THE SILENT CHORUS

CULTURE & SUPERFICIALITY

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The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality
ABSTRACT

The Silent Chorus is a philosophical examination of superficiality in the modern capitalist West. Building on the work of thinkers such as Aristotle, Vico, Herder, Marx, Heidegger, Baudrillard and MacIntyre, this thesis analyses superficial appropriation in popular culture to highlight the shallowness of our everyday cultural life. Superficial appropriation reveals how the world is treated as a mass of depthless commodities to be bought, sold and consumed for self-satisfaction. Superficiality more generally estranges us from our and others’ narrative traditions, corrupts our universities, robs us of our communal ethical will and hollows out our world so that we are symbolically ‘homeless’. This hollowness, in turn, leads people to seek meaning through shallow and vicarious means, such as superficial appropriation. The Silent Chorus argues that this malaise is engendered by the Epicurean tradition, and its modern expressions in late capitalism, mechanistic materialism and egoistic individualism.

As an alternative to this Epicurean ‘homelessness’, The Silent Chorus develops the vision of the ‘Chorus’. Drawing on Classical Greek tragedy and democracy, narrative theory and thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition, the Chorus is a utopian vision of diverse, creative, open-ended cultural life. This vision is used to highlight the degeneration of superficial popular culture, past and present deficiencies of our universities and the ethical weakness of our superficiality. It does not solve our problems, but rather clarifies them, and gives us an alternative.

Moving dialectically between deep utopia and shallow reality, ‘what should be’ and ‘what is’, The Silent Chorus further reveals the ontological, existential and ethical danger of our age, while providing a speculative vision for the future.
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I’m full to bursting with wise men and fools – they’ve utterly exhausted me!

- Yevgeny Yevtushenko, *The Face Behind the Face*, p.77

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis:

i. contains no material which has been accepted for the award to the candidate of any other degree or diploma, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis;

ii. to the best of my knowledge, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis; and

iii. where the work is based on joint research or publications, discloses the relative contributions of the respective workers or authors.

__________________________ Date: / / 
Damon A. Young
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>p.iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>p.v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>p.ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>p.xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>p.xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>p.xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1. CULTURE AND THE NARRATIVE WORLD

A. The Cultured Nature of Humanity                                      | p.1  |
B. The Cultivation of Humanity                                          | p.39 |
C. The Narrative World                                                  | p.53 |

## 2. SUPERFICIALITY AND POPULAR CULTURE

A. Cultural Appropriation                                               | p.99 |
B. Popular Culture and Superficiality I                                 | p.117|
C. Popular Culture and Superficiality II                                | p.126|
D. Superficiality                                                       | p.142|

## 3. CONFRONTING SUPERFICIALITY: CHORUS, UTOPIA AND SYMBOLS

A. The Chorus                                                           | p.169|
B. Universities and the Chorus                                          | p.200|
C. Utopia                                                               | p.251|
D. Utopia and Superficiality                                            | p.268|
E. Symbols                                                              | p.274|
4. SUPERFICIALITY AND SYMBOLS OF HOMELESSNESS

A. Early Hellenism.................................................................p.291
B. Judaism..............................................................................p.308
C. Christianity.................................................................p.316
D. Western Renaissance.....................................................p.324
E. Early Western Modernity................................................p.338
F. Late Western Modernity...................................................p.348

5. OVERCOMING SUPERFICIALITY: SPECULATION ON FUTURE DIRECTIONS.................................................................p.381

CONCLUSION........................................................................p.397

ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................p.407

APPENDICES
Appendix I: LG’s Air-conditioning System............................p.413
Appendix II: Calvin Klein and Victoria’s Secret......................p.415
Appendix III: ‘Academic Calendar Project’ – Swinburne University p.418
Appendix IV: Madonna the Postmodern................................p.419
Appendix V: ‘Powering Up Organisations for Renewable Results’ p.421
Appendix VI: The Nolan Waterfront Apartments..................p.422
Appendix VII: On Lenin.........................................................p.423
Appendix VIII: On The Castle...............................................p.426
Appendix IX: More Superficiality.............................................p.428

REFERENCES........................................................................p.437
PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS .....................................................p.522
# TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS


3. Detail from BMW promotion, *Vogue*, Nov. 1998, p.6 ................................................................. p.408


7. ‘Pathways to Better Living’, pamphlet received at ‘New Age and Psychic Expo – A New Day of Psychic Discovery’, Rosebud Memorial Hall, 17/1/99 ......................... p.410


10. ‘Absolut Impotence’ (13/2/02), http://adbusters.org/spoofads/alcohol/absolutimpotence/ .................................................................................................................. p.411

11. ‘American Flag With Logos’ (13/2/02), http://adbusters.org/campaigns/corporate/culturejam/flag_download.jpg ................................................................................. p.411


My rivals, let us cast away flattery
and the deceptive honour of abuse.
Simply let us consider our own fate.
We have in all of us the one and very same
sickness of soul.

Superficiality, it is called,
Superficiality, you are worse than blindness.
You can see, but do not care to see.
Maybe it is due to ignorance?
Or maybe, from a fear to tear up by the roots
the trees beneath which we have grown,
not having planted even a fence post for the future!
And is not that the reason why we always hurry,
skimming the surface, perhaps getting down a few inches,
so that, forgetting courage, we frighten ourselves
with our task to dig down to the heart of things.

- Yevgenny Yevtushenko, ‘I Journeyed Through Russia’, p.4

‘Now I know…the major cause of your illness: you have forgotten your true nature.
And so I have found out…the reason for your sickness and the way to approach the task
of restoring you to health.’

- Philosophy, in Boethius, *Consolations of Philosophy*, I.vi
INTRODUCTION

The impression of separation is total; from now on I am imprisoned within myself. It will not take place, the sublime fusion; the goal of life is missed. It is two in the afternoon.

- Michel Houellbecq, Whatever, p.155

Genius has often lamented our modern age. Nietzsche, philosophical poet, told us that God is dead. Speaking as a timely madman, Nietzsche asked: “How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? [...] Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not grown colder?” Soon after the First World-War, many artists echoed his cries in one way or another. Hemingway wrote ‘Nausea’, an unsettling account of a returned soldier’s nihilistic isolation, while e.e. cumming’s stories and poems spoke of “this monster, manunkind”. Dos Passos’ 1919 closed with a frightening vision of impersonal, bureaucratised, mechanised death, devoid of meaningful rite and ritual.

Moreover, the mechanical brutality and hollowness of this war reflected the greater malaise in modern Western society. T.S. Eliot wrote ‘The Wasteland’ and ‘The Hollow Men’, Robert Musil wrote The Man Without Qualities, and Fitzgerald wrote The Great Gatsby. Kafka showed us a society plagued by meaningless technological rationality and heartlessness, while Camus later wrote of emotionally barren men divorced from place and people. While Symbolism and Expressionism did not necessarily address objective realities, the paintings of Munch, Beckmann, Kokoschka and Rouault revealed a seedy, unsettling or frightened modern subject. Like van Gogh and Gauguin, these artists harboured a deep “discontent with the spiritual ills of

7 Musil, R. (1979), The Man Without Qualities, Volumes 1, 2 and 3, Picador, London
Western civilisation…[a] preoccupation with decadence, evil, and darkness”⁹. Munch’s *The Scream* was truly the cry of a modern man. Similarly, painters like Arthur Boyd and Albert Tucker saw in modern Australia a corrupt, hypocritical society, festering beneath a polite façade.³ Shocked by the mechanical brutality of the Second World-War, and the numbness that followed, Boyd’s *Melbourne Burning* and *The Mockers* are chilling images of decaying modernity. The same could be said for Tucker’s *Images of Modern Evil*. In all of these literary and visual works, our modern age was revealed as cold, dead or mechanical, and we moderns as hollowed out, shallow and alienated shadows.

Contemporary art reveals that postmodernity has not cured us of these ills. Rather, the meaningless has worsened, the shallowness has increased and the mechanism of life has grown stronger. Joseph Johnson’s *Womb to Let*, for example, portrays ‘The Queue’: a grotesque yet inescapable human train of monotonous masturbation, sodomy and urination.⁴ Similarly, in Houellebecq’s *Whatever, Atomised* and *Platform*, and Ellis’ *American Psycho*, we see the quintessential late modern capitalist West.⁵ Sadistic yet robotic rape and sex, rampant commodification and petty distractions for all. Tim Winton’s *Dirt Music* shows the internet as yet another superficial addiction to take our minds off our hollow lives.⁶ Rather than life, we have, as Winton puts it, “a listless kind of browsing.”⁷ Czech-born writer Milan Kundera writes of a young woman ‘losing her world’, that “part of our existence that answers our call…, and whose call we ourselves hear.”⁸ While she attempts suicide, others respond to this very same ‘worldlessness’ by simply ‘playing’ at life.⁹ In other works, Kundera speaks of ‘kitch’: the denigration of reality, and celebration of seductive hyperreal veneers.¹⁰

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7 *Ibid.*, p.4
10 Kundera, M. (1999), *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, Faber and Faber, pp.246-254
Consequently, we moderns have not developed our culture to overcome the malaise revealed by Nietzsche, Kafka and their poetic brethren. Rather, we have made it fun – the ultimate Pepsi Max ‘extreme sport’. Some decades ago Camus wrote that we, like the Romans, “have conquered, moved boundaries, mastered heaven and earth. Our reason has driven all away. Alone at last, we end up by ruling over a desert.”¹ If this was a portrait of modernity, the postmodernity of late capitalism is this very same desert, only with an entertaining mirage of Starbucks, McDonald’s, widescreen televisions, fizzy drinks, internet cafés and cynicism. Rather than facing the ennui of our disenchanted cosmos, we flee the depths of ourselves, our traditions and the world and amuse ourselves until death. We are superficial.

However, these artistic lamentations are not enough. In *The Silent Chorus*, we will attempt to explore the symptoms of this superficiality: superficial appropriation, ethical weakness, the failure of universities and ontological ‘homelessness’. We will ground this in a theoretical tradition that begins with Aristotle, and includes Marx, Heidegger, Whitehead and MacIntyre. Our task is to show how these symptoms of superficiality are grounded in a deeper cultural malaise, and to reveal this malaise in greater detail than previously achieved through purely speculative means. We will see how we have fallen away from our own authentic nature into nihilism.

Certainly, we are not alone in this task. As we have seen, poets and painters have long screamed of a hollow world. Moreover, key thinkers such as Heidegger, Marcuse, MacIntyre, Baudrillard and Gare have all argued that we have fallen away from authenticity and authentic traditions. Heidegger, for example, charts the course of Western metaphysics from Parmenides onwards.² Associated with this is technological rationality and the ‘will to will’.³ Marcuse, drawing on Freud, Marx and Heidegger, articulates the domination of technological rationality and the sublimation of authentic political spirit.⁴ MacIntyre explains that individualism and universalist rationalism

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have corrupted the narrative traditions and their associated virtues.\textsuperscript{1} Baudrillard argues that commodification has corrupted culture to the extent that there is only abstract exchange-value, and that our signifiers no longer have a signified.\textsuperscript{2} Gare draws on all these thinkers to argue that mechanistic materialism and egoistic individualism have resulted in both the overdetermined reifications of Enlightenment modernity, and the superficiality of postmodernity.\textsuperscript{3} From these stem ecocide, oppression, exploitation and a superficiality that feeds back into modernity and postmodernity. What all these accounts have in common is the idea that we have fallen away from cultural life of any depth.

Yet what precisely is this cultural life that we have fallen away from? To properly characterise superficiality it is necessary to articulate a vision of culture. In \textit{The Silent Chorus}, this is achieved by explicating two broad traditions of thought, Aristotelian and Epicurean. It is argued that Epicureanism is the dominant tradition in modern Western society, and that this has engendered the superficiality we are examining. Modern Epicureanism upholds egoistic individualism, technological rationality and atomism, and these have corrupted our culture, and our capacity for just and free cultural development. Indeed, culture has no metaphysical reality for Epicureanism, and so it is unable to even comprehend the scope and scale of its own danger.

The Aristotelian tradition is defended as a more suitable approach to culture. By building on the work of those in this tradition, such as Herder, Marx, Heidegger and MacIntyre, our unique human nature can be seen as a process of creative and open-ended cultural development. We begin with Aristotle, as it is his account that gives the first systematic articulation of the role of community, custom and dialogue in human nature. According to Aristotle, to be human is to speak and act rationally on matters of justice and freedom in a political community. Thinkers like Herder and Vico further develop Aristotle’s ideas by introducing the historical nature of human self-interpreting communities, and Hegel and Marx clarify the role of creative labour in this process.

\textsuperscript{1} MacIntyre, A. (1984), \textit{After Virtue}, Duckworth Press, London
Building on this, Heidegger integrates physical dwelling with historical hermeneutics in a unified ontology of humankind. Reconceptualising the contributions of previous thinkers, Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being-in-the-World’ – or simply ‘World’ – enables us to appreciate the depth of our cultural nature. This approach, in turn, allows us to give an account of what is involved in falling away from cultural traditions into superficiality. Moreover, the Aristotelian tradition also allows us to develop a normative vision of cultural life, the ‘Chorus’. The Chorus acts as a touchstone for our modern ills.

However, this vision of the Chorus requires two steps before it may be adequately articulated. Having given an account of culture culminating with the work of Heidegger, we turn first to psychology and childhood development, including the works of Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky. These theories of psychology and childhood development not only deepen our sense of culture and acculturation, but also allow us to make sense of our libidinous attachment to the World. While Piaget and Vygotsky explicate our internalisation of social and physical relations, Freud gives a clear account of desire and motivation. This is particularly important for an analysis of superficial appropriation, and the feelings of disenchanted depthlessness that lead to it. It is also essential for an account of symbols, which we draw on later to articulate ‘homelessness’.

After psychology and childhood development, we turn to narrative with thinkers including Husserl, Heidegger, Carr and MacIntyre. Narrative theory further clarifies our sense of culture and acculturation, including generational change and childhood development. Building on the insights of Heidegger, it also allows us to make sense of cultural traditions, and our own relations to them. Consequently, with our account of tradition we not only articulating a theory of culture. We are also justifying our own approach to culture, that of opposing philosophical traditions, and the central place of the Heideggerian notion of World. Lastly, the narrative account allows us to reconceptualise notions of justice, freedom and power, which are later used to clarify superficiality further, by articulating how superficiality is unjust and unfree.

With this account of cultural narratives, we therefore show what it is that we are falling away from: cultural life understood as a narrative World. Moreover, we lay the
groundwork for the development of a normative vision of cultural life in opposition to superficiality and the Epicurean tradition. This vision is the ‘Chorus’.

Grounded in the Aristotelian tradition, Greek tragedy and democracy and the insights of thinkers like Bakhtin and Vygotsky, the Chorus is a vision of creative, open-ended cultural life. People take up and live narratives, do justice to the narratives of others and freely develop their selves by creatively contributing to the development of the cultural narratives they share. The Chorus not only gives us a perspective from which to critique Epicureanism and superficiality, but also gives us a vision to defend in opposition to these. It is thus an ideal expression of creative, reflexive and just cultural life, and a vindication of the work of those in the Aristotelian tradition, such as Vico, Herder, Heidegger, MacIntyre and Gare.

However, the Chorus is purely speculative. Similarly, the ‘Aristotelian’ thinkers never address themselves to the concrete manifestations of superficiality in everyday life, and popular culture in particular. Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is a brilliant philosophical articulation of everyday fallenness. Yet the concept of ‘das Man’, \(^1\) as we will see, \(^2\) is lacking in sociological detail. It deduces superficiality from *a priori* philosophy. Marcuse recommends turning on television or radio, but never analyses these himself. \(^3\) MacIntyre devotes much time to analysing the relationship of the Enlightenment project to hollowed out traditions and narratives. Nonetheless, he never actually analyses these traditions or narratives in their everyday reality. \(^4\) Baudrillard does draw on case studies such as the Gulf War, \(^5\) but these studies are often articulated in vague, generalised terms with little detailed analysis. At other times, Baudrillard forgoes empirical analysis altogether in favour of theoretical speculation. \(^6\) Moreover, Baudrillard eventually accepts that the real has lost all currency, \(^7\) essentially erasing any distinction between

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2 See pp.66-68, below.
7 Baudrillard, J., ‘Desire in Exchange Value’, in Baudrillard, J. (1981), *For a Critique of the Political Economy of Signs*, Telos Press, St. Louis, pp.204-212. In these early writings, the ‘real’ is Marxist use-value. Baudrillard argues that use-value can never be extricated from exchange-value, and that exchange
superficiality and depth.¹ Gare draws on Baudrillard, MacIntyre and others to depict postmodernity, but the actual manifestations of superficiality are not extensively articulated.² For these thinkers, superficiality is deduced from the laws of economics, philosophy, sociology or history, but largely taken for granted as an inductive ‘fact’. Eco makes a similar argument, arguing that the so-called ‘apocalyptic intellectual’ fetishises the very same mass-consumer he accuses of fetishising culture.³ While this criticism applies more to Heidegger and MacIntyre than Gare or Baudrillard, it is a sobre argument. These thinkers, and those they have influenced, never come face-to-face with the everyday reality of superficiality. They are able to develop theories for overcoming metaphysics, one-dimensionality, the corruption of narratives, mechanistic materialism, hyperreality and so forth. Still, they have never given an account of everyday superficiality, and its iron grasp on popular culture.

