What is the Gadamerian truth conception? Notwithstanding its prominence in the title of his major work, the concept of truth remains implicit, underspecified, and correspondingly enigmatic in Gadamer’s writings. In response, the present paper undertakes to defend a conception of hermeneutic truth as dialogical disclosure and to affirm its capacity to warrant, or justify, truth claims through highlighting its differences from, as well as similarities to, the better-known Heideggerian truth conception. In so doing, it challenges a prevalent assumption that the Gadamerian truth concept simply mirrors the Heideggerian. In particular, given the prominence accorded the experience of aesthetic truth and the model of play (Spiel) in the first part of *Truth and Method,* it is often assumed that, for Gadamer, as for Heidegger, the emergence of truth is best characterised as a sudden disclosive event, as epitomised by metaphors of “lighting” and “lightening.” Gadamer’s emphasis on the “enlightening” (Einleuchtende) toward the end of *Truth and Method* further reinforces this impression.

But such similarities notwithstanding, significant structural differences between the Gadamerian and Heideggerian projects must also be factored in, and hence it cannot, in fact, be assumed that the former’s truth conception coincides with the latter. In particular, as we shall see, to do so would be to overlook the prominence of the dialogical dimension in Gadamer’s thinking. Balancing these considerations, I contend that hermeneutic truth is more appropriately
conceptualised as dialogical disclosure. As elaborated below, this response has merits not just in better enabling us to conceptualise the Gadamerian truth conception, but also in terms of rebutting charges of arbitrariness, subjectivism, and relativism levelled against the Gadamerian truth concept through association with the Heideggerian.³

To this end, I begin by elaborating on the differences as well as similarities between the Gadamerian and Heideggerian truth conceptions. Thereafter, I go on to contend that these differences enable the former to withstand charges of relativism levelled against the Heideggerian conception of truth as disclosure, in particular those crystallised in the Tugendhat critique. I then go on to elaborate the case for, and merits of, construing Gadamerian truth as dialogical disclosure, outlining how this enables it to eschew the spectre of relativism which continues to haunt hermeneutic truth. Correlatively, I defend the complementarity of the ontological and epistemological in Gadamer’s thinking in face of a long-standing misconception that the hermeneutic emphasis on the former necessarily excludes the latter. *Inter alia,* this better positions the hermeneutic approach to impact the broader contemporary debate about knowledge and truth.⁴

However, it should also be noted at the outset that this paper is not intended as a comprehensive account of either Heidegger or Gadamer’s stance on truth, still less as an attempt to vindicate the putative merits of the latter at the expense of the former. Rather, to the extent possible within the confines of a short paper, the intent is simply to defend the contention that, although underspecified by Gadamer himself, his major work embodies resources capable of responding to problems of justification as epitomised in the Tugendhat critique of Heidegger’s truth conception, in ways beyond those readily discernible in the Heideggerian corpus.

**HERMENEUTIC TRUTH IN GADAMER AND HEIDEGGER: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES**

Traditionally, as is well known, truth has been defined in terms of correspondence with the facts (such that, famously, “the cat is on the mat” is true if, and only if, the cat *is* on the mat). Although the correspondence definition has not been uncontroversial on other grounds, Heidegger poses a radical new challenge to it by taking issue with its metaphysical presuppositions.⁵ He does so initially in *Being and Time,* Section 44, where he focuses on elucidating the *ontological*
conditions of the possibility of truth as correspondence. Contending that an ontologically prior event of unconcealment is necessary for the thing (state of affairs, or subject matter) to show itself as it is, and hence to enable its adequation (or otherwise) to become manifest, Heidegger here identifies unconcealment (aletheia, Unverborgenheit) or disclosure (Erschlossenheit) as the primary such condition. On this basis, Heidegger deems unconcealment to constitute truth in a more primary sense than correspondence, affirming that “the Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering.” Hence, while not negating the significance of truth as correspondence (or ‘correctness”, as he dubs it), Heidegger nonetheless defines truth primarily as disclosure. Moreover, although he goes on to explore the truth question in greater depth and complexity in his later writings, Heidegger’s emphasis on the primarily disclosive character of truth remains pivotal and enduring, while the suddenness and immediacy of the disclosive truth event are prominent in his later writings.

