiliated farmer’s organization *Rukun Tani* and the maritime association, *Rukun Pelayaran*. The word *Rukun* (which literally means a pillar or cornerstone but also embodies a sense of harmony and like-mindedness) in the names of these two organisations indicates the concern of the Parindra leaders to look to organic traditional forms of mutual assistance, such as *sinoman* and *gotong-royong*, in seeking to mobilise the masses while maintaining “traditional” fundamentals of social order. Parindra also sought to mobilize the youth by developing the *Surya Wirawan* youth movement.

Soenarjo Gondokusumo was a leading member (*pemuka*) of Parindra and closely associated with Dr Sutomo in Surabaya in the 1920s. He was an organiser of Sutomo’s Indonesia Study Club and other organisations, such as the *Rukun Pelayaran* and *Rukun Tani*. Sunarti recalls selling the red and white national flag in the streets of Surabaya to raise funds for the construction of the *Gedung Indonesia* (Indonesian Building), an object of great pride for the nationalists of Surabaya that Sutomo and his friends initiated.

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*Central Javanese Village, Ithaca, NY, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1959, pp. 6, 7.*


*For a summary of Parindra’s development, including its subsidiary organisations, see Pringgodigdo, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 122 – 124.*


*“The people of Surabaya, from teenagers to the elderly, devoted their time (every Sunday), their physical strength, and materials to complete the building in a few years. Without any assistance at all from the government construction of the Gedung Indonesia was completed in December 1931.” Padmodiwiryo, *Op. Cit.*, p. 679.*
On returning to Java from his studies in the Netherlands, Soenarjo had joined the state railway company. 68 He left in 1927 to become the founding director of the Parindra-owned National Bank of Indonesia. 69 Maria Gondokusumo was also a member of Parindra. 70 Soenarjo was appointed head of the Bumi Putera (Native Son) insurance company in Bandung and the family moved there from Surabaya in 1937. That Soenarjo Gondokusumo was personally very close to Sutomo is evident in their building of a holiday house together in a village near Mojokerto. 71

Soenarjo clearly passed on the values of the Surabaya group of Parindra activists to Sunarti. I have previously referred to Sunarti’s recollections of her mother taking her to villages to see for herself how the masses lived. That this was important to her is further evidenced by her recollection that she was no stranger to rural village life thanks to the holiday house that Soenarjo shared with Sutomo:

I was always raised in cities and mostly mixed with educated people. Nevertheless, from the time I was small I was taken by my mother to rural villages (desa) where I mixed with the local people. Father, who participated in the struggle with Dr Sutomo, built a holiday place together [with Dr Sutomo] in the rural village of Celakat, near Mojokerto. Our family often took holidays there and my brothers and I played all day long with the village children. 72

The following excerpt from the biography she provided when she was awarded the 1981 Ramon Magsaysay Award (from the Philippines) for Public Service indicates that she not only visited rural villages but joined her mother in social work in the “urban slums” of Surabaya:

Johanna's mother, though Dutch, raised her children to be nationalists and dressed in kain (long wrapped skirt) and kebaya (long-sleeved overblouse), the Indonesian national costume. She was a leader of the Indonesian Girl Scouts until 1937 and was very active in social welfare work. She often took her daughter to help the poor in the urban slums. Johanna once wrote a high school paper about these visits and remembers the anger and astonishment she felt when her Dutch teacher returned the composition saying, "This is not your work; it looks very communistic. Please change it." 73

A young resident of Surabaya at this time, Suhario Padmodiwiryo, recalls that the efforts of PBI and Parindra in developing “… the Suara Umum newspaper, the Rukun Tani organization, the Indonesian National Bank (Bank Nasional Indonesia), the People’s

Cooperative Bank (*Bank Koperasi Rakyat*), the Indonesian Maritime Union (*Persatuan Pelayaran Indonesia*), village schools, and the small industry cooperatives” were “more romantic than scientific.” There is little doubt that the “romantic” sentiments the Parindra activists attached to their activities in the villages were passed on to Sunarti.

**The Gondokusumo Family**

On his return to Bandung to join the Military Academy, Nasution came into contact with ethnic Sundanese cooperating nationalist figures associated with the *Pagoejoeban Pasundan* (Sundanese Association) that had been established in 1914 as a Priangan (the West Java region around Bandung) equivalent of *Budi Utomo*. In his spare time he became a drill instructor for the Pasundan youth organization *Yayasan Obor Pasundan* (Pasundan Torch Foundation).

Nasution also began to visit the Gondokusumo family where he became acquainted with Soenarjo. Sunarti had taken up tennis and Nasution first met her when he joined her club.

Sunarti attended the prestigious Dutch Lyceum secondary school and had plans to become a doctor. When the Japanese invaded she went to Yogyakarta to continue her secondary schooling. She writes that by this time Nasution was already “at home” with the Gondokusumo family:

> Pak Nas appeared to be at home in the midst of our family. It’s true that Pak Nas had a different background from me. Pak Nas was from the regions, not from the city like me.
>
> I was born and brought up in large cities like Surabaya and Bandung. Pak Nas was born in Kotanopan, a small town in the interior of North Sumatra. I came from, it could be said, a well-off family. Even my bicycle was very nice, bought new for a fairly high price. Whereas Pak Nas, at the time that we met - bear in mind he was far from his parents and had to be frugal - had a bicycle that he bought for 7.5 guilders, if I’m not wrong, a second-hand bicycle. But what made Pak Nas feel at home within our family - apparently because he had previously gone to school in Bandung - was to listen to father talking about idealism and nationalism and the issue of independence, which he apparently took a great interest in and enjoyed.

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75 The ethnic group indigenous to West Java. Culturally and linguistically they are distinct from the Javanese ethnic group of Central and East Java.
77 McKemmish writes that Nasution was introduced to the *Yayasan Obor Pasundan* when he was sent to Jakarta for extra training within the KNIL. The head of this youth organization was Djuanda, who was to become Prime Minister of Indonesia from 1957 until his death in 1963. McKemmish, *Op. Cit.*, p. 16.
78 Nasution became club President and Sunarti was the Treasurer.
Nasution appears to have been well disposed towards Parindra before his association with the Gondokusumo family. I previously mentioned that Nasution had considered joining the Parindra affiliated Surya Wirawan youth organization when he was teaching in Bengkulu in 1938 and that he subscribed to Dr Ratu Langie’s (sympathetic to Parindra) Nationale Commentaren Hindia Belanda. \(^{80}\) Relations of his friend, Artawi, who influenced Nasution along the path of “cooperating nationalism” were members of Parindra. \(^{81}\)

The closeness of Soenarjo’s relationship with Nasution has recently been made clear by Sunarti. She writes that Nasution (“Pak Nas”) first visited the Gondokusumo residence because she was a member of the scouting organization (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia – KBI) and “…Pak Nas often met with girls and boys from KBI and Surya Wirawan. So he became closely acquainted with our family.” \(^{82}\)

After living a frugal lifestyle in dormitories for so long, Nasution revelled in the comfortable family atmosphere:

> Our home was open to anybody. And besides that, mother and my brothers were very close to him. Even Oma – my grandmother on my mother’s side – paid Pak Nas a lot of attention. Oma had family members who were officers in The Netherlands and because of that she often chatted with Pak Nas about the officer training he was receiving at CORO. In short, Pak Nas found a ‘home’ in our house. And we ourselves regarded him as a member of the family. \(^{83}\)

Elsewhere, Sunarti further attests to the closeness of Nasution’s relationship with Soenarjo:

> But that didn’t mean that father or mother had plans to match-make between Nas and me (it didn’t mean that Pak Nas was my partner). Not at that time. In fact, when the two of us, Pak Nas and I, had plans to get married, father and mother put obstacles in our way because father regarded Pak Nas as his own son. \(^{84}\)

…..

> Father was very angry when I told him about our marriage plans. Father thought of Pak Nas as his own son and because of this it would be like having one of his children marry another. What would people say? Especially in a critical time when conflict could break out at any time. However, finally Father became aware that our love for each other was very deep and sacred and he agreed and gave us his blessing. \(^{85}\)

Another indication of Soenarjo’s closeness to Nasution is a visit the pair made during the Japanese occupation to the Jombang / Mojokerto area where Soenarjo had once been a patih to the Regent. Nasution writes that Soenarjo suggested that Nasution could seek...

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\(^{81}\) *Ibid*, pp. 84, 85.


\(^{83}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{84}\) *Ibid*.

shelter there “within the framework of our preparations for action.” 86 While Nasution is not explicit about what sort of action was envisaged, presumably the intention was to prepare some sort of plan in the event of the return of the Dutch.

**Javanese Traditionalism and Nasution**

To sum up thus far, Nasution’s association with Soenarjo and the Gondokusumo family introduced him to an affluent Western-educated family. Soenarjo Gondokusumo was of high *priyayi* birth. He had been exiled for his nationalist activities but later joined a movement that cooperated with the colonial government. In particular, he had immersed himself in his early adult years in a form of activism that sought to draw upon organic “traditional” self-help structures and an idealised form of social harmony and cooperation. His political mentor, Dr Sutomo, eschewed both Islam and Communism in favour of a style of nationalism that emphasised indigenous political values that he thought had deteriorated under the colonial regime.

In the introduction to this chapter I pointed out that this activity clearly fits within the parameters of the “Javanese traditionalism” stream identified by Feith and Castles in their study of political thinking in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965. 87 In discussing this stream, Feith and Castles remark:

> As in other societies faced with disruptive exogenous change … there has been a tendency deliberately to utilise elements of the indigenous traditions in ideologies designed to face the new situation. Where the traditional element in such ideologies is strong, they may be called traditionalists.

These researchers describe Professor Supomo’s use of “…Western political theory, as well as the Japanese model [as an attempt to] devise an ideal which [would] harmonise with indigenous traditions and values.” 89 The search by Sutomo and his nationalist colleagues in Surabaya in the 1920s to find indigenous forms of interest representation to compete with those developed by the Dutch is another example of this form of traditionalism.

Javanese traditionalism is also evident in Sutomo’s rejection of the imported ideologies of political Islam and Communism in favour of organic “traditional” ideals. Just as Nasution’s “… principal contribution to the theory of guerrilla warfare … was his technique for depoliticising it ….” 90 by providing no place in his plans for the parties that espoused imported ideologies and relying instead on organic social structures, these

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87 They were communism, radical nationalism, democratic socialism, Islam and Javanese traditionalism. Feith and Castles, *Op. Cit.*
cooperating nationalists looked to “traditional” social structures, rather than exogenous thinking.

Sunarti indicates throughout her memoirs that she was deeply influenced by the values of her parents, and her behaviour throughout her life bears this out. Like her mother, she became deeply involved in charitable work and in *Pak Nas dalam Kenangan* she devotes large sections to her work assisting the less fortunate. 91 Earlier in this chapter I noted that in 1981 her work in this field was recognised when she was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service. 92 Her references to her contacts with urban and rural villagers also indicate that she was deeply influenced by her parents, and in her old age she wrote of the importance of *gotong royong* in developing disadvantaged communities. 93

In Chapter Two I drew attention to Bourchier’s argument:

Taking an instrumentalist approach … helps explain the attraction of [Javanese] organicist formulas to pragmatic politicians like (the north Sumatran) Gen. A.H. Nasution, a keen builder of corporatist institutions from 1957 … 94

While instrumental factors were no doubt of very great importance to Nasution in the late 1950s, his exposure to “Javanese traditionalism” through his association with the Gondokusumo family - and with Soenarjo in particular - was clearly an important factor. There is no evidence that Nasution was in some way “Javanised” through his association with the Gondokusumos who were, in any case, a cosmopolitan family. Moreover, although Parindra had its roots in the originally Java-centric *Budi Utomo* and Sutomo’s *Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia*, which had its headquarters in Surabaya, Parindra saw itself as an Indonesia-wide party.

Feith and Castles observe that Javanese traditionalism failed “… to develop a distinctive approach on many national questions.” Instead, it tended to be subsumed within other streams of thinking, and particularly the radical nationalism stream epitomised by the thinking of Sukarno. 95 Although Sutomo had focussed on Java and Javanese culture at the outset of his political career, like other sections of the nationalist movement, such as *Budi Utomo* and the regionally based youth movements, he had evolved into an Indonesian nationalist as the concept of an Indonesian nation took on a clearer form during the 1920s and early 1930s. His originally Java-centric thinking became subsumed with the broader nationalist stream, an evolution that would have required the

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92 *Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service, Op. Cit.*
identification of binding elements and values that were organic to all the cultures of Indonesia.

As discussed in Chapter One, Professor Supomo produced his own idealised version of Indonesia-wide organic values and authority structures in his address to the BPUPKI in 1945. Given Sutomo’s attraction to *sinoman* self-help structures and the tutelary role he sought to play in preparing the impoverished masses to play their part in the independence struggle, it is unlikely that he would have significantly disagreed with Supomo.

Culturally, Nasution retained the direct and straightforward approach that is often associated with members of the *Batak* ethnic group. He also remained a relatively orthodox and very observant Muslim. Nevertheless, Nasution was to go on to rely upon organic “traditional” forms of interest representation in his strategies for “people’s war”, to idealise these structures when he began to write about the armed struggle in the 1950s, to garner support from *priyayi* identities who had associated with him during the guerrilla war, to support *pamong praja* interests when they were threatened by legislation aimed at achieving a devolution of democratic government to the regions in the late 1950s, and to demonstrate negative attitudes towards Communism, political Islam, the political parties and the system of parliamentary democracy that was adopted in 1950. As Bourchier also remarks, all of this was “… consistent with the outlook of the Parindra elders.”

Sunarti writes that in 1960 Nasution clearly thought [like Supomo] that *kekeluargaan*, rather than “western individualism” and “communist collectivism” defined the Indonesian identity. In view of the particular strand of Parindra activism with which Soenarjo was associated and the closeness of the relationship that Sunarti describes between her father and Nasution, there is little doubt that he was influenced at a young and formative age by the outlook of Soenarjo Gondokusumo and the emphasis of Sutomo’s stream of cooperating nationalism on moving towards a form of independence that would draw upon organic “traditional” values, rather than “imported” ideologies.

**Japanese Influences**

Organicist thinking and corporatist/functional modes of interest representation in particular have been linked with Fascism, and the Japanese military regime of the pre-war period is often seen as fascist. However, in his highly regarded analysis of fascism, Robert O. Paxton has concluded that fascists can be identified by their emphasis on historical grievances, cults of leadership, militant mass movements, the suppression of civil

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liberties, and the use of violence to further political ends. On the basis of these criteria, Paxton does not categorise the Japanese regime of the occupation period as fascist:

… the Japanese government decided to pick and choose within the fascist menu and adopt a certain number of its measures of corporatist economic organisation and popular control in a ‘selective revolution’ by state action, while at the same time suppressing the messy popular activism of authentically (though derivatively) fascist movements.

Similarly, although Nasution sought to suppress civil liberties in the 1950s through the use of martial law powers, he displayed none of Paxton’s other indicators of Fascism to a degree that might mark him as a fascist. Where he emulated the occupation regime is in picking and choosing elements of their thinking, such as their methods of organising the youth of Indonesia in state-corporatist paramilitary movements, and their intention to use these organisations as a form of “people’s defence” against an Allied invasion.

There is evidence that Nasution was impressed with Japan well before he returned to Bandung in 1940 and became acquainted with Soenarjo and other Parindra identities. Nasution wrote that while he was living in Muara Dua in the late 1930s he obtained by mail order Ratu Langie’s book *Indonesia in de Pacific*, which:

… discussed international developments around Indonesia, and particularly the advance of Japan. The essence of the book was that the balance would continually change, and Indonesia would gain the opportunity for its national struggle. Of course, because of the colonial situation this had to be implied rather than expressed openly. Nevertheless the book was able to make an impression (*dapat mengesankan*) and provided stimulus for thinking about an Independent Indonesia.

It is also possible that Nasution hoped that help for the nationalist movement might one day come from Japan and had a regard for aspects of the German Nazi regime, although he probably saw such things in the light of how events might impact on the situation in Indonesia.

Tahi Bonar Simatupang, a fellow cadet at the Royal Military Academy (and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the early 1950s) has said that Nasution admired Baldur von Shirach, the Hitler Youth leader, “… and sought a state in which the youth was organised and militarised.” By the time he made this comment in the early 1980s, Simatupang had developed an antipathy for Nasution and might have been self serving in describing Nasution in this way.

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely he would have lied about such a matter, particularly as Nasution was well able to counter the allegation. For his part, Nasution commented that

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while he might not have disagreed with von Schirach’s views (because he knew little about Fascism) he did not see him as a role model. Rather he looked to heroic individuals and great deeds in history for inspiration.\(^{102}\)

It is likely that it was, in fact, Nasution’s romanticising of great military heroes and his love of the military that attracted him to von Schirach. Images of von Schirach’s militarised and disciplined Hitler Youth were often featured in newsreels of the 1930s and particularly during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. Many conservatives throughout the world saw Hitler as a bulwark against Communism and looked with favour at his apparent rescue of Germany from defeat, economic collapse and demoralisation that they linked with his militarisation of German society. The rapid German military victories in the early years of the War no doubt also impressed Nasution.

There was apparently little anti-Nazi sentiment in the Indies until Germany invaded the Netherlands. Few Europeans were hostile to Fascism and the Dutch National Socialist Party had many supporters in the colony,\(^{103}\) including senior military officers who permitted their facilities to be used by fascist youth organizations.\(^{104}\)

I have already noted that the Japanese naval victory over the Russians in 1905 made a strong impression on many members of the “native” population and gave impetus to the founding of Budi Utomo. Abeyasekere writes that Japanese cruelty towards the Chinese in their invasion of that country during the 1930s “… partly because of anti-Chinese feeling among Indonesians, and partly because many of them approved of Japan’s rationale that the conflict was really between Japan, representing Asia, and the Western colonial powers which were exploiting China.”\(^ {105}\)

\(^{104}\) *Ibid.*, p. 39. There was even an Indonesian Fascist Party (*Partai Fasis Indonesia* – PFI). While Mussolini’s version of fascism looked back to the values and glory of the Roman Empire, the PFI based its philosophy on the resurrection of the culture of the pre-Dutch kingdoms of Indonesia. The PFI was very small and short-lived but its particular emphasis on resurrecting ancient culture had similarities with Supomo’s idealisation of village authority structures and values. The PFI was established in Bandung in 1933 by a Dr Notonindito. The party was roundly criticised in the nationalist movement for wanting to restore a feudal Indonesia rather than moving towards participatory democracy. "Kaum pergerakan di Hindia Belanda 1930-an, reaksi terhadap fasisme", Prisma 10, Okt 1994, cited in [http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/08/04/0013.html](http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/08/04/0013.html), accessed August 2004.
Abeyasekere also notes an article in *Soeara Parindra* speculating that a Japanese invasion of the Indies might be beneficial. Nazi Germany’s increasing closeness to Japan and Japan’s assertive stance towards both China and the European colonising powers and the influence of Soenarjo might well have further stimulated Nasution’s awareness that Japan might in some way be associated with Indonesia gaining its independence.

The Indies Governor General was informed in December 1940 that the Japanese were directing their attempts to enlist support from Indonesian leaders and organizations mainly at Parindra. The leading Parindra identity, M.H. Thamrin was suspected of channelling Japanese financial support to Parindra through his association with the Japanese Consul-General in Jakarta (who directed Japanese espionage in the Indies).

**Soenarjo Gondokusumo and the Japanese**

In tracing Nasution’s association with the Japanese and the impact of the Japanese occupation on his political socialisation, Soenarjo Gondokusumo again plays an important role. Soenarjo was clearly anticipating a Japanese invasion and appears to have influenced Nasution towards a favourable attitude towards the Japanese. As the invasion became imminent, Soenarjo “gave a signal” to Nasution to try for a posting to Surakarta where his brother, the Parindra leader Mr R.P. Singgih, was planning an uprising against the Dutch “at the appropriate time”. That Nasution shared Soenarjo’s pro-Japanese attitudes is evident in that he requested such a posting but was instead sent to Surabaya. He writes that it was only after the Japanese arrived in Indonesia that he knew of the plan for the uprising in Surakarta, but it seems much more likely that Soenarjo had given him an intimation of his plans.

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106 Abeyasekere cites Palau, a democratic-socialist Indonesian who was concerned that all parties, with the exception of Gerindo (formed in 1937 as a more radical and staunchly anti-fascist alternative to Parindra) tended towards being pro-Japan. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
108 Bourchier, *Op. Cit.*, p. 57. Thamrin actually taunted the Dutch, coining the expression *Koloni Orang Belanda akan Jepang Ambil Seantero Indonesia* (Japan will take over the whole of the colony of the Dutch) from the name of the leader of a Japanese economic mission to the Indies in 1940, Kobojashi. Thamrin was arrested, together with a number of other Indonesians, including Ratu Langie, on suspicion of disloyal relations with the Japanese. He died while under house arrest in January 1941.
112 *Ibid.* It seems unlikely that Soenarjo was in contact with the Japanese before the invasion. In *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas* Nasution recounts in some detail Japanese espionage and subversion in the Indies in the years before the invasion. However, he does
A further indication that Soenarjo favoured a Japanese invasion is the risk he took in concealing and organising medical treatment for a Japanese pilot who had been shot down in the Ciwidey area, south of Bandung. Soenarjo, who was given a letter of gratitude by the Japanese, was far from alone in cooperating with the occupation authorities.

Nasution writes of widespread support for Japan among nationalist leaders in the early phase of the occupation. However, whereas Nasution claims to have come to the conclusion early in the occupation that Japan and Germany would ultimately be defeated, he implies that Soenarjo remained pro-Japan until the end of the occupation:

“Pak Gondokusumo was one of these senior men [Bapak-bapak] who for a long time did not believe Japan would be defeated.”

Nasution Deserts the KNIL

Nasution’s closeness with Parindra is further evident in the contact he sought with a number of senior Parindra figures in Surabaya before the Japanese began intensive air raids of the city. He tells of Dutch nationals deserting their posts in disarray before his unit was assigned to the north coast to prepare for an enemy landing. Before this eventuated the unit was pulled back to the interior where they met with chaos on the roads. The unit kept moving through East Java before stopping near Jember. Nasution changed into peasant clothing and stole away before dawn one morning while on duty as officer in charge of the guard.

A fugitive who could not speak the local Javanese language, he made his way along roads crowded with Dutch military vehicles until he came to a large town. There his Parindra contacts were of great assistance and possibly saved his life. He knocked on the door of a

not mention any involvement on Soenarjo’s or his own part with the Japanese at this time, and in view of Soenarjo’s later disclosure to Nasution of plans for an uprising in Surakarta and Soenarjo’s assistance to the downed Japanese pilot it seems unlikely he would have not have told Nasution of such involvement. Moreover, Sunarti writes of hesitation among the cooperating nationalists when the Japanese entered the city of Bandung on 7 March 1942. Soenarjo and a group of fellow nationalists debated whether it was “… necessary to welcome the foreign troops or not – that was the problem that had emerged. Finally it was decided not to give them a welcome. That’s what my father said when he returned home from the meeting.” Sunarti, Op. Cit., pp. 13, 14.

114 “In the first phase there were not a few leaders who sincerely trusted Japan and sincerely joined in official and unofficial propaganda to ‘live or die with Japan, East Asia Co-Prosperity’ and [associated] geopolitical theory and many who also continued to hold such opinions until the final moments of Japanese authority in Indonesia.” Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol One, Op. Cit., p. 96.
115 In discussions with Murjani, the Deputy Chair of the Parindra Executive Board. Ibid.
116 Ibid., fn.
house with a *Rukun Tani* sign on the door. Not long after he was shown into the house the adjutant of his battalion pulled up outside the *Kecamatan* office across the road. It turned out the occupants trusted Nasution because they were relatives of his friend, Artawi, and Nasution was able to discuss Soenarjo Gondokusumo with them.

They procured a bicycle for him and he began to make his way back to Bandung. In Mojokerto he approached a Parindra luminary (and uncle of Sunarti), *Raden Panji* Soeroso, with whom he was to become further acquainted during the armed struggle against the Dutch and in the 1950s. Soeroso told him not to show himself to the Japanese as they were believed to be acting savagely and might shoot him. On arrival in Bandung he stayed at first with a fellow cadet who was under house arrest and asked Nasution to move on so as not to endanger him. Nasution left for Sukabumi and then wandered around West Java before returning to Bandung to seek advice from Soenarjo Gondokusumo.

Sunarti writes that her father arranged an amnesty for Nasution with the Japanese and gave him accommodation in the *Bumi Putera* building, which was close to the Gondokusumo residence. He was to reside there for the remainder of the occupation.

**Further Contact with the Gondokusumo Family/Parindra**

Nasution writes of continuing high-level contact with Parindra figures through his open access to the nearby Gondokusumo residence. Soenarjo once took Nasution to Surabaya to meet with Parindra figures. He enjoyed a close relationship with all the members of the Gondokusumo family and particularly Sunarti. When Sunarti went to study law at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta (accompanied by her mother) Nasution kept in touch, frequently visiting her there and sometimes staying with them for weeks.
Sometimes small gestures are most effective in revealing the closeness of a relationship. This is evident in Nasution’s recollection that Sunarti’s mother sewed underpants for him (from canvass) as economic conditions deteriorated in the final stages of the occupation.  

**Nasution and Japanese Militarism**

Simatupang’s claim that Nasution was an admirer of Baldur von Schirach’s work with the *Hitler Jugend* is supported by the unusual interest in mobilising youth into militaristic organizations that Nasution displayed. An insight is his failure to gain high marks in his practical teaching subjects (when training to be a teacher in Bandung) because he was too serious, to the point that the head of school had remarked (jokingly) that he should have trained to be a *dominee* (Dutch Reformed minister). Nasution was clearly better suited to the formalised and ceremonial aspects of military life. There he could lead and teach, but within a highly disciplined and regimented format.

As mentioned earlier, Nasution had been a drill instructor for the Pasundan youth organization *Yayasan Obor Pasundan* while he was still a CORO cadet. During this period he often met with members of the scouting organization, *Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia* and the Parindra youth movement *Surya Wirawan* at the Gondokusumo residence.

This aspect of Nasution’s personality in his youth has not been given the prominence it deserves in previous research. His interest in paramilitary youth organisations was demonstrated when he emerged from hiding in Bandung and decided that unlike “all his other cadet friends” who had “applied for and obtained employment with the occupation administration as mid-ranking civil service officials” he would not do so because of “his feelings” and he did not want “a commitment”. Rather, he earned money from giving lessons in the Malay [Indonesian] language to Japanese soldiers. His intention to go his own way and his strong attraction towards things military is evidenced in the unusual step that he took of obtaining three sets of boy-scout uniforms “…complete with short pants and sleeves …”, which “…were to be my uniform throughout the occupation period.”

Nasution attributes this course of action and his subsequent involvement in Japanese paramilitary training to a desire to further the nationalist cause and no doubt there is truth

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127 Ibid., p. 104.  
in this. However, his adoption of a personal “uniform” (with “short pants and sleeves”) was highly unusual behaviour and lends veracity to Simatupang’s claim that Nasution was attracted to militaristic youth movements of the Hitler Jugend type. Certainly, none of the other former CORO cadets seem to have adopted such a course of action.

Nasution began to view paramilitary training as a sort of vocation. Sunarti writes that Nasution was soon asked by local youth groups to be their drill instructor. 133 Meanwhile, the Japanese decided to develop a youth (pemuda) movement, the Barisan Pemuda Priangan (Priangan Youth Front) and the Mayor of Bandung appointed Nasution its leader and enlisted him as an employee of the city government.

Nasution records that he was highly energetic in organising youth leaders in 14 village level branches and in establishing a central training centre and an agricultural training centre: “That period is really quite a beautiful memory for me, when I never felt tired or weak at all.” 134 However, the freedom Nasution enjoyed in establishing Barisan Pemuda Priangan was short lived. At the end of 1942 the Japanese went on to establish Seinendan, a much more militarised and tightly controlled organization. The new organisation had branches at the kabupaten level throughout Java, the membership was more restricted, and some of the training was given by Japanese. 135

Nasution, together with other young men from throughout Java who were chosen to be Seinendan leaders, was sent on an intensive three-month indoctrination and training course in Jakarta. His head was shaved and he was subjected to highly rigorous and sometimes humiliating training. 136

On his return to Bandung Nasution was continually employed as a military instructor in all the various youth organizations organised by the Japanese. 137 These organisations, and other groups established by the Japanese, clearly accord with O’Donnell’s definition of state corporatist structures as the incorporation of the ”... popular sector economically and politically ...” and the control and prevention of ”... the emergence of autonomous organisational bases, leaders, and goals that might carry its political activation beyond the limits acceptable to the new bourgeois and state-based sectors.” 138 As Suhario Padmodiwiryo (who was in Surabaya at the time the Japanese invaded) recalls, even

137 Ibid., p. 100.
organisations operated by the pro-Japanese Parindra were banned and only those under the auspices of the Japanese were allowed to exist. 139

Nasution writes that his relations with the Japanese were to sour and a growing disaffection is discernible in *Memenuhi Panggil Tugas*. Nasution was a proud man 140 and a series of humiliations and a clash between his sense of nationalism and the priorities of the Japanese appear to have played a part in this process.141

In October 1943, after Nasution resigned from the city government, the Japanese formed the PETA light infantry force. By this time the Japanese were embarking in earnest on a program to mobilise the Indonesian people in support of their war effort. The Triple A had been ineffectual, largely because of its almost exclusive concentration on support for Japan. It was followed in March 1943 by the formation of the Centre of People’s Power (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat – Putera*). Both *Seneindan* and PETA were formed under the auspices of *Putera*.142

The Mayor of Bandung urged Nasution to join PETA but he took care to make himself unavailable. Nasution has explained that at 25 years of age he would only have become a Platoon Commander (*Shodanco*) and would not have been able to accomplish much.143 Certainly, he was a senior and influential figure within the paramilitary organizations and appointment as a *Shodancho* would have represented a loss of prestige and influence while the training given by the Japanese was of a much more basic nature than Nasution had received within the KNIL. It is also likely that his growing distaste for the tendency of the Japanese to humiliate him and his fellow Indonesians was a factor in his decision.

Although he had avoided service with PETA, he maintained contact with those who joined. He was appointed a member of the executive board of the Priangan Soldiers Assistance

139 “In the beginning [of the occupation] the Parindra leaders had hopes that the Japanese military government would approach them to seek advice on government and social matters. That hope was entirely misplaced. In the third week of the occupation flying the [Indonesian] red and white flag was forbidden and political organizations were frozen “for the time being”, including Parindra. *Surya Wirawan*, the Parindra scouting organization was able to hang on for a few weeks but after being given the opportunity to stage a display at the *Gedung Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Building) to entertain the Japanese it too was frozen and the wearing of all uniforms, except those approved by the Japanese, was banned.” Suhario, *Op. Cit.*., p. 685.

140 Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol One, *Op. Cit.*., p.40 for an account of his sense of humiliation when he was offered assistance by one of his Dutch teachers because he was unable to get a job at the end of his teacher training in Bandung, and his relief when the appointment didn’t eventuate.


Body (Badan Pembantu Prajurit Priangan) that was intended to assist PETA personnel. His duties in this organisation allowed him considerable independence and freedom of movement within West Java. With the help of friends in the railways (who provided free tickets) he also travelled throughout Central Java and parts of East Java.

Nasution and Hokokai

The final and most successful mass organization to be formed by the Japanese was the People's Loyalty Organisation (Jawa Hokokai - known in Indonesian as the Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakyat). Jawa Hokokai had branches down to village level and included women's and youth groups. Unlike Putera, the Jawa Hokokai was administered in the regions by the pangreh praja.

A system of neighbourhood associations augmented by paramilitary and other organisations was created and a further effort was made to mobilise the youth in the form of the attachment to the Hokokai of the para-military Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Corps). The basis of the system of security and people's defence was the family. A number of families were organised into a Kumi and a number of Kumi were organised into a Cokai. The heads of each Cokai reported to the village chief.

Through his intimate involvement in this system of “security and people’s defence” Nasution was absorbing valuable lessons that he would put into effect when he began to develop his principles of “people’s war” during the struggle against the Dutch. The durability of the system in Indonesia is evident in the fact that Indonesia is the only one of the occupied territories to retain the kumi and cokai neighbourhood system. The modern version of the kumi is the rukun tetangga or neighbourhood association found in Indonesian cities. The cokai has become the rukun warga or intermediate administrative unit whose head reports to the village chief.

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144 Ibid., p. 110.
145 Ibid. This latter aspect of Jawa Hokokai was something of an about-face for the Japanese. They had earlier established cooperative relationships with nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta and accorded a greater recognition to the political forces of Islam through the creation of Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia – Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), an umbrella organisation for Muslim groups. By the time the occupation government formed Jawa Hokokai the occupation authorities had become aware of the important role that traditional priyayi influences in the form of the pangreh praja could play in their efforts to engage grass-roots populations. See A. Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan Kontrol, Jakarta, Gramedia, 1993, pp. 394-98, for an account of ways in which the Japanese came to rely upon the pangreh praja, rather than the nationalist leaders, for the mobilisation of local populations. See also J.A.A. van Doorn, "Kelampanuan Adalah Kekinian Yang Kental: Konflik Belanda-Indonesia dan Bertahannya Pola Kolonial", in A.B. Lapian and P.J. Drooglever, Menelusuri Jalur Linggarjati, Jakarta, Grafiti, 1992, p. 266.
Soenarjo Gondokusumo gained Nasution a paid position within Hokokai. However, Nasution writes of a growing sense of frustration with the leaders of this organization because of their failure to appreciate the probability that Japan would be defeated and their lack of plans to seize independence in the power vacuum that was likely to ensue.

**Nasution and the Older Leaders**

At this stage of the occupation Nasution appears to have become increasingly disappointed with the older generation, accusing them of a lack of foresight in failing to appreciate Japan’s deteriorating position in the Pacific War and even of accepting too readily Japanese militarist and corporatist thinking:

To have authority and control over all movements, Residents, Regents (Bupati), District Heads (Wedana), Sub-District Heads (Camat) and Village Heads (Lurah) automatically became the leaders of all organizations, except for women’s organizations, in which case the wife of the official concerned automatically became the leader. All movements were treated as supporting structures to the government, which was totalitarian. All organizations outside the official structures were banned in accordance with the totalitarian nature of the Japanese at that time. These fascist totalitarian methods were strengthened by the spirit of Dutch colonial bureaucracy (ambienaarisme) and feudalism which still attached itself to Indonesian officials.

Again, Nasution was not alone in having such feelings. At this time a generation gap opened between the older nationalist leaders, most of whom had received a high standard of Western education in the more settled atmosphere of the Dutch colonial regime, and the younger generation or pemuda, whose ranks included the PETA officer corps. The higher education system had been seriously disrupted by the war and the formative experiences of the pemuda generation had been gained in the militarised and mobilised atmosphere of the Japanese occupation. Whereas many of the older nationalists believed that Indonesia could not possibly prevent the return of the Dutch through force of arms, much of the pemuda generation was committed to unremitting armed struggle (perjuangan). Some PETA units mounted resistance to the Japanese in the dying stages of the war and PETA personnel were involved in confused lobbying of political leaders in the day or so before the proclamation of independence.

Nasution, who was a few years older than the members of the pemuda generation, straddled both the older and the younger groups. He had received a Dutch education, although not of

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148 Ibid., p. 105. Nasution was not alone in having such feelings. See Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., pp. 25-60 for an account of the growing estrangement of many young educated Indonesians from the Japanese and their concern that the older generation of nationalists were placing too much trust in the occupation government.
150 Ibid., p. 102.
the same quality and level as many of the older nationalists. His military education within the KNIL had been curtailed by the war and he had been caught up in Japanese attempts to mobilise the population. Nevertheless, Nasution was a leader of the mobilisation efforts in the Bandung area, rather than a relatively immature participant.

Until the Japanese capitulated, Sukarno and Hatta cooperated closely with the occupation authorities and refused to proclaim Indonesia's independence without their approval. However, many pemuda became impatient with the older political leaders and were concerned that a Japanese-approved proclamation of independence would be seen as a tarnished "gift" from a vanquished foreign power.

Attempts by a number of influential pemuda to persuade the nationalist leaders to defy the Japanese and immediately proclaim independence gained momentum when news of the United States nuclear attacks on Japan became known in Indonesia. On 15 August 1945 a group of pemuda spirited Sukarno and Hatta to a Peta unit in the small West Java town of Rengasdengklok. On the morning of 16 August the Peta unit rebelled, seizing the town, disarming the Japanese and hoisting the national flag. 151

Nasution and Political Organisations

While Nasution was critical of the older leaders for their timidity in dealing with the Japanese as the occupation drew to a close, he himself was not particularly at ease in fluid situations that could lead to unforeseen consequences.

Nasution by no means lacked courage or creativity in responding militarily to the Dutch in the armed struggle, nor was he backward in promoting the political interests of the army in the 1950s. However, where Nasution felt most at home was in structured, hierarchical and militaristic organizations in which he played a clear leadership role, rather than in more free-flowing and less disciplined contexts. This is evident in the alacrity and enthusiasm with which he threw himself into mobilising paramilitary youth organizations in the occupation period. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Nasution’s desire to lead and be influential is likely to have been a factor in his decision not to accept a relatively junior position within PETA.

As also noted earlier, it is clear that Nasution had an unusual passion for mobilising young Indonesians in paramilitary organisations. By the time he joined the Republican Army in 1945 he was not an “accidental” soldier who enlisted because of the circumstances of the time like most other officers. Rather, some five years beforehand he had consciously chosen a military career after traversing an unlikely route from a simple village childhood in North Sumatra to the Dutch education and military training systems.

These tendencies and perhaps an authoritarian dimension to his personality are also evident in his constant endeavours during the armed struggle against the Dutch to impose discipline over the various fighting forces associated with the Republic and to either “regularise” them within the army or disarm and demobilise them. It is apparent in his handling of the 17 October 1952 Affair, in which he essentially rebelled against “interference” in the affairs of the army by members of parliament.

Sukarno and Hatta refused to comply with the demands of the pemuda until they were assured that the Japanese would not retaliate. Sukarno was finally convinced and he and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s independence on 17 August.

**Nasution and Japanese Thinking and Culture**

The Japanese undertook a vigorous propaganda campaign during the occupation. Kurasawa has documented their establishment of the *Sendenbu* propaganda agency and its development of carefully directed programs in a variety of media, including radio, film and the press. For example, she writes that films were intended to eradicate Western individualistic ideas and promote instead the Japanese family principle (similar to the *kekeluargaan* principle advocated by Supomo) and the sacrifice of the individual for the state and the community.

In Chapter Two I referred to Bourchier’s account of the work of the Batak poet and novelist, Sanusi Pane, in denouncing Western individualism and liberalism and championing instead an “awareness of the unity of mankind and nature as God’s creations” and the “unity of ruler and ruled.” Bourchier also writes that the Japanese sought to stimulate an interest among Indonesians in their own ancient past as a means of weaning them away from the Western culture that Dutch colonialism had brought to the archipelago. While Bourchier notes that the Japanese appear to have had a genuine desire to encourage their new subjects to create systems of governance that reflected indigenous “Eastern” traditions, another aim was to make them aware of common elements between their culture and that of Japan.

Bourchier observes that “Nasution’s experience in Japanese military and paramilitary organisations has been played down in assessments of his thinking, though he spent more time in Japanese formations than in the KNIL.” Despite Nasution’s nationalism and

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152 After he returned to Jakarta and held discussions with a senior and influential Japanese intelligence official, Vice Admiral Tadashi Maeda.


resentment of Dutch colonialism, he probably felt closer to his KNIL instructors than the Japanese because he had been brought up by Dutchmen since his *asrama* days in Bukit Tinggi, and there was no language barrier between them. Moreover, he had been closely exposed to Dutch people in the form of Maria Gondokusumo and her mother at a very friendly and familial level. There is nothing in Nasution’s writings that indicate that Japanese thinking or culture had any impact on him, apart from the growing feelings of distaste that I have referred to earlier.

Nevertheless, Bourchier’s observation is worthy of consideration. As I indicated earlier, Nasution seems to have picked and chosen elements of the Japanese experience for use in his future career. In particular, he learnt in the early 1940s that the Dutch could be defeated militarily, and during the occupation he gained a great deal of experience in mobilizing and training young Indonesians within state-corporatist paramilitary organisations, and an awareness that these organisations could be used as a system of “people’s defence”.

**Conclusions**

The information I have presented in this chapter represents a departure from previous research. In this chapter I have concentrated on Nasution’s association with the Gondokusumo family and I have explored in particular the influence on Nasution of Soenarjo Gondokusumo. That this has not been done before is evident in the confusion in previous research about the identity of Nasution’s early mentor and future father-in-law.

Drawing upon Sunarti’s memoirs, I have described an intensely close, lengthy and personal relationship between Nasution and Soenarjo. I have categorised Nasution as a socially conservative cooperating nationalist who had much in common with Soenarjo and other cooperating nationalist Parindra leaders.

I have shown that in his formative years, Nasution developed into an austere and ambitious young man. Those organizations with which he became associated were elitist and socially conservative. He showed no interest in disturbing existing indigenous social structures and was prepared to work within the colonial system while maintaining nationalist aims.

An instrumentalist approach helps explain the attraction of organicist thinking to Nasution in the 1950s. Nasution was not a Javanese and was in no way Javanised by his association with the Gondokusumo family. Nevertheless, I have shown that Nasution was exposed to “Javanese traditionalism” at a particularly important stage of his political socialisation through his association with the Gondokusumo family. In making this point, I have explored the particular strand of cooperating nationalist activism to which
Soenarjo Gondokusumo belonged, and the emphasis it placed upon building upon organic “traditional” self-help customs at the village level.

I have also drawn attention to the tendency of proponents of Javanese traditionalism to subsume this political orientation within other streams of political thinking and particularly the radical nationalist stream. I have argued that this process took place within Parindra and that the values of that organisation were presented as Indonesian, rather than purely Javanese, by the time Nasution came into contact with the Gondokusumo family.

In future chapters I shall trace lines of connection between the infusion of “Javanese traditionalism” within Doctor Sutomo’s Surabaya strand of cooperating nationalism, the idealised version of village culture that was an important element of Supomo’s attachment to organicist ideas, Nasution’s reliance upon organic “traditional” village administrative structures in his planning for “people’s resistance”, and his idealisation of this aspect of his strategies when he transformed them into a means of military intervention in the 1950s.

In examining Nasution’s involvement with the Japanese in the occupation period I have also explored Soenarjo’s influence as he, like a number of other Parindra leaders, was a cooperating nationalist in another sense. He was close to the Japanese occupation forces and he appears to have influenced Nasution to cooperate closely with the Japanese. I have described Nasution’s development of a pre-existing interest in forming and training paramilitary youth organisations through the leading role he played in the Seinendan and other paramilitary bodies during the occupation. Significantly, these organisations were not only intended to be a state-corporatist means of fostering support for the Japanese within the younger generation but the basis of a system of “people’s resistance”.

There is no evidence that Nasution was attracted to the “Eastern values” and kekeluargaan aspects of Japanese fascist thinking that Sendenbu sought to popularise, or even that he was aware of Supomo’s contributions to the BPUPKI debates. However, Nasution was clearly very attracted to military modes of discipline and order. From his childhood he displayed an enthusiasm for military history that fascinated him. While he attributes his service within the repressive KNIL to nationalist aims, he was also clearly drawn by the military lifestyle. From his time at the Royal Military Academy he displayed an unusual interest in youth mobilisation that appears to have included an admiration for fascist modes of paramilitary youth organisation.

Although in later life Nasution railed against ambtenaarism and feudalism within the pangreh praja when the Japanese established their network of state corporatist
organisations, Nasution’s subsequent actions show that he learnt a great deal from the Japanese. As will be discussed in future chapters, he went on to build upon his experience in Japanese corporatised paramilitary organisations when he strove to develop his Siliwangi Division into the sole Republican military force in West Java, and when he set out to develop a system of “people’s war” in the struggle against the Dutch.

What he had in mind was a depoliticised form of “people’s war”. Like the socially conservative cooperating nationalists who followed Doctor Sutomo in Surabaya in the 1920s, there was no room in his plans for political parties that espoused imported ideologies. Rather, he placed his reliance upon organic authority structures in the form of the pamong praja and traditionally appointed village chiefs.
This chapter covers the period from the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945 until January 1948, when Nasution and his Siliwangi Division departed from West Java. The major political events in Indonesia and the processes through which the army emerged during this period have been extensively researched elsewhere and I shall only attempt to summarise them here.

Rather, I shall continue to depart from the approaches adopted in previous research into Nasution’s life and career. I shall be concerned to trace the evolution of Nasution’s emerging political orientation described in Chapter Four: his social conservatism, intense interest in developing military organizations, and his exposure to “Parindrist” ideas through his association with the Gondokusumo family. I shall continue to argue that while Nasution was no doubt attracted to organicist formulas in the 1950s because of instrumentalist factors, further insights can be gained by examining his life experiences and political socialization and the process through which these influences found their way into the strategies for “people’s war” that he developed in the second half of the 1940s.

I shall argue that particular experiences in the first two years of what became known as the Indonesian revolution began to solidify Nasution’s political orientation. I shall show that in this period, Nasution’s previous lack of interest in disturbing the indigenous social order solidified into a concern to maintain it in the face of the politicization of society and widespread civil disorder.

I shall also argue that Nasution’s experiences of waging a guerrilla war after the Dutch routed Nasution’s Siliwangi Division in July 1947 instilled within him a growing appreciation of organic “traditional” values and authority structures, particularly at the village level. While it was logical for Nasution to rely upon these authority structures as the guerrilla fighting of the period took place in the rural hinterland, away from the larger population centres where political leaders were to be found, I shall show that the strategies Nasution developed at this time were important to him at an emotional level as they saved his reputation and the existence and the reputation of his Siliwangi Division.

I shall show that some of Nasution’s experiences in the second half of 1947 were very important to him in a personal sense. By this time he and Sunarti had married, and I shall draw upon Sunarti’s memoirs and Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas to show that she
and Nasution recalled this period as one of considerable emotional intensity that left a vivid and lasting impression. I shall recount their portrayal of village administrations and populations as loyal and steadfast, and their much less favourable impressions of the civilian political leaders and many of the inhabitants of the towns and cities.

I shall argue that the support provided to the guerrillas by village administrations in the second half of 1947 and the period of emotional intensity Nasution shared with Sunarti favourably influenced Nasution’s attitudes towards the village administrations. He was to make these feelings clear in 1948 when he described the lurah as “… the only leaders amidst the people who are still obeyed by the people.” ¹ His elective affinity between strategies for “people’s war” and organic forms of interest representation was beginning to emerge, and he employed this rationale to make these officials the focus of his plans for a second campaign of “people’s resistance” that would be led by the army with the assistance of village administrations and the pamong praja.

The Emergence of the Laskar

For some weeks after the surrender the Japanese occupation forces remained in formal control and there were very few Allied forces in Western Indonesia. ² Eventually British forces arrived, followed by the Dutch who were still recovering from the occupation of the Netherlands. Initially the British were concerned to repatriate civilian and military prisoners of the Japanese but they soon clashed with laskar and military units who suspected their intention was to restore order with a view to handing the archipelago back to the Dutch.

This early period of the revolution was a time of heroic poses and romantic gestures ³ that inspired a new wave of literature by writers such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Chairul Anwar, who became known as the Angkatan 1945 (1945 Generation). It became remembered for the cries of bersiap! (“get ready!”) that rang out in cities and towns, calling young men to fight.

² The Americans had bypassed most of the archipelago, the Australians had landed in parts of the Eastern islands, while the British were concentrating on their colonies of Malaya and Singapore.
³ For example, many pemuda took oaths not to cut their hair until the Dutch were expelled from Indonesia
More formally constituted and politically affiliated *laskar* grew out of the rapid proliferation of political parties that took place when a parliamentary system of government was formed under Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir soon after the proclamation.  

The BPUPKI had previously enlarged and reformed itself into an interim parliament on 19 August (the Indonesian National Central Committee – *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* – KNIP) and similar national committees were established in the regions. The formation of a single State party, named the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI – Indonesian Nationalist Party) in honour of Sukarno’s old “non-cooperating” party of the same name, was announced on 22 August.  

The idea of a single state party was opposed by Indonesians who kept their distance from the occupation government and the initiative was "postponed" on 31 August. By late October Sjahrir and his supporters had joined the KNIP and Sjahrir was Prime Minister. By 3 November the Sjahrir government was urging that political parties be formed and the multi-party system that followed was a major rebuff to the *pamong praja*-associated advocates of organic means of interest representation who had cooperated with the Japanese.  

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4 As discussed in Chapter One, Sjahrir was a Dutch-educated social democrat. Between 1934 and 1942 he had been exiled by the Netherlands East Indies Government to the remote and harsh Boven Digul detention centre in Papua. Sjahrir was strongly anti fascist and declined to cooperate with the Japanese. He became a symbol of resistance to the idea of accepting independence from the occupying power. After the proclamation of independence a consensus emerged within the Republican civilian leadership that Sjahrir was the right man to negotiate with the returning Allies. On 16 October he was appointed Head of the Working Committee (*Badan Pekerja*) of the KNIP, a form of parliamentary cabinet that was authorised to carry out the daily business of government between KNIP sessions. It was in this capacity that Sjahrir became Indonesia’s first Prime Minister.  

5 Anderson notes: “The single most important aspect of this PNI was its direct continuity with the *Hokokai*.” He bases this conclusion on the composition of its top leadership (Sukarno and Hatta) and the involvement of former leaders of arms of the Hokokai, such as military (*Barisan Pelopor*) and women’s organisations. Anderson, 1972 *Op. Cit.*, p. 93.  

6 Reeve, 1985 *Op. Cit.*, p. 76. Sukarno and other members of the BPUPKI had desired that a single State party be formed. In October Sjahrir had not been averse to the concept of a one-party state. However, possibly due to an awareness of his limited profile and appeal outside elite circles in Jakarta, he considered that a vanguard party rather than a mass party was the best option. Sjahrir appears to have realised by the end of that month that parties with mass support were in the process of formation and could not be absorbed into a vanguard party. Reid, *Op. Cit.*, p. 73  

7 As Lance Castles puts it, “the *pamong praja* figures who had close relations with the Japanese…” and whose 'blueprint' had provided for a dominant executive and a single state party but had not mentioned elections or individual rights had proved to be “… too narrow to deal with revolutionary demands.” Lance Castles, “Pengalaman Demokrasi Liberal di Indonesia (1950-1959)”, Education on Democracy and the Civil-Military
On 10 and 11 November Sjarifuddin (who was to become Minister for Defence) sought to form a single pemuda organisation with a socialist programme at a meeting of 28 major youth organisations in Yogyakarta. Only seven organisations\(^8\) came together to form the Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth – Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia), which became the largest laskar organization associated with the Left. Other major laskar organisations were the radical nationalist Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Brigade) organisation which had evolved from the wartime nationalist Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Brigade) and the Hizbullah (Army of God) youth militia, which primarily consisted of more devout Javanese Muslims.\(^9\)

\(^8\) Hizbullah did not attend the conference and relations between this organisation and Pesindo were often poor. Frictions soon began to appear between Pesindo and some of its constituent organisations. On the other hand pemuda associated with prominent national Communist, Tan Malaka and/or the radical nationalist Barisan Banteng organisation (which evolved from the wartime Barisan Pelopor) moved into more clearly oppositionist roles vis-à-vis Pesindo. For a list of these organisations and an account of the events leading to and immediately following the formation of Pesindo see Anderson, 1972 \textit{Op. Cit.}, pp. 252-60. Sjarifuddin's attempts to impose a socialist philosophy on the pemuda movement is often said to have resulted in a breakdown of pemuda solidarity after the Yogyakarta conference. (\textit{Ibid.}, p. 260)

\(^9\) The laskar emerged in part from Japanese-sponsored para-military organizations, including the Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Corps) led by the radical nationalist, Dr Muwardi (Anderson, 1972 \textit{Op. Cit.}, pp. 29, 30), the village-based para-military Keibodan (vigilance corps), and the Seinendan (\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26). In the final year of Japanese occupation the major Muslim party, Masyumi, was given permission by the authorities to form its own militia, the Hizbullah (Army of God) youth militia. From early in the occupation period the Japanese had sought to influence and gain the cooperation of the Muslim community in Indonesia as evidenced by the 1943 Japanese initiative to incorporate the various and fissiparous Muslim organisations into the Masjumi umbrella organisation (\textit{Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia} - Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). In addition to Hizbullah, in November 1945 the Sabiillah (Way of God) citizen militia, which was originally intended as a type of home guard, was established. This organisation was also associated with Masjumi. (See C. Van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia}, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1981, pp. 76-7, for a brief account of the origins of Sabiillah.) The cadre of 500 Hizbullah leaders who had been trained by the end of the occupation formed the nucleus of a laskar force that fielded two divisions in the Muslim heartland of West Java and was strongly represented in Central and East Java. By early 1946 Hizbullah claimed a membership of 300,000. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 75. See Anderson, 1972 \textit{Op Cit.}, pp. 252-60, for an account of the formation of Pesindo by Amir Sjarifuddin.
The Politics of “People’s Resistance”

During this period there were competing visions of how “people’s resistance” could or should be waged which were based as much on attempts to shape the political orientation of the new state as the immediate imperative of defending Indonesia’s independence. For example, Amir Sjarifuddin (who declared himself to be a socialist at the outset of the revolution but later claimed to have been a secret member of the PKI since the mid-1930s) proposed that a large people's army operate alongside an elite, well-trained and equipped military force. A component of this people’s army was to be the large numbers of irregular armed units known as *laskar* that had sprung up after the proclamation of independence and were particularly active early in the revolution.

A more radical concept was put forward by the national Communist, Tan Malaka, a former Chairman of the PKI and Comintern member who had left the international Communist movement. Impressed at the popular resistance that shook British forces attempting to

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10 A graduate of the Dutch-established Law School in Jakarta, Sjarifuddin was, like Nasution, a Mandailing Batak. However, Sjarifuddin had converted from Islam to Christianity. Sjarifuddin was a “non-cooperating” nationalist and served a term of imprisonment in the 1930s for his nationalist activities. However, following his release he worked for the colonial government and was on friendly terms with a number of members of the Dutch community. Cribb, 1991 *Op. Cit.*, p. 94. Prior to the capitulation of the East Indies the Director General of the Department of Education, P.J.A. Idenburg, provided him with funds to establish an underground movement. Sjarifuddin was arrested by the Japanese and only saved from execution through the intervention of Sukarno. However, he was imprisoned until August 1945. Sjarifuddin claimed to be a socialist but later said that he had been a secret member of the PKI since the mid-1930s. His anti-fascist beliefs were undoubtedly strengthened by cruelty he suffered at the hands of the Japanese *Kempetai*.

11 An aristocrat from the Minangkabau (West Sumatra) ethnic group, after studying in the Netherlands, Tan Malaka became Chairman of the PKI in 1921 before being exiled from the Indies. He took up residence in China, where he became the Comintern representative in Southeast Asia, before moving to Manila in 1925. He warned against plans by the PKI to stage a putsch in the Indies and began a letter writing campaign when his warnings were ignored. Many PKI members blamed him when the revolts, which broke out in West Java in November 1926 and West Sumatra in January 1927, failed. He then formed the *Partai Republik Indonesia* (Republic of Indonesia Party - PARI) to take up the struggle from the shattered PKI and became increasingly estranged from the international communist movement. As Anderson - who presents a sympathetic portrayal of Tan Malaka in Java in *A Time of Revolution* - puts it, "Thereafter he seems to have led an increasingly lonely and isolated life, largely in the coastal cities of China.” Anderson, 1972 *Op. Cit.*, p. 274. He fled south to Singapore in the wake of the Japanese attack on China, before moving to Jakarta in July 1942. *Ibid.*, pp. 269-75. Anderson’s account of Tan Malaka’s activities after returning to Jakarta differs from that of the American journalist and
impose control over the city of Surabaya (the Battle of Surabaya), 12 in 1946 Tan Malaka wrote a paper entitled Muslihat (Strategy) in which he advocated guerrilla warfare against the Dutch. 13 In 1948 Tan Malaka followed this up with a treatise on guerrilla warfare entitled Gerpolek (Gerilya, Politik, Ekonomi - Guerrilla Warfare, Politics and Economics).14

Seeing himself as a rival for the office of President, he attempted to persuade Sukarno to appoint him as his political legatee. Sukarno obviously sensed personal danger and eventually named Tan Malaka as one of a group of four legatees. 15 Tan Malaka subsequently became involved in discussions with Prime Minister Sjahrir that appear to have centred around the prospect of one or the other replacing Sukarno. While there are different versions regarding who instigated this association the two men subsequently fell out. 16

**Nasution and the Laskar**

Nasution’s lack of interest in disturbing the indigenous social order solidified during the early years into a strong distaste for radical change and radical political activity. This is evident in his reaction to the intense political activity that took place in the early years of the revolution and the formation of laskar military units by many of the political parties. Among the divisional commanders on the island of Java, Nasution displayed an unusual level of concern to exert army control of the laskar and he was relentless in suppressing or

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incorporating them into the army. 17

An instinctive lack of empathy with the romantic and unruly aspects of the revolution coupled with his background in the KNIL and the highly disciplined youth paramilitary organizations of the occupation period were important factors in Nasution’s approach to the laskar. 18 However, these factors do not fully account for the unusually intense nature of Nasution’s distaste for these organisations.19 The more political of them were the military

18 These feelings were no doubt reinforced by humiliating experiences at their hands, such as being ordered to show his identity card when entering the “territory” of a particular laskar organisation, even though they knew he was the local TKR divisional commander. Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 30. On one occasion he was forced to strip naked so that he could be searched. Prasetyo and Hadad, Op. Cit., p. 42.
19 The other former KNIL officers were more equivocal in their attitudes to these irregular units. For example, Urip Sumohardjo issued a statement in which he attempted to spell out the respective roles of the army and the laskar. He asserted the army's differentiation from civil society "... the army is released from all other work aside from national defence, and its livelihood is guaranteed by society.", while also stating that the army was not a separate "... 'caste' standing above the community." Going to an issue which was central to the rivalry between the laskar and the army he referred to the shortage of arms on the Republican side, stating that if it proved possible the army would "... arm the people...", however "... for the present the TKR [was] not in a position to do this." (Anderson, 1972 Op Cit., p. 265, 266.) When the capital of the Republic moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta in early 1946 there were tensions between some laskar and army units in Central Java. Nevertheless, Central Java commanders did not seek to disband or co-opt the laskar with anything like the same enthusiasm as Nasution. Army units and laskar forces coexisted best in East Java where, Anderson observes, the largely PETA-trained officer corps "... came closer than the KNIL veterans to sharing the ideology of the pemuda groups." Ibid., p. 267. Penders and Sundhaussen contrast the outlook of Nasution’s Siliwangi Division with those in Central and East Java in the following terms: “In contrast, the almost totally ethnic Javanese divisions and badan perjuangan (struggle groups) in Central and East Java held very different views about the role of the armed forces and their organization. It was here that the idea of the fighting spirit of the traditional ksatria (knights) of Java – which recently had been strongly reinforced with the Japanese bushido – remained supreme. Matters of organization, tactical planning, and strategy were much less important to these troops than Nasution’s division. The idea of a people’s fighting force – not a professional army – to oust the colonialist was uppermost in the minds of the vast majority of officers and men in these areas. Also, the badan perjuangan had from the beginning been far better armed than their counterparts in the Priangan – the group of regencies in West Java having Bandung as its centre – and were therefore far more difficult to control by the official army. Attempts at integrating the irregulars by the Army High Command under General Urip Sumohardjo had met with little success.” (Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 31) Sudirman took a fairly benign view of the various components of perjuangan. As Said remarks, "For Sudirman, the armed pemuda, regardless of whether they were in the army, left wing laskar or right wing laskar, were all 'sons' of the panglima besar." Said, Op.
embodiments of competing visions regarding the political orientation of the new state and some posed a threat to the socially conservative “non-cooperating” idea of an independent Indonesia that retained such socially conservative features of the colonial regime as the maintenance of peace and order (rust en orde) stemming from respect for “traditional” authorities and governance structures. 20

Indeed, Nasution writes that the Siliwangi was nicknamed “the rust en orde division” by opponents who accused him of adhering to the old KNIL mentality. 21 He was often accused of being a NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) agent who was intent on suppressing armed opposition towards the Dutch. 22

The Sjahrir government also became concerned about the more unruly laskar as Jakarta was particularly affected by bersiap! actions, greatly embarrassing the government which was seeking to impress upon Allied troops that it had the security situation under control. 23 Nasution was highly energetic and committed in taking action against the Jakarta-based laskar, perhaps to the point of discussing joint action against the group with Dutch forces. 24

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20 Such attitudes were also evident in the older “non-cooperating” nationalists who chose the path of diplomasi. As McKemmish puts it, “The civilian politicians, especially of the older generation, had more to lose in terms of their prestige and positions of power in a society torn apart by revolution.” McKemmish, Op. Cit., p. 22.