A fuller articulation of late modern superficiality requires a detailed analysis of its concreteness. As Whitehead has argued, philosophy is like a plane taking off, flying and landing.⁴ Imaginative flights of fancy and speculative theorising must begin and end with grounding experience, and vice versa. In this way, the ground is put in a sharper perspective by the distance of theoretical flight, but this flight itself relies on a solid ground to take off, and to orient the path of the flight as it lands. Keen speculation relies on the brute facticity of particular observation, just as observation relies on speculation to yield broader abstract insights. Similarly, the notion of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ implies that we require a grasp of the whole before we can make sense of parts, yet this whole is nothing without its parts.⁵ There is therefore a dialectical movement between parts and wholes – take-offs, flights and landings – which resembles a slowly

widening spiral. As the parts and whole mutually shed light upon one another, we gradually gain a better sense of reality.

Therefore, to gain a fuller grasp of superficiality it is necessary to balance the theoretical speculations of Heidegger, Baudrillard and their kin with detailed examinations of everyday superficiality from popular culture. Similarly, it is not enough to simply develop a speculative vision of the Chorus, and not test it against the slings and arrows of contemporary life. Rather, we should glean insights through a dialectical movement between theoretical speculation, historical analysis and case studies of popular culture. This will involve ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture. As Best and Kellner argue, hasty dismissals of ‘elite’ or ‘mass’ culture are both equally destructive, as they lead us to ignore elements which equally contribute to an understanding of our age. In The Silent Chorus, having grounded ourselves in the Aristotelian tradition and its account of culture, we will therefore undertake a number of case studies and historical analyses.

First, we will explore the phenomenon of cultural appropriation, which explicates the character of people’s relation to their own and others’ cultures. We begin with an account of deep appropriation by the Jews, the Satnami of India and contemporary oppressed groups like Black Americans and Indigenous Australians. This reveals how it is possible to appropriate from other cultures in accordance with the Aristotelian vision of creative, open-ended cultural life. Put simply, these groups do justice to narrative traditions. We then turn to an analysis of superficial appropriation in cinema, television, New Age spirituality, advertising and mainstream media. This shows how superficial appropriation is associated with greed, egocentrism and the profit motives of capitalism. Indeed, in superficial appropriation we see that the meaninglessness of the Epicurean world leads people to seek meaning in novel traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism. However, as Epicureanism is characterised by individualism, technological rationality and depthlessness, these narrative traditions are ultimately reduced to ‘things’ which can be abstracted and consumed for personal entertainment and profit. This leads to a restless thirst for new ‘things’, which are quickly out of date and discarded, regardless of the nobility of their narrative origins.

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Second, having earlier developed the vision of the Chorus in opposition to superficiality and Epicureanism, we undertake an historical analysis of universities from the perspective of this Chorus. This not only justifies the Chorus as a rich analytical model, but also highlights the degeneracy of our universities. Historically, the European universities have failed to nurture creative, open-ended cultural development of the Chorus. Rather, they have been stifled by the demands of Church, empire or state, or by the reactionary conservatism or moral ambivalence of academics. Alternatively, they have embodied and promoted a culture of Epicureanism opposed to healthy cultural life. This analysis also reveals the superficial nature of late modern Australian universities, where education has become another ‘thing’ to be consumed as entertainment, or to gain profit. Whereas they were once mediocre or exploited, universities are now superficial also. Consequently, while deepening our articulation of superficiality, this historical analysis also shows that the vision of the Chorus is truly utopian.

Third, having thus shown the utopian nature of the Chorus, we turn to an historical and theoretical defence of utopias. This involves an analysis of Plato’s *Republic*, and the reconceptualisation of his utopia. The utopian element in Plato is not necessarily the state of the philosopher kings, but the life of Socrates as depicted in Plato’s literature. This utopian vision influenced thinkers for over two millennia, and is testament to the life of Socrates and the art of Plato. This not only defends utopias, but also further upholds our emphasis on creativity. This historical analysis lays the groundwork for a case study of sorts, focusing on the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades. Through the failure of Socrates to develop in Alcibiades an ethical life, we see the limits of utopias in the face of ethical weakness, or *akrasia*. Moreover, we see that superficiality and Epicureanism actually engender moral weakness on a cultural scale, fragmenting the cultural lifeworlds wherein we gain our ethical integrity. As a people, we are ethically weak, and this is another manifestation of superficiality.

Lastly, we investigate the symbols of ‘home’ in canonical and popular narratives of Western civilisation from Homer’s *Iliad* to George Lucas’ *Star Wars*. While symbols can be inspiring and deep, thinkers such as Baudrillard argue that they have become lifeless. Similarly, Heidegger argues that we are ‘homeless’. We turn to canonical and popular texts to deepen these speculative insights, and articulate the gradual hollowing
out of our cultural symbols of ‘home’. This not only confirms the importance of symbols in analysing culture, but also reveals the ‘homelessness’ of late capitalism. While pre-modern and early modern texts are characterised by a unity of symbols wedded to creative cultural practices, late modernity is characterised by atomistic individualism, technological rationality and the dissolution of ‘home’. Lacking a creative relation to place, people and history, and devoid of a cohesive ethical will, we are ‘homeless’. Rather than developing our creative, open-ended cultural nature, we have simply replaced ‘home’ with the bourgeois family embraced by conservative America. This ‘family’, in turn, is yet another forum for superficial role playing, greed and consumption. Meanwhile, the lack of inspiring symbols of ‘home’ undermine our capacity for determined ethical action. Thus, this symbolic analysis reveals the further spread of Epicureanism and, mutatis mutandis, superficiality.

Consequently, by moving dialectically between theory and ‘facts’, speculation and case study, utopia and reality, ‘what should be’ and ‘what is’, The Silent Chorus argues that superficiality is the greatest cultural malaise of the late modern West, particularly Australia and America. In doing so, it justifies the lamentations of our modern and late modern artists and writers. We are in no position to take up the vision of the Chorus. By adopting the Epicurean tradition, we have essentially destroyed our own narrative traditions. Our worldview is incapable of doing justice to the cultural, creative and open-ended nature of humanity. Rather than creatively developing our own culture, we steal from the cultures of others, while at the same time using them for cheap labour or resources. The feelings of meaninglessness that engender this desperate grab for novelty are associated with the same forces of egotistic individualism, mechanistic thinking and atomism that have corrupted our education, undermined our moral capacity and destroyed our most inspiring symbols. The Silent Chorus concludes by briefly proposing some ways to overcome our superficiality, and then summarising the dialectical movement of the thesis as a whole.
1. CULTURE AND THE NARRATIVE WORLD

We are concerned at all times to take into consideration an enormous mass of history barely conscious of itself. [...] If man usually remained within the limits of the possible, it was because his feet were sunk in this clay.


There was never such a time as the state of nature, for man evolved as a gregarious creature and the glutinous context of culture has always stuck to him.

- Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Truth: A History*, p.21

Our first task is to account for culture itself, and we will devote considerable space to this. The reason for this is that without an appreciation of culture, we cannot adequately explicate what it is for a culture to be superficial. Building on this, we will then characterise the way in which culture is taken up and creatively developed through socialisation and individuation. Turning to ‘process’ philosophy, phenomenology and narrative theory, we shall then finalise our account of culture by proposing that our relation to culture should be understood in terms of narrative traditions, integrated with the Heideggerian notion of the ‘World’. Consequently, superficiality can then be understood as the corruption of the capacity to creatively engage with the narrative World.

In accordance with this emphasis on narrative and tradition, we will begin by moving through an historical story that contrasts Aristotle, Epicurus and their theoretical descendants on the subject of sociality, community, language and creativity. This enables us to identify two distinct traditions of thought, each of which understands human nature in a particular way. With the Aristotelian tradition, humans are social, creative and live in a purposeful world. Here, our words are always understood in a community. With the Epicurean tradition, humans are individualistic, egocentric and live in a dead, purposeless world. Here, words are fundamentally understood in relation to individuals. We then explore how this Epicurean tradition was taken up and developed by Hobbes and Locke, wedding materialist individualism to mechanism, and a defense of capitalism. This, in turn, is responsible for the worst aspects of modern capitalism and the destruction of culture, including language.
In opposition to this tradition, we show how the insights of Aristotle were taken up by Vico and Herder, and then how the work of Herder was developed by Hegel, Marx and Heidegger. With Heidegger, particularly, we are given a relational view of human life, where a materialist emphasis on worldliness is wedded to an idealist emphasis on interpretation. Moreover, the work of Heidegger, following Herder, upholds the primordiality of language in culture, and rejects any deterministic accounts of cultural history. Consequently, to be human is to be a creative, open-ended process of poetic cultural development.

Later, we will further develop this account by engaging with theorists of childhood development such as Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky, and narrative theorists such as Carr, MacIntyre and Ricoeur. The purpose of this is to further articulate a systematic account of humanity’s creative, open-ended cultural nature, in order to more clearly explicate later what it means to fall away from this nature. To begin this account, though, we must first turn to Aristotle.

A. The Cultured Nature of Humanity: The Shared ‘I’

i. ‘Man’: The Social Animal

In his classic treatise *Politics*, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) argues that “man is by nature a political animal”\(^1\). Despite Aristotle’s rigorous style, this is now an equivocal statement, precisely because contemporary understandings of ‘politics’ and ‘nature’ are antithetical to those of Aristotle, and the Greek political community of Classical Athens. For we moderns, a ‘political animal’ is often crude, self-interested or untrustworthy.\(^2\) If we are political animals by nature, we are thus solely preoccupied with individual gain, and ignorant of justice and fairness.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a:2-3

\(^2\) See, for instance, Grant, A.R. (25/10/01), ‘He doth protest too much, methinks’, The Age, OPINION, p.18. Here, ‘political animal’ is contrasted with ‘humanitarian’ and ‘leadership’.

However, the Aristotelian account of human nature and politics stands in contradistinction to this. For Aristotle, all human activity fundamentally aims at some ‘good’.\(^1\) Furthermore, because “every community is established with a view to some good…the state or political community, which is the highest of all…aims…at the highest good.”\(^2\) Consequently, for Aristotle human nature is not a matter of private advantage, but about goods. Certainly, goods may differ with human practices – Aristotle is no Platonist, and thus there is no ‘Good’.\(^3\) In this sense, goods may be many things to many people. Nonetheless, \textit{qua} humans, we have real goods to be discovered and developed through political activity. Contrary to Aristotelian Athens, it can therefore be maintained that ‘politics’ is a word whose lustre has waned in our time.\(^4\) While politics has acquired an air of mistrust due to its association with egoistic individualism, Aristotelian politics is concerned with the good life, and the community required for this.

For Aristotle, politics is grounded in the \textit{polis}, meaning ‘political community’\(^5\). The \textit{polis} is a \textit{sine qua non} for politics and the good life. This \textit{polis}, however, should not be conflated with the modern state, with its abstract, legal and instrumental character.\(^6\) When we are told that man is the worst of all animals “when separated by law and justice”\(^7\), this ‘law’ of Aristotle is not the realm of barristers. Rather, ‘law’ is \textit{nomos}. For the Greeks, \textit{nomos} meant “custom, habit, regularity of behaviour, or manner of reverence”\(^1\). For Aristotle, it is in terms of custom that justice is done in the \textit{polis}. Thus, justice is also not a matter of ‘law’. Rather, justice is defined by Aristotle in relation to our entire moral character, or \textit{ethos}. For Aristotle, there is a clear link between \textit{ethikē}, meaning moral virtue, and \textit{ethos}, meaning ‘habit’ or ‘character’. As a habit, the ethical life does not arise in us by nature, but must be cultivated in the same

\(^1\) Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1094a
\(^2\) Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1252a1-6
\(^3\) Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1095a:15-1096a:10
\(^5\) Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1252a:1-5
\(^7\) Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 1253a:32
manner as *nomos*.\(^2\) Far from being a matter of laws, justice requires the full cultivation of the virtues. Moreover, these virtues are seen in relation to the good of others as well as the good of ourselves.\(^3\)

In order to cultivate these virtues and thus justice, the people of the *polis* must participate in dialogue. When democracy began in Athens, ‘*nomos*’ was chosen over other words for ‘law’ because it emphasised judgements stemming from democratic dialogue.\(^4\) By Aristotle’s time, this was common sense.\(^5\) As Athenian statesman Pericles (495-429 BCE) tells us, “we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated.”\(^6\) For Aristotle, as for the Athenians like Pericles, speech is not simply an handy tool. Rather, it is part of our very nature. Aristotle writes:

> Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain…, the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.\(^7\)

Speech is *logos*, our natural gift for rational thought, and the articulation of this thought.\(^8\) It is our nature to speak, and to speak reasonably. Moreover, when we speak we are speaking to others who are different.\(^9\) Indeed, Aristotle recognises that a good state is one where diversity is acknowledged, respected and protected.\(^10\) In doing so, we gather diversity into a unity. Because of this, justice and injustice can only be understood within the context of everyday social life in the *polis*. It is through *logos* that we are true to our political nature.

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\(^3\) Ibid., 1129b:27-1130a:15


\(^6\) Pericles, cited in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, II:4.§5

\(^7\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a: 9-15


\(^9\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1261a:15-1261b:15

\(^10\) Nisbet, R. (1976), *The Social Philosophers*, Paladin, St Albans, p.395
In Greek, this ‘nature’ is *physis*. This is important, for it enables us to clarify the Aristotelian view of human nature. As opposed to the Latin ‘natura’, *physis* must be understood as a process of becoming.\(^1\) Indeed, Aristotle sees nature as a process of the unveiling of immanent potentialities.\(^2\) Following from this, we begin to see the Aristotelian account of human nature. Goods and justice are developed by political humans who are themselves natural processes of becoming. Moreover, as human processes, we only realise our nature by talking to one another in the political community. Indeed, for Aristotle, contemplation itself is the highest end we can achieve.\(^3\) At the risk of perpetuating a cliché, the *polis* is thus Nature talking to itself, though Aristotle may not have put it this way. Nonetheless, it is this insight which implies that *physis*, and therefore the *kosmos* itself, has thinking as its final end.\(^4\) This is an Aristotelian conclusion. It is for this reason that “man, when perfected, is the best of all animals”\(^5\), as it is we men who think, and speak of thinking. When we develop a virtuous character as a result of contemplation, our nature is perfected. Therefore, for Aristotle, as Nichols writes,

> [m]an develops his full potential only through participating in a community in which he pursues with others what is advantageous and just. [...] Man is not a self-contained whole who is merely protected through his membership in a civil society. He is an incomplete being who becomes more complete through political activity.\(^6\)

In agreement, Yack writes that “[n]ature does not provide human beings with sufficient conditions to produce the good life, according to Aristotle. It provides, instead, sufficient conditions for the possibility of a good life.”\(^7\) Human nature, nature *qua physis*, is characterised by growth and development both to this ideal and from this ideal. The nature of man should not be obscured by law, or by the state as we


\(^{3}\) Aristotle, *Ethics*, 1095b:14-1096a:10


\(^{5}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a:31-32


understand it. We are social animals and, because of this, political animals. Moreover, politics *qua* reasonable speech is not a matter of self interest, hedonism or simply the clash of interest groups. Rather, it is the way in which human nature is perfected. For Aristotle, we grow into social life, and grow within social life – we are always social.

Certainly, the Aristotelian notions of ‘perfect man’ or ‘ultimate goal’ are questionable, as they imply that processes are only actualised insofar as they are eternally present. This establishes human nature too rigidly, and does so in a manner often laced with problematic social bias.¹ We will come to terms with this later, however.² For now, we should turn to Epicurus.

**ii. Man:** The Lonely Animal

Epicurus (341-270BCE), a philosopher of the Hellenic period, reacted against this Aristotelian characterisation of the good life. Influenced by the atomism of Demokritus and Leukippus, Epicurus wanted to free human life of all Divine influence, including the notion of ends, human or otherwise, central to Aristotelianism. For Epicurus, Nature is a collection of “indivisible particles of undifferentiated matter”³, and in this Nature there is no Providence, Fate or any such thing. Rather, there is only Necessity and Chance.⁴ Confronted with this picture of a meaningless, unpredictable world, Epicurus sought simply to “provide a secure refuge for the soul among the storms of this troublesome life.”⁵ To do this, Epicurus taught that we should seek pleasure, rather than virtue, for its own sake. This was not meant in the vulgar sense later understood by the wealthy Roman classes, but in terms of *edonē*, meaning ‘joy’.⁶ This joy allows us to decide what is wrong and right, for we must choose between lesser degrees of pleasure and pain. While the word ‘Epicurean’ has certainly been distorted to imply mere hedonism or gluttony, Epicurus’ philosophy is still grounded in individual self-interest.

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¹ See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253b:1-1255b:15, where the ‘nature’ of some people is to be slaves.
² See p.19ff, below.
Consequently, we see here two radically different views of human nature. For Aristotle, the important ideas are *logos*, *nomos* and *ethos*. The development of our humanity is inconceivable outside of a political community. Justice is associated with the goods of those in our community as well as ourselves. Moreover, we are naturally gifted to foster these goods through interaction with others who are often different. Lastly, while he does not exclude considerations of pleasure and pain, Aristotle gains joy from wisdom developed in communal collaboration, and this is joyous in itself, not as an end.\(^1\) However, for Epicurus, as A.A. Hope argues,\(^2\) humans are not naturally social. We are so only for practicality. Similarly, justice is also a matter of utility. *Contra* Aristotle, we must choose what is pleasurable for its own sake, for it is pleasure that motivates our souls, rather than any concern for the shared good, the just and so forth. For Epicurus, the development of humanity is associated with a modest distance from any community, and particularly others who are different. Berlin sees this as a result of the fall of the Greek city-states, and an inward retreat, really a “very grand form of sour grapes.”\(^3\) Here, justice is simply our ability to increase pleasure and decrease pain.\(^4\) Moreover, as the world is an arbitrary collection of atoms, there is no natural reason for us to seek justice of any kind other than self-interest, however modestly this self-interest may be understood. For Epicurus, as Long writes, “[j]ustice…does imply recognition of the interests of others besides oneself. But the basis of this recognition is self-interest.”\(^5\) Aristotle and Epicurus, then, give us two opposing views of human nature and, indeed, two philosophical traditions based on these views.