But our focus here is on the Gadamerian truth conception rather than the Heideggerian. The latter is broached as background primarily because, being underspecified by Gadamer himself, it is often taken for granted that Gadamer’s stance on truth closely resembles Heidegger’s. Indeed, to an extent, Gadamer lends weight to this assessment not only by explicitly acknowledging his indebtedness to Heidegger, but also because Heidegger’s emphasis on a sudden, disclosive truth event, as epitomised by metaphors of “lighting” and “lightening”, finds clear parallels in Gadamer’s own emphasis on aesthetic truth and the model of play (Spiel) in the first part of Truth and Method. These Heideggerian resonances are further reinforced in Gadamer’s treatment of the “enlightening” (Einleuchtende), toward the end of Truth and Method. This too is event-like, is characterised by immediacy, and potentially overwhelms us with its seeming truth-disclosive force. In addition, truth, for Gadamer, is inherently contextualised and situated, embodying the possibilities and limitations characteristic of human finitude and fallibility. It is not surprising, then, that it is commonly assumed that the Gadamerian truth concept is co-extensive with the Heideggerian especially since, unlike Heidegger, Gadamer fails to explicitly detail his stance on truth. But such similarities notwithstanding, this assessment is not well justified given that Gadamer’s hermeneutic project actually differs significantly from the Heideggerian. As contended below, these differences are important because they profoundly affect Gadamer’s appropriation of hermeneutic truth and ultimately immunise it against the relativistic charges levelled at the Heideggerian.
Thus, in particular, Gadamer’s focal concern is not with Being as such, but with elucidating the operation of hermeneutic understanding with a view to valorising the human sciences and vindicating the possibility of truth beyond method. Moreover, far from seeking to eschew the philosophical tradition in favour of an originary understanding, Gadamer actively reappropriates key insights from Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel, amongst others, each of whom contributes to tempering his overall hermeneutic position and correlative his truth conception. Importantly too, given Gadamer’s involvement with the foundations of the human sciences, it needs to be acknowledged that epistemological concerns are not alien to his hermeneutic project, as is often assumed to be the case. On the contrary, notwithstanding the extent of his ontological commitments and avowed indebtedness to Heidegger, epistemological concerns, and in particular problems of justification, are explicitly to the fore in Truth and Method, Part II. Hence, far from eschewing problems of justification, as is often assumed to be the case, it transpires that, in keeping with his orientation toward the Enlightenment heritage more generally, Gadamer’s actual concern is with recasting the framework within which the justificatory challenge is to be discharged. Thus, while Gadamer is certainly not an epistemologist in the traditional sense, as Rockmore aptly puts it, “he does not flee the question of knowledge” but rather seeks to reappropriate it from a perspective informed by an acute awareness of “the finite, historical character of human experience.”

For these and related reasons, it cannot be assumed that Gadamer’s stance on truth simply coincides with the Heideggerian. On the contrary, the differences are at least as telling as the similarities. Furthermore, it will be contended that these differences effectively immunise the Gadamerian truth conception from the relativistic threats that allegedly accrue to the Heideggerian due to its lack of justificatory resources, as famously epitomised in the Tugendhat critique. In particular, the contention is that while Tugendhat castigates the Heideggerian stance on truth for its failure to grapple with problems of justification, the Gadamerian stance does not fall prey to these criticisms because, notwithstanding its avowedly ontological orientation, it actively embraces the challenge of justification, while remaining true to its hermeneutic commitments. In effect, it can do so because, Gadamer does not valorise ontological concerns to the exclusion of the epistemological, but instead reappropriates the latter in an appropriately hermeneutic fashion. As the next step toward defending this contention, let us now briefly reprise the nub of Tugendhat’s critique.
TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION

While viewed by its proponents as a ground-breaking challenge to the traditional conceptualisation of truth, the Heideggerian reconceptualisation of truth as disclosure is not without its critics. Of particular concern for present purposes are the relativistic threats it allegedly embodies, deriving primarily from the too-ready identification of truth with disclosure and the sudden immediacy of the disclosive truth event. These concerns have been preeminently crystallised in the Tugendhat critique.¹⁵

Essentially, two key questions motivate Tugendhat’s critique of the Heideggerian conception of truth as disclosure: (i) Can truth, traditionally construed in terms of correspondence or adequation to the things themselves, be judiciously reconceptualised as disclosure?, and (ii) can such a reconceptualisation dispense with the justificatory commitments that traditionally accrue to truth? Although contested by prominent Heideggerians, the Tugendhat critique casts doubt on the tenability of an affirmative response to the foregoing questions. That is to say, it challenges the contention that the Heideggerian concept of hermeneutic truth as disclosure can in fact support a viable truth conception capable of discharging the justificatory commitments that traditionally accrue to truth or, alternatively, of establishing that it is somehow immunised from such commitments.