23 The situation was exacerbated when the Laskar Rakyat Jakarta Raya (Greater Jakarta People’s Laskar - LRJR), many of whom were criminals, refused a government directive that all armed units (regular and irregular) leave Jakarta by 19 September 1945, only complying much later. Cribb, 1991 Op. Cit., p. 95. When the LRJR carried out acts of social revolution on the outskirts of Jakarta (together with other irregular groups) that entailed overthrowing members of the pamong praja the Sjahrir government was again greatly concerned.

24 See Cribb 1991 Op. Cit., for an account of the bandit-nationalists and leaders of social movements – which included the notorious Laskar Rakyat Jakarta Raya (Greater Jakarta People’s Militia - LRJR) - in the ommenlanden, the lands surrounding Jakarta that had been emptied by the East India Company, settled by migrants and exploited by Dutch-owned estates. (Ibid., pp. 18-21) For an account of the actions of these groups in taking over private estates, deposing local bupati and calling for social revolution see Ibid., pp. 49-57. Cribb writes that at this time Nasution was primarily concerned about developing a conventional military force that could at least hold the Dutch to their positions in West Java. Accordingly, he sought to demobilize and disarm those pemuda who had joined the laskar and who could not readily be absorbed into the already bloated ranks of the Siliwangi. “Because they thought that the army should itself espouse an ideology more
Supported by Sutoko, a local Pesindo leader who had been trained by Nasution within the Seinendan organization, Nasution employed a mixture of personal contacts, persuasion and force in incorporating the laskar in the Priangan area into the Siliwangi Division. Where persuasion was unsuccessful, Nasution used force.

That Nasution was displeased at the intense political activity that nurtured the laskar phenomenon is apparent in his many publications. Sunarti Gondokusumo appears to have shared Nasution’s distaste for the political impetus in many laskar organizations. She records that she attended Sjahrir’s conference of pemuda groups in Yogyakarta as a

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25 Sutoko had been the leader of the Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications Youth Force (Angkatan Muda Pos, Telegrap dan Telepon – AMPTT) before it amalgamated with Pesindo. (Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 28) Sutoko was to remain associated with Nasution and played a leading role in the 17 October 1952 Affair.


27 An example is his forcible suppression of the radical API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia - a radical pemuda organisation formed on 1 September 1945) organisation in Bandung. Van Dijk has recorded Nasution’s description of his suppression of API as follows: "Well, at a given moment, it was in Bandung, I recruited 50% of them [the laskar groups] to form one regiment with me. The rest refused. Thereupon I secretly disarmed a fourth or third of them within the space of a few hours one night. After that the remainder came of their own accord." Van Dijk, Op. Cit., p. 78.

28 For example, in the first volume of TNI, Nasution wrote of his dismay at the proliferation of the parties and their laskar forces following Sjahrir’s appointment as Prime Minister: “The Socialist Party was established and Pesindo was also formed at the beginning of November. Not long afterwards, all the parties formed their “armies” that took the form of armed youth brigades that were officially controlled by the parties.” Nasution, TNI (Vol One), Op. Cit., p. 154. Nasution wrote disparagingly of long-haired pemuda striking romantic poses at the outset of the revolution: “Standardised regular uniforms were considered inappropriate; rather one had to have an appearance and a uniform which expressed the Rebel – with long hair, belts full of bullets, etc.” Nasution, TNI, translation excerpted from Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., pp. 236, 237.
member of the PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia – Youth of the Republic of Indonesia) but resigned from this organisation when it agreed to be incorporated within Pesindo. 29

In 1948, radical Pesindo elements were heavily involved in triggering the Madiun Affair. By this time Sjarifuddin had served as Defence Minister and then as Prime Minister, before going into opposition and becoming involved in the Madiun Affair. Soon afterwards, Sjarifuddin was summarily executed by a military unit and Nasution, who used the Siliwangi to spearhead an operation that crushed the Affair, later observed wryly that at the time he had teased Sunarti: “If you had not left [Pesindo] I would have been forced to arrest you.” 30

**Nasution and the Republican Army**

For the first time since entering the Military Academy in Bandung, Nasution, together with a number of other former KNIL officers, moved from the sidelines of military activity. A Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR - People’s Security Agency) consisting mainly of former PETA officers had been formed on 20 August after the Japanese disbanded that organisation.

BKR units were not provided with a centralised command and officers held and maintained their positions through patron-client (bapak-anak – father-child) relationships. 32

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29 “As a member of the PRI, I attended a meeting of Java youth organizations in Yogyakarta. I was very dismayed when the PRI, that had originally been pure and free of party associations, was changed by the socialist group into Pesindo (The Indonesian Socialist Youth – Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia). I felt that this change would give rise to problems so I took the decision to leave the PRI. I resolved to devote myself solely to the Indonesian Red Cross (Palang Merah Indonesia) as my calling in life.” Sunarti, *Pak Nas Dalam Kenangan*, 2002, p. 24. See Anderson, 1972 Op Cit., pp. 252-260 for an account of the formation of Pesindo.


31 Said cites fear on the part of Sukarno and others of being tried as war criminals by the allies as a reason for government acquiescence towards the disbandment of PETA. "It is known that Sukarno and his friends - the older generation - before and even after the formation of his cabinet, were not only afraid of the Japanese but also of the Allied armies. This was because they already knew - from Allied radio broadcasts - that they were the first targets of the incoming Allies, especially the Dutch re-occupation troops. By not having any army, Sukarno and his friends were hoping to show the Allies that they were not the Japanese collaborators the Dutch had portrayed them as." Said, Op. Cit., pp. 11, 12.

32 Mulder writes that in Javanese culture such relationships "focus on a leader who becomes the binding element of the group, horizontal bonds among the members tending to remain weak. The loyalty to the leader is of course a function of his capacity to provide his followers with moral or material benefits and if he is reasonably successful in doing this he may enjoy the respect that is due to his status.” N. Mulder, *Individual and Society in Java*, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992, p. 49.
As the security situation deteriorated the Sjahrir administration established a more professional military force, the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Army – TKR), on 5 October 1945. Amir Sjarifuddin increasingly assumed responsibility for defence matters and was appointed Minister for Defence on 14 October 1945. He appointed as its Chief of Staff, Urip Sumohardjo, a retired KNIL major and graduate of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in Breda.

Nasution became Chief of Staff of the West Java Command of the TKR under the Breda-trained Didi Kartakusumah. Not long afterwards, Didi was transferred to the Ministry of Defence in Jakarta. Still wearing his boy scout uniform, Nasution was appointed Commander of III Division (Priangan region).

However, the government’s attempt to place KNIL officers in charge of the army was soon challenged when many former PETA officers and particularly those in Central and East Java were resistant to Urip’s orders. They had been trained in the heightened atmosphere of the occupation where the Japanese had emphasized the inculcation of semangat through intensive propaganda and physical endurance activities. The ethos they

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33 The Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, like the BKR, was intended to uphold security within the new state while the political leadership conducted negotiations with the Allies and the returning Dutch. On 1 January 1946 the name of the TKR was changed to Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat - People’s Salvation Army - implying a widening of its terms of reference. On 25 January 1946 yet another change of name took place when the TKR became the Tentara Republik Indonesia (Army of the Republic of Indonesia). Whereas former PETA officers had dominated the BKR and the TKR, a reorganisation following the formation of the TRI led to a strengthening of the position of Amir Syarifuddin’s Ministry of Defence vis-a-vis the Army Headquarters and a bolstering of the position of former KNIL officers. The reorganisation also led to a greater official recognition of laskar forces, which Syarifuddin sometimes used as a counterweight to the army. Difficulties in coordinating TRI and laskar forces due to the dual command structure developed at this time led to a further organisational and name change. On 3 June 1947 the name of the army was changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army or TNI) which was to comprise the TRI, laskar units and other armed groups.

34 The government had appointed Supriyadi, a PETA officer who had led a revolt against the Japanese in Blitar, East Java, to this position. This bizarre appointment of a man who was widely believed to have been killed by the Japanese was yet another indication of the government’s hesitation in forming an army.


36 Sunarti writes that she and her family were proud of Nasution “… although rather taken aback because he was only 27 years old. He didn’t even have a TKR uniform, other than his scout uniform. Sunarti, Op. Cit., p. 26.
had acquired was more akin to the *samurai* spirit of the Japanese warrior than the more technical ethos of Western armies. 37

On 11 November Sumohardjo held a meeting in Yogyakarta to sort the situation out, where former PETA officers succeeded in holding an election for a new position of Commander-in-Chief (*Panglima Besar*). A charismatic former PETA officer, Colonel Sudirman, was elected to the post while Sumohardjo was confirmed in his old position of Chief of Staff. 38 Both were promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and, perhaps surprisingly, entered into a cordial and mutually respectful relationship. 39 The same meeting also proposed that the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, be appointed Minister for Defence.

Prime Minister Sjahrir was apparently not aware of the meeting and, as previously noted, had already installed Sjarifuddin as Minister for Defence. While the government doubtfully accepted the election of Sudirman as *Panglima Besar*, it confirmed Sjarifuddin as Minister for Defence.

**Nasution and Sudirman**

In the first eighteen months or so of the revolution, the *Siliwangi* Division became known for its responsiveness to the Jakarta-based central government (where Sjahrir remained in his dual capacity as Prime Minister/Foreign Minister after the transfer of the government to Central Java in early 1946), rather than Army Headquarters (which Urip Sumohardjo had established in Yogyakarta). 40

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38 Reid writes that Sudirman "owed his election in part to his success in negotiating the acquisition in his Banyumas area of the largest supply of Japanese arms outside Surabaya; in part to his moral authority as an ascetic, strong-minded exemplar of traditional Javanese values, with a fatherly concern for his men's spiritual and material welfare." Reid, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 78-9.

39 According to Reid, “The incipient conflict between Japanese-trained and Dutch-trained officers was partly resolved by the surprisingly smooth relationship which developed between Commander Sudirman, the charismatic leader, and his technically more competent chief of staff.” *Ibid.*

40 According to Kahin, Sudirman's control over the Siliwangi Division was "... largely nominal. [It] looked chiefly to the Minister of Defence ... for [its] orders." Kahin, *Op Cit.*, p. 185.
In return for this responsiveness the Siliwangi were given privileged access to scarce funding, a factor that assisted Nasution in ensuring the loyalty of his officers. Nasution was intended to “hold the line” in West Java both to ensure that nationalist sentiments were assuaged and to persuade the Dutch that it would be more prudent to negotiate with the Republic than attempt a military solution. An important aspect of this course of diplomasi was to reassure the Dutch that an independent Indonesia would be a safe place for Western investment and this was a factor in Amir’s funding of the Siliwangi Division and Nasution’s concern to disarm unruly laskar organizations. 41

Nasution’s ambivalence was demonstrated in March 1946 when Sjahrir ordered Nasution to evacuate his forces from the southern part of the city of Bandung in response to a British ultimatum. 42 On the other hand, Sudirman’s Army Headquarters in Yogyakarta sent Nasution a telegram ordering him to “… defend every inch of our land." 43 While Sukarno, Hatta and Urip apparently were all arguing with Sjahrir to allow at least the laskar to remain, 44 the Siliwangi ordered the evacuation of the southern part of the city and set it alight. 45

Although this episode, which became known as Bandung Lautan Api (Bandung Sea of Fire), became mythologised and inspired two very popular songs, 46 Nasution actually appears to have had little choice but to follow the course of action he did. His senior colleagues 47 had set in train the scorched earth strategy on their own initiative and Nasution elected to agree with them and formally issue the instruction. 48

Sudirman became openly associated with Tan Malaka and the cause of perjuangan on 22 December 1945 when he spoke at a meeting at Purwakarta that Tan Malaka had organised to oppose Sjahrir’s policy of diplomasi. At Purwakarta, Tan Malaka demanded the formation of

42 In late 1946 the British had inflicted humiliation on the Siliwangi Division by successfully demanding that all Indonesians evacuate the northern half of the city of Bandung. Anderson, Op Cit., p. 296.
45 Penders and Sundhaussen, Op Cit., p. 33.
46 The songs are Halo Halo Bandung, Bandung Selatan (South Bandung) and Sapu Tangan Sutera dari Bandung (A Silk Handkerchief from Bandung).
47 In particular, Sutoko, Omon Abdulrachman and Sukanda Bratamanggala.
48 McKemmish, Op. Cit., pp. 27-31. While Sjahrir was satisfied by this compromise, the Army Headquarters was not, and as Said comments: "It took a few weeks for Nasution to straighten out his decision with the headquarters." Said, Op Cit., p. 42.
a popular front which would have the aim of achieving "100% Merdeka" (100% Independence) and later announced a "minimum program" that made a number of demands, including a “people's army”, “people's government” and the nationalization of foreign assets. 49

By late February Sjahrrir was under such pressure that Sukarno announced the Prime Minister had tendered his resignation. 50 However, Sjahrrir's Socialist Party retained a majority within the KNIP and on 2 March President Sukarno, who, like Vice President Hatta, was wary of Tan Malaka, appointed Sjahrrir to form a new cabinet. Sjahrrir did so and set out in secret to negotiate a settlement with the Dutch. 51

By mid March the government had resolved to destroy Persatuan Perjuangan, 52 which it realised would object strongly and might well jeopardise any agreement resulting from Sjahrrir's negotiations and Tan Malaka was arrested and detained until late 1948. 53 After his release, he formed the Murba Party and in the wake of the Dutch offensive he attempted to lead the guerrilla struggle, claiming the Sukarno / Hatta government had been wiped out. He was killed by a TNI unit in 1949.

On 27 June, Hatta announced that Sjahrrir's position was to concede Dutch authority over areas outside Java, Sumatra and Madura and to agree to the Republic's participation within a federal Indonesia within a Netherlands-Indonesia union. In exchange, the Dutch would recognise the Republic's de facto control over these islands. 54 On the same day the Prime

50 An indication of the pressure the government was under by this time is that on the afternoon of the same day it announced its own Five-Point Program. Although similar in tone to the Minimum Program, the Five-Point Program was, as Anderson puts it, "vague to the point of evasiveness." See Anderson, 1972 Op Cit., p. 316, 317 for details of the Five-Point Program. Prime Minister Sjahrrir, who had never been close to Sukarno, began to describe the Five-Point Program as "Sukarno's five points". Ibid., p. 318
51 The battle-lines between Persatuan Perjuangan and the government were now clearly drawn. Wikana, a prominent Pesindo leader (Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., p. 316) stated that the Persatuan Perjuangan would not permit member organisations to be represented in a new cabinet, raising doubts about the viability of Sjahrrir’s position. However, the tide began to turn in favour of the government as Sukarno clearly indicated his support for Sjahrrir. A number of organisations began to disassociate themselves from Persatuan Perjuangan, the most notable being Pesindo. Nevertheless, the government suffered a setback when after a ten-day period of deliberation the major Muslim party, Masjumi, decided to stick with the Persatuan Perjuangan. Ibid., p. 319.
52 Ibid., p. 323.
53 Ibid., p. 327.
54 Ibid., p. 63.
Minister was kidnapped by members of the army.

After an appeal by President Sukarno, Sjahrir was released and on 2 July several opposition politicians were arrested. 55 In the early morning of 3 July 1946, a Major Sudarsono (who claimed he was acting on Sudirman's orders) and a group of leading Tan Malaka associates went to the President to present a petition that he dismiss the cabinet. Sudarsono was arrested on leaving Sukarno's office. 56

Sudirman could not be contacted until he reported to the Palace on the evening of 3 July, and his involvement in what became known as the 3 July Affair remains unclear. 57 Although Sukarno obviously suspected Sudirman of complicity in what amounted to an attempted coup, the Commander-in-Chief was subsequently cleared by a military tribunal.

Sudirman’s association with Tan Malaka was particularly worrying for the government because within the predominantly Javanese army he was very popular. He was able to call upon essentially Javanese symbols to rally the support of his troops, whom he referred to as his anak. 58

Sudirman epitomized the PETA idea of fighting spirit or semangat. Nasution lacked Sudirman’s charisma and unlike the Commander-in-Chief he took care not to associate himself with Tan Malaka’s radical-left programme, which was no doubt repugnant to him. Once again, the contacts he had made with leading Bandung pemuda during the occupation came to his assistance when Sutoko, a prominent youth leader and ally of Nasution, distanced the Bandung Persatuan Perjuangan from the organization as a whole.

Attempts to Form a “Professional” Army

The relative closeness to the government of the former KNIL officers compared to those

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58 He often spoke of the “sacred” nature of the struggle for independence and once ordered his men to fast for three days so that they would be more aware of the spiritual dimension of the revolution. Britton, Op. Cit., pp. 42, 43. Remarking upon the "pervasive sadness" of a radio address Sudirman made to his troops on 9 April 1946, Anderson insightfully comments: “But Sudirman knew his audience, and spoke out of the culture he shared with his listeners. In his stress on spiritual purity and sincerity, on the moral qualities of the soldier, and on the need for austerity and self-sacrifice, one can see a
with a PETA background was brought into sharper focus when Sjarifuddin sought to reorganise the army in early 1946, renaming it the Tentara Republik Indonesia (Army of the Republic of Indonesia - TRI). As Cribb points out, while the former KNIL officers might not have been politically close to Sjarifuddin, their desire to establish an army that could meet international standards of professionalism led them to cooperate closely with Sjarifuddin in forming the TRI. 59

Tensions had emerged between the anti-fascist Prime Minister Sjahrir and the former PETA officers when he published a pamphlet entitled Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle) on 21 October 1945, in which Sjahrir declared that "democracy" rather than nationalism "... should be the primary objective of our revolution." He had called for a purge of all "... political collaborators of the Japanese fascists." 60

When Sjahrir became firmly identified with the policy of diplomasi the rift between the more hard-line former PETA officers and the government widened. It also exacerbated emerging conflicts within the army between former KNIL and PETA officers as the Sjahrir government generally favoured the former KNIL officers and they were generally more accepting of Sjahrir’s diplomasi policy. 61

The closeness of the government to the KNIL officers was reflected in the government statement that the TRI was to be "... organised on international military foundations." and was to "... undergo revision of its organisation in accordance with sound military forms and harmonious blend of ancient Javanese conceptions of the satria [noble]-warrior and the values of the Japanese military ethos at its best." Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., pp. 375-378.

59 As Cribb points out, the former KNIL officers may not have shared Amir Sjarifuddin's left wing political views but "... they had many other things in common in the context of 1946, notably Western education and an interest in discipline, hierarchy and effective military organisation." Cribb, 1991 Op Cit., p. 108.


61 Sjahrir’s reasons for favouring diplomasi have been succinctly summarised by T.B. Simatupang: “The most urgent issue was how to solve the conflict between us and the Dutch. In this case, at first there emerged a political faction which supported negotiations with the Dutch, because the international situation could benefit us if we were skillful in showing ourselves as a democratic movement with peaceful intention, and because we (and actually also the Dutch at that time) were unable to resolve the conflict with armed forces. Thus, according to this faction, there was room to solve conflict through negotiations, so that we would not lose time, materials, and lives in a war, and we could immediately start the development programs. This faction was mainly associated with Sutan Sjahrir. Simatupang, 1996 Op. Cit., p. 114.
foundations." 62 This “revision” or review of the TRI was to be implemented by "... a committee comprising military experts and other experts considered necessary." 63 Former KNIL officers dominated the committee that was headed by Didi Kartasasmita. 64

The committee sought to reduce Sudirman’s influence while bolstering Sjarifuddin and the former KNIL officers. It reorganized the defence apparatus into a General Headquarters (responsible only for operational matters) under General Sudirman, and a Military Section that was subordinate to an expanded Ministry of Defence in which key positions were accorded to former KNIL officers. 65 However, former PETA officers continued to dominate the field commands in Central and East Java. Nasution was appointed Commander of the West Java Siliwangi Division.

While Nasution shared with the other KNIL officers something of an alliance with the Sjahrit government, his appointment indicated that he had qualities that the others lacked as he was the only former KNIL officer to gain and retain a field command. The older Breda-trained KNIL officers found it difficult to cope with the somewhat anarchic nature of the emerging Republican Army and gradually retreated into relatively ineffectual positions or were deposed, while Nasution’s fellow CORO cadets felt most comfortable around Urip Sumohardjo. 66

63 Ibid., p. 260.
65 Supporters of Sudirman were concerned at this attempt to assert the authority of the Defence Ministry over him and the Army Headquarters. See, for example, the recollections of former PETA officer, Soebijono, in Soebijono, Op. Cit., p. 14. Sudirman's Army Headquarters, under the day-to-day operational control of Urip, was to consist of seven sections whose activities were confined to military / operational matters, while the Ministry of Defence had more than twice that number of sections, indicating a considerably larger number of functions. Anderson, 1972 Op Cit., pp. 372, 373. On the other hand, Pierre Heijboer describes the reorganisation as a means of dividing the slow and large TNI into organisational and tactical sections, thereby creating a force that was more mobile and in the interests of more effective control of the army. Pierre Heijboer, Agresi Militer Belanda: Memperebutkan Pending Zamrud Sepanjang Khatulistiwa 1945/1949, Jakarta, Gramedia, Widiarsana Indonesia in Cooperation with Koninklijk Institut voor Taal-Land-en Volkunde (KITVL), 1998, p. 126.
66 Britton, Op. Cit., p. 46. As Anderson states, "Didi Kartasasmita [Command I, West Java] seems to have hung on the longest, perhaps in part because Nasution served as his chief of staff, but it was for little more than a month. The KNIL veteran Suratman [Command II Central Java] was never accepted by his PETA division commanders; and Muhammad [Command III East Java], formerly daidancho [PETA battalion commander]
Nasution had not only acquired some Western technical military skills as a result of his KNIL officer training, but was heavily steeped in Japanese paramilitary mobilization and training techniques in Japanese-sponsored paramilitary organisations through which he had developed close links with the prominent West Java-based pemuda who entered PETA and subsequently joined the Republican army. In a sense, Nasution had developed the sort of bapak-anak links that he disdained in his later writings and that other former KNIL offices were apparently unable to emulate. 67

“People’s War”

Nasution liked to portray himself as apolitical, and the noted guerrilla warfare researcher, Walter Laqueur, has observed that Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare reminded him “of Mao with the politics left out”. 68 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that, like Tan Malaka’s ideas in Gerpolek, there was a strong political dimension to Nasution’s strategies for “people’s war”. Indeed, although Tan Malaka placed great emphasis on the formation of a "people's army" 69 and a "people's government" 70 the socially conservative Nasution quotes Gerpolek extensively in Volume Two of TNI, his history of the armed struggle. 71

However, unlike Nasution, Tan Malaka never had the opportunity to put his principles into practice. Anderson has argued that Tan Malaka’s imprisonment and the defeat of his movement were decisive blows to any prospects of the struggle against the Dutch turning in Buduran, was even arrested by the military police of his subordinate, Jonosewojo. Both men had to be withdrawn rapidly to the security of General Staff headquarters."  
Anderson, 1972 Op Cit., pp. 240, 241. One of the former CORO cadets who worked with Urip was T.B. Simatupang, who wrote that Nasution chose to serve in the Siliwangi Division rather than in a staff appointment at army headquarters in Yogyakarta because of Nasution’s interest in tactical-organisational matters. Simatupang, 1996 Op. Cit., p. 110. 67 Nasution was also assisted by the particular nature of the city of Bandung, which was not “indigenous” but founded by the Dutch. In the twentieth century it had become a centre of learning and administration for young people from throughout the archipelago, resulting in the pemuda of Bandung being more prepared to accept “outsiders” like Nasution.
69 Whose obligation was to: “implement the people's political programs of the Murba (proletariat). In the revolutionary period, the people's army is a revolutionary army, that is an army of revolutionary politics.” Nasution, TNI (Vol Two), Op. Cit., p. 222.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., pp. 216-226.
into a national revolution. It is likely that had the struggle spawned a large left-wing revolutionary army, the pamong praja would have been a prime target. Indeed, in the early stages of the revolution social revolutionary movements acted against a number of members of the pamong praja.

Tan Malaka displayed considerable antipathy toward the pamong praja. He thought that the social order in the Dutch colonial period was “rotten to the core” and while he was concerned to enlist the support of what he described as “enlightened” members of the priyayi class, he proposed the redistribution of land that was the property of "... hostile aliens and aristocratic parasites of the Dutch."

Tan Malaka’s cry that “The Indonesian revolution cannot be just wrapped up within a national revolution” could have been directed specifically at Nasution, whose views on what constituted good government appear to have accorded fairly closely with the Dutch colonial view that “traditional” authority structures were the best means of governing the Indonesian masses. From the early period of the revolution Nasution’s lack of interest in disturbing the indigenous social order changed into a concern to maintain it in the face of the

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72 “Anderson believes that this defeat over the issue of immediate social revolution not only reinforced the position of the political moderates in Indonesian society but considerably reduced the likelihood that, once national independence was attained, far-reaching social reforms would actually be carried out.” George McT. Kahin, “Foreword” to Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., p. ix.
73 See Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., pp. 332 – 369 for an account of the patterns of social revolution that took place in Java during the revolutionary period. Perhaps the best known of the social revolutions that took place in Java was the so-called "Three Regions" (Tiga Daerah) Affair which took place in Brebes, Pemalang and Tegal in the Pekalongan area of North Central Java. Very briefly put, the affair was precipitated in part by santri-abangan rivalries in that orthodox Muslim youth replaced a number of lurah with members of the santri group. The unrest culminated in action by left-wing forces who replaced the Resident of Pekalongan - who had cooperated with the Japanese in conscripting forced labour, had been personally corrupt, had a history of countering nationalists and failed to understand the changes which the end of the Japanese occupation and the proclamation of Independence were to bring - with a member of the secret PKI. This event provoked a reaction by Indonesian Army units whose officers had been recruited from local priyayi families. Anton Lucas, One Soul, One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1991, provides a comprehensive account of the Tiga Daerah affair. Later in the revolution, members of the pamong praja were targeted by left-wing forces during the September 1948 Madiun Affair.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 286.
77 Ibid., p. 217.
widespread politicization of society and the civil disorder that accompanied this process that was often manifested in the actions of the more unruly *laskar* groups.

Nasution only came into his own as a military strategist in July 1947 when the Dutch launched an offensive that they termed a “police action”. This was to lead to Nasution’s association with “people’s resistance” of the type that the Yugoslav officer, Lieutenant-General Dushan Kveder, has described as “territorial warfare”.

Territorial warfare takes place after large parts of a state have been overrun by an occupying army. It goes beyond such purely military concerns as battlefield tactics and strategies, and even civilian mobilization at home and the occupation and government of enemy territories. Importantly, forces engaged in territorial warfare, and particularly guerrilla and partisan forces, have to maintain government functions and the sovereignty of the state to the maximum degree possible within their own national boundaries, and adopt political roles at the grassroots in dealing with political differences within their own societies. 78

The strategies that Nasution developed between 1945 and 1948 accorded with the basic tenets of territorial warfare in that they were both directed at wearing down the technologically superior Dutch forces while maintaining enclaves of national sovereignty. His reliance upon the *pamong praja* and village administrations meant that he was also upholding a particular political vision of the nation and the state. It is this latter objective that is of most relevance to this thesis.

**The Siliwangi Routed**

When most of Nasution’s *Siliwangi* forces were overrun by the Dutch he endured a period of personal and professional crisis. The Republic appeared to have suffered a devastating blow and in West Java Nasution faced disappointment and recriminations. Nasution’s lowest point was when many officers in army headquarters were taken in by a

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78 As Kveder points out, in territorial warfare situations guerrilla leaders need to: “.. independently solve many political problems... This is a necessity which cannot be avoided in such a war, regardless of the desire of many officers in European armies to refrain from politics in the exercise of their military profession.” Dushan Kveder, “‘Territorial War’: The New Concept of Resistance”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 32, Nos. 1-4, October 1953-July 1954, p. 97.
message transmitted by the Dutch but purporting to be from within the Siliwangi (using the Siliwangi code) that he had capitulated. 79

Nasution resurrected his career and reputation when he developed his strategies of “people’s war” from the rural hinterland of West Java, an episode in his life that he was later to portray as something of a “road to Damascus” experience that laid the foundations for Indonesia’s future defence doctrines:

The term “territorial” originated in the Siliwangi period, and the task of “territorial cadre” was introduced. From the characteristics of this “territorial” [term] certain other aspects developed, such as kekaryaan, karya operations and Civil Defence (Pertahanan Sipil – Hansip) and People’s Resistance (Perlawanan Rakyat – Wanra).

This territorialism gave rise to the recognition of the TNI as a force within the Indonesian people in the 1960s. It supported the development of further TNI doctrines. 80

In a similar vein, Heijboer cites Nasution: “At the time [of the rout of the Siliwangi Division] this [territorial warfare] was just an idea that emerged in my thoughts. Later I would channel it into other functions, and make it the foundation for principles of war in Indonesia.” 81

The “police action” followed the break down of an agreement the Dutch had reached with Sjahrir in the mountain resort of Linggajati in November 1946, in which the Prime Minister acknowledged Dutch authority over areas outside the islands of Sumatra, Java and Madura, and agreed to a decolonisation plan that would lead to the creation of a Netherlands-Indonesia union. While moderates like Simatupang supported the Linggajati Agreement, 82 those who adopted a harder line, and the Tan Malaka-inspired opposition in particular, were enraged. 83

81 Heijboer, Op Cit., p. 52.
82 As Simatupang writes, the Linggajati Agreement was a watershed in Dutch-Indonesian relations: “After this agreement, our strategic goal changed, because we and the Dutch had agreed that one day there would be a sovereign United Indonesian States (RIS). Neither we nor the Dutch could get out of the main points of this agreement after it became a historical reality which had national and international significance.” Simatupang, 1996 Op. Cit., p. 115.
83 Hard-line members of the Dutch parliament also found the agreement difficult to accept because they believed it gave too many concessions to the Republic, and only ratified the Agreement when clarifications were attached to some of its points to the effect that they did not reflect the intentions of the Dutch negotiators. Heijboer, Op. Cit., p. 28.
The Dutch had already established a federal state (*negara*) of East Indonesia (*Indonesia Timor*) in early 1946, which covered the swathe of islands from Sulawesi (Celebes) to Bali and the East and Lesser Sundas. They exacerbated disagreements within the Republic when they set about developing a number of other *negara* and special districts (*daerah istimewa*) in “outer islands” where the Republic was weak and built up their forces in the occupied parts of Indonesia. In mid-1947 they attempted to impose further conditions, serving an ultimatum that a “transitional government” be formed, under which the Republic was not permitted to carry out its own diplomatic relations. Moreover, the ultimatum required the Republic to agree to Dutch police entering its territory to secure Dutch enterprises.

In the last week of June, Sjahrir conceded 95% of the Dutch demands. However, his position became untenable and he resigned as Prime Minister in June 1947. His successor was Amir Sjarifuddin, who led a large left-wing coalition known as the Left Wing or *Sayap Kiri*. On 15 July the Dutch delivered a new ultimatum to Indonesia. 84 They launched their offensive after claiming that Sjarifuddin’s response was unsatisfactory.

The main objective of the economically hard-pressed Netherlands Indies administration was to gain access to prime export-earning areas of Java and Sumatra, and deep-water ports. 85 Dutch forces were mechanized, well trained and had the advantage of air and naval support. They rapidly brushed aside the Republic’s rudimentary linear defences, occupying major population centres in West Java (with the exception of Banten), Madura and the Eastern Salient of Java, the Semarang area of Central Java, the plantation areas around Medan in North Sumatra, and oil and gas fields in the Palembang and Padang areas of Central Sumatra.

The Dutch did not extend their offensive into the Republican heartland around the cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, although their Commander, General Spoor, wished to do so. 86 Yogyakarta would have been his major target as the capital had moved there from Jakarta in early 1946 on the invitation of the strongly nationalist Sultan Hamengku Buwono.

Before the offensive Nasution had adopted flexible strategies that allowed for the possibility of retreat, while paying lip service to directives from the army command in Yogyakarta to

84 Demanding that Republican forces withdraw 10 kilometres from a demarcation line that had been negotiated on 14 October 1946
85 This was clear in the choice of the code name “Operation Product” for the “police action”.
conduct a linear defence. He divided his West Java command into six zones into which he placed his brigades. Although each brigade was positioned to conduct a linear defence of a strategic location, they were intended to be administratively self-sufficient and located in close proximity to an area of mountainous terrain into which they could retreat if necessary.

In spite of making these preparations Nasution later wrote that he was in despair at the ease with which the Dutch routed his forces and ashamed that his Siliwangi Division had let down the people of West Java. He recalled travelling by packhorse through West Java in the wake of the offensive, accompanied only by an adjutant:

Along the entire length of the road we encountered groups of soldiers who were retreating or lost, often accompanied by their families. My discussions with them were not pleasant for me, because what I heard were expressions of despair or indifference. And sometimes their weapons served as carrying poles for parcels or small suitcases. Of course, as a commander, it was very stressful for me to see such a thing because there was nothing at all I could do. All along the road I tried to think “what can I do”, but my thought processes ran into a dead end and there was still no way out.

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Throughout the day I remained under cover in that sector. We ate sweet potato. At that time Mashudi from the Indonesian National Bank and a member of the KNI for the Priangan area came to me to express the people’s disappointment with the Siliwangi Division because the enemy was so easily able to occupy centres of government and production.

As a commander I really felt helpless at that time.

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87 Heijboer states that Nasution was among the commanders who: “… agreed with [the concept of] another system of defence that was more flexible. The spokesman for this group was Nasution, whose division, the ‘Siliwangi’ in West Java had to deal with a very long front compared to the others. He was able to point out to his colleagues the superiority of the weapons the Dutch possessed, and also the unique possibilities afforded by mountainous terrain that was available for guerrilla warfare, as well as the fact that the Indonesian military was in the middle of a large-scale reorganisation. On 5 May 1947 some of the armed groups (laskar) entered the organic ranks of the army, which from that time became known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). On paper everything was certainly in order, but in practice there was still much that needed to be done.” Heijboer, Op. Cit., p. 30.
90 Ibid., p. 327.
Principles of “People’s Resistance”

Nasution gained valuable time to properly assess the situation when the Dutch delayed fanning out into the occupied regions while a decision was made on whether to continue their advance to the Republican capital. Meanwhile, Priangan-based Siliwangi units gradually regrouped in the interior of West Java, where they soon found that while the Dutch controlled major population centers they lacked the resources to occupy the rural areas as well. There, Nasution and other officers developed principles of guerrilla warfare that were intended to maintain Republican sovereignty within guerrilla pockets where they could harass the Dutch. Nasution writes that he became fully aware of the potential of this form of warfare as he was generally welcomed by the inhabitants of rural villages:

For one or two weeks my adjutant and I traveled on foot carrying backpacks, unable to work out a way out from the south of Tasikmalaya. According to the map, at that time the Dutch were everywhere. But in the field it turned out to be the other way around. In a physical sense, the Dutch were only able to control certain points. At that time I became aware of two things. One, the people in the villages were still loyal to the Republic. Two, it became apparent that the troops who had retreated from the outskirts of Jakarta and the other cities had regrouped in the mountains and were being helped and looked after by the people.

Nasution wrote that he and his officers were influenced by Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* and Charles Rollo's *Wingate's Raiders* and these sources are generally credited as inspiring him to develop strategies of “total people’s resistance”. However, other factors also influenced him, not the least of which was the “people’s resistance” apparatus established by the Japanese occupation forces. In Chapter Four I remarked that Nasution

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92 Nasution, “Kita Belum Cukup Dewasa”, 1995 *Op. Cit.*, 48-49. In a similar vein, Pierre Heijboer has recorded the following recollections by Nasution: “After we had travelled a considerable distance I thought how extensive West Java was. On the map it looked as if the Dutch were everywhere, but it was clear that they had only occupied a small part of it, the cities and the roads, while we were still in charge of the rest. I was reminded of a book I had read, a present from someone who brought it from Singapore. The book was by the British General Wingate who had fought the Japanese in Myanmar (Burma). At one time Wingate infiltrated his troops behind Japanese lines. I had an idea that such a concept could be applied. Pockets of resistance could be formed, which could not be reached by the Dutch, a type of guerrilla base, and from those places attacks could be mounted against their posts and lines of communication. In this way the war of independence could be continued without large-scale battles.” Heijboer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 52.
learnt a lot about “people’s resistance” from the Japanese, something he later made clear in *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*:

The people’s resistance and civil defence organization was very well organized. Security and people’s resistance were organized beginning at the level of each household. A number of families were organized into a *kumi* with its own head; a number of *kumi* were amalgamated into a *cokai*, also with an elected head. And a number of village heads were subordinate to the Cokaico [head of a *cokai*]. Each village administrative unit [kelurahan] had its own youth brigade [barisan pemuda], a *Keibodan* unit (to assist the police and in civil defence). Each village and *cokai* had its own guard, surveillance and first aid posts. In every office and enterprise there were *pemuda* organizations and civil defence brigades. Similarly, there were women’s organizations in every village administrative unit, nursing organizations and organizations to entertain *romusha* [indigenous labour force]. Heads of regions from the *bupati* to the *lurah* led their youth brigades and *Keibodan* while their wives led women’s organisations. The most senior leader of auxiliary units for the troops was Bung Karno and auxiliaries for workers were led by Bung Hatta. In every village administrative district there was a platoon of the Pioneer Brigades [*Barisan Pelopor*] or the *Suṣijintai* [Driving Force of the Army], consisting of adult *pemuda*, which were intended for a future partisan war. The highest command was exercised by Bung Karno, through regional commands, commanders of battalions in each *kabupaten* and company commanders in each district. As well, *Hizbullah* forces were formed especially for people’s resistance as well. Every school was formed into companies headed by a teacher who was trained in military matters.

Through such methods, all the people undertook physical exercise and military training, and were formed into tightly disciplined organizations. And in each *kabupaten* office there was a defence section.³⁴

Another Japanese-sponsored organization with which Nasution was closely associated, the PETA, had many of the characteristics of a territorial warfare force. PETA was never accorded a central command structure and each PETA battalion was an autonomous unit with close links to its local area from which most of its members were recruited.³⁵

Nasution was also influenced by his experience in ordering the southern part of Bandung to be burnt in the *Bandung Lautan Api* incident of March 1946. ³⁶ He later wrote that the

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³⁵ As Mrazek points out: “… the structure of the PETA was to be ‘territorial’. The PETA was to consist of battalions and companies that would be permanently stationed in one area and all the maintenance of the troops was to be provided from the resources of this area. There was virtually no provision for a logistical support of the units from a centre outside the region. Indeed, no central staff of the PETA was established at all.” R. Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-65: A Study of Intervention*, Prague, Oriental Institute in Academic, 1978, p. 27.
³⁶ After fighting broke out between *pemuda* and the British in November 1945 Bandung was divided into Northern (British) and Southern (Indonesian) zones. *Pemuda* groups
incident gave him faith that the people were at one with the army and that the evacuation had convinced him that it was wrong for partisan forces to be organized under various civilian controlled organizations:

In Europe people’s army systems were organized as militia forces with professional cadres at their heart, and this was the case when the spontaneity of the people gave rise to partisan forces in areas occupied by the enemy.

Regretting that *laskar* forces and people’s struggle organizations had become arenas for political conflict, rather than having an external defence focus, he cited *Bandung Lautan Api* as evidence that the people were highly responsive to the leadership of the army in emergency situations, and that a duality of command between the army and civilian-led *laskar* umbrella organizations was undesirable and unnecessary. He went on to recount that the incident taught him that the TRI was a “people’s army”:

The *Bandung Lautan Api* incident convinced me that the unity between the people and the army was strong, and that therefore the idea of a “people’s army” was a fact of life in the field.

However, Nasution also envisaged that his “people’s army” was in some ways above the people, and should lead the people and the civil authorities in critical situations:

Although the civil government [authorities] were [originally] obedient to the cabinet instruction, when the time arrived they obeyed the divisional commander. This experience greatly influenced my ways of thinking and acting in a range of army leadership positions in the future.

asserted dominance over the older civilian leaders in the Southern zone and in this context Nasution assumed command of the local TKR from the older former PETA officer, Arudji Kartawinata, whom many *pemuda* blamed for failing to secure arms in the early weeks of the revolution and for being too accommodating to the Japanese and the British.

97 “… the British were wrong in pointing the finger at me and saying that the Indonesian people wanted to stay within the city. They evacuated, they said, because we forced them. I was able to witness the solidarity of the people with the army, and many of them burned their own houses down. For the other side, the TRI were extremists who incited the people, and even oppressed and terrorized them. It was difficult for them to understand the spontaneity and togetherness of the people with the army.” Nasuton, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol One, *Op. Cit.*., p. 235.


At a more military technical level, prior to the “Police Action” Nasution was also influenced by a Prussian / German concept known as *wehrkreis* or “military district”, 101 which became the precursor of the territorial command structure in Indonesia. Cribb attributes Nasution’s initial impulse to create the *Wehrkreis* to a need to “… restore a sense of hierarchy within the Siliwangi Division” whose units had been “scrambled” in the retreat from the Dutch offensive, and to assert responsibility for the entire province of West Java after the Ministry of Defence “stripped him and the Siliwangi Division of responsibility for the security of the province in the wake of the apparent debacle of July 1947.” 102

The *Wehrkreis* idea was developed by a group of Army Headquarters (Yogyakarta) staff officers known as the Younger Generation Officer corps, whose leader was Nasution’s CORO classmate, T.B. Simatupang. 103 Recognizing the likelihood that Indonesia’s linear defences might not survive against a Dutch offensive, this concept advocated a territorial strategy. There are similarities between the *Wehrkreis* system and Nasution’s advocacy for different tiers of forces (one offensive / mobile and the other more supportive and partisan in nature) during the revolution.104

There are also similarities between the *wehrkreis* concept and the form of warfare that Tito’s Yugoslav forces described as “territorial”. Lieutenant General Dushan Kveder, whose thinking on territorial warfare was to influence the Indonesian Army in the 1950s, wrote that armies that adopted this form of warfare did not countenance the prospect of surrender to a

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101 The *Wehrkreis* system had its origins in Prussian mobilisation techniques that were later practised by the German Army. Although the term *Wehrkreis* can be literally translated as “defensive circle”, a more meaning-based translation is “military district”. For example, George Forty describes it as such in his *German Infantryman at War*. George Forty, *German Infantryman at War*, Hersham, UK, Ian Allen Publishing, extracted from http://print.google.com/print/doc?isbn=0711029296, July 2005.

102 Cribb, 2001 *Op. Cit.*, p. 148. Sudirman had given responsibility for the recovery of West Java to the large Divisi Gerilya Bambu Runcing (Guerrilla Division of the Bamboo Spears) laskar organization that was formed on the basis of elements of the West Java *Laskar Rakyat*. Cribb, 1991 *Op Cit.*, p. 158

103 Simatupang was a member of the Younger Generation Officers’ Corps. He later wrote that the term *Wehrkreis* (defensive circle) emerged from within this group, having been taken from German books, and that it became widely used during the armed struggle when combat areas had to be controlled and defended as functional areas of the Republic, even though Dutch troops occupied several points within them. Simatupang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 120.

104 For example, Forty writes: “Before general mobilisation in June 1939, each military district [*Wehrkreis*] had two components in its headquarters, a tactical component, which became the corps HQ in the field, and a second component that remained the military district and was responsible for training and reinforcement. Older, less fit men unable to take part in active operations normally staffed this component.” Forty, *Op. Cit.*
stronger enemy. Rather, they avoided linear methods of defence and operated freely within a particular territory, liberating and relinquishing areas in accordance with the flow of battle. They attacked only when they stood a reasonable chance of defeating enemy forces.  

In October 1947 Nasution formed five Wehrkreis sectors throughout West Java. In December he extended the Wehrkreis system downwards to include Military District Commands (KDM - Komando Distrik Militer) and Sub-District Military Commands (KODM - Komando Onder Distrik Militer).

Strategies for Resistance

Nasution made plans for three phases of resistance. At first the Dutch were to be harassed wherever possible while the Siliwangi Division regrouped. Siliwangi units were then to enter their Wehrkreis sectors where they were to reinstitute and/or consolidate civil governmental institutions so that the de facto authority of the Republic reached to the village level. In the third stage Siliwangi forces were to cut lines of communication between enemy concentrations:

Troops were sent through enemy territory, infiltrating into empty areas, particularly in the northern area. Several battalions were moved from the mountain areas in the south to the northern plain, a journey that took several weeks. Territorial officers were appointed to maintain public relations with the civil administrators and the public. A long-term program was initiated to gradually enlarge the pockets in all directions, even into the outskirts of big towns occupied by the enemy. People in the villages were still loyal to the Republic, and the important thing was [to work out] how to organise them. Tactics aimed at tiring the enemy, tying him down wherever he was, forcing him to disperse his strength, and rendering him immobile were gradually improved.  

The Dutch were heavily reliant on road transport to move troops and logistics and Siliwangi troops had some success in waging guerrilla warfare against them. Pierre Heijboer writes that Dutch soldiers began to call certain stretches of highway (such as between Cirebon and

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105 “Along with the use of the whole national territory, free manoeuvring is characteristic of territorial warfare. The larger units operate now in one area, now in another, while the small detachments cover the whole territory with their guerrilla activities. Wherever large regular units appear, liberated territories are formed; these may often be abandoned, to be formed again somewhere else.” Kveder, Op. Cit., p.95.
Ciamis and Cirebon and Cikijing) “death roads” because of frequent Siliwangi ambushes. \(^{107}\) Siliwangi forces also systematically destroyed roads and bridges. \(^{108}\) Indonesian troops, with their territorial focus, close ties with local communities and loose structures of command and control, were well suited to guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the Dutch had little rapport with Indonesians and the mechanised forms of transport that afforded superiority to them in the early part of their offensive proved to be vulnerable to guerrilla attacks and of little use to their tightly stretched troops who had to engage Republican forces in the rice fields and jungles of West Java.

The Depoliticisation of “People’s War”

At a Divisional meeting in December 1947 the Siliwangi leadership decided that the emphasis would shift to “total people’s resistance”. A West Java Leadership Political Note was issued to that effect, jointly signed by Sewaka (the West Java Governor) and Nasution, and planning was put into place to establish “guerrilla pockets” throughout West Java to the perimeters of the major cities of Jakarta, Bogor and Bandung. Territorial operations were to be led by the Sub-District Head (Camat) and Sub-District (Kecamatan) Territorial Officers (Opsir Teritorial Kecamatan – OTK). \(^{109}\) For Nasution, an important objective of the “Political Note” was to establish a single military-civilian leadership for West Java, replacing Regional Defence Councils (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah) that had been established at each Residency because he saw them as unwieldy committees comprised mainly of party-affiliated civilians who sought to interfere in military matters. \(^{110}\)

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\(^{107}\) Heijboer writes that “Mental tiredness had a great deal to do with the disappointing experience that almost everywhere the TNI was still capable of launching violent actions, and as well were practically impossible to reach.” Heijboer, Op. Cit., p. 112.

\(^{108}\) Dutch traffic in occupied areas was disturbed not only by gunfire, but – sometimes more effectively – by various forms of damage to the roads. The Dutch Army had to admit that in this regard their enemy was demonstrating considerable creativeness and perseverance. On more than one occasion bridges were dropped into ravines the day after they were erected by the engineers corps. *Ibid.* Guerrilla warfare was not confined to West Java. Heijboer writes that it was highly successful in occupied parts of East Java: “….after all of the sacrifices of the Dutch Marines and X Brigade in seizing the road to Malang, they continually became the targets of sabotage. The troops that carried out this harassment were able to stay close to cities for long periods. It was only after September with air and artillery support that large-scale actions were launched against such cities as Ngadipuro, Nongkojajar, Krewek and Batu, that the situation for the Dutch around Malang, Blimbing, and Singosari became secure. *Ibid.*


Nasution’s “people’s resistance” structures were only established in a few areas where his influence was strong, Sewaka’s influence was limited, and the central government never recognized Nasution’s province-level defence council. Nevertheless, the “Political Note” issued by Nasution and the West Java Governor and the appointment of Kecamatan Territorial Officers was highly significant as the system Nasution envisaged entailed the formation of territorial commands that shadowed the civilian pamong praja system of administration. It pioneered the idea of a partnership between the army and the pamong praja in the leadership of “people’s war”.

Nasution’s choice of the pamong praja was no doubt heavily based on instrumental considerations. The territorially based corps of civil servants remained largely intact in the areas under his control and extended down to the pamong desa (village administration) level, and it was logical for Nasution to attempt to assert Republican sovereignty over these areas through the civil service. Nevertheless, “people’s war” is inherently political and Nasution’s choice of the pamong praja as partners in waging “people’s war” was also a political one.

It was a choice that followed logically from his attempts to co-opt or disband the party-affiliated laskar organisations in that it was intended to “depoliticise” the conflict in favour of organic “traditional” authority structures. Under a joint army-pamong praja leadership, the mobilisation of “the people” was much more likely to follow organic (kawula-gusti) lines than those espoused by political figures such as Tan Malaka.

The political nature of Nasution’s choice is evident in his references in the early-to-mid 1950s to his wartime reliance upon organic authority structures. For example, in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare he lauded the reliability and authenticity of “traditional” pamong praja and pamong desa officials in the “people’s war” campaign of 1947 and dismissed the parties as fickle, divisive and unreliable:

Experience in the first military action [the Dutch 1947 “police action” against the Republic] showed that in times of guerrilla warfare and within the guerrilla enclaves, it was clearly not the party leaders who became the leaders and protectors of the people, but the lurah [village head], camat [sub-district head] and local military commanders.  

111 Ibid.
112 As discussed in Chapter Two, Cribb has argued that Nasution’s greatest contribution to the theory of guerrilla war was his attempt to “depoliticise” the conflict. Cribb, 2001 Op. Cit., p. 146.
... Pa’ Lurah is still the one and only person to rely upon or to be dependant upon for leadership, although he may be a person lacking in education and general knowledge, lacking understanding of the nationalist movement and of economic matters.\textsuperscript{14}

Nasution’s praise of the lurah and the camat and castigation of political leaders was no doubt self-serving, as he wrote Fundamentals in the wake of his humiliation at the hands of opponents in the parliament that culminated in the 17 October 1952 Affair and his dismissal as Army Chief of Staff. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Nasution found loyal members of the pamong praja and pamong desa to have political views that were compatible with his own and that they performed invaluable services for him and his Siliwangi Division in the “people’s war” against the Dutch.

That Nasution was, in return, held in high regard by many of the loyal pamong praja officials in West Java was evident in the 1955 general elections. His IPKI organisation received most of its votes from West Java, where it was supported by a highly motivated group of Siliwangi officers and pamong praja officials.\textsuperscript{15}

**An Emotional Dimension**

There was another personal and emotional dimension to Nasution’s recollections of the services village administrations and populations provided in the second half of 1947, as they were extended to Sunarti as well. Written after a long and happy marriage, Sunarti’s memoirs provide previously unavailable information that helps account for Nasution’s idealisation in the 1950s of traditional village leadership structures and values. Their relationship began in the early period of the revolution when Sunarti nursed Nasution after he was injured while observing a test of hand grenades:

I looked after his wounds and covered them with a bandage. I had to use a few of them, and they even covered his left eye. He looked really gallant, like a freedom fighter. I was enthralled and my heart was beating strongly. Before this happened we had only had a friendly, family style relationship because he was like a son to my

\textsuperscript{14} Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, Op. Cit., undated, pp. 265-7. Nasution indicates his concern for the maintenance of rural social stability and his fear that traditional patterns of authority might easily be disturbed in such statements as: “the intellectual levels” of lurah and village officials needed "... to be raised in order that they might follow the developments confronting them but in wartime it was difficult to make improvements. “Ibid. p. 267.

father and mixed with us every day in our home.  

Sunarti went to Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta to study law but a year into her studies Nasution came to her and “poured out his longing for her”:

Without my presence at his place of duty he was very lonely. I was only too well aware of his intense need for me to be beside him as he fulfilled his immense responsibilities. So we became engaged and exchanged rings on the 17th of February 1947. I gave him one condition - that after we were married I wanted to continue my studies. He agreed.

That Nasution found in Sunarti and the Gondokusumo family a haven he had not known since leaving North Sumatra is evident in the following excerpt from his memoirs:

Sunarti’s Indonesian Red Cross post evacuated to Ciwidey, as did her parents who lived with Mrs Kawilarang at the emergency hospital at Soreang that was managed by Dr Sugandi. Her post became like my parent’s home for me, a place to come home to from time to time to relax. And whatever happens, we all need something of a “base” in the form of a family or parents as a place to come home to now and then.

In May 1948 they married in the town of Ciwidey (where the Gondokusumo family had evacuated) and Sunarti moved to Tasikmalaya where Nasution’s headquarters were located. During the Dutch attack in July Sunarti miscarried and had to be treated under an operating table because of fears of air raids. Still weak and losing blood, she was evacuated from the city. She was to move 13 times from hamlet to hamlet to avoid the Dutch, often losing contact with Nasution. They eventually reunited but were separated again when Nasution had to leave for the Tasikmalaya area.

When Nasution returned, he and Sunarti took refuge in another series of villages, ending up in the hamlet of Bojong Gambir, where the Divisional meeting that formalized the Siliwangi’s emphasis on “people’s resistance” took place. Sunarti had a small typewriter and she typed Nasution’s orders to his commanders.

Sunarti appears to have been well disposed towards village life. She writes of visiting the lurah and ajengan (religious teachers), recalling one in particular (Pidoli) who meant well in seeking to give Sunarti religious instruction but was much too slow:

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On my request, Pidoli sped up her instruction particularly for me as I had studied at the Lyceum and the Law Faculty of Gadjah Mada University.\(^{120}\) She wore peasant clothes and took part in cooking, washing dishes, etc. but was accompanied by a servant because of her weak physical condition following her miscarriage.\(^{121}\) She only describes one unpleasant experience: being forced to sleep on a verandah after being introduced to a Camat, who only invited her to stay in his residence the following day.\(^{122}\)

In Chapter Four I noted the feeling of “noblesse oblige” towards villagers that was instilled in her as the daughter of a prominent and well-off priyayi family. Her parents’ Parindra connections were no doubt instrumental in this process. As discussed in Chapter Four, Parindra and its predecessor organizations had developed the Rukun Tani and other organizations to enhance social welfare, encourage economic development and raise consciousness of the independence struggle among the urban and rural masses.

In Chapter Four I also described Dr Sutomo’s sinoman programme for developing governmental systems from “traditional” self-help concepts in the urban villages of Surabaya, and Soenarjo Gondokusumo’s close association with Sutomo (whom she affectionately refers to as Pak Tom) and other Parindra activists from Surabaya.\(^{123}\) I drew attention to her accounts of being taken to urban slums by her mother and her association with village children during holidays in her father’s (and Dr Sutomo’s) rural retreat.

In this chapter I have referred to the emotional intensity experienced by Nasution after the rout of his Division at the hands of the Dutch. Sunarti’s miscarriage and flight from Tasikmalaya no doubt added considerably to this emotional pressure. The recourse of having a baby reasonably soon after the miscarriage was apparently not available and Sunarti did not have a child until 1952. It is reasonable to assume that these influences impacted on Nasution when he began to idealise organic “traditional” village authority structures after his dismissal in 1952, as it was the lurah and village populations of the hamlets where Sunarti sought refuge who cared for her.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p. 42.
\(^{121}\) Ibid., p. 41.
\(^{122}\) Ibid.
\(^{123}\) Ibid., p. 5.
While Nasution and Sunarti experienced some hardship in the rural villages, they found time to nurture their relationship in beautiful natural surroundings. The following excerpt from Sunarti’s memoirs reveals the emotional intensity they experienced at this time:

After the Dutch occupied Taraju, Pak Nas built a hut made of bamboo in the middle of a forest for us to evacuate to. It was in a valley that was watered by a small river with clear water. The hut, which was at the edge of the river, was shaded by lush overhanging branches. To go down to the river I had to use a bamboo footbridge.