After the Hellenistic period, the philosophy of Epicurus was largely ignored in favour of Aristotelianism and Platonism. Christianity, in particular, embraced Platonism and Neo-Platonism, though Aquinas later reconceptualised this Platonism in favour of an increasingly popular Aristotelianism during the thirteenth-century. However, after the Reformation and during the Enlightenment, ancient pagan atomism, including Epicureanism, was revived against Aristotelian Scholasticism by scholars such as

\(^1\) Ibid., p.39
Bacon, Boyle, Galileo, Gassendi and Newton. Despite the impact of these thinkers, though, we may better understand the political and social implications of the Epicurean tradition by looking at its greatest exponents in political philosophy, Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes and Locke were both sympathetic to the Royal Society’s view that “Aristotle’s an ass to Epicurus.” Consequently, to gain a better sense of the Epicurean tradition and its influence on Western society, we should turn to Hobbes and Locke.

### iii. Aristotle Rejected: Individualism, Materialism, Mechanism and Capitalism

Seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote his seminal *Leviathan* in a Europe shattered by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Indeed, for Hobbes these must have seemed like the ‘storms of troublesome life’ Epicurus sought to avoid. Certainly, Hobbes’ work must be understood as taking place against a backdrop of massive social upheaval. Indeed, we will see that the social conditions of Hobbes’ time have an impact on his work.

For now, though, we should note that Hobbes’ writings are a revival of a mechanistic Epicureanism against Aristotelianism. For Hobbes, the world is composed of material bodies. These bodies will not move unless acted upon. As we are also composed of such objects, the sense impressions we feel indicate bodies outside us in the world. They move, we move. However, there is not necessarily any correlation between the causes of the moving bodies and the qualities of these sense impressions in our minds.

The colour blue, for instance, may be related to the objects of the sky. Nonetheless,
there is no sense in which the blue in our minds is definitively correlated with the sky. This is a kind of nominalism. The perceptions, meanings we give these perceptions, and words we give these meanings, are relative to each of us.¹

Having rejected the Aristotelian idea that we might find purposes in Nature, Hobbes concludes that ideas of the good and the just are as relative as these sense impressions.² As Tuck writes, “there were no objective moral properties, but what seemed good and what pleased any individual or was good for him. The implicit realism of ordinary language, like that of the ordinary language of colour, was therefore a serious error.”³ Like Epicurus, all we can do is follow our own judgements as to what is pleasurable and painful. Moreover, for Hobbes our desires based on this judgement are of a very particular kind. Contra Aristotle, who tells us that only some confused people have an boundless appetite for riches,⁴ Hobbes assumes that we all have unlimited desires.⁵

However, if we all follow our own judgements about desire, there will be no society per se. Rather, there will only be a collection of individuals acting on self-interest. Hobbes describes this situation as the ‘state of nature’, the ‘true’ nature of us qua humans. In a classic formulation, Hobbes writes:

> To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice […] Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.⁶

In this natural state, there are no kinship ties or political bonds to bring people together as in Aristotle. This is because Hobbes sees the notion of the political animal as the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp.13-14
² *Ibid.*, p.27
fatal flaw of Classical philosophy. 1 People are discrete individuals, primarily motivated by self-interest and in a state of perpetual isolation from one another. 2 They are not political, in the Aristotelian sense. This is not to say that society per se does not exist for Hobbes, but that we cannot be understood as anything but individuals. For Hobbes, as MacPherson writes, “[t]he individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself.” 3 Here, as Strauss writes, “Hobbes joins the Epicurean tradition.” 4 Thus, Hobbes’ ontology of man is one of atomistic individualism. Of course, this individualism is later balanced in the Hobbesian tradition by an equally materialistic emphasis on mechanism, derived from Descartes, Galileo and Newton. 5 Nonetheless, ‘man per se is an individual.

In order to remedy this natural individualism, Hobbes develops the idea of the ‘social contract’. Here, as Brown reminds us, we see Hobbes’ psychology informing his ethics and politics. 6 The social contract is a rational, conscious and calculated surrender of our personal will to the sovereign. By giving up our right to decide our own interests and protect them, we gain order, stability and protection from pain. For Hobbes, as Myers tells us, “[e]conomic freedom for the individual is possible but only well below the absolute freedom of the state. The state must be the monitor of man’s actions in self-interest.” 7 We are free precisely because we are free to pursue our own self-interests within the limits set by the sovereign; we can seek justice qua pleasure, or the absence of pain.

For Hobbes, then, contract law and property take the place of social custom, Aristotle’s nomos. In this way, by understanding human society through a legalistic framework,
“Hobbes declares that liberty exists only in the interstices of law”\(^1\). Thus, while Aristotelian justice is associated with social cultivation of the virtues, justice for Hobbes is merely adherence to a contract, a mechanical ‘law’.\(^2\) With Hobbes, man is a machine, and history and custom are nothing but mechanistic physical laws.\(^3\) This worldview, along with its implicit individualism and mechanism, continued to influence Enlightenment thought. As Nisbet argues, neither Locke, Rousseau nor Bentham were able to move radically beyond Hobbesianism,\(^4\) though Rousseau was also an influence on Romantic thought. It is to Locke, the most influential Hobbesian, that we should turn to develop our account of the Epicurean tradition.

British empiricist John Locke (1632-1704) was a young man when *Leviathan* was published. Nisbet tells us, perhaps harshly, that “Locke is a derivative thinker, whose master in all important respects was Hobbes.”\(^5\) While Locke does seem well within the Hobbesian tradition, it seems he was also influenced by the early Greek atomists, and by Newton and Boyle, themselves materialists influenced by Epicurus and Lucretius.\(^6\) Certainly, though, Locke is Hobbesian in his overall outlook.

Like Hobbes, Locke tells us that our sense impressions are the result of atoms moving in space. This movement is continued within us by the atoms of the “nerves, or animal spirits”\(^7\) in our bodies. Here, the ‘bodies’ of Hobbes have been reformulated as the ‘atoms’ of Newton. From these we receive primary qualities, such as extension, motion, figure, solidity, which actually resemble particles in the world. We also receive secondary qualities, such as taste, colour and so forth, but these have no resemblance to actual atoms.\(^8\) Here, then, Locke makes a distinction between the objective character of primary qualities, and the subjective character of secondary qualities. This, as Copleston

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1. Culture and the Narrative World

1. The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

tells us, Locke shares with Democritus, Epicurus’ Atomist predecessor. Moreover, like Hobbes, Locke tells us that the words we use have no relation whatsoever to the material world, and reside only in the mind of each individual. With this, Locke’s nominalism, words are subjective and often associated with secondary qualities and complex ideas. Thus, they cannot be relied upon. Pleasure and pain, on the other hand, are simple ideas that may be trusted. From this, Locke deduces that things “are good or evil only in reference to pleasure and pain.”

Having come to similar conclusions as Epicurus and Hobbes, Locke also develops the idea of the state of nature, and retains the contract to remedy this. Here, as our individual judgements are associated with the unreliable secondary qualities and complex ideas of Locke’s atomism, “[w]ant of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of Nature.” Certainly, as Aarleff shows us, if Locke did not believe he had found a real state of nature, he certainly believed he had found the real state of man. This state is one where we are free to use and exchange our possessions and ourselves, without interference. In particular, we are free to have private property, which is the result of labour. Moreover, as the fruits of our labour soon perish, there is a limit set on our accumulation. These are our ‘natural rights’. However, with the advent of money, which does not perish, Locke shows how we are free to accumulate as much as we want for ourselves, and to buy the labour of others who can then labour for us. Here, then, private property and wage-labour are justified. All this, we should add, comes to pass before the political contract.

3 Ibid., pp.299-306
4 Ibid., p.159
5 Ibid., pp.159-160
9 Ibid., pp.133-139
10 Ibid., p.139
11 Ibid., p.130, pp.139-141

1 1. Culture and the Narrative World
As to the contract itself, it is the surrender of our natural rights to the majority.\(^1\) This ensures the protection of our possessions, public and private, and the keeping of the peace.\(^2\) Such things are our only reason for joining a community.\(^3\) For Locke, then, _contra_ Aristotle, we can be understood as individuals without society, though we enter into society to protect our individual self-interests, particularly our private property. Indeed, we may note that if

Hobbes was inclined to limit [political purpose] to defence and peace, Locke lays excessive stress on the ‘preservation of property’. The individualism of his time allows him to play with the old notion of rights which men bring like bundles into society, out of an hypothetical and crudely atomistic ‘state of nature’.\(^4\)

For Hobbes and Locke, then, influenced by a crude Epicureanism, atomistic individualism appears natural. In this way, the evils of stormy society can only be remedied by surrender to the lawful state by social contract. The kinds of social and political communities understood by Aristotle as essential for the growth and development of humanity are not relevant. As we have seen, for Hobbes and Locke this is chiefly because human nature is no longer associated _a priori_ with goods, justice and life in a community of reasonable dialogue. Rather, as Nisbet told us, only individuals are real, and anything else, such as a society is a collection of individuals. Man, a machine, is a ‘thing’ in a larger world machine.\(^5\)

Despite the extensive political and philosophical influence of Hobbes and Locke, there are several serious problems with this understanding of human nature. Firstly, as Midgley writes, “[i]t is not clear how a species could evolve which did what Hobbes supposed, and became calculating before becoming social.”\(^6\) MacIntyre makes a similar

criticism. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that we would never have survived as a species if we were, as Hobbes suggests, ‘self-interested calculators’. Secondly, both Hobbes and Locke base their understanding of human nature on the social conditions of a given historical period. Hobbes, as MacPherson writes, “deduces [the state of nature] from the appetites of men who are civilised in that they desire not merely to live but to live well or commodiously.” Hill is more blunt, writing that “Hobbes’s state of nature is bourgeois society with the policeman removed.” Locke accepts this with some polite changes, ultimately securing Hobbes’ naturalisation of the mercantile society of seventeenth-century England. Indeed, it is for this reason that Hobbes and Locke can assume calculation before sociability, for calculated self-interest makes much sense in bourgeois society. Moreover, as Vaughan observes contra MacPherson, both Hobbes and Locke seek in Epicurus a foundation for bourgeois society missing in the homo politicus of Aristotle. In each case, then, Hobbes and Locke are not presenting us with the natural state of man. Rather, they are defending a particular society with a particular philosophical tradition. Thirdly, the foundation for society they are seeking is only necessary in a Europe characterised by the disintegration of earlier social formations. Thus, the fading of the Medieval worldview, the rise of Protestantism and capitalism, and the need for a justification of the new socio-economic order, can only be understood socially. Only people shaped by, and thus inseparable from, a given social period could, like Hobbes and Locke, defend the primacy of the atomistic individual. It would make much more sense to speak, as does Aristotle, of different kinds of political communities, and different kinds of individuals therein; of polis, nomos and ethos. Fourthly, the nominalism of Hobbes and Locke abstracts


14 1. Culture and the Narrative World
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

conversation, dialogue and debate from the social and political communities that give them meaning. Here, language is simply in the mind of each individual, rather than in the society. This, in turn, undermines not only everyday speech, but also ethical and political discussion and, mutatis mutandis, the entire tradition of political philosophy of which Hobbes and Locke are a part. As Rapaczynski notes, this is due to a rejection of Aristotelian logos, a rejection which, we may add, is itself associated with the tradition of atomistic individualism inherited from Epicurus. Fifthly, and perhaps most pressingly in our times, are the everyday consequences of this tradition. By rejecting the Aristotelian worldview, Hobbes and Locke leave little room for justice, particularly of the economic kind. Indeed, for Hobbes, justice and injustice have no ontological or ethical significance whatsoever. They are only a function of law. As Spragens tells us,

[v]iewing economic activity as only one aspect of a broader human order, the Aristotelian tradition placed certain limitations upon it which followed from the larger order. […] Here, as elsewhere, however, the concept of justice is an ontological one, and Hobbes’s destruction of the classical ontology leaves him no basis for these traditional theories of economic justice.

The result of the extension and embodiment of this worldview, as Gare shows us, is a world dominated by Western capitalist civilisation, and characterised by the nihilistic destruction of the environment and ourselves in order to satisfy the most vulgar economic imperatives. As I have argued elsewhere, it is this worldview that replaces justice with individual ‘rights’. These, in turn, actually perpetuate injustices of isolation, alienation, mechanistic oppression and a latent ‘war against all’. Moreover, as we will see, this atomistic individualism and mechanistic thinking in the form of modern capitalism is linked to ‘doublethink’ and ‘doublespeak’. At this point, though, we should turn to the reinvigoration of the Aristotelian tradition. This will counter the defects of Epicureanism, and ground our account of culture. This, in turn, will allow us to better account for superficiality in our culture. First, however, we should turn to Vico.

4 Gare, A. (1996), Nihilism Inc., Eco-Logical Press, Como, pp.135-156 and passim
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was a child at the time of Hobbes’ death. Vico gives us an alternate tradition to Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. Though he was influenced early on by Epicureanism and the work of Descartes, Vico later left behind these influences, as well as those of Hobbes and Locke. One influence that stayed with Vico was that of Augustine and the Catholic schoolmen. Retaining the Scholastic belief that God knows the world because He made it, Vico came to believe that we know best in the world what we make. Contra Locke, then, it is not because of ‘simple ideas’ and ‘primary qualities’ that logic and mathematics are correct. Rather, logic and mathematics are knowable because they are human creations.

Moreover, Vico came to see that the study of history, philosophy, myth and language, *qua* human creations, tells us more about humans than natural science tells us about the world. This is because we are social creatures, and our social creativity enables us to understand one another, even from afar. Through *fantasia*, or imagination, we may enter into the minds of even the earliest people. Rather than affirming natural rights or social contracts, Vico therefore tells us that the “social nature is the true nature of humanity and that law exists in nature.” As with Aristotle, then, Vico sees our sociality as natural. Contra Aristotle, though, who tells us that there cannot be scientific knowledge of ‘things human’, Vico believes in a science of man. By following the development of history, we follow the development of different societies, societies which can only be understood on their own terms, their own ‘common sense’, or *sensus communis*. Though Vico rejected Aristotelian metaphysics, we see here a strong affirmation of *logos*. Language, particularly poetic language, is not in the mind as it is

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6 Ibid., §2
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

with Hobbes and Locke, but rather in a given society.\(^1\) Moreover, in each of these societies, individuals cannot be made sense of alone. Rather, they must be understood in relation to their communities, and these communities must be seen as part of an overall process of development.\(^2\) The ‘logic’ behind this process of development Vico called Providence.

Vico developed the idea of Providence in opposition to Epicurus, Hobbes, Descartes and others. Indeed, Vico tells us that Hobbes, “in seeking his basic principles, he went astray, led by the chance of his admired Epicurus.”\(^3\) Rather than Epicurean chance and necessity, Providence is a Platonic blueprint that governs an otherwise dynamic human social development.\(^4\) Though Providence is associated with God,\(^5\) it nonetheless paints a picture of human nature characterised by growth, development and, most importantly, creativity. We are no longer the individuals of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke, but truly social animals, who can only be understood in social institutions that arise only at certain times, and in certain places.\(^6\) For Berlin, this is “the authentic beginning of the idea of culture as a complete pattern of living….In short, we are in at the emergence of the concept of the uniqueness….of an age, an outlook, a civilisation.”\(^7\) Certainly, this is a rich alternative to the bleak atomism of Epicureanism.

There are, however, two serious problems with Vico’s ‘new science’. Firstly, like Hobbes and Locke, Vico believes that primitive humans are self-interested individuals. Thus, if “people were left to pursue their private interests, they would live in solitude like wild beasts.”\(^8\) While we are saved from this by Providence, this nonetheless contradicts Vico’s own ideas on the social nature of humans. Indeed, to rely on God-given Providence to save human dignity and creativity seems a curious choice. Rather, the Aristotelian idea that human custom and speech are part of Nature seems far more dignified, and more in accordance with Vichian thought. Secondly, Vico believes in a predetermined development from primitive to Poetic to Heroic to Human society, and

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\(^2\) Ibid., §147
\(^3\) Ibid., §179
\(^6\) Ibid., §147
back again. This is due to the Platonic and Christian influence in his Providence. Thus, while he rejects the Hobbesian timeless principle of human nature in favour of development, he accepts a timeless principle of the development of human nature. This principle, however, is not properly demonstrated in Vico’s work. Vico, as Pompa writes, “cannot show that there is a necessary sequence in the history of any nation, let alone that of all nations.” Moreover, this idea of a timeless principle governing our historical development seems at odds with any approach that valorises the creativity of humans. Certainly, societies may show themselves to be partial to a given direction of development. However, this is not the same as speaking of necessity which, we may conclude, is the result of Vico being overly influenced by “a metaphysics consonant with Christian piety”. This, however, is overcome by Herder.

v. Culture, History and Creativity

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), while perhaps coming to the work of Vico late in life, must be seen as the bearer of the Vichian tradition. Writing at the dawn of the Romantic backlash against the Enlightenment, Herder gives us a profound vision of man as a social and creative, though still rational, animal. He begins with the Aristotelian idea that nature is a process of creative becoming, where the end of each process is immanent within it. Like Aristotle, Herder also argues that Nature “bestows no powers in vain”. Thus, our capacity for speech is not an individual one, as it was for Locke and Hobbes. Rather, it is prefaced on our social and cultural nature. Indeed, Herder comes to the Aristotelian view that we are not even alone when we are by ourselves. One man cannot “realize himself in isolation, since his values [are] not

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1 *Ibid.*, §349, §916-946
innate, nor the mere reflection of his immediate environment, but arise from a relationship between himself and his people.” Thus, for Herder, as Berlin argues, the idea of the purely solitary man is as fanciful as it was for Aristotle.