Thus firstly, Tugendhat presses his case by querying whether Heideggerian disclosure can, as such, rightfully be equated with truth—or whether this effectively amounts to an unjustified stipulative redefinition. In particular, Tugendhat’s primary concern is that Heidegger ultimately valorises unconcealment (\textit{aletheia}, \textit{Unverborgenheit}) or disclosure (\textit{Erschlossenheit}) to the extent of excluding adequation to the things themselves as the indispensable hallmark of truth. On the basis of a careful textual analysis of Heidegger’s development of his position, Tugendhat contends that the Heideggerian truth conception does indeed fall prey to this criticism and that, thus shorn of its “specific” (or distinctive) meaning—deriving from its adequation to the things themselves —Heidegger’s proposed redefinition of truth as disclosure fails, essentially because it loses the capacity to differentiate between true and false disclosures.¹⁶ Worse still, in sidelining the need for evidential appraisal—that is, for putting our (disclosive) truth claims “to the test”—the Heideggerian stance actually \textit{impedes} the disclosure of truth.¹⁷ As Tugendhat has it, these problems are ultimately attributable to Heidegger’s failure to engage systematically with the epistemological dimension of the truth question,
and in particular, to meet “the Socratic challenge of a critical justification,” that is, to adequately discharge the long-standing epistemic responsibility for justifying one’s truth claims. In thus (allegedly) failing to meet the challenge of critical justification, the Heideggerian truth conception courts charges of arbitrariness, subjectivism, and relativism. (In everyday life, these are manifested in the relative frequency with which we may find ourselves overwhelmed by a sudden conviction regarding the rightness of a particular way of viewing a (problematic) situation or issue, only to find subsequently that this seemingly incontrovertible enlightening “disclosure” was in fact mistaken.) Moreover, although Tugendhat’s critique engages systematically only with Heidegger’s early treatment of the truth problem in *Being and Time*, Section 44, he maintains that Heidegger’s later writings simply exacerbate this problem. Indeed, surprisingly, the later Heidegger himself seems retrospectively to concede the limitations of equating unconcealment with truth, noting that, “one thing becomes clear: to raise the question of *aletheia*, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call *aletheia* in the sense of opening, truth.” While the impact of the Tugendhat critique is vigorously disputed by prominent Heideggerians, it is by no means evident that the Heideggerian “corpus” embodies the resources needed to respond to the justificatory concerns it raises.

But in foregrounding these issues here, the intent is not to attempt to resolve them definitively in the case of Heidegger, but rather to pave the way for contending that, given significant differences in the constitution of their respective projects, the Gadamerian stance embodies justificatory resources which better equip it to meet “the Socratic challenge of a critical justification” which Tugendhat found wanting in the Heideggerian. Thus in what follows, it is contended that the Gadamerian conception does not lose the capacity to differentiate between true and false disclosures notwithstanding Gadamer’s espousal of the event-like character of truth and the immediacy of its disclosive impact, as epitomised in the well-known Gadamerian dictum that “In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth (*Wahrheitsgeschehen*) and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe.” To this end, in what follows, I proffer a Gadamerian conception of hermeneutic truth as *dialogical* disclosure, a conception that has heretofore received limited attention in the literature. In so doing, it will become clear how, thus construed, the Gadamerian truth conception can meet the Socratic challenge of a critical justification without compromising its ontological commitments.
HERMENEUTIC TRUTH AS DIALOGICAL DISCLOSURE