I was there for about a week and it is my most beautiful memory. On that last day before we left (hijrah) for Yogyakarta, Pak Nas and I just sat there for hours to imprint our beautiful memories in our minds. We could hear birdsong and the sounds of animals around the valley. We bathed in the clear little river. We felt that we never wanted to leave because we were at one with the beautiful natural surroundings. And we were aware, that after we left we would be separated and we did not know when we would meet again. We were entering a period of uncertainty. 124

That this period was also very important to the normally more phlegmatic Nasution is evident in his description of his time in the villages with Sunarti as “… a beautiful memory for us.” 125 On the other hand, both of them portray their return from the forests to the cities as something of a fall from grace. Their accounts indicate that whereas the people of the villages had been simple, uncomplicated and steadfast, the politicians in the big cities were unaware of the achievements and importance of the Siliwangi Division, and the people of the towns and cities were less likely to be loyal and supportive.

A Cease-Fire

As Sunarti indicated in the above extract from her memoirs, she and Nasution were compelled to leave their sanctuary in West Java in early February 1948. A ceasefire was declared on board a United States naval vessel (the USS Renville) in January 1948 following renewed negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch. 126 Under what became known as the Renville Agreement, the Republic agreed to recognise the military gains made by the Dutch (along a line of demarcation that became known as the van Mook line) and was required to remove its forces from large areas of Java and Sumatra. The Siliwangi Division

126 The negotiations resulted from widespread international concern about the behaviour of the Dutch in attacking the Republic. Australia and India successfully called upon the United Nations Security Council to mediate. A Good Offices Committee was formed which comprised representatives from the United States, Australia and Belgium. Following the
was the most affected, having to leave the hinterland of West Java for Republican held areas in Central Java.

The Dutch benefited economically and politically from the cease-fire. They gained access to the rich plantation lands of East Sumatra (around Medan), West Java (with the exception of Banten) and most of East Java, and the oil fields around Palembang in South Sumatra. In line with the federalisation process they had set in train with the Linggajati agreement, they moved to set up the federal states of Pasundan (West Java), East Sumatra, South Sumatra, Madura and East Java in the newly occupied areas.

It is clear that Nasution felt that the “people’s war” strategies he developed at this period in his life salvaged his reputation and that of his Siliwangi Division, particularly after the Ministry of Defence had lost faith in them following the rout of July 1947. However, later in life he was to complain that the civilian leaders had failed to sufficiently recognize his achievements and those of the Siliwangi. He considered that by signing the cease-fire the civilian leaders had not only neglected the interests of rural civil servants and villagers who had been loyal to the Republic but had created a vacuum that was quickly filled by Darul Islam insurgents:

It was from that time that the authority of the central government faded in West Java. The people felt wounded, the consequences of which became increasingly serious. How great was the bitterness of the suffering that was to impact on the TNI in the future when, as a result of the failure of an act of diplomacy, they had to return to their places of origin. And even more serious were the consequences that had to be suffered by the people in those areas, who year after year thereafter continued to feel it in the form of never-ending disturbances to security.

It is understandable that the political leaders in the capital city who were still in an atmosphere that was more “normal” were unaware of the real situation and requirements in the people’s guerrilla pockets. There were even a number of members of our delegation who thought the TNI was largely destroyed and only a few battalions remained in existence, and because of that were convinced that it was not appropriate for the government to allow them to become the victims of cruel slaughter by a much stronger enemy.\textsuperscript{128}

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\textsuperscript{127} The Siliwangi preferred to use the term \textit{hijrah} to describe their departure, recalling Mohammed’s flight from Mecca to Medina from where he mustered his forces and returned to seize Mecca.


According to Heijboer, by the time of the withdrawal Nasution was planning a large-scale assault on the South Priangan area and was at first reluctant to withdraw to Central Java.
Sunarti recalls that for her the evacuation resulted in humiliation at the hands of city people, in stark contrast with her experiences in the villages, when she was separated from Nasution, who was en route to Yogyakarta. This incident occurred when she arrived in the city of Garut to find that nobody would assist her, even when she explained that she was the wife of the Siliwangi Commander. She ended up travelling to Bandung on top of a truckload of firewood. 129

Nasution alludes to this sort of humiliation in his memoirs:

So our guerrilla fighters had to separate from their families who were left behind in the mountains with nobody to safeguard and look after them, or they had to ask their families to go into the occupied cities where they attracted insults and misery, or bring their families with them which, of course, meant that they would suffer in other ways. They had to leave behind the guerrilla civil servants who had loyally and unstintingly devoted themselves to the Republic, leaving them to remain in their positions without any guidance. They had to leave behind the ordinary people, who had united with them in the guerrilla war to such an extent that they had become like family. 130

No doubt Nasution’s recollections of his time in the villages were to some extent self serving and embellished over time. However, the assistance he received for the villagers was no doubt a real and important factor in his focus on village administrations in the plans for “people’s resistance” he developed when he evacuated to Central Java:

In investigating what organisation of the people's defence and what organisation of guerrilla government would be most efficient for our needs, I came to the conclusion that it was the structure of the village and the position of *Lurah* and village officers that must be their foundations. It could not be allowed to happen that these were altered and weakened; on the contrary, they had to be strengthened in order that the fullest possible benefit could be won from them for the people's struggle. 131

Nasution’s experience during this period also provided him with a powerful fund of memories about organic “traditional” authority structures and values. They were highly compatible with the type of organicist thinking that was advocated by Professor Supomo in his addresses to the BPUPKI in 1945 and that re-emerged in Indonesia in the mid 1950s.

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only doing so when he realised that some of his troops had received the order before him and were proceeding to assembly points. Heijboer states that the Dutch were surprised when some 20,000 Siliwangi troops reported at assembly points for evacuation from West Java. Heijboer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.
Conclusions

In this chapter I have argued that particular experiences in the first two years of the Indonesian revolution greatly influenced Nasution’s political socialisation. That his previous lack of interest in disturbing the indigenous social order solidified into a concern to maintain it in the face of the politicization of society and widespread civil disorder is evident in his reaction to the emergence of the laskar,

I have also shown that Nasution’s experiences following the rout of the Siliwangi Division by the Dutch in the second half of 1947 led to his reliance on organic authority structures as he began to develop strategies for “people’s war”. While it was logical for Nasution to rely upon these authority structures in seeking to assert Republican sovereignty in his guerrilla pockets, I have argued that these strategies were very important to him at an emotional level. The decision of the Siliwangi leadership to reorientate the Division towards “people’s war” was instrumental in salvaging his reputation and that of the Division. And I have introduced aspects of his personal life that indicate that this period was particularly important to him in more than a strictly professional sense.

I have drawn upon Sunarti’s and Nasution’s personal recollections to show this was a period of heightened and unforgettable emotion for them. I have argued that it was important for Nasution’s later idealisation of organic leadership structures that Sunarti was looked after by village leaders and populations after she had a miscarriage and had to flee Tasikmalaya. I have also shown that the couple experienced times of great joy and emotional intensity during their time in the West Java villages and forests.

I have shown how they portrayed their emergence from the rural hinterland to the cities as something of a fall from grace. Nasution’s accusations of fickle behaviour on the part of the civilian negotiators and complaints about personal hardship and humiliation on the part of Republican supporters and family members left behind in West Java starkly contrast with Sunarti’s positive and emotionally charged recollections of their “honeymoon” in the rural hinterland of West Java.

Importantly, Nasution’s elective affinity between strategies for “people’s war” and organic forms of interest representation was beginning to emerge. In Chapter Six I shall show how
this elective affinity solidified during the period of his military administration when he relied on organic “traditional” authority figures to assist the army in waging “people’s war”.
SIX - “TOTAL PEOPLE’S RESISTANCE” AND “TRADITIONAL” VALUES

In this chapter, which covers the period from January 1948 until January 1949, I shall continue to trace Nasution’s emerging political orientation to ascertain how and why he was attracted to organic “traditional” modes of interest representation and to identify the processes through which he began to arrive at an elective affinity between organic authority structures and his strategies for “people’s war”.

Again, I shall not describe in detail the main political and military events of the period, which have been thoroughly researched elsewhere. I shall draw heavily upon Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, other firsthand accounts of the guerrilla struggle and the military administration, and previously published research.

Nasution’s experiences during the period of military administration in 1949 have received relatively little attention from researchers, perhaps because he did not have direct command of a body of troops and there was no defining battle along the lines of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. His Siliwangi Division had returned to West Java and he was overshadowed in the eyes of many ethnic Javanese by Sudirman and the Sultan of Yogyakarta. He appears never to have fired a shot in either the earlier campaign in West Java or the period of military administration in Central Java.

Rather, for some months he was something of a fugitive in the rural village he chose as his base near the city of Yogyakarta. He was threatened by remnants of the PKI and other disaffected elements and was the butt of jokes that his headquarters was constantly on the run from the Dutch and had little direct influence over military activities.

However, I shall argue that the importance of this period to Nasution’s life and career and to the future of military intervention in Indonesian politics can hardly be overstated. Nasution’s planning for guerrilla warfare in 1948 and the guidance that he issued in 1949 provided for the establishment of Republican-administered enclaves in Java and the conduct of a form of guerrilla warfare that enabled the Republican enclaves and the army to survive and harass the overstretched Dutch until a cease-fire was declared. This preserved the existence of the TNI as a credible force and enabled it to emerge as the core element of the army that was formed after the recognition of sovereignty in December 1949.

Beyond this military achievement, I shall argue that it was during this second guerrilla war that Nasution’s ideas for “total people’s resistance” became firmly associated with “traditional” and “integralistic” values and authority structures. A story emerged that at a critical time in the life of the Republic the army had gone into the villages where it had worked selflessly together with the people and “traditional” forces in society while the politicians had submitted to capture and were negotiating with the Dutch.
I shall draw particular attention to the rather unusual role that Nasution adopted after the Dutch attack. In earlier chapters I have argued that Nasution was as much a political as a military figure. I shall show that rather than fulfilling a typical front-line leadership role of organising troops and setting up or responding to engagements with the enemy, Nasution attempted to create something of a state within a state. He worked hard at compiling instructions and regulations on the conduct of military operations and the administration of a wide variety of non-military matters, including the courts, education and health. In later chapters I shall argue that this was the precedent for the Indonesian Army’s use of its territorial structures and concepts to shadow the administrative structures of the state for most of the following three decades.

I shall point out that he was particularly concerned to place the military administration on the soundest legal foundations possible under the circumstances. This will lay the ground for arguments that I shall put in later chapters, when I shall point out that Nasution continued to display an unusual interest in legal matters for a military officer from an infantry background when he sought legal and constitutional bases for the modes of military intervention in politics, society and the economy that he developed during the 1950s. In later chapters I shall also draw attention to the unusual interest the Indonesian Army has displayed in legal officer education (particularly in the New Order period) since Nasution was its Chief of Staff in the early 1950s. Again I shall refer to the period of military administration to identify its foundations.

I shall continue to provide insights into Nasution’s political behaviour by examining his life experiences and his association with the Gondokusumo family. However, in this chapter I shall begin to trace wider political associations as Nasution began to develop links of his own with socially conservative senior members of the Central Java pamong praja who participated in the military administration. All of them supported Nasution when he began to advocate more organic forms of interest representation in the 1950s and one in particular, Sumitro Kolopaking, became the General Chairman of Nasution’s IPKI organization.

I shall argue that the absence of the civilian political leadership from the armed struggle had major and lasting consequences for the course of military intervention in Indonesia. It resulted in the army and the pamong praja filling the vacuum of power that they left, and in Nasution’s principles of “people’s war” being centred on the army and the pamong praja. Unlike the “people’s armies” of the Left, the Indonesian Army was not part of a monolithic national political movement and the absence of the political leaders meant that it did not have to share the glory of the guerrilla struggle with civilian political leaders.

Finally, I shall point out that the guerrilla campaign resulted in something of a reshuffling of nationalist credentials among the military and civilian leaderships. When a ceasefire was declared
“cooperating” nationalists such as Nasution and loyal pamong praja identities felt that they had emerged with impeccable nationalist credentials, while the former “non-cooperating” nationalists who had submitted to capture by the Dutch had lost something of their moral authority.

**Nasution in Yogyakarta**

In December, after the failure of Republican forces to mount an effective linear defence when the Dutch attacked in July 1947, the parliament enacted far-reaching legislation that provided for the reorganisation and rationalisation (re-dan-ra - reorganisasi dan rasionalisasi) of the army. The ethnic Javanese units were reorganised into three territorial divisions. ¹ The Siliwangi Division, headquartered at Surakarta, was designated a General Reserve Unit (Kesatuan Reserve Umum – KRU). ² In January, the Sjarifuddin government effectively sidelined Sudirman by limiting his scope of responsibility to that of Panglima Besar Angkatan Perang Mobil (Commander in Chief of the Mobile Armed Forces) and placing him in charge of a Markas Besar Pertempuran (Combat Headquarters).

At the Ministry of Defence a more powerful Staf Umum Angkatan Perang (Armed Forces General Staff) was formed. It was headed by former CORO cadets Air Commodore Suryadarma and Colonel T.B. Simatupang, who reported directly to Prime Minister Sjarifuddin. Of course, these reforms were strongly opposed by Sudirman and Urip, although Sudirman confined his criticism of re-dan-ra to the premise on which it was based: that it was necessary because of the inability of the army to defend the Republic against the Dutch. ³

Nasution was another former CORO officer who was accorded a leadership position, replacing Urip Sumohardjo as Sudirman’s deputy after Urip resigned in protest at the changes. ⁴ Sudirman followed his precedent of delegating the management of technical military matters to Urip ⁵ by entrusting military planning to his new deputy. ⁶ As Sudirman’s health worsened towards the

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¹ Division I (Western Central Java), Division II (Eastern Central Java); Division III (Republican remnants of East Java).
⁴ Urip had strongly disagreed with the concessions made in the Renville Agreement and resigned his position. The emotions set in train by the re-dan-ra process are evident in Sudirman’s later assertion that Urip, who died soon afterwards, had committed a form of “mental harkir” because of “spiritual anguish”. See Sudirman’s strikingly eloquent and bitter letter of resignation in Nasution, *TNI* Vol Three, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 69, 70. The retired TNI officer and noted commentator on Indonesian military and political affairs, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, provides a succinct analysis of the causes and effects of the conflicts between the pre-war generation of KNIL officers and those who had been participants in the CORO scheme. See Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, *Kepemimpinan ABRI: Dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya*, Jakarta, Intermasa, 1996, pp. 78-81.
middle of 1948, and particularly after he was hospitalised and lost a lung during an operation, planning was left largely in the hands of Nasution.  

Sjarifuddin did not have sufficient time in office to ensure all the changes he envisaged took place. Just as Sutan Sjahrir had been forced to resign because of controversy over the Linggajati Agreement, Sjarifuddin became embroiled in similar controversy after negotiating the Renville Agreement and resigned as Prime Minister in early 1948. President Sukarno appointed Vice President Hatta as Prime Minister and Sjarifuddin became leader of an opposition coalition known as the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR - People's Democratic Front).

The PKI was beginning to re-assert itself. The Dutch had dealt a shattering blow to the party when it staged premature and unsuccessful revolts in West Java in November 1926 and West Sumatra in January 1927. In 1935 an exiled Communist, Musso, had returned briefly to the Indies to establish an "Illegal PKI". The party remained an underground organisation until a faction within it declared the PKI operative again in October 1945 but no major figure from the PKI appears to have been in Indonesia when independence was proclaimed.  

From the time Sjarifuddin formed the FDR he entered into an increasingly close association with that party.

Hatta took over the reorganisation and rationalisation programme and directed it against unruly Javanese units. Nasution supported the programme and while constrained by the proximity and

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7 Ibid., p. 78.
8 Brackman has summarised the PKI's motives in remaining concealed as follows: "A number of reasons dictated the policy of concealment. By playing an open, prominent role early in the postwar Indonesian revolution, the Communists would have handicapped the Republic when the time came to solicit Western recognition and assistance. This also would have played into the hands of the Dutch, who, after first seeking to depict the Republic as a Japanese fiction, then labelled it a Communist creation. Thus, the Communists would only have antagonised Indonesian nationalism - especially in view of the PKI's supranational character. Then, too, by delaying its emergence above ground, the PKI provided its scattered leadership abroad with time in which to return to Indonesia. Underground, the PKI enjoyed a breathing space while awaiting a clarification of the postwar Communist line and the revolutionary situation at home. It is also conceivable that the PKI chose to remain underground to await the reception accorded the Allies on their landing. If the Republic collapsed, the PKI's emergence would have proved premature. Abroad, the Communists were treating the Republic disdainfully. Radio Moscow ignored the proclamation of independence, and in Holland, the Communists - Indonesian and Dutch alike - denounced the Republic as the handiwork of Japan. Certainly, between August and November, the Indonesian situation must have confounded Moscow. From afar, the Republic appeared to be controlled by collaborating nationalists of Trotskyite coloration." Brackman, Op. Cit., pp. 54, 55. For a brief account of the reformation of the above-ground PKI by Mohammad Jussuf in October 1945, see Ibid., p. 55
9 Said, Op. Cit., p. 70. Ruth McVey writes of "an alliance" being formed "between the army leaders and the conservative [Hatta] regime whereby, in return for military support for the government's program, the army was freed of civilian interference, and both irregular forces and army units of dubious loyalty to the central command were dismantled in the name of retrenchment [sic.] and rationalisation."McVey, 1971 Op. Cit., p. 137.
influence of Sudirman, he reestablished the sort of symbiotic relationship between the government and Nasution that developed under Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin.

An immediately controversial element of Nasution’s plans for “total people’s resistance” was his proposal that the army be divided into three types of forces: strike units with a weapon to personnel ration of 1:1, territorial elements with a weapon to personnel ration of 1:3, and territorial cadre forces who were to lead the resistance at the village, kecamatan and kabupaten levels. The government intended the Siliwangi Division become the elite and relatively well-armed strike unit, which would have accorded with its status as a General Reserve Unit, while the designation of the remaining Javanese divisions as territorial forces seemed to many to relegate them to second-class status. The laskar forces (which had been organised by Sjarifuddin into a body known as the TNI-Masyarakat – People’s TNI) were to be disbanded altogether.

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11 Whereby the Siliwangi Division had supported the Jakarta-based government and vice versa. Within the officer corps of the Javanese divisions there was concern that Nasution and the other former KNIL officers were intending to merge the army in some way with the KNIL and an intense degree of suspicion regarding moves to reform the TNI so that it accorded more closely with “international” standards. Many Central and East Javanese opponents of Nasution’s re-dan-ra plans suspected that Nasution, his former KNIL colleagues, and the Siliwangi Division had a hidden agenda of securing themselves advantageous positions in the army of a future federal state formed through negotiations with the Dutch. A.H. Nasution, “Bertugas Dengan Sri Sultan”, in Atmakusumah (ed.), Tahta Untuk Rakyat: Celah-celah Kehidupan Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, 1982, p. 180.
12 A.H. Nasution, TNI Vol. Two, Op. Cit., pp. 160, 161. Nasution had a number of examples to draw upon, such as the forces of Mao Tse Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap and Tito. Mao Tse Tung is perhaps the best-known proponent of the development of such forces. See, for example Mao Tse Tung, "Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare", in Mao Tse Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963, pp. 244-248. For some two decades Mao and his comrades developed both guerrilla and conventional forces to the point where they controlled much of the hinterland of China. At the time Nasution was making plans for “total people’s resistance” Mao’s forces were conducting a series of general offensives that were to culminate in the destruction of the Chinese Nationalist regime on the mainland and the establishment of the People’s Republic in October 1949. A similar combination of conventional and guerrilla forces was being developed in Indonesia’s near neighbour, Vietnam. The Vietnamese leader, Vo Nguyen Giap, developed village-based guerrilla infrastructures from 1946 while building his offensive forces up to the point where he inflicted a devastating blow against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1953. The war in the South of Vietnam followed a different course. The Viet Cong never developed large-scale mobile offensive forces and it was the arrival in strength of conventional forces from the North following the United States withdrawal in 1973 that was a decisive factor in the defeat of the Saigon regime. In Europe, Yugoslavia had been the centre of a people’s war during the Nazi occupation of that country. Tito’s army evolved from a force of partisans into a combination of partisan and conventional forces. Kveder, Op. Cit., p. 95.
14 Ibid.
Again, Nasution quickly became caught up in rumors that he was pro-Dutch and his re-dan-ra plans were a precursor to a future Dutch-formed federal army with only a few TNI elements. Nasution’s relations with Sudirman and many of the Javanese commanders were often poor. And as Anthony Reid remarks, “Whatever the military merits of such drastic pruning, it was a complete political impossibility short of civil war.” Such a conflict erupted in September in the form of the Madiun Affair, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Nasution and Planning for “Total People’s Resistance”**

Nasution also developed comprehensive strategies for the formation and defence of Republican enclaves on the basis of his planning in West Java the previous year. His Strategic Order No. 1/1948 (that Sudirman signed on 12 June 1948) provided for the army to switch to territorial warfare, with the support of the pamong praja and village administrations, in the event of a further Dutch attack. It contained the following key elements:

- The army would no longer mount a linear defence.
- It would endeavour to obstruct the enemy advance (by non-linear methods), buying time for the total evacuation of the Republic’s civil service, which would be used to maintain the administrative apparatus of the Republic in guerrilla strongholds, and the implementation of a scorched earth policy which would deny assets of economic importance.
- Its basic task was to form guerrilla pockets (Military Sub-district Commands Komando Onder-distrik Militer) at the sub-district (kecamatan) level within which "totalitarian" guerrilla governments would maintain the authority of the Republic. A number of wehrkreis were to be established in mountain strongholds within which more mobile forces would conduct a war of attrition against the Dutch.
- Troops from West and East Java who had been evacuated from their home regions under the terms of the Renville Agreement were to return to these districts and form guerrilla enclaves.

Also reflecting his experience in West Java, Nasution issued instructions that established the pamong praja territorial administrative system as the basis for guerrilla enclaves. The pamong

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16 This manoeuvre was to become known as “Operation Wingate”. Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, notes that the second source of inspiration for the Wingate concept was the Long March of the Chinese Red Army in the 1930s. After being defeated by Kuo Min Tang forces in the Shanghai area, Red forces marched for thousands of kilometres to the relatively safe area of Yenan in the north of China. See Suryohadiprojo, *Op. Cit.*, p. 77. The object of the “Operation Wingate” manoeuvre was to turn the whole of Java into a theatre for guerrilla warfare. The type of warfare Nasution envisaged was encapsulated by Lieutenant General Dushan Kveder in his account of the resistance Tito’s Yugoslav Army mounted to the Axis occupying forces during World War Two: “An army waging a territorial war ... consists of two parts: large regular units to carry out the bigger operations, and many partisan and diversionary groups for auxiliary actions.” .....”Along with the use of the whole national territory, free manoeuvring is characteristic of territorial warfare. The larger units operate now in one area, now in another, while the small detachments cover the whole territory with their guerrilla activities. Wherever large regular units appear, liberated territories are formed; these may often be abandoned, to be formed again somewhere else.” Kveder, *Op. Cit.*
praja] were to form mobile guerrilla administrations that could be moved about the countryside within geographically fluid liberated areas in accordance with the ebb and flow of territorial warfare.

Nasution recognised that the condition of Indonesian forces and the nature of this form of warfare would not enable guerrilla administrations to function effectively above the level of the kecamatan. Moreover, the camat had always been responsible for representing the outside world to the villagers and for mobilising the people. 17 Accordingly, his planning concentrated on the village and kecamatan levels.

Nasution provided for the lurah, whom he described as: “… the only leaders amidst the people who are still obeyed by the people,” to remain in charge in their villages. 18 To ensure their effective cooperation, they were to be “assisted” by army-trained village cadres. 19 He wrote and widely distributed a pamphlet entitled Village Defence (Pertahanan Desa), which provided guidance for guerrilla administration and operations in the event of a second Dutch attack.

The camat were expected to operate their mobile administrations under the supervision of the Commanders of Sub District Military Commands (Komando Onder Distrik Militer - KODM), but his planning envisaged army officers becoming the “top official” 20 at all levels of administration above the village. In effect, he sought to sever the direct relationship between the lurah and the camat as the lurah were to be responsible to the KODM Commander. 21 At the next level of military administration he provided for the regents (bupati) and residents (residen) to be “… intermediates, inspectors and planners.” 22 They were to assist the Military District (Komando Distrik Militer - KDM) Commanders. Heads of Keresidenan (Residencies) were subordinated to STM (Sub Territorium Militer) commanders.

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17 Legge, 1961 Op. Cit., p. 16: “At the base of the [pamong praja] pyramid the camat or sub-district officer has maintained the vital link between the government and the rural population in general. He conveys information concerning national policies as far as they affect the village and, indeed, may be said to provide the village with its picture of the outside world. He mobilises support for novel projects. He is an arbiter between conflicting pressures. He is, in effect, the government.” For a description of the relations between lurah and camat in a Central Javanese village in the 1950s, see Nitisastro and Ismail, The Government, Economy and Taxes of a Central Javanese Village, 1959 Op. Cit., pp. 13, 14. In a similar vein to Legge, these researchers describe the camat as “the backbone of the system”.


19 According to Chaidir Basrie, these cadres, known as pasukan gerilya desa (pager desa - village guerrilla troops), were former laskar personnel who did not enter the regular forces (Bela Negara: Implementasi dan Pembangunannya, 1988, p. 28). An important task of the village cadres was to prevent the lurah from coming under the influence of the Dutch. Both the Dutch and the Indonesians were aware of the importance of the lurah, who, as the foundations of public administration in Indonesia, came under heavy and sometimes lethal pressure from both sides. Heijboer, Op. Cit., p. 124

20 Ibid.


In keeping with this emphasis on army leadership of guerrilla administrations, Nasution sought to do away with the existing “dualistic” command structure under the Regional Defence Councils (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah – DPD) that he had opposed in West Java. Indeed, in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare he makes it clear that he was determined not to repeat this experience:

We suffered somewhat in West Java from such a mistake during the first guerrilla war. This disrupted the attempt to make the war a total people’s war.

... In the second guerrilla war on Java we used to the fullest such a concentrated form of leadership.

Nasution’s antipathy towards these bodies is also evident in the following extract from Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare in which he referred to his experiences in West Java in 1948 and again praised the lurah:

Although we [in 1953] boast about our total people’s defence we were divided among ourselves within the government, the army, the bureau of national defence, the administration, the police, the lawyers, the economists, etc. Each group only recognised the authority of its own minister, who often could not be reached any more due to lack of communication and thus our efforts to effect a total people’s defence collapsed. The same difficulties were seen in the case of the parties; often they were waiting for instructions from their national committees. It is fortunate that the lurah … at least retained some authority, and we made ample use of this situation.

Nasution was to occupy the position of Commander of the Java Troops and Territory (Komando Tentara dan Territorium Jawa), with Colonel Hidayat occupying a similar command in Sumatra.

Nasution summed up his ideas for guerrilla administrations and operations in classic territorial warfare terms, except that unlike territorial warfare forces of the Left he firmly allied himself with organic “traditional” authority figures:

... a permanent military administration is needed which the people will always know is there. This military administration will be in the hands of the army’s territorial officers. The civil administration will be included within this structure. In this way it can be arranged that the Republic of Indonesia’s de facto authority continues firmly over the people. The apparatus of the state remains intact, for it is evacuated if an enemy patrol comes. Officials will be taught to play “hide and seek” with the enemy patrols. They ought to be permanently mobile in their territory, so that the people will come across them everywhere.

Nasution and the Gondokusumo Family

Nasution’s reliance on the pamong praja and village administrations no doubt accorded with the political attitudes of the people with whom Nasution associated most closely at a personal level during 1948. While living in Central Java Nasution continued to mix with the Gondokusumo

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25 Ibid., pp. 94, 95.
26 Ibid., p. 113.
family in the form of Sunarti’s uncle (and Soenarjo’s brother-in-law), the former Parindra identity, R.P. Soeroso, who was living in the city of Surakarta.

Born in 1893, in the 1920s Soeroso had formed the Federation of Civil Servants’ Unions (Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri – PVPN) that had grown to a membership of some 42,000 by the time of the Japanese occupation. He had been a Volksraad member during the colonial period and was one of three Indonesians to be appointed a Resident (political head of a Residency) by the Japanese. He was Deputy Chairman of the BPUPKI, where he advocated the separation of “church” (Islam) and state in the deliberations of the committee. He subsequently became a member of the successor body to the BPUPKI, the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI - Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) formed in August 1945 after the Japanese determined to grant “puppet” independence to Indonesia.

In response to professions of loyalty from the pangreh praja soon after the Proclamation, Sukarno had reassured the civil service that the leadership of the Republic would by no means regard them “… simply as secretaries, clerks or petty foremen. We are not going to lower the pangreh praja. We are going to give it the proper place it deserves.” It is probable that as part of this rapprochement between Sukarno and the pangreh praja, senior members of the corps were given prominent positions and that this arrangement resulted in Soeroso being appointed Governor of Central Java.

The prestige of the royal courts of Surakarta (the senior of which was the Susuhunan while the Mangkunegaran was the junior line) had been weakened over time. Over time peasants lost their most valuable land to the plantations and a destitute landless class became pitted against the forces of Colonial capitalism and in the process the royal courts lost much of their prestige.

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27 As mentioned in Chapter Four, Nasution met with Soeroso in Mojokerto on his way back to Bandung after deserting the KNIL in 1942. Ibid., p. 87. Soeroso had married Soenarjo Gondokusumo’s younger sister. Correspondence by fax from R.P. Soejono (Soeroso’s son) dated 17 May 2005.
32 Antara-Domei (Jakarta), 3 September 1945, excerpted from Ibid., p. 113.
33 Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo became Governor of West Java and R.M.T. Soerjo Governor of East Java. Ibid., p. 114.
34 The decline of these royal houses started in the early twentieth century with the loss of the appanage system, whereby court functionaries had levied taxes on agricultural produce (pajeg) and were able to requisition the services of particular groups of peasants. When European estates entered the area the system of pajeg required peasants to pay in cash or in the form of crops suitable for export. The Colonial government abolished the appanage system in the early twentieth century because of the hardships it was imposing and organised the financial arrangements of the royal houses along more Western lines. Ibid., pp. 353 – 363
By the time of the revolution the situation was exacerbated by the disturbances of the Japanese occupation, weakness on the part of the young Susuhunan, and (unlike the Pakualaman in Yogyakarta) a refusal by the Manguknegaran to accept a subordinate relationship to the Susuhunan in negotiations on the future status of the principalities.\(^{35}\)

This situation made the Surakarta elites particularly vulnerable to social revolution, which duly arrived in the form of an anti-kraton (palace) movement that opposed special status (swapraja) for the principalities. As the crisis escalated the cabinet felt Soeroso was too weak to handle it and replaced him with Soerjo, the Governor of East Java who had won considerable prestige during the Battle of Surabaya. However, the crisis continued and the government declared a state of emergency by forming a Regional Defence Council (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah) for the area on 5 June.\(^{36}\) Soeroso was reappointed as the representative of the central government in mid-June 1946.\(^{37}\)

Although the Surakarta royal houses were not accorded special status, as the royal houses of Yogyakarta were,\(^ {38}\) the status quo prevailed in Surabaya because the government, under pressure to reach a negotiated settlement with the Dutch and from an increasingly strident national opposition, found itself in broad alliance with the traditional authority figures of the area. Something of a schism emerged between the pro-Government centre of Yogyakarta and the more restive and oppositionist Surakarta area.\(^ {39}\)

This situation in Surakarta further illuminates the differences in political and social outlook between Nasution and the Panglima Besar. Sudirman spent a great deal of time in Surakarta which had become known as the “wild west” because, in addition to the social unrest already mentioned, disaffected military and civilian elements there had coalesced into a centre of opposition to the government’s plans for re-dan-ra. He often spent weekends at the nearby hill station of Tawangmangu, where Tan Malaka and his adherents were detained. Nasution and Sunarti also frequently spent weekends in Surakarta, but with R.P. Soeroso.\(^ {40}\)

Soeroso’s socially conservative attitudes are apparent in the platform of the tiny Parindra party that he formed in November 1949 as a successor to the pre-war party of the same name. Feith notes that this party was one of only two in the parliament (the other was the PIR) that expressed reservations about democracy. Both were aristocratically led and used similar

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\(^ {35}\) Ibid. pp. 348-353.
\(^ {36}\) Ibid., p. 367.
\(^ {37}\) Ibid. p. 368.
\(^ {38}\) In 1950 the Yogyakarta area was declared a Special Area (Daerah Istimewa) of the Republic, giving it the status of a province. The current Sultan (Hamendku Buwono X) is the Governor and the Pakualam (Pakualam IX) is the Deputy Governor.
\(^ {39}\) Ibid. pp. 356, 357.
language to that of Supomo in his address to the BPUPKI in calling for an “Eastern democracy” and “democracy with leadership”. 41

During 1948 Soeroso became a senior official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the successor to the colonial Binnenlandsch Bestuur and responsible for administering the pamong praja throughout the Republic). During this time, he lived in Yogyakarta with Sunarti and Nasution, At the time Nasution was preparing his plans for a military administration should the Dutch mount another offensive and he appears to have sought information on regional administration from Soeroso: “After I got a house in Yogyakarta, Pak Soeroso moved in with us. I often discussed politics and regional government matters with him.” 42 Sunarti describes their relationship in similar terms: “Pak Nas often discussed politics and the situation that was developing in the country with Pak Soeroso.” 43

Nasution also mixed with other members of the Gondokusumo family (the R.P. Gondoadikusumo family) who lived in Yogyakarta. Married life and his “absorption” into the wider Gondokusumo family were clearly a revelation after years of living a relatively austere and self-sufficient life:

In Yogyakarta Ibu Ning, my wife’s aunt who lived in Bausasran Street, was our family. While at Senior High School during the Japanese occupation my wife had stayed with them. For us, Bausasran was a place for family reunion. I felt that I had been “absorbed” into my wife’s family. Possibly the same thing would have happened to her if we had been in Sumatra. 44

Nasution’s socialisation into family life also took place in his home and was important to him, as he records elsewhere in his memoirs:

Our house was always busy, with Pak Soeroso and my adjutant, and often there were guests staying. The long and the short of it is there were always lots of people. Since I had been 13 I had always lived in dormitories or “paid for food” or “shared accommodation” and this situation continued during the Japanese occupation and into the independence period. On the other hand Sunarti was brought up in her parents’ household and she was very sensitive to household matters that I often completely neglected. 45

Soenarjo Gondokusumo continued to reside in Bandung. In her memoirs Sunarti makes no further reference to the older man mentoring Nasution and his political influence over Nasution appears to have largely ceased from the time he and Sunarti moved to Yogyakarta. After the Dutch attack in December 1948, Soenarjo and a number of other nationalists in that city were jailed for issuing a statement condemning the Dutch action. 46

44 Ibid. Sunarti’s aunt was a younger sister of Soenarjo Gondokusumo and of R.P. Soeroso’s wife. Written communication via intermediary with Professor R.P. Soejono, Jakarta, 1 April 2005.
“Total People’s Resistance” – Against the Communist Party

Given the socially conservative nature of Nasution’s association of his principles of “total people’s resistance” with the pamong praja, it is perhaps not surprising that the first use of these strategies was to counter internal opponents from the left of politics in the form of an insurgency by left-wing units, laskar and the PKI (the Madiun Affair of September 1948) in which the pamong praja were a particular target.

By 1948 the PKI had regrouped and was playing an increasing part in the political life of the Republic. A sign of the resurgence of the party was the return from exile of Musso in August 1948.

In early September the major parties in the Front Demokrasi Rakyat merged with the PKI, and Sjarifuddin announced that he had for some time been a secret member of the party. Musso made a number of pro-Soviet statements, which the government feared would harm its efforts to foster United States support in its negotiations with the Dutch. 47

The situation became extremely tense when Nasution’s intentions to demobilise or downgrade units associated with this broad left movement became clear. Clashes occurred between these units and the substantial Siliwangi representation in the Surakarta area.

On 18 September a laskar leader took control of the East Java city of Madiun and proclaimed a 'revolutionary' local government. Sudirman tried to negotiate with the leaders of the uprising, incurring Hatta’s wrath. 48 On 19 September, President Sukarno called upon the people of Java to choose between the current leadership and that offered by Musso. In turn, Musso denounced Sukarno and Hatta as Japanese Quislings and declared that he would fight to the finish.

While the East Javanese forces approached from the East towards Madiun, a much larger force from the Siliwangi Division advanced from the West. Pro-PKI forces retreated to the south and pro-government forces took town after town until they occupied Madiun on 30 September. Many of the prominent leaders of the left in Indonesia, including Musso and Sjarifuddin, were killed and others were imprisoned.

The Madiun Affair also had the effect of purging many left-wing officers within the army. These developments attracted American support for the Indonesian cause, which became vitally important when the Republic sought to influence world opinion at the end of 1948 after the Dutch launched their second “police action”.

In restoring order, Nasution’s plans for the army to assume wide political and economic powers with the pamong praja as its junior partner were put into practice for the first time in Central and East Java. The Republic-held territories of East Java were declared a Special Military Area

(Daerah Militer Istimewa) and Colonel Sungkono appointed Military Governor. 49 The retired army officer, Soebijono, a veteran of the guerrilla war who participated in developing the doctrine of territorial warfare and territorial management in the 1960s, points out that because of the death and disappearance of a number of civil servants who had been targeted by the PKI in areas where that party had been dominant, the army took over many of the functions of the pamong praja. 50

Most of the territorial officers during the period of military administration were secondary school and university students, with the former being assigned to villages and the latter to sub-districts or kecamatan. 51 Soebijono further states that this was "intended as an interim arrangement" but remained in place until the second “police action” in December 1949. 52

Nasution’s intense dislike of the laskar forces and particularly those of the left is evident in a remark he later made that the Affair was “a blessing in disguise”. It had enabled him to “… move against groups he had long regarded with distrust and enmity, and against those whom he bore many grudges because of their slighting attitude towards him and the Siliwangi Division.” 53

Three Tiers of Forces

Meanwhile, important aspects of re-dan-ra had already run into serious opposition from Sudirman. This, and the distraction of the Madiun Affair, meant that Nasution was largely unable to form the different tiers of forces envisaged in his planning for “total people’s resistance”, and the campaign that followed the second Dutch “police action” was fought with no clear distinction being made between Republican units.

To return to Alfred Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm that I discussed in Chapter Three, this failure to develop mobile, offensive forces meant that the vast majority of the officer corps of

50 “They had to be capable of keeping the wheels of the government and the economy turning and restoring the life of the community, in addition to carrying out their security tasks.” Soebijono, Dwifungsi ABRI, 1992, p. 17. See Said, Op Cit., p. 104 for an interview with Slamet Danusudirdjo, a member of the Student Army (Tentara Pelajar), who was assigned as a territorial warfare officer “… to accompany the troops and to take charge of areas already liberated from enemy control.”
51 According to Slamet Danusudirdjo, this was because "... it was difficult to find members of the regular army to be assigned to territorial duty." Ibid. The assignment of young, relatively well-educated Indonesians as territorial officers had its origins in the decision in 1947 to use cadets from the Military Academy to impart military training to the best-educated young men from the villages. They, in turn, were to form the basis of military cadres who were to assist the lurah in preserving the sovereignty of the Republic in their administrative areas and in providing support for the army. SESKOAD, Serangan Umum: 1 Maret 1949 di Yogyakarta Latar Belakang dan Pengaruhnya, 1990, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1990 Op. Cit., pp. 71-2.
53 McKemmish, Op. Cit., p. 44. McKemmish notes that Nasution made such statements in two interviews.
the post-revolutionary army never acquired the more advanced technical military skills associated with “old professionalism”.

Nevertheless, Sudirman’s worsening illness and the political consolidation of forces that had been achieved through the suppression of the Madiun Affair resulted in Nasution’s authority within the army increasing and he continued to plan for a campaign of “people’s resistance” that would entail the army exercising authority over the civilian administration. 54

The Army and the Government - A Parting of the Ways

Nasution’s provisions for military administration were put into effect when the Dutch attacked Yogyakarta on 19 December 1948. The ensuing events resulted in a clear break between the civilian political leadership and the army leaders.

While the bombs were falling on Yogyakarta’s Maguwo airfield, a cabinet meeting was hastily convened where it was decided that President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta and those cabinet ministers who were in Yogyakarta at the time would remain in Yogyakarta. This amounted to a decision on their part to submit to capture by the Dutch rather than follow the army leadership in waging a guerrilla war in the hinterland of Java, despite having previously undertaken to do so. 55

Before being captured, Hatta commissioned an Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia -PDRI) in Sumatra under the Minister for Welfare, Sjafruddin, who happened to be in Sumatra at the time. 56

The Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Air Commodore Suryadarma, also allowed himself to be captured, but his deputy, Colonel T.B. Simatupang, escaped from the city. Significantly, although seriously ill and ordered by Sukarno to stay in Yogyakarta, 57 Sudirman made a hurried and dangerous departure from the city. The handful of government ministers who remained at large in Central Java 58 formed a “Commisariat” of the Emergency Government in Sumatra under the Home Affairs Minister, Sukiman, with Soeroso being made responsible for “internal affairs matters”. 59

62 According to T.B. Simatupang this was an afterthought and only done at his urging.
59 Indonews, 20 March 2000 (http://www.mail-archive.com/indonews@indo-news.com/msg06592.html, accessed November 2004. Another Minister, Supeno, evacuated Yogyakarta but was ambushed and killed by the Dutch in February 1949.
The decision by the civilian leadership not to avoid capture remains controversial. It seems that an important factor in Sukarno's decision was the likely impact of his capture on world opinion. Sukarno claims that he resisted pleas from General Sudirman to evacuate to a guerrilla area because he wished to remain in a position where he could "... bargain for us and lead." Heijboer writes: "In a cabinet session held in a rear room of the palace because bombs were falling, Sukarno explained to the ministers that what was important was to surrender with honour. [He would be] surrendering to an enemy who had unilaterally ended a cease-fire, and this would become known by the whole world." 

In a similar vein, Hatta states that he was confident that the Dutch would be forced by international pressure and their own reluctance to continue with an "unprecedented war" to negotiate. He wanted to be close at hand for this eventuality.

**International Support**

The course adopted by the civilian leadership was successful in drawing international attention and sympathy to the Indonesian cause. A few days after the offensive began the United Nations

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60 According to Simatupang, the cabinet concluded that even if it left Yogyakarta it was likely to be captured within days. Simatupang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 10. It is likely that perceptions that the Republican forces had performed poorly against the Dutch weighed upon the civilian leadership in making their decision. The civilian leaders may also have doubted their ability to adapt to the hardships of the guerrilla struggle. The dilemma faced by older civilian leaders faced with the prospect of participating in guerrilla warfare has been summed up well by Regis Debray: "It has been widely demonstrated that guerrilla warfare is directed not from outside but from within, with the leadership accepting its full share of the risks involved. In a country where such a war is developing, most of the organisation’s leaders must leave the cities and join the guerrilla army. This is, first of all, a security measure, assuring the survival of the political leaders. ...In Latin America, wherever armed struggle is the order of the day, there is a close tie between geology and ideology. However absurd or shocking this relationship may seem, it is nonetheless a decisive one. An elderly man, accustomed to city living, moulded by other circumstances and goals, will not easily adjust himself to the mountain nor - though this is less so - to underground activity in the cities. In addition to the moral factor - conviction physical fitness is the most basic of all skills needed for waging guerrilla warfare; the two factors go hand in hand." R. Debray, "Guerrilla Doctrine Today", in W. Laqueur (ed.), *The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology*, 1977, p. 215.

Anthony Reid has made a somewhat similar observation in regard to the situation in Indonesia, where relatively few were prepared to follow the course of armed struggle to the end of the revolution: “Only those militarily and psychologically prepared for an endless, destructive, hit-and-run guerrilla resistance could be consistent about defying both Holland and the great powers. In practice only [the national communist] Tan Malaka and some military men were in this category among national leaders, although the communists also joined it after their fall [in the Madiun Affair of September 1948].” Reid, *Op. Cit.*, p. 101.

Security Council called for a cessation of hostilities. 64 A number of countries, including Australia and New Zealand boycotted Dutch commerce, far exceeding Dutch fears of possible retribution. 65

The situation worsened for the Dutch when the United States began to question the use of Marshall Plan aid by the Dutch for the war in the Indies, and linked this questioning with a demand for the captured leaders, who were detained in Sumatra, to be immediately returned to Yogyakarta. 66 In Indonesia the Dutch experienced another setback when the leaders of the federal states also expressed their outrage at the “police action” and stated that they would not take part in further negotiations with the colonial power until the leaders of the Republic were returned to Yogyakarta.

The Military Administration

Nasution’s stay in the villages of Central Java in 1949 differed markedly from his experiences in 1947. On this occasion he was not accompanied by Sunarti, who was in Surakarta when the Dutch attacked. She made her way to Yogyakarta, narrowly avoiding PKI remnants, was detained by the Dutch and then released.

Nasution’s frustrations with the duality of command in West Java in 1947 were reflected in the code he devised to signal that a state of war was imminent (DPD dirobah – “Regional Defence Councils are altered”) and the code for an actual state of war (“DPD hapus” – “Regional Defence Councils are abolished”). 67

Nasution was outside Yogyakarta at the time of the attack and he established his command in the village of Kepurun on the Yogyakarta / Surakarta border as this was an area that was not frequently patrolled by Dutch units from Yogyakarta or Surakarta but was close to Yogyakarta. 68 He proclaimed a military administration throughout Java on 25 December, 69

64 Although the Dutch launched their offensive at a time they calculated would draw minimum world attention – a few days prior to the end of the final session of the UN General Assembly for 1948 and during the Christmas recess of the US Congress – they were unfortunate in that a number of members of the UN Security Council were meeting in Paris.


66 The US had been torn between refraining from directly criticising the Dutch – who were an ally in the looming Cold War - while supporting Indonesia, which had just annihilated the PKI in the Madiun Affair.

67 Ibid., p. 134. Nasution’s “Working Instruction for the Military Administration Throughout Java” that was issued together with his proclamation of the military administration in December 1948 advised: “b. Regulation No. 79 abolishes DPDs and people’s defence bodies that are not in accordance with the instruction of the Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces dated 9 November, and gives responsibility to heads of regions at each level, and instructions from heads of regions [in the form of] residents, bupati, camat, and lurah to all civilian instrumentalities in their regions.” Nasution, “Working Instructions for the Military Administration Throughout Java” in Sudarno, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 51, 52.


69 This created a different situation to that in Republican areas in Sumatra where civilians were still in charge of the government as a result of the formation of the Emergency Government (PDRI).
despatching 20 officers to circulate the Proclamation and “Working Instructions” for the military administration. 70

He was fastidious in seeking to provide a legal basis to the military administration and the instructions he issued during its existence, although in proclaiming the military administration he overstepped the intentions of government regulations No 3 and No 70 that he said provided a legal basis for it:

On that first night tasks that awaited us were outlined and divided up amongst us. In fact, some of [my officers] had already departed to perform particular tasks. Drawing upon experience in West Java and bearing in mind preparations that had been made in Yogyakarta which were still in the early stages, there was no need to think about this or that.

So I immediately wrote instructions by hand, and representatives of Headquarters Java Command (MBKD) left in various directions. On 20 December 1948 I drew up the first MBKD Proclamation: ‘In relation to the war situation, based on government regulations no. 3 and no. 70, I proclaim the existence of military administration for the whole of [the island of] Java.’

This was very necessary because those regulations provided for military government arrangements to be [in the hands of] the military governors and STC (residency) commanders. The central government had always been reluctant to give the same authority to the Armed Forces Headquarters. 71

A State Within a State

In Chapter Two I remarked that Nasution was as much a political figure as a military leader. Seeing him in this light helps explain many of his actions during the military administration and the legacy he left the Indonesian Army.

Reid writes that “Nasution was unable to co-ordinate activity even in Java, and initiative rested more than ever with the unit commander.” 72 This accorded with the nature of guerrilla warfare where commanders are typically given wide autonomy and reflected the difficulty of commanding and controlling the Republic’s diverse and highly autonomous units. It also reflected Nasution’s lack of a body of troops of his own (his Siliwangi Division had returned to West Java in accordance with the plans he had drawn up in 1948 and he had no direct command of combat units). Deprived of these preconditions to set up and respond to engagements with the enemy, Nasution had no choice but to hope to wear the Dutch down.

70 “Java Command Headquarters Proclamation No. 2 MBKD” and “Working Instructions for the Military Administration Throughout Java” in Sudarno, et. al., Op. Cit., p. 50. Sudarno states that a week after these documents were circulated throughout Java, “… a letter arrived from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel T.B. Simatupang, and from Minister Sukiman, stating that the government of the Republic of Indonesia ratified the policy steps taken by the Commander of Java Command as a point of departure towards working to continue the struggle to save the Republic of Indonesia.” Ibid., p. 60.
71 Ibid., p. 83.
Nasution appears to have been intent on preserving the army so that it would remain intact as a credible force when the conflict ended, while holding onto enclaves as an assertion of continuing Republican control over parts of Java. He later wrote that the TNI only “brought to a deadlock” the struggle against the Dutch and gave credit to the civilian negotiators for ending the conflict:

… our guerrillas did not defeat the enemy in the sense of wiping out the enemy from Indonesia’s soil. We only frustrated their attempts; we did not defeat them in the usual military sense of the word.” … The fact that the enemy finally surrendered, that he was willing to recognise a return of all the areas to the Republic and the TNI, that he was willing to transfer sovereignty under several conditions and was willing to withdraw his troops, all were hastened by international political pressure. Consequently we did not have to prolong our guerrilla war which at a certain point would have required a regular army to launch an offensive.**73**

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**73 Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, Op. Cit., p. 20.** Penders and Sundhaussen contend that although Nasution’s guerrilla forces were never in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the Dutch, the tactics they employed were successful in seriously weakening the capability and resolve of the colonial power. “… the objective was not the defeat of the Netherlands, but forcing the Dutch to relinquish their colony. This object he achieved by forcing the Dutch to negotiate an end to a war they could not win. What many of the internationally more celebrated guerrilla leaders achieved in the course of many years, often with aid from the outside, Nasution and his forces accomplished - admittedly against a weaker opponent than most of the other leaders had to face - within a few months.” Penders and Sundhaussen, *Op Cit.,* p. 49. These researchers believe that Nasution "forced the leaders in The Hague to realise that they would never be able to raise enough troops to defend the positions they held before their renewed attack, to protect Dutch investments, and to seek out and destroy Republican forces. Deprived of their chance of winning a military victory, they would have to negotiate an end to an unwinnable and costly war." *Ibid.,* p. 49. Perhaps overstating the case, they assert: “But the interned politicians overruled the army's vehement objections against a negotiated settlement, since they could not afford to leave the entire glory of achieving national independence to the army.” *Ibid.,* p. 44. Their position accords with that of Kahin, who was a highly sympathetic observer of the Indonesian struggle: “By late January the 145,000 Netherlands troops in Indonesia were actually more on the offensive than on the offensive. Their initial control of the chief Republican cities and towns was soon strongly contested by powerful night attacks of large Republican units. By day Dutch armoured columns knifed out from their bases in these towns into areas where they believed Republican forces to be concentrated. But at dusk they returned to their bases, where sometimes they had to fight for sheer survival through the night. They held strong points between these towns and cities but exercised only a limited control over the roads between them, being able to negotiate many of them only by heavily armoured convoys. The major city of Madiun was through much of January completely isolated and had to be supplied by air. Plantations were being abandoned, the Dutch having no troops to spare for their protection, even having to pull their garrisons from some of the smaller towns.” Kahin, *Op. Cit.,* p. 391. Nevertheless, TNI units were generally unable to take and retain territory. For example, Simatupang wrote that a stalemate developed in which neither side could inflict a decisive blow on the other: "Not far from Kenteng there was a Dutch post, at Banter. This post was not very strong, I estimate that Dutch strength there was [at the level of] one company at the most. ... on three occasions our side had launched attacks on the post with forces assembled from our troops in the vicinity of the post and augmented with troops specially brought in from other places, including from around Wates. However, we were not able to take the Dutch post and the Dutch remained in Banter. This is an example of our inability to take or drive out a Dutch post which was not very strong, even though we had assembled all the forces available to mount an attack on it.” Simatupang, *Op. Cit.,* p. 44. Republican forces did mount some limited offensive actions, the best known of which is a six-hour “general offensive” on Yogyakarta led by Lieutenant Colonel (later President) Suharto on 1 March 1949. The attackers
Nasution’s role in the guerrilla struggle attracted some adverse comment at the time. His small and covert headquarters was sarcastically referred to by many Republicans who stayed in the towns as the “Headquarters Traveling Around Java” (Markas Besar Keliling Djawa – MBKD), a play on the words Markas Besar Komando Jawa (Java Headquarters – MBKD):

The politicians who stayed and sat around in the cities waiting to see who would win the struggle made snide remarks or made heated threats against the guerrillas, such as “the TNI only knows how to retreat” and “this is the result of reorganization and rationalization”. 74 In countering such arguments Nasution wrote that his role was not to command troops in an operational sense. Rather it was “… to lead, to provide understanding and directives about methods of organization, operations, administration, etc. in guerrilla conditions. This enabled all officials to determine their activities for themselves.” 75

Nevertheless, there is something unusual in Nasution’s passion for the administrative and legal aspects of the military administration and his lack of direct involvement in the fighting. Throughout his life he never seems to have displayed a detailed and technical interest in combat operations and as discussed in Chapter Two, during the revolution he never seems to have actually taken part in fighting or directed troops in a military engagement and after his retirement he showed little interest in weapons or the technical aspects of the military profession. His military education as a KNIL officer cadet might have been higher than most other officers in the TNI but was actually quite limited by international standards and (through no real fault of his own) he never engaged in any significant further officer education.

Nasution was as much a political figure as a military leader during this period and his major legacy to the TNI was not a history of great military campaigns but a blueprint for operating a military government in partnership with the pamong praja and pamong desa. It was his military administration that, as Salim Said has noted, the 1945 generation of army officers came to regard as an example of “… how government should be conducted, which has been a powerful influence on their behaviour ever since.” 76

Nasution’s preoccupation with the administration of civilian populations was emulated by the 1945 generation and future generations of army officers who built a doctrinal edifice of “territorial management” on the model established by the military administration. The system of territorial apparently caught the Dutch by surprise and occupied parts of the city for some six hours. Due in no small part to former President Suharto’s role as the commander of the attacking forces, the “offensive” was the subject of Janur Kuning, a major motion picture in the late 1970s, and a detailed Indonesian Army Staff and Command College publication (Seskoad, Serangan Umum: 1 Maret 1949 di Yogyakarta Latar Belakang dan Pengaruhnya, 1990 Op. Cit.). A further example is a three-day attack on the city of Surakarta in mid-March, when the Indonesians only desisted when asked to do so by representatives of the United Nations. Heijboer, Op. Cit., p. 175

76 Ibid., p. 3.
commands that Nasution pioneered sometimes operated as a state within a state during the 1950s and 1960s, and “Territorial management” provided for the army to shadow and supervise the civilian administration through these commands from the early 1960s until the end of the New Order period.

An indication of Nasution’s passion for the legal-administrative aspects of his position is that even though he was aware that he was being hunted by remnants of the PKI and the Dutch had begun to patrol the area more frequently, he “forced himself” to stay on in Kepurun:

… to finish the most important instructions for operations and the guerrilla administration, even though the danger that I faced increased because PKI remnants were always searching for me so they could murder me.

His instructions were distributed by couriers and through an air force transmitter located to the south of Yogyakarta. He also enlisted a Radio Republik Indonesia employee, Maladi, to broadcast the news of the guerrilla struggle to the Emergency Government in Sumatra and overseas through a transmitter on Mount Lawu.

They were sufficiently numerous to take up many of the 200 pages of Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare that he set aside for archival material from the military administration. They include general appreciations of military and political developments, instructions on procuring supplies of food and other requirements, maintaining the education system, securing communications, handling captured goods and dealing with irregular troops. He also issued guidance on non-cooperation with the enemy, the extinction of rumours, the roles of the camat and lurah in maintaining guerrilla administrations, and the roles of village guerrilla troops vis-à-vis village administrations. His concern to operate within the law and to establish a sense of order is evident in a detailed instruction he issued in May 1949 entitled “Emergency Regulation Governing Military Courts of the Military Government, Governing Civil Courts of the Military Government, Governing Special Military Tribunals, and Concerning the Methods of Executing Sentences of Imprisonment.”

He sought to establish a “Defence Bank” modelled on existing “village banks” so that the wealthy would be able “… to declare their good will … by giving a part of their money to form…"

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77 Nasution’s freedom of movement was severely restricted at Kepurun, particularly after two of his staff officers were murdered: “To deal with danger from the Dutch and the PKI we were forced to impose very tight security. I myself never went out of the house during daylight hours.” Ibid., p. 103. Sunarti was detained by the PKI elements when she returned from Surakarta to Yogyakarta after the Dutch attack. She was released and then detained for some time by the Dutch before she took shelter in a school in Yogyakarta.


79 Ibid., p. 83.

80 Ibid., p. 129.


82 Ibid., pp. 255-264.
the Bank’s capital; the right to their wealth will not be reduced.” 83 In another section of the same instruction, he outlined measures to maintain public health, including the administration of polyclinics and people’s hospitals, and recommendations for using medicines obtained from plants to treat such illnesses as intestinal problems, coughs, malaria and skin diseases. 84

In an effort to ensure his instructions were sanctioned at the highest level available, Nasution sought and gained general approval from the Commisariat of Ministers headed by Home Affairs Minister Sukiman. 85 He later praised this cooperation, stating that during the guerrilla period there was no “short circuit” between the civilians and the military. 86

**The Depoliticisation of “People’s War”**

If Nasution’s major legacy to the TNI’s approach to military intervention was his system of territorial commands and the presumption that the military could use them to shadow civilian administrations and jointly administer civilian populations, his greatest contribution to the theory of “people’s war”, as Cribb argues, was his technique for depoliticising it. 87 He achieved this in large part through his partnership with the organic “traditional” authority structures of Central Java.