Against Aristotle, though, Herder extends this view of language and speech to defend the Vichian view of man’s nature as a process of becoming. Rather than having a single nature to be perfected throughout time, Herder argues that we learn to be human, and that we all learn differently. Moreover, we learn, not by discovering mathematical laws of timeless truths, but by taking on the cultural characteristics of the tradition we inherit. As Herder writes, “[h]uman beings living among human beings cannot avoid being improved or harmed by culture.” With Vico, then, this is a picture of man as inherently social and creative, and bounded by his place in time and space.

However, Herder builds on the philosophy of Vico by discarding the Vichian idea of Providence. While Herder speaks of the role of God in the nature of humans, he tells us that “Providence itself…require[s] no ideal”. We do not need God to guide us towards our humanity, for nature is a creative process of becoming, and we are part of nature. Thus, the role of God is not to guide us with a timeless law of development, but to grasp the whole of which we are a part. This whole is not a uniform mass, but a multiplicity of equally human difference. Thus, while similarly influenced by the Divine, Herder overcomes Vico’s Platonism while retaining his belief in humanity as social, cultural and creative animals. For Herder, then, as Berlin writes, “history [is] a drama, but one without a dénouement: as if it were like a cosmic symphony of which each movement is

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5 Ibid., p.52
significant in itself, and of which...we cannot hear the whole, for God alone does so.”¹
This, then, is a revolution of sorts. Not only is man social, cultural and creative. Man is in history, and the whole of history is the manifestation of humanity’s natural creative capacity blooming in many beautiful ways.

For Herder, however, our creative becoming is nurtured through the development of poetry, literature, philosophy and so forth. There is no sense in which we are creatively engaged with the physical environment around us, except insofar as this environment enables us to undertake literary or philosophical activity. In short, Herder does not take labour into account. We may remedy this by turning briefly to Hegel.

vi. Creative Ideals, Creative Labour

For George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), the whole of history is a logical movement to the Absolute. Everything that is, is insofar as it is a manifestation of the Absolute. This Absolute develops through history as Spirit, the “underlying unifying principle of consciousness and...the underlying rational will behind all practical reason and action.”² However, this Absolute is not to be understood in purely Platonic terms. Rather, it is like a Platonic Form characterised by Aristotelian growth and development.³ As Collingwood writes, “whereas Plato’s world of forms is static..., Hegel’s is permeated through and through by process, it is dynamic, its being constantly issues forth in a becoming”⁴. This, then, is a modern form of Aristotelian Platonism, where the Platonic Absolute is a “possibility” that “points to something destined to become actual”⁵ through the working-out of itself. For Hegel, this working-out is history. With each historical era, the contradictions, or imperfect manifestations of the Absolute, are overcome, and the potential of the Absolute is further actualised.⁶ The Absolute is the absolute archē and telos, the beginning and end of all history within which our lives have meaning.⁷

¹ Ibíd., p.192
⁶ Ibíd., pp.53-57
For Hegel, then, we are not discrete individuals. Rather, “all of us are born within our own people and belong to its spirit.”¹ In turn, the Spirit of each people can only be understood as a part of the weltgeist, or World-Spirit, that moves toward the Absolute. Through Spirit, then, the Absolute is made manifest in the world in the work of humans.² Hegel refers to this as the ‘cunning of reason’, where the Absolute develops into itself by using us. Here, we see the influence of Vico on Hegel, where the whole of history seems a ploy to make man recreate the Creator. The cunning of reason is not, however, as Croce, Berlin and Gare would have it, the same as Providence in Vico.³ There is no rational, logical Absolute in Vico. For Vico, development occurs as a result of internal social forces acting in time. For Hegel, on the other hand, the Spirit moves through history through the passions of social people, but in a logical progression to the Absolute Self-Consciousness. Put simply, the modus operandi of Spirit in Vico is social, while in Hegel it is ‘logical’.

Here, history is, in Hegel’s words, “the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially.”⁴ Thus, the end of history comes when Spirit has reached Absolute Consciousness of itself. Here, Hegel is echoing Herder, who said ‘all will come to be’.⁵ For Herder, of course, Providence is understood as the Divine grasping of the whole, whereas in Hegel, Providence is the grasping of, and necessary logical development to, Absolute Spirit. In each case, though, history is the creative development of the potential inherent in the existence of man and the world. Hegel has wedded the imaginative insights of Herder to the metaphysical rigour of Plato and Aristotle and the Providence of Vico.

With Hegel, then, we see the tradition of Aristotle, Vico and Herder maintained. As with these thinkers, for Hegel “the social is ontologically prior to the individual, [and]

that the individual emerges through culturally constituted social relations.”¹ Moreover, as with Vico and Herder, art and language cannot be seen simply as the ‘things’ made by discrete individuals. Rather, art is the manifestation of the Spirit for a given people, while speech must be understood as grounded in a given culture.² Certainly, with Aristotle, Hegel gives primacy to the clarity of language, insofar as it grasps the Absolute.³ Thus, he moves away from the more Romantic view of Herder.⁴ Nonetheless, for both thinkers, language and art are creatively rooted in the worldview of a given people; in their subjective and sensuous grasp of the Absolute.

However, Hegel also shows us how man becomes himself through creative relations with our environment, rather than simply through literary or philosophical acts. Certainly, for Herder, the natural environment plays a role in shaping our culture and nature. Hegel makes similar observations.⁵ As Berlin notes, though, in Herder this often comes close to a kind of naturalism.⁶ With Hegel, however, our relations with the environment are associated with the externalisation of the Idea, which is the particular Absolute made concrete in Mind.⁷ Rather than simply being ‘made’ by the environment, the personality of the will of each particular individual struggles against a Nature that appears external to it. Here, the personality “is that which struggles to lift itself above this restriction [of nature] and to give itself reality”⁸. Labour, like language, is the immediate Objectification of the Subjective, itself a manifestation of the self-grasping Absolute.⁹ By toiling with Nature, then, we may grasp the Spirit as a sensuous Object, and come closer to realising our potential, and the potential of the Absolute whence we came. Certainly, this overcomes the egoistic individualism of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

¹ Gare, A. (1995), Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, Routledge, London, p.45
⁸ Ibid., p.38
Moreover, Nature itself is the imperfect manifestation of the Absolute, and characterised by spatialised matter. Nature is “a world…in which things are outside each other.” Thus, the Absolute qua matter is imperfectly realised. Only through humans can Nature and, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, the Absolute, come to know itself in unity. Here, then, “nature is one phase in a real process which is leading on to the existence of mind.” When mind develops the Absolute, the Absolute finds itself again; the reconciliation of Subject and Object, and the ultimate actualisation of human potential. This is Absolute Spirit and Absolute Self-Consciousness, played out as humans exercise their creative potential. The Absolute, as Taylor puts it, “has shaped its vehicle to be a perfect expression of itself. And since the essence of that vehicle, man, is to be the vehicle of \textit{Geist}, he too is…free.” Here, through our sensuous involvement in the world, human creativity involves not only human potential, but the potential of Nature and of existence itself.

However, while this improves on Herder, the Hegelian account of human nature is still characterised by some serious problems. Certainly, we cannot hope to account for the richness and complexity of Hegelian philosophy in so short a space. Nonetheless, if we are to account for human nature in a way that allows for creative and open-ended cultural becoming, there are a number of theses we should explicitly reject, if only for reasons of conceptual clarity. Firstly, Hegel retains a belief in Providence similar to that of Vico against Herder. However, if we are to affirm the creativity of human nature, we cannot accept that our cultural life is merely the logical unfolding of a single end, however Absolute this end may be. We must affirm that the development of human nature in history is, as Berlin told us, “a drama, but one without a \textit{dénouement}”. Secondly, as Dreyfus puts it, “cultural norms are not given in such a way that their intelligibility can be traced back to lucid absolute consciousness.” If it is our nature to ‘make’ and ‘remake’ our nature, we must doubt any claims to absolutely rational conceptions of the absolutely rational. Rather, we must assume that rational self-

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3 \textit{Ibid.}, p.130
transparency is itself an ideal, and seldom the reality.¹ This, moreover, refuses Hegel’s historical determinism. If the Absolute cannot be rationally grasped, there can be no necessary movement towards it. Rather, it will always be part of an ongoing process of creation and recreation.² Thirdly, as Ricoeur notes, if each people is to have a Spirit, there is little reason to suggest that these Spirits can be rationally unified, particularly if their form of Spirit is unlike the presupposed self-transparent reason of Hegel.³ Rather, as Herder has shown, there are myriad cultures, each understandable in its own terms. Lastly, while giving an account of our creative relations with nature, the Hegelian idea of man is still far too much characterised by absolute idealism. Rather than beginning, like Herder and Aristotle, with humans a priori in a material world characterised by entelēcheia, Hegel has the material world only insofar as it is the path from the Absolute to itself. Thus, the Absolute is ontologically prior to Nature, and “nothing exists which is not a manifestation of the Idea, that is, of rational necessity.”⁴ Certainly, Hegel’s œuvre must be seen as an attempt to reconcile material reality with Spirit and, mutatis mutandis, the Absolute. Moreover, Hegel does give a place for Nature apart from pure thought.⁵ Nevertheless, this still rests on a process of development that is, as Copleston writes, “in and for thought rather than in objective reality.”⁶ Reason is only reconciled with reality, and Nature, through reason. Our everyday relation to a concrete reality, then, cannot be properly understood unless we temper this rationalistic idealism with a richer articulation of our creativity in the material world. While we are not here to develop an ontology of Nature, we must begin with Nature, and not with the Absolute. To do this, we will turn to Marx, who retains the Hegelian articulation of labour and creativity, and weds it to a more materialist philosophy of Nature. Thus, the emphasis on history, creativity and becoming, remains, but without the absolute idealism of Hegelian thought.

² Schelling, F.W.J. (1997), System of Transcendental Idealism, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, pp.207-212
³ Ibid., p.204
Karl Marx (1818-1883) was one of the Young Hegelians, and owed much to the revolution started by Herder. Indeed, it appears that Marx may have also been influenced by Vico. Either way, Marx embraces the cultural view of Herder through the ontological categories of Hegelian idealism, but later tempers this idealism with a materialism influenced by the ideas of Epicurus, Bacon, Descartes and Locke. Though Marx is not concerned with culture per se, his ‘materialist’ account of human nature is an important development of the tradition of Aristotle, Vico and Herder. Rather than discarding matter in favour of spirit, or nature in favour of culture, Marx “envisions a total praxis that reunites theory with practical activity and culture with economic production.” Moreover, Marx’s work on creativity and capitalism will allow us to later make sense of our modern culture, including the impact of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

For clarity, we may further distinguish, with Althusser, between ‘early Marx’ and ‘late Marx’. Like Vico and Herder, Marx indicates in his early philosophy that we must understand our culture and cultural creativity to understand ourselves. More specifically, Marx believes that, in transforming the natural world, we transform ourselves. In the 1844 Manuscripts, he writes:

> The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.

This idea, obviously owing much to Hegel, is further developed in Capital. Here, Marx argues that we change ourselves as we change the external world. Indeed, we change our nature. Certainly, in Capital and in other later works, this notion of a created world underplays the role of the natural world in labour. Nature does not create, per se,

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3 Dupré, L. (1983), Marx’s Social Critique of Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.287
4 See pp.148-150, below.
7 Marx, K. (1977), Capital, Volume 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.173
but gives man ‘spontaneous gifts’. ¹ As for Locke, Nature is thus valued only insofar as man transforms it.² Indeed, Marx sometimes speaks of Nature as if it were a ‘thing’ to be merely used.³ Here, Marx is moving away from the notion of *physis* in Aristotle, and the idea that ‘nature is a process of creative becoming’ in Herder.

In Marx’s earlier works, though, nature is “man’s inorganic body”.⁴ Indeed, the creative labour of man is nothing other than nature manifesting itself creatively, “for man is part of nature.”⁵ For Marx, then, material Nature, rather than the Hegelian Absolute, is understood as the ground of any human particularity. Here, Marx develops idealism into a theory of *praxis* in nature.⁶ This, in turn, can be understood as a revival of Aristotelian naturalism over vulgar Platonic idealism. Indeed, this dialectical materialism, as Hook writes, “has its basis in Aristotle’s naturalism.”⁷ Nonetheless, we can still see the Hegelian influence here, where we realise ourselves through our relation to an objective whole. It is just that this objective whole for Marx is Nature and the natural state of Man, rather than the conceptual World-Spirit. As Mészáros puts it, human “activities and needs of a ‘spiritual’ kind…have their ultimate ontological foundation in the sphere of material production as specific expressions of human interchange with nature”⁸. In developing ourselves as a species and as individuals, we do so only through our creative labour.⁹ By making Nature manifest, we ‘make’ ourselves.

As with Herder and Hegel, Marx argues that we do not ‘make’ ourselves alone. Rather, we can only develop ourselves in society. This view is strongly affirmed in Marx’s humanistic *Grundrisse*.¹⁰ Man is, as Marx writes, “not only a social animal, but an

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⁷ Hook, S. (1968), *From Hegel to Marx*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, p.36  
animal which can develop into an individual only in society.” \(^1\) It is no coincidence, then, that the *Grundrisse* is described by Harvey as Aristotelian. \(^2\) Humans are social, political and historical beings, and are so creatively. Moreover, because we ‘make’ ourselves with creative labour, our nature is not fixed in ourselves or in the natural world. Rather, man “has his act of origin – history – which however, is for him a known history, and hence as an act of origin it is a conscious self-transcending act of origin.” \(^3\) Here, again, Marx is the bearer of philosophical history from Vico, to Herder, to Hegel. For Marx, we create ourselves through history. As a consequence of this insight, as Marx makes eminently clear, we ‘make’ history, but not with materials of our choosing. \(^4\) Consequently, we cannot understand ourselves unless we understand culture, society and history, and our role in creating them. By noting Marx’s debt to the tradition of Vico, Herder and Hegel, we reaffirm the role of creativity in human cultural life, including everyday labour. Moreover, we allow ourselves to make sense of modern capitalism, its corrupting impact on culture and creativity and the dangerous legacy of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. \(^5\)

There are, however, three serious problems with the Marxist account. First, Marx often retains the Vichian and Hegelian historical determinism. However, there is no need to accept the “inevitable downfall” \(^6\) of capitalism and revolutionary rise of socialism, as fruitful as this might be. Here, Marx and Engels seem unduly influenced by Providence, reading a Hegelian determinism into ideas originally developed by Schelling. \(^7\) In fact, there is reason to believe that Marx himself rejected this determinism towards the end of his life. \(^8\) Consequently, there is room in Marx’s thought for such a revision. Secondly, in ‘later Marx’ or orthodox Marxism, culture

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5 See pp.148-150, below.
6 Engels, F. (1954), *Anti-Dühring*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p.43
7 White, J.D. (1996), *Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical Materialism*, Macmillan Press, London, pp.169-173, p.177. Here, the Schellingian idea of ‘subsumption’ is used to infer the effect of the economic base on the social superstructure. This, in turn, is used to show the definite spread of capital and the subsumption of all things into its ‘logic’. This then leads to universal capitalism, the rise of economic and social contradictions irreconcilable within the system, and the rise of communism.
often seems a secondary phenomenon determined by the primary economic base.\textsuperscript{1} Certainly, by overestimating the role of the economy, Marx proves himself to be a man of his time.\textsuperscript{2} Gare, however, sees this as a result of later misinterpretations by Engels,\textsuperscript{3} and others have made similarly convincing arguments.\textsuperscript{4} Certainly, there are indications of this, even in the texts where economic determinism appears.\textsuperscript{5} Perhaps this should not surprise us. The ‘early Marx’ was much more influenced by Herder and Hegel than by those in the Epicurean tradition, such as Hobbes.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, Marx’s doctoral thesis was an analysis of the problematic elements of Epicurean thought, though this was more a critique of privative individualism than materialism \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{7} Still, if we take Marx as an heir to the tradition of Aristotle, Vico, Herder, Hegel and Schelling, we can accept Gare’s account. We may embrace the Marxist account of labour, sociality and creativity, without economic or technological materialist determinism. Thirdly, Marx, like Aristotle and Hegel, sees the world as inherently rational.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, the Marxist critiques of political economy and the manifesto are ‘scientific’ philosophy “which expounds the iron laws of its…development and eventual demise.”\textsuperscript{9} However, if we ‘make’ our nature, there can be no determinable eventual demise for any cultural development.\textsuperscript{10} Here, we see that Hegelian rationalism, and determinist and materialist positivism, sometimes combine in Marx to undermine human creativity. These must be rejected. Lastly, if we find ourselves always within a culture ‘ready made’, our ability to grasp the world as if from without will not be so easy. We also saw this in Hegel. There can be no hard-nosed materialist science of culture, for “culture is both the context and the co-conspirator of all human action, and what is problematic about it is that the most important elements of it are by definition unspoken and inexplicit.”\textsuperscript{11} We can be informed about culture, but we cannot treat it as a mass of facts and laws. Thus,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Marx, K. (1970), \textit{A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy}, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp.19-23}
\footnote{Dupré, L. (1983), \textit{Marx’s Social Critique of Culture}, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.54-57}
\footnote{Gare, A. (1996), \textit{Nihilism Inc.}, Eco-Logical Press, Como, pp.222-232}
\footnote{Marx, K. (1970), \textit{A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy}, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp.211-213}
\footnote{Gare, A. (1996), \textit{Nihilism Inc.}, Eco-Logical Press, Como, p.225}
\footnote{Dupré, L. (1983), \textit{Marx’s Social Critique of Culture}, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.9}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp.554-556}
\footnote{Polan, A.J. (1984), \textit{Lenin and the end of Politics}, University of California Press, Berkeley, p.16}
\end{footnotes}
Marx is unable to fully wed the creative poetics of Hegelian idealism to the creative worldliness of materialism. We must accept these gifts from Hegel and Marx, but once again show the limits of rationality when placed in a ready made world. To do this, and thus to finally characterise human creativity in the world, we must turn to Heidegger. With Heidegger, we will see the more fruitful insights of all these thinkers expressed in a poetic vision of human creativity in the world.


Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was strongly influenced by Aristotle. He was also indirectly influenced, like Marx, by Vico and Herder. However, Marx sometimes moves between Hegelian idealism and Epicurean materialism, with Lenin’s dangerous bourgeois materialism the result of this. Heidegger, on the other hand, enters the tradition of Herder partly through the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Josef von Schelling (1775-1854). Schelling offers us an alternative philosophy to that of Hegel, prefaced on a more radical idea of our Being in Nature and the world. As Snow puts it, “[f]or Hegel, history is the increasingly rational elaboration of the absolute spirit as it comes to know itself completely.” Put simply, Reason encompasses all. However, for Schelling the ‘spiritual self-development’ of Nature becomes only ‘half conscious’ in man. The dramatic movement of history “is and must remain less than transparent, even to the author of the drama.” Even when Schelling shows how the Subjective and Objective of the Absolute, or Being, are united, it is never a matter of logical transparency.

3 See Appendix VII, p.423
8 Ibid.

1. Culture and the Narrative World
Similarly, Heidegger rejects any simple ideas of subject and object, economic determinism, or absolute logical self-transparency. He understands culture as the expression of our poetic relationship to Being, and shows that we are always creatively Being-in-the-World. Moreover, Heidegger, like Marx, allows us to later critique the atomism, individualism and mechanism of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke as it exists in our modern culture.\footnote{See pp.144-148, pp.369-371, below.}

Heidegger sees the Hobbesian tradition as a problem of Being stemming as far back as Parmenides. As we have seen, the Presocratic idea of Being was associated with \textit{physis}. Heidegger writes that the early “Greeks…called [the] emerging and rising in itself and in all things \textit{physis}.”\footnote{Heidegger, M. (1935), ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Krell, D. F. (ed.) (1999), \textit{Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings}, Routledge, London, p.168} Being was therefore that which rose up from being hidden and was there for us in and of itself. Parmenides, in turn, held that whatever is not Being must be non-Being, and this Being later came to be associated with what is always present. Thus, ‘things’ in the world are Being, and all else is non-Being. This influenced the Atomists, such as Democritus, Leukippus and Epicurus, who therefore held that atoms were indivisible, eternally present Being in a Void of non-Being.\footnote{Burnet, J. (1948), \textit{Early Greek Philosophy}, Adam and Charles Black, London, p.182} Alternatively, Plato saw the eternally present Forms as Being, while Aristotle saw ‘substance’, or \textit{ousia}, as Being. In both cases Being was taken as that which was present. Even Vico, reacting against the Atomistic tradition, falls victim to this,\footnote{Vico, G. (1988), \textit{On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians}, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp.134-135} as does Hegel.\footnote{Heidegger, M. (1988), \textit{Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit}, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp.142-143} For Heidegger, the intertwining of Platonic mathematicism, Aristotelian empiricism and Epicurean atomism, led to the metaphysics of Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, the modern scientific worldview and capitalism. Here, rather than asking ourselves what ‘is’ is, we assume Being to be “[p]ermanent, always identical, already-there, given – all mean fundamentally the same: enduring presence, \textit{on} as \textit{ousia}.”\footnote{Heidegger, M. (1987), \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.202} Being, including the Being of humans, is understood as ‘things’. Culture, in turn, is simply the glue that binds human ‘things’ together after the fact.\footnote{Heidegger, M. (1985), \textit{Being and Time}, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp.76-77}
In response to this, Heidegger radically reconceptualises culture in terms of Being. This reconceptualisation can be explained with a brief contrast. Marx, as we saw earlier, argued that labour ‘makes’ us by objectifying our Being. Once we are ‘made’, we may be interpreted, reinterpreted or misinterpreted. This, for Heidegger, is a form of humanism, where we are already determined by a presupposed interpretation of Being. We have, in Heidegger’s terminology, made an ‘ontic choice’ about the shared stuff of our existence. Contra Marx, Heidegger argues that our very Being is an interpretation of Being. Thus, stones, trees and even wombats simply are. Qua humans, we are unique in that we have a relation to Being. This relation to Being is Dasein, or ‘Being-there’.

Dasein, as this implies, is Being’s limiting relation to Being – it is ‘there’ as opposed to somewhere else. As Heidegger writes, “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not be itself.” Here, by ‘choosing’ a Dasein, we neglect others. Had we chosen another, we would ‘be’ another, or at least no longer ‘be’ ourselves. Either ‘here’ or ‘there’ is a possibility. In either case, we are ‘Being-there’. To differentiate it from the ‘existential’ ontology of Being and Dasein itself, Heidegger calls this choice of Dasein ‘existentiell’. It acknowledges that our existential nature is open and creative, but our existentiell nature is particular and finite; we must always neglect possibilities. Heidegger’s Dasein, in this sense, is partly captured by Midgley’s characterisation of culture: it is a matter of being ‘restricted to a single place’.

Where is this place we are ‘there’ in? What gives us these possibilities to be? For Heidegger, the answer is the welt, or World. World is used by Heidegger in a number of ways, before and after his famous ‘turn’ against metaphysics. In terms of culture,
though, the World remains “the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people.”\textsuperscript{1} Put simply, the World is our cultural heritage, and the possibilities this heritage affords us. Within this World, we are given a way of seeing the world, where ‘things’ do not come to us raw. Rather, they are culturally understood, or preunderstood. Moreover, there is in this World a space where Being stands out. For this space, Heidegger later uses the term ‘lichtung’, which means both ‘clearing’ and ‘light’. Thus, there is this “open space within which one can encounter objects. […] Things show up \textit{in light of} our understanding of being.”\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, we \textit{are} this process of lightening, or clearing. We are revealing the World and, in doing so, ‘being’ ourselves as a culture.

In this manner, our Being is hermeneutical, though this is not the hermeneutics of Biblical exegesis. We are ‘made’ by an interpretation, and grow into an interpretation of ourselves and the world. Thus, we are still the historical animals of Marx. However, this history is derived from the more primordial fact that man, “however dimly and unconsciously, always understands, and must understand, his own being historically.”\textsuperscript{3} From this perspective, each \textit{Dasein} can only be understood as an unconscious gift from the World to us. We are given a self-understanding by our heritage,\textsuperscript{4} and labour is always worlded by this heritage.

However, with projection, or Being-ahead-of-ourselves, we do not simply ‘choose’ an interpretation of Being every day, although this is possible as an \textit{existentiell} reinterpretation. Rather, we are continually projecting into the future a range of activities and purposes. As a result of each for-the-sake-of-which, we also project ourselves into our possibilities to be. Thus, we have always a preconscious projected self-understanding before us.\textsuperscript{1}

Furthermore, this self-understanding retains a Hegelian and ‘early-Marxist’ emphasis on our reconciliation with the material world. For Heidegger, we do not have simply

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, p.162
\end{itemize}
‘things’ with us in the World as if we were next to them in a box. Rather, we are Being-alongside fields, statues, mountains and so forth. ‘Things’ in-the-world cannot be understood outside our World. Thus, “[a]head-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world…includes one’s falling into one’s Being alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world”2. Thus, Dasein itself cannot be understood in isolation from the landscape and its features, tools, buildings and so forth. Moreover, in his later writings Heidegger speaks of a temple, or a hut in the Black Forest, as if they did justice to the processes surrounding them. These works were built by people who dwelt in the place, rather than by those who would treat it as an abstract space to be filled with passive matter. They therefore allow the surrounds to be.3 In Heidegger’s terms, they gather the surrounds in their difference, and this difference allows them to ‘be’ in their unique heterogeneity.4 Indeed, these works enhance the physis of Being through creative contrast, or ‘strife’.5 Consequently, as I have argued elsewhere,6 our Being-in-the-World entails that we are ‘in’ places, and also that these places are ‘in’ us.

We are therefore not simply ‘in’ the world like toys are in a box. We dwell in it. This, in turn, weds the human creative becoming of Herder to the creative labour discussed in Hegel and Marx. Without falling victim to vulgar materialism or idealism, Heidegger shows how we are bodily in-the-world, and weds this to a hermeneutic interpretivism. The ‘things’ in our World are part of our projected self-understanding.

Contra Hobbes and Locke, this self-understanding is not to be understood individually. Here we again see the influence of the German tradition from Herder to Marx. For Heidegger, our Being-in-the-world is also Being-with-others.7 We are with these people, not as ‘things’ are merely alongside one another. Rather, as Heidegger writes, “the world is always one that I share with Others.”8 This is why there are, as Dreyfus...
writes, “a plurality of activities of clearing, but...only one cleared field”\(^1\), one \textit{lichtung}. Rather than society, underpinned by contract-law, a World is built collaboratively and bequeathed to \textit{Dasein} by others in history. Our fates are bound together.\(^2\)

How, though, do we ‘make the world’ together? Certainly, we should be careful of this word ‘make’. Heidegger, particular in his later philosophy, moves away from any wilful construction of individual and social selfhood, problematising the Latin notions of ‘culture’ and ‘cultivation’.\(^3\) Rather than recognising our inheritance of Being, beings and our shared world, Heidegger argues that we mistakenly see all as a willed product of our genius for ‘making’. Against this, we are reminded to heed nature and Being in their Greek senses. At this point Heidegger moves away from Marx and Hegel, and even from his own earlier works such as \textit{Being and Time}.

For Heidegger, particular in his later work, the truth of the world is associated with \textit{alētheia}: revealing, unforgetting or unconcealing. This is because Heidegger affirms the Presocratic notion of Being: \textit{physis}. We earlier saw this retained in Aristotle despite his apparent ‘metaphysics of presence’. Because Being is associated with the “emerging and rising in itself”\(^4\) of \textit{physis}, it may be hidden. As we said, “being loves to hide itself.”\(^5\) As the ‘shepherds of Being’, we may allow Being to rise up so it is no longer hidden, and let it endure. This ‘brining forth’ is \textit{poiēsis}, whence we have ‘poetry’.\(^6\) This is the clearing, the unconcealing, that brings forth the \textit{lichtung}. When Being endures and is no longer hidden, it ‘is’ for us in a particular way. Moreover, as we are ‘made’ by our World, in bringing forth Being we ‘make’ ourselves. In this sense, we do ‘make’ our culture and selves. It is just that this is not a wilful construction ontologically, but an openness to the creative fullness of Being. Consequently, when we say ‘make’, we do not mean the construction of automobiles or firearms, but the way

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Heidegger, M. (1992), \textit{Parmenides}, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, p.70
\end{itemize}
we ‘make’ a garden by allowing the *physis* therein to creatively self-develop in collaboration. *Poiēsis* is closer to communal gardening than management theory.¹

We see here the role of creative labour in ‘making’ ourselves and the world. Certainly, like Herder, Heidegger spends much time emphasising the role of poetry.² Each World is partly ‘made’ through poetic language as a people bring Being to light.³ However, as with Hegel and Marx, any laborious art may be an act of *poiēsis*. Whether it is the art of Van Gogh, the poetry of Rilke or a cottage in the Black Forest, we make things true by bringing Being to light in a particular way.⁴ Certainly, this poetic truth is not entirely unproblematic. However, we will address *poiēsis* later in relation to *phronēsis*.⁵ For now, we should merely note the role of art in *alētheia*. Here, contra Aristotle, truth is not necessarily about logical axioms, but about unconcealing Being, or allowing Being to reveal itself.⁶

Consequently, Hegel’s emphasis on rational clarity is also rejected by Heidegger.⁷ Indeed, Heidegger sees Hegel as another ‘metaphysical’ philosopher, seeking “the massive presence of reality to itself that has been the theme since Plato.”⁸ For Hegel, art, religion and philosophy try to grasp this presence and bring it into itself. For Heidegger, however, instead of grasping Being through apophantic logic or poetic description, language makes Being itself manifest through *poiēsis* by allowing it to rise up. For Heidegger, as Ricoeur writes, “there is always a Being-demanding-to-be-said…which precedes our actual saying”¹. These manifestations of Being, as for Schelling, are only ever finite. To move away from this in search of infinite Being is to

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⁵ See p.66ff, below.
move away from ourselves. As Heidegger writes, “[c]an and should man as transition try to leap away from himself in order to leave himself behind as finite?”\(^2\) Thus, any Hegelian descriptions, logical, poetic, or otherwise, are still abstracted from our more primordial Being-in-the-World, Being-alongside ‘things’ and Being-with-others who share our creative vision of Being.\(^3\) Heidegger therefore abjures the rationalistic *hubris* of Hegel and Marx.

Nonetheless, like Vico, Herder, Hegel and Marx, Heidegger affirms the creative, cultural nature of humanity. Moreover, Heidegger overcomes the sometimes ambiguous idealism of Hegel and materialism of Marx by showing us the *a priori* ontology of *Dasein*.\(^4\) Of course, this same ontology may be inferred *a posteriori*.\(^5\) Nonetheless, in Heidegger the ontology of *Dasein* is *a priori*. Before Subject and Object, and before mind knows itself apart from matter, we are already Being-in-a-World, where equiprimordiality is given to mind and matter, spirit and nature and so forth. This World grants us our understanding of what is, and what ‘is’ is. Certainly, this is a far cry from the metaphysical humanism of Aristotle, where Being already ‘is’.

Despite this, Heidegger still retains some important insights in Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics*. As we will later draw on Aristotelian politics, ethics and criticisms of Socratic philosophy, we must show how these insights are maintained in a Heideggerian understanding of World.

Firstly, the notion of *ethos* is preserved in Heidegger’s notions of ‘ready-to-hand’, ‘dwelling’ and ‘abode’. In each of these, we do not have a conscious, rational appreciation of the tools we use or the abode we dwell in. Rather, we grow into habits so that these things and places have an unconscious place in our everyday.\(^6\) Moreover,
by making the preconscious relation to self a matter of our Being, Heidegger, as Hodge writes, “is attempting to spell out the ontological conditions required for Aristotle’s concern with the formation of character to make sense.” 1  Secondly, by stressing our Being-ahead-of-ourselves, Heidegger commits himself to a teleological view of ‘irrational’ human character similar to Aristotle in some respects. 2  Thirdly, we see in Heidegger an affirmation of logos inspired by Aristotle. Certainly, it may be that Aristotle’s logos indicates a movement away from logos qua legein, or ‘gathering’. 3  Nonetheless, the Aristotelian polis is still inclusive of a thoroughly Presocratic understanding of physis. 4  Indeed, “Aristotle’s thought remains faithful to that of Heraclitus, who said physis kruptesthai philei, being loves to hide itself.” 5  Because of this idea of physis, Aristotle’s apophatic idea of logos can be partly redeemed. For instance, concealment and unconcealment, development and growth, potentiality and actuality can all be understood within the context of everyday social life. Speaking is logos: ‘gathering’. Thus, social interaction amongst different people serves to gather the World into a place of civilised human life. This is why, for Heidegger, Aristotelian logos correctly characterise man as the ‘being who speaks’. 6  The polis is a place of history, the site of humanity’s Dasein where man’s ‘is’ is created, perpetuated and recreated through logos. 7  Lastly, this emphasis on creation means that nomos is not understood as ‘law’ per se. Rather, nomos is a people’s understanding of the truth of Being. 8  In any case, oikos, nomos or polis, we ‘make ourselves’ together. Each person is, as Dreyfus puts it, “the result of a cultural interpretation;…[and b]eing essentially self-interpreting[…]…has no nature” 9.  Certainly, we have a ‘nature’ of sorts because of food, sex, desire, friendship, death and so forth. Like plants and animals, we live. 10

1. Culture and the Narrative World 37
Moreover, we live creatively. However, insofar as we are uniquely human, the World is the groundless ground for our Being. While we are thrown into Being, we are also thrown into a World that limits our relation to Being and – in limiting it – gives us our nature.

vii. Aristotle to Heidegger: The Poetic Life

In retaining the social insights of Aristotle, Heidegger is the culmination of a philosophical tradition spanning two millennia. What these ‘Aristotelian’ thinkers have in common is the notion that we are social animals, and that our nature is creative. Collaboratively, we may create and recreate ourselves. With his articulation of poiēsis, alētheia and World, Heidegger gives a poetic expression to this tradition, retaining the social creativity of Aristotle, and overcoming some of the key shortcomings. Similarly, Heidegger overcomes materialism and idealism, subjectivism and objectivism and historical determinism by articulating an ontology of equiprimordiality that abjures these dichotomies. For Heidegger, it is our nature to ‘make’ our nature by allowing it to be revealed. This is the significance of culture: we burst into blossom through poiēsis, and ours is thus a poetic life.