What, then, of the Gadamerian truth conception? Can it avoid the spectre of relativism through withstanding criticisms akin to the Tugendhat critique of Heidegger? Can it achieve this outcome in an appropriately hermeneutic fashion, while discharging traditional epistemic responsibilities? In response I contend that, although underspecified by Gadamer himself, the Gadamerian truth conception is most appropriately construed in terms of *dialogical disclosure*, and that, thus construed, it can indeed withstand such charges—and in particular, those deriving from an undue emphasis on the sudden, event-like character of truth. Moreover, the comparative merits of the Gadamerian truth conception in terms of its ability to withstand the Tugendhat critique are attributable to key differences in the constitution of the Gadamerian and Heideggerian projects as already briefly delineated above. In this regard, it is especially noteworthy that, notwithstanding Gadamer’s Heideggerian emphasis on the ontological, epistemological concerns, and in particular problems of justification, are explicitly to fore in the second part of Gadamer’s major work. As elaborated below, it is this intertwining of the epistemological and ontological that enables the Gadamerian stance to discharge its justificatory commitments while remaining true to its hermeneutic origins. More specifically, in what follows I contend that the Gadamerian stance can meet the challenge of critical justification which Tugendhat found wanting in Heidegger in virtue of complementing a hermeneutic commitment to truth as disclosure with an equally strong commitment to the need for a dialectical process of appraisal and testing, which in addition to eliminating “arbitrary,” or otherwise untenable, “fancies,” whatever their origin, also supports a dynamic learning process whereby the subject matter can disclose itself in increasingly more adequate ways.

To this end, it is important to be clear, firstly, that, despite what has often been assumed to be the case, Gadamer’s valorisation of “the enlightening” does not amount to presupposing that the disclosive event of truth is self-warranting, but is counterbalanced by his thoroughgoing commitment to the dialogical character of experience and understanding. Hence, it needs to be recognised that it is not the enlightening itself but rather the tension between the enlightening event of truth and its dialectic unfolding that most appropriately characterises the Gadamerian stance. Noteworthy in particular is the consideration that, while for Gadamer, as for Heidegger, truth entails an ontological event of unconcealment or disclosure, this in itself does not constitute truth. Rather,
a careful reading shows that Gadamer neither equates “the enlightening” with truth as such, nor confers on it a self-warranting status. Instead, he explicitly affirms that what thus comes to light “has not been proved,” but “asserts itself [...] within the realm of the possible and probable,” leaving open the question of how it is ultimately to be assessed and integrated. Given these and related qualifications, it becomes clear that rather than constituting an incontrovertible truth disclosure, the enlightening, for Gadamer, simply has the status of a possible truth claim. Crucially too, in concluding Truth and Method, it is to “a discipline of questioning and inquiring” that Gadamer attributes the capacity to underwrite or warrant truth, not to the enlightening as such. Furthermore, differentiating the requisite mode of inquiry from method as such, it is “the model of Platonic dialectic” that Gadamer endorses, contending not only that the thing or subject matter does not reveal itself “without our thinking being involved,” but also that only a specifically dialectical mode of thinking is capable of unfolding the logic proper to the thing itself. In thus embracing a dialectical model, Gadamer foregrounds the indispensability of dialogical questioning and testing for adequate truth disclosure. Notably too, this dialogical dimension is no mere appendage to Gadamer’s thinking, but rather, as built into the structure of hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung) itself, is integral to his position from the outset. On balance, then, it becomes clear that Gadamer does not accord the truth event a self-warranting status, but rather requires that, however it originates, what is assumed to be true needs to become the subject of a disciplined dialogical process of questioning and testing, along the lines briefly delineated below. In short, then, it emerges that, for Gadamer, the event-like dawning of truth is not self-validating, but is simply a “moment” in an ongoing dialectical process oriented toward the attuned and adequate disclosure of the matter under consideration. Importantly, as we shall see, valorisation of this dialectical dimension of truth disclosure is pivotal in enabling the Gadamerian stance to discharge the challenge of critical justification in appropriately hermeneutic terms beyond what the Heideggerian position seems to allow for.