The defeat of the PKI at Madiun, the absence of the captured civilian leadership and the immobilisation of the *de facto* parliament left the way open for the functionaries of the state – the army and the *pamong praja* - to take control in the Republican areas of Java. That Nasution immediately moved to occupy this vacuum is evident in his use (and extension) of government regulations No 3 and No 70 to assert the legitimacy of his military administration, and in his abolition of the Regional Defence Councils.

Soebijono writes that the army sought to depoliticise the populations in Republican enclaves by trying to reduce antagonisms between contending political forces 88 and there is some evidence to support this assertion. 89 Of course, the pre-war *pangreh praja* had been dedicated to the aim of

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88 “… it can be concluded that while waging guerrilla warfare the TNI was not only carrying out a military function but was also implementing a socio-political function, by also assigning military personnel in non-military fields. In addition, regional commanders at each level also carried out political indoctrination functions so that at a minimum tensions and/or clashes between political forces could be avoided and optimally to harness the potential of the people in confronting the enemy. While carrying out guerrilla warfare the TNI clearly lived at one with the people and carried out total people's warfare." Soebijono, *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.
89 In *Laporan Dari Banaran*, T.B. Simatupang writes that the idea of banning political activities was discussed in Republican circles before the second Dutch "police action" and "became more powerful, particularly in certain armed forces circles" during the period of military administration. Simatupang, *Report From Banaran: Experiences During the People’s War* (English language translation), Ithaca, NY, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, c1972, p. 130. Excerpted
upholding *rust en orde* and that service, still largely intact under its new name of *pamong praja*, was an ideal ally for Nasution in his efforts to promote order and stability in Republican areas by “depoliticising” the populace.

Nasution worked hard to ensure that the *pamong praja* remained loyal and immune to enticements from the Dutch:

It was clear that the enemy could not possibly establish *rust en orde* with troops alone. Because of that they tried political methods, i.e. to acquire the *pamong praja*, *pamong desa* and their people. They began distributing medicines, food, etc. in the cities, on the roadsides. They used propaganda, for example a village would suddenly be surrounded and the people forced to listen to propaganda. We took care that they never acquired the *lurah* and the *camat*.  

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from Said, *Op Cit.*, p. 111. The instructions of some field commanders provide examples of attempts to unify contending forces. On 22 January 1949 Colonel Sungkono, in his capacity as Military Governor of East Java, issued the following order: “The Struggle has only one aim, that is the victory of the Republic of Indonesia. In relation with this, all other interests of the citizens must succumb to the general interest. No interests of any parties or groups should be entertained. The struggles of the parties and groups for the time being should be suppressed, so that all the physical as well as spiritual powers can be mobilised for the benefit of the struggle of the Republic of Indonesia.” Instruction of the East Java Military Governor, dated 22 January 1949, CMI Document no. 5682, CAD, CG 58, The Netherlands Defence Ministry Archives. Extracted from Said, *Op Cit.*, pp. 110-111. Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Rijadi, Commander of the 5th Brigade, Second Division, Java, issued the following order on 23 March 1949: “In a number of places lately friction has begun to appear between left and right which is truly disadvantageous to our struggle. Therefore, every guerrilla must try to overcome the friction and to turn those persons' every desire and purpose back to what it was when we proclaimed our Independence on 17 August 1945. The only question is to be free or to die. Do not let us split from within only because of a quarrel as to what characteristics we will give to out State. ....” .... “Further, real attention must be given lest the guerrillas can be shaken, influenced by party ideologies or by political party members. ..... Guide for Guerrillas, Issued by Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Rijadi, Commander of the 5th Brigade "Penembahan Senopati", Second Division, Java, dated 23 March 1949. Extracted from: Nasution, *Fundamentals, Op. Cit.*, pp. 224-225. Nugroho Notosusanto, a former student army member who became a New Order ideologue also recalls the suppression of political activities during the period of military administration: “There were some political party leaders in our kecamatan, notably from PNI and Masjumi. But they seemed not to be very active, perhaps because the Military administration prohibited acts that might endanger the unity of the people in our kecamatan. Anyway, they did not belong to the 'ruling elite' in our kecamatan.” Nugroho Notosusanto, "Some Effects of the Guerrilla War (1948-49) on Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia", in Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, p. 105. Extracted from Said, *Op Cit.*, p. 111. Sunarto, a young KODM Commander in the Temon area during the guerrilla war asked the people to cease carrying out partisan political activities until the end of the war. According to Sunarto, the result was that "... the many political parties in Temon simply cancelled their activities during the period of guerrilla war." *Ibid.*, p. 106. Writing about the situation in East Java, Sudarno recalls: “It can be said that throughout the Second War of Independence there were no activities carried out by the political parties in the areas held by the Republic. All of the attention of the leaders, whether they were party leaders or in the administration (civilian and military) was totally focused on finding the best method of winning the war. The exceptions were the followers of the Murba Party who up until March 1949 in East Java were the backbone of the unit led by Sabaruddin which operated in the Nganjuk area.” Sudarno, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 369, 370.

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Ultimately, a sufficient number of *pamong praja* were prepared to work with the army in upholding pockets of Republican sovereignty. Indeed, Kahin writes that the level of civilian non-cooperation was a “stunning surprise” to the Dutch. 91

The Sultan of Yogyakarta (Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX) played a vitally important role in ensuring non-cooperation with the Dutch and the loyalty of the *pamong praja* to the Republican cause. He had immense authority and prestige within the city and surrounding areas, and his policy of neither cooperating nor dealing with the Dutch was a major setback for them.

Kahin found (from a “candid” Dutch official) that almost all civil servants in the Yogyakarta area refused to work for the Dutch: “Out of about 10,000 civil servants in the Yogyakarta area no more than 150, he stated, were working for the Dutch administration.” 92 Those civil servants in Yogyakarta who refused to work with the Dutch endured considerable personal hardship as the relatively little food that was entering the city was reserved for the Dutch and cooperating civil servants. 93

The retired civil servant, Sudarno, provides a particularly complete and illuminating account of how *pamong praja* agencies in the Malang area of East Java withdrew to guerrilla strongholds and worked with their army counterparts in the civilian administration. For example, he records that 1,100 officials and their families (a total of 5,000) in the Kawi area of East Java and another 450 officials and their families (totalling 1,800) had to be provided for by the administration so that they could “keep the wheels of government rolling”. His account describes the collection of taxes, rice and corn (for which emergency government promissory notes were issued) to maintain the administration and the troops in the field. 94

Wiliater Hutagulung, a former army territorial officer and medical practitioner, has recently written of a close relationship between the army and *pamong praja* officials. He recounts that in early January 1948 he was instructed by Java Command Headquarters to convene a meeting between senior *pamong praja* and military officers. In view of the recent and apparently devastating nature of the Dutch attack it is impressive that he was able to assemble the Governor of Central Java (Wongsonegoro), two Residents (Salamoen and Boediono) and two *Bupati* (Sangidi and Sumitro Kolopaking). From the army side, the divisional commander (Colonel Bambang Sugeng), a regimental commander (Lieutenant Colonel Sarbini) and Hutagulung (territorial officer) were present.

91 “Outside the towns and just back from the main roads Republican civil servants, though frequently on the move to escape Dutch patrols, maintained the Republican civilian administration as best they could.” Kahin, *Op. Cit.*., p. 391, 392.  
94 See Sudarno et. al., *Op. Cit.*, pp. 94 – 253 for accounts of such activities, including orders issued by regional branches of the administration in East Java and records of taxes and other contributions collected by the *pamong praja*.  

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The discussions confirmed that the civilian governor would function as an adviser to the military governor and that throughout the period of emergency the decisions of the military governor would be binding. On the other hand, the military were forbidden to intervene in the “internal affairs” of the pamong praja, and the civilian administration below the kabupaten level was to function as smoothly as possible. The responsibilities of lurah and camat and procedures for the provision of sustenance for refugees and the military were determined. In February Hutagulung successfully convened another meeting with the same officials present, this time to plan (in Nasution’s absence) the “general offensive” against the Dutch in March 1949.

“Total People’s Resistance” in the Villages

Below the ranks of the pamong praja were the village administrations headed by the lurah who, as discussed earlier, Nasution regarded as fundamentally important to his version of “people’s war”. In earlier parts of this thesis I have referred to writings by Nasution in the 1950s that stressed the role of village leaders in carrying on “people’s resistance”. While his publications written after the 17 October 1952 Affair were no doubt influenced by his disillusionment with the parliamentary system of the time, in the pamphlet that Nasution wrote in August 1948 he used remarkably similar language in highlighting the essential nature of the villages and village administrations to his strategies:

In implementing such a form of state administration, the regional unit that is sufficiently compact and able to be directly led is the rural village [desa]. Because of this, the village leaders, i.e. the lurah, are the foundations of the maintenance of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. The lurah remains the one and only leader in the midst of the people who continues to be obeyed by the people. And of course the lurah is elected by his own people whom he knows intimately, and the lurah knows all the ins and outs of the village. The lurah must be protected and respected. Members who are seconded to the villages, such as village cadres, must be under the authority of Pak Lurah. The lurah must himself hold the authority of the military administration.

In relying on the lurah in this way Nasution was, in effect, bolstering traditional patterns of authority, as Cribb observes, although this scholar’s portrayal of the lurah is different than Nasution’s:

This [decision to rely upon the lurah] was a telling decision, because the lurah were at the centre of village tensions, distrusted for their former role as agents of the colonial government. True, many lurah had been replaced in village administrations in 1945 and 1946, but the institution remained a conduit for the delivery of supplies and labour from the village to the authorities of the outside world, and Nasution sought to make use of this relationship in his guerrilla struggle. His enthusiastic espousal of the lurah as the pivot of his people’s defence

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96 Ibid.
system reflected his general willingness to preserve the social order rather than seeking to transform it.  

Cribb also observes that Nasution attempted to distance his forces as much as possible from the general population and to make his forces as self-sufficient as possible, to the extent of providing opium to the Siliwangi to finance their operations when they returned to West Java.  

He goes on to remark that in Vietnam the “old village order” was overthrown by the resistance and replaced with “… a new one better geared to the struggle.” The Vietnamese resistance was a socialist-led one. Many existing village heads were loyal to the Saigon government and not in sympathy with the socialist cause. It was necessary to replace them both to build up alternative administrations that would support the guerrillas and influence local populations to lose faith in Saigon.  

While a new administrative order in the villages of Java might have been better able to mobilize resources for the army (and this is debatable given the long history of the lurah in providing supplies to “the outside world”) such an overhaul could easily have given rise to political forces that Nasution opposed. To sum up, Nasution’s reliance on the pamong praja and pamong desa meant that the mobilisation of the people to support the armed struggle accorded with his concern not to disturb the existing social order.

The instructions Nasution issued during the period of the military administration also appear to have percolated down to the village level and Republican forces were generally well supported by the villages. For example, Suhario Padmodiwiryo writes that in the Malang area of East Java:  

The village lurah in our area had been given sufficient information about the situation and what activities we expected from them. For example, that they should avoid stockpiling too much rice and it would be best if stocks of food such as rice, yams, corn and cassava should be dispersed and concealed. With the full understanding of the lurah and village elders we began to dig covered trenches and tunnels in protected forest areas on the slopes of Mount  

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99 Ibid., pp. 151, 152.  
101 Ibid.  
103 Nasution writes that while on a journey to the Wonosobo area he came across a village meeting: “As it happened, Pak Lurah himself was explaining the latest instructions from Java Command Headquarters. It was really interesting for me to attend this event. Suranto interpreted the discussion for me because I couldn’t follow it as they were speaking Javanese. It turned out that all my instructions were complete and had been delivered in a bundle to the lurah.” Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Two, Op. Cit., p. 145.
Kawi, in preparation for a headquarters that we might have to use in emergency situations depending on the intensity of fighting in the future. 104

Suhario also describes how his wife, who joined him in the guerrilla enclave, assisted in setting up a village school in cooperation with local teachers and that “…their influence was very good for the school atmosphere because they brought a number of innovations in teaching.” 105

Even in the economic field, the Republic seems to have enjoyed some success at the village level. Salim Said provides an interesting account of the imposition of taxes and the utilisation of plantation crops by local commanders in *Genesis of Power* 106 and Suhario Padmodiwiryo provides a first-hand account of the exploitation of coffee plantations in the South Kawi area by Republican forces, and the use of women vendors or *bakul* for trade activities with areas under Dutch control. 107

In his pamphlet on village defence Nasution had written: “Indonesian currency must be the only one that is valid. Dutch currency must be obliterated.” 108 This appears to have been successful, as Kahin writes that peasants who brought “slim supplies of food” in to Yogyakarta would only accept Republican currency. 109

105 *Ibid.*, p. 272. According to Anthony Reid, the involvement of such refugees in village life during the guerrilla struggle was to leave a strong and generally positive impression upon them. “Army officers, politicians, officials and refugees of all sorts from the occupied cities were thrown on the hospitality of uneducated villagers. The contact was not always without friction, but its impact on both sides was profound. For many villagers the presence of these refugees and their cat-and-mouse encounters with Dutch patrols was the first real experience of revolution. Some of the townspeople organised schools and development projects in the villages, and even encouraged distribution of village or plantation land to poor peasants in order to encourage commitment to the Republican cause. For the townspeople themselves the guerrilla supremely symbolised the hardship, the comradeship, and the solidarity of the common struggle. Most powerfully affected were perhaps the *Tentara Pelajar* (Student Army) of Central and East Java, most of whom were still at school during the 1945-46 upheavals, but who by 1949 formed an enthusiastic and disciplined volunteer army of the young elite. The solidarity which the guerrilla period forged between these future leaders and young army officers, and the populist legitimacy it seemed to confer on the leadership of both, were important elements in post-independence national life.” Reid, *Op Cit.*, p. 155.
109 “One significant effect of this, a factor which helped buoy Republican morale, was that the rate between the N.E.I. guilder and the Republican rupiah prevailed among Chinese shopkeepers in Yogyakarta, which had fallen from 1:50 before the Dutch attack to 1:500 a few days thereafter, had climbed back to 1:150. Some Chinese shopkeepers with whom the writer spoke in Yogyakarta at this time stated a preference for Republican currency over N.E.I. currency, explaining that they had to have the former in order to buy rice. Ten days after the writer left the ratio was back to 1:110 and by the end of January it reached 1:90. The faith of the Indonesian peasant in the Republican regime and its dog-eared paper notes with the picture of Sukarno on them appeared to be exerting a greater power over the relative values of the currencies than Dutch military might.” Kahin, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 396, 397.
Nasution and Central Javanese Elites

As the conflict dragged on Nasution became acquainted with members of the Central Java aristocracy who were working with the military administration. After three months spent writing all the instructions that he felt were necessary to the military administration he moved to Boro where he maintained a more secure and complete headquarters for another three months. While at Boro he attended a meeting in the mountains near Wonosobo where he met a Javanese aristocrat, Sumitro Kolopaking.

Sumitro Kolopaking was the sixth Bupati of Banjarnegara. He could trace his ancestry to the Central Java-based Mataram Kingdom, which was originally a Hindu kingdom whose capital was originally to the north east of the Dieng Plateau (the location of Banjarnegara). Mataram later converted to Islam and unsuccessfully attacked Batavia in 1629 under the leadership of Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo. The name Kolopaking is said to have been bestowed upon Tumenggung Kolopaking I for giving “dried coconut” (kelapa aking) to Sultan Agung’s successor, Sultan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-77).

Mataram was divided by the Dutch East India Company into the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta before becoming bankrupt in 1799, when all its territories were taken over by the Dutch administration in Batavia. Prince Diponegoro of Mataram fought the Dutch in a prolonged conflict that became known as the Java War (1825 - 1830).

Raden Adipati Tumenggung Kolopaking IV had supported Prince Diponegoro and the Kolopaking family had been stripped of the kabupaten of Kebumen. Instead, the senior member of the family was installed as Bupati of Banjarnegara with the proviso that the name Kolopaking no longer to be used.

However, Sumitro Kolopaking was successful in having the name restored when the Dutch prevailed upon him to leave his position of Komisaris Besar (Chief Commissioner) of Police and go into training to take over as Bupati, as the then incumbent was elderly. He accepted the offer on condition that he and his siblings could again use the Kolopaking name.

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113 Ibid., p. 19.
Kolopaking had been one of the “senior conservative civil servants” who had been appointed a member of the BPUPKI. 114 He had been installed Resident Ad Interim of the Pekalongan area in the wake of the social revolution that became known as the Three Regions Affair. 115

Later in the revolution he became a member of the executive of the Persatuan Indonesia Raya (PIR - Greater Indonesian Union Party), 116 a party that was formed by “… older-generation civil servants having aristocratic backgrounds,” 117 and became a member of parliament for this party in 1950. The anti-party, secular, paternalistic, and socially conservative nature of the PIR is evident in this summary of its views by Kahin:

The PIR is to be a mass-backed party without the religious orientation of Masjumi and without being based upon Western political concepts of the PNI. It is to be based upon traditional Indonesian political and socio-economic concepts partially modified and adapted to those of the West. The present is seen as a transitional period between the old authoritarian society and the more Western-oriented Indonesian society that is yet to come. The ballot cannot alone serve to insure that the interests of the common people will be looked after. Not only will many of the common people not vote, but when they do they may well vote in a way that does not serve their interests. They are not individualistic enough to look after their own interests directly and are accustomed to expect authority from above.

The great danger is that the peasant vote will go to irresponsible demagogues who do not understand the people and are not in a position to represent their interests. The people need and expect guidance from above; this has been ingrained in them for centuries. The people themselves are not accustomed to pushing their own interests in a politically articulate manner and cannot over night be expected to become politically responsible individualists of the character of people living in the Western democracies.

Some means must be found for giving real representation to the agrarian population. Such representation was given them in the past by the civil servants because of the fact that they went out to and among the people and learned what their interests and desires were. Somehow this virtue must be incorporated into the structure of the Indonesian government. The leaders of the government must be able to know the interests of the people and must to a very large extent depend upon themselves, rather than upon the people, to ascertain what their interests are. The character of the Indonesian government that is to be developed must allow for ‘fatherly authority’ from above to look after the needs of the peasantry. 118

That Nasution shared such views, and particularly the dangers of “demagogues”, is evident in the following excerpt from Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare:

The village community cannot change very quickly, the village community is well known for its conservatism in maintaining traditional knowledge and its non-acceptance of new things. As a community whose thinking is agrarian which lives close to its wet rice fields and its vegetable gardens, such conditions are indeed only usual.

115 Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 341, 342. Anderson writes that Kolopaking did not enjoy real authority in this position and he was replaced in May 1946.
116 Ibid., p. 111.
118 Ibid., p. 325. Kolopaking was not the only PIR member to become associated with Nasution’s “total people’s resistance” strategies. Governor Sewaka of West Java, who authorised Nasution’s plans from Bojonggambir in 1947 (see Chapter Five) was also a PIR member.
This village community consists of the government’s most obedient citizens. Whatever comes from the government is accepted with the utmost loyalty. Agitation and propaganda had been commenced in the colonial period in order to activate an anti-colonial spirit, which was often interpreted as anti-
_lurah_, opposed to paying the _lurah_ through free work on his lands, anti-village work orders, anti-tax, etc. But in my experience in several regions during the first and second Dutch attacks, in general this had not yet affected the old relationships greatly, apart from a number of localities. But also how difficult it was to restore stability to the village communities once they had been disrupted by confusion in the administration, by the depredations of armed gangs, or brought to chaotic conditions by agitation. ¹¹⁹

The views of the PIR were also consonant with those expressed in Professor Supomo’s contributions on organicism in the BPUPKI debates. For example, Supomo had described individualism ¹²⁰ and the open contestation of ideas leading to voting ¹²¹ as contrary to the norms of Eastern civilisation and advocated decision making through consultation leading to consensus (_musyawarah sampai mufakat_), ¹²² rather than voting. It is not surprising that Supomo became a member of the PIR in 1951. ¹²³

Kolopaking and other _pamong praja_ identities from the guerrilla era in Central Java were to become mainstays of Nasution’s IPKI organization in the 1950s and Kolokaping became General Chairman.

Nasution found in Kolopaking another older aristocratic associate. His admiration for Kolopaking and the “traditional” values he embodied is strikingly clear in his recollections of their meeting:

_Bapak_ Kolopaking, a person of aristocratic descent, carried on the way of life of the aristocrats of the past; that is he lived simply, had strong personal discipline, and unobtrusively mixed a great deal with the people.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Mokoginta, told me that he and Kolopaking were once walking in a certain area. ‘From early morning _Bapak_ Kolopaking never opened his water bottle or the package of rice he took, and never stopped walking. As someone who was much younger it was not fitting for me to eat or drink first, even though I was thirsty and hungry.’

_Bapak_ Kolopaking is still a close friend of mine. When in 1954 I formed IPKI he spontaneously joined in, together with the _Bupati_ of Wonosobo whom I also met at the Division III Headquarters, and all the other Residents of Central Java who had of course all participated in the guerrilla struggle. I met all of them at the Division III Headquarters, although they were all still holding _Bupati_ appointments. ¹²⁴

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¹²¹ Ibid.
¹²² Ibid., p. 91
A Reshuffle of Credentials

It is evident that the guerrilla experience was not only a defining event for Nasution but also for many of the pamong praja and pamong desa. Nasution and his pamong praja associates had been “cooperating nationalists” under the Dutch and had not enjoyed the heroic stature of those who opposed the colonial regime outright and suffered for it. They also lacked the particular status that Sjaehrir and Sjarifuddin had gained as “non-cooperators” with the Japanese.

Conservative pamong praja identities such as Kolokaping had been largely swept aside in the emergence of pluralist politics when Sjaehrir came to power, and Nasution had often been accused by laskar and other political interests of being authoritarian, militaristic and a stooge of the Dutch. As noted earlier, during the guerrilla campaign of 1949 some political figures who elected to remain in the occupied cities poured scorn on Nasution and his Java Command Headquarters. However, by the time the Dutch recognised Indonesian sovereignty Nasution and these pamong praja identities emerged with much improved nationalist credentials, while some of those more favoured at the outset of the revolution had lost some of their moral authority.

In the 1960s Margono Djojohadikusumo, a high-status priyayi who had pamong praja connections, commented along somewhat similar lines in comparing the pangreh / pamong praja and the civilian political leaders:

Throughout the Netherlands Indies administration this service was the intermediary that connected the Dutch authorities with the people. This was a particular instrument of the state that was often condemned and belittled by people. And let me say frankly that I myself often did so, but now my views have been tempered. Because actually in the Japanese occupation period and then when the Dutch mounted their two military actions I saw many examples of quiet patriotism and courage on the part of pamong praJA officials, who set examples that were worthy of emulation by most of the politicians.

To return to Bourchier’s “instrumentalist” argument, such sentiments show that it was during this second guerrilla war that Nasution’s ideas for “total people’s resistance” became firmly associated with “traditional” and “integralistic” values and authority structures. Nasution was to idealise the period as a critical time in the life of the Republic when the army had worked selflessly together with the people and organic “traditional” authority structures while the politicians had submitted to capture and were negotiating with the Dutch.

125 Margono Djojohadikusumo, Kenang-kenangan dari Tiga Zaman: Satu Kisah Kekeluargaan Tertulis, Jakarta, Indira, 1970, p. 101. I should point out that Margono was a senior official in the Netherlands Indies, Japanese Occupation and Republican administrations. He lost two sons in the fighting against the Dutch and as will be discussed in later chapters, he was the father of the noted economist Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who associated himself with the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and fled to Malaysia where he remained until the advent of the New Order. Margono fled with him and his opinions about Indonesian political leaders (Sukarno in particular) were often quite bitter. His grandson, Prabowo, married into the Suharto family and achieved considerable notoriety over his actions in East Timor and during Suharto’s downfall.
For example, during what he referred to as his “leper period” in 1953 (after the 17 October 1952 Affair) Nasution asserted his preference for “traditional” authority structures and the revolutionary credentials the pamong praja and pamong desa had gained during the guerrilla war of 1949:

From the beginning I had been opposed to the structure of people’s defence that had been organised earlier by the Ministry of Defence which did not rely upon and was not dependant upon Pa’ Camat, Pa’ Lurah and his village officers. Irrespective of the insults of being feudal and colonial which are usually thrown at them because of their history in past times, it was a fact that they are the lawful leaders of the people and that they are recognised by village society. 126

As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, some of the IPKI literature, while not as paternalistic as the PIR’s, harked back to a golden age when the people were united under the wise leadership of “traditional” leaders and was integralistic in tone.

Moreover, the restoration of the reputation of the pamong praja under the military administration was not a case of swimming against the broader political tide. Anthony Reid has observed that an unusual aspect of the Indonesian Revolution was that "... it moved slightly to the Right, rather than to the Left, over a five year period." 127 As discussed earlier, Amir Sjarifuddin and a number of other leaders identified with the PKI were killed after the Madiun Affair. After the Dutch attack Tan Malaka allied himself with sympathetic Republican troops and declared that he was now the leader of the Republican cause but was hunted down and killed by other army units. Through such processes the officer corps on Java gradually shed itself of most of its very left-wing officers and because of the largely junior priyayi recruitment bases was not particularly sympathetic to political Islam. 128 The political complexion of the officer corps was more closely resembling that of the pre-war pangreh praja.

The TNI Preserved

When the captured leadership decided to enter into negotiations with the Dutch that culminated in the Indonesian representative, Mohammad Roem, signing an agreement with van Royem of the Netherlands to return the captured civilian leadership to Yogyakarta, Nasution and other military leaders registered their opposition to the civilian leadership negotiating a ceasefire. Nasution asserted that the military administration remained in control and issued an order for Republican troops to step up their activities and consolidate their positions, asserting that the Dutch could be

128 The emergence of centrist attitudes within the army officer corps has been commented upon by Ruth McVey who has observed that by the early 1950s most army officers were considered to be anti-communist and to be antipathetic to radical Islamic forces. McVey, 1971 *Op. Cit.,* p. 138.
forced to submit to all of Indonesia’s conditions if the fighting was permitted to continue until September. 129

After Sukarno returned to Yogyakarta, Sudirman declined to join him there, only agreeing to do so when persuaded by a special emissary of the Sultan of Yogyakarta (Colonel, later President, Suharto). On his return he tendered his resignation to Sukarno who countered by stating that he too, as supreme commander, would also resign. Sudirman subsequently drafted a profoundly bitter and eloquent letter of resignation but was dissuaded from submitting it by Nasution, who by then had also returned to the capital. 130

Sudirman’s determination not to make concessions to the Dutch impacted on the outcome of the conference to settle the issue of the decolonisation of the Netherlands Indies (termed the Round Table Conference) that was convened in The Hague. Sudirman’s envoy, Simatupang was successful in ensuring that the TNI, rather than the KNIL, would be the core of the post-revolutionary army. 131

Nasution’s principles of “total people’s resistance” had played a significant role in ensuring the survival of the army. Had the TNI been easily overrun and dispersed in December 1948 it is most unlikely that it would have been in a relatively strong position at the Conference. Susan McKemmish effectively sums up his situation at this time:

In some respects he had been peculiarly ill at ease in the atmosphere of heightened nationalism, revolutionary fighting spirit and millenarian expectations of the revolutionary years. Although he had advocated the armed revolutionary road to national independence, in his pragmatic, almost clinical approach to the tactics and strategies of guerrilla warfare he tended to downgrade the importance of the revolutionary fighting spirit, which to the more semangat-oriented guerrilla fighters was the very essence of their struggle. On the other hand, using the opportunity provided by the revolutionary experience to display his considerable organisational and administrative skills, he had become by the end of the revolution an officer whose reputation in these areas was unsurpassed. 132

As discussed in Chapter Three, the Indonesian Army became one of only four post-colonial forces that Janowitz has described as armies of national liberation, in that it was established “… during the struggle for national liberation.” 133 The post-revolutionary TNI also had similarities with

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130 For an account of these events, see Said, *Op Cit.*, pp. 114-22.
131 The leadership of the TNI, and Sudirman in particular, were adamant that the TNI would form the core of the army of the state which resulted from the Round Table Conference but were not confident that the civilian negotiators would support their position. As Ian MacFarling points out, this led Sudirman to take the highly unusual step of sending: “… a military mission as part of the Republican delegation to the Round Table Conference ... The notion that an official delegation from a nation should include an independent military group which had a separate directive that differed from the national political delegation’s terms of reference is still astonishing today.” MacFarling, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 43, 44.
133 The countries listed by Janowitz were Indonesia, Burma and Algeria. Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 10, 13.
revolutionary Marxist forces, such as those of China and (later) Vietnam. However, unlike those revolutionary armies that were attached to Communist parties, the Indonesian Army emerged from the revolution without links to a particular political movement or ideology.

Conclusions

Nasution’s military administration was not only a critically important milestone in his political socialisation but also had ramifications for the future course of military intervention in society, politics and the economy. In this chapter I have shown how the period of military administration set a number of powerful precedents.

The cooperation between the army and the pamong praja / pamong desa laid the ground for Nasution’s later portrayal of the second guerrilla war in terms of the army struggling selflessly with organic “traditional” authority figures to maintain the existence of the Republic while the civilian politicians had submitted to capture and were engaged in negotiations with the Dutch that were to culminate in the introduction of the liberal democratic system of the 1950s.

Through this partnership between the army and organic “traditional” authority figures, Nasution became associated with senior members of the Central Java aristocracy, including Sumitro Kolopaking. I have drawn attention to Nasution’s admiration for this member of the socially conservative and paternalistic Persatuan Indonesia Raya who was to go on to become the General Chairman of Nasution’s IPKI organisation.

I have shown that Nasution saw his military administration as something of a state within a state, laying the foundations for the army’s subsequent use of its territorial structures and concepts to shadow the administration of the state. I have drawn attention to Nasution’s unusual interest in legal matters and his attempts to provide legal foundations for the military administration, setting in place a pattern of behaviour that continued into the 1950s when he sought legal formulas for the modes of military intervention into politics that he developed during that decade.

I have pointed out that the period of military administration established another powerful precedent. Rather than fulfilling a typical front-line leadership role, Nasution worked hard at compiling instructions and regulations regarding the military administration and the guerrilla war and that he was concerned to place the military administration on the soundest legal foundations possible under the circumstances. In later chapters I shall show that he continued to display an unusual interest in legal and constitutional matters when he sought legal and constitutional bases for the modes of military intervention and organic corporatist / functional modes of interest representation that he developed during the 1950s.

I have argued that the guerrilla campaign resulted in a reshuffling of nationalist credentials among the military and civilian leaderships. Former “cooperating” nationalists such as Nasution and his
pamong praja associates who had been swept aside by political figures and parties in the period immediately after the proclamation emerged with strong nationalist credentials. On the other hand, Sukarno and other former “non-cooperating” nationalists had submitted to capture by the Dutch and lost something of their moral authority. Most importantly, they had not been present (hadir) during the guerrilla struggle, leaving the field to the army and the pamong praja / pamong desa. This resulted in Nasution’s principles of “people’s war” being army and pamong praja-centred. Unlike the “people’s armies” of the Left, the Indonesian Army was not part of a monolithic national political movement and did not have to share either the ownership or the glory of the guerrilla struggle with civilian political leaders.

Finally, Nasution’s planning preserved the army as a credible force in large sections of the Javanese hinterland. This enabled it to become the core of the army that was formed as a result of the Round Table Negotiations. To borrow a phrase, in later life Nasution recognized that this was his finest hour:

… what is an even more beautiful memory for me as an officer is that in 1948 I was able to contribute my experience as Siliwangi Commander to the continuation of preparations for total people’s defence, as Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff for Operations in Armed Forces Headquarters. Pak Dirman [Sudirman] entrusted me to formulate the Commander-in-Chief’s Strategic Order for the Second Guerrilla War. As we know, the Second Guerrilla War has been recorded as the most critical period in the existence of the Republic. 134

In terms of this thesis, the period of military administration was most significant in establishing in Nasution’s mind elective affinities between his strategies for “people’s war” and an organicist vision of appropriate relations between the state (the army in the case of the military administration) and society. He was to idealise these aspects of the military administration in his many publications and throughout his life.

SEVEN – THE IDEALISATION OF “TOTAL PEOPLE’S RESISTANCE”

The term “people’s resistance” is not generally associated with the Indonesian Army of the early-to-mid 1950s, due in no small part to Guy Pauker’s assertion that the officer corps as a whole seemed to have forgotten this aspect of the revolution until later in that decade. 1 In this chapter I shall show that “people’s resistance” remained a live issue both for Nasution and in the wider political arena. I shall show that although Nasution planned to create a more professionalised army he remained consistent in continuing to advocate a “people’s resistance” role for it.

I shall continue to draw upon Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas and Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, and previous research into this period. I shall also begin to introduce contemporary newspaper reports and an interview with Suhario Padmodiwiryo, who was an officer in the “People’s Resistance” branch of Army Headquarters in the early-to-mid-1950s.

As in earlier chapters, in this chapter, I shall only summarise the main events of the early-to-mid 1950s. Rather, I shall focus on a renewed attempt by Nasution to reorganise and rationalise the army with the aim of moulding it into a smaller and more mobile core force with another two tiers of forces under it. In this 1950s version of re-dan-ra the supporting forces were to be a reserve territorial militia force and civilians trained to assist in a guerrilla war.

Again his plans entailed the demobilisation of large numbers of personnel with financial hardship and loss of status for many of those affected. There were perceptions that he favoured the retention of those he found politically or professionally congenial (i.e. those who favoured a more technocratic approach) and the dismissal of men who believed that semangat and service in the revolution were more important than educational attainments and preparedness to undergo professional military training. The widespread opposition to these plans and the reaction of Nasution and like-minded officers culminated in the 17 October 1952 Affair.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the type of “people’s resistance” Nasution recalled from the revolutionary period was nothing like that inspired by movements of the Left that had emphasised class struggle. Rather, Nasution sought to subsume narrower ideological and sectarian interests within the banner of an all-embracing nationalism that in fact drew upon existing authority structures and values and was resistant to social change.

In discussing these events in this chapter, I shall show that after Nasution was placed on the inactive list he outlined in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare important elements of the strategies

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1 Pauker, 1963 Op. Cit., p. 16. As discussed in Chapter Two, Pauker’s publication has deservedly influenced a number of researchers. However, Pauker focused on the Indonesian Army’s re-emphasis on territorial warfare / “people’s resistance” at the time of his own visits to Indonesia in the late 1950s. He paid little attention to the development of territorial warfare/total resistance doctrines in the revolutionary period or the first half of the 1950s.
for intervening in politics, economy and society that he began to implement in the mid-to-late 1950s. I shall also show that in doing so, he began to idealise the elective affinities between his strategies for “people’s resistance” and an organicist vision of the proper relations between the state (including the army) and society.

**The Political System in the Early 1950s**

When Nasution took up the appointment of Chief of Staff in Jakarta he had to work within a political system that had been worked out the previous year in the Round Table negotiations. The 1945 Constitution had been discarded in favour of a liberal democratic system of parliamentary rule that provided for a bicameral parliament with a House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR) and a Senate.

This system threw up the two categories of politicians and bureaucrats that Feith has described as either “administrators” or “solidarity makers”. Feith’s "administrators" were "... leaders with the administrative, technical, legal, and foreign-language skills required to run the distinctively modern apparatus of a modern state.”

On the other hand, the “solidarity makers were “… leaders skilled as mediators between groups at different levels of modernity and political effectiveness, as mass organisers, and as manipulators of integrative symbols.” President Sukarno was the leading exponent of "solidarity making" and placed nation building and the development of a national spirit above all other issues.

Feith traces the period of ascendancy of the administrators in the first three cabinets that followed the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by the Dutch. Although this was a relatively prosperous period due to increased sales and prices for commodity exports as a result of the Korean War, many Indonesians became frustrated and disillusioned with the fruits of independence.

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2 Feith, 1962 *Op.Cit.* This categorisation is probably the best known element of Feith’s seminal work.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 113. Sjahrir and his *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI) exemplified the "administrators", although they were also represented in the Masjumi and smaller parties including the *Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya* (PIR), the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*) and the Protestant Christian Party (*Parkindo*). The “administrators” sought to use the skills they had developed in the colonial period to work within the system of parliamentary democracy to solve the immediate administrative, developmental and financial problems with which the republic was faced.


5 *Ibid.*, p. 132. The *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian Nationalist Party – PNI) that had formed in 1946 and modelled itself on Sukarno’s party from the late 1920s of the same name (the later version lacked Sukarno’s direct involvement) and Murba, the party formed by Tan Malaka supporters, were the leading “solidarity makers.” The PNI represented “Javanism.” Its leaders were drawn from the *priyayi* class and it drew a great deal of support from the *pamong praja*. The Murba presented itself as both “radical nationalist” and “radical socialist” but it actually conveyed “… an inchoate messianistic radicalism,” refusing to “… recognise the practical difficulties of governments.”
The disillusioned were often younger people who had reached adulthood in the heightened atmosphere of the occupation and were not members of the high elite circles that produced the administrators. They were not accorded such social prominence or highly paid positions in the routinised post-revolutionary system, and they craved integrative leadership that would give the sort of meaning to their lives that they had found in the revolution. Anti-Dutch feelings, reinforced by a growing perception that the Dutch were being intransigent in refusing to hand over West Irian, led to a belief within this group that the revolution had been derailed and the post-1949 system of government was a mere facsimile of the former colonial regime.

As discussed in previous chapters, Nasution straddled the *pemuda* and older generations, having been a cooperating nationalist in colonial times and benefited from a Dutch education before becoming involved in Japanese paramilitary organizations and serving in the army. In this new period of his life Nasution worked closely with Hatta (who continued as Prime Minister), Simatupang, Sultan Hamengku Buwono (Defence Minister) and Ali Budiardjo (the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence). All were “administrators” and members of or associated with the PSI.

In a policy sense, at this stage in his career Nasution was closer to the “administrator” camp. He agreed with those in the ministry of defence / armed forces leadership that there was a need to drastically reduce the army’s size and introduce much greater efficiency and technical expertise. However, unlike his colleagues Nasution was focused on the army and antipathetic towards the parties, including the PSI.

Sukarno remained an indispensable rallying figure for the Indonesian masses but had lost some of his influence within the military as a result of failing to avoid capture in Yogyakarta. In the final year of the revolution he had been eclipsed in day-to-day political processes by Hatta and in the post-revolutionary regime he was by and large a figurehead President whose most important formal

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6 Nasution does not fit easily into the “administrator” or “solidarity maker” categories. According to Feith, in the early 1950s Nasution was an “administrator” (Feith, 1962 *Op. Cit.*, p. 171) but Susan McKemmish doubts the validity of this categorization. She disagrees with Sundhaussen’s categorisation of Nasution as one of a group of former KNIL “administrator-type” officers in *The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: The Siliwangi Division and Army Headquarters*, the thesis upon which he based *Road to Power*. McKemmish observes that Nasution was not associated in any way with the PSI and admired the “solidarity maker” Sukarno more than “administrator” Hatta. McKemmish, *Op. Cit.*, p. 53. However, some years later Sundhaussen (writing with Penders) appears to have qualified his earlier observation in *Nasution: A Political Biography*, remarking that while Nasution supported the plans of the “administrators” for professionalisation, he remained as committed to the Panca Sila as the “solidarity makers”. Penders and Sundhaussen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 79.

7 “Close cooperation was possible between Nasution on the one hand and Simatupang on the other because they shared an approach to the building up of a modern, cohesive and powerful army.” Feith, 1962 *Op. Cit.*, p. 254.

role was to appoint a cabinet *formateur* from within the parliament when it was necessary to form a new government.

Sukarno was not the only political force that the liberal democratic system failed to accord a pre-eminent position. On the island of Java, the army had to surrender the political authority it had gained through the military administration. ⁹

Both the new constitution and the parliament were temporary, pending the holding of general elections for the parliament and a constitutional commission (*Konstituante*) whose function was to draw up a permanent constitution. One of the primary tasks of the interim parliament was to produce the necessary legislation to hold parliamentary and *Konstituante* elections.

Importantly, the new state was a federation: the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat* – RIS). In accordance with the processes set in train at Linggajati, the original Republic was a member state of the federation and retained its capital in Yogyakarta. Two thirds of the 146 members of the House of Representatives were from the “federal” states (*negara*) established by the Dutch to counter the power of the Republic of Indonesia, while the Republic and each of the other states provided two members each to the Senate.

Hatta served as Prime Minister until August 1950, when he resumed vice-presidential duties. Republican leaders and Hatta in particular (who had led the Republican side in negotiations with the federal states and at the Round Table Conference) had emerged from the revolution with much greater moral authority than those from the federal states. ¹⁰

Once the Dutch were no longer able to prop this federal construct up it quickly collapsed and the resignation of the Hatta cabinet coincided with the establishment of a unitary state known as the Republic of Indonesia. The senate was abolished and a unicameral system installed but the composition of the DPR remained largely as it had been (meaning that two thirds of members were from the old federal states). The provisional constitution was largely unchanged and

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⁹ Although Feith notes that the leadership was not interested in creating a Western-style non-political army and expected to be able to exert political pressure on the central government. *Ibid.*, p. 209. Nasution describes this situation as follows: “At the time we, the armed forces leadership and particularly Armed Forces Chief of Staff Simatupang, were accused by the parties and parliament of being fond of pressurising the cabinet or the President, or of being fond of pressing our advice on the formation of cabinets, which in a formal constitutional sense was indeed inappropriate. But we as patriotic fighters [*pejuang*] of the Republic of Indonesia sometimes felt this to be necessary. This was understandable in such conditions where the national leadership team and their structures were not felt to be adequate. Why weren’t national figures mobilised for the best possible leadership?” Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol Two, *Op. Cit.*, p. 277.

¹⁰ Kahin writes that the *negara*, with the exception of East Sumatra where a social revolution by left-wing forces had seriously alienated local middle-class Republicans, had attracted support largely from “…members of the local aristocracies who feared loss of their political and economic positions under Dutch rule, and political opportunist dissatisfied with their positions under the Republic.” Kahin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 352.
provisions remained in place for general elections for a new parliament and Konstituante. Mohammed Natsir of the Masjumi formed the first government of the unitary state.

Problems Facing Nasution

Nasution’s recollections of the early 1950s indicate that he was often under great stress. He had doubts that he was technically qualified enough to perform his duties competently and was concerned that he might be regarded by Dutch officers (many of whom had been his seniors within the KNIL) and other foreigners as too young and inexperienced to be Chief of Staff.¹¹ Nasution and Sunarti often spent weekends in Bandung and his reluctance to return to Jakarta was such that he sometimes stayed on afterwards, spending his time “… walking alone in the places I enjoyed in the colonial and Japanese periods while mulling something over in my mind but feeling that my brain was clogged up and at a dead end.” He writes revealingly of experiencing a stress-related “crisis”¹² and he seems to have experienced a feeling of deflation and redundancy after the emotional intensity of the guerrilla campaign and the military administration.¹³

¹¹ “As a Chief of Staff of the Army who was still green - 31 years old - I often felt frustrated in dealing with problems and I often had trouble sleeping at night. …Sometimes I would just lie awake on the couch in the guest reception room. I was envious of my wife who was able to sleep soundly.” Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Two, Op. Cit., p. 294. When Nasution visited India soon after becoming Chief of Staff in 1950 he felt ill at ease with the much older and more technically trained officers of the Indian Army: “The commander of the Calcutta military area also attended and immediately approached me as the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army. He was a big man with a long moustache. He asked me how old I was and I replied that I was 31. He laughed. He referred to me as the Command-in-Chief of the Indonesian Army (at that time in India the Army Chief of Staff was called the Command-in-Chief Army). And he said that he had served in the military for more years than I had been alive. I felt somewhat slighted by that old Two-Star General.” Ibid., p. 217. Nasution often writes of feeling slighted during this period. For example, in describing a flight from Makassar to Bali with Sultan Hamengku Buwono, he recalls: “It is noteworthy that the final journey, in a KNIL Dakota [C47 – DC3 transport aircraft] with a pilot holding the rank of Lieutenant, nobody spoke to us apart from the Steward.” Ibid., p. 206

¹² He wrote that the crisis had assisted him to assist friends who had similar experiences: “The problem was that there was a gap between the reality of their duties and their confidence that they had the capacity to perform them. They were considered intelligent and knowledgeable by their subordinates but they themselves felt inadequate. There were also some who felt ill at ease with their outward appearance as heads [of organisations] because at home they were in the opposite position. And there were other problems faced by important officers on the staff in the first years the TNI spent in Jakarta.” Ibid., p. 294. While it is possible that Nasution’s reference to being in “an opposite position” at home might have described his own marriage, Sunarti writes that she always encouraged Nasution to spend the extra days in Bandung “… to calm his mind in dealing with the disorder that continued to exist, not only in West Java but in other regions as well. I always advised him that it was necessary to calm his mind in such ways. I saw many officers who felt ill and regularly went to the doctor but really didn’t have anything physically wrong with them.” Sunarti, Op. Cit., p. 99.

¹³ “… because national matters and military matters at the centre were directly handled by the President, the Prime Minister / Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Defence and the
There were frictions between Nasution and Simatupang, often due to Simatupang interfering in the running of the army. \(^{14}\) The PSI group, with whom Simatupang was associated, \(^{15}\) regarded Nasution as a “Bonapartist” and (after the 17 October 1952 Affair) of having aspirations towards a military coup of the type that had recently taken place in Egypt. \(^{16}\) This accords with Simatupang’s claim that Nasution had been an admirer of Baldur von Schirach (Chapter Four).

Plans were made for Nasution to step down from his position of Army Chief of Staff at the end of 1951 so that he could study for a year at the Netherlands War College ("Hogere Krijgschool"). \(^{17}\) Nasution was only too well aware of his lack of technical military skills and wanted to pursue further military education, \(^{18}\) and Sunarti was keen to accompany him (her Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. While it was sufficient for matters relating to the capital city, the regions and the field to be dealt with by the [regional] commanders who were also the military governors. Meanwhile, the military governors in a de facto sense directly communicated with the Minister for Defence of the RIS. And the RIS Minister for Defence had in a practical sense taken over the position of the Dutch military commander. It was a big contrast with the period of guerrilla warfare, the period of Java Command Headquarters which was so filled with activity, although not actual operational activity but outlining, instructing, coordinating etc. within the framework of overall resistance.” Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol Two, *Op. Cit.*, p. 211.


\(^{15}\) Like a number of other officers of the day (but unlike Nasution) Simatupang was closely associated with the PSI. The PSI-linked officers included Sutoko (Nasution’s old ally from his Siliwangi days); his Coro classmate and then Siliwangi Commander Alex Kawilarang; Lieutenant Colonel Parman, the Military Police Chief; and Lieutenant Colonels Taswin and Kemal Idris (both of whom were Siliwangi regimental commanders). McKemmish, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 52, 53. Simatupang appears to have been more robust and self confident than Nasution. For example, Simatupang visited India on the way to the Round Table Conference in 1948 but appears to have experienced none of the feelings of insecurity that Nasution has described. Simatupang’s background in the revolution was largely as a negotiator and he was present at all the major negotiations with the Dutch, including the Round Table Conference. Although he had some misgivings about the outcomes of this Conference he appears to have been generally satisfied that the outcome had achieved all that was possible. As a “stakeholder” in the Round Table Conference he was committed to developing the international and Western-style army that both sides agreed to in principle. He was sufficiently forthright in his opposition to militarism to ask Sukarno not to wear military uniform to avoid the experiences of militarist states like imperial Germany where the Kaiser was never photographed in civilian clothes. Simatupang, 1996 *Op. Cit.*, p. 130 Simatupang writes that one of his “obsessions” in the early 1950s was to professionalise the army to avoid mistakes made in other countries where people’s wars for independence had resulted in Communism (China) or a never-ending cycle of coups (Latin America). *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 131


expenses paid by the Gondokusumo family). 19 However, Nasution suspected that the proposal had been inspired by Simatupang to remove him. 20 The proposed assignment was later amended to a study tour to a number of countries 21 and then cancelled due to rising tensions associated with the 17 October 1952 Affair.

Nasution was faced with massive tasks as he sought to shape a national army out of the regular and irregular forces on the side of the Republic, and the KNIL personnel who elected to join the TNI. A major demobilisation programme was put into place that was reasonably successful (particularly in the case of students returning to their interrupted studies) but far too many personnel wished to remain within the army. A particular headache was that many of those who wished to stay both lacked the skills to gain employment of similar status in civilian life or to fit into a professional army that no longer relied so much on guerrilla warfare.

With the departure of the Dutch the country was divided into seven territorial regions (Tentara dan Territorium - T&T) 22 whose commanders were accustomed to operating with a very high degree of autonomy. During the revolution the army headquarters staff had often found it difficult to control these commands and the situation was further exacerbated by the period of guerrilla warfare in 1949 when Sudirman was critically ill and Nasution recognized that local commanders and officials had to be left to “… determine their activities for themselves.” 23 The regional commanders and senior officers on the army general staff were similar in terms of age, combat experience and personal reputation, adding to Nasution’s feelings of frustration and helplessness. 24

The security situation rapidly deteriorated after the recognition of sovereignty. In the cities where Dutch forces had congregated there were clashes with the TNI “… that had to be handled

22 T&T I/Bukit Barisan (Aceh, North Sumatera, West Sumatera, Riau)
T&T II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatera, Jambi)
T&T III/Siliwangi (West Java)
T&T IV/Diponegoro (Central Java)
T&T V/Brawijaya (East Java)
T&T VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan)
T&T VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi, Moluccas - including Irian Jaya, Bali, West Lesser Sundas)
24 “The territorial commanders looked on themselves as the equals of the officers on the general staff, and they considered that decisions of basic policy should be taken collegially, with them, rather than by the central authorities alone.” McVey, Op. Cit., p.147. Nasution has described the situation in similar (but more rueful) terms: “A meeting of unit or regional commanders at that time was like a meeting of “shareholders” in the Republic, with the result that not only was I subjected to criticism but the Cabinet and the President were criticized freely. Tendencies towards bapakism and warlordism were a reality.” Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Two, Op. Cit., p. 258.
quickly so they didn’t explode into armed conflict between the two armies.” 25 Such a clash occurred in January 1950 when a former Dutch captain, Turco “Turk” Westerling, staged a revolt in Bandung that resulted in many TNI casualties. Westerling had created a well-armed force (the Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil - APRA – Army of the Just King - of some 800 men) with the support, albeit hesitant, of the negara of Pasundan. 26

The Dutch garrison commander in Bandung persuaded Westerling’s force to leave Bandung but a number of them began to infiltrate into Jakarta (with the backing of Sultan Hamid of Pontianak) to stage a coup. However, Westerling’s forces were driven out of Jakarta and he was subsequently spirited out of Indonesia by the Netherlands military. 27

Meanwhile in West Java and border areas of Central Java the Darul Islam rebellion gathered intensity under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo. To complicate matters remnants of Westerling’s forces began to cooperate with Darul Islam elements in the West Java hinterland. 28 Suspicion of Dutch nationals in Indonesia grew and was often directed at members of the Netherlands Military Mission who were disparagingly referred to as Nederlandsch Mata-Mata (NMM - Dutch Spies). 29

The Netherlands Military Mission

Nasution was cooperating with the NMM. 30 For example, in October 1951 he announced plans for the Netherlands to provide the bulk of military training to Indonesia. He stated that 100 officers per year were to be sent abroad for training and 90% of these were to go to the Netherlands. Places for Indonesian officers at the Hogere Krijgschool were to be increased from two to four. 31

However, Nasution was in a difficult position in his dealings with the NMM because of his sponsorship of renewed re-dan-ra (that was commonly perceived to be in line with Dutch objectives to exert control over the army), his KNIL background and his wife’s Dutch ancestry. He was friendly with the Head of the Mission, Major General Pereira, 32 but appears to have tried to keep his distance from the Dutch in public and only attended those NMM functions that he felt absolutely necessary. 33 However, Sunarti (who joined him in Jakarta in 1950) was

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25 Ibid., p. 236.
29 Ibid.252.
32 McKemmish, Op. Cit., p. 54, f.n. 17. Pereira was a former KNIL officer.
popular with the NMM officers and appears to have persuaded Nasution to accept invitations that were extended to her:

But this attracted unfounded gossip regarding my husband. It was said that Pak Nas enjoyed mixing with the Dutch officers and had close relations with them. There were even those who said that this had led to the negotiations regarding the future of West Irian not being able to be concluded. 34

Nasution writes that frictions emerged between the army leadership and sections of the parliament over the NMM:

… because the parliament continually attacked me over the use of the NMM. Whereas the existence of the NMM was a decision of the Round Table Conference – a political decision that had previously been agreed by all the parties. 35

Signs of resentment towards the presence of the NMM also began to appear in the press. For example, on 7 February 1951 the Bandung daily *Pikiran Rakyat* reported that officers at the Army Officers’ Training Centre, Bandung, had questioned the Speaker of parliament, Mr Sartono, on why Dutch officers were still being permitted to give lectures in the Dutch language. 36

On 10 March 1951 Simatupang wrote in the Ministry of Defence journal *Perwira* that, with the failure of discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia on Irian, the Indonesian Armed Forces needed to approach the issue of the Netherlands Military Mission on the basis of whether Indonesia gained or benefited from its presence. Simatupang’s view was that Indonesia needed to look at the matter rationally and without sentiment and that it should be separated from the Irian dispute. Although the foundation of Indonesia’s army was “people’s defence” and people were asking whether use of the Dutch military would distance the armed forces from their origins he believed Indonesia had much to gain because the Dutch language was the most widely used foreign language in Indonesia and cooperation with a small power like the Netherlands was more in line with Indonesia’s non-aligned foreign policy. 37

**The NMM and “People’s Defence”**

The future of the system of “people’s defence” was also raised within the context of the controversy over Nasution’s plans for reorganisation and rationalisation. In By March 1952 two Masjumi-led cabinets (the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets) had been replaced by the PNI-led Wilopo

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34 Sunarti writes that she was the one who was invited and that the invitation included her husband. Sunarti, *Op. Cit.*, p. 101.
36 “Tentara dan politik: Mr Sartono depan opsir-opsir Bandung” (“The Army and politics: Mr Sartono with Bandung officers”), *Pikiran Rakyat*, 7 February 1951.
cabinet (April 1952 – June 1953). The proposed re-dan-ra program became a difficult issue for the Wilopo cabinet from the time of its formation.

Nasution had “learnt a great deal” from his previous experience of attempting to reorganize and rationalise the army in Yogyakarta and he had made sure that the cabinet and the Minister for Defence authorised his plans. Nevertheless he was again a target for criticism of the plans because he “… was indeed their architect.” 38

Nasution proposed that the army be reduced in number from 200,000 to 100,000 men, comprising a force of 100 battalions. The new “core” army was to be mobile and highly trained, with training accessed both within and outside Indonesia. It was to rely on a large militia (based on compulsory national service) that could be activated in time of emergency and volunteer groups such as the revolutionary-period Village Guerrilla Troops (Pager Desa). 39

Nasution was criticised within the army and the parliament for seeking to downgrade the TNI’s identity as a revolutionary force that was close to the people and had engaged in people’s defence. In fact his plans were remarkably consistent with those he had developed for three tiers of forces in 1948. He was not seeking to neglect the territorial emphasis of the TNI but to develop three tiers of forces with the more professionally trained one being a cadre army that was capable of carrying out more mobile and offensive operations.

Many army personnel became concerned at the emphasis of the re-dan-ra program on selecting officers for retention or demobilisation on the basis of educational level and professional military qualifications. Officers who felt that they had served the Republic well during the revolution but lacked formal qualifications were incensed by Nasution’s warning " ... that those who did not meet the requirements for higher positions must be prepared to fill lower positions". 40

Suhario Padmowiryo writes that the Dutch term klein en hanteerbaar (small and manageable) became used disparagingly to describe efforts of this type to downsize and professionalise the army. 41 Just as Nasution had been accused of Dutch sympathies when he attempted to reorganise and rationalise the army in 1948, his renewed re-dan-ra program was often seen as a plot by graduates of Dutch military academies and the NMM to impose KNIL values on the army and do away with its “people’s resistance” origins.

Suhario also writes of hearing that the re-dan-ra program meant that the Section would be closed down:

39 Ibid., p. 176
What this point of view amounted to was disagreeing with the TNI’s total people’s defence system and it was in accordance with the KNIL’s ethos as a police army that was used to confront the people of Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period. A leading army solidarity maker and distant relative of Sukarno, Colonel Bambang Supeno, led the resistance to this early 1950s version of re-dan-ra. McVey writes that while Nasution and his colleagues in the leadership favoured a cadre army, Supeno began to advocate retention of “… a mass force that possessed close ties to its civilian surroundings and was oriented towards local defence.”

Supeno was particularly affected by Nasution’s plan to build a Staff and Command School. He had already established a Candradimuka Academy near Bandung, the term Candradimuka being the name of the volcanic crater in which the mythological hero of the Ramayana / Mahabharata epics, Gatot Kaca, forged his strength and fighting spirit before flying out to engage in battle. Supeno’s choice of this name indicated his concern to draw upon Indonesian culture to reinforce the ethos of the revolutionary TNI.

The emphasis of the Candramuka Academy was on maintaining semangat or fighting spirit. It was no doubt intended also to counter the influence of the Netherlands Military Mission, and officers with a KNIL background were never invited to participate in its courses. A lasting influence of the Academy is the Sapta Marga or seven oaths of the Indonesian officer corps that was developed there. Although the Academy was favoured with visits by President Sukarno, Nasution moved to disband it in 1952 so that the limited funds available to the army could be diverted to a more conventional Staff and Command College.

Supeno communicated directly with President Sukarno, proposing that Nasution be sacked and received an encouraging reaction. He began to campaign within the officer corps for Nasution’s removal as Chief of Staff and gained strong support from the Officers’ Association of the Republic of Indonesia (Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia – IPRI) that at the time was chaired by the East Java commander, Bambang Sugeng.

Supeno was summoned to a meeting with senior officers where he walked out after being strongly criticised. Undeterred he again went outside the chain of command, writing to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence and sending copies to the President and Zainul Baharuddin, the

42 Ibid., pp. 398,9.
43 Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 81. An indication of the small size of the Indonesian elite at the time is that Supeno was also a relation of Sunarti. He had supported Nasution’s plans for re-dan-ra in 1948 and served as Nasution’s Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs during the period of military administration. McKemmish, Op. Cit., p. 67.
47 Ibid., p. 63.
chairman of the parliamentary committee on defence. Four days later Nasution suspended Supeno from duties.