B. The Cultivation of Humanity: The Development of Cultural Self

We have just explicated how we ‘make’ ourselves, by following a tradition of thought from Aristotle to Heidegger. However, this account is lacking, as it has not yet given a place to childhood development. How do uncultured infants develop into cultured adults? When we are thrown into a World, how do we land on our feet? Moreover, how do we learn poiēsis? Are we born as poets?

None of these Aristotelian thinkers give us a clear account of how we cultivate culture. Certainly, through speech, poetry and so forth, we are given a World within which things come to light for us. However, we are given no insights as to how we first inherit this World. As Jonas tells us, “we begin life as infants (a fact philosophers so easily forget), coming into a world already peopled with adults”\(^2\). If we are to properly explicate how we are falling away from culture, we must give an account of how culture is taken up and lived. If we are to understand this, we must give a place to the theories articulated by psychologists and scholars of childhood development. To do this we will turn to Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky.

Freud links the notion of selfhood to the unconscious. For Freud, all individuals have hidden within them the irrational passions of survival, and the social structures of their society. This gives a necessary place to the drives, passions and instincts, while accounting for socialisation. This, in turn, sheds light on our attachment to place, people and history, and the capacity for this attachment to be distorted as it is reconceptualised by the exigencies of capitalist Epicureanism. The work also allows us to explicate the role of symbols in culture. Symbols of ‘home’ will later shed more light on the

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corruption associated with the worldview of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke, and the relation of this to superficiality.¹

After Freud, we turn to Piaget and Vygotsky. Piaget complements Freud by showing how we internalise parts of the world as relational schemata. In a Piagetian scheme, physical processes and social relationships all become constitutive of our way of understanding and interacting with the world. This gives a necessary place to intelligence, while accounting for our internalisation of natural and social processes. Drawing on the insights of Furth, we can then reconcile the work of Freud and Piaget, and move on to the work of Vygotsky. Vygotsky transcends Piaget by emphasising the role of language in development, and opposing Piaget’s ontogenetic determinism and valorisation of scientific intelligence. This accords with the creative and open-ended vision of human cultivation we have already articulated, while giving a necessary place to development, socialisation and desire. By drawing on Piaget and Vygotsky, then, we can better grasp the kinds of processes required to properly internalise and develop culture, and the way in which Epicureanism distorts these. This, in turn, will later clarify our understanding of superficiality, where people fall away from their own cultural traditions.

From Vygotsky we can turn to a more general meditation on the cultured nature of humanity, and then ground this account in the ‘process’ insights of Whitehead, Bergson, Husserl and others. We are then in a position reconceptualise culture, socialisation and ‘process’ through narrative, and the broad notion of the ‘narrative World’. Drawing on the key insights of all the Aristotelian tradition, this notion of the narrative World will subsequently guide our account of creative, open-ended culture, and what it means to fall away from this into superficiality. First, however, we shall turn to Freud.

### i. Eros, Unconscious and Objects of Desire

Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) began his work in the later nineteenth-century. Seemingly influenced by the work of Schelling,² Freud

¹ See p.274ff, below.
revolutionised our view of human nature. Essential to Freud’s account of the psyche is eros, or ‘desire’ in Greek. Certainly, this has parallels with Schelling’s idea that self-consciousness emerges from the desire of Being.\(^1\) In the work of Freud, though, there is no Being from which the self may spring, however this Being may be understood. For Freud, eros is simply the “the sexual drive together with its sexual energy, or libido”\(^2\), all of which originally reside in the *id*, the repository of the drives.\(^3\) Through its libido, the infant’s ‘it’ “presses for satisfaction at all costs”\(^4\). The id, though, sees no separation between it and the external world; it merely seeks pleasure.

However, pleasure soon ceases. Moreover, crying does not cause the pleasure to continue. Consequently, part of the id eventually develops to come to terms with this unpleasure. At this point, as Freud writes, “the portion of the id which is directed towards the external world – the ego – begins to function.”\(^5\) Here, the ‘cathexis’ – the urging forces of the libido – is checked by the ‘anti-cathexis’ of the ego. In doing this, the ego further develops the first ‘object’, “something which exists ‘outside’, which is only forced to appear by special action.”\(^6\) Furthermore, because of this sudden differentiation between pleasurable and unpleasurable, the ego ‘introjects’, or devours, those objects that are pleasurable, while expelling those that are not.\(^7\) Thus, the ego becomes further disengaged from the external world,\(^1\) and also produces objects in the world capable of being desired as a result of cathexis.

For Freud, then, each person is not born pregiven or preformed. Rather, we are formed in and with the external world, as the id attempts to satisfy itself but cannot. Moreover,

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and \textit{contra} Hobbes and Locke, our desire for pleasure is not unlimited. Rather, we become individualised precisely because we have accepted limits to our desires, and can alter the things we desire.

The calculating individualism of Hobbes and Locke is further opposed by Freud’s idea of the ‘unconscious’. For Freud, the psyche, like the self of Schelling,\textsuperscript{2} is somewhat opaque to itself. Put simply, the unconscious is the world within ourselves of which we are not conscious.\textsuperscript{3} This, of course, must include elements of the ego.\textsuperscript{4} Just as the World is ‘in’ the ego, so too is it ‘in’ the unconscious. Thus, our self not only includes “the influences from the external physical world but [may] also [include] the influences entering the mind from the community of other individuals”\textsuperscript{5}. These influences, of course, are not conscious but unconscious, like the \textit{sensus communis} of Aristotle and Vico.

This account of ‘common sense’ is furthered by the Freudian notion of the ‘super-ego’. Ego development entails interaction with the mother and father. Specifically, through ages two to five, the infant sees the mother as an erotic object to be introjected. Simultaneously, however, the infant identifies himself with the father and, given that the mother is also the object of the father’s affections, the child sees the father as an obstacle to his pleasure. Thus “[h]is identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father in order to take his place.”\textsuperscript{6} This is the Oedipus complex. The ego, and \textit{mutatis mutandis}, the child, is eventually able to transcend the Oedipus complex by giving up the mother as an object for the id’s pleasures, and simultaneously introjecting the father as an internal object to repress the id’s cathexis of the mother.\textsuperscript{7} The Oedipus complex results in the internalisation of coercive authority, another anti-cathexis like that of the ego: the ‘father object’. This

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., pp.367-375

\[1. \text{Culture and the Narrative World}\]
father object is the super-ego. This super-ego, in turn, is the “most precious cultural asset in the psychological field. Those in whom it has taken place are turned from being opponents of civilisation into being its vehicles.”¹ Here, civilisation is “the heritage of many generations”², similar in this respect to the ‘society’ of Vico, the ‘culture’ of Herder or the ‘World’ of Heidegger.

In Freud, though, the task of this civilisation is to protect us from the world. Without it, we would be in a ‘state of nature’.³ For Freud, we are, quite simply, *homo eroticus*. We are ‘naturally’ egocentric, hedonistic and saved from this only by introjection of the coercive force of civilisation. Though we are not Hobbesian individuals, our decentred individuality is nonetheless prefaced for Freud on a kind of self-interest. Thus, early egocentric humans are in a ‘state of nature’. Here, as Bowie points out, Freud takes up a Hobbesian view over that of Schelling.⁴ This view, as we have seen, does not do justice to human nature. Also problematic is Freud’s view of the Oedipus and Electra complexes as ontogenetically and phylogenetically predetermined.⁵ This difficulty, however, will be overcome once we have reconciled Freud with Piaget and Vygotsky.

For now we should recognise Freud’s contribution to our account of acculturation. Freud argues for the role of the external world in the maturation of the ‘I’; the acknowledgment of social objects as objects-of-desire; and the existence of the unconscious in human nature. The importance of these is that they retain the

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³ *Ibid.*, p.194
Aristotelian belief in ‘irrational’ urges, and the influence of nomos upon ethos. Moreover, the notion of the unconscious overcomes the Hobbesian account of the calculating individual by emphasising many hidden elements of the external world involved in human development. In Ricoeur’s words, “Freudian psychoanalysis…help[s] us displace the locus of meaning toward the unconscious, that is, toward an origin over which we have no control.”\textsuperscript{1} With Freud, we add a fruitful articulation of the permutations of desire to our account of Heideggerian ‘thrownness’.\textsuperscript{2} However, we are burdened with the spectre of Freud’s homo eroticus and scientism if we do not press on further. To do this, we will turn to Piaget, and then to Vygotsky.

\textbf{ii. Relational Schemae and Objects of Thought}

Twentieth-century Swiss genetic epistemologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980) and the Piagetian tradition allow us to reconcile Freud’s homo eroticus with the more Aristotelian homo politicus. Whereas Freud was interested in the development of the ego, Piaget’s main concern was the development of intelligence. Like Freud, this was achieved by accepting the ego’s intellect as formed through interaction with pre-existing constraints in the external world. Piaget, however, explores ‘feedback’ and ‘groping’.\textsuperscript{3} Instead of assimilating the environment piecemeal or, alternatively, undergoing a “passive imposition from outside”\textsuperscript{4}, Piaget describes a form of feedback between the child and the world.

After a two to three month period where the infant is unable to differentiate itself from the external world, resistance from objects – or their absence, in the case of a nipple – in the world forces the infant to engage in short searches. In this process, the object is briefly encountered as an object-to-assimilate, as in the case with the mother object in Freud. Soon, however, real accommodation and assimilation of objects in the world begins. Thumb-sucking, for instance, assimilates the thumb as an ‘object-of-action’,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Ricoeur, P. (1970), \textit{Freud and Philosophy}, Yale University Press, London, p.494
\item \textsuperscript{3} Piaget, J. (1977), \textit{The Origin of Intelligence in the Child}, Penguin Education Books, Ringwood, pp.396-459
\item \textsuperscript{4} Furth, H. (1987), \textit{Knowledge As Desire}, Columbia University Press, New York, p.27
\end{itemize}
and links it to the other senses, such as sight, taste and so forth. In this process of probing, the infant first learns to truly separate objects in the world from self as ‘objects-of-action’. These objects-of-action have some separation from the infant, but their existence and action is entirely associated with its own action. When the search for an object-of-action “does not succeed [the object] is still ‘out of sight out of mind’”\(^1\). At around six months, however, the infant begins to actively search for objects, applying the scheme it assimilated in accommodating to previous constraints to approach new objects in the external world. Gradually the infant refines its scheme by utilising the previous schema to purposefully assimilate elements of the external world. At around eighteen months, the infant eventually develops a scheme which is not dependent on immanent, local laws or crude phenomenal induction. Thus, “to ‘understand’ an object means to assimilate it into an increasingly complex and logically and hierarchically ordered network of schemes.”\(^2\) Objects not only exist independently of the child, but can also be expected to obey specific ‘laws’ common to most objects in most situations. In short, “the world of objects becomes constituted for the infant as independent of his own actions and perceptions”\(^3\). Indeed, as Loevinger emphasises, this process is continuously developed as interaction in the world continues.\(^4\) Thus, we see the difference between Freud and Piaget. Freud’s object constancy is associated with the internalisation of the mother object and father object. Piaget’s object permanence is associated with logical relations between objects in spatial field.\(^5\)

\(^1\) Ibid., p.24
\(^2\) Ibid., p.26
Certainly, Piaget’s emphasis on abstract logic is problematic.\(^1\) Like Furth, however, we may accept Freud’s account of the internalisation of social objects as objects-of-desire.\(^2\) Moreover, we can extend Freud’s account of internal significance, or motive, to include the objects of Piaget’s cognitive-developmental theory. In this manner, objects in Piaget’s schemes become, in Blasi’s words, personally ‘significant’ but also ‘suprapersonal’\(^3\). In other words, objects are characterised by a field of relations which are personal and social. This, in turn, adds a human element to Piaget’s rather abstract schemata. Nonetheless, Piaget still errs on the side of what could be termed ‘genetic individualism’.\(^4\) It is for this reason that, having tempered Freud’s Hobbesianism, Piaget himself must be reformulated. To do this, we may turn to Vygotsky.

### iii. Inner Speech and Internalised Culture

Developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) was influenced by Piaget, Hegel, Marx and, through Humboldt, the work of Herder.\(^5\) Indeed, in his seminal *Thought and Language*, Vygotsky offers us a reformulation of Piagetian concepts in the tradition of Herder.

For Vygotsky, *logos* is fundamental to human development. In particular, the infant begins the maturation process by internalising phonetically the speech of adults, incorporating into her more simplistic schemas the complex speech of adults.\(^1\) This continues until the child not only utilises words independently, but also develops what Vygotsky describes as ‘inner speech’. Vygotsky writes that “[l]anguage arises initially as a means of communication between the child and the people in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion to internal speech, does it come to organise the

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child’s thought”². This inner speech brings with it, albeit in simple form, the social relations constitutive of the community. This insight sits well within the tradition of Aristotle and Herder. Because a “child’s thought…must [initially] find expression in a single word”³, the social meanings of words are introjected long before their explicit representational capacity is understood. In this manner, the child speaks with the voice of her World long before she finds her own voice.

However, Vygotsky does not discard the Piagetian emphasis on schemae in favour of pure logos. Rather, like Heidegger, Vygotsky sees us as bodily ‘stretched’ over a shared world. In this sense, our practices are internalised to form psychological schemae, but our social schemae are also internalised to ground our practices.⁴ We will return to this later with MacIntyre, Heidegger and Mead.⁵ For now, the sociality of Vygotskian psychology is more directly relevant.

Reconceptualised in this way, Piaget’s developmental approach loses its gloss of individualism and scientism. Rather, as Blasi notes, “[p]ersons and objects are considered for their content characteristics, not as terms in relations, except insofar as relations become internally constitutive of the individual.”⁶ When the child speaks to himself, this is not merely ‘egocentric’. It is part of the development from vague collectivity to autonomous individuality.⁷ Consequently, individuality is not the primary metaphysical reality as Hobbes would have it. Rather, individuality is grounded in a more primordial collectivity, that of culture. Culture, in turn, is not an idealist fiction or materialist aggregate, but the shared creative development of people Being-with and objects Being-alongside.

Moreover, because this culture is understood as a continual process of historical becoming, the Vygotskian notion of the ‘ego’ is closer to Herder and Heidegger than to Freud and Piaget. For Vygotsky, as Scribner writes, “[b]ecause socially organized

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⁴ Ibid., pp.210-213, pp.249-256 and passim
⁵ See p.70, pp.302-305
activities change in history, the human nature they produce is not a fixed category that can be described once and for all; it is a changing category.” Indeed, this approach allows for developmental ‘tutoring’, where childhood development is a matter of potential being actualised through social interaction. This is a dialectical process of development opposed to Piagetian or Freudian ontogeny, where children pass through fixed stages. Like Herder contra Vico, Hegel and Marx, this allows for development as guided by ethos and nomos, but not determined by Providence or Fate. Against the mechanistic ‘laws’ of Hobbes and Locke, we have the teloi of human creativity, prefaced on our interpretive internalisation of the World.

Consequently, by accepting the insights of Vygotsky we may better understand childhood development without Freud’s and Piaget’s scientism, individualism or determinism. Our orientation to the World is the gradual development of increasingly more complex internal schemas. These schemas arise through constrained interaction with, and introjection of, the relations constitutive of the external world. Rather than being ‘subjects’, or Hobbesian mechanistic individuals, we are each Being-in-the-world wherein objects can emerge within us as external to us, and stand forth accordingly.

In this way, the work of Heidegger is developed with that of Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky. In cultivating desires for objects, and developing and internalising relational schemata, we also begin to grow into our mode of Being-alongside ‘things’ in the World. These relations include other humans as objects of desire, love and so forth. Each Dasein is partly formed by her immediate social relations. In this sense, our interaction with the world not only develops motor skills and abstract intelligence, but also a sensitivity to the minds of others, including their culture. This is the beginning of the fantasia in Vico, and ‘sympathetic imagination’ in Herder. We are, as Heidegger tells us, not only Being-alongside, but also Being-with-others.
Moreover, this is grounded in our understanding of Being itself. The psychological ‘self’ that is developed is not an individual ‘I’, but a Being-having-understood-and-understanding-itself. The child, as Barrett writes, “secretly hears his own name called whenever he hears any region of Being named within which he is vitally involved.”

This accords with recent work in neurophysisiology. There is always Being and World before the ‘I’, and we share this with others in the same culture.

In this sense, Freud’s neo-Kantianism is tempered by retaining his emphasis on motivation and desire – and the subsequent permutations of these – but reconceptualising these as ontic forces grounded in a more primordial Being-in-the-World. For an object, such as a symbol, to motivate or inspire us by being cathected, we must first internalise a World wherein objects can appear as meaningful in the first place. As Heidegger argues, “[t]here is obviously something in a motive that addresses me. There is an understanding, a being open for a specific context of significance in the world.”

Put simply, we do not imbue ‘things’ with meaning, but rather develop within a world wherein objects appear to us as meaningful, grounded in a preunderstood sense of what it is to appear, to ‘be’. This process itself is not one of axiomatic logic or scientific induction, but cultural creativity grounded in embodied practices.