In what, then, does this dialectic process of truth disclosure consist, and how can it succeed in discharging the “Socratic challenge of a critical justification” without falling prey to methodologism? Here the core contention is that in virtue of its embrace of a dialectical template, the Gadamerian stance embodies the conceptual resources needed to underwrite the critical appraisal and testing of putative truth claims, while avoiding the kind of enframing that renders method untenable as a medium of hermeneutic truth disclosure. Equally noteworthy is the
fact that notwithstanding the affinities with the traditional correspondence and coherence theories foregrounded by some commentators, the Gadamerian truth conception extends beyond what these approaches can offer in its commitment to securing the adequacy as well as adequation of truth disclosure. In valorising “completeness” as a regulative ideal and the importance of achieving a “higher universality” which overcomes the partiality of initial perspectives, Gadamer demonstrates a clear awareness that truth disclosure can fail as much through distortion or inadequate disclosure as by manifest untruth, a factor not adequately accounted for by the more traditional truth theories. In endorsing the model of Platonic dialectic, Gadamer aspires to overcome such limitations through incorporating attributes capable of testing for adequacy of truth disclosure as well as coherence and adequation as such. As Gadamer shows, in incorporating such conditions, the dialectical model can correct for the factors that typically thwart attempts to achieve adequacy of truth disclosure (for example, close-mindedness, failure to probe the topic deeply enough, to truly assess the supporting evidence, or to consider alternatives). A process of dialogical exploration and testing can thus ensure that plausible but ultimately misleading, or otherwise inadequate, interpretations are transcended, so that the subject matter can adequately disclose itself in its truth. In effect, then, the capacity to secure this outcome is attributable to the dialogical attributes valorised by Gadamer in his endorsement of the Platonic template. Most notably, these include: genuine openness, ongoing, appropriately directed questioning, sustained attunement to the subject matter, consideration of opposing views, and assessment of supporting reasons. Moreover, far from being an external imposition, Gadamer is emphatic that the correlative process of dialectical appraisal and testing is indispensable for enabling the subject matter to reveal itself in its own terms, contending not only that the thing or subject matter cannot reveal itself “without our thinking being involved,” but also that only a specifically dialectical mode of thinking is capable of unfolding the logic proper to the thing itself. Hence, as we shall now consider, this dialectical process of critical appraisal enables the subject matter to show itself in its truth through the active participation of dialogue partners who bring to light, and test, the possibilities inherent in the thing itself under appropriate dialogical conditions. It is in this way that the Gadamerian conceptualisation of hermeneutic truth as dialogical disclosure can meet the Socratic challenge of a critical justification proffered by Tugendhat as integral to adequate truth disclosure.

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Thus, firstly, in appropriating a Platonic template, Gadamer eschews ready acceptance of putative truth claims in favour of an interrogative, or questioning, stance characterised by genuine openness and willingness to view the issues in broader perspective through dialogical engagement with others. Especially important is a commitment to appropriately attuned questioning aimed at interrogating proffered claims in ways that will uncover entrenched presuppositions and thereby genuinely open up the topic and advance inquiry instead of prematurely closing it off or distorting it. In thus emphasising “the priority of the question,” Gadamer alerts us to that fact that our initial apprehensions of truth may not characterise the subject matter appropriately, and that open-minded inquiry is needed to test, and if need be correct, initial impressions. In hermeneutic terms, this is necessary to ensure that the subject matter can disclose itself in its own terms and according to its inner logic, while mitigating, or eliminating, the influence of “arbitrary fancies” or untested assumptions, whatever their origin. To this end, Gadamer enjoins adoption of a Socratic attitude of “not knowing,” while emphasising the importance of rightly directed questioning and sustained attunement to the subject matter as prerequisites for advancing adequate disclosure.

Correlatively, Gadamer foregrounds the inherently dialogical character of the process of truth disclosure as epitomised on the Platonic model, contending that “the art of questioning”, integral to the disclosure of truth, finds its natural complement in the “art of conducting a real dialogue.” Indeed, counteracting the traditional presupposition (characteristic of the correspondence theory in particular) that knowledge is a matter of a static, individual judgment, Gadamer affirms that “knowledge is dialectical from the ground up” precisely because it entails considering alternative possibilities deriving from different conceptual starting points. This again reinforces our appreciation that hermeneutic truth as disclosure does not primarily depend on an enlightening truth event, but is rather the outcome of a process of well-structured dialectical inquiry, in the context of which enlightening events have an important, but not ultimately definitive, role to play. The significance of the dialectical dimension thus hinges on its potential for the mutual exploration and testing of alternate ways of conceptualising the subject matter, which reveal the inevitable limitations of untested prejudgments while simultaneously opening up heretofore unrecognised possibilities for consideration. As such, it entails a process of mutual learning through conjoint dialectical inquiry, whereby seemingly persuasive but ultimately inadequate contentions are progressively overcome, as epitomised on the Platonic model.
Only in this way can one-sided interpretations be judiciously transcended so as to disclose the subject matter in its multifaceted complexity. To this end, Gadamer affirms that the subject matter under investigation must itself occupy centre stage with the contributions of the dialogue partners remaining subservient to the task of its adequate disclosure. In thus providing a bulwark against an adversarial contest aimed at establishing the one’s superiority over the other, this factor serves to ensure that the dialogue partners remain committed to conjointly uncovering the truth about the subject matter and to revising their preexisting views in light of what thus emerges. To this end, Gadamer emphasises that “considering opposites” is integral to the advancement of truth disclosive, dialectical inquiry. Hence, instead of seeking to demolish or dismiss them, each partner is required to factor in the strengths of the other’s views. Indeed, in this, Gadamer tells us, consists the “art of testing”, which in challenging the fixity of preformed views about the subject matter, simultaneously opens up for consideration new, heretofore unrecognised possibilities. Dialectical testing thus simultaneously fulfils a dual function of ensuring that our understanding is not distorted either by entrenched prejudices or “arbitrary fancies,” including those emanating from seemingly enlightening but untested insights while, in apprising us of heretofore unrecognised aspects of the matter, it corrects for the partiality and one-sidedness of initial opinions, giving rise to a progressively deeper appreciation of its richness and complexity.