Simatupang, Nasution and Hamengku Buwono arranged a meeting with the President to seek clarification of reports that he favoured Nasution’s removal. Simatupang records that he did nearly all the talking from the defence / military side in what became a very heated exchange that led to an irrevocable breach between Simatupang and the President and hastened the processes that led to the Affair.

In September and early October claims were made in parliament by “solidarity makers” that the army leadership was failing to pay due regard to semangat and tradition, that KNIL and PSI-associated officers were being favoured, and that Bambang Supeno’s suspension was illegal. Zainul Baharuddin moved an unsuccessful motion of no-confidence in the Minister for Defence and the armed forces and army leadership and demanded changes to their policies. Sukarno exerted influence behind the scenes and the motion was worded in more subtle terms by Manai Sophian and a section of the PNI who called for a commission to review the defence organization with a view to making improvements in both leadership and organization.

Nasution and officers loyal to him became bitterly resentful at what they regarded as insulting treatment that amounted to meddling in internal military affairs and considered whether to put some sort of pressure on Sukarno to dissolve parliament. Feith states that at first Nasution planned to use Siliwangi forces to mount a coup but was opposed by Simatupang and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and that Sukarno would not endorse a program of arrests he intended to implement.

49 The President eventually admitted to having spoken to Supeno and indicated he was not opposed to removing Nasution. Simatupang flatly told the President he had made a terrible mistake that could have profoundly negative consequences for the democratisation process in general and the professionalisation of the army in particular. When eventually the President angrily claimed that Simatupang was trying to “corner” him the meeting was over. Simatupang declined to shake hands on leaving and appears to have slammed the door on the way out. Simatupang later wrote that others recall this, but he could not remember doing so. Simatupang, *Fallacy of a Myth*, Op. Cit., pp. 134-138.


51 Ibid.

52 Feith, 1962 *Op. Cit.*, p. 262. Extracted from R. McVey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 148. There are varying opinions on the extent of Nasution's involvement in the 17 October 1952 Affair. Ruth McVey notes Feith's generally sympathetic treatment of Nasution and his assertion that the incident was planned by a small group within the General Staff and the Jakarta city commander. (Feith, 1962 *Op. Cit.*, p. 264 and McVey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 147.) While agreeing that this could indeed have been the case, she cites a tendency of officers to "feign reluctance while quietly encouraging impatience on their subordinates' part." She further notes that in confronting Sukarno at the palace the spokesman for the officers' group was an old Nasution ally, Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko, while two regional commanders, Colonel Simbolon (North Sumatra) and Colonel Kawilarang (West Java) made supporting statements. "...Nasution's own formal role was only to introduce the speakers." *Ibid.*
In the days leading up to 17 October Nasution appears to have gradually ceased to play a leading role because he became aware that some of the officers involved wished to remove him as Chief of Staff. On 17 October a group of officers drew up a list of points to be conveyed to Sukarno the following day, which Nasution “after some procrastination” signed. Meanwhile, Nasution’s close ally from his Java Command Headquarters days, Brigadier Dr Mustopo, arranged for demonstrators to assemble outside the palace. Mustopo had particular skills in this area, having organised underworld elements in the fight against the Dutch and it was this element of society that he called upon.

On 17 October 1952 army units together with these "spontaneous" civilian supporters, staged a show of force outside the palace in which guns were directed at the palace. A group of officers then met with President Sukarno to demand changes to the parliament. As was the case when he had met with the President together with Simatupang and Hamengku Buwono, Nasution did little talking.

Sutoko started by explaining that the army leadership was concerned about the composition and behaviour of the parliament and called for the President to form a new assembly before handing Sukarno a petition signed by sixteen officers. Colonels Simbolon (Commander T&T I/North Sumatra) and Kawilarang (Commander T&T III/Siliwangi) then spoke along similar lines. The President reminded the delegation that the army should not involve itself in politics but promised to discuss the issues they raised with the cabinet and others. Sukarno then went to the front of the palace and employed his considerable prestige and oratorical skills to persuade the demonstrators to disband. They duly did so and army personnel were withdrawn.

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53 “.. he was caught up in an alliance in which he felt increasingly uneasy and insecure, and from which he was unlikely to emerge in a leading position.” McKemmish, Op. Cit., p. 72.
54 Ibid.
55 Who was by this time head of the army dental service.
56 In describing the events of 17 October 1952, Feith has drawn attention to Mustopo’s links with the Jakarta underworld: “A number of those who took part in the demonstration were either personal followers of Dr Mustopo, a man whose influence in working-class Jakarta was considerable at the time, or members of ganglike kampung village guard organisations with which he had associations. Some of those who took part are known to have done so for money.” Feith, 1962 Op. Cit., p. 262. See Cribb, 1991 Op. Cit., pp. 112, 113 for an account of this highly eccentric officer’s involvement with underworld elements in the fight against the Dutch. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, Nasution appointed Mustopo Chairman of the coordinating body for his civil-military cooperation groups, the West Irian National Liberation Front, in mid-1958.
That afternoon the army banned a number of newspapers, arrested six parliamentarians and imposed a curfew but after a few days set all the detainees free and lifted its restrictions. 59 Not long afterwards Nasution was under threat of court martial and placed on the inactive list until his reinstatement in November 1955.

There has been considerable debate on the legality and propriety of the 17 October Affair. 60 Nasution himself later used the term “semi coup” in “informal” conversations because his aim was to have the provisional parliament disbanded while retaining the leadership of Sukarno and Hatta. 61

The 17 October 1952 Affair can be interpreted as a classic case of an attempted use of "moderator" techniques 62 to assert the will of the army leadership over the parliament. However, there were divisions in the section of the leadership that mounted the action and it was opposed by large sections of the officer corps. That they fell at the hurdle of negotiating with President Sukarno was a reminder of the President’s considerable prestige and political skills.

The rivalries within the officer corps subsequently intensified with senior officers lining up as for or against the Affair. Three regional commanders, Colonel Suwondho in East Java, Colonel Gatot Subroto in South Sulawesi, and Lieutenant Colonel Kosasih in South Sumatra, were overthrown or detained by subordinates who opposed their alignment with the officers involved in the Affair.

By the end of the year Nasution had resigned from the appointment of Army Chief of Staff and was placed on the non-active list (he was replaced by Bambang Sugeng). In 1954 Simatupang's Armed Forces Chief of Staff position was abolished.

59 Ibid., pp. 86, 87.
60 For example, Crouch writes that although the Affair was on the surface an attempt to redress a situation where civilian politicians were meddling in purely military affairs, those involved "cannot have been unaware, however, that the dissolution of parliament at their behest would have placed them in a very strong position from which to make further political moves." Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 28-30. McVey contends that: "...it seems clear that the military chiefs did not intend their move as a bid for direct army rule, but sought, maximally, an arrangement whereby Sukarno would serve as the leader and legitimator of a regime which would provide a much enhanced role for the army." R. McVey, Op. Cit., p. 148. Simatupang has written that the armed forces leadership never intended to mount a coup when it staged the 17 October 1952 Affair because this would have led to an endless cycle of coups. Simatupang, Laporan Dari Banaran, Op. Cit., p. 251.
Nasution entered what he called his “leper period”. He was more wary of Sukarno than before and his treatment at the hands of the parliament had considerably reinforced his long-standing dislike of civilian politicians “meddling” in army affairs.

He felt intensely frustrated at the failure of his plans to develop a more professional army, something he had been trying to do from the outset of the revolution when he demobilised or incorporated the laskar into the army. He was to return to reforming the army in the publications he began to write during his period on the inactive list, offering ideas for the future as the army entered an increasingly rudderless period.

It is highly significant that the plans he had drawn up while Chief of Staff were not intended to discard the “people’s resistance” role he had carved out during the revolution. While the army entered a period of virtual leadership paralysis in which its material and human resources declined sharply, Nasution began to burnish his reputation as a military strategist and particularly his background in developing “people’s resistance” strategies by working to idealise this aspect of the army’s history.

“People’s Resistance” in the Early 1950s

Like Nasution’s re-dan-ra programs of the revolution, the re-dan-ra debate of 1952 was over differing visions of how best to achieve an army based on “people’s resistance”. Nasution wished to preserve the people’s army base of the army through a system of militia reserves and trained civilians while Bambang Supeno appears to have seen the army as filling both the regular and militia functions.

As also noted earlier, Guy Pauker writes that until the late 1950s Indonesian Army personnel appeared to have forgotten the lessons of guerrilla warfare they had learnt in the struggle against the Dutch:

Strange as it may seem, the lessons of those years [of guerrilla warfare in the revolution] had apparently been forgotten between 1950 and 1958.

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64 As discussed in Chapter Six, this was clearly illustrated in his choice of the code DPD Hapus (Regional Defence Councils are Abolished) to signal the advent of the guerrilla war in December 1948. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Two, Op. Cit., p. 84; Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Op. Cit., p. 134.
65 Supeno’s is the view that has prevailed in Indonesia, largely because troops have been used extensively for internal security duties. Robert Lowry wrote in the mid-1990s that “… the regular army is at least twice as big as it needs to be given the regional security situation. At least 100,000 of the approximately 150,000 men employed in the territorial structure could be replaced by reserves or militiamen if the external threat were the only consideration. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1993, p. 219.
However, the territorial structures of the revolutionary period in parts of Java and Sumatra did not disappear with the recognition of sovereignty and were actually extended throughout the country when the TNI spread into the previously Dutch-occupied areas in the early 1950s. That this continued to entail the shadowing of civilian administrative boundaries is evident in Nasution’s remark that the Dutch (who were seeking to prop up the federal system) complained that the TNI was exceeding its authority by shadowing local Dutch-sponsored administrations:

In fact the TNI was not just a combat organization but was in fact, in line with its territorial concept, a socio-political organization. Our *pamong praja* organization was sufficiently intact in the ‘federal’ regions and our *pamong desa* structures were becoming increasingly complete.

In negotiations I was always conscious of Dutch protests directed specifically at me because they regarded me as the ‘architect’ of the Republican territorial system which they referred to specifically as Nasution’s “shadow administration”.

In a meeting at the Homan hotel in Bandung the Resident, Van der Harst, was so angry he didn’t want to talk to me any further. He left the room and the Colonel from the United Nations Commission on Indonesia (UNCI) apologised to the Republican officers for his behaviour / attitude.  

That the army intended to retain links with its “people’s resistance” origins after the transfer of sovereignty is evident in the command structures that it introduced from late 1949. The seven territorial commands were intended to carry out guerrilla warfare independent of command and provisions in the event of attack. They were comprised of both combat troops and a military administrative unit capable of taking over administrative and political functions in the event of war.  

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67 Nasution also writes that whereas the government did not wish to upset negotiations with the Dutch in any way:

“… the TNI welcomed the new phase as a means of continuing the struggle with which we had become imbued in the guerrilla period. A struggle that had its basis in territorial movements to reinstate our territorial troops and apparatus throughout the whole of Indonesia.” Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol Two, *Op. Cit.*, p. 213, 224. Nasution’s account is supported by a September 1949 Australian Department of External Affairs report complaining of Republican “interference” in the civil administration of the federal areas of Central and East Java, and in Pasundan: “In Pasundan they have said that they will garrison their troops by the end of the month but this will probably depend on the outcome of their present demand that the Republic withdraw its administration. In East Java the Dutch are pressing for the Republic's complete military and civil withdrawal. The F.C.A. [Federalists] are supporting the Dutch, claiming that the presence of Republican administrations is inconsistent with the *Negara* status of Pasundan and East Java as recognized by the Republic at the Inter-Indonesian Conference [a meeting between the Republic and the various *negara* held in Yogyakarta from 19-22 July 1949]. The Republicans appear genuinely anxious that a withdrawal on their part from Pasundan and East Java will considerably strengthen the positions of the Darul Islam and Tan Malacca groups, both of which are opposed to the Hatta Government and to the R.T.C [Round Table Conference].” www.info.dfat.gov.au, 487 Pritchett to Critchley and Department of External Affairs, Cablegrams The Hague 6 K340 Batavia, 12 September 1949, accessed November 2004.

In principle, the troops in these regional commands were to be drawn from the ethnic groups in the areas in which they operated. A number of regiments were formed which had particular areas allocated to them while Military District Commands had the primary task of liaison with local populations. Regiments were allocated to particular territories while Military District Commands had the primary responsibility of liaison with civilian populations.

Another indication that the army intended to remain in touch with its revolutionary origins was the establishment of a territorial section within Army Headquarters (Section VI of the General Staff [Staf Umum Angkatan Darat – SUAD VI]). While the Tentara dan Territorium operated in the regions, the Section was to liaise at a national level with civil authorities. It was to draw up plans for territorial defence and was to ensure good relations between army units and local communities.

According to Suhario Padmodiwiryo (who was Deputy Head of Territorial Affairs in the early 1950s) the propensity of Suharto-era territorial affairs officers to intervene in politics was evident from that time. Suhario states that following the transfer of sovereignty the section attracted officers with a family background in the pamong/pangreh praja and that, like their forebears in Dutch colonial times, they busied themselves collecting information on the political parties throughout Indonesia.

The Section conducted courses for army officers on territorial affairs in Bandung, the first of which was run in January 1951. In his biography Suhario writes that when he attended advanced infantry officer training in the United States in 1956 he felt that he did not have much to learn from the American instructors on one subject offered in the curriculum: the planning and operation of a military government.

In July 1951 the Siliwangi Division opened its own training course for territorial officers. Present at the opening ceremony were the Divisional/Tentara dan Territorium III Commander,

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69 Reorganisasi TNI-AD Tahun 1984, 1986, p.p. 13, 14. This section was retained in a reorganisation of staff appointments in 1954. Ibid., p. 15.
70 Rencana-rencana dari Komisi Perencana Angkatan Darat (Plans of the Army Planning Commission) General Staff, Army Headquarters, 2nd Ed., 1951, 1f and 33f. Extracted from Sundhaussen, 1982 Op. Cit., p. 60. Nasution’s ally in taming the laskar in the Priangan area, Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko, was in charge of territorial affairs in the army headquarters. Sutoko was one of two Deputies to Nasution (the other was Colonel Suprapto). Supratno looked after operational affairs while Sutoko was in charge of territorial affairs and intelligence.
71 Interview with Suhario Padmodiwiryo, Jakarta, 2 December 1996.
72 “Kursus Bagi Perwira Teritorial” (“Courses for Territorial Officers”), “Organisasi Territorial Tentara Harus Sempurna: Pendidikan Perwira Territorial Dibuka” (“Army Territorial Organisation Must be Perfect: Territorial Officer Education [Program] Launched”), Pikiran Rakyat, 5 January 1951. Suhario himself taught these courses over a number of years. Interview with Suhario Padmodiwiryo, Jakarta, 2 December 1996.
Colonel Sadikin and representatives of the West Java provincial administration. Both the military and civilian guests stressed the need for relations between the army and the community.

All officers of the Tentara dan Territorium were to undertake this training, which was to take place in four phases of one and a half months. Fifty percent of the course material was to be in the area of military studies while the other half was to include constitutional law, people’s defence and general knowledge. Apart from military instructors, lecturers were to be drawn from the pamong praja, the police and the Department of Information. 74

“People’s Resistance” as a Political Issue

The newspapers of the early 1950s indicate some concern to maintain the strategy of “total people’s resistance”. Announcing plans to demobilise 80,000 military personnel on 24 June 1950, an army spokesman (speaking on behalf of Nasution) said that with the cessation of the conflict with the Dutch large numbers of personnel who had been mobilised were now no longer required and would be returned to civilian life. The government had determined that Indonesia’s defence policy would be based on total people’s defence:

This does not mean that every member of our populace will be armed. Rather, what is meant by that is the realisation of the greatest possible defence potential based on the strength of the people. This system can be arranged and directed towards a militia system that provides for every citizen to have an obligation to defend the country. Meanwhile, our army which will be the core of this total people’s defence will undergo training and improvement.

…. if it eventuates that in the coming years we are dragged into conflict, with the existence of total people’s defence we will have put into place preparations for a return to guerrilla tactics. 

… a defence that is based on total people’s defence is the most appropriate for Indonesia because it is clear that in the next three to five years Indonesia will not possibly be able to develop armed forces that are of a similar standard to the armed forces of our neighbouring countries around the Pacific. 75

When the Hatta cabinet resigned in August 1950 the new Defence Minister, A. Halim, 76 expressed his concern that the army remain close to the people in an “order of the day”:

Our armed forces must continue to foster close and good relations with the people and the community, so that our army can truly be called a real people’s army. Most of you know from personal experience that the guerrilla war could not possibly have been carried on and completed if [the army] had not been supported and upheld by the general public. Because of


75 “80,000 anggota tentara akan didemobiliser. Tapi pemerintah tak akan melepas sebelum ada kepastian didapatnya mata pencaharian. Politik pertahanan tetap berdasarkan pertahanan rakyat total.” (80,000 army members to be demobilised. But the government will not let them go before there is confirmation that they will have work. The defence policy will continue to be based on total people’s defence”), Merdeka, 24 June 1950.

76 The Sultan was reappointed to the position from April 1952 and he served until July 1953. Bachtiar, Op. Cit., p. 118.
this, in carrying out further steps towards the perfection and consolidation of the armed forces, [your] close relations with the people should never be forgotten. 77

On 4 October 1950 – in preparation for the first commemoration of Hero’s Day since the transfer of sovereignty - Colonel Gatot Subroto’s Central Java Tentara dan Territorium announced that all the village heads (lurah) from throughout the province who had assisted the army during the guerrilla war would be assembled, entertained and thanked for their service. 78

In December 1950 the government linked the maintenance of a defence policy of “total people’s resistance” with the country’s non-aligned or “free and active” foreign policy. “Government circles” stated that it was important that the foreign and defence policies be intertwined. Referring to the need to rapidly form an army during the revolution, the involvement of the army in security duties since the transfer of sovereignty and the increasing tensions that were evident in the international arena, the “government circles” said that:

For these reasons “total peoples resistance” will remain Indonesia’s defence principle until such time that the Indonesian armed forces are organised in such a manner that they can confront an external threat. 79

A defence policy of “total people’s resistance” (which could be implemented without a large-scale purchase of weapons) appears to have been compatible with the government’s non-aligned foreign policy. The “government circles” quoted above went on to state unequivocally that the government would not become reliant upon international arms providers as that would compromise its non-aligned policy. 80

In January 1951, the political figure who in 1943 proposed the establishment of PETA, Gatot Mangkupradja, linked the total people’s defence policy with a free and active foreign policy in a series of articles in the Bandung daily Pikiran Rakyat. Gatot idealised the territorial links of the forces established by the Japanese, such as PETA and Hizbullah, and urged the army to reestablish what he recalled as warm relationships between these forces and the people. 81

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77 “Hubungan tentara dan rakyat harus tetap dipelihara: Perintah harian Hamengku Buwono IX dan Dr. Halim” (“Relations between the army and people must be maintained. Order of the Day from Hamengku Buwono IX and Dr. Halim”), Merdeka, 12 September 1950.
79 “Beleid pertahanan dan beleid politik L.N.: Indonesia mendasarkan pertahanannya atas pokok pikiran politik bebas” (“Indonesia’s defence policy and foreign policy: Indonesia bases its defence on the principles of a free [and active foreign] policy”), Merdeka, 11 December 1950.,
80 Ibid. A major factor in the downfall of the Sukiman government was the acceptance of its foreign minister of U.S. military aid under the U.S. Mutual Security act of 1951. This required accepting governments to sign agreements that were widely perceived in Indonesia to be in violation of Indonesia’s non-aligned “free and active” foreign policy. See Feith, 1962 Op. Cit., pp. 198-207.
81 Gatot laid claim to a continuing relationship with the villages who had protected townsfolk and the army during the guerrilla conflicts but was scathing in his criticism of those who he claimed had reclaimed their high offices and who: “… have not only never visited the humble
Three days later Lieutenant Colonel Saragih, Territorial Affairs Officer in Tentara dan Territorium III/Siliwangi lamented attempts to separate the army from the people by those who were upset by the army’s attempts to clamp down on militia groups. 82

President Sukarno joined in the call for the continuation of people’s defence. In his Hero’s Day address he called for the creation of:

… a system of defence in which, alongside the armed forces, the people will be prepared to take part in the defence of their homeland in an organised manner. 83

**Mobilisation of Villagers for Counter-Insurgency Operations**

The threats to security that the army faced in the early 1950s were all from within the country and required a counter insurgency response. Regional insurrections began to emerge after the federal structure, which the Round Table Conference had put in place, was disbanded in 1950 in favour of a unitary state. The most pervasive and threatening were associated with attempts to establish an Islamic State.

In West Java Darul Islam forces continued to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic State and over time they were joined by insurgencies in parts of Central Java (Angkatan Umat Islam - Forces of the Muslim People), South Sumatra (where in January 1952 forces led by Kahar Muzakar declared this region to be part of the Darul Islam established in West Java), Kalimantan (where Ibnu Hadjar established the Darul Islam-aligned Kesatuan Rakyat Tertindas - Union of Oppressed People in 1950), and Aceh (where forces led by Daud Beureu'eh aligned themselves with the West Java Darul Islam movement from September 1953).

The institutionalisation of the army’s role as a mobiliser of the people for counter-insurgency operations began to take shape in the mid-1950s in West Java, where the Darul Islam insurrection continued and intensified after the transfer of sovereignty. In 1956 the Commander of the Tasikmalaya-based 11th Infantry Regiment (East Priangan region), Major Suwarto, formulated an integrated military, economic and socio-political strategy to separate Darul Islam insurgents from dwellings of the peasant farmers but who have never even sent a letter of thanks. Those who sit on the thrones of high office cannot, of course, hear what these farmers have to say but my comrades and I who continue to enjoy family-like relationships with them hear and feel the disappointments of these small people, even though they do not express them openly.”

“Pertahanan total dan politik bebas” (“Total defence and the free [and active foreign] policy”), *Pikiran Rakyat*, 15 January 1951.,

82 Let. Kol. B. Saragih: Ada usaha-usaha memecah tentara dari Rakyat” (Lieutenant Colonel B. Saragih: People trying to split the army from the People”), *Pikiran Rakyat*, 18 January 195.,

83 “Pidato Panglima Tertinggi: Bangunlah sistem pertahanan yang teratur” (“Speech by the Supreme Commander: Develop a systematic defence system”), *Merdeka*, 6 October 1950.
local communities." His ideas on counter-insurgency gained wide attention in April 1956 when he announced a “Five Year Plan” to end the Darul Islam rebellion. 

However, the newspapers of the period indicate that the army’s involvement in a range of non-military affairs aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of populations where insurgencies took place, and the mobilisation of civilians for counter-insurgency purposes, began four years before Suwarto’s plan was announced.

On 25 April 1950 the Commander of the Siliwangi Division, Colonel Sadikin, ordered that with effect 1 May all military personnel in his division were to donate one percent of their salaries to a Community Development Implementing Agency to repay the great debt of honour that military personnel owed to the people.

Previously, on 22 March, Sadikin had put forward a proposal to construct housing for people displaced by the conflict between the army and Darul Islam forces that was a precursor to more coordinated efforts by the army to carry out civic mission projects.

In May 1951 Pikiran Rakyat reported that the people of the East Priangan area had ceased to be passive bystanders and were assisting the army in the fight by the army against Darul Islam insurgents. A June 1951 report describes the mobilisation of 1000 villagers in a cleansing

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86 “… it was the people who from the time of the independence struggle provided necessities for forward scouts and the military, who provided guidance, food, places to sleep, etc. throughout the guerrilla times, who were casualties of battle and cleansing actions, with the result that now hundreds of thousands of them are suffering, have no houses and nothing to eat.” “Tentara berhutang budi pada rakyat: Instruksi Kol. Sadikin untuk pemberian sumbangan dari tentara kepada rakyat” (“Army has debt of honour to people: Colonel Sadikin instructs soldiers to donate to people”), Merdeka, 25 April 1950.
87 “Villagers who previously evacuated to the towns are now, after the TNI has carried out cleansing operations, returning to their villages. Their situation is very saddening: their houses have been burned, they no longer possess farming implements. Sadikin hoped attention would be given to this matter.” “Pembersihan di Djawa Barat” (“Mopping up in West Java”), Merdeka, 22 March 1950.
88 “The passive attitude of the people [that was apparent] when the army began its pursuit and cleansing [operation] has now changed to active participation to guarantee security and assist the army in carrying out its task. … the change in the people’s attitudes has not only been brought about by information programs, particularly those concerning religion, but have been given impetus by the quick reaction of army and police units towards any acts on the part of the [insurgent] gangs. Moreover, thanks to the wise training of troops by commanders, interaction between the army and the people that in the beginning was often mutually hurtful has given rise to a positive spirit of mutual assistance. This is evident in no less than 8,500 villagers taking part in pursuing and surrounding insurgents to the south of Tasikmalaya with satisfying results from 10 to 17 May.” “Rakyat mulai turut aktif dalam pembersihan” (“People beginning to participate actively in mopping up [operations]”), Pikiran Rakyat, 24 May 1951.
operation on the island of Kalimantan. Village officials were tasked with sending seven of their villagers to participate in the operation for periods of one week at a time. 89

In August 1951 the army and villagers in the Bogor area of West Java staged a people’s defence exercise involving 5000 villagers that was attended by the police, pamong praja and the press. The somewhat idealistic – and perhaps unrealistic - exercise scenario began with a group of insurgents armed with Lee Enfield rifles, Sten guns and machetes entering a village with the purpose of seeking food. The village head struck a gong as a signal for villagers to mobilise. Armed with sharpened bamboo poles and machetes the villagers surrounded the insurgents, yelling out “advance” and “we are ready”. After being cut off from their line of retreat by soldiers who had heard the alarm, the insurgents fired their weapons wildly and soon ran out of ammunition. They were finally captured by the villagers. 90

**Nasution and “Total People’s Resistance”**

Nasution’s consciousness of the importance of “total people’s resistance” to the identity of the army and the medium-term defence and security of the nation is evident throughout his writings. His account of the “infiltration” of the army’s territorial system into Dutch areas has been discussed. When he visited India in 1950 he was acutely conscious of the differences between the Indian and Indonesian armies because of their differing backgrounds:

> The formation of their units and territorial [matters] followed the British organisational system, including “territorial [army] cadets”. People’s resistance, which was a basic element for the Indonesian people was something they had not thought about. 91

...  

> The [Indian] cadets spoke English and their lives were organised in accordance with the rules of British academies. In their spare time they were organised in various sporting, art, etc. clubs. Spontaneously I asked them what time they had to live together with the people, something that I regarded as so basic in the education of an officer. They answered that in fact that was not a part of their planning. I explained how we had lived and struggled together with the people in wartime, and were accommodated and fed by the people. One of them replied firmly that they did not desire such a situation precisely because they did not wish to ‘burden’ the people. 92

By mid 1951 Nasution was seeking to reemphasise “total people’s resistance” within the officer corps. He had issued his plans for a force of 100 battalions in a booklet that outlined a number of basic issues relating to the army, the system of training envisaged (from recruit training school to the staff college) and the salary system. The opposition to these plans that culminated in the 17 October 1952 Affair was beginning to mount.

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He writes that a speech by President Sukarno on Independence Day 1952 on the need to return to the spirit of the proclamation, including: “... a true national unity, and not just the unity of families or the unity of groups” 93 inspired him to conduct a series of lectures in the major cities and write articles in the army newspaper on total people’s defence as the core identity of the army.

Using themes that were to be the bases of *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* he advocated a continuing focus on “total people’s resistance” on the grounds that “total people’s warfare” was the form of conflict that typified the 20\(^\text{th}\) Century. He decried the neglect of proper planning for “people’s war” in the early stages of the revolution and stressed the need for leadership of such conflicts to be centralised, even though it was typically fought at local levels.

He placed his advocacy for “total people’s resistance” within the context of the three types of forces he had recommended (the regular army being the mobile strike element, a reserve militia force that assisted and supported the regulars, while the third element was the trained civilian component):

... our army, like other armies, has front-line troops as mobile strike forces, second-line troops as their territorial guards, and staff and service entities as leaders and supporters. It can be said that we have a particular third-line force to guarantee internal security (actually police functions) because of the lability of our internal security. 94

He emphasised that there was no question of front-line forces being allocated exclusively to either conventional or guerrilla warfare but to both. Guerrilla warfare was defensive in nature and a regular conventional force was needed to take the offensive:

... guerrilla warfare, especially in a total context is very damaging both physically and psychologically with the result that its effects are very difficult to overcome. So this is a very expensive form of warfare. Therefore we will not undertake guerrilla warfare because we love it or because of a guerrilla “ideology”, but because we are forced to, because our army is not yet mature enough to undertake conventional warfare. 95

**Idealising “Total People’s Resistance”**

By the end of the following year Nasution was on the inactive list and it was during this period that he began to go further than advocating “people’s defence” for technical reasons and to idealise the army’s “total people’s resistance” experience. In *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* he took up his arguments from 1951, asserting that a reliance on guerrilla war was still necessary.

He declared that it would be some ten to fifteen years before Indonesia could hope to develop an army of international standard and fifteen years to build such a navy. Even then Indonesia would lack the industrial base necessary to support a modern war machine and was unlikely to

acquire one in the foreseeable future. For the next ten years, he argued, “guerrilla warfare will be the main item on our program of defence.”  

However, guerrilla forces had to have strong ideological convictions that conventional forces were unlikely to possess. In retrospect Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare can be seen as something of a blueprint for the style of military intervention in politics that Nasution would later fashion. For example, Cribb has noted perceptively that it was in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare that Nasution began to cite the continuing need to prepare for guerrilla warfare to formulate a role for the army that steered a middle course between being a mere instrument of the state and taking over the running of the country, i.e. the “middle way” doctrine that Nasution announced in 1958 (Chapter One):

A member of a guerrilla army, fighting for an ideology, can not only be used as a country’s tool to be ordered to carry a gun; but also as an ideological pioneer, he must be active in ideological matters and in politics. How can he be the vanguard of an ideology or fight for a political aim if he is merely to be a tool to be ordered around with no voice in political decisions. It is not sufficient for him to be merely acquainted with political matters, but he must champion and propagate them. An army which is merely a country’s tool does not have the inner strength to withstand a violent guerrilla war.

Nasution later implied that Professor Djokosutono had some involvement in his idea of a “middle way” for the army. As will be further discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, it is not clear whether Nasution came up with the idea himself and later involved Djokosutono in some way, or whether Djokosutono might have been advising Nasution along such lines from as early as his period on the inactive list when he wrote Fundamentals.

In another part of Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Nasution presaged his formation, soon after his reappointment as Chief of Staff in late 1955, of the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance:

There should be in the headquarters a leadership or inspectorate in charge of ‘territorial’ affairs, such as the ‘second army’, or the people’s guerrilla army.

Relating this idea to the problem of reorganising and rationalising the army, he also stressed the need for further planning and training in territorial affairs:

For this, there is need for special planning and education which cannot be separated from the problem of rehabilitation of the forces back in civilian life in their communities.

In Chapter Nine I will show that Nasution was to use his Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance to launch and manage the BKS and other corporatist initiatives from 1957.

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97 Ibid., pp. 22-26.
101 Ibid.
In Chapter Ten I shall describe how the army energetically developed territorial training and doctrine from the late 1950s that was intended to provide means for the army to intervene in politics, economy and society and embodied organicist thinking.

In Chapter Two I argued against an assertion by Penders and Sundhaussen that Nasution’s political orientation was based on “no other ideology but nationalism and the Pancasila.” I stressed that their characterisation did not sufficiently take into account Nasution’s social conservatism, concern to maintain existing authority structures, distrust for politicians (particularly of the radical variety) and attachment to “traditional” authority structures and values.

Such attitudes were strikingly evident in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. For example, Nasution criticised “petty politics” in favour of an amorphous all-embracing nationalism based on Pancasila while seeking to extend into peacetime a continuing leadership role for the army on the basis of guerrilla warfare remaining the basis of Indonesia’s defence policy:

> For us, who for many years to come must concentrate on guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare in which the army and the people’s partisans must cooperate, it is not possible to say that a soldier is a soldier, and politics is politics, and that the soldier must keep away from politics. In the past, people used to preach that the army should have an ideology, but that it must not mix in politics. The facts in our guerrilla war for independence have twice proven otherwise because those facts grew out of the nature of that struggle, the struggle of the guerrilla war for independence. The army as a core of our people’s guerrilla war has become an important political factor and in the Republic has achieved a certain stature within the country and society. This stature is represented in the position occupied during our fight by our army’s Chief of Staff, Sudirman.

> With the word politics we do not mean ‘petty politics’ in the sense of parties and groups fighting only for positions in the government as is usually the case in peacetime. It is politics in the wider sense; it is statesmanship; it is fighting and defending a greater policy as is implied in the proclamation [of independence] and the preface of our original Constitution of 1945 [which includes the Pancasila]. Herefore, with such ideas we do not mean to say that the soldier must belong to this or that party, but that he must adhere to the wider political horizons.

> The official army and our partisans must in the future be oriented towards the country’s ideology in its wider political implications. They must be informed and must discover for themselves about events in our political development and be able to judge them with a deeper awareness. Involvement in the ‘petty politics’ going daily around them in the struggle for position is dangerous, and to avoid them they must be steeped in the proper political ideology.

In *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, Nasution also attached considerable importance to an organic relationship between the army and the people that was expressed through links between the army and the “traditional” leaders of the people: the pamong praja and pamong desa. In his

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planning for “people’s resistance” he had made detailed provision for army, *pamong praja* and *pamong desa*-led guerrilla administrations that made no mention of the parties or representative institutions.

In particular, he praised and sought to maintain the authority of the *lurah* as “… the one and only leader in the midst of the people who continues to be obeyed by the people…” who was “… elected by his own people whom he knows intimately…” and who “… must be protected and respected.” 104 In previous chapters I have drawn attention to his comments in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* regarding the inherent worthiness of the *Lurah* (as compared to the fickleness and selfishness of political leaders).

**Conclusions**

In this chapter I have shown that “people’s resistance” remained a live issue both for Nasution and in the wider political arena during the first years of the 1950s. I have shown that although Nasution planned to create a more professional army he remained consistent with his policies during the revolution in continuing to advocate a smaller and more mobile core force with another two tiers of forces under it comprising a reserve territorial militia force and civilians trained to assist in a guerrilla war.

Again there were perceptions that he favoured the retention of those he found politically or professionally congenial. On this occasion the widespread opposition to these plans and the reaction of Nasution and like-minded officers led to the 17 October 1952 Affair.

The sources I have discovered and outlined in this chapter show that by the time he was placed on the inactive list Nasution was already fully immersed in ways of thinking which predisposed him to develop systematically the elective affinities between his strategies of “total people’s resistance” and an organicist vision of the proper relationship between state (including the military) and society. I have show that after the turmoil and despair of his first tenure as Chief of Staff, Nasution began to idealise the military administration of 1949. He portrayed it as a harmonious time in which there was an all-embracing sense of nationalism and an absence of divisive politics. Instead, the people were united under the leadership of the army and organic “traditional” authority structures.

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EIGHT - THE “LEPER PERIOD”

This chapter covers the three years Nasution spent on the inactive list (from late 1952 until late 1955), a time that he later described as his “leper period”. Drawing upon previous research and campaign material that Nasution developed for his IPKI organisation that he formed to fight the 1955 general elections, I shall continue to show that by the time Nasution went to the inactive list he was systematically developing elective affinities between his strategies for “people’s war” and an organicist vision of how the state (including the military) should relate to society.

I shall show that Nasution continued to portray the period of military administration as a time of social harmony when all social groups were united in an all-embracing sense of nationalism. I shall draw attention to the similarity of the material he developed for IPKI with the platform of the Persatuan Indonesia Raya. Like the PIR, Nasution’s IPKI lauded organic and integrative forms of leadership and argued that the Indonesian masses were not sufficiently educated to choose between the unfamiliar ideologies of the parties.

It is well known that many aspects of Nasution’s IPKI platform accorded closely with President Sukarno’s increasing doubts about liberal democracy and his growing attraction to organic and integrative forms of governance. However I shall point out that by referring to the guerrilla struggle, Nasution was in effect drawing attention to a significant point of difference between his and the President’s record. Unlike Nasution and his associates, Sukarno had allowed himself to be captured and did not share in the ownership of the guerrilla struggle.

Much of the chapter will focus on overlapping networks of the socially conservative elites in Jakarta with whom Nasution associated during his period on the inactive list. I pieced together information on these networks of associates from previously published research, Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, and correspondence with members of the Kolopaking family.

In Chapter Six I drew attention to Nasution’s association during the period of military administration with his “close friend”, the socially conservative aristocrat Sumitro Kolopaking. I shall show that one element that these networks had in common was that Sumitro Kolopaking was linked to them in various ways. A second element was that members of these networks were associated with the Persatuan Indonesia Raya party, or with leading members of that party. A third was that a number of members of these circles had been hadir (present) in Central Java during the guerrilla struggle against the Dutch in the first half of 1949.
I shall argue that these networks of associates were vitally important to Nasution in developing his IPKI organisation and that they indicate the importance of his continuing contacts with senior pamong praja officials who had been close to him during the revolution. I shall also show that they contributed to the links Nasution established with Professor Djokosutono during this period.

It is well known that Nasution showed a strong interest in legal and constitutional affairs as he attempted to find a legally permissible way of challenging the parliament in the lead up to the 17 October 1952 Affair. He then sought legal advice in dealing with an investigation by the Attorney General into his role in the Affair. It is also well established that Nasution and Djokosutono showed a strong interest in developing legal training for Indonesian Army officers and that the structures they created were developed and extended until the end of the New Order period.

I shall argue that the interest of Djokosutono and Nasution in developing legal training for army officers was highly unusual. Armies that place such an emphasis on legal training are usually preparing for or are involved in the military government of occupied territories or areas that are under martial law.

Previous research has attributed Nasution’s interest in legal affairs to his training within the KNIL and the influence of his (incorrectly identified) father in law. As discussed in Chapter Six, I believe Nasution’s leadership of the military administration of 1949 has not been given sufficient prominence in previous research. In this chapter I shall argue that he developed this interest in the law during the period of military administration. I shall recall the emphasis that he placed on administrative and legal procedures during the military administration and then link this activity with the army’s continuing maintenance of a “people’s resistance” role and Nasution’s search for legally sanctioned means of military intervention in politics.

**Nasution’s Associates**

Nasution was profoundly embittered at his forced resignation as Chief of Staff. ¹ He associated with a few of his military associates, including Gatot Subroto with whom he was to form the IPKI organization, but his links with other officers, including those from the army headquarters

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who had organised the 17 October Affair, suddenly ceased.  

His stress was compounded by the possibility that he could face legal action, and he frequently had to report to the Attorney General who was investigating the Affair.  

His family life appears to have remained a source of comfort and support. On 24 February 1952 Nasution’s first child, a girl named Yanti, had been born. This was obviously an occasion for great joy, particularly after Sunarti had miscarried at the outset of the first guerrilla war in West Java in 1947. As Chief of Staff Nasution had been allocated a large house in the wealthy suburb of Menteng and they remained there after his dismissal.

**Links with the Gondokusumo Family**

Nasution continued to spend a great deal of time with the Gondokusumo family. In Chapter Seven I mentioned that he frequently spent weekends in Bandung, often staying on for a day or so into the working week.

Soenarjo Gondokusumo was frequently in Jakarta, staying with Sunarti and Nasution when he was in capital and providing financial support to them. He traced the owner of the home they had been allocated by the army (a Dutch doctor) and purchased it for them “… so we wouldn’t be destitute and homeless.”  

In Bandung, Soenarjo and family eventually moved from the old Bumi Putera complex in South Bandung to the much more prestigious former Dutch area of North Bandung where he built an apartment for Sunarti and Nasution above the garage because, as Sunarti put it, they continued to regard Bandung as their “base”.  

After alluding to his own incorruptibility, Nasution complained in one of the campaign speeches he made for IPKI in the 1955 elections that “as a colonel and guerrilla leader during the first and second clash, and former deputy commander of the armed forces and chief of staff of the army, I can survive on my monthly salary for only two weeks. In the third week I have to live on my royalties from my writings and for the fourth I depend on the assistance of my parents.”

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2 “Around the time of my dismissal a very tense situation was palpable. None of the group comprising Sutoko and his friends contacted me any more, neither did anybody from the anti-17 October group, and also neither did anybody from the Ministry for Defence.” *Ibid.*, p. 204.
3 He writes that he did not did not attend the swearing in of Bambang Sugeng as Acting Chief of Staff because he “… had to report to the Attorney General in accordance with the demands of the anti-17 October group.” *Ibid.*, p. 203.
There is little doubt that the “parents” he was referring to were the Gondokusumos. Nasution’s father became ill in the early 1950s and never completely recovered. 7 He moved to Jakarta to live with him and Sunarti in 1967 and almost blind from glaucoma, he returned to North Sumatra in the late 1970s where he died in 1981. 8 In his recollections of the 1950s, Nasution rarely mentions his own relatives except to complain that a number of them expected him to provide them with “promotions, transfers, the provision of facilities”, which he had to decline. 9

After the occupation period there is also no mention of any mentorship between Soenarjo and Nasution in either Nasution’s or Sunarti’s memoirs. R.P. Soeroso continued to associate with Nasution after the Affair. As discussed in Chapter Six, Soeroso lived with Sunarti and Nasution in Yogyakarta in 1948 where they often discussed matters relating to the *pamong praja* and politics in general, and in 1949 Soeroso joined members of the Commissariat of ministers during the period of military administration. In November 1949 he established a new Parindra party that Feith describes as “a splinter party” led by aristocrats with similar backgrounds to those in the PIR. Its ideology and policy were “somewhere between PIR and PNI”. 10

Feith also notes that at the outset of liberal democracy Parindra and PIR were the only parties to express reservations about democracy. PIR advocated “a democratic society as it really is” and expressed reservations about decisions reached through a majority of votes. As noted in Chapter Six, Soeroso’s Parindra Party believed in an “Eastern democracy”, a “regulated democracy” (*demokrasi teratur*), and “democracy with leadership” (*demokratie met leiderschap*). 11 There is little doubt that Soeroso discussed such ideas with Nasution in Yogyakarta in 1949 and in Jakarta from 1950, or that Nasution was sympathetic to them in view of his concern to maintain the existing social order that I have discussed in earlier paragraphs.

In spite of leading a “splinter party” Soeroso was a member of every cabinet until the 1955 elections. 12 However, Nasution appears to have become somewhat distrustful of Soeroso’s advice. He believes it was at the suggestion of Prime Minister Wilopo that Soeroso advised him to “… just be obedient and he even outlined that I would be more free to act if I was a civilian in the political field. Although he spoke as an uncle, I felt he was also an unofficial liaison person with [the Prime Minister] Pak

Wilopo. Instead, before and after the 17 October 1952 Affair Nasution was receiving advice from other quarters.

Professor Djokosutono

Professor Djokosutono was from a well-off pangreh praja family in Surakarta, like his mentor, Professor Supomo. After receiving a Dutch secondary education he moved to Batavia (Jakarta) in the mid 1920s to study law at the Rechtshoogeschool where “His thinking was strongly influenced by his Dutch teachers … and by the German traditions of constitutional law they were steeped in.”  

He probably remained on the staff of the Rechtshoogeschool as a teaching assistant before occupying a senior position in the Justice Department (probably under Supomo). During the occupation he worked in the Department of Justice (probably still under Supomo) and after the proclamation he provided legal training to officials of the Republic.

Djokosutono is remembered by some as a perfectionist, somewhat insecure and prone to be eccentric. Like many priyayi Javanese, Djokosutono was a follower of kebatinan, a Javanese mystical belief system that originated from animistic, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist traditions, whose followers seek through meditation and other practices to find a unity with the spiritual powers of the universe. Supomo described kebatinan (in general terms, rather than as a belief system) in the BPUPKI discussions in the following terms:

… the spirit of inner life [kebatinan] the spirituality of the Indonesian people is characterized by the aim of achieving unity of life, the unity of kawulo and gusti, i.e. unity between the outer world

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15 Ibid.
16 At a dinner to mark the death of Dr Wertheim, who had been one of Djokosutono’s teachers at the Law School in Jakarta, the story was told that Djokosutono was such a perfectionist that he was always reluctant to sit exams, to the point that Wertheim and another lecturer, Professor Logeman, turned up at Djokosutono’s house and offered to take him for a trip around town by car. While discussing every day matters, they surreptitiously inserted questions that were to be asked in a forthcoming examination, which Djokosutono easily answered, and at the end of the trip they told him he had passed. That this aspect of Djokosutono’s character was recalled (and possibly embellished) on such an occasion is an indication of his personality. Wahana, Selamat Jalan Prof Dr Wertheim, www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/11/06/008.html, accessed February 2005.
18 Features of kebatinan are a search for clarity or “clear water” (mamayu hayuning bening) and a desire to unite oneself with the forces of the cosmos that are manifested on earth in harmonious relations between humans of various functions and statuses in life.
and the inner spiritual world, between microcosmos and macrocosmos, between the people and their leaders. 19

From 1946 he established the Akademi Ilmu Politik (Academy of Political Sciences) 20 that trained civil servants in Yogyakarta and was later fused with the prestigious Gadjah Mada University in that city. He directed the Academy until the Madiun Affair of September 1948 when it ceased to function because its students dispersed to fight the PKI. 21

Djokosutono, who was “preoccupied with legal order”, 22 had established a Police Academy near Malang in East Java, which then moved to Yogyakarta before being relocated permanently to Jakarta in 1950. Supomo had been its Dean but Djokosutono took over this appointment and retained it for nearly all of the 1950s. 23 In 1952 he began to teach at the Military Law Academy.

Nasution first became associated with Djokosutono in 1951, 24 possibly through his friendship with Sumitro Kolopaking. A half-brother of Sumitro, Mr. 25 Sunario Kolopaking, 26 was associated with Djokosutono during the last years of the revolution and the early 1950s. Sunario, who had been the first Minister for Finance of the Republic in Sjahirr’s first cabinet, assisted Djokosutono to set up the Academy of Political Sciences in Yogyakarta. 27

As there was no expert in economics available, Sunario was appointed as the first Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta in 1950. Soon afterwards he was joined by Djokosutono who had moved back to Jakarta from Yogyakarta. Sunario was a founder of the Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (College of Police Sciences). 28 As noted earlier, Supomo had been the first Dean of this institute, but Djokosutono held this appointment throughout nearly all of the 1950s. 29 It is likely that Sunario’s interest in police matters was shared by his half-brother, Sumitro,

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20 Ibid., p. 120.
22 Bourchier, Op. Cit., p. 120. Djokosutono renamed the Academy the Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (College of Police Sciences).
23 Ibid.
25 Meester in Rechten – Master of Laws
26 Sumitro and Sunario were half brothers (children of the Bupati of Banjarnegara, Tumenggung Djojonegoro II). Email from Kolopaking family, 28 December 2004. Sumitro’s mother was the Bupati’s first wife, while Sunario’s was his second. Kolopaking, Op. Cit., 1997. p. 18.
27 Bourchier, Op. Cit., p. 120, f.n. 36.
28 Ibid., p. 120. Djokosutono renamed the Academy the Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (College of Police Sciences).
who (as noted in Chapter Six) had been a Chief Commissioner of Police before undergoing training to become Bupati of Banjarnegara.

Because of overwork and illness, Sunario handed over the Economics Faculty to Djokosutono who became Acting Dean before transferring it to the noted economist, Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.³⁰ It is possible that Djokosutono’s association with Sunario Kolopaking gave some impetus to the relationship Nasution developed with Djokosutono.

By June 1952 Nasution had established a Sekolah Hukum Militer (Military Law School) in Jakarta where Djokosutono was a senior academic. In 1953 the name of this institution was changed to Akademi Hukum Militer (AHM – Military Law Academy) because it regarded itself as almost the equal of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of Indonesia.³¹ As Bourchier notes, the AHM “… trained almost all of Indonesia’s military lawyers, including many who were to play crucial parts in constructing army sponsored corporatist organizations after 1957 and, later on, Suharto’s New Order.³² In the early 1960s Djokosutono played a leading role in establishing a Military Law College (Perguruan Tinggi Hukum Militer) that provided degree-level training in law.³³

The legal education structures Nasution pioneered together with Djokosutono seem to be unprecedented and certainly cannot be found in Western armies that are not involved or likely to be involved in occupation duties, such as the US forces in Germany and Japan after World War Two. While such armies obviously need to recruit large numbers of lawyers into the military and to train them in aspects of the law that impinge particularly on the military I am not aware of any other army that has developed its own legal training courses to degree level (and beyond in the 1990s) as the Indonesian Army did through the influence of Djokosutono and Nasution.

By the mid-1990s the army had produced so many military lawyers that the number of senior officers in the Legal Corps of the TNI was second only to the Infantry Corps and considerably higher in number than the other arms corps (Artillery, Engineers and Cavalry).³⁴ These army

³³ In 1994 this institution was renamed the Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Militer providing legal education to the doctoral level. Panduan Memilih Perguruan Tinggi, Op. Cit.
³⁴ Arms corps are the combat branches of an army, while service corps (e.g. Transport, Logistics) play supporting roles to the arms corps.
lawyers played instrumental roles in trying those thought to be involved in the failed coup attempt of 30 September 1965 and drafted much of the legislation that underpinned the New Order regime.\(^{35}\)

As discussed in Chapter Six, Sundhaussen overstates the influence of Nasution’s brief career within the KNIL by attributing his keen interest in legal and constitutional issues to his officer cadet training. \(^{36}\) Relying on Penders and Sundhaussen’s misidentification of Nasution’s father-in-law, Bourchier is also incorrect in attributing Nasution’s interest to “… the influence of Djody, [Gondokusumo] who had been trained at the Rechtshoogeschool (Law College) in Jakarta.” \(^{37}\) In Chapter Six I pointed out that Nasution’s activities during the period of military administration had not received the attention they deserved. While family influences in the form of Sunarti’s period as a law student in Yogyakarta might have influenced him towards an interest in the law, it is much more likely that Nasution’s experience of heading the military administration was the major impetus to his interest in legal and constitutional matters.

In Chapter Seven I showed that after the recognition of sovereignty the Indonesian Army continued to maintain a “people’s resistance” section in the Army Headquarters, and a territorial system of commands. I drew attention to Suhario Padmodiwiryo’s assertion that this territorial function entailed the monitoring of civilian populations and the training of army territorial officers to liaise with rural villagers to prepare them for “people’s resistance”. \(^{38}\) In Chapter Seven I also showed that in the early 1950s army commanders in West Java were involved in enlisting civilian populations to assist in the fight against the Darul Islam movement. It is probable that Nasution saw the establishment of legal training for officers in Jakarta as a logical continuation of the focus he had given to legal and administrative matters in the first half of 1949.

In 1952, Nasution sought to find a legal basis for mounting a “half coup” against the parliament (while leaving the Presidency and Vice Presidency intact). In essence, he was attempting to find a legally sanctioned means for the army to close down the legislative arm of government and assume wider powers in administering the civilian population. He writes that at this time he took legal advice from

\(^{35}\) “Closer analysis of the data shows that these officers played a major role in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of 30 September 1965 acting not only as prosecutors, attorneys general and judges but also as the drafters of the laws that support the New Order.” MacFarling, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p. 158.


\(^{37}\) Bourchier, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p. 119. As noted in previous chapters, Bourchier relied upon the incorrect identification of Nasution’s father-in-law by Penders and Sundhaussen. This led him to believe that Nasution’s father in law was Djody Gondokusumo.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Suhario Padmodiwiryo, Jakarta. 2 December 1996.
Mr Basaruddin Nasution, the Director of Justice in the Ministry of Defence, \(^{39}\) who was a “… faithful student and assistant of Professor Djokosutono.” \(^{40}\) Nasution strongly implies that Basaruddin was in turn seeking legal/constitutional advice from Djokosutono in the lead up to the 17 October Affair:

Apart from the Vice President, I also always requested advice from the Head of the Justice Directorate, Mr Basaruddin. In those days I was forced to take lessons on the Provisional Constitution [Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara] from him.

The problem of what steps could be taken after the dissolution of parliament was very difficult to explain, because it had not yet been possible to hold general elections. However, there was a widely held understanding that there was a way out based on the Law of the State of Emergency (staatsnoodrecht), where the President could act because the atmosphere in the country was such that it endangered the safety and unity of the nation and people.

Mr Basaruddin was in continual contact with his friends at the University of Indonesia with the result that discussions on the problem of the army contra the parliament also developed there. Indeed the timing was very appropriate, because it was orientation time [at the University] and the newspapers that were full of news about the parliament naturally stimulated the development of discussions.

From him I came to know that there were many who were sympathetic to the army’s position at that time. \(^{41}\)

Significantly, Nasution continued to be interested in legal affairs while on the inactive list because of the need to defend himself against possible charges of attempting to stage a coup. Basaruddin was one of the handful of officials from the army / defence department who remained in contact with Nasution during his “leper period” \(^{42}\) and it is highly likely that he retained his conduit to Professor Djokosutono through this official.

The exact nature of the relationship between Nasution and Djokosutono remains unclear but it would appear that Nasution sought legal and constitutional means whereby aspects of his thinking on military intervention could be put into practice short of an outright military coup. Perhaps the best-known example of this is Nasution’s “middle way” approach to military intervention that he announced in 1958 and that I shall discuss further in Chapter Nine.

Bourchier writes that Djokosutono was not so much an ideologue as a legal technician, along the lines of the legal and political theorist of the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt,

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and Djokosutono’s involvement in developing the “middle way” concept indicates that he played such a role. Bourchier argues that like Schmitt, Djokosutono:

… saw law primarily as a tool of power and the role of constitutional lawyers as adjusting the legal architecture to suit the prevailing conditions. At the same time he held that Indonesia’s legal structures should more faithfully reflect the country’s cultural patterns, which he spoke about in terms strongly redolent of the Leiden adat scholars such as van Vollenhoven, Ter Haar and Haga whom he quoted frequently and with approval. 43

Djokosutono saw the army and Sukarno as two centres of power that were not sufficiently taken into account in the 1950 Constitution and “… he played an important role as a supplier of political, legal and doctrinal formulas which would help legitimize the increasingly prominent political profile of both Nasution’s army and the President.” 44

This view is supported by Daniel S. Lev, who knew Djokosutono:

Djokosutono was in a sense, a Javanese sense, conservative, but not remarkably so. …. Djoko was useful because he knew a lot, was very well read with something of a photographic memory, and could be called upon to fish up useful and applicable ideas for anyone who needed them. 45

While Lev is well placed to make such an observation, there is reason to think that Djokosutono’s thinking largely accorded with Nasution’s and that this was an important element in their association. Djokosutono’s academic interests, friendships and actions indicate that he was a social conservative who would not have been unsympathetic to Nasution’s desire to suppress political forces that seemed to be threatening the status quo.

Nasution’s remark that when seeking legal advice prior to the 17 October Affair he “… came to know that there were many [at the University of Indonesia’s Law Faculty] who were sympathetic to the army’s position at that time,” 46 indicates that Djokosutono was more than a disinterested legal technician. Another indication is the great interest Djokosutono showed in developing the Military Law School, to the point of providing degree-level training.

A further indication is Djokosutono’s involvement in programmes initiated by CIA-linked Guy Pauker (whose role in Indonesia with the Rand Corporation will be discussed in Chapter Ten) in which visiting lecturers from the University of Indonesia taught and advised the officers at the University of Indonesia.

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44 Ibid.
45 Email from Lev, 6 September 2004.
Bandung-based Staff and Command School (Seskoad) who were developing doctrines for army intervention in politics and the economy. 47 Djokosutono took over leadership of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia in 1958 after Sumitro Djojohadikusumo allied himself with the PRRI/Permesta movement in Sumatra and then fled to Malaysia. A former student, Subroto, recounts that Djokosutono “… was the leading figure in protecting the Faculty of Economics. There was a lot of pressure to appoint leftists on the teaching staff.” 48 That Djokosutono was personally loyal to Nasution as well as a legal adviser is indicated in Nasution’s recollection that on one occasion after returning from giving a lecture at Seskoad Djokosutono “reported to him” that certain officers were opposed to him. 49

Djokosutono’s very close association with Supomo is another pointer to his political orientation. Reeve has drawn attention to the close philosophical and research relationship that existed between Djokosutono and Supomo, in which Djokosutono shared Supomo’s interest in adat law and together with Supomo wrote Indonesia’s main textbook on this subject. 50 It seems more than likely that Djokosutono agreed with the type of organicist political formulas Supomo advocated in the discussions of the BPUPKI and, as noted earlier, his thinking “…was strongly influenced by his Dutch teachers [at the Rechtshoogeschool] and by the German traditions of constitutional law they were steeped in.” 51

Djokosutono’s close research and personal association with Supomo over many years and his interest in kebatinan indicate that he was philosophically in tune with the older man. He might well have been inspired to assist Nasution in finding constitutional formulas for an increased political role by personal belief as well as a preparedness to assist in providing technical legal advice.

And there is the web of interlocking family and professional connections between Sunario Kolopaking, Sumitro and Djokosutono that I have noted earlier. It seems likely that this drew Nasution into Djokosutono’s social and professional orbit, placing their association on a closer basis than that of a lawyer and his client.

51 David Bourchier, Op. Cit., pp. 120, 121.
Nasution and the PIR

Another indication of Nasution’s socially conservative attitudes and links with Sumitro Kolopaking and other conservative and “integralistic” interests in the early 1950s is an assertion by the generally authoritative retired senior army officer, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, that the TNI leadership sought to develop an association with the PIR.

While Djokosutono does not appear to have joined the PIR, Supomo and Sumitro Kolopaking (Chapter Six) were members of this party. In the early 1950s the PIR had expanded from its base in Central Java by taking into its ranks a number of aristocrats from the federal states. It had 17 of the 232 seats in parliament and occupied a number of powerful portfolios prior to the 1955 elections.

It continued to push for pamong praja interests, particularly as the aristocratic nature of the civil service began to be diluted by what Sutherland describes as “…a gross and administratively unwarranted expansion of government services as politicians strove to provide jobs, reward clients and obtain a following.”