**iv. Without Culture We Are Not Human**

This accords somewhat with the work of the poet, Hebrew scholar and computer scientist, David Gelernter. While Gelernter’s early claims in the field of artificial intelligence seem naïve, his later work is at one with our account. In *The Muse In the Machine*, Gelernter develops a ‘folk-psychology’ spectrum of thought and learning. At the ‘low’ end are young children, pre-modern peoples such as the Homeric Greeks,

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3 See pp.274-397, below.
and sleepy moderns. At the ‘high’ end are wakeful modern adults. However, this is not a Freudian or Piagetian conflation of phylogeny and ontogeny. Rather, it is an instructive analogy. The ‘low’ end involves diffuse, relational thought, characterised by metaphor, analogy and deep cultural stories. The high end involves discrete, discontinuous thought, characterised by logic and experientially shallow axiomatic abstractions. For children to learn to Be-in-the-World, they cannot simply focus on formalised rules or theoretical distillations. Rather, they must ‘stretch’ themselves over a deep and wide range of focii and experiences. The same characteristics, Gelernter argues, extend to the mythic narratives of premodern cultures, and our own periods of creativity. Consequently, the abstract, atomistic ‘logic’ of the Hobbesian or Lockean tradition is unable to do justice to learning, development, or creativity. Rather, its instrumental formalisations are removed from cultural and psychological depth and breadth. They are superficial, even when they cover vast spaces and times. This is because we are not ‘thinking things’ who live by means of individual calculation and abstract computational specialisation. Rather, we are Being-in-the-World by creatively internalising this World.

Our human individuality, then, cannot be understood by the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes or Locke. Rather, it must be understood within culture and the relations that perpetuate it. To be a human without culture is not to be in a ‘state of nature’. It is simply not to be human. Of course, this is not to say that people with autism, for example, are not human. Certainly, their capacities for social interaction may be less. Nonetheless, they can internalise their World, live amongst other humans and share in their open-ended creative development. As Aristotle tells us, to live outside a human community we would have to be a beast or a god, not a human. While we saw this in the work of Aristotle, Vico, Herder and so forth, we have now given an account of how these human communities are taken up and lived. Consequently, by integrating the

2 Ibid., p.12, pp.100-103
3 Ibid., p.16, pp.79-91
6 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a:29
insights of psychology and developmental theory with those of the Aristotelian tradition of philosophy, we have given a fuller account culture and acculturation. We have an alternative to the Hobbesian worldview that accords with our articulation of creative Being-in-the-World.

However, there are three serious problems with the work of Freud and Piaget that we should canvass before we go on. Firstly, Freud tells us of a ‘state of nature’ which, as we have seen in the work of Hobbes, is simply impossible. While it may be fruitful to speculate on the erosion or stagnation of a culture, it is simply impossible to be without culture – in any bestial ‘state of nature’ – and still be human. Put another way, we are ontologically, and not ontically, cultural. Secondly, Freud’s notion of eros, even if generously understood, is too narrow in its scope to do justice to the range of human motivations. If truly our nature, this kind of narrowness would have rendered us extinct some time ago.¹ As Frankl reminds us, “[w]hat has been…eliminated in this view of man is…that man is a being encountering other beings and reaching out for meanings to fulfill.”² Thirdly, Piaget views childhood development as a movement from childhood intelligence to scientific intelligence. This, however, we have dealt with by extending Piaget’s relational schemae, through Vygotsky, to include cultural relations as well as object relations. This is also addressed in the spectrum of Gelernter, where mechanistic science is unable to account for childhood, myth and creativity. Fourthly, and like Vico and Marx, Freud and Piaget describe development in a deterministic way, characterised by necessary stages, such as the Oedipus and Electra complexes. However, we should reject determinism, whether it be Vichian, Hegelian, Freudian or Piagetian. As Vygotsky shows us, the child’s ability to take up the super-ego should not be tied ontogenetically to any definite path, such as gender distinctions. On the contrary, these things are modified by the various sublimations and symbolisations inherent in the culture itself.³ As Herder reminds us, our instincts drive us towards, and not away from,
cultivation by cultural traditions. Thus, there is always the introjection of an authoritative identity object, and development within the constraints of the super-ego. Without this, we would not be human. On the other hand, Freudian themes such as castration or penis envy, or the abstract object-relational schemae of Piaget, are dependent on the local culture. Fifthly, Freud does not differentiate between that which is unconsciously repressed as part of an existentiell mode, and that which is existentially concealed by virtue of clearing. A World needs concealment ontologically to allow some ‘things’ to be unconcealed, and this Schellingian insight is one that Freud qua scientist cannot abide. Lastly, Freud speaks of the psyche as if it were a Platonic ‘thing’. Here, development and duration are not understood as primordial. Rather, they are merely the means to the ‘end’ of the psyche. As a result of this, it is as if time is simply a space within which change can occur, rather than relative to the unfolding of the ego and psyche proper. Similarly, in his later work Freud directs emphasis away from the role of critical reflection in development, and instead constructs a treatable psychic structure. In this way, development ceases to be a creative act of reflexivity, and becomes the treatment through universal laws of an objective ‘thing’.

However, if we wish to properly understand culture and cultivation in terms of physis, we should overcome this view. We will do so by turning to ‘process’ philosophy, phenomenology and narrative theory. This, in turn, will allow us understand the psychology of Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky in terms of an Aristotelian philosophy of Nature and a Heideggerian account of the World. Moreover we will be able to more fully develop our account of culture, introducing notions of power, freedom and justice, and articulate ways of nurturing this justice.

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3 Ibid.
4 Habermas, J. (1972), Knowledge and Human Interests, Heinemann, London, pp.214-273
C. The Narrative World: *Culture and Storytelling*

Into the same river no man steps twice […]
And the too strong grasping of it, when it is pressed together and condensed,
loses it
This very thing you are

Charles Olson, ‘The Kingfishers’, pp.9-10

Working with a tradition of thought stretching from Aristotle to Heidegger, we have articulated our cultural nature with the concept of Being-in-the-world. Moreover, we have used this to reconceptualise our understanding of the processes of socialisation explicated by Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky. The result of this is a picture of humanity as cultural, creative and open-ended, developing these capacities in an ongoing process of becoming of which childhood is the beginning. What remains to be accounted for, however, is an overarching configuration that ties both individual and cultural processes together in a common bind. If we were able to do this, we could speak in no uncertain terms about our shared human nature, and articulate how this nature can be perverted by things such as capitalism, technological rationality and the cultural legacy of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

Following Carr, MacIntyre and Gare, we will see that this overarching configuration is nothing other than the story. The narrative form accounts for experience and action at the level of the individual and of the group. Moreover, we will see that it is precisely narratives that serve to build or destroy the relationships between individuals, individuals in a group and between groups. We will also introduce power-relations into our consideration of the narrative form, and tie these to issues of freedom and power. Having done this, we will be in a better position to address concrete issues of justice and injustice in the world, by showing how experiences and actions relate to a given narrative or set of narratives.

Before we can begin this, however, we must first deal with the ‘thingness’ of Freud’s conception of the psyche. By reconceptualising the self as a process of becoming, *contra* Freud, we will be able to move swiftly to the phenomenology of Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger, the narrative theories of Carr, Gare and MacIntyre, and the *Geist*-
phenomenology of Hegel. We will also consider the work of Mead in the light of these thinkers. This, in turn, will allow us to more fully account for culture, by reconceptualising it as a narrative World. We can then develop accounts of freedom, power and justice in terms of this narrative World. This will lay the groundwork for our analysis of superficiality, for we must fully characterise what culture is before we are able to articulate what it is to fall away from it.

i. Process and Temporality

As we have seen, Freud treats the psyche as if it were a ‘thing’, rather than an enduring process of becoming.1 Certainly, for Heidegger, the ‘thing’ is often the name we thoughtlessly give to objects that are merely present-at-hand for our calculated use.2 Rather than understanding them in themselves, we simply see each as a res extensa; a ‘thing’ with extension in the world to be used. A hammer is a ‘thing’ to hit nails, a stream is a ‘thing’ to provide hydroelectric power and minds are ‘things’ to think. Because of this, we never understand the ‘things’ themselves. We never, in Heidegger’s words, “hit upon the thingly element of the thing.”3 For Heidegger, the thingly element of the thing is that it ‘things’. To ‘thing’ is to unify heterogeneities. Each ‘thing’ that blossoms forth when we build it, reveals the heterogeneous place, people and ‘things’ it has blossomed alongside. It emerges from the earth, gathers these surroundings, and then recedes back into the earth once again.4 As we have seen, this ‘building’ is poiēsis. Moreover, this poiēsis, this shaping, making and building, depends on physis. Physis sees Nature, including humans, as a process of creative becoming, and we have already seen this in the work of Aristotle and Heidegger.5

R.G. Collingwood, in The Idea of Nature, comes to a similar conclusion by tracing the Greek concept of physis back from the pre-Socratics to Aristotle. For Collingwood, as for Heidegger, our ontology of Nature should not be entirely the province of the

1 This section contains portions of Young, D.A. (2002), ‘Not Easy Being Green’, Ethics, Place and Environment, Volume 5, Number 3, pp.189-204
3 Ibid., p.150
5 On Aristotle and physis, see p.5, above. On Heidegger and physis, see p.30, above.

54 1. Culture and the Narrative World
Pythagorean-Platonic mathematicism of modern science and analytic philosophy. Rather, with Aristotle, *physis* is better understood through a biological approach that emphasises “potentiality, nisus, and teleology.” Indeed, this is why Heidegger refers to *physis* as the rising in itself of all things. Like the blossom that blooms, the acorn that brings forth an oak, or the oak that brings forth acorns, our ontology should be one of development, change and immanent self-causation. For all those, such as Whitehead, who embrace this ontology against vulgar Platonism, Nature is therefore “a process of becoming”. It is this becoming that the ‘thing’ mentality often ignores, and Whitehead calls this ignorance the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. We have seen this problem in Vico, Hegel, Freud and Piaget. When we mistake the Platonic abstraction of the ‘final actuality’ for reality, we inadvertently treat ‘processes of becoming’ as if they were merely ‘things’, or eternal ends.

These theorists, Heidegger, Collingwood and Whitehead, all understand the world in terms of creative process of becoming. Whitehead characterises the founding principle of this tradition when he writes: “the very essence of actuality – that is, of the completely real – is process. Thus each actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and perishing.” From this ‘process’ perspective, our creative participation in the world can no longer be a matter of manipulating ‘present-at-hand’ things. On the contrary, it is one of allowing the potential qualities inherent in the world’s processes, including other humans, to develop. Moreover, this approach should also apply to our understanding of the ego, and psyche proper. Quite simply, we must take *physis* into account, and we will firstly turn to Bergson to do this.

By opposing the ‘thing’ mentality in favour of process, Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was an influence on Piaget, Whitehead, and Heidegger. Here, Bergson will help us to

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overcome the ‘thingness’ of the ego in the work of Freud, and wed temporal psychology to the cultural World. Like Freud, Bergson was influenced by Schelling. However, where Freud develops the Schellingian idea of the unconscious, Bergson emphasises continual development and change. For Bergson, the ego should not be understood as a ‘thing’ in the space of time, but rather as an enduring process. Therefore, he tells us that the ego “is merely a symbol intended to recall unceasingly to our consciousness the artificial character of the process by which the attention places clean-cut states side by side, where actually there is a continuity which unfolds.” Thus, we must not forget that this ego is not a passive ‘thing’, but an active process of enduring.  

For Bergson, each of our moments is a convenient differentiation made by a continuous consciousness upon itself, and then forgotten. It is a case where the human intellect ‘freezes’ the dynamic world as if it were inert matter, capable of being reduced to discrete component parts and then reassembled conceptually as mechanical systems. Here, the ‘thingness’ of Freud or Piaget’s ‘ego’ is avoided.

With Bergson, however, human consciousness seems a mere duration, lacking the human aspects of Freudian or Piagetian theories. Specifically, “[a]ll that has happened is that mechanical energy has been replaced by spiritual, the discontinuous being of empiricism by being of a fluid kind, but of which we can say that it flows, describing it in the third person.” Similarly, as Carr writes, the “Bergsonian durée pure is as much an abstract version of time as its atomization into timeless points.” What we need, then, is a view of time that does justice to the unique ‘humanness’ of human time. We must understand the way in which an apparently seamless process of temporal unfolding is infused with meaning and actively dwelt within. For this, we should briefly turn to Dilthey, and then to Husserl. Husserl will enable us to build on the durée of Bergson without the ‘abstract neutrality’ of Bergsonism.

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3 Ibid., p.4
4 Ibid., p.155
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was influenced by Herder, Schleiermacher and Bergson, among others. Like Freud, Dilthey saw that the self develops out of the immediate experience of resistance from the world.\(^1\) This world, though, only gains its meaning by virtue of its place in a human history. In this sense, Dilthey affirms a Hegelian interest in the development of historical selfhood. Against the abstract idealism of Hegel, however, Dilthey was interested in wedding the philosophy of history to the immediate experience of life. This involved the rejection of any Hegelian absolute consciousness in favour of a purely human creativity. For Dilthey, then, it “is not in speculative knowledge of the concept, but in historical consciousness, that spirit’s knowledge of itself is attained.”\(^2\) This, as Gadamer notes, was a revival of the Vichian epistemology we saw earlier.\(^3\) We make sense of the world because we create it. Moreover, we create it in an historical context that already exists as an unfolding structural whole, grounded in a meaningful past.\(^4\) While seemingly influenced by Bergsonian flux,\(^5\) we see here that Dilthey rejects “the unstructured plenitude of Bergson’s intuition of duration”\(^6\). Thus, Dilthey develops Bergson’s flux, but without the vague intuitism.\(^7\) Rather than the abstract ‘it flows’ of Bergson, we see in Dilthey the experience of temporal duration as taking place within a wider historical becoming.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a younger contemporary of Dilthey, an influence on Vygotsky and the teacher of Heidegger. Though his later thought moves toward a more Cartesian or neo-Kantian understanding of consciousness, Husserl’s early work on the phenomenology of time-consciousness is, like that of Dilthey, a fruitful conceptualisation of human time. Husserl tells us that each presentation of consciousness is intimately attached to its past and future presentations.\(^8\) The past is

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3. Ibid., p.222
6. Ibid., p.387
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

retained in the present, and the present reaches out to the future. This future, in turn, is the present for the passed past. Phenomenal time is therefore more than a ‘pure’ duration. Human time is a continuum of mutually-acknowledging presentations, each flowing in a manner related to preceding and proceeding presentations.

To more precisely depict this process, Husserl distinguishes between ‘retention’, ‘protention’ and ‘recollection’ as forms of memory. With this, Husserl extends the temporality of Dilthey and articulates a “brilliant innovation [that] leaves all previous attempts far behind.”

Specifically, retention is the memory which immediately associates a past now with the proceeding now, and protention is the forward-oriented version of retention, the manner in which a given moment’s presentation prehends the proceeding now. Recollection, as the term implies, is that which categorises passed events as specifically past and not related to the now. The significance of this is that time is not seen as an objective and neutral phenomenon. On the contrary, time becomes a meaningful human process. The sequence of presentations merge into one another as a result of immanent categorisation by the ego and, indeed, partly shape the ego. Simply put, then, we shape this time and are shaped by it.

Furthermore, this continual categorisation takes place in a manner receptive to differing temporal processes and their relevance to the self. Husserl explains this using the example of music. To us, the presentation of the weak violin tone in its fading reverberations is not the same as retentional presentation. In its present passedness, the latter has been diminished in the now by human memory, as opposed to the violin’s fading reverberations which have been diminished by lack of energy. This, then, is an active reception of time, indeed, a creation of time. Human time, as Carr puts it, “is in our sense, configured time. It is no more alien to time than the curving banks are alien to the river, or the potter’s hands to the clay.” In this way, human time is established as a fundamentally durational process. It is then further elaborated as a process capable of being actively differentiated into durational entities, each of semantic and spatio-

3 Ibid., p.50, p.53
temporal unity, and each unified by virtue of a common temporally-guiding ego. Thus, human “practice is not in time but makes time (human time, as opposed to biological or astronomical time).”\(^2\) For this reason, primary experience is not an event, or an object, but a lived creative process.\(^3\) This retains the durée of Bergson, but adds to it a feeling of human time.

With this human time, the psychology of Freud and Piaget can be further reconceptualised to accord with the work of Heidegger. This is because, for Hussurl, human time is not transcended by a Hobbesian individual. Nor can the psyche be seen as a ‘thing’. On the contrary, we dwell in time as a unity, where processes in the world are taken as meaningful, and given conceptual autonomy. In the case of the violin tone, for instance, the melody itself is accorded a certain conceptual autonomy due to its place in a given unified human context.\(^4\)

Our Being-in-the-World, then, cannot be understood as the passive movement of a ‘thing’ in time and space. Our involvement in time and space requires a groping backward to the past, forward to the future, and the creative redevelopment of the self as this movement goes on. This groping, in turn, is unified by a general organisational structure. Recent work in artificial intelligence seems to confirm the difficulty of accounting for everyday life in any other way.\(^5\) Protention, retention and recollection are always understood through a principle of order that allows us to make sense of our temporality. For Carr, this “‘principle’ by which they are held together and organised articulates the action…into beginning, middle, and end.”\(^6\) Here, again, is the notion of a diverse unity of ‘thinging’ – heterogeneities actively gathered into a whole.\(^7\)

Indeed, it is the end of this whole that differentiates Husserl from Heidegger. Husserl’s intentionality has a sense of unfinished openness. The Heideggerian Dasein, however, is

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7. See p.54, above.
characterised by its Being-towards-death.¹ Being-ahead-of-ourselves, death is the one future possibility we cannot avoid Being. Thus, while plants merely perish, as Heidegger writes, “human beings…are called mortals because they can die. […] Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth”². Life develops into death. Life ‘is’ death.