In this way, the dialectical model supports an inherently developmental conception of inquiry whereby conclusions reached at one stage are seen to be provisional answers on the way to an increasingly more adequate understanding of the subject matter, through the ongoing dialectical testing of proffered claims. To advance this outcome, as already intimated, the core desideratum on the part of the dialogue partners is to facilitate the dynamic unfolding of the subject matter according to its inner logic by finding and building on common ground, while learning from difference, so that “what is said is continually transformed into the uttermost possibilities of its rightness and truth.” Given appropriate dialogical conditions, this can eventuate in a potentially transformative “fusion of horizons” whereby, as Gadamer famously has it, we arrive at a “higher universality” in our understanding of the subject matter, from whence the partiality of earlier, more limited, views become apparent. Notably, too, while a Gadamerian fusion of horizons entails a genuinely transformative advance in understanding, its cogency is underwritten by a principled process of “integration and appropriation,” underpinned by a distinctive dialectical logic. Significantly, this orientation differentiates the
Gadamerian model of conjoint dialectical testing from other justificatory models, in that its primary commitment is not simply to the justification of what is already known, but rather to the transformative advancement of understanding through a “fusion” of heretofore partial perspectives (or horizons). Moreover, since, for Gadamer, the process of inquiry is always under way and never finished, even such a transformative fusion of horizons constitutes only a provisional close (or resting place) in an ongoing process of situated dialectical inquiry which continually challenges and transcends even our most penetrating truth-disclosive insights.

CONCLUSION

In sum, then, it is contended that the Gadamerian truth conception can effectively meet the challenge of critical justification that traditionally accrues to truth while preserving its distinctive hermeneutic orientation, and this in a way that would seem to transcend the possibilities inherent in the Heideggerian truth conception from which it derives its inspiration. As we have just seen, it does so specifically through embodying a distinctive dialogical (and dialectical) procedure oriented toward securing the adequacy as well as adequation of truth disclosure. Moreover, notwithstanding the extent of Gadamer’s ontological commitments, there is nothing incongruous about this conclusion since, as has also been contended, the Gadamerian stance embodies a unique blending of the ontological and the epistemological in ways that render it capable of “warranting” truth, while avoiding the kind of objectivist enframing that renders method untenable as a medium of hermeneutic truth disclosure, as Gadamer himself clearly intimates in concluding *Truth and Method*.