Sayidiman asserted that:

From 1950 the TNI leadership was aware that the TNI would find it difficult to obtain realisation of its political aims if it struggled by itself. There were too many forces in Indonesia whose interests differed from the political aims which they wished to realise. As an organisation that was basically of a military nature, the TNI had difficulty in moving in the political arena.

Therefore the TNI sought partners within the political party environment which they could invite to move together. At first the choice fell upon the Partai Indonesia Raya or PIR. Because the PIR was comprised of people who appeared also to adhere to the ideology of the Republic of Indonesia which was based on the Pancasila.

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52 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo trained at the Republic’s Military Academy in Yogyakarta in the late 1940s before joining the Siliwangi Division as a junior officer. He undertook junior officer military training in the United States and later studied at the Fuhrungskademie in West Germany and undertook the International Defence Management course at the Naval Post Graduate School in the US. He served as a battalion commander, Kodam Commander, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Governor of the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas), Ambassador to Japan and Ambassador at Large for the African region. Upon retirement he taught at various institutions within and outside the military and became a well-known media commentator on military affairs. He has written a number of books, including Kepemimpinan ABRI (The Leadership of ABRI) 1996 Op. Cit. While something of a New Order ideologue in the sense that he has been a prominent supporter of Sishankamrata and the Pancasila state, he is outspoken and generally regarded as a credible commentator on military affairs.


54 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "Hubungan ABRI dan Golkar Pada Masa Mendatang", (“Relations between the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia and Golkar in the Future”), Pelita, 20 October
However, according to Sayidiman, the link between the army and PIR was not a durable one because:

... the PIR became afflicted by the same illness that at that time greatly affected the people and those in party circles in particular. Divisions emerged within PIR because personal interests became stronger than organisational interests. The result was that PIR could not play an effective role in the Indonesian political arena in struggling for its political objectives that originally were parallel with the political objectives of the TNI. 55

Sayidiman is likely to be referring to a split within the PIR in 1954 over the economic policies of the first cabinet of the PNI politician Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953 – July 1955) 56 whose economic policies were seen to favour Javanese interests and disadvantage the export-producing outer islands. Java-based members grouped under the leadership of Mr Wongsonegoro while those from the outer islands formed a separate grouping under Dr Hazairin. Sayidiman does not state who in the army leadership attempted to form this association with the PIR, but is presumably referring to officers in the Army Headquarters in Jakarta. It is unlikely he was referring to Simatupang and the other PSI-associated officers and Nasution is the most likely candidate. 57

Referring to Sayidiman's assertions, David Reeve suggests that Nasution may have come under the influence of Supomo's kekeluargaan ideas from the time Supomo became a member of the PIR leadership in the early 1950s: 58

When Nasution founded the army's party IPKI in 1954, its leadership consisted of officers close to him and senior pamong praja figures. Sumitro Kolopaking, a Javanese aristocrat formerly on the PIR executive, became general chairman of the IPKI executive. In the late 1950s, when both men [Sukarno and Nasution] were developing their ideas of functional groups, both men were advised by Professor Djokosutono, who after Supomo's death in 1958, was considered to be Indonesia's foremost constitutional law expert. Djokosutono was himself a follower of Javanese mysticism, and Supomo's colleague; he and Supomo had co-authored a two-volume study of adat law. There is thus a direct line of adat law-Supomoism into the Golkar concept, and the whole idea of collectivity of the national being expressed through functional groups represents a political format for the integralistic vision of the state. 59


56 The Wilopo cabinet fell in July 1953 as a result of a dispute over foreign investment. After a fifty-eight day period of political stalemate, Ali Sastroamijoyo of the PNI formed a cabinet.
57 Citing Reeve’s ‘The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar’, Bourchier writes that the connection Reeve describes was between IPKI and the PIR. This connection does not seem to be immediately evident in Reeve’s paper.
The “adat law-Supomoism” connections Reeve draws between Sumitro Kolopaking, Supomo, Djokosutono and Nasution complement the family associations I have drawn between Sumitro Kolopaking, Sunario Kolopaking and Djokosutono, and the connection I have drawn between Djokosutono and Nasution (on the basis of these family associations) and Nasution’s keen interest in developing legal education for army officers. Most importantly, the connections that Reeve has drawn strongly indicate a similarity of attitudes between these influential and socially conservative Indonesians.

A further connection with the PIR is Nasution’s and Sunarti’s association with the former Governor of West Java, Sewaka, with whom Nasution co-signed a political note authorizing the army to lead a campaign of “total people’s resistance” throughout the province (Chapter Five). Sewaka was a member of parliament for the PIR and became Defence Minister in the Sukiman cabinet in April 1951, replacing Sumitro Kolopaking (also from PIR) who was appointed but declined to be installed. 60

Contrary to Feith’s assertion that relations between Sewaka and the army leaders “were strained from the beginning” because he was some twenty years older and would not actively promote army interests,61 Nasution records that the personal relationship they had in West Java had not changed and that the older man took the initiative to visit him and Sunarti. 62 Sunarti recalls that “Our relationship had been close in Bandung and in South West Java during the guerrilla period.” 63

**IPKI**

At this stage it is appropriate to explore what it was that drew Sumitro Kolopaking and certain other Indonesians with aristocratic connections to Nasution in 1954 when he established his IPKI organization. In Chapter Six I noted that Sumitro Kolopaking was a member of the executive of the “integralistic” Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya or PIR formed by “… older generation civil servants having aristocratic backgrounds.” 64 who became a life-long “close friend” of Nasution. Together with the Residents of Central Java and the Bupati of Wonosobo (who also met Nasution at this time) he supported Nasution’s IPKI organization. When Nasution refrained from becoming the formal leader of the organization because he was still in the military (albeit on the inactive list) Sumitro became General Chairman.

Nasution formed IPKI in May 1954 for the purpose of fighting the general elections. It is well known that this organisation was something of a predecessor to the New Order’s election vehicle, Golkar, in that it participated in politics but refused to be categorised as a political party. It called for the “spirit and soul” of the Proclamation and the 1945 Constitution to be protected and nurtured, presaged the New Order’s “simplification” of the parties by advocating the amalgamation of those with a similar outlook. Thus it flagged Nasution’s interest in returning to the 1945 Constitution and signalled that Nasution supported Sukarno’s claim that the revolution was not yet complete. Moreover, it strongly criticised the parties and the multi-party / liberal-democratic system as being at odds with Indonesian political culture.

Kolopaking had been one of the more conservative members of the BPUPKI (Chapter Six). He was one of the “pamong praja” figures whose “blueprint” had called for a dominant executive and a single state party and made no mention of individual rights. 65 By now Nasution was voicing his support for the idea of a single state party, and a lack of concern that it might have been seen by the Allies as a fascist creation. He was also registering doubts about the readiness of the Indonesian people for a multi-party democratic system, particularly at times of crisis and imminent conflict. 66

While there was an obvious similarity of political attitudes between Nasution and Kolopaking another essential ingredient was shared participation in the “total people’s resistance” campaign and military administration of 1949. IPKI performed poorly in the elections, achieving four seats in parliament (three in West Java and one in Central Sumatra). The relative success of the organization in West Java was due largely to the concerted support of a group of Siliwangi officers and pamong praja officials. 67 However, in Central Java Nasution was supported by almost all the Residents and Bupati who had participated in the military administration, 68 and by Sultan Hamengku Buwono (who was

66 “This [the formation of laskar organizations] was in line with efforts to oppose the formation of an Indonesian National Party which they considered gave the impression of fascism or totalitarianism and which became the source of divisions in the future. Because of this, the Indonesian people who were seething for independence were theoretically given the go ahead to implement democracy 100%, and this also was theoretically intended to give the impression to the Allies that we weren’t an appendage of fascist Japan but a democratic country, even though it was clear that we weren’t ready and weren’t allowed to do this, and even though all countries that are at war put aside party affairs and even their popular representative institutions to concentrate all their energy and thoughts on winning the war.” Nasution, TNI (Vol One), Op. Cit., p. 158.
67 Penders and Sundhaussen, Op Cit., p. 100. Indeed, the election results showed that the vast majority of IPKI voters were from West Java. Ibid., p. 100A. See also Brackman, Op. Cit., p. 218.
68 As Feith puts it, “... various pamong praja officials with clean revolutionary records ...” were candidates for the League in the 1955 elections. Feith, 1962 Op. Cit., p. 405.
close to Sumitro Kolopaking) 69 and the head of the junior line of the Yogyakarta royal family, the Paku Alam.

Noting that Sumitro Kolopaking became general chairman of the IPKI executive and that he had PIR antecedents, Reeve contends that “IPKI’s endorsement of society as a “harmonious unity” supported by all groups and regions in its ‘Manifesto Number 1’ was indicative of an integralistic world view. 70 However, IPKI was not advocating a particularly Javanese version of integralism. It indicated Nasution’s support for ethnic minorities and greater regional autonomy and this was a factor in Sultan Hamengku Buwono gradually pulling back from IPKI, 71 although the Paku Alam remained a supporter and took Nasution’s seat in parliament after he reentered the army. 72 It was also indicative of Nasution’s attachment to the Indonesia-wide “traditional” values of the type that Parindra had espoused and Supomo had advocated in his address to the BPUPKI, rather than an exclusive adherence to organic values that were particular to Java. 73

Nasution also advocated a return to organic “traditional” means of interest representation found at the village level along lines that are strikingly similar to that of Kahin’s description of the PIR’s objectives and doubts about the ability of the uneducated masses to resist attempts by parties with imported ideologies to manipulate them (Chapter Six):

We will fight for an electoral law which will force political parties of a similar outlook to combine, by changing the current legislation inherited from the Dutch into one based on our traditional ways of electing village heads. In short, we would like to change the current system, which is voting for a party, to our traditional system of voting for a person.

The system of electing a village head is a personal election, not a system of voting for isms. I think our people, who are not individualistic like Western peoples, cannot choose which ism is better; and indeed, it is not the theory behind an ism which is important but the character of the individuals who represent them. It doesn’t matter how good an ism is if it is implemented by bad people … 74

69 Nasution states that Kolopaking accompanied him and the Sultan on a visits to the federal states in 1949 and that Kolopaking had just been “… assigned by the Sultan to form an appropriate intelligence organization for the government, a matter that for the time being only Prime Minister Hatta and I knew about.” Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Two, Op. Cit., p. 249.
71 Penders and Sundhaussen write that Nasution’s support for greater regional and village autonomy cost him the support of the Sultan. Penders and Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 100.
72 Ibid., f.n. 67.
73 Discussed in Chapter Four.
It is also redolent of his support in his pamphlet on village defence written in 1948 for the leadership role of the lurah as the basis for guerrilla administrations because they were “… the only leaders amidst the people who are still obeyed by the people”. 75

In speeches during the general election campaign Nasution continued to idealise the values of the guerrilla struggle, contrasting them with what he saw as the divisiveness and disunity of the 1950s:

If [in 1945-50] we had put the interests of parties and isms above the national struggle, if at that time we had fought only for our own isms, I am sure our Republic would have been wiped out by the Dutch a long time ago.

People are divided because of their commitments to their political parties; people who were formerly united in the guerrilla struggle against the colonial power are now enemies. Worse still, they will be friends with people who betrayed our struggle as long as they belong to the same party. Furthermore, these divisions along party lines have penetrated the family, creating frictions between father and son, elder brother and younger brother. …… 76

At the heart of IPKI was an alliance between army supporters of Nasution, pamong praja leaders with “clean political backgrounds” and the royal families of Yogyakarta. The pamong praja supporters had in common the fact that they had not been federalists or absent from the revolution ‘absen dari revolusi’. While dismayed at what they saw as the erosion of organic “traditional” values and authority structures caused by the multi-party system, they had sound nationalist credentials.

Unlike most pamong praja members who, as Sutherland points out, “found it expedient to lie low and cultivate influential patrons” 77 they felt able to oppose aspects of liberal democracy and speak out in support of “traditional” values together with Nasution and other officers who had been their partners in the military administration. They could criticise the “isms” of the parties on the basis that they had united and “put the national struggle above party interests” … “to save our state during the first and second clash [with the Dutch].” 78

Pride in the “total people’s resistance” campaigns of the revolution was also indicated in IPKI’s defence policy which promised to “… fight for the implementation of a people’s defence system by introducing a people’s army [militia] based on conscription, compulsory military service, compulsory training, and an efficient civilian reserve.” 79 Nasution was to attempt to reemphasise the idea of

“people’s defence”, although not along the lines proposed in his IPKI speech, when he was reinstated in November 1955, an event that was initiated by an old comrade from the military administration.

Later in this chapter I shall discuss similarities in the doubts about liberal democracy that Nasution espoused in his IPKI material and the thinking of Sukarno, who was also becoming increasingly pessimistic about this system of government. However, Nasution was not merely imitating Sukarno.

As discussed in earlier chapters, Nasution was unusual among the former commanders who had been involved in “people’s wars” aimed at achieving national liberation. The Indonesian Army had not been part of a monolithic political movement and the civilian political leadership had absented itself from the guerrilla struggle.

In drawing upon his experiences in the guerrilla campaigns of the revolution he was implicitly drawing a line between those who had been hadir during the military administration and those, notably Sukarno, who had not. By invoking organicist thinking on how the state should relate to society he was nurturing the myth that he had begun to propogate in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and that he had continued to promote in the first volume of TNI and Tjatatan-Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (that appeared in 1955) that the army and organic “traditional” authority figures had saved the Republic by waging a campaign of “people’s war” in which political antagonisms were largely absent and all sections of society were united in a common national purpose.

The Reinstatement

The Minister for Defence in the Ali Sastroamijoyo government was Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, who had been a supporter of Tan Malaka. This was a strange choice as Iwa was neither liked nor trusted by conservative army officers. Frictions arose between these officers and the civilian leadership, partly as a result of this antipathy.

When the Ali cabinet made a number of decisions affecting the sensitive area of promotions and appointments, attempts were made by a number of officers to present a united front to protect what they saw as the corporate interests of the army from further encroachments. In mid-1954 there was an attempt at reconciliation between officers who had been pro- or anti- the 17 October 1952 Affair

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and in early 1955 a reconciliation of sorts was achieved when army leaders from all factions met in Yogyakarta in February 1955 and hammered out a Charter of Army Unity (Piagam Keutuhan Angkatan Darat). A major objective of the meeting (which Nasution, who was on the inactive list, did not attend) was to try to ensure that the government appointed a successor to the Army Chief of Staff, Bambang Sugeng, who was acceptable to the army leadership.

An attempt by the cabinet to disregard the outcome of the Yogyakarta meeting and appoint an officer who had not been recommended by the army leadership led to a crisis in which they boycotted the swearing-in ceremony. Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who had been Acting Army Chief of Staff since 2 May 1955, was dismissed following his refusal to hand over to the cabinet's appointee.

The affair culminated in Iwa's resignation on 12 July 1955 and the demise of the Ali cabinet a week later. A Masyumi-led coalition led by Burhanuddin Harahap (August 1955 – March 1956) took over and Zulkifli Lubis was reinstated as acting Chief of Staff.

The revolt by the army leadership was a strong indication that powerful sections of the officer corps would no longer tolerate "interference" in matters they regarded as internal to the army. The concept of civilian supremacy over the army suffered a considerable blow as the army had shown its potential to influence political events as long as it was sufficiently united and resolute. 82

Meanwhile, long awaited general elections brought something of an anticlimax to those seeking stronger government. The elections exacerbated inter-aliran tensions and failed to solve the problem of cabinet instability. No clear winner emerged, with four major parties sharing most of the vote between them and the number of parties in parliament increasing from 20 to 28:

### The Four Major Parties in the 1955 General Elections 83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Valid Votes</th>
<th>% Parliamentary Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASYUMI</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of the PKI, which had made a startling comeback after its involvement in the 1948 Madiun Affair, the election results had failed to satisfy any of Indonesia's major interest groups. Nahdatul Ulama had separated from Masyumi in mid-1952 and was operating as a separate party.

82 Soebijono comments that, "From that moment, the Armed Forces (cq the Army) in a de facto sense became an active social and political force." Soebijono, Op. Cit., p. 23.
NU's third place in the election, like the PKI's fourth, gave that party a fillip. However, the combined vote of the major Islamic parties, Masyumi and NU, only amounted to 39.7% of the total vote and the combined vote of the Muslim-oriented parties was only 43.5%.

Indeed, the outcome of the elections had clearly exposed schisms within the Muslim community of Indonesia. In the ethnic Javanese areas of Central and East Java, Masyumi and the predominantly Javanese and santri-based party, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) competed for the votes of the santri aliran. Masyumi was associated with a modernist (moderen) style of Islam which, as Ruth McVey notes, was "... most visible socially as the "Protestant ethic" of an emergent urban entrepreneurial class." The NU on the other hand, represented the kolot or old-fashioned style of Islam. Masjumi came second to win 20.9% of votes cast, while Nahdatul Ulama came third due to its support in densely populated Java, gaining 18.4% of the vote.

Within the context of the politicisation of Indonesian society in the 1950s, the schism between moderen and kolot forms of Islam was not as sharp as that between priyayi and abangan, based as the latter was on issues of social class, rather than religio-cultural orientation where differences in cultural orientation were much less. Until the upheaval of the Independence struggle and the politicisation of grass roots Indonesia in the lead-up to the general elections, differences between these two groups tended to be masked or overwhelmed by the "ideological domination" of the priyayi group over the abangan

84 As Ramage points out, "... although 87.1% of Indonesians profess Islam as their religion (according to the 1980 government census), many of them do not seek to channel their political ambitions through Islam. In what is widely regarded as the most "fair" and accurate of Indonesian elections, the 1955 parliamentary polls gave all Islamic-oriented political parties a combined total of only 43.5% of the vote." D. Ramage, Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian New Order: State Ideology and the Beliefs of an Elite, 1985-1993, PhD Dissertation, University of South Carolina, p. 61.
86 As McVey puts it: "Politically, the kolot position is represented archetypically by the Nahdatul Ulama Party, the leading element of which has consisted of the moneylenders and landholders of hinterland Java, together with traditionalist religious teachers and scholars. Hence the kolot position has come to be identified with rural and small-town wealth as well as with theological conservatism, though in fact the overwhelming majority of those who adhere to it are poor and a considerable number are urban." She also states that:"Outside the Javanese ethnic areas, Masjumi was associated with "... anti-Javanese sentiment rather than from theologically or socially moderen enthusiasm." Ibid.
87 Masjumi won between one quarter and one half of the votes in all regions except the Christian areas and Hindu-Buddhist Bali, three quarters of the vote in Aceh and was the largest party in the strongly-Muslim province of West Java. However, in Central and East Java it only won 12 per cent of the vote while NU, won 30 per cent in these provinces. Ricklefs, Op Cit.
masses. The inclusive, syncretic nature of abangan-priyayi belief systems had generally mitigated against the expression of open or articulated division between the two social classes.

Right wing elements within the PNI, a party whose power base was the pamong praja and whose major constituency was the abangan masses, had perhaps even better reason than the anti-PKI Muslim parties to be concerned at the PKI's resurgence. Although the PNI was comprised of both radical and conservative elements, the loyalty of the abangan masses was increasingly being transferred to the PKI. This was evident in the size of the vote achieved by the PKI in the 1955 general election and the large number of previously PNI-voting Indonesians who were attracted to the PKI in the 1957 regional, district and municipal elections.

Even less satisfied than the PNI, which had gained first place in the poll (22.3% of the vote) were members of the small number of conservative parties that had done poorly in the elections. The PIR's parliamentary representation fell from 18 to two in the elections, Parindra was wiped out and IPKI only gained four seats.

Pamong praja-associated organisations of this type were not only disappointed with their poor showing in the elections but were alarmed at the rapid growth of the PKI. While in the mid to late 1950s the potential for disruptive abangan-priyayi class struggle was generally mitigated by the fact that PNI and PKI members tended to concentrate their resentment on the common enemies of their abangan-priyayi cultural entity (the santri and Indonesia's small but economically-dominant Chinese ethnic group) the electoral gains of the PKI in the 1955 elections alarmed both members of the priyayi elite and the santri who stood to lose their power, prestige and wealth in the event of a Communist electoral victory in future elections.

McVey has pointed out that the possibility of class struggle between priyayi and abangan was largely absent in the rivalry between Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama: “... the priyayi-abangan relationship is as much one of two classes as it is one of cultural variants. It thus has a dimension which the kolot-moderen contrast does not possess, for though the intra-santri dichotomy involves groups with differentiation towards economic activity, both wings are led by a moneyed and commercially active class - rural landholders and usurers on the one and urban traders and entrepreneurs on the other. The division within the abangan, on the other hand, represents the contrast between elite and mass, between priyayi as ruling class and abangan as populace. “This division is easily as deep as that between santri and abangan, but it has been largely inarticulate. In contrast to the doctrinal exclusiveness of Islam, the older "Javanese religion" is highly syncretic and provides little opportunity for schism; on the contrary, it places very great value on the absorption of deviant thought. Moreover, the priyayi bearers of Javanese high culture, who were naturally uninterested in aiding the formulation of a subversive viewpoint, achieved such an ideological domination of the larger abangan cultural grouping that no anti-Establishment position developed, save on the local level, until the quite recent penetration of Communist ideas.”
Disappointment at the inconclusive results of the elections led to President Sukarno becoming increasingly vocal, claiming Western models of liberal democracy were artificial implants in the Indonesian environment and parties were ideologically divisive and thus not able to provide Indonesia's much needed "political unity". 90

In the aftermath of the elections the Burhanuddin cabinet had to appoint a new Chief of Staff, a decision in which President Sukarno played a major role. After a series of discussions with Sukarno a rapprochement was achieved and Nasution was reappointed in November 1955.

The Importance of Being Hadir

Earlier in this chapter I have described networks of associates with whom Nasution came into contact. An element that almost all of them had in common was that they had been hadir in Central Java during the guerrilla struggle. While they might have remained in Yogyakarta, as Djokosutono appears to have done, they shared many of the hardships of that period. 91

Again, an individual who had been associated with Nasution in the military administration came forward to help him. The rapprochement was brokered by Maladi, the Radio Republic of Indonesia employee who Nasution had appointed information officer to Java Command Headquarters in 1949 and who had broadcast news of the guerrilla campaign to the outside world (Chapter Six).

Nasution had unofficially involved Maladi in his IPKI organization but writes that it was not appropriate for him to be formally involved in the election campaign because by this time he had become Head of Radio Republik Indonesia. During the campaign Maladi had informed Nasution that the President was pleased with his themes of “purifying and finalizing the revolution of 1945”, “returning to the 1945 Constitution”, and reuniting forces that had participated in the revolution but had since rebelled against the central government. 92 Maladi also reported to Nasution that he had told the President that Sukarno’s picture still hung in Nasution’s office and that the President had been very moved. 93

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Back to the Army

The candidates put forward by Army Headquarters for the Chief of Staff position were Colonels Simbolon, Zulkifli Lubis, Kawilarang, Jatikusumo and Nasution. Penders and Sundhaussen write that Nasution was, in Sukarno’s eyes, the “least objectionable” of the candidates and “... the only officer who could be expected to try, and possibly succeed in reducing the army’s assertiveness to manageable levels.” Reflecting Sukarno’s diminished support for the parliamentary system since the 17 October 1952 Affair, they contend that “... Sukarno in 1955 would have been more sympathetic to the officers’ 1952 requests. For his part, Nasution had always believed his true vocation was the army, and IPKI’s poor performance in the general elections made it unlikely he could make a major mark on the political scene.

Moreover, as noted earlier, Nasution’s only natural allies in the previous parliament – conservative pamong praja interests in the PIR and Parindra – had disappeared from the parliamentary scene. The political stakes for conservatives like Nasution were rising as the PKI had demonstrated its popular appeal in the general elections and was about to make further gains at local elections held in 1957.

Nasution thereafter became increasingly distant from the IPKI organization. As noted earlier, the Paku Alam took Nasution’s seat in parliament when he was reinstated. Sumitro Kolopaking took the seat of Nasution’s close supporter, Gatot Subroto, who was also reinstated in the army, becoming Nasution’s Deputy Chief of Staff in August that year.

95 Penders and U. Sundhaussen, Op. Cit., p. 104. Another factor in Nasution's rapprochement with the President may have been that Nasution’s preoccupation was the army. Feith has pointed out that army politics were Nasution’s overwhelming concern. Feith, 1962 Op. Cit., p. 115. McVey writes that “... he was a strong centralist who sought to preserve the unity of the nation (and to enhance his own power) by strengthening the army chain of command and imposing Jakarta’s will on the outlying regions. McVey, 1971 Op. Cit., p. 158. Reeve comments that "It appears that Sukarno agreed to cooperate with Nasution's plans to reassert central control over the army while Nasution agreed to cooperate with Sukarno's emerging plans to reform the political system." Reeve, 1985 Op Cit., p. 142.
97 Nasution writes that his reappointment “… did not receive a positive response within IPKI. Generally my friends felt that it was not appropriate for me to return. Indeed, an IPKI leader from Malang who at the time was the Director of the Internal Affairs Academy openly criticised me. He said the only appropriate way [for me to return to the Defence structure] would have been to become Minister for Defence. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Three, Op. Cit., p. 314.
Nasution began moves to fashion the army into a major centre of political power – albeit one that was still largely excluded from the processes of government. 99 In doing so he further developed ideas that he had presented in his IPKI material into means of military intervention.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have show that Nasution continued to develop elective affinities between his strategies for “people’s war” and an organicist vision of appropriate relations between the state (including the military) and society. I have shown how he continued to idealise “traditional” authority structures and to portray organicist forms of state-society relationships as inherently superior to the imported ideologies of the major parties and the liberal democratic system. I have shown that in campaigning for IPKI, Nasution sought to portray the guerrilla struggle as a time of social harmony when all social groups were united in an all-embracing sense of nationalism. I have drawn connections between his IPKI campaign material and the outlook of the socially conservative and paternalistic Persatuan Indonesia Raya.

Many aspects of Nasution’s IPKI platform accorded closely with President Sukarno’s increasing rejection of liberal democracy and calls to overhaul the political system by introducing organic and integrative forms of governance. However, I have pointed out that by harking back to the guerrilla struggle Nasution was indirectly drawing attention to a significant point of difference with the President, who had taken no part in the guerrilla struggle.

I have pieced together overlapping networks of the socially conservative elites in Jakarta with whom Nasution associated during his period on the inactive list. I have shown that Sumitro Kolopaking was linked to these networks in various ways, that members of these networks had an association with the Persatuan Indonesia Raya party (or, such as Djokosutono, with leading members of that party) and that the members of these circles had been hadir in Central Java in the first half of 1949.

I have argued that these networks of associates were vitally important to Nasution in developing his IPKI organisation and that they indicate the importance of his continuing contacts with senior pamong praja officials who had been close to him during the revolution. I have shown that they contributed strongly to the links Nasution established with Professor Djokosutono during this period and to his eventual rapprochement with Sukarno.

99 Lev supports this view: “He [Nasution] believed IPKI would actually win lots of votes in 1955 because the army and its many families and friends would vote for it. They didn’t, at least not in
I have argued that the interest of Djokosutono and Nasution in developing legal education for army officers was highly unusual. I have pointed out that such an attention to legal education is normally only found in armies that are preparing for or are involved in the military government of occupied territories or areas that are under martial law. I have argued that Nasution’s interest in legal and constitutional matters can be traced to his leadership of the period of military administration. I have recalled the emphasis that he placed on administrative and legal procedures during the military administration and linked this activity with the army’s continuing maintenance of a “people’s resistance” role and Nasution’s search for legally sanctioned means of military intervention in politics.

In Chapter Nine I shall continue to draw upon Nasution’s association with Djokosutono as he embraced corporatist / functional modes of interest representation. However, while Djokosutono’s advice was instrumental to the army’s eventual claim to functional group status, I shall show that in seeking to form and manage army-backed functional groups Nasution again harked back to “people’s resistance” and associated his functional group initiative with the strategies he had developed in the struggle against the Dutch.

enough numbers. So, in effect, when he was re-appointed commander, he simply set about transforming the army into somthing of a political party.” Email from Lev, 6 September 2004.
In this chapter I shall describe the emergence of the first of two strands of “total people’s resistance” that emerged from the mid 1950s as means of military intervention into politics and the economy: the BKS initiative (the other was the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management which will be discussed in Chapter Ten). Nasution’s and Sunarti’s memoirs are no longer as revealing about personal and family matters at this point in his life and I shall not attempt to trace personal and family influences in this chapter, with the exception of Nasution’s association with Professor Djokosutono who provided legal advice to Nasution on ways of involving the army in politics.

I shall describe how Nasution appropriated organicist thinking and exploited its compatibility with his own strategies for the army’s political role in society and other integrative aspects of “people’s resistance”. I shall draw attention to evidence I have discovered that planning for important aspects of the army’s sponsorship and management of corporatist groups was set in train some time before Nasution announced his intentions. I shall show that this planning took place, in a somewhat covert fashion at first, from within the Inspectorate-General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance (IJTP) that Nasution established almost immediately after his reinstatement as Army Chief of Staff in November 1955.

I shall also show that the rationale for establishing the BKS organisations and then their umbrella organisation, the West Irian National Liberation Front, was to galvanise “people’s resistance” to perceived Dutch intransigence over the future of the territory of West Papua. I shall show that in stating this objective Nasution was again harking back to an idealized version of the guerrilla campaigns that he portrayed as a time of national unity. I shall point out that a major aim of the initiative was for the army to gain a measure of control over the party affiliated mass organisations of the day, thereby weakening the parties and the PKI in particular.

Nasution was no doubt motivated to embrace organicist thinking because of its “instrumental” worth. Acquisition of functional group status by the army had the potential to legitimise the role Nasution was seeking for it as a political force in its own right. And as mentioned above, the functional group idea opened up the possibility of the army forming functionally based corporatist groups of its own on the basis of the mass organizations of the parties, thereby deideologising them and placing them under the influence of the army.

However, what has previously not been given adequate recognition is that, in addition, it accorded with important aspects of Nasution’s own political orientation. Once that is recognized, the
developments that followed and that led ultimately to Golkar and New Order corporatism were less
adventitious and owe their growth to the confluence of these circumstances, and the elective affinity
of Nasution’s political orientation with the corporatist institutional forms that developed first under
Guided Democracy and later under the New Order.

While the BKS organizations are regarded as failures because they were unsuccessful in prising mass
organizations from the parties and binding them to the army, I shall contend that the initiative set a
powerful precedent. This was the first attempt by the army to use its “total people’s resistance”
principles and apparatus to intervene directly in politics and to associate organicist thinking and
principles of “total people’s resistance” as means of military intervention in politics and the economy. I
shall show that the two concepts were highly compatible, based as they were on denying the relevance
of parties and ideologies. And the initiative provided a cadre of officers from within the “total people’s
resistance” apparatus who nurtured army-backed corporatist bodies until a military-backed regime
came into power in the late 1960s.

I shall examine the initiative in the light of Guillermo O’Donnell’s “bureaucratic authoritarian” model,
and argue that somewhat similar conditions to those present when state-sanctioned corporatism was
introduced in Latin America applied at the time of the BKS initiative. However, I shall draw attention
to the links with the army’s “total people’s resistance” strategies and apparatus that lent an indigenous
and army-centred element to the BKS that is missing from O’Donnell’s case studies. I shall argue that
this no doubt contributed to the tenacity with which the army maintained support for the functional
group concept. I shall show that the precocious nature of the initiative – it was launched some ten years
before the army established its own regime – was a major reason for its failure.

In tracing the emergence of this initiative I have made extensive use of contemporary newspaper
reports, documentary evidence, and an interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Pamurahardjo, the
IJTP officer who was in charge of the BKS organisations. I have also drawn upon previous research
and Nasution’s Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas for information on the initiative and its wider political and
social context.

Regional Unrest

Restored to office, Nasution became increasingly occupied by widespread regional unrest that was
developing into a series of full-scale rebellions. Their origins were many and complex, including a
perception that political life was becoming dominated by the Javanese ethnic group (heightened in
November 1955 when the outer islands-oriented Burhanuddin Harahap Masyumi-led government fell
and was replaced by another Ali Sastroamijoyo PNI-led cabinet), and that expenditure on development was being unfairly focused on Java. Many devout Muslims in these so-called “outer islands” were concerned at the rising influence of the PKI, whose power base was on Java, and that President Sukarno was too close to the PKI. Nasution, who was politically conservative, was no doubt in sympathy with this anti-PKI sentiment.

However, while Nasution was from the outer islands he had spent many years in Java and he was concerned to assert control over the territorial commanders. This stance was in fact a major factor in territorial commanders becoming involved in the rebellions.

Some were particularly resistant to the idea that they should be rotated through a series of appointments. They were putra daerah or “local sons” and under the bapak-anak system of command relationships that had persisted after the revolution tended to be resistant to the authority of Army Headquarters. Rather, they relied upon the support of their troops. They also tended to have well-established and lucrative business arrangements.\(^1\)

Nasution was initially cautious in attempting to transfer territorial commanders but by mid-1956 he had stepped up the pace. Colonel Lubis, who was to be posted from the Army Headquarters to North Sumatra (to replace an also reluctant Colonel Simbolon as Commander of T & T I / North Sumatra\(^2\)), began plotting against Nasution.\(^3\) After two failed attempts to send West Java-based troops to the

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\(^1\) As Ruth McVey points out, the "catastrophic" decline in army income after 1952 resulted in the high command losing "an important source of patronage and discipline, and regional commanders began to make deals with local business interests which enabled them to support their troops and preserve the loyalties of their subordinates. This gave them a financial base independent of the centre, one which sometimes was so strong that even if the military budget had been restored the commanders would have lost income by giving up their local arrangements. Moreover, it helped to identify military officers with the interests of the civilian elites at the regional and local levels." McVey, 1971 Op. Cit., pp. 152, 153. Many bapak-anak relationships forged in the revolution were disturbed as personnel were transferred in a round of postings initiated by Nasution in the period of flux soon after the transfer. Instead, more instrumental patron-client relationships were formed in which ". a commander's strength rested as much on his subordinates' support as on his official authority..". Commanders sought "to secure the personal loyalty of the regimental and city commanders below them, and these in turn tried to insure their authority and prepare their future advancement by soliciting the support of the battalion commanders and men in their service." Ibid., p. 153.

\(^2\) Simbolon may at first have been inclined to go along with the planned rotation, but became caught up in the political power plays within Sumatra that culminated in the PRRI regional rebellion. For an interesting (although perhaps hagiographic) account of his life see P. Bangun, Kolonel Maludin Simbolon: Liku-liku Perjuangannya dalam Pembangunan Bangsa, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996.

\(^3\) Lubis was personally antipathetic towards Nasution and extremely disappointed that Nasution, rather than he, had been chosen to lead the army. Lubis was able to find new allies who had in some cases had supported Nasution in the 17 October 1952 Affair. In particular, attempts to move Colonel Simbolon...
capital to overthrow Nasution, Lubis was summoned to Army Headquarters by Nasution. He failed to comply, was sacked and disappeared from Jakarta.

Lubis turned up in Sumatra where he attended a meeting of all the Sumatra commanders. On 20 December 1956 Lieutenant Colonel Achmad Husein, a West Sumatra (Minangkabau) officer took power from the local governor, Ruslan Mulyoharjo. Two days later in North Sumatra, Colonel Simbolon "temporarily suspended" relations with the Jakarta government. Not long afterwards Lieutenant Colonel Barlian took power from the Governor of South Sumatra. The three officers then broke off relations with the Ali government.

In early 1957 the Governor of Sulawesi, Andi Pangeran, and Colonel Warouw's replacement as military commander of Eastern Indonesia, Lieutenant Colonel Sumual, unsuccessfully demanded more autonomy from Jakarta, the right to levy taxes at regional levels, funds from Jakarta for development in Eastern Indonesia and an improvement in the conditions of soldiers in the region. On 2 March 1957 they announced the formation of a regional movement known as *Perjuangan Semesta* (Total Struggle). Some two weeks later, the central government declared a state of martial law throughout the country.

In November 1957 an Indonesian call for the UN to order the Dutch to negotiate on West Irian was rejected, exciting anti-Dutch protests throughout Indonesia and further heightening the political temperature. Days later a group of Muslim zealots, thought to be connected with Lubis and other regional dissidents, attempted to assassinate Sukarno. The incident appears to have been the last straw for Nasution who abandoned attempts to reach a compromise with the regional commanders. In February 1958, following a meeting between discontented military officers, a number of leading Masjumi politicians and the leading Socialist Party (PSI) figure, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* - PRRI) was established, based in Padang, Central Sumatra.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency, which had observed the resurgence of the PKI and Sukarno’s association with this party with increasing concern, was quick to assist the rebels. Under the auspices of the CIA, a private US firm began providing rifles and ammunition and the US backed the
provision of a number of B26 bombers and P51 fighters by Taiwan, which were used against
government troops. 4 Some bombing missions were flown from the Philippines (where the US
maintained large air and naval facilities) and an American citizen was shot down while carrying out a
bombing raid over Ambon in May 1958.

However, the United States and its allies had seriously miscalculated. A rudimentary land, sea and air
operation led by Nasution encountered little resistance from rebel troops 5 and by late 1958 it was clear
that the insurgencies had been suppressed. In a major change to the political landscape, the central
government subsequently banned Masjumi and the PSI. 6

“Total People’s Resistance” Reemphasised

While the regional revolts were gathering force Nasution began to work out ways the army could
assume greater political power and one means that he chose was to reemphasise concepts associated
with “total people’s resistance”. That Nasution acted quickly after his reinstatement to reemphasise
these concepts is evident in his Order of the Day on his reinstatement in which he referred to the "very
difficult tasks" faced by the army:

They must safeguard the sovereignty [of the nation] ... against internal uprisings and subversive
actions from the outside. They must plan the military sector in the context of advancing the
unfinished 1945 Revolution. They must gradually form "... a People's Army with the Soldier of
1945 as its core, to pioneer People's Defence in order to safeguard the State of the Proclamation
[of Independence] against any possible internal or external aggression. 7

tensions surrounding the August 1956 resignation by Hatta as Vice President and detaining the Foreign
Minister (Roeslan Abdulgani) on corruption charges, an order that was countermanded by Nasution.
 4 Ernst Utrecht, The Military and the 1977 Election, Townsville, Qld., James Cook University of North
Queensland, South East Asian Studies Committee, 1980, pp. 87, 89. For an authoritative and
comprehensive account of these actions by the CIA, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin,
Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, New York,
 5 Who might have expected that the situation would be settled through negotiation rather than outright
conflict.
 6 The impact of the rebellions on Masjumi and PSI was disastrous. Rebel leaders who included
former Prime Minister and PSI leader Syahrrir and the leading Masjumi figure and former leader of the
revolutionary emergency government in Sumatra, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, were arrested. Another
leading PSI figure and former finance minister, Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, fled to Malaysia. In the
struggle against the secessionists, Nasution forged new alliances. Unlike the 17 October 1952 Affair,
where Nasution had been accused of being in alliance with the PSI, he now stood with Sukarno and
against the PSI. Whereas in 1955 Masjumi had supported Nasution’s reappointment as Army Chief of
Staff, in suppressing the rebellions Nasution had opposed important elements of this party. He had
eliminated his main rivals for the leadership, particularly the respected Colonel Simbolon.
This reference to "People's Defence" aimed at overcoming "internal uprisings" indicates that Nasution was already interested in using its “people’s war” strategies and apparatus against internal opponents. Obvious targets were the Darul Islam and other right-wing insurgents then active in various parts of the country. However, the PKI may well have interpreted it as a warning about its own activities as Nasution's reinstatement was preceded by press speculation of an army crackdown on that party.  

Penders and Sundhaussen point out that the three sentences quoted above were so important to Nasution that they appear identically in articles in the daily *Pedoman* on 1 and 3 November 1955, in his Order of the Day and in Sukarno's Armed Forces Day speech of 5 October 1955.  

In Chapter Seven I noted that Nasution had presaged the formation of an Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. Nasution’s planning for the introduction of such an Inspectorate in order to implement some of the reforms set out in his Order of the Day was made clear immediately after his reinstatement. The Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance was formed as part of a shake-up in the structure of the army by Nasution, which involved the disbandment of separate Inspectorates of Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry, to be replaced by an Inspectorate-General of Training and Education, Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, and an Inspectorate-General of General of Inspection. The Inspectorate-General replaced the old SUAD Section VI. 

Preparations for the establishment of the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance were under way in February 1956, as evidenced by a press announcement of a number of officer postings, including that of Major Pamuraharjo to the Chief of Staff for “arrangements for the

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8 For example, in November 1955 the Indonesian national news agency, Antara, carried a report from the U.S. Christian Science Monitor to the effect that the reinstatement of Nasution was likely to lead to a crackdown on the PKI. The article stated that the army was "... expected to play an even more active political role here following the success of the Communist Party in this young Republic's first general election on September 29."


13 Who at that time was “seconded to the Deputy Chief of Staff”. “Pemindahan pejabat-pejabat Perwira” (“Transfer of officers”), *Pikiran Rakyat*, 25 February 1956
task of the Inspector General of Territorial [Affairs].” 14 The first Inspector General (officially appointed on 23 May 1956) 15 was Colonel Sadikin, the Siliwangi Commander in the final year of the revolution. Sadikin’s anti-Communist credentials included his command of forces involved in suppressing the Madiun Affair and his appointment as Commander of the Madiun Military Area in September 1948. 16

According to a January 1956 army document, the new Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance was to:

... assist in a return to a people's army concept, to organise training schemes for veterans, village guards and school cadets, to prepare for the return to civilian life of older men discharged from the army, and to maintain close relations between the army and the general populace. 17

The time was right to reemphasise people’s defence. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Nasution's reputation as a guerrilla warfare strategist had increased after the recognition of sovereignty in 1949. In 1953, soon after he commenced his period on the inactive list, he had published his influential *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* and the first volume of *TNI* was completed in 1955 and published shortly after his reinstatement. In his campaign speeches on behalf of IPKI he had referred to the "guerrilla struggle" and castigated the prominence of Indonesians who had been neutral or sided with the Dutch.

The publication of Nasution's books was timely. They promoted an image of harmony between soldiers and civilians in support of the lofty ideal of upholding the state against external attack and contrasted sharply with the fragmentation and crisis that characterised mid-1950s Indonesia. A decade had passed since the proclamation and Nasution's publications emerged at a time of political, social and economic turmoil and this added to feelings of nostalgia for the periods of guerrilla warfare and what Said describes as the "ideal-typical model" 18 of the military administration.

Memories of General Sudirman were being rekindled at this time. For example, when senior officers gathered in Yogyakarta to sign the Charter of Army Unity in 1955 they made a pilgrimage to Sudirman's grave. Sudirman had not lived to become embroiled in the conflicts, disillusion and turmoil that affected the army and political life in general after the transfer of sovereignty. He had opposed the

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14 *Ibid.*, Pamuraharjo was one of three officers listed in the above article as having been assigned to this duty.
resumption of negotiations with the Dutch in 1949 and the terms of the Round Table Agreement, which were increasingly being regarded as onerous, demeaning and in the case of the retention of West Irian by the Dutch, neo-colonial. 19

The Functional Group Idea

In August 1953 Sukarno had expressed his disillusionment with Western-style liberal democracy and called for a form of democracy that would embody Indonesia’s “soul”, elements of which were gotong royong and musyawarah [consultation aimed at achieving consensus]. 20 In 1954 he had called for the formation of an “Indonesian National Congress” to mobilize support for the return of the territory of West Irian. In January 1955, an Angkatan ’45 [Generation of ’45] Committee formed a Congress Committee to advance the proposal but became bogged down in party politics. 21

During 1956 President Sukarno made a series of speeches in which he criticised the multi-party system and proposed a number of changes to the political system that culminated in his proposal to introduce means of interest representation through functional groups. In early August 1956 he attacked the party system and called for all political forces to unite. A week later he expressed concern that the elections had not produced a more stable set of political forces.22

In late October the President went further, calling for the parties to be “buried”, and for "guided democracy" and a single state party to replace them. As regional unrest, political uncertainty and economic malaise worsened, Sukarno announced that he would soon bring forth a "political conception" or konsepsi that would provide an overall solution to the country’s problems.

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19 In his Order of the Day issued on his reinstatement as Chief of Staff, Nasution referred to Sudirman's last message to the army in August 1949 in which he described the army as the "only national property of the Republic" which had emerged from the struggle for Independence "unimpaired and unchanged", in that it had not surrendered or been destroyed by the Dutch. The army therefore had an obligation "...to defend persistently the survival of the Proclamation of 17 August 1945." Penders and Sundhaussen consider that the inclusion of this message was "ominous" and was "... included in the first place ... to enhance the legitimacy of his own political position. But since this message was uttered when the prestige of the politicians was at its lowest and carried clear anti-politician nuances, it was also a kind of veiled threat; the nation and its political leadership groups had to return to the task of building the kind of society they had promised in the beginning of the Revolution, or the army, the 'only national property', might take it upon itself to fulfil its obligation to 'defend the survival of the Proclamation of 17 August 1945.' " Penders and Sundhaussen, Op Cit., p. 107.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 115.
Sukarno made his *konsepsi* address to the nation in February 1957. He repudiated liberal democracy and called for a return to what he regarded as “traditional” non-confrontational methods of interest representation. Reflecting his emphasis on “traditional” values, he proposed the formation of a *gotong royong* cabinet with membership from the four major political parties to emerge from the general elections (PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI).

The President himself was to call into existence a Dewan Nasional or National Council comprising representatives of functional groups in society. Sukarno had originally discovered the functional group in the 1930s. In a move that was clearly aimed at downgrading the importance of parliament, he stated that because these groups were "functional in society" they would therefore "... be a reflection of society, just as the Cabinet is a reflection of parliament." The various "functional groups" which were to be given membership in the Dewan Nasional would include representatives of labour, youth, intellectuals, farmers, journalists, religious scholars, business, women, artists and minorities. Cabinet ministers and the Armed Forces chiefs of staff were also to be members of the *Dewan*.

The more conservative political parties vehemently opposed the inclusion of the PKI. Some party leaders were also wary of the functional group concept because of its potential to weaken the role of the parties and the parliament. Nevertheless, Sukarno inaugurated the *Dewan Nasional* in July 1957.

Suwirjo of the PNI was charged with forming a *gotong royong* cabinet but failed in his mission. Sukarno himself subsequently formed an extra-parliamentary cabinet led by Prime Minister Djuanda, although this cabinet failed to include Masjumi and the PKI.

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23 "The principles of Western democracy, the parliamentary democracy of the western countries, incorporate the concept of an active opposition, and it is precisely the adoption of this concept that has given rise to the difficulties we have experienced over the past eleven years. By accepting this concept we have come to think in a manner which is alien to the Indonesian way of life.” Pauker, 1958 *Op. Cit.*, p. 139.


26 *Ibid*.

27 A vehement attack on this proposal was made by "... Masjumi, the NU, PSI, Christian parties, and a host of others -- not to mention the regionalist leaders -- who regarded Sukarno's support of the PKI as disastrous ..." *Lev, Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 24. As it turned out, the parties with the exception of Masjumi, tended to retain their influence on the functional groups within the *Dewan Nasional* through party-associated functional group appointees. "... the PNI and the PKI largely shared the labor, peasantry, youth and journalists categories. ... NU monopolised the Islamic religious representation. Six or seven of [the] Council members with political party connections would, when necessary, firmly defend the interests of their parties against the encroachments of Guided Democracy.” *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

29 Nevertheless, supporters of these parties were included. *Ibid*. 

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The Functional Group Idea and the Army

Over time it became clear that the functional group idea provided the potential for the army to acquire the legally sanctioned and powerful political role that Nasution was seeking. However, this required a return to the 1945 Constitution.

In debates on the proposed Constitution in 1945, the idea of representation through "groups" or golongan was raised as a means of providing vehicles for parliamentary representation with which Indonesians could most readily identify, and the participation in the People's Consultative Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat -MPR) of groups representing particular occupations or interests was eventually stipulated in Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution:

The People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - MPR) shall consist of the members of the Council of Representatites (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - DPR) augmented by the delegates from the regional territories and groups as provided for by statutory regulations.  

The clarification to the Constitution defined groups (golongan-golongan) as collective associations such as cooperatives and labour unions. However, the idea of representation through groups was jettisoned when Indonesia adopted a liberal-democratic constitution on the recognition of sovereignty by the Dutch in December 1949.

If the army was to acquire status as a group or golongan in its own right it would be able to participate in all aspects of national life, releasing it from the role of tool of the state and enabling it to play a role within the legislatures alongside other functional groups. It is not clear at what stage Nasution became aware of the possibilities offered by the 1945 Constitution for the army to gain such a role by gaining classification as a golongan, but Nasution had called for a return to the 1945 Constitution in his IPKI campaign material and Djokosutomo clearly played a role in advising Nasution on this feature of the Constitution.

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31 Ibid.
32 The following passage from Nasution's Towards a People's Army, is typical of the explanations of and justifications for the army's new political role: "The military men are now not only [part of the] State apparatus technically but also are functional groups. They can become ministers. [The] Armed Forces must know clearly the difference between [being part of] the State apparatus and functional group[s] ... The Armed Forces' functional group cooperates side by side with political groups, functional groups in the field of religion, material and spiritual development ..." A.H. Nasution, Towards a People's Army, Jakarta, Delegasi, 1964, p. 22.
Daniel S. Lev who (as discussed in Chapter Eight) knew Djokosutono, believes Nasution's corporatist ideas were influenced:

… on the one hand by Djokosutono's digging up of Italian fascist ideas, and on the other by his (Nasution's) concern to find a formula that rendered the army equal to or superior to the political parties, which were the main obstruction to Nas's vision of military guidance of the state.  

Lev happened to be present at Djokosutono’s residence when one of Nasution’s officers visited:

He was a lieutenant, I think, who simply ran errands for Nas and came to pick up letters or reports or to give Djoko requests from Nas. Djoko gave the young officer some paper, and when he had left told me that Nas had long ago asked for some formulation of the army's position and also for some ideas about managing the state in a more orderly fashion. That would have been in late 1957 or 1958. When Djoko and I talked about these issues, it must have been in mid or late 1959 or so. Thus we were actually talking about history. …. The answer to the first problem was "the army's middle way," *jalan tengah tentara*; the second resulted in the *golongan karya*, chief of which was of course the army.  

Lev’s recollection of Nasution seeking a “formulation of the army's position and also for some ideas about managing the state in a more orderly fashion” taking place some time before 1957 / 58 possibly refers to the period in the early 1950s when Nasution was looking for a legal framework in the lead up to the 17 October 1952 Affair (Chapter Eight).

In later years Nasution claimed that it was on President Sukarno’s initiative, rather than his, that the army was classified as a functional group. When interviewed by Australian ABC Television in the early 1990s, he contended that he had never intended the military to become so dominant in day-to-day political life. He asserted that he had only intended the army to become involved in “the broad guidelines of state policy” but had been overruled by Sukarno who had told him the military must do more because it was a functional group, and that was how the army had came to occupy seats in the legislatures. He complained that the style of military intervention the army had adopted under the New Order no longer accorded with his “middle way” formulation. While Nasution may have been highly selective in his memory of these events, his recollections do accord with his statement in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* where he appears to have presaged the “middle way” idea:

> With the word politics we do not mean ‘petty politics’ in the sense of parties and groups fighting only for positions in the government as is usually the case in peacetime. It is politics in the wider sense; it is statesmanship; it is fighting and defending a greater policy as is implied in the proclamation [of independence] and the preface of our original Constitution of 1945 [which

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34 *Ibid*.
35 See his remarks in *Riding the Tiger*, ABC documentary series.
includes the *Pancasila*. Therefore, with such ideas we do not mean to say that the soldier must belong to this or that party, but that he must adhere to the wider political horizons.  

The President stated in his *Konsepsi* speech that he did not consider the Armed Forces to be functional groups, although the veterans clearly were.  

However, by July of that year Sukarno declared that the *Dewan Nasional* would comprise:

... persons from the following groups: workers, peasants, intelligentsia, artists, women, Christians, Muslims, national entrepreneurs, the army, navy and air force. 

**Intimations of Nasution’s Thinking**

A series of articles by a Colonel Suhud Prawiroatmodjo that appeared in the Jakarta daily *Merdeka* in February 1957 indicate that the army leadership was already beginning to think of the army as a *golongan* in its own right prior to Sukarno’s *Konsepsi* address. Moreover, the army leadership was linking the idea of the army as a *golongan* with its formative experience as a guerrilla force, thus associating for the first time corporatist / functional modes of interest representation with “people’s resistance”.

Colonel Suhud’s articles appear to have been intended to soften up public opinion towards the idea of the army acting as a *golongan* or group within society, alongside other social forces. In a similar vein to arguments Nasution had put forward in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, he based this claim on the army being a stakeholder in the revolution and not just a tool of the state.

He began by asserting that Indonesian Army personnel had greater rights to participate in political life than members of armies in other countries because of the Indonesian Army's unusual origins:

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38 Ibid.  
39 Colonel Suhud was a former PETA officer who later wrote about the rigours of PETA training and the particular ethos that the Japanese sought to implant in PETA trainees. Anderson, 1972 Op. Cit., pp. 22, 23, 24. He was deeply steeped in Javanese traditionalism and after his retirement in the late 1950s he established a successful plantation in East Java where he sought a Javanese spiritual basis to growing traditional Indonesian crops. The plantation is at Kaliklatak, at the eastern end of Java. His widow remarked to a journalist that R, Suhud Prawiroatmodjo was “… a real Javanese. He believed in the saying, ‘Put before you the ocean, behind you the mountains, in between the land will bring you happiness’. ” Colonel Suhud wished to show off traditional Indonesian plants and built a “spiritual gate and fence” that were completed in 1960. Ron Gluckman, “The Best Joe in Java”, www.gluckman.com, accessed January 2005. 

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It was not the State that took the initiative in forming and creating its Military; moreover it was not the State that preceded and led [the Military]. Rather, [the State] followed [developments] and only then regulated, step by step the growth of the Military with various formal regulations. 40

He sought to root the idea in the military administration of 1949 which he described as a "... Totalitarian Military Government that subordinated the civil government which was also totalitarian in nature as an absolute necessity in defending and saving the State of the Republic of Indonesia." 41

After Sukarno announced his Konsepsi Prawiroatmodjo followed up with another article in which he claimed that the army was a golongan with similar rights to participation in the political process as other social groups:

The TNI as the armed pejuang group of citizens was born at the same time and is equal to other groups of citizens, that is the political groups or parties, economic groups, religious and cultural clubs or associations and other social groups or agglomerations. These groups all stand shoulder to shoulder in formulating the State and its apparatus, in jointly regulating structures of life, in driving out threats from any source, both external and internal." 42

Prawiroatmodjo went on to display a remarkable degree of presience in calling for the army to adopt a “middle way” or jalan tengah in involving itself in non-military affairs:

If power in the military and political fields is held by one person in the one pair of hands as was the case with Caesarism and Bonapartism there will clearly be no conflict between military and political elements. In order to prevent this sort of Caesarism and Bonapartism, Clausewitz proposed following middle way [jalan tengah]: Make the commanders members of the cabinet so that they can take part in cabinet discussions and decisions regarding important matters. 43

There is a strong probability that Nasution was behind Colonel Suhud’s articles. The similar lines of argument that Nasution had run in Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (discussed in Chapter Seven) point to this, and lthough Nasution was by no means “a keen student of Clausewitz” 44 (as Penders and Sundhaussen claim) 45 he liked to quote Clausewitz’s dictum on the need for civilian and

41 Ibid.
military elites to work closely together towards clearly defined goals.  

Colonel Suhud’s identification of the army as a social *golongan* with a right to a role in the political process because of the part that it played in forming the state and then leading other social groups in the “people’s war” of 1949 is another indication that Nasution was behind the articles, and that Djokosutono was advising Nasution on such formulas for military intervention.

Djokosutono has become strongly identified with the historic address Nasution gave to officer cadets in November 1958 where he stated that the army would neither accept being disengaged from political affairs nor seek to take over government. Arguing that the army must follow a "middle way" or *jalan tengah*, he asserted that the Indonesian Army was not a tool of the state like those in Western countries and was also unlike armies in Latin America which had assumed total political power. While the Indonesian Army would not attempt to take over the government, its non-military skills should be used to assist in developing the nation. Military officers had to play a role in determining policy at all levels of government. Implying the possibility of a coup if these conditions were not met, Nasution warned that if the armed forces were not included in the administration of the state they would be "like a volcano which must certainly erupt at some time in the future".  

Of course, this was an extension of arguments that Nasution had originally raised in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* where he warned that guerrilla war would be the mainstay of Indonesia’s defence for the foreseeable future, that guerrilla war required “ideological pioneers” rather than being “a country’s tool to be ordered to carry a gun”, and a guerrilla fighter who was the “vanguard of an ideology” could not “merely be a tool to be ordered around with no voice in political decisions.”  

Implying that he had exerted a measure of what Nordlinger might describe as “guardian” pressure over Sukarno, Nasution writes that he only made his “middle way” speech after he learnt that the President would accede to his recommendation to return to the 1945 Constitution:

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46 For example, see Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol One, 1990, p. 220
47 See, for example, Soebijono, *Dwifungsi ABRI*, 1992, p. 25.
49 As discussed in Chapter Three, a further increase in the intensity of Nordlinger's "moderator-type" behaviour might take place after such officers become accustomed to their interventionist role and increasingly impatient with the inability or unwillingness of civilian leaders to govern as they see fit. At this point they might assume greater powers and become “guardians”. Nordlinger, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 24-26.
In line with this in my graduation address at the Military Academy in Magelang I officially affirmed the TNI opinion [of its place] in national life: it could not be just an ‘instrument [responsive to] civilians’ like in the Western democracies, and it also could not be a ‘military regime’ which monopolised power, but would follow a *jalan tengah* [‘middle way’] as [provided for] in the 1945 Constitution. What Professor Djokosutono later termed *The army’s middle way.* 50

Nasution’s reference to Djokosutono “later” coining the term “the middle way” is interesting. Nasution wrote this sentence in English and may be referring to subsequent research by overseas researchers, rather than implying that Djokosutono only came up with the term well after the event. Elsewhere, Nasution states that the term “middle way” was coined by Djokosutono. 51

The probability of Djokosutono advising Nasution on corporatist / functional modes of interest representation and the “middle way” formula is strengthened by Colonel Suhud’s use of the Indonesian term *jalan tengah* as early as January 1957 and by the fact that at the time Colonel Suhud’s articles appeared, Djokosutono was advising Sukarno on whether the functional / corporatist forms of interest representation the President wished to introduce were compatible with the 1950 Constitution. 52

Colonel Suhud’s identification of the army as a *golongan* with similar rights to participation in the political process as other social groups also indicates a connection with Djokosutono. In view of the lack of reference to the army in the clarification to “groups” in the 1945 Constitution, it is highly unlikely that Nasution would have been aware of the possibility it offered for the army to gain a measure of constitutional legitimacy had he not been receiving such legal and constitutional advice.