**ii. Death and the Narrative Life**

According to Heidegger, however, death is problematic for most people.³ This is because death is seen as an external event; something which happens, but not something that happens to us, inasmuch as we are living now. To each *Dasein*, death becomes a ‘thing’ disconnected from Being. When asked about death, for instance, one young woman replies: “I don’t really know. I’m too busy living my life.”⁴ This attitude is also shown in Tolstoy’s *The Death of Ivan Ilyich*.⁵ We see here in life and fiction an Epicurean world composed of dead matter, where death itself is strangely absent.⁶ Death, in a poetic irony, is excluded from life. By fleeing from death in this manner, people alienate themselves from their very lives, refusing to acknowledge that they are, to use Heidegger’s phrase, ‘dying already’. In response, Heidegger recommends a more authentic relation to death. By authentic, Heidegger does not mean one which merely thinks about death empirically, thus treating death as an *a posteriori* hypothesis with the possible everyday refutation this entails. Nor, indeed, is death to be treated as if it were ready to hand for us to use, for this would entail suicide, thus annihilating any possibility of even having an authentic attitude to death in life. Similarly, death is not to be brooded upon like the more superficial ‘Goths’,⁷ or expected like one expects the postman.⁸ We should not use death as an excuse for greed, usury and hoarding, like the

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⁴ Leonore Boerma, cited in Milson, R. (15/7/01), ‘Looking for answers’, *The Age*, SUNDAY LIFE MAGAZINE, p.21
⁷ ‘Goths’ are often identified by jet black hair, clothes, and makeup, and also by their deathly white faces. Frequently their clothing and music is permeated with macabre imagery
skinflint Ladas in Kazantzakis’ *Christ Recrucified.* Rather, death should be anticipated as an existential possibility, the nearness of which gets greater and greater the more we live. More living is less living is life and, in Heidegger’s words, the “more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.” As beings who are Being-towards our possibilities for existence, the one possibility that we cannot outstrip is death. There is, as the Tanak puts it “a time to be born, And a time to die; A time to plant, And a time to pluck what is planted”. As with the seed and the tree, or the colour of a sunset, our life is a process that is gathered into a unity. This unity, *qua* unity, must end.

When human time is understood in this manner, the flow of Husserl’s phenomenology, and human life in general, may be characterised more fully by Carr’s ‘beginnings, middles and ends’. Moreover, Carr integrates these beginnings, middles and ends with the notion of making time. To do this, Carr articulates the notion of the narrative. We have seen

> beginning, middle, and end…departure and arrival, departure and return, means and end, suspension and resolution, problem and solution. Now these are some of the very structures most often cited as features of the narrative, in the sense that they represent the manner in which the events of stories are arranged into coherent wholes.

In *The Literary Mind*, Turner makes a similar argument that accords with our articulation of Heideggerian being-in-the-World and the relations of internalisation articulated by Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky. As children, we map the bodily, sensory and social schemas we internalise onto objects and events in the world, and internalise these in turn. We then creatively integrate these into unities, so that even the smallest events have spatial and temporal beginnings, middles and ends. Consequently, the various people Being-with and processes Being-alongside-us-in-the-World are continually

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3. Ecclesiastes 3:2
restructured so that we do not see bits, but storied unities.\(^1\) Indeed, our own selves are such unities.\(^2\) Ricoeur develops a similar account with his notion of autobiography.\(^3\) In this sense, the protentional and retentional structure in Husserl is also indicative of a larger structure operating at the level of the whole life. The single event of the violin melody is composed of several elements, each of which gains its significance through temporal interaction with the others, and with the whole that this engenders. Similarly, the whole of the human life is bounded by the beginning of birth and the ending of life. It is not experienced as a single moment, but as a stretching out of recollection towards the grounding past, experience of the lived present, and expectation towards the future.\(^4\) This movement, as we have seen, is also appreciated by Heidegger, where we live out our selves in the future by taking them up from the past of our previous projection, in a passed World within which we are thrown.

Moreover, this notion of the storied life incorporates the traditional narrative concepts of storyteller, characters and audience. Indeed, our ability to tell stories and write literature depends on these basic capacities for creative construction.\(^5\) For Carr, our own retentional and protentional movements function like a storyteller in that they select those elements of experience to render significant.\(^6\) Indeed, simply by Being-in-the-world only some ‘things’ will be brought to light and understood as being. Moreover, by trying to account for ourselves in the form of the story, we find ourselves grasping for the authority the storyteller role holds.\(^1\) We want to have the control that a storyteller has, and the quest for this is part of the development of the self in experience, thought and action. Whether in a court of law, academic disputation, argument with friends over a choice of lover, or angst-ridden inner dialogue, the story must take stock of the whole of the life in order to do the same for the events of that life. We may be storyteller, character and audience for ourselves or for another, or perhaps only one of these. Either way, the form of the story is what creates and recreates meaning by taking stock of the coherent whole of a life, or by projecting coherence onto a future range of projected possibilities. In this sense, narrative is more than a simple mimētic fable, in

\(^1\) *Ibid.*, pp.110-115
the pejorative sense. On the contrary, narrative is fundamental to human temporality and, indeed, human life. In their everyday action and experience, and for the duration of their lives, humans *qua* mortals live in and through narratives. This is why, in MacIntyre’s words,

> in successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer. [...] It is because we all live out narratives in our lives...that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others.2

Thus, not only can perception and action be rendered sensible by virtue of the narrative form, but also the whole lives of humans *qua* cultural animals. Human life, inclusive of perception and action, can be seen as a continual effort to develop or redevelop meaningful human time from the often unfathomable or apparently immutable narrative scenes within which we find ourselves.3 Here, human beings are not self-interested individuals or machines, but creative storytellers.

### iii. Narrative, Process and Speech

By affirming storytelling in this way, we are able to integrate process, narrative and *poiēsis*. This, in turn, will allow us to articulate a little later how communities are developed, and the relevance of this for cultural traditions and the narrative World.4 As we have seen, Heidegger problematises the ‘thing’ mentality by speaking of *physis*. However, Heidegger spends little time really looking into the *physis* of language, his house of Being. Certainly, the poetic worlding of Being from dark to light is a kind of process from potentiality to actuality. Nonetheless, there is a strong primordiality in poetry for him, so words are most important when they originally world us.5 It is as if there was no house for Being before the writings of Heraclitus,6 and any remaining

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1 Ibid., pp.61-63
4 See pp.66-73, below.
house has become progressively dilapidated since Parmenides, with the exception of the work of master-builders Sophocles, Holderlin, Rilke and a few rare others. Thus, most emerging and rising in language has been for the worse, eventually accompanying the "dreary technological frenzy" of the twentieth century. Certainly, modern superficiality and instrumentality has apparently left much of our language "worn out and used up". Despite such prophetic pronouncements, though, Heidegger does not seem to fully appreciate the \textit{physis} of language, the emerging and rising in itself of words or the word.

However, if there is anything about language and speech that should pique our interest, it is exactly this. Whitehead himself, though certainly no Heideggerian, is quick to warn us that the "mistake is to think of words as entities." Surely these, too, are processes? Certainly, Bakhtin, Volosinov and Ricoeur would concur. Similarly, Joyce, Woolf and Dylan Thomas would all answer with a resounding 'yes'. For these writers, words flow into one another, and lend one another meaning through this flow. Power moves from speaker to speaker and context to context. As such, the perfect fund of each context assumed by Saussure may change, precisely due to changing speakers and changing speech. Moreover, this is not a simple mechanical process, characterised by abstract synchrony and diachrony. It is, on the contrary, more like a stream. Thus, as Ricoeur writes,
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

constancy of meaning is never anything but the constancy of contexts. And this constancy is not a self-evident phenomenon; stability is something to be explained. (Something more likely to be self-evident would be a law of process and of growth, like that which Whitehead postulated as the principle of reality.)

Indeed, in a typically Whiteheadian choice of words, Volosinov simply tells us that language “endures as a continual process of becoming.” However, this process of becoming does not mean that there is no stability in language. Rather, it means that this stability is at a higher level than the words it stabilises. Certainly, Heidegger’s notion of a World gives us some idea of this constancy. If we have brought the world to light for us in a given way, there can only be some stable meanings for us. Put another way, some potentialities and, as such, some actualities, are constrained by their present retention of past actualities – the stream of meaning is held within stable banks. Certainly, this notion of constraint would accord with the work of Merleau-Ponty, and with Bakhtin’s notion of a speech genre, where we speak in a stable context created by speech itself. Indeed, Ricoeur’s own work in The Symbolism of Evil presupposes a kind of mythic stability. Put simply, speaking within a World mostly perpetuates this world as distinct from others. Heidegger would no doubt agree with this.

Our articulation of the storied life gives further clarity to this account. Put simply, narratives emplot the Whiteheadian process and growth of meaning spoken of earlier by Ricoeur. As such, when we speak to each other we are living and telling stories.

These stories, including the narrative contexts in which they are set and spoken, lend the process of language a certain stability and predictability. Of course, this is not to say that all our work is done. Far from it. Because of the process nature of culture and logos, predictability and unpredictability always coexist. Indeed, as Carr writes, “the

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1 Ricoeur, P. (1997), The Rule of Metaphor, Routledge, Cornwall, p.78
5 Heidegger, M. (1985), Being and Time, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp.107-114, pp.212-213. Of course, the role of language in Being and Time is less primordial than it became after Heidegger’s ‘turn’. Nonetheless, in both periods Heidegger saw language as perpetuating a given world, and Being in Time describes this process in detail.
6 Ibid., pp.210-211
7 Ibid., pp.215-216
unity of self…is not a pregiven condition but an achievement. […] What we are doing is telling and retelling, to ourselves and others, the story of what we are about and what we are.”¹ Moreover, a hermeneutic approach is sometimes necessary to unconceal the meanings offered to us by previous generations in the World,² though this unconcealment will itself be a creative spiral.³ In this sense, narratives, and the process ontology that grounds them, are necessary preconditions for our ability to articulate ourselves to one another. This is why it is essential to pay heed to process, narrative and poiēsis.

iv. Everyday Storytelling: Poïēsis, Phronēsis and the ‘Generalised Other’

When we see ourselves as articulable stories in this way, we are given an opportunity to place ourselves in relation to other stories. Indeed, it because we are primordially storytellers that we are able to place ourselves in the stories of others.⁴ These stories will not only be long-term narratives, such as the creation of authentic democracy, for instance, but also the stories of other people. By addressing who I am, where I am from and where I am going, narratives allow us to further develop the social ends spoken of by Vico and Herder. Here, characters in a narrative may

represent…themselves to each other and to themselves as unfinished autobiographies or narratives. In formulating these autobiographies people define themselves in terms of commitments to a hierarchical order of projects, ranging from short-term projects…to the projects through which they define the significance of their lives.⁵

By living storied lives, then, we give ourselves the opportunity to share our lives with others. This, in turn, overcomes Heidegger’s omission of phronēsis, or practical intelligence, in his explication of Gestell, or technological enframing.⁶ For Heidegger, Gestell is the ‘logic’ of technology, where Being is revealed in such a way that it

⁵ Gare, A. (1996), *Nihilism Inc.*, Eco-Logical Press, Como, p.360
becomes understood as a mass of ‘things’ ready for our use.\(^1\) This, in part, is a kind of self-assertiveness. Rather than letting the *poiētic* blooming of *physis* be, we arrogantly tear Being into the light. Consequently, in his infamous later years, Heidegger turned away from the wilful revealing of Being, seeing it as an example of *Gestell*. He would not agree with our emphasis on autobiography, or reauthorship, or the wilful transformation of the Western world. Crying “Nietzsche did me in!”\(^2\), he was certain that the technological domination of the world had progressed so far that any attempts to ‘philosophise’ our way out of crises would still be permeated by the instrumentalist rationality of modernity.\(^3\) He turned to poetry to save us, with Being like the “bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself.”\(^4\) Certainly, there is much fruit in the poetic life.

However, in his ‘flight from will’, as Taminiaux points out, Heidegger abstracts *phronēsis*, or practical wisdom, from the Aristotelian context of human diversity.\(^5\) By speaking of us as unfinished autobiographies, Gare reminds us that cultural life means more than just the poetic bursting into blossom of Being. Rather, it should allow for human diversity and the tensions of ethical and political speech. The narrative should nurture “sensitivity to the ambiguity and contingency in…everyday public engagements,…[the] everyday involvement with other human beings in their otherness.”\(^6\) Indeed, as Bernstein tells us, a Heideggerian ethics *qua ethos, qua abode*, necessitates the *phronēsis* of everyday engagement so important to Aristotle.\(^7\) Here, the value of narrativity is in the dialectical interpenetration of life as story, and life told as story.\(^8\) Thus, the narrative World is a vindication of the Aristotelian belief in rational discourse, discourse which is a “valorisation of live interlocution in the construction of

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1. Culture and the Narrative World

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\(^1\) See p.145ff, below.


a story, its investments of desire, its effects of truth.”

Certainly, it may be true that, as Heidegger argues, *logos* is associated with an ethos of wilful, arrogant, self-assertion. Perhaps the history of *logos* in Western thought is one of instrumentalism and control, and the forgetting of Being.

However, as we saw earlier, Heidegger never rejected the Aristotelian account of sociality completely. Everyday participation in social, political and cultural activity itself is a kind of gathering. Here, it is still important to convince others that we should remember Being in the first place. Moreover, it is important to allow ourselves and our narrative stance on Being to be the subject of *logos*, of dialogue and debate. Indeed, Heidegger, a philosopher obviously situated in a given tradition of thought, cannot be understood outside a commitment to dialogue, debate and disputation.

It is for this reason that Carr invokes Hegel. Using Hegel’s ‘dialectic of recognition’, Carr shows that it is only this kind of heterogeneous conflict that engenders communities made up of independent individuals who understand their place relative to others in the same group. These others, of course, only develop their selves by their common commitment to the project of the community itself. This project involves conflict, but requires at least a commonly experienced world. This conflict, of course, can tear apart those who would make up a diverse political World. As with life, the narrative of the community must be seen as a constant struggle “against the centrifugal tendencies which inhere in it because of the independent-mindedness of the individuals that make it up.” Nonetheless, once involved in a common project, the same narrative configurations of experience and the autobiographical self arise in the World. We, rather than I, speak of our stories. With the development of the Hegelian dialectic, the community is bound together in a common story, and this storyliving and storytelling is an open-ended, creative activity. This is an everyday process of tying together a shared past, present and future. ‘We’ could not do today what ‘we’ will do tomorrow, if it were not for the heritage passed on to us now by what ‘we’ did all that time ago.

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3. See p.37, above.
5. Ibid., p.148
6. Ibid., pp.149-150
This development from egocentrism to community, ‘I’ to ‘we’ to ‘I’, is also articulated by the social behaviourist George Herbert Mead (1863-1931). Like Aristotle and Herder, Mead maintains that life is a self-maintaining, self-developing creative process. Similarly, Mead argues that we are stretched in time and space, so that our past, present and future are all actively implicated in our creative development. This, of course, accords with the work of Bergson, Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger. However, Mead also gives us the notion of the ‘generalised other’. This will be fruitful in our later account of the Chorus. For now, however, we should turn to the bare bones of Mead’s work on the development from egocentrism to community.

Like Heidegger, Mead argued that we cannot account for mind, self and community if we ground our analysis in discrete individuals. Rather, we must begin with the social and environmental worlds that these individuals share. This is in accordance with recent work in neurophysiology, and extends to the development from non-human to human life as well as infants to adults. For Mead, this process can be differentiated into four stages, though these are often flexible in life. The first stage is simply one of gesture. We begin, like Heidegger, with a number of organisms involved in shared activities in a shared place. Here, the organism is able to effect changes in another organism through its behaviour. The change is the interpretation by the ‘other’ of the organism’s gesture. These changes, in turn, point to the social nature of the shared situation in which the organisms find themselves. Mead gives the example of a dog fight, where the snarls of one dog evoke snarls and anger in another. The evoked snarls, in turn, show us the sociality of the two dogs. However, the snarls cannot be said to mean anything to the dogs, for they do not symbolise anything.

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2 Ibid., pp.74-76
3 See p.186, below.
With the second stage comes symbolisation.\(^1\) Here, the organism begins to see the 
response of the other within itself. A bully, for example, must understand the fear of his 
victim in order to bully him.\(^2\) In effect, the bully must have learned how the other feels, 
rather than simply learning how to make him behave in a given way. Moreover, this 
involves more than simple snarls. Rather, it involves vocalisation and language.\(^3\) With 
speech and writing, we objectify our own communication, and are able to see these as 
others would. Like Vygotsky, then, Mead argues that we internalise the linguistic 
objectifications of our own relations with other individuals.\(^4\) Indeed, \textit{contra} Epicurus, 
Hobbes and Locke, Mead argues that language is never arbitrary, or confined to a single 
mind. Rather, it is “part of a co-operative process,”\(^5\) and present in the unconscious of 
each individual before any gestures occur.\(^6\) It is in the relations of an objective field 
before it is in each subject.\(^7\)

However, these relations only occur between particulars. In the third stage, Mead 
argues that we are able to universalise each of the particular others, so that we develop 
what he calls a ‘generalised other’.\(^8\) As with Hegel, this account maintains that we 
overcome our own egocentrism and particularity only when we are able to form a 
generalised abstraction from the various others, and our relations with these others. 
Like Bourdieu, Mead articulates this in terms of a game.\(^9\) While play only requires that 
we place ourselves in a relation to another, participation in a game requires a sense of 
the rules over and above the particulars of each player. Indeed, these are also very 
much like the ‘major premises’ of MacIntyre