—Swinburne University of Technology
NOTES

4. This paper draws on themes initially broached in my presentation on this topic at the 2013 Athens Philosophy World Congress (due for publication in the Conference Proceedings), and in my chapter on “Truth and Relativism” in the recent Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics. Their development here has benefitted significantly from these earlier articulations.
5. For a succinct summary of several of the long-standing problems besetting the correspondence conception of truth, see Daniel Dahlstrom, “Truth as Aletheia and the Clearing of Beyng” Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts. Ed. Bret W. Davis. Durham: Acumen, 2010, 118. It is worth noting, however, that Heidegger does not so much resolve these problems as dissolve them, by redefining truth while calling into question the ontological presuppositions on which the traditional correspondence conception is based.
8. For example: “In being presented in play, what is emerges. It produces and brings to light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn”; “The world of the work of art, in which play expresses itself fully [...], is in fact a transformed world. In and through it everyone recognises that this is how things are”. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 112, 113.
11. See the Introduction in Gadamer, Truth and Method.
13. Thus, for example, Gadamer explicitly identifies the task of ascertaining “the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices” as “the fundamental epistemological question for a truly historical hermeneutics”. See Truth and Method, 277. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, as elaborated below, he deems the challenge of ensuring adequation with the “things themselves” an indispensable condition for truth. See Truth and Method, 266-67.
on which this paper is based, was originally delivered at Heidelberg University in February 1964. The outline that follows is necessarily very brief and selective, aimed simply at pinpointing the problematic identification of truth with disclosure and at foregrounding Heidegger’s alleged neglect of justificatory concerns. For a detailed analysis of the Tugendhat critique, incorporating critical appraisal of recent Heideggerian responses to it, see William Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem” Inquiry 50:2 (2007): 156-79).

19. “For Tugendhat, Heidegger’s writing after 1930, with its emphasis on the ‘truth of Being’, and later, on the ‘clearing’ and Lichtung, only exacerbates the basic error already latent in the analyses of Being and Time (Sec 44)”. See Smith, “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem”, 177, n. 6.
23. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 490. Clearly, the concern here is that, on Gadamer’s account too, we are overwhelmed by the sudden immediacy of the disclosive truth event in ways that undermine, or paralyse, our critical faculties. Thus, for example, Irwin interprets it as entailing that “the immediacy with which the truth of the artwork or text seizes us is such that we are overcome; [since] we do not decide to accept it provisionally but are involuntarily swept up in it”. See “A Critique of Hermeneutic Truth as Disclosure”, 67.
26. “The circle for Gadamer is going back and forth between intuition and dialectic. The
tension between these poles is precisely the engaging power of thought which characterises his ‘between’. See Dostal, “The Experience of Truth”, 66-7.


28. “[W]hat the tool of method does not achieve must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees (verburgt) truth.” See Gadamer, _Truth and Method_, 491.


31. See, e.g., Gadamer, _Truth and Method_, 36; cf. P. Christopher Smith, _Hermeneutics and Human Finitude_. New York: Fordham University Press, 1991, 190-92. Along with emphasising that Gadamer’s commitment to a dialogical conception of inquiry has its origins in the prior conviction that hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung) itself has “the structure of dialogical interplay with an other within a world,” Smith also points out that the hermeneutic conception of experience simultaneously denotes “an experience of my own limits” and “openness to the other”.

32. Cf. Dostal, “The Experience of Truth”, 48-49: [A]lthough it is appropriate to consider Gadamer’s understanding of truth Heideggerian in a fundamental way, Gadamer diverges significantly from Heidegger with regard to truth. This significant divergence concerns the immediacy of the experience of truth for Heidegger and the mediated character of the experience for Gadamer. The truth overcomes us suddenly, in a moment, like a flash of lightening on Heidegger’s account. For Gadamer, the exemplary experience of truth comes when we take the time to dwell on the matter at hand (Sache selbst) in conversation with another.

33. In proffering this assessment it is not intended to underestimate the complexity and subtlety of Heidegger’s stance on truth. But while it could even be contended that the meditative style of thinking valorised by the later Heidegger has much in common with the kind of investigative openness valorised by Gadamer (as elaborated on briefly below), it is not easy to discern in Heidegger anything akin to the emphasis on dialectical appraisal that, on this assessment, enables the Gadamerian approach to discharge the challenge of critical justification along the lines called for by Tugendhat.


43. Cf. Rudiger Bubner, “On the Ground of Understanding” _Hermeneutics and Truth_. Ed. Brice Wachterhauser. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994, 72-73. Here, partners, with their different points of view, come together in a conversation governed by a subject matter of common interest. It is orientation to the subject matter that leads both sides into a dialogical context and binds them for the course of the dialogue. The process is not motivated by the
chance of success of single, one-sided viewpoint, for its limits are already set by the resistance of
the partner. What is much more definitive is that both sides are bound by the task of the actual
elucidation of the subject matter.
47. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305-07.
49. P. Christopher Smith, “Toward a Discursive Logic: Gadamer and Toulmin on Inquiry and