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50 Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol Four, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 303, 304. Lev writes of Nasution and like-minded officers placing a considerable amount of pressure on Sukarno and the parties. See, in particular, Lev, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 269-277, which talks of manoeuvring and pressure tactics on the part of Nasution while Sukarno was on an overseas trip in mid 1959 that placed particular pressure on the parties to return to the 1945 Constitution, and on Sukarno when he returned. See also Lev’s discussion with Nasution’s eventual successor as Chief of Staff, Achmad Yani, for an account of divisions within the officer corps of the mid-to-late 1950s. *Ibid.*, p. 72. While there is no evidence that Nasution wanted to mount an outright coup in 1958/59, these divisions would have made it difficult for him to do so. Nasution later wrote that he grew tired of being lectured on options regarding constitutional arrangements by the President and had not done much to hide his feelings “… because I was rather dogmatic about the struggle to return to the 1945 Constitution, which at the time was perhaps not very attractive to him.” Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas*, Vol Four, *Op. Cit.*, p. 91.


52 Reeve, 1985 *Op. Cit.*, p. 117. A contemporary newspaper report stated: “The President already has a *konsepsi* and it has been corrected by Professor Djokosutono, who was recently summoned by President Sukarno. “Konsepsi Presiden Tunggu Munculnya Simbolon” (“President’s Concept Awaits Emergence of Simbolon”), *Merdeka*, 5 January 1957.
Rather, in view of Nasution’s lengthy association with Djokosutono, it seems likely that Djokosutono was exploring the potential the 1945 Constitution offered for such recognition.

This is strengthened by Reeve’s observation:

Though not precisely stated within the [jalan tengah] speech, Nasution’s concern was to strengthen within the Dewan Nasional the idea that the armed forces should have the status of a functional group. The term ‘middle way’ was Djokosutono’s idea, so it seems most likely that Djokosutono played the central role in devising this means for the armed forces to be integrated into the political theory and structure of Guided Democracy. 53

**The Return to the 1945 Constitution**

In November 1958 the Dewan Nasional completed deliberations on a new electoral law in which half the seats in the DPR would be reserved for functional groups that were to be nominated through a National Front, thus detaching the mass organisations from the parties. The list of functional groups proposed included such general categories or functions as youth, women and artists. Significantly, it also included the armed forces and the veterans as functional groups. 54

The proposal was put to the embattled House of Representatives but no agreement could be reached. Party leaders opposed the concept of representation through functional groups and fears were expressed that such a corporatist style of representation could lead to fascism. It was also argued that functional groups in themselves would not achieve any greater degree of consensus than the parties had done and there was still a great deal of uncertainty about how groups would be categorised and recognised as little work had apparently been done to refine the concept since it was mooted in 1957. 55

No finalisation was reached on the matter and Sukarno, with the full endorsement of Nasution, proposed to the Konstituante (which had been established to frame a permanent constitution) that the 1945 Constitution be restored. A heated debate ensued in the Konstituante over the status of Islam within the state. Three votes were taken on whether to return to the 1945 Constitution and each time a majority was in favour. However, on each occasion the majority fell short of the two thirds needed to approve a draft constitution.

The army leadership placed a ban on all political activities. It then stepped up the tension with a series of statements being made by military officers to the effect that the president should reinstate the 1945

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Constitution by decree, including a statement to that effect by the Youth-Military BKS. 56 On 5 July 1959, with the full support of the army, Sukarno reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by presidential decree and the Guided Democracy era began. As Reeve puts it, "Now the Armed Forces had worked themselves into the very grain of the theoretical basis of Guided Democracy, the solution to the army leadership's search for a constitutionally-based, political role."

Organicism and “People’s Resistance” – The BKS Initiative

While the army’s categorization as a functional group under the 1945 Constitution was a most significant milestone in the history of military intervention in Indonesia, the BKS initiative was also very important. As discussed in Chapter One, for a few years from July 1957 the Indonesian Army established a series of organisations known as civil-military cooperation bodies (Badan Kerja Sama - Sipil Militer - BKS) covering such fields as youth, labour, peasants, fishermen and religious scholars. The first BKS, the Youth-Military BKS (Badan Kerja Sama - Pemuda-Militer BKS-PM) originally comprised the youth mass organisations of the four major parties to emerge from Indonesia's first general elections, held in late 1955. The BKS concept was taken a step further in January 1958 when Nasution consolidated these organisations into a newly formed West Irian National Liberation Front (Front Pembebasan Nasional Irian Barat - FNPIB) of which he was chairman.

Reeve interprets Nasution’s behaviour in forming these groups as “… vigorous but derivative, grasping eagerly at the developments in Sukarno’s political thinking.” 57 Sukarno apparently came up with the functional group idea after visiting countries with socialist regimes and to the extent that Nasution was attracted to it and then appropriated it, his behaviour was derivative.

However, the army leadership’s linkage of its claim for categorization as a functional group with its history of leading “people’s resistance” during the revolution (from which Sukarno had absented himself) was certainly not derivative. Neither was Nasution’s association of the BKS initiative from the outset with his concepts for “people’s resistance”. Again, these were concepts with which Nasution was intimately associated and were the exclusive property of the army, unlike the functional group idea which he (and Sukarno) appear to have needed some time to fully understand. 58

58 Sukarno himself may not have been fully aware of the implications of the Dewan Nasional and other initiatives announced in his Konsepsi speech. Lev, Op. Cit., p. 28. The term Sukarno initially coined to describe functional groups in Indonesian was golongan fungsional. At the time of the inauguration of the BKS-PM in mid 1957 the term used to describe its two components - the
It has not previously been noted that the initiative set a precedent for the use of “total people’s resistance” and corporatism as means of military intervention and for their association in the minds of the army leadership at a time when precedents were rare in the Indonesian Army’s growing involvement in military intervention. It was the first manifestation of what was to become a feature of military intervention in Indonesia from the late 1950s: a symbiotic relationship between corporatist and “total people’s resistance” concepts.

Moreover, this association influenced the political behaviour of the Indonesian Army during its power-sharing relationship with President Sukarno under Guided Democracy, and during the New Order regime. It entailed the linking of an idea that originated outside the army, representation through functional groups, and “total people’s resistance” which was associated with the army’s own core concepts and experiences.

My research shows that these two strands of military intervention were peculiarly compatible. The functional group idea sought to deny the relevance of the parties and the liberal democratic system. Similarly, the strategies for “people’s resistance” Nasution developed during the revolutionary period were not associated with a particular party or ideology and were linked in the minds of many officers with the military administration in which the parties had not participated.

Both were linked to a priyayi worldview of social order, social hierarchy and political leadership. The functional group idea was associated with organicist thinking of the type espoused by Professor Supomo in 1945, while “people’s resistance” was associated in the minds of the army with the military administration of 1949 which army commanders had led in partnership with the pamong praja and pamong desa.
Functional Groups and the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance

In developing the BKS initiative the Inspectorate-General was embarking on a process that would see this organisation and its successor bodies responsible for the sponsorship and management of army-backed corporatist bodies into the early New Order period. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the timing of Nasution's reemphasis on “total people's resistance” and its association with the functional group concept has often not been made clear in previous accounts of this process, presumably because this has not been their focus.

As discussed in Chapters Two and Seven, in his *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management* Pauker does not mention Nasution's establishment of the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance in 1956. 59 Pauker’s oversight has been reproduced through subsequent analyses.

Lev notes a connection between the BKS initiative and territorial warfare but only describes it in very general terms, and he does not link it with the Inspectorate-General:

> The theoretical basis of the effort was the concept of territorial warfare, the basic doctrine of defence strategy to which Nasution had committed the Army. Possibly originating in Japanese occupation ideas and undoubtedly influenced by revolutionary experience, territorial warfare, as Nasution explained it, was essentially a guerrilla strategy in which each area of the country would be prepared to defend itself, independent of central direction, against outside attack. This would require not only proper logistics and tactics but also considerable social, economic, and political preparation, in which the Army would necessarily assume the leading organisational role. The political implications of the doctrine are obvious and, after 1957, tended to take precedence over its military significance. 60

Reeve and a number of other researchers who have discussed the emergence of functional groups in Indonesia (for example Yong Mun Cheong 61 and Leo Suryadinata 62) do not link territorial warfare / “people's resistance” with the army's involvement in corporatism at the outset of the army's formation of the BKS.

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59 As discussed in Chapter Two, presumably this is because Pauker’s focus in the early 1960s was on the then unfolding doctrine of territorial warfare and territorial management and the influence on this process of a committee on army doctrine established in 1958.


62 Suryadinata, *Op. Cit.*, p. 8. Suryadinata is incorrect in stating that the Department of Defence and Security was responsible for forming the BKS organisations. At the time, there was no such Department in Indonesia (there was only a Department of Defence). Rather, Nasution specifically gave the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance the task of forming these organisations. Suryadinata also goes too far in asserting the BKS organisations were intended to be the
Reeve, who quotes Pauker’s *Doctrine of Territorial Warfare* extensively in his *Golkar of Indonesia*, provides a comprehensive account of the association between the army's territorial warfare apparatus and its support for the functional group concept from 1958. Although Reeve notes the establishment of the Inspectorate-General “after [Nasution’s] reappointment as Chief of Staff” in *Golkar of Indonesia*, it is apparent in a subsequent paper, *The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar*, that Reeve is under the impression that rather than there being a link between the BKS and the Inspectorate-General from the outset, the Inspectorate General of Territorial Warfare and People's Resistance was established after the various BKS were formed:

In the late 1950s the 'cooperation bodies' were set up on the initiative and under the direct supervision of Nasution as Army Chief of Staff. This activity was institutionalised with the creation of the Inspectorate General of Territorial affairs and People’s Resistance, headed by Colonel Sokowati (who later became chairman of Sekber Golkar in 1966). Supriyatmono associates the BKS initiative with “total people’s resistance”:

From Nasution’s point of view, the Civil-Military BKS were a joint working forum for the military and the functional groups or mass organisations, which would also reflect the close relations between the military and the civilians or between the TNI and the people, which at the same time was based on ‘territorial warfare’ or total people’s resistance.

However, he does not provide evidence of the association of the BKS organisations with territorial warfare, and he does not mention this aspect of the BKS initiative again.

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The Role of the Inspectorate-General

One of the contributions of my research is to focus on the work of the Inspectorate-General in pioneering the army’s linkage of the functional group idea with Nasution’s “people’s resistance” strategies through the launch and management of the BKS initiative. The responsibility of the Inspectorate-General for the BKS initiative was made explicit in an instruction issued by Nasution to the Inspector-General in connection with the establishment of the first BKS in July 1957. In his capacity as Chief of Army Staff and [martial law] Military Authority, Nasution directed the Inspector-General for Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance to:

... in the shortest possible time carry out a meeting, the intention of which is to invite all existing youth organisations to consider a program which has been agreed by the four core organisations.67

Clearly, this instruction gave the Inspector-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, as a member of the Daily Staff of the [martial law] Military Authority, a central role in the BKS enterprise.68 In a later section of this chapter I shall describe how the Inspectorate-General carried out this function.

The Legion of Veterans

While the BKS organizations were formed under the auspices of the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, to some extent they owed their existence to an earlier BKS-like organization: the Legion of Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia (LVRI). This body was formed in 1956 outside the direct auspices of the Inspectorate General but with the involvement of Majaor Pamurahardjo who was an officer in this organisation at the time and who went on to develop the BKS initiative.69

A link between the LVRI and the BKS initiative has been confirmed by Pamuraharjo, who states that he was closely involved in the formation of the LVRI. Indeed, Pamuraharjo states that he “gained experience and the inspiration” for the BKS initiative from the LVRI exercise. He claims that the BKS was a “pure endeavour” and that a range of organisations “from the extreme left to the extreme right”

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67 Surat Keputusan No.: Kpts/P.M./015/1957 issued by the Ministry of Defence Army Staff (Kementerian Pertahanan Staf Angkatan Darat), 5 July 1957, National Archives No. AN # 250.
68 Ibid.
69 The Legion of Veterans was formed on the basis of organisations of former pejuang, many of which were attached to the parties. Yong Mun Cheong’s 1975 article, The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-59, explores the similarities in the processes adopted in forming the first BKS and those used in 1956 in prising the veterans' organisations away from the parties and forming them into the army-backed and controlled Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia. Yong Mun Cheong, Op Cit.
were willing to belong to it because its focus was on Dutch “subversion” and the campaign to “restore” West Irian to the Republic. He implies that the BKS-PM was a more focussed organisation than the LVRI, which had no particular target in mind, other than the unification of all the veterans’ organisations. 70

The basic elements of the army's efforts to establish a veterans' association (the separation of mass organizations (ormas) in the form of veterans' groups from party control and their affiliation with an army-backed organisation) were part of a pattern which was continued (rather than initiated) when the army began to establish the BKS in June 1957. These threads of continuity are crucial. Once they are recognized – which, to date, they have not been – then the army’s and Nasution’s contribution to the growth of New Order corporatism can be better understood.

An Attempt to Weaken the Parties

It was logical for the army to target the party mass organisations through the BKS initiative. Reeve has noted that Sukarno’s intention in coming up with the functional group idea was to detach the mass organizations “… from the parties and to draw them together on the bases of common ‘functional’ interests and of commitment to his own grand vision.” 71 The mass organisations were often more vital and in touch with grassroots Indonesia than the parties themselves. A proportional representation, rather than a district electorate system, prevailed in Indonesia and this tended to concentrate the attention of the party leaderships and parliamentarians on politics at the centre, in the capital Jakarta. Pauker has vividly described the fissiparous and poorly organised nature of Indonesian political parties and organisations, with the exception of the PKI, and the lack of ability of the party leaders (again with the exception of the PKI) to directly coordinate their mass organisations . 72

Many conservative Indonesians were concerned about the PKI's clearly superior organisational skills. Indeed, the PKI appeared to be unstoppable in organising down to the village level, as the following observation by Donald Fagg, who carried out research into the social structure of a town in Central-East Java in 1953-54, points out:

... on all occasions of national or local significance, the Communists through the auxiliaries of the Party, the youth organisation Pemuda Rakyat [People’s Youth], Sobsi [All-Indonesia Central Organisation of Workers], BTI [Indonesian Peasants' Organisation] and other groups exploited all organisational opportunities to their advantage, occupying key positions on various committees, implementing directives from the centre relayed through regional headquarters. In their untiring,

70 Interview with Pamurahardjo, 10 February 1995.
well-planned, well-organised and well-financed activities the Communists seemed a few years ago unrivalled in the small towns and villages of Java. Other organisations, outclassed in terms of initiative, sense of direction and material means, were either put in the position of going along or had to leave the field to the Communists.  

The army leadership felt that it needed to compete with the organisational skills of the PKI, as Guy Pauker (who had close relations with army officers in the 1950s) made clear in 1958 when discussing the army’s motives in developing the BKS initiative:

Developments in the last two years indicate that the army, unlike the non-Communist political organisations, is increasingly aware of and familiar with the value of organisational techniques through which to reach and integrate the intermediate social strata.

…

Clearly the army was establishing control over the activities of the auxiliary organisations of the political parties and other voluntary organisations, though not over the parties themselves.

Quasi State Corporatist Bodies

In attempting to establish army-backed functional groups a decade before the army achieved power in its own right Nasution was acting in a highly precocious manner. He was, in effect, trying to establish quasi-state corporatist bodies.

As discussed in Chapter One, state-imposed corporatist bodies have been a feature of fascist states such as a Mussolini’s Italy and a number of military and military-backed regimes, such as the Franco regime in Spain and some Latin American governments. As discussed in Chapter Eight, Djokosutono was aware of the association of functional groups with fascism. Although he attempted to allay concerns that the move to functional groups would be undemocratic by referring to a move towards executive government in Western countries and their use of specialist interest groups as advisory bodies, 75 he warned the Dewan Nasional of the association of functional groups with fascist regimes, as Nasution records in Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas:

73 Excerpted from Ibid., pp. 141, 142.
74 Ibid.
75 Reeve, 1985 Op. Cit., p. 133. Reeve refers to the speech as “positively perverse” as it set the use of functional groups in the context of parliamentary democracies (whereas Sukarno had referred to countries like the Soviet Union, China and Burma in stating the kind of system he preferred) and attempted, in the main, to “… overwhelm criticism by learned terminology and by the citation of over fifty Western scholars in support.” Ibid.
A firm warning came from Professor Djokosutono, the ‘top’ constitutional lawyer in Indonesia at that time. Professor Djokosutono warned that the President’s idea could be found in fascist states with their corporate systems and communist states with their workers’ organizations. 76

In Chapter Three I referred to research into the corporatist structures of the Latin American military regimes of the 1970s by Guillermo O'Donnell who defined state-sanctioned bodies (which he refers to as “statising”) as:

...those structures through which functional, nonterritorially based organisations officially represent 'private' interests before the state, formally subject for their existence and their right of representation to authorisation or acceptance by the state, and where such right is reserved to the formal leaders of those organisations, forbidding and excluding other legitimate channels of access to the state for the rest of its members. 77

Similarly, Dwight King has used the term "state corporatism" to describe the form of corporatism "... in which constituent units are created and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state ..." and "societal corporatism" to describe forms of corporatism "... in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state depends on the support and recognition of constituent autonomous associated units." 78 As King remarks, "state-corporatism" was "... more applicable to New Order politics than 'societal-corporatism'." 79

State corporatist bodies are referred to as functional groups when they incorporate and purport to represent societal groups on the basis of function. Typically, they are introduced by regimes in an attempt to redirect mass organisations that are based on ideological, ethnic or sectarian loyalties into organisations that are based on function. By organising members of society on the basis of function such regimes hope to impose more readily controllable forms of “interest representation” and thereby curb undesired political activity.

Proponents of these more authoritarian forms of corporatism often claim that it offers a more authentic and organic form of interest representation by according a role to the naturally occurring forces of society, including groups that represent people on the basis of shared functions. To

76 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol Four, Op. Cit., p. 91. Nasution went on to record that a compromise was found whereby two-thirds of the DPR were to be members of parties and one-third were to be from functional groups, although Sukarno eventually reneged on this agreement. Ibid.


78 King, Op. Cit., pp. 111-112. The distinction Dwight King draws between "state-corporatism" and "societal-corporatism" is similar to O'Donnell's categorisations of "privatist" and "statising" corporatism.

proponents of state corporatism, forms of interest representation that are based on political parties and ideologies are inherently divisive as they do not spring from such organic roots.

In Chapter Three I discussed O’Donnell’s theory of the bureaucratic authoritarian state for which he outlines a number of predisposing factors, such as “the politicization of the popular sector”, economic decline and the reaching of a “social impasse”. Arguably, by 1957 all of these factors were present in Indonesia.

Feith writes of a widespread dissatisfaction with the parties, political leaders and liberal democracy in general by the mid-to-late 1950s. Material expectations had generally not been fulfilled in the years since 1950 and rapid social change had diminished social barriers, but the expectations this raised of moves into higher status occupations were also usually unfulfilled. The widespread disillusionment of the time was expressed vividly by writers such as Achdiat Karta Mihardja:

The Second World War gave rise to the Revolution of 1945. The Revolution of 1945 gave rise to the two clashes with the Dutch. Clashes 1 and 2 gave birth to Bung Karno’s new direction [the cease-fire and resumption of negotiations]. This new direction culminated in the Round Table Conference.

All of this resulted in expectations rising day by day. And accompanying this was a rise in the number of muggings, beggars and prostitutes; and of motions, meetings, cocktail parties and interviews.

….

A session of parliament. The building full. Crowds spilling out to the grounds, beneath the trees the workers await the result of the debate.

Some members are pro. Some are anti. Who knows how many absented themselves, after signing the attendance record. ….. 80

Feith records that the disappointment that many Indonesians felt after the general elections of 1955 led to a yearning for integrative leadership that could give meaning to lives that first the “administrators” and then the “solidarity makers” in the parliament were unable to nourish. A feeling emerged that there was a need to adapt in order to be “attuned to the cosmos”, which entailed a return to traditional values and for “… an organic [my italics] meaning-providing state.”81

Nasution’s attraction to the functional group idea was that it had the potential to deideologise society and put a lid on the sort of dynamism that was threatening the social order to which he was attached. As stated earlier, a particular threat to the army was the PKI. As will be discussed in Chapter Ten, that party went on to perform very well in regional elections in 1957 that were associated with a proposal to form elected regional councils that directly threatened the remaining power of the pamong praja.

Conservatives such as Nasution and his associates from the PIR and Parindra had little to lose and potentially much to gain from moving away from a liberal democratic system towards something that might better safeguard their interests. In that Nasution sought, through the BKS initiative, to disrupt the activities of the PKI in disturbing the social order at the grassroots he was seeking to uphold and preserve the organic “traditional” values and authority structures upon which he had relied in his strategies for “total people’s resistance”.

As discussed earlier, Sukarno presented the functional group idea as a path back to more authentic means of interest representation. Significantly, Nasution writes that he was attracted by the “traditional” values that Sukarno said the functional group idea embodied:

I was attracted to gotong royong, the term he used, which was [the same as] kekeluargaan [the family principle] that I had encountered in the 1945 Constitution. Kekeluargaan versus individualism [found] within Western liberalism and versus totalitarianism in the communist and fascist systems. One was too heavily weighted towards the individual, and the other to totality. Kekeluargaan had the meaning of a balance, a harmony, a concord between individuals along with totality, as is found in the life of a good family. 82

O’Donnell goes on to argue that the introduction of a bureaucratic state under such circumstances typically involves the creation of state corporatist structures “… to control or to prevent the emergence of autonomous organisational bases, leaders and goals that might carry its political activation beyond the limits acceptable to the new bourgeois and state-based sectors.” 83

In Chapter One I commented that Nasution shared with the leaders of fascist movements in the 20th Century a deep concern about the possibility of chaotic change and even a communist revolution, while the conservative elites had interests in common with what Robert Paxton describes as the “possessing classes” of countries such as Germany and Italy, who accepted Fascism into power “from above”. 84

While Nasution was not a fascist (as I argued in Chapter Four) and the conservative priyayi interests

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with whom he became acquainted from the 1940s were not in the same league as the “possessing classes” of 1920s/30s Germany and Italy, they had a similar concern to protect entrenched privilege through the suppression of potentially disruptive forces that had been unleashed by the revolution and the particular dynamics of parliamentary democracy in 1950s Indonesia.

While (as will be discussed later) Nasution does not appear to have initiated the BKS idea, he soon realised the potential it offered to suppress forces that threatened the social order by taking over the mass organizations of the parties on the pretext that there was a need to unify all the divergent aliran of Indonesia behind an overriding and inclusive nationalism, as determined by the army. This is evident in reactions of contemporary researchers. For example, Lev states that Nasution intended to prise the mass organisations away from the parties, organise them on a functional basis and channel all their activities through the cooperation bodies. In doing so, a measure of control would be exerted over them and they would be to some extent depoliticised and deideologised.  

However, a highly distinctive feature of the BKS initiative and perhaps the one that sets it most apart from the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes O’Donnell describes was its association from the outset with Nasution’s concepts of “total people’s resistance”. This association between organicist / corporatist thinking and strategies for “people’s war” appears to be unique in the history of military forces that have attempted to control interest representation through the imposition of corporatist structures.

**Links with Nasution and “People’s Resistance”**

My research shows that had Nasution not formed the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, Pamuraharjo would have lacked a pretext and a context to form the BKS-PM. Pamurahardjo was Head of People’s Resistance within the Inspectorate General. In my interview with him in 1995 he told me that it was his duty, as Head of People’s Resistance in the Inspectorate General of Territorial and Affairs, to foster “people’s resistance” to Dutch subversion and to rally the people behind the West Irian cause.  

An East Javanese former PETA officer, Pamurahardjo had taken part in the Battle of Surabaya and commanded a unit that took part in the late 1948-early 1949 “Wingate” return of Republican units to East Java following the Dutch assault on Yogyakarta in December 1948. In Yogyakarta he became

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86 Interview with Pamurahardjo, 10 February 1995.
President Sukarno’s military adjutant and maintained a close association with the President into the 1950s.

Like Sukarno, Pamurahardjo was inclined towards radical nationalist policies. Pamurahardjo was identified with the Murba Party that gained its inspiration from Tan Malaka, the national communist opposition figure of the revolutionary period and one-time rival to Sukarno. Pamurahardjo had remained close to Sukarno since serving as his adjutant and was a member of Angkatan ’45, the organisation that in 1955 had attempted to form a “National Congress” to bolster support for the return of West Irian.

Pamurahardjo was also reasonably close to Nasution at the time. In the aftermath of the 17 October Affair he was one of a small group of East Javanese officers who attempted to liaise with the dissident Brawijaya command on Nasution’s behalf. Soon after Nasution’s reinstatement he was one of a few officers who undertook to safeguard Nasution from possible actions against him by dissident officers.

Immediately after being appointed to the Inspectorate-General in early 1956, the new Head of People’s Resistance drew upon his political interests and involvements, and particularly on moves by Angkatan ’45 to achieve the return of West Irian, by associating himself with political activities that were to lead to the formation of the BKS.

Pamuraharjo told me that he was in agreement with President Sukarno on the need to reduce the influence of the parties, although he was fervently anti-PKI while the President was much more prepared to accommodate this party. Pamuraharjo also states that he specifically avoided involving the parties themselves in the BKS-PM as he was concerned that they would politicise the organisation, as they had done with the LVRI. Instead, he concentrated his attention on the youth mass organisations of the parties.

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88 Associated with this group: ...were a number of non-party persons of a radical nationalist orientation, mostly former members of the Student Armies of the Revolution, the most prominent being Achmadi, A.M. Hanafi, Major ‘Mas’ Isman, Lt. Col. S. Parman, Major Pamurahardjo, and Chaerul Saleh. These latter figures came to dominate the Angkatan 45 by 1956 although there was little progress in turning that loose association into a working organisation. Reeve, 1985 Op. Cit., p. 114.
90 Ibid., p. 309.
91 Interview with Pamurahardjo, 10 February 1995.
92 Ibid.
Four Core Organisations

The Youth-Military BKS was initially comprised of the four youth organizations of the major parties to emerge from the elections. This was in line with Sukarno’s call in 1956 for a "four-legged" gotong royong cabinet drawn from the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI. 93 Reeve’s comment: “That the head of the BKS, for youth, was the Angkatan 45-Kongres Rakyat [People's Congress] figure, Major Pamuraharjo, suggests that Sukarno had been able to intervene [in the BKS initiative initially],” 94 is supported by Pamuraharjo’s assertion that he was encouraged in forming the Badan Kerja Sama - Pemuda Militer by President Sukarno.

As Pamurahardjo explained to me:

The idea emerged from the youth. ... The youth and us, the army group [golongan]. For this purpose we needed to form a home front. A home front with which we could clean up subversive elements. In order to form this home front we had to, amongst other things, have as its core our fundamental forces.... Then, Bung Karno and I - in my capacity as a member of the Inspectorate General of Territorial affairs and people’s resistance - I had responsibility for the People's Resistance section - I was the Head of the Governmental Affairs Section - I discussed this matter with Bung Karno. Yes, Bung Karno agreed but as a Government person he couldn't act in the manner we desired. And then he handed it over to me to settle this matter. Bung Karno himself handed it over to me. 'You yourself take action. As the Government I can't.' And that is when I began to assemble the pemuda, 120 organisations, from the far Left to the far Right. But its core [organisations] were four [in number]. Its core [organisations] were four [in number], the winners in the general elections. 95

In assembling the pemuda, Pamuraharjo was calling on a component of society that had at times played leading roles during the revolutionary period. The President was increasingly calling upon the youth of the country to carry out regeneration and to "finalise" the Revolution of 1945.

In February 1956 the Merdeka daily, whose editor B.M. Diah was close to the President, ran an editorial on the role of youth that reflected these concerns:

In recent times several newspapers have devoted attention to the role that might be played by our youth in bringing about order in this country of ours. At this time when it is evident that the results of the general elections will not provide an antidote to the political illness which our people have suffered until now, the question which arises in our hearts is: what contribution can be made by the leaders of our younger generation in bringing greater order in matters of state. This is a question that needs to be raised at an important moment in our history. Since 1945 we have

93 Pamuraharjo states that he selected the four core organisations for the BKS-PM from the youth organisations of these parties because of the support they had received in the elections. Interview, 10 February 1995.
95 Interview with Pamurahardjo, 10 February 1995.
observed a deterioration taking place which is not uncommonly blamed on our older generation who have lost their revolutionary spirit in leading this nation, [and] who are frightened to make mistakes and therefore are happy not to do anything.

Pamurahardjo worked in a somewhat conspiratorial manner throughout 1956 and in early 1957, taking part in a series of activities that culminated in the BKS initiative. His involvement with a number of "anti subversion" youth organisations which were to become the member-organisations appears to have begun in early 1956 within the context of the trials of two Dutch nationals, Jungschlaeger (the former Head of NEFIS - Netherlands Expeditionary Forces Intelligence Service - and currently a senior employee of the Dutch-owned KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij - Royal Shipping Line) and Schmidt (a former KNIL officer) on charges of subversion. The trials became linked with Dutch insistence on retaining sovereignty over West Irian and allegations that the major Dutch conglomerates that still dominated economic life in Indonesia were actively involved in subversive activities.

On 23 February 1956 a major public meeting was held at Independence Square in connection with the trial. Significantly, the representative of the pejuang was Major Pamuraharjo who was "still active in the military". Three weeks earlier on 1 February some 100 Jakarta youth from a variety of organisations had demonstrated in front of the court, demanding the death penalty for Schmidt and a resolution was taken to the President by a delegation including Major Pamuraharjo.

On 16 March organisations involved in the 23 February public meeting had held a further meeting in the Pemuda Building. That this group of organisations was beginning the process of taking on a relatively permanent form is evident in reporting in the daily Suluh Indonesia which referred to the

96 "Peranan golongan muda" ("The Role of the Young"), Merdeka, 2 February 1956.
97 Jungschlaeger and Schmidt were charged with complicity in a number of subversive activities, including fostering the Darul Islam cause. See, for example, the Merdeka article "Lanjutan perkara Schmidt: Schmidt perencana siasat dalam gerakan Darul Islam" ("Further to the Schmidt case: Schmidt was the planner of tactics in the Darul Islam movement"), 9 November 1955. Leslie Palmier provides extensive information on the trials in The Dutch in Indonesia, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.
98 "Rapat raksasa anti Van Empel dikundjungi puluhan ribu manusia" ("Giant anti-Van Empel meeting attended by scores of people"), Merdeka 23 February 1956.
99 "Pemuda-pemuda Jakarta Adakan Demonstrasi: Menuntut hukuman mati bagi pembunuh pemuda-pemuda Indonesia" ("Jakarta Youth Hold Demonstration: Demand the death penalty for the murderers of Indonesian young people"), Merdeka, 1 February 1956.
100 "Rapat raksasa anti Van Empel dikundjungi puluhan ribu manusia" ("Giant anti-Van Empel meeting attended by scores of people"), Merdeka 23 February 1956, Op. Cit..
youth organisations that had taken part in "... the Gigantic Anti Foreign Subversive Movements Meeting (Rapat Raksasa Anti Subversip Asing) some time ago ..." 101

The campaign against Jungschlaeger suffered a setback when he died suddenly, apparently of natural causes, in late April. 102 However, the continuation of the Schmidt trial resulted in further demonstrations. 103

The first use of the term Badan Kerja Sama appears to have been in connection with a group which gathered outside the Jakarta State Court when Schmidt was sentenced to life imprisonment on 16 October 1956:

Meanwhile the huge crowd which had congregated since that morning outside the Jakarta State Court building, on the other side of the canal and in the main roads which face the Court building, after learning of the sentence passed by the Judge and at the time Schmidt was taken under very tight escort from the Court building shouted: 'Long live the Badan Kerja Sama menentang aksi subversif' [Cooperation Group to oppose foreign subversion]. 104

Anti-Subversion Movements and Sukarno's Political Conception

My research show that the atmosphere within which this Badan Kerja Sama menentang aksi subversif came into being was one of tension, excitement and expectation of imminent change in the lead-up to President Sukarno's Konsepsi speech, and support for the Konsepsi from the army leadership. On 5 February 1956 Sukarno had made a speech to Armed Forces officers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he stated his conviction that "the people and the Armed Forces would support his Konsepsi." According to a press account of the speech, Sukarno regarded the Konsepsi:

as the only way ... because the [President's] strongest motivation and absolute conviction [has been based] first of all on the awareness and agreement of the people and secondly on his

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101 The reason for the meeting was to discuss reports that comments on the Jungschlaeger case from "... overseas in general (including the International Council of Jurists) and the Netherlands in particular ... " that Jungschlaeger had not been involved in a subversive movement aimed at bringing down the state." "Pemuda perhatikan reaksi-reaksi perkara Jungschlaeger" ("Youth pay attention to reactions to the Jungschlaeger case"), Suluh Indonesia, 17 March 1956.
103 "Nyonya Bouman minta Schmidt dibebaskan" ("Mrs Boumann requests Schmidt be freed"), Merdeka, 11 September 1956.
104 "Schmidt dijatuhi hukuman seumur hidup" ("Schmidt sentenced to life imprisonment"), Merdeka, 17 October 1956.
conviction that the Armed Forces, ie. the TNI also stand behind the Konsepsi. Because the Konsepsi does not violate Revolutionary Unity and Democracy ...” 105

A few days later an announcement was made that another Public Anti-Subversion Meeting would be held in Jakarta on 10 February by a joint committee known as "The Anti Subversive Movements Gigantic Meeting Committee". The stated aim of the meeting was to "... oppose subversive movements and to analyse the current situation." 106

When the meeting was held it issued a statement along the now familiar lines of "... affirming the existence of a danger which has been created by subversive movements in regions of Indonesia [and] threatens the safety of the Republic of Indonesia." 107 However, the headline in the daily Merdeka focussed on the fact that the meeting had supported President Sukarno's Konsepsi. 108

The Konsepsi and the BKS

Contemporary newspaper reports show that by the day of Sukarno's Konsepsi announcement, 21 February 1957, the term Badan Kerja Sama had reemerged following the fleeting appearance of the Badan Kerja Sama menentang aksi subversif at Schmidt's trial in October 1956. The Merdeka daily reported that the Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda dan Pelajar Anti Gerakan Subversif (The Youth and Student's Cooperation Body to Oppose Subversive Movements) had issued a statement calling upon all groups [golongan] "... Youth, Secondary School Students, University Students, Workers, Peasants, Veterans and all levels of society to enthusiastically welcome President Sukarno's konsepsi." 109 The BKS called upon the Indonesian people to:

... flock to the State Palace to hear the address by the Head of State in which the konsepsi will be announced at 8 pm. tonight. People outside Jakarta should congregate in the houses of neighbours where there are radios and those who have radios should ensure that they are easily heard by the public. 110

As was the case in its reporting of the Badan Kerja Sama menentang aksi subversif, Merdeka did not cite the names of individuals and organisations associated with the Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda dan Pelajar Anti Gerakan Subversif. That this latter Badan Kerja Sama was a more substantial entity is

105 "Presiden Yakin Rakyat dan A.P. Mendukung Konsepsinya " (“President Confident the People and Armed Forces Support his Concept”), Merdeka, 5 February 1957.
106 "Rapat Umum Anti Subversif di Jakarta" (“Public Anti-Subversion Meeting in Jakarta”), Merdeka, 6 February 1957.
107 "Rapat raksasa anti subversif dukung konsepsi Presiden" (“Giant anti-subversion meeting supports President’s Concept”), Merdeka, 11 February 1957.
108 Ibid.
109 "Menyambut Konsepsi" (“Welcoming the Concept”), Merdeka, 21 February 1957.
evidenced by the fact that it issued a press statement. That *Merdeka* did not list the names of associated individuals and organisers or at least the name of a spokesperson raises the possibility that the newspaper was aware of the involvement of highly placed individuals or organisations in this *Badan Kerja Sama* and was not able or did not wish to name them.

By July 1957 the only *Badan Kerja Sama* to be referred to in the Indonesian media was the officially inaugurated *Badan Kerja Sama - Pemuda Militer*. According to Pamuraharjo, he and two other youth leaders had the idea of forming the BKS-PM. After initial discussions they took a proposal to form a civil-military group to a meeting of youth organizations, but Pamurahardjo did not involve Nasution at that stage because this would have made the youth groups “suspicious”.

At the time I had not sought permission from Nasution. After they [the youth organisations] met and agreed I took ... Nasution didn't know anything about it. I told him that these four core organisations were willing. This took place outside army premises and outside the army. Because if it had begun in the army it would never have been completed. Because they [the youth organisations] would have been suspicious. If it was Nasution they would have been suspicious. They wouldn't have wanted to. Finally the four core party youth organisations were willing to meet with us and we conducted our negotiations outside. But the theme wasn't what you might think. The theme that I put forward wasn't about anything else but West Irian. West Irian - the thinking of the army hadn't gone that far. We said that West Irian was a long way away but it must return [to Indonesia]. How can we bring about the return of West Irian. Are you all going to just stay quiet? They agreed [with me]. For West Irian we will unite! Then I formed a committee - this was still outside the army. I was the only military person with four people from the core organisations. They agreed and we formulated a document, a sort of decree - no, not a decree but a document [memorandum of] association. After they were willing - these four people - we took it to other *pemuda*. It developed into 120 organisations. They all agreed.  

Pamuraharjo’s statement that Nasution was kept in the dark while he carried out the spadework in forming the BKS-PM contradicts most accounts of the BKS initiative, which assign a central role to Nasution. Pamuraharjo is known to have become antagonistic towards Nasution in later life and this might have coloured his 1995 recollection of events in 1957. However, his involvement in *Angkatan '45* and the anti-subversion movements in 1956 and his closeness to President Sukarno support his claim, as does the degree of autonomy he evidently enjoyed in running the BKS-PM in the second half of 1957.

It seems likely that Nasution was carried along to a large extent by the flow of events. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the idea of mobilising the youth under the leadership of the army appealed to him. In Chapter Four I discussed his involvement in the corporatist youth movements of the Japanese occupation period, and his apparent admiration for Baldur von Schirach and the Hitler

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Youth because of his desire for “… a state in which the youth was organised and militarised.” 112 In Chapter Five I discussed his distaste for the politically affiliated laskar organisations and the firm steps he took to co-opt them into the army or disband them. The prospect of detaching the youth organisations from what he saw as the fractious and divisive parties must have seemed very inviting.

Nasution later wrote that the initiative was in accordance with the functional group idea outlined in the konsepsi, and was associated with “total people’s resistance”:

I formed the Cooperation Groups that were later united in the West Irian National Liberation Front. And during that period the President began with his konsepsi, political reform. ….

My first step was the formation of the BKS Pemuda-Militer in June 1957, that was implemented by Lieutenant Colonel Pamurahardjo. .... [all the BKS organizations] were formed in line with the President’s konsepsi on existence of groupings in the community based on their professions or particular field of work. ....

The doctrine of territorial management had already been applied at the village level in the guerrilla period and almost throughout the whole of the archipelago during the period of restoration of security .... Now this was being done at the national level, because the TNI was now being compelled by national developments to participate actively in national [territorial] management. 113

An army document shows that in launching the BKS-PM Nasution directed Pamurahardjo’s superior officer, the Inspector General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance (Colonel Sadikin), to invite “... all existing youth organisations ...” to join a Youth-Military Cooperation Body. 114 His concern that the BKS address problems of national unity is clear in his address at the launch of the BKS - Pemuda-Militer in July 1957:

The condition of our society provides a clear picture that at the present time our people are fragmented into various groups and aliran, [It is] as if only particular groups are entitled to live on Indonesian soil. However, this was not the aim and intention of the struggle of the people of Indonesia. The fruits of our struggle were for all the Indonesian people.

111 Interview with Pamuraharjo, 10 February 1995.
114 In his capacity as Army Chief of Staff and [martial law] Military Authority, Nasution directed the Inspector General for Territorial affairs and People’s Resistance to: “... in the shortest possible time carry out a meeting, the intention of which is to invite all existing youth organisations to consider a program which has been agreed by the four core organisations.” Surat Keputusan [Written Directive] No.: Kpts/P.M./015/1957 issued by the Ministry of Defence Army Staff (Kementerian Pertahanan Staf Angkatan Darat), 5 July 1957, National Archives No. AN # 250.
I therefore thank God the Almighty that tonight a desire to [work] together has been reached amongst the youth who represent the four (4) major aliran in our society.

A joint desire which indicates an intention to UNITE, AN INTENTION TO STRUGGLE TOGETHER, AN INTENTION TO PAVE THE WAY FOR PEACE IN OUR NATION.

Without considering differences of opinion and aliran but only with the fullest capacity to pave the way for PEACE IN OUR NATION." 115

Nasution’s concern for “peace in our nation” can be interpreted as a sign of concern about the deteriorating regional situation. However, it is much more likely he was concerned about threats to “peace” at the grassroots level of society that were being posed to organic “traditional” values and authority structures by more radical forces and the PKI in particular. Nasution’s reference to the fruits of the independence struggle being denied by fractious and fissiporous aliran-oriented parties is redolent of his IPKI speech in which he spoke of people who had been united in the guerrilla struggle being divided by the parties, even to the point of penetrating families. 116

Nasution’s choice of the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance to manage the BKS initiative was in one sense a pragmatic one as this organization was the appropriate one to fuse together mass organizations so they could be better organised for “people’s resistance” under the army’s new martial law powers. However, it also signalled that he wished to return to his idealised version of the military administration when the army (with the support of traditional authority structures) led the population and narrower ideological interests were subsumed under the banner of an all-embracing nationalism.

The Decline of the Initiative

Perhaps the highlight of the year that Pamurahardjo was in charge of the initiative was the leading role he played in December 1957 in starting a rash of takeovers of Dutch enterprises – starting with the KPM shipping line- after further negotiations on West Irian failed to yield progress. Feith writes that the source of the takeovers is unclear … although it is clear that a major role was played by Lieutenant Colonel Pamurahardjo…” 117 According to Louis Fischer, Sukarno later stated explicitly

115 Amanat KASD Dalam Pertemuan Program Kerdja Sama Penguasa Militer - Pemuda Massa [Address by the Army Chief of Staff to the Meeting of the Military Authority – Mass Youth [Organisations/ Cooperation Program], pp. 1-2.
that he ordered the takeovers, implying that he in some way instructed the BKS-PM to do so.\footnote{118} Lev notes that:

The take-overs begun with Sukarno’s encouragement, and a few leaders of the recently established Youth-Military Cooperation Body … were involved in the action. But if the takeovers were not entirely spontaneous, nor were they fully planned. Neither [Prime Minister] Djuanda, who did not agree with the take-overs, nor Nasution was entirely aware of what was happening, and policy during the tense days of early December was largely ad hoc …\footnote{119}

Pamurahardjo told me that he was acting in accordance with Sukarno’s unstated wishes and that Nasution did not know what was happening [again being carried along by the flow of events]. Pamurahardjo states that he set the ball rolling with the takeover of the KPM shipping line, the first major Dutch asset to be confiscated in a rolling and apparently unstoppable campaign of confiscations that in the following weeks divested the Dutch of all their assets in Indonesia. Pamurahardjo states that he presided over a heated meeting of youth organizations at the Proclamation Building in Jakarta on the night and early morning of 2 and 3 December 1957 at which the decision was made to take over the company. He also states that there was opposition from some representatives of PKI mass organisations present, and that Prime Minister Djuanda sent Minister for Veterans Affairs Chaerul Saleh and Minister for Information Sudibjo to the meeting to argue against such a course of action. He further states that in the early hours of the morning the Prime Minister ordered Nasution to arrest Pamuraharjo but Nasution handed the matter over to Pamurahardjo who ordered that the takeover go ahead. Finally, Pamurahardjo told me with obvious satisfaction that after the takeover proceeded he reported to President Sukarno who said nothing but indicated his approval by smiling.

By the time of this meeting Pamurahardjo had expanded the scope of the BKSPM to include peasants and workers, although no official inauguration of new BKS-style organisations had taken place at this stage. Prior to the meeting on the KPM takeover, Pamurahardjo had made contact with members of labour unions (buruh) and according to press reports the organisation which decided to mount the takeover on the night of 2/3 December styled itself the Front Buruh-Tani-BKSPM - the BKSPM-Peasants-Workers Front.\footnote{120}

Pamurahardjo’s unofficial action front continued its involvement in the takeovers. On 7 December the “BKSPM-Peasants-Workers” were said to be in control of the then major hotel in Jakarta, the

\footnote{118 Louis Fischer, \textit{The Story of Indonesia}, New York, Harper, 1959, p. 300.}
\footnote{119 Lev, \textit{Op. Cit.}, p. 34.}
colonial-era Des Indes. The process of forming the *Front Buruh-Tani-BKSPM* prior to the formal establishment of BKS organisations for peasants and workers appears to have mirrored, to some extent, the conspiratorial emergence of informal “*badan kerja sama*” organisations of late 1956 and early 1957. As stated earlier in this chapter, these organisations, which appeared fleetingly, disappeared with the formation of the BKSPM. By December a Workers-Military Cooperation Body had been inaugurated and a Peasants-Military Cooperation Body was formed in 1958. The BKSPM returned to its earlier role and composition and Pamurahardjo / the BKS-PM do not appear to have played a role in the subsequent takeovers.

Subsequently the army took the confiscated organizations over to prevent the PKI from doing so, thus acquiring a substantial means of independent funding. Nasution went on to establish a second organization, the Worker-Military BKS (*BKS Buruh-Militer*), which appears to have been intended as a means of controlling unions in the confiscated enterprises and the workforce generally. However, while a number of other BKS organizations and an umbrella organization for these organisations, the West Irian National Liberation Front, were established in 1958, in the middle of that year the initiative became enmeshed in a financial scandal over the West Irian Struggle Fund that collected contributions for the West Irian cause. Pamurahardjo was the Secretary-General of the Fund and he was suddenly removed from the initiative in August 1958, handing over as Secretary General of the Front to Brigadier-General Mustopo. The Deputy Secretary-General was (President Sukarno’s brother-in-law) Achmadi.

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120 “*KPM dapat berjalan lancar: Tenaga-tenaga Indonesia akan gantikan Belanda jika mereka undurkan diri, kata jurubicara BKS-PM*” (“KPM able to continue smoothly: Indonesian staff will replace Dutch if they withdraw, says a spokesman for the BKS-PM”), *Merdeka*, 5 December 1957.)
122 “*Badan Kerja Sama Buruh dan Militer Telah Dilantik*” (“Worker – Military BKS Formed), *Suluh Indonesia*, 14 December 1957. This BKS from the outset comprised fourteen organisations, rather than the four core organisations that had been the basis on which the BKS-PM was formed. An army officer (Lieutenant Colonel Djarot Subiantoro) was to lead/chair the organisation.
123 “*KSAD sahkan Dana Perjuangan Irian Barat*” (“Army Chief of Staff authorizes the West Irian Struggle Fund”), *Merdeka*, 7 December 1958.
124 Ibid.
125 “Two unidentified officers from within the Front were arrested because they could not “... account for irregularities in regard to material and financial matters.” “*Dua perwira A.D. ditahan: Karena tak bisa pertanggungjawabkan keuangan FNPIB: Tindakan koreksi ke dalam*” (“Two Army officers detained: Because they cannot account for West Irian National Liberation Front funds”), *Merdeka*, 5 September 1958. On 8 September Mustopo issued a statement that the arrests were not being made arbitrarily but on the basis of clear evidence. “*Anggota Front Nasional tidak perlu merasa takut: Kalau tak punya salah, kata Brig. Jend. Mustopo*” (“Members of the National Front have no need to feel afraid: If they have not done anything wrong, says Brig, Gen. Mustopo”), *Merdeka*, 8
These events took place against a background of increasing rejection of the BKS initiative by President Sukarno and a number of parties. In addition to the financial scandal, many of the officers assigned to manage the BKS organisations and the West Irian National Liberation Front proved not to be up to the task of influencing the party mass organisations.  

At first, the PKI appears to have had few qualms about allowing its mass organisations to join the BKS-PM. A former member of the PKI’s youth organisation (Pemuda Rakyat) who was involved in this organisation’s affiliation with the BKS-PM told me that the party was confident of being able to withstand any attempts on the part of the army to influence its members. Indeed, it hoped to exploit the opening provided by the BKS-PM to spread its influence within the army.  

After initially cooperating with the initiative, the PKI was the first party to reject the BKS idea after a year of involvement and many of the other parties became antipathetic towards the BKS initiative.  

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September 1958. Concern about missing funds within the Front came into the open on 27 August when the newly-installed Secretary-General, Mustopo, told the press that the Front was not (supposed to be) a centre for people seeking “... money, licences, rank, influence or [to carry out] party activities.” Indicating that there was public concern over the financial management of the Front, he stated that “... should any members of the public feel that they have been disadvantaged by the West Irian National Liberation Front they can make a personal submission to the Secretary-General ...”, “Front Nasional satu-satunya markas perjuangan rakyat: Untuk bantu penguasa Perang dan Pemerintah - Bukan markas buat cari uang dan lisensi, pangkat, pengaruh dan kegiatan partai-partai” (“National Front the one and only headquarters for the struggle of the people: To assist the Military Authority and the Government – Not a headquarters to seek money and licences, ranks, influences and party activity”), Merdeka, 27 August 1958. The scandal involving the West Irian Struggle Fund continued to dog the WINLF in November 1958, when Nasution called for greater financial probity. “Letkol. Tituler Achmadi Pejabat Sekjen FNPIB”, Merdeka, 24 November 1958.  

126 “Brigadier Jenderal Dr. Mustopo Sekjen FNPIB” (“Brigadier General Dr. Mustopo Secretary General of the West Irian National Liberation Front”), Merdeka, 15 August 1958. On 12 September an announcement was made that Brigadier General Gatot Subroto (Deputy Army Chief of Staff) had been appointed by Nasution as Deputy Chairman of the West Irian National Liberation Front. “Gatot Subroto Wakil Ketua Front Nasional”, Merdeka, 12 September 1958.  

127 Yong Mun Cheong writes that “Army officers sent to head the BKS were either inexperienced or incompetent. Organising and leading functional groups already affiliated to and heavily influenced by political parties was a difficult job at best.” Yong Mun Cheong, Op. Cit., p. 99.  

128 Interview with Hardoyo, January 1995.  


130 Ibid., p. 66. Initially, a number of other parties and factions within parties appear to have perceived some benefits in cooperating with the army within the BKS initiative. For example, as the anti-PKI intentions of the army became increasingly apparent, elements within the parties of the right, such as Masjumi, may have seen some benefit in the BKS, although this would have been tempered by a growing awareness that the army was a threat to all the parties. In 1957 Nasution instigated a strong anti-corruption drive and prohibited senior civil servants from becoming members of parties. Roccamora writes that these measures adversely affected right-wing senior PNI functionaries because of the reliance of that party on its support base within the civil service and corrupt practices that had benefited PNI-associated Indonesians during the various PNI-led
A bureaucratic authoritarian regime of the type O’Donnell describes can only be established where proponents of such a system are in control of the state. Nasution’s attempt to establish quasi-state corporatist institutions before the army had achieved undisputed power over the state can be seen in retrospect to have doomed it to failure. While Sukarno remained a powerful political force Nasution’s BKS initiative could only prosper for as long as martial law remained in force and with the President’s acquiescence.

As creatures of the army’s martial law powers, the Front and its constituent BKS organizations became caught up in growing unrest about the duration and harshness of martial law. When martial law fell into increasing disrepute, the army’s ability to pressure the parties into cooperating diminished. The premature nature of Nasution’s attempt to incorporate the various party-associated mass organisations within what were in effect quasi state-corporatist institutions a decade before the army became the predominant power within the state was perhaps the major reason for the failure of the initiative.

Sukarno, who had gained a degree of influence in the Front through the appointment of Achmadi as a Deputy Chairman, began to express frustration with the inroads the army was making into many areas of national life. He became concerned that Nasution was attempting to use the West Irian National Liberation Front to develop a political vehicle of his own that could rival the power of the President.

Sukarno also became opposed to Nasution’s intent to use the functional group idea to deideologise society and put a brake on changes to the social order. For Sukarno, interest representation through functional groups had not meant a return to a static representation of the past. Lev has portrayed him as a dreamer, an idealist and a revolutionary. He intended to unlock the “dynamic” forces in governments: “On the whole, the army campaign to restrict the activities and undermine the prestige of the political parties also weakened these leaders’ positions within the PNI. This being the case, leftist elements in the PNI leadership, especially those in the ormas (mass organizations) who benefited from their participation in the various army-organised Badan Kerja Sama, tended to see the army at this time as an ally.” J.E. Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1945-1965, Qezon City, University of the Philippines, Center for Advanced Studies, 1975, pp. 333-4. Roccamora also makes the point that after leftist elements within the PNI began to gain control over that party, "continued army moves against the political parties brought these leaders to a position where they now had to fight back." Ibid., p. 334.

131 For example, in December 1958, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Sukarno instructed Nasution to leave the work of civilians to the civil authorities. “Amanat Presiden di Hadapan Peperpu - Peperda: Presiden Sukarno Peringatkan APRI Serahkan Pekerjaan-pekerjaan Sipil pada Instansi-instansi Sipil” (“Address by the President to the Central War Authority – Regional War Authorities: President Sukarno Warns Armed Forces to Hand Over Civilian Functions to Civil Agencies”), Merdeka, 16 December 1958.

Indonesian society while developing what he saw as authentic means of interest representation that united in their commitment to his own revolutionary zeal.

A number of interest groups circled upon the Front as they sought to follow the thinking of Sukarno. Six months after decreeing the introduction of Guided Democracy in July 1959, the President took action to curb the growing influence of the army by announcing the absorption of the West Irian National Liberation Front into a new National Front. The BKS initiative was wound up when martial law was lifted in 1963 and the BKS organizations were ultimately unsuccessful in their primary aim of leveraging the mass organisations away from the parties.

**Continuing Links with “Total People’s Resistance”**

The BKS organizations had some enduring legacies. For example, the Youth-Military BKS presaged the New Order’s attempt to control the younger generation through such organizations as *Pemuda Pancasila*, and the Worker-Military BKS set the scene for the regime’s establishment of a

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133 In November 1958 the PNI leader, Suwiryo, proposed that a new *Pancasila Front* be created which would comprise “all golongan and individuals … buruh, peasants, women, pemuda, students, politicians, intellectuals, artists, the religious, state instrumentalities which truly possess the spirit of the proclamation of 17 August 1945 and are therefore loyal to Pancasila and a free and active [foreign] policy.” The statement conspicuously failed to mention the army as one of the golongan that might be included in the *Pancasila Front* and made no reference to the various BKS and the West Irian National Liberation Front. On the other hand, politicians were to be included. “P.N.I. Usahakan Bentuk Front Pancasila: Untuk Membantu Pelaksanaan Demokrasi Terpimpin Bung Karno” (PNI Strives to Form Pancasila Front: To Assist Implementation of Bung Karno’s Guided Democracy”), *Merdeka*, 26 November 1958.

134 Like the youth organizations organised by the New Order regime, the BKS-PM mobilised jago or thuggish elements of society in support of the army’s political objectives. During the New Order such elements became known as preman while in the 1950s they were known somewhat quaintly as crossboy. Pamurahardjo involved crossboy elements when the BKS-PM took a leading role in organising the celebrations for Youth Pledge Day on 28 October 1957 (“Pesta Pemuda Puncak Peringatan Hari Sumpah Pemuda: Didahului dengan pawai pemuda berobor” (“Youth Festival Peak of Youth Pledge Day Commemorations”), *Merdeka*, 28 October 1957. A week before the celebrations this officer made an explicit appeal to crossboy “to participate in the youth struggle” (“BKSPM ajak ‘Crossboys’ ikut dalam perjuangan pemuda”, *Merdeka*, 23 October 1995) and the BKS-PM went so far as to form a special sub-committee of the Youth Pledge Commemorative Committee known as the Sub-Committee for Channelling Crossboy. Pamurahardjo’s rationale for involving crossboy (“... their activities should be channelled towards the appropriate struggle of the pemuda which will enable them to contribute their energies to their nation and people.”) (Ibid.) was similar to that of the Golkar-associated *Pemuda Pancasila* of the New Order period – who claimed they were not preman but were attempting to rehabilitate criminals. Interview with Pamurahardjo, 10 February 1995. For a thorough account of the role of Pemuda Pancasila, including its relations with the New Order regime and Suharto himself, see Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s New Order”, *Indonesia* 66 (October 1998) pp. 45-73.
monolithic organization of workers, the All-Indonesia Organisation of Workers (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia – SPSI).

The most durably significant aspect of the BKS initiative was the precedent it set in associating corporatist thinking with “total people’s resistance”. As the BKS initiative declined, Sadikin and the Inspectorate-General conducted activities that were aimed at mobilising populations for activities such as working bees that were redolent of the gotong-royong and sinoman type activities discussed in earlier chapters. Such community assistance activities were to be taken up by the army under the banner of “civic mission” and became increasingly associated with the army’s territorial role from the early 1960s.

In December 1958, as the army was conducting mopping-up operations against PRRI/Permesta troops and was continuing its struggle against the Darul Islam insurgency, Nasution made a major statement on the army’s renewed commitment to territorial affairs, including the role the BKS/West Irian National Liberation Front were to play within the territorial organisation:

In regard to the BKS, [these organisations] will be organised within the framework of the Territorial organisation [as bodies] that are permanent and [which] will receive colours [unit flags] from the Supreme Commander.

In regard to the [West Irian] National [Liberation] Front, efforts will be intensified for its formation in operational areas as a means of assembling National potentials. In this regard, some time ago the formation of the [West Irian] National [Liberation] Front was to have been carried out, with the exception of operational areas.

135 There are several newspaper accounts of these activities. In July 1958, Merdeka reported that the BKS - Buruh Militer would hold a “Week of Action to Increase Productivity”. The BKS-BUMIL stated that in the wake of the takeovers of Dutch assets it would no longer just consider the interests of workers but would strive to increase productivity in the interests of national development. “BKS-BUMIL Akan Mengadakan Pekan Aksi Pertinggi Produksi” (“Worker-Military BKS to Hold a Week of Activities to Increase Production”), Merdeka, 25 July 1958. In August the Minister for Civil-Military Cooperation announced that a revised National Front would move to implement “concrete” objectives. The second of three major objectives of the WINLF was to “… carry out development which was inspired by a feeling of sacred kerja bakti [work of devotion – often in the form of a working bee] in the interests of the nation and people.” In the same month Mustopo associated the West Irian National Liberation Front with more basic aspects of “total people’s resistance” by referring to the WINLF’s role in forming “… a strong basis [for a] home front in confronting the challenge of the danger of subversion from within and outside the country.” and the “… importance of a ‘people’s army’ and ‘people’s defence’ in Indonesia.” “Yang masih kantongi uang Dana Irian Barat: Supaya segera menyerahkan pada FNPIB” (“Those who are still pocketing the West Irian Fund: Hand it over to the West Irian National Liberation Front’), Suluh Indonesia, 28 August 1958.

136 “Keputusan-keputusan Rapat Peperpu dan Peperda: Operasi Keamanan Lebih Diperhebat - Brigade-brigade Pembangunan Diaktifir di Daerah-daerah” (“Decisions of Central Authority and
Further indications of the links between the West Irian National Liberation Front/BKS initiative and “total people’s resistance” were evident in the following month when a visiting President Tito of Yugoslavia awarded Mustopo and Nasution the Star of the People’s Army of Yugoslavia Class II in a ceremony involving the various BKS.  

That the Front was increasingly being seen by the army leadership as integrally involved in seeking the participation of the people in preparations for and the conduct of “total people’s resistance” is evident in the involvement of the WINLF in an institution known as the Pancasila Development Research Centre which had the task of providing education in five basic areas aimed at “facilitating” the WINLF’s command [structure]: “... the intensification of People’s Defence, security, development, education and the welfare of the people.”

While the army was undertaking these activities the BKS/West Irian National Liberation Front initiative remained under threat. When efforts to form the National Front were delayed, Sukarno appointed a Dewan Harian (Daily Board) that first met on 20 January 1961 to discuss the incorporation of the West Irian National Liberation Front and the various Badan Kerja Sama organizations into the National Front.

Nasution stated that whether the West Irian National Liberation Front and the Badan Kerja Sama were dissolved or not, their work would continue. The link between these institutions and concepts of

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Regional War Authorities: Security Operations to be Further Stepped Up – Development Brigades to be Activated in Regions”), Merdeka, 15 December 1958. The wording of this passage was somewhat ambiguous in that it was not entirely clear whether it was the BKS or the territorial organisation which was to be permanent - Mengenai BKS-BKS segera akan diatur dalam rangka organisasi Territorial yang permanent dan akan mendapat panji-panji dari Panglima Tertinggi. The balance of probabilities indicated that it was the BKS which were intended to be permanent. The reference to the Supreme Commander indicates that Nasution presumed that President Sukarno himself would present colours (unit flags) to the various BKS.

137 “Brigjen Mustopo di Hadapan BKS-BKS” (“Brig. Gen. Mustopo in Front of the BKS Organisations”), Merdeka, 8 January 1959. Mustopo’s medal was pinned to his uniform by the youngest member present from the Womens’ - Military BKS. As Ruth McVey points out, in the years prior to the advent of the New Order regime the Indonesian Army had excellent relations with Yugoslavia, “… which was seen as nonaligned, acceptable to respected Western opinion, and opposed by the Indonesian Communists.” R. McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army Part Two” in Indonesia, No. 13, April 1972, p. 169, f.n. 169. That the Yugoslav Army, like the Indonesian Army, had emerged as a territorial warfare force could be added to McVey’s list. As stated in previous chapters, a former senior officer in Tito’s World War Two Yugoslav Army, Dushan Kveder, wrote a tract on territorial warfare (Kveder, Op. Cit.) that was highly influential in Indonesian Army circles.

territorial warfare was underlined when it was announced that the BKS would work through the Inspectorate General of Territorial affairs and People’s Resistance. 139

A further association between the BKS and the concept of mobilising groups for “total people’s resistance” was made when Nasution determined that the army would have the task of mobilising "functional potentials". 140 This was an attempt to maintain the BKS by another name and subsequently, the army formed three new "Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials" (Badan Pembina Potensi Karya - BPPK). 141 As had been the case with the BKS, these bodies reported to the Inspector General of Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance (led by Colonel Sokowati) and to the organisation that replaced it when, in 1961, it was disbanded.

Reeve writes that "From 1961 on the BPPKs operated as a rival to the Front Nasional..." were "...criticised as such by Sukarno and increasingly attacked by the PKI and Partindo (Partai Indonesia) in 1962". 142 This final phase of the BKS project ended when the BPPKs were dissolved on the lifting of martial law in 1963. 143

Despite these setbacks, Nasution continued to press for a more powerful role for functional groups. In addition to the BKS and a number of smaller functional groups, three major army-sponsored functional groups had been formed by 1962. All three continue to exist and are pillars of the Golkar party.

Principal among them was the SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia - The All Indonesian Central Organisation of Workers, mentioned earlier in relation to the Worker-Military BKS) that largely comprised workers in the formerly Dutch owned enterprises taken over by the army after the confiscations of Dutch assets. SOKSI was an amalgam of 25 organisations representing workers and management in government-owned industries and plantations and was a direct counterpart to the PKI-dominated union SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia - The All Indonesia Central Organisation of Labour). Like the Worker-Military BKS, SOKSI paved the way for the New Order’s corporatisation of labour unions.

140 Ibid.
141 These bodies respectively covered Material, Religious and Spiritual functional groups and were chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Amir Murtono (Material), Lieutenant Colonel Harsono (Religious) and Mohd. Isa Idrus (Spiritual). Ibid., p. 182.
142 Ibid., pp. 181-2.
143 Ibid., p. 185.
The second of the major groups was MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong - The Mutual Assistance Familial Consultative Organisation) that was established in 1960. It was originally active in social and religious fields but evolved into a quasi-political organisation.

The third major golongan was Kosgoro (Koperasi Simpan Tabung Gotong Royong - the Mutual Assistance Savings Cooperative) that was founded in 1957. It was at first only open to former members of TRIP (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar - Republic of Indonesia Student Army) but it soon expanded its activities into the political field and began to accept non TRIP members. All three bodies were headed by senior army officers 144 and came to be known collectively as the Trikarya. 145

The Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and the Rise of Golkar

In 1964 the army formed the predecessor of the Golkar Party, the Secretariat-General of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya – Sekbergolkar), largely on the basis of these three bodies. The number of Golkar member organisations steadily increased from 64 in late 1965 to 128 in 1966 and 262 in 1967. 146 The sudden increase in 1966 and 1967 was due to the advent of the New Order regime and the attention it was beginning to pay to developing Sekbergolkar into its political vehicle.

While a discussion of these developments is outside the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that the most influential officer in this process was Major General Sokowati, who was elected General Chairman of Golkar in 1967. 147 Sokowati had replaced Sadikin as Inspector General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance in November 1958. 148

As will be discussed in Chapter Ten, Army Headquarters staff organisations in Jakarta were revamped in the early 1960s when the army reemphasised “total people’s resistance” and sought to use these concepts to facilitate military intervention. 149 In 1961 Nasution replaced the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance with a new fifth branch of the General Staff - Section V

144 SOKSI was led by Lieutenant Colonel Suhardiman, Kosgoro by Lieutenant Colonel Mas Isman and MKGR by Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Soegandhi. Panggabean, Op. Cit., p. 391.
145 For information on these bodies see Suryadinata, Op. Cit., pp. 13, 14.
147 See Reeve, 1985 Op. Cit., for a comprehensive account of this process.
149 Reorganisasi TNI-AD Tahun 1984 (Reorganisation of the Army 1984).
(Staf Umum Angkatan Darat - SUAD V) \(^{150}\) of which Sokowati was the Head. Upgrading the Inspectorate to a Section of the General Staff was a very significant step as most armies only have four branches (Operations, Intelligence, Personnel and Logistics).

This showed that the army now regarded its territorial doctrines and apparatus as having similar importance to the four Staff sections that most armies embraced, and that it was not afraid to embark on initiatives that were shaped by local, rather than international, experience. Sokowati’s seamless transition from Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance to Head of SUAD V and then to the Chair of Golkar indicates the association that existed in the minds of the army leadership between the army’s management and sponsorship of functional groups and the doctrines for military intervention that it began to develop around the strategies for “total people’s resistance” that Nasution developed in the 1940s.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown how Nasution appropriated organicist thinking and exploited its compatibility with his own strategies for the army’s political role in society and other integrative aspects of “people’s resistance”. I have shown that planning for important aspects of this process was set in train some time before Sukarno’s advocacy of corporatist / functional modes of interest representation in his Konsepsi speech. These included Pamurahardjo’s covert approach to developing the first BKS organisation from within the Inspectorate-General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance and Djokosutono’s assistance to Nasution in developing formulas for limited military intervention.

I have shown that the army officers involved associated the BKS from the outset with “people’s resistance”, using the West Papua issue as their rationale, and that in stating this objective Nasution again harked back to an idealized version of the guerrilla campaigns. In drawing attention to Nasution’s association of his “people’s resistance” concepts with organic corporatist / functional

\(^{150}\) Ibid. In 1963, two additional branches were added to the Army General Staff. According to Pauker, Section V now managed the army’s territorial warfare function and Section VI its involvement in forming and managing functional groups. As Pauker put it, both sections were aimed at enabling the Indonesian officer corps "to play a major role in the government of the country and to mobilise extensive popular support, of a political nature, behind army policies." Pauker, 1963 Op. Cit., p. 22. On the other hand, the army’s own document states that Section VI was to manage the placement of officers in organizations outside the army. Reorganisasi Angkatan Darat, Op. Cit., p. 18. Whatever the case, the fact remains that the Indonesian Army retained a specialist section or sections on the Headquarters Staff that looked after the army’s more conventional territorial functions and its involvement in functional groups and this organization had its origins in the old Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance that founded the BKS initiative.
modes of interest representation in the BKS initiative I have shown that it embodied Nasution’s elective affinities between “people’s resistance” and an organicist vision of the proper relationship between the state (including the military) and society.
Nasution did not play a leading role in the development of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. By the late-1950s he was too busy for such direct involvement and in 1962 Sukarno succeeded in sidelining him to a resurrected but relatively powerless Armed Forces Chief of Staff appointment.  

Sunarti writes that by the early 1960s relations between Nasution and Sukarno had become increasingly tense, with the President expressing resentment at Nasution’s (and Sunarti’s) opposition to the President’s polygamy and sexual promiscuity.

By this time the Nasutions had a second daughter, Ade, who was born in 1960. No doubt based on the unusually small size of their family and the many years that separated the births of their daughters, “deplorable” rumours were being circulated that Nasution was not the father of their two daughters “… because, they said, Pak Nas was unable to father children.”

Of course, there were deeper elements to the tensions between the two men. Sukarno had become wary of being dominated by the army and Nasution was dismayed at the President’s increasing closeness to the PKI. Nasution’s career never recovered after being sidelined, and he fell out with the New Order regime in the early 1970s. He spent most of the rest of his life in an oppositional relationship to the New Order, to the point where the regime placed tight restrictions on his movements and banned him from leaving the country.

Nevertheless, I shall argue that the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management that was developed at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) in the early 1960s embodied the elective affinities between Nasution’s strategies for “people’s resistance” and his organicist vision of the proper relations between the state and society. Drawing upon Indonesian Army training documents, I shall identify the use of “people’s resistance” strategies to exert

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1 Nasution attempted to assert control over the rapidly developing navy and air force by pressing for the creation of a position of Armed Forces Commander which would entail command of all the separate services. Nasution eventually accepted the dual appointments of Minister for Defence and the newly created position of ABRI Commander (Panglima ABRI), relinquishing the Army Chief of Staff appointment. At the (manipulated) urging of the Air Force Chief of Staff, Omar Dhani, the president subsequently converted the positions of "chiefs of staff" of the four services to "commander" (panglima) while changing Nasution's military appointment from panglima to ABRI Chief of Staff. Therefore, operational command and control gravitated to the four services commanders who, under the 1945 Constitution, were formally accountable to the President and Supreme Commander, Sukarno. The position of Armed Forces Chief of Staff held relatively little power and Nasution's other position of Minister for Defence was also lacking in real influence. The more personally and culturally congenial Achmad Yani (who was Javanese and known to be sexually promiscuous) was appointed Army Chief of Staff. While Yani shared the concern of many officers about the influence of the PKI he was nevertheless more prepared to work more closely with the president than Nasution. For an account of Sukarno's sidelining of Nasution see Crouch, 1978 Op. Cit., pp 344, 345.

control over civilian populations, and organicist elements, such as antipathy towards “imported” ideas like communism, liberalism and individualism.

I shall also examine whether the doctrine accorded with Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm of military intervention in politics. Stepan has suggested that there are similarities between his paradigm and military intervention in politics, the economy and society during the New Order period but I shall argue that this intervention, based as it largely was on the 1960s Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, was unusual and probably unique, embodying as it did Nasution’s “people’s resistance” strategies as a means of intervening in society.

By 1962, Nasution’s deep involvement in military and political affairs appears to have left him little time for the personal and family relationships that I have referred to in earlier chapters, Nevertheless, I shall show that Nasution continued to support pamong praja interests in the late 1950s.

Finally, I shall draw attention to the continuing adherence of the Indonesian Army leadership (at the end of 2004) to the territorial structures and doctrines that Nasution pioneered and transformed into a pervasive and durable form of military intervention in politics, society and the economy.

New Doctrines and Command Structures

Nasution moved to strengthen the army’s system of territorial commands and the territorial administrative apparatus at Army Headquarters soon after his defeat of the regional rebellions in 1958. He took steps to reduce the authority of individual commanders so that they would be more responsive to central direction by dividing the seven existing Tentara dan Territorium into sixteen (later seventeen) smaller territorial commands. These were termed Military Area Commands (Komando Daerah Militer – Kodam).  

3 The seven Tentara dan Territorium were split into the following sixteen (seventeen after the incorporation of West Irian) Komando Daerah Militer (KODAMs):

- Kodam I/Iskandarmuda – Aceh
- Kodam II/Bukit Barisan – North Sumatra
- Kodam III/17 Agustus – West Sumatra
- Kodam IV/Sriwijaya – South Sumatra and Jambi
- Kodam V/Jaya – Greater Jakarta
- Kodam VI/Siliwangi – West Java
- Kodam VII/Diponegoro – Central Java
- Kodam VIII/Brawijaya – East Java
- Kodam IX/Mulawarman – East Kalimantan
- Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat – South Kalimantan
- Kodam XI/Tambun Bungai – Central Kalimantan
- Kodam XII/Tanjung Pura – West Kalimantan
- Kodam XIII/Merdeka – North and Central Sulawesi
- Kodam XIV/Hasanuddin – South and Southeastern Sulawesi

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Each Kodam covered a single densely populated province or a number of smaller ones. This enabled commanders to more closely shadow their civilian administrative counterparts. Over time the system was expanded into something like the present system which provides for a number of Korem (Komando Resort Militer) or Military Provincial Commands, equating roughly to a province in more populated areas or a number of provinces in outlying regions. Further down the chain are Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer) Military District Commands, which are generally equivalent to Kabupaten or Regency administrative districts, and Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer) Military Sector Commands which generally correspond with the Kecamatan or Sub-District level of administration.

The “shadow administration” the Dutch had complained about in 1949 was now much more deeply entrenched. Many of the Kodam headquarters were located in provincial capitals and army regional commanders were able to shadow more provincial administrations than had been possible under the Tentara dan Territorium system.

The reorganization greatly expanded Nasution’s opportunities to dispense patronage as the number of command appointments and promotion opportunities available to the officer corps increased substantially. Nasution was also aiming to use these structures to exert greater control over the activities of the PKI throughout the country. Soebijono, who was involved in developing the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, writes that the system was eventually extended right into the rural villages to counter the party at the grassroots:

Another step that the Armed Forces took to counter the strength of the PKI, particularly in the regions, was the enhancement of the territorial organization in accordance with the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare. At the end of 1962 at the [Ministry of Home Affairs] sub-district level Military Sector Commands were established and from 1963 Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers were placed in the villages.

As discussed in Chapter Nine, army headquarters staff organisations in Jakarta also experienced a shake-up when in 1961 Nasution replaced the Inspectorate-General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance with a new fifth branch of the General Staff - Section V (Staf Umum Angkatan Darat - SUAD V). Meanwhile, the army was embarking on far-reaching changes to its doctrines that were intended to cement in place the role of the army as leader of “people’s resistance”.

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Kodam XV/Pattimura Maluku and Irian Jaya
Kodam XVI/Udayana West Lesser Sundas
Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih Irian Jaya (formed in August 1962)

5 A former commander of the armed forces, Maraden Panggabean, observed that the ratification of this doctrine and the rapid proliferation of territorial commands that took place from the early 1960s was “a thorn in the side of the PKI”, Panggabean, Op. Cit., p. 280.
Attempts to Control Rural Populations

With the acquisition of martial law powers the army had increasingly sought to influence rural populations that were showing a tendency to vote for the PKI. Lev writes that in Java the army’s use of these powers at the grassroots was to cause friction with the pamong praja who came to realise that their positions were actually being usurped by their erstwhile allies:

Throughout Java the army initially worked with and through the pamong praja, which remained the effective administration over the island. In part, this reflected not only the prestige of the pamong praja but also a concurrence of interest between the pamong praja and the army, neither of which was sympathetic to the political parties or had any profound commitment to a parliamentary order. Within two years, however, local army commands began to make their presence felt in the villages, a traditional sphere of influence of the pamong praja, and the latter soon began to turn back to the parties for help. 7

Lev also notes, however, that Nasution came to the pamong praja’s rescue when parliament passed a new decentralization law in 1957 (Law No. 1/1957) that would have seen the already declining pamong praja eliminated altogether in favour of elected local councils. In local elections in that year the PKI improved its vote further on its performance in the general elections two years earlier, causing even more consternation within the pamong praja. Lev writes that an alliance of mutual interest developed between the corps and the army that saw Nasution demand that the law be reconsidered:

The pamong praja was in fact rescued and its position greatly strengthened by new regional administration laws in 1959, which served also to weaken the parties’ hold on local government. 8

Again, Nasution had asserted a partnership between the army and the pamong praja but it was an increasingly lopsided one. The imposition of martial law saw the introduction of committees in the regions comprising the regional commander, the head of the pamong praja in the area, members of the regional assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – DPD) and the regional chief of police. Legge points out that this “…naturally constituted a limitation of authority upon the freedom of local authorities.” 9

Throughout the period of martial law a pattern of government was developed at the provincial level in which territorial management decisions were made by a committee of four or Catur Tunggal [Four in One] comprising the “…territorial military commander, the civil governor, the chief of

8 Ibid., f.n. 29. For a discussion of moves toward regional autonomy at the time, including extracts of Law No 1/1957 see J.D. Legge, Central authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1959-1960, Op. Cit.
9 Ibid., p. 205. Legge goes on to point out that the extent to which regional military commanders exerted their influence through these committees “…varied from area to area and upon the regional commander himself.” “…There was a more restricted limit in fact than there was in theory to the emergency powers of the army and there was no detailed military intervention in civil administration.” Ibid., pp. 205, 206.
police, and the district attorney.” 10 Under martial law the military commander, rather than the civil governor, chaired these meetings. These arrangements were a direct throwback to the system Nasution devised in 1948 where territorial commanders became military governors in times of war.

The army increasingly inserted its presence into the pamong praja’s traditional domain of the rural village. Civic mission programs were developed which were intended to win “hearts and minds” by improving conditions for village populations. Army units became involved in constructing roads and public buildings and assisting in programs such as land reform and the development of local industry.

As discussed in Chapter Seven, the army had used such strategies in the early 1950s in West Java, where the Darul Islam insurrection continued after the transfer of sovereignty. In the mid 1950s the Commander of the Tasikmalaya-based 11th Infantry Regiment, Major Suwarto, formulated an integrated military, economic and socio-political strategy to separate Darul Islam insurgents from local communities. 11

Suwarto gradually assumed Nasution’s mantle as the army’s main territorial warfare strategist. Like Nasution, Suwarto was a former CORO cadet. 12 He had been an officer in Nasution’s Siliwangi Division during the revolution where he acquired first-hand experience of waging “total people’s resistance”. Like other Siliwangi officers (including Nasution) he first became interested in concepts of “total people’s resistance” after reading Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China in 1946. 13

He was apparently a charismatic and highly intelligent officer 14 who held views associated with the PSI. 15 His ideas on counter-insurgency gained wide attention in April 1956 when he announced a “Five Year Plan” to finalise the Darul Islam rebellion. Suwarto’s plan predated the general elections and he expressed the hope that the incoming government would “take it over” to “assist the people and release them from the depths of despair that they have suffered thus far.” 16

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14 See, for example, Molly Bondan’s brief but respectful account of her association with Suwarto during the revolution in Yogyakarta in J. Hardjono and C. Warners (eds.) In Love With a Nation: Molly Bondan and Indonesia, Picton, Charles Warner, 1995, p. 89. Maraden Panggabean, a former Armed Forces Commander and influential figure within Golkar, writes respectfully about Suwarto’s role in developing army doctrine and of his affection for Suwarto, who died at the relatively young age of 46 in September 1967. See Panggabean, Op. Cit., pp. 279, 280, 363.
15 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, 1984, p. 203, f.n. 35.
In a similar vein to the concepts of “total people’s resistance” developed by Nasution in the revolutionary period, Suwarto’s concept provided for a leading role for the army in the mobilisation of all governmental apparatus and the people, as reported by Merdeka:

He [Suwarto] affirmed that in his ‘five year plan to restore security’, the restoration of security had to be carried out in a planned and integrated manner. All of the machinery and apparatus of the state and the people were to be mobilised in order to participate in accordance with their respective capacities, with the military [acting as] exponents. 17

By 1958, when the army was finding it difficult to deal with rebel troops after they retreated from urban centres and resorted to guerrilla warfare, 18 Nasution formed the Army Doctrine Committee (of which Suwarto was an influential member) which recommended that territorial warfare be the basis of Indonesia’s defence doctrines. 19

The New Doctrine and “New Professionalism”

Suwarto was to become deeply involved in attempts by the United States to introduce what Stepan has termed “new professionalism” into the Indonesian Army. As discussed in Chapter Three, Stepan observed that in some Third World states the educational and training institutions that had fostered military professionalism had been redirected into researching, developing and teaching techniques aimed at denying left-wing people’s movements the opportunity to exploit social and economic grievances.

These training systems and doctrines became increasingly concerned with fostering more favourable social conditions through “military role expansion and ‘managerialism’ in the political sphere.” Stepan cites, in particular, the redirection of Brazil’s Escola Superior do Guerra (ESG) or Superior War College towards internal security and nation building. He conjectures that other Third World armies may have followed a similar course, and mentions Indonesia as a specific example. There is a great deal of evidence in support of this.

Suwarto and Pauker

From the early 1960s the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) became increasingly involved in developing doctrines of internal security and national development. Suwarto undertook training at Fort Leavenworth in the United States in 1959 and on his return became the Deputy Commandant of the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat - Seskoad).

17 Ibid.
18 As Pauker points out: "... the rebels were now 'like fish in the water,' to use Mao Tse-tung's classic simile, while the loyalist troops were like occupation forces in an enemy country. The initial victories of 1958 had only led to protracted war in hostile territory." Pauker, 1963 Op. Cit., p. 16.
19 This was endorsed by the Provisional People’s Consultative Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara – MPRS) in December 1960. Panggabean, Op. Cit., p. 280.
By this time he had become associated with Guy Pauker, who was associated with the Rand Corporation, a U.S. “think tank”. Pauker had made extensive contacts within the army leadership during visits to Indonesia from the mid 1950s, first with a team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and then with the Rand Corporation. At the time, the US government that was in the process of providing increased aid to the Indonesian Army.

As discussed in Chapter Nine, the US had backed the PRRI/Permesta rebels, to the point of providing weapons and conducting air strikes against government forces. Following the embarrassing failure of this policy the US had freed up its military aid to Indonesia in the hope that Nasution and the army would provide a bulwark against the rising influence of the PKI. In 1958 and 1959 Nasution had organised the purchase of aircraft from Eastern Bloc countries, including Mig-15 trainers, Mig-17 fighters, IL-28 bombers and IL-14 transports. In late 1959 the US sought to counter the rising influence of the Eastern Bloc in Indonesia by agreeing to the sale of 50 military aircraft including 10 transports, and allowed Indonesia to make other private purchases.

It was within this context of heightened US concern about Indonesia’s relationship with Communist countries and renewed cooperation between the US Government and elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces that Suwarto, at Pauker’s invitation, visited the Rand Corporation in the United States in 1962.

In a process that resembled the refocusing of Third World armies from conventional military threats to “new professionalism”, the Rand Corporation had redirected its activities from a conventional defence focus to a number of other areas, including “… economic, social and political affairs overseas …”. In a similar rationale to that adopted by “new professional forces”, it did so because of “… Cold War competition..”. In the case of the United States and its Rand Corporation, this competition was “… with the Soviet Union …”.

Pauker subsequently stated that Suwarto learnt "all sorts of things about international affairs" at Rand and saw how Rand "organises the academic resources of the country as consultants". Suwarto returned to Indonesia with the "new idea" of inviting some top Indonesian US-trained economists at the University of Indonesia to lecture at Seskoad. The "mini Rand" created under Suwarto's influence a generation of officers who passed through the School.

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22 "In effect this group became the army's high level civilian advisers. They were joined at Seskoad by other PSI and Masyumi alumni of the university programs - Miriam Budiardjo from Pauker's MIT study group, and Selosoemardjan from Kahin's program at Cornell, as well as senior faculty from the nearby Bandung Institute of Technology, where the University of Kentucky had been 'institution building for AID since 1957.'" Ransom. *Op. Cit.*, p. 102.
As discussed in Chapter Eight, in 1958 Professor Djokosutono took over the leadership of the University of Indonesia’s Faculty of Economics. That Djokosutono was favourably disposed to the ideas being espoused by the US-educated economists in the Faculty is evidenced by the cooperative arrangements with the Ford Foundation and the University of California, Berkeley, that were developed during his tenure. As also noted in Chapter Eight, Djokosutono strove to prevent the Faculty from being taken over by “leftists on the teaching staff” and he joined other staff from the Faculty in lecturing at Seskoad.

According to Utrecht, the lectures of the staff from the University of Indonesia reflected "a growing impatience [within the military] with the prevalence of civil authority over its affairs and an increasing propensity to, itself, interfere deeper in civil administration." And, "On balance it may be concluded that during the final eight years of Sukarno's rule, the military dictatorship of 1966 was being prepared in Seskoad." David Ransom describes the development of 'contingency plans' at Seskoad to be implemented in the event of Sukarno's sudden death, aimed at preventing a PKI takeover of the country.

The New Doctrine

It was at Seskoad and under Suwanto’s direction that territorial warfare doctrines were developed into what became known as the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. At an operational level, a three-phase plan was formulated. In the first phase attempts would be made, primarily by the navy and air force, to repel an external threat. However, these branches of the armed forces were considered bound to fail given their lack of capability. In the second phase the army would play a predominant role, constantly inflicting damage on the enemy while avoiding engagements which would entail its own destruction and making preparations for a counter-offensive to drive the enemy out. The counter-offensive was to be the third phase.

In countering insurgencies, the revised doctrine of territorial warfare concentrated on obtaining the support and assistance of local communities. This entailed villagers carrying out such duties as surrounding guerrilla redoubts in a pagar betis (wall of feet) during military operations in order to alert the army to any attempt by guerrillas to break the encirclement. Army officers attributed such tactics to their eventual success against the Darul Islam insurgents in mid 1962.

Indonesian officers became familiar with the influential paper written by the Yugoslav Army Lieutenant-General Dushan Kveder, who fought in Tito’s Yugoslav Army in World War Two. As

25 Ibid., p. 78.
26 Ibid., p. 76.
discussed in earlier chapters, Kveder defines territorial warfare as a form of conflict in which technically inferior forces operate opportunistically throughout a territory that is under dispute. He emphasises that while guerrilla forces are an integral part of territorial warfare, the ultimate aim of exponents of this form of warfare is to develop large, conventional forces that are capable of taking the offensive and achieving a military victory. 29

The operational aspects of the territorial warfare doctrine were to be supported by an associated doctrine of territorial management. This envisaged the army having a wide interventionist role in virtually all areas of national life, ostensibly at least in order to be better able to mobilise the civilian populace for territorial warfare.

The doctrine was to describe territorial warfare as "... a form of warfare which is total in nature. It utilises all national forces in a total fashion ..." 30 The definition of "national forces" included "the national potential in the military, political-economic-social, spiritual, and civic (or people's) fields".31 In order to achieve a resilient defence capability there needed to be "territorial management" (pembinaan wilayah) in order to supervise all these areas. 32

Whereas preparing for territorial warfare was the army’s pretext for leading and mobilising the population, territorial management set out the army’s concept of an ideal Indonesian citizen and provided guidelines for intervening in non-military affairs in the cause of managing the human and other resources needed for territorial warfare.

The doctrine of territorial management was intended to provide the army with an ongoing "... leading role in civil affairs ..." in the widely-expected event of the lifting of martial law in 1963.33 Suwarto hoped to maintain this leading role through courses and seminars aimed at acquainting "a substantial number of senior officials to understand the relationship between Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, hoping that this would create enough consensus between civilian and military authorities to help them close ranks." 34

**The New Doctrine and “New Professionalism”**

In that Suwarto’s United States-backed “mini Rand” at Seskoad employed its military training and doctrinal development techniques to focus on countering a perceived internal threat from the left, the territorial management doctrines developed there accorded closely with Alfred

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29 Kveder, *Op. Cit.* From the late 1950s Indonesian officers increasingly used the term “territorial warfare” to describe “total people’s resistance” strategies as links were forged with Yugoslavia (whose army had a similar guerrilla background and had developed a system of “people’s resistance” known as Total National Defence).
Stepan’s description of “military managerialism” in his theory of “New Professionalism” (discussed in Chapter Three). Indeed, like the Brazilian military, the Indonesian Army’s response to the threat posed by “the common people” … “many of whom are found in the Communist ranks” was to hold out the promise of better living standards through a process of “nation building” and enhanced internal security.  

As also stated in Chapter Three, the Indonesian Army’s particular style of military intervention in politics and the economy was so similar to that of the Brazilian military in the 1970s that Stepan suggested that “… either Brazil must be considered a deviant case, or one must suggest an alternative framework that is capable of incorporating Brazil, Peru … and, I suspect, a number of other countries, such as Indonesia, as the predictable outcome of the new paradigm.”  

However, in that chapter I contended that it would be wrong to view military intervention in Indonesia primarily as a manifestation of Stepan’s “new professionalism”. Indeed, the differences between Stepan’s paradigm and the Indonesian case are useful in identifying the unusual style of military intervention that developed in Indonesia.

Lack of “Old Professional” Characteristics

The “new professionalism” paradigm presupposes that a military force with “old professional” characteristics becomes politicised and engages in military intervention. However, this was hardly the case in Indonesia. After the departure of the Netherlands Military Mission in 1953 the Indonesian Army was unusual among post-colonial forces in not employing permanent foreign advisors, resulting in the army remaining relatively untouched by overseas influences.  

The TNI actually lacked an entry-level military academy between 1950 (when the revolutionary period Akademi Militer Nasional in Yogyakarta closed its doors) and November 1957 (when it reopened in Magelang).  

Because of this lack of other training institutions, Seskoad (or SSKAD as it was known before 1961) occupied a particularly important place in Indonesian military training throughout the 1950s.

36 Alfred Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil, 1973, p. 48. The italics are mine.
37 McVey, 1972 Op. Cit., p. 170. She comments perceptively: “Nonetheless, an effective military machine was created, and if the process was accompanied by many expensive mistakes it resulted in an army that was probably more capable of handling the situation at home than it would have had it been guided by outsiders. Moreover, consciousness that the army was shaping its own character counted a great deal for its internal morale and the prestige of its leaders.” Ibid.
38 See Ibid., pp. 162-4 for an account of the rivalry within the army that prevented an academy being re-opened sooner.
From the mid-to-late 1950s, the Staff College began to use United States doctrine. However, in line with the spirit of not wishing to draw too heavily on overseas influences, in January 1961 Seskoad was upgraded to a “principal command” [komando utama] so that it could both educate officers and develop “a doctrine of our own” (doktrin sendiri – doks). This process led to the emergence of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

The most important influence the Indonesian Army brought to its new doctrines was its own history as a “people’s resistance” force. Again, this process differs markedly from those described by Stepan, who notes that “new professionalism” arose out of the history of conventional armies that had engaged in conflict with unconventional revolutionary forces; Stepan mentions China, Indochina, Algeria and Cuba.

The situation in Indonesia was very different. The TNI had pursued an unconventional “people’s war” guerrilla strategy against the conventional Dutch military and it was to this experience that it turned in the 1960s when Suwarto and Seskoad came under the influence of United States thinking on “internal warfare and military role expansion”.

Moreover, the types of military intervention Stepan describes in his observations of authoritarian Brazil and Peru differ in many ways from those espoused in the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. In large part this was due to the different histories of the Indonesian Army and these Latin American armed forces. In the early 1960s Indonesia was still a very young nation, having declared its independence only a decade and a half earlier, while Brazil and Peru were long-established nation states.

39 “At the beginning, when the [Indonesian] Army did not yet possess its own formulated and confirmed doctrine, all the teaching materials which were at hand were those of the Staff and Command School at Fort Leavenworth. They had to be translated ... and also field manuals, advanced sheets [sic], lesson plans and so on. At the beginning, the teaching materials of the Staff and Command School at Fort Leavenworth of 1956 were used at Seskoad and then we changed them gradually for the Fort Leavenworth teaching materials of 1960-61.” "Perkembangan dan Kegiatan Seskoad sedjak Didirikan hingga Sekarang”, Karya Wira Jati 13 (1964). From Mrazek, Op. Cit., p. 125.


41 In 1971, Seskoad later summarized developments from 1951 as follows:

c. The phase of perfecting and developing own doctrines (1965 – henceforth).

The Indonesian Army Command and Staff College: General Informations [sic.] 1971, p. 12.


43 Brazil became independent in 1822 after three centuries of Portuguese rule and the Armed Forces of Brazil had a correspondingly long history. Like Indonesia in the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, Brazil experimented with authoritarian corporatism after Getfio Vargas came to power in a coup in 1930. In 1945 Vargas was in turn ousted by a military coup. In 1951 Vargas was again elected president but committed suicide in 1954. In 1964 the authoritarian military regime described by Stepan came to power.
The armed forces of Brazil had developed “old professional” characteristics over many
decades. Indeed, Stepan writes that by the time the Brazilian armed forces adopted “new
professionalism” they had developed a “highly evolved” education and training system. It was
these pillars of “old professionalism” that were transformed into “centres of the new
professionalism.”

As also discussed in Chapter Three, in response to perceptions of a threat of insurgency and
social revolution the military in these countries shifted their focus from external defence to
internal security and to nation building activities. While retaining a highly professional outlook
—including the operation of training courses and the development of doctrine—the armed forces
in these countries diverted their well-developed training courses and doctrinal development
activities to this perceived threat and new focus. In doing so, they began to emphasise training
in political affairs and activities matters that they believed would equip them to handle the
political aspects of their internal security duties.

By the early 1960s, under the tutelage of the United States military, the Brazilian Armed Forces
had shifted from their previous focus on external defence to an almost exclusive focus on
counter insurgency. Stepan noted a decline in the authority of civilian governments as the
military acquired increasing expertise and involvement in internal security and national
development, while the concentration on internal security led to unrestricted political activity by
military officers, their politicisation, and a “military role expansion and ‘managerialism’ in the
political sphere.”

However, the type of managerialism that emerged from within the think tanks of Seskoad did
not entail a substantial shift in focus from “frontier defence”, being based on the strategies of

44 Brazil was the only country in Latin America to enter the Second World War. After declaring
war on the Axis powers in 1942 Brazil despatched a substantial expeditionary force (25,000
men) that fought in major battles in Italy. Moreover, Brazil’s Navy provided escorts to Allied
convoys to Europe.
46 Stepan notes that this shift coincided with a significant shift in United States Policy:
“In 1961 the United States shifted the rationale of its U.S. military assistance programs away
from ‘hemispheric defence’ to that of ‘internal security.’
“The doctrine of counterinsurgency which the United States emphasized at its military schools
attended by Latin American officers, stated that revolutionary warfare involved the economic,
political, and ideological sectors, as well as the military.
“Both the U.S. military schools and the U.S. military missions implicitly and explicitly urged
the Latin American military missions to shift their attention from traditional missions such as
frontier defence, or from any goals that entailed acquiring and mastering ‘sophisticated’ military
hardware, in order to concentrate instead on the domestic problems of insurgency and the ways
to prevent or curtail it.”
Alfred Stepan, Military Assistance Training. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National
Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of
Representatives, Ninety-First Session, October 6,7,8, December 8, and 15, 1970, p. 106.
“total people’s resistance” that Nasution developed in the 1940s. Unlike the Brazilians, with the exception of some basic and feebly opposed combined air, sea and land operations during the PRRI/Permesta revolt, the Indonesian Armed Forces had never participated in conflict above the guerrilla or counter-insurgency level and their mastery of weapons technology and battlefield tactics was very low.

The new Indonesian doctrines diverged from Stepan’s Latin American examples most where they were based on the Indonesian Army’s own core experience of waging armed struggle against the Dutch. While they clearly provided for “… military-political managerialism and role expansion” the type of managerialism they proposed was firmly rooted in aspects of the “people’s resistance” campaigns of the armed struggle against the Dutch.

As Robert Elson points out, the Indonesian Army’s new doctrines, based as they were on the experience of the armed struggle, led to the emergence of an interventionist doctrine that emphasised “total people’s resistance”:

Taking as their starting-point the idea of a territorial army esconced with the people, set out by Nasution in the late 1940s and after, Suwarto’s [Seskoad] group drew out its implications for the Army’s relationship with Indonesia’s broader society. The notion was not just that the army should be amongst the people, but that it should also seek to manage [Elson’s italics] affairs within its territorial areas, including the idea that there should be developed a parallel army administration side by side with the civilian territorial administration controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs, with a mandate to check and supervise these authorities.

Elson’s comment that the army intended to “manage affairs within its territorial areas” points to the emergence of a form of managerialism in Indonesia that harked back to Nasution’s strategies for the military administration which envisaged the army leading and mobilising civilian populations with the pamong praja as its junior partner. With this relationship clearly in mind, the Doctrine recommended that “Close cooperation between the commanders of Military Regions and the governors/chiefs of First-Level Regions must be initiated in peacetime.” The military territorial command structures were also to shadow civil administrations at the Regency and Sub-District levels.

Moreover, rather than tie its Doctrine of Territorial Management exclusively to the internal threat the Indonesian Army drew upon its origins as a “people’s resistance” force. It put forward a hypothetical (and most unlikely) external threat of invasion as a rationale for mobilizing the population and making other preparations to wage a war of “total people’s resistance”. In effect, the army was layering the “internal warfare and military role expansion” approach adopted by other

48 Ibid., p. 52.
51 “The same principles [of establishing territorial command boundaries] should be applied in deciding on the regional boundaries of military districts and second-level regions.” Ibid., p. 109.
“new professional” forces over its own history and ethos of external defence through “total people’s resistance”.

This transformation of doctrines originally directed towards external defence into a rationale for military intervention across the archipelago and down to the grassroots of society was a particularly unusual and even ingenious approach to military intervention. In the early 1960s Pauker went further, describing the “… political conception underlying the doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management” as “… shrewd and even brilliant…”.

The New Doctrine and Organicist Thinking

While the new doctrine did not fit neatly within the “new professionalism” paradigm, territorial management had an agenda that accorded closely with organicist thinking. Indeed, aspects of it would not have looked out of place in Supomo’s address to the BPUPKI or Kahin’s description of the aims of the PIR.

Territorial management stressed political stability, national unity, a harmonious blending of the elements in the war potential of a nation. It warned that “… the infiltration of foreign ideologies into the body of the people can endanger the well-being of the state and the unity of the people.”

It aimed at suppressing "antagonistic elements" including “individualism and liberalism”, “international communism”, “negative religious fanaticism”, and “atheism”.

It advocated territorial managers use different methods of approach to change the attitudes of different social groups: “the educated upper group (the elite, the wealthy) many of whom are found in the currents of liberalism, individualism and feudalism”; “the common people” … “many of whom are found in the Communist ranks”; the “orthodox group of people, many of whom are found in fanatical religious movements”; and “those groups of citizens who are inspired by feelings of regional separatism and narrow ethnocentrism”.

It is clear that the new Doctrine was intended to promote social stability. I have already mentioned its reference to “antagonistic elements” which the army intended to suppress altogether or at least weaken. A paper on Territorial Warfare by the Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance emphasises this concern for stability and the belief that Panca Sila would act as an antidote to “foreign” ideologies that would be detrimental to the achievement of social stability:

The objective of control in these [the political and psychological] fields is to strengthen the people’s moral defence power. This is encouraged by indoctrinating them in the ideology of

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52 Ibid., p. 46.
53 “Basic Thoughts on Territorial Management by the Department of the Army Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance”, Ibid., pp. 301, 2.
55 Ibid., pp. 145, 146.
the Pancasila and by achieving political stability. Conscious indoctrination in the Pancasila will provide a powerful defence against the penetration of foreign ideologies, ideologies which are raging in the international world at this time and whose areas of influence are increasing. The infiltration of these foreign ideologies into the body of the people can endanger the well-being of the state and the unity of the people.  

This doctrine represented the final stage in the transformation of Nasution’s strategies for “people’s war” into overt means of military intervention that accorded with Nasution’s own social conservatism and his concern to put a brake on threats to the social order through an emphasis on organicist thinking. That the doctrine was influential long after Nasution’s direct influence over the army had evaporated entirely is evident in the following excerpts from Seskoad’s core publication for students, Vademikum, issued at the height of the regime’s reign in 1987.  

According to Vademikum, the first two areas of vulnerability at the national level were:

1. Communism, which in its essence does not tolerate the participation of all citizens within the political system.
2. Liberalism, which in its essence emphasizes individualism in an extreme manner, which disturbs social harmony and balance and particularly a social sense of community.

Elsewhere the manual counselled territorial staff to impart a sound understanding of Pancasila, to foster “loyal and moderate” religious teaching, and to develop a culture of consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) as means of making decisions and resolving issues. It referred to “the spirit of the preamble to the 1945 Constitution” as “… containing characteristics of openness and the provision of opportunities for new social energies and dynamics to participate within the system. Thus, in a strategic manner social changes and dymanism can be absorbed and integrated into the system.”

Vademikum contained similar advice on how to communicate with different social groups, such as intellectuals and the Muslim community, while an apparently new section advised officers on how to handle the “Chinese problem” (“through implanting a spirit of Indonesian nationality and eradicating characteristics of exclusivism within citizens of Chinese descent”).

Socio-political operations had objectives that accorded particularly closely with the traditional values espoused by Supomo and taken up by Nasution. They included “a basis of musyawarah” and “gotong royong / kekeluargaan”.

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56 “Basic Thoughts on Territorial Management by the Department of the Army Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, Ibid., pp. 301, 2.
58 Ibid., p. 194.
59 Ibid., pp. 195, 196.
60 Ibid., pp. 197, 198.
61 Ibid., p. 207.
Significantly, in view of the particular nature of their organicist origins, Javanese was often used to describe particular concepts, with Indonesian translations offered. An example is *tut wuri handayani* (to influence and provide impetus from behind).  

The *Catur Tunggal* committees of the 1960s had by this time been replaced by Regional Leadership Consultation Committees (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah* – Muspida). These were to be chaired by province governor and bupati (depending on the level of government) and membership included the local military and police commanders and the head of the attorney general’s office. The aims of these committees were to “facilitate the implementation of development throughout all parts of the nation and to develop political stability and national unity”.

The new doctrines that emerged from the 1960s overturned the emphasis of Seskoad education, with top marks given to officers who did well in territorial, rather than operational subjects, and future assignments for such officers tended to be much more prestigious and lucrative than for their more “old professional” colleagues. For example, David Jenkins wrote in 1983:

> Assignments given to officers who have completed the course at Seskoad reflect the pre-eminent position of the territorial apparatus. While the top ten or twelve graduates may be selected by the intelligence service to serve as military attaches, those immediately below them are generally given Korem [territorial] commands.”

Jenkins also described how officers were specifically trained to intervene in such activities as influencing the outcome of general elections:

> As part of their course work, mid career officers at Seskoad study the mounting of a territorial intelligence exercise during the run-up to a general election. They decide the groups to target and what sort of psychological operations should be launched against them. ... inevitably in these exercises the political parties are listed as targets, with special attention being paid to which members of these groups are of particular interest. The 'targets' also include informal leaders in the community -- a man who stands up and commands attention at the local mosque, a student leader, and so on.

Clearly, Suwarto’s use of Nasution’s strategies as the basis for the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management resulted in a highly unusual, durable and pervasive form of military intervention. In the final part of this chapter I shall briefly explore the extent to which territorial concepts and the anti-party attitudes on which they were based have survived into the post-New Order period.

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“Total People’s Resistance” After the New Order

In Chapter One, I discussed how in the period of *reformasi* following the collapse of the New Order the army severed its ties with Golkar, distanced itself from the functional group concept, and set about restructuring its “total people’s resistance” doctrines so that they emphasised external, rather than internal, defence. The experience of East Timor’s transition to independence was a particular indication of a need for change. The army had organised militia bands in that territory, under the banner of “total people’s resistance”, whose behaviour was so barbaric that it attracted world attention. 66

However, regional conflicts in a number of parts of Indonesia provided a rationale for putting a stop to this process, and for a reversion to old habits in the form of the army establishing new territorial commands, rather than closing them down. In this climate, the current army leadership began to strongly and frequently defend the territorial structures and territorial management role as being indispensable in maintaining national unity. For example, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu made the following statements in a July 2002 media interview:

> We don’t need to copy the defence models of other countries, because they are not yet appropriate for application in our nation. Here in Indonesia the nature of the state has not been finalised as it has in advanced countries. We are still facing a number of problems, particularly social conflict and separatism in a number of regions. Because of that, what is needed [is thinking about] how to enhance the resources that we possess – human and equipment. …

> It has been put to the test, how this country is still standing and how rebellions have been able to be eradicated. So don’t experiment with concepts of defence. Trial and error can have good results if it succeeds, but if it fails it will be fatal. Imagine if this country were threatened and we didn’t have an established concept, because we were still dismantling and replacing them. 67

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66 See Cribb, 2002 *Op. Cit.*, for an interesting and persuasive argument that a particular reason for the often violent behaviour of Indonesian troops in East Timor was a particular ethos of brutality on their part and deference and timidity on the part of the Indonesian population that stemmed from the separate and leading role of the army in pursuing “people’s warfare” in the revolution and culminated in arrogant and tyrannical behaviour on the part of many members of the armed forces during the New Order period. Cribb postulates that soldiers often became enraged when East Timorese civilians failed to show such deference.

67 “KSAD Ryamizard Ryacudu: Komando Teritorial Masih Relevan” (“Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu: Territorial Commands Still Relevant”), *Kompas*, 13 July 2002. Ryacudu’s views about the territorial commands were met with concern on the part of human rights advocates, such as Munir:

> “Now, when the basic tasks of the army are becoming so extensive, the army is becoming the nation itself. Because they can then fight at any level, on the basis of their own estimation regarding safeguarding the sovereignty and symbols of the state. There was a statement from Ryamizard, he said that for example he would maintain the territorial commands which until now have been criticised. He said that dismantling the territorial commands was the same as dismantling the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.”
The following analysis by the human rights advocacy group, Tapol 68 which I shall quote in full, is a very concise and accurate summation of the continuing pervasiveness of army territorial structures in post-Suharto Indonesia in the early years of this century:

For some time there was confusion about the decisions of an important TNI seminar regarding the future of the territorial structure. One decision was to hand over the military territorial structure to local governments. Some far-reaching ideas were floated about abolishing military structures below sub-district level. [Gatra, 1 September 2001]. In discussions outside the TNI, academics and military watchers agreed that the military territorial structure should be gradually dismantled.

The territorial structure functions as a shadow government, often more powerful than the regional administration. The territorial structure or koter (komando teritorial) 69 was initially the foundation of the Indonesian army. In the early days of the young republic, military units were primarily organised in regional battalions and officers were identified by their territorial affinity. After a big overhaul in 1984, kotama, 70 KOSTRAD 71 and Kopassus 72 became the backbone of the army. Financial constraints transformed the territorial commands into cesspools of criminal activities. Regional commands increasingly involved themselves in mafia practices instead of concentrating on security matters.

The separation of the police from the TNI strengthened the view among civilians that koter had become redundant. The police are now responsible for law and order. The downgrading of the position of Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial, chief of staff of territorial affairs) into an assistant position on the general staff was another indication that territorial affairs would be sidelined.

But in the end, the results were very different, with a big victory for the military. Instead of downsizing koter, the army top is determined to maintain or enlarge the territorial structure. Lt. General Ryamizard Ryacudu 73 bluntly told a journalist: "Like it or not, the glue of the nation nowadays is the TNI. If people want to dismantle the state, go ahead and..."

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68 Tapol is a United Kingdom-based human rights advocacy group. The following two statements from the group’s website (tapol.gn.apc.org) indicate the focus of their activities:

"TAPOL - which means political prisoner in Indonesian - is a leading English language authority on the human rights situation in Indonesia and East Timor.,” and “Campaigning to expose human rights violations in Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua and Aceh.”

69 Komando Teritorial equates to Territorial Commands.

70 Acronym for Komando Utama – Principal Commands.

71 Acronym for Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat – Army Strategic Reserve Command.

72 Acronym for Komando Pasukan Khusus – Special Forces Command.

73 Ryacudu was then Commander of the Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat – Army Strategic Reserve Command. He was appointed Army Chief of Staff in July 2002. After that he made a number of further statements in defence of the army’s territorial command system.
abolish the territorial units. If the Trikora military command in Irian Jaya were dissolved, Irian Jaya would be independent' [Tempo, 7 April 2002].

The new military territorial command in Aceh, Kodam (military area command) Iskandar Muda set up in February 2002 is the latest example of the army's determination to expand rather than downsize koter. In May 1999, Kodam Pattimura was re-established in Maluku while two other Kodams, Tanjung Pura in West Kalimantan and Lambung Mangkurat in Central and South Kalimantan are in the pipeline. With the creation of new provinces, a string of new districts and subdistricts are emerging. The TNI Information Centre recently said this might lead to the creation of new district and subdistrict military commands.

Since the establishment of Kodams in Maluku and Aceh, military operations have continued in both regions, primarily by kotama forces under the command of the headquarters in Jakarta. The operations in Aceh are run by a special command called Kolakops, similar to the military operation in East Timor, while operations in Maluku are in the hands of Yongab, the joint battalions.

The real reason for the expansion of the territorial commands lies elsewhere. Firstly, finances. Territorial commands can siphon off money from the provincial budget. In particular the autonomy law can, in practice, provide more money for the regions. Regional 'projects' like offering protection for local companies or vital projects can be co-ordinated by the command through a special unit called PAM Provit (Pasukan Pengamanan Projek Vital, Troops Securing Vital Projects).

So-called self-financing by the military can for a great part function through the local commands. Lack of funding by the state is used to justify efforts to find other sources of money. Local businesses have become more viable thanks to the autonomy law. The territorial commands can play a crucial role in these business activities. A more sinister role for commands is the recruitment and deployment of militia groups in conflict areas. Despite the disastrous experience in East Timor, the military continues to consider militia groups as part of their security doctrine. Increasing the number of territorial commands is another example of how the military have gained leverage over civilian politics.

Clearly, army leaders had again begun to view themselves as the sole guarantors of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the agenda of leading army officers to safeguard the state from separatist movements.

Tapol pointed out that this view had been fashioned by the army’s experience of outright civilian rule during the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s and the two years after the end of the New Order regime, from 1998 till 2000, both of which were marked by the secessionist movements and political instability. Tapol went on to argue that similar conditions in contemporary Indonesia and particularly unrest in Aceh and Papua had given the army the pretext for stepping in to save the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia:

It has become second nature for most army officers to regard civilian rule as ineffective as compared with the military who are the 'divine rulers', or 'saviours of the nation'.

75 Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia – Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia - NKRI.
Tellingly, Tapol described the emergence of a new group of officers in the post-Suharto period which it terms the Mandiri (self reliant) officers, who professed disdain for civilian politics and a mission to safeguard the unity of the Republic:

While most retired officers are accustomed to being active in politics, most active officers, in particular those who run Cilangkap, the Indonesian Pentagon, have developed a different approach. While the older generation, the so-called political generals, still function as members of parliament, provincial governors or mayors, the present generation have structurally said goodbye to the idea of holding public office. 77

Conclusions

The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management of the early 1960s embodied the elective affinities between Nasution’s strategies for “people’s resistance” and his organicist vision of the proper relations between the state (including the army) and society. Within this Doctrine, Nasution’s strategies for “people’s resistance” were transformed into means of exerting control over civilian populations. The Doctrine contained organicist elements, such as antipathy towards “imported” ideas like communism, liberalism and individualism.

The Doctrine provided for an unusual and probably unique form of military intervention. While important elements accorded with Stepan’s “new professionalism” paradigm of military intervention in politics, the Indonesian Doctrine harked back to the formative experiences of the army and Nasution’s “people’s resistance” strategies.

At the time I began to write up this thesis (late 2004) the Indonesian Army leadership was continuing to maintain its territorial structures and concepts. The leadership of the day was also voicing the sorts of opinions that Nasution expressed in the 1940s and 1950s: a disdain for politics and a belief that the army was the only force that could maintain national unity in the face of the feckless and self-interested behaviour of politicians.

77 Ibid.
From the time he was sidelined in 1962 until the political upheavals of September / October 1965, Nasution was a disapproving and largely powerless figure on the fringes of power. His youngest daughter, Ade, was killed when troops who came to arrest Nasution on the night of 30 September fired shots through his bedroom door. Nasution managed to escape and joined General Suharto in countering the “30 September Movement”. He became Chairman of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara – MPRS) that called upon Sukarno to account for his actions and then appointed Suharto Acting President and then President.

However, Nasution fell out with Suharto’s New Order regime in the early 1970s and he retired from the army in 1972. In 1980 he signed a petition together with 49 other leading Indonesians (the Petition of 50 – Petisi 50) and was banned from leaving the country for a number of years. Towards the end of his life the Regime softened its stance towards him and in 1997 he was promoted to Field Marshal (Jenderal Besar), together with Suharto and the General Sudirman.

Until the final years of his life he received a steady flow of visitors, always sitting under a large portrait of Ade in his house in Jakarta where the furniture and décor had hardly changed since the early 1950s. He continued to write his many accounts of the formation of the army, the revolutionary years, and the processes through which the army came to acquire the role in politics that culminated in the Dwi Fungsi Doctrine of the New order (Chapter One).

Sunarti recalls that he wrote largely from memory, only calling on research staff to find details on: “… names, dates, places or troop numbers. But he didn’t need to ask for information on all the strategies and the way operations had taken place because they were still lodged in his memory.” ¹ He could remember all the details of his “monumental” Strategic Order No 1/1948 that laid down the basis for the struggle against the Dutch in 1949: “Anyone who took part in the Second Independence War certainly witnessed how the Dutch military were gasping for breath because they had run out of energy.” ² Nasution’s Strategic Order No. 1/1948 was “monumental” in more than a strictly military sense as it embodied an emerging political orientation that owed a great deal to his personal and family life.

In this thesis I have drawn attention to the impact on Nasution’s political socialisation of his absorption into the welcoming and affluent Gondokusumo family after pursuing a frugal and institutionalised lifestyle for many years. By this time Nasution held cooperating nationalist views and he found in Soenarjo Gondokusumo a mentor and father figure.

² Ibid., p. 221.
He became associated with socially conservative Central Javanese priyayi figures when he headed the military administration in 1949. This was a time of considerable emotional intensity and many of the military and pamong praja / pamong desa officials who were hadir during the military administration felt a great sense of pride at holding out against the Dutch, particularly as the political leadership of the Republic had allowed themselves to be captured.

I have shown that during the revolution and the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s, Nasution shared with the socially conservative Central Javanese elites from the PIR and Parindra both distaste for imported ideologies and forms of interest representation and paternalistic views about the capacity of the uneducated masses to avoid being manipulated by “demagogues”. He relied on organic “traditional” authority structures in his planning for “people’s war” and from the early 1950s he idealised their role in the guerrilla campaigns against the Dutch. He had begun to systematically develop an elective affinity between his “people’s war” strategies and an organicist vision of the proper relationship between the state (including the military) and society.

Nasution was no doubt a man of considerable intelligence, energy and ambition who was of great service to his country in the struggle for independence. However, he seems not to have understood that once an army involves itself in politics it is profoundly difficult to restrain it from committing excesses because ultimately, as Thomas Hobbes has warned, “clubs are trumps.”

Like most other members of the Indonesian colonial indigenous elites (and unlike the pre-war elites of Vietnam, China and other societies where Communist movements had used “people’s war” to achieve national liberation), Nasution lived in financial comfort in his home country into his old age. However, from the 1980s he became a victim of the army whose ethos he did so much to form and nurture and which did so much to suppress the PKI, and he became concerned that his interventionist approaches of the 1950s had been misused by the New Order regime.

In Chapter Ten I drew attention to the (2004) army leadership’s continuing adherence to the territorial management doctrines that Nasution pioneered, and to their belief that the role of the army was to defend and uphold the state that was constantly in danger of being derailed by fickle and untrustworthy civilian political leaders. I hope that by drawing attention to the origins and nature of the style of military intervention Nasution pioneered in Indonesia I have shed


4 Ibid.
some light on the potential his legacy might offer should an army leadership again decide to intervene in politics while repudiating party politics and constitutional democracy.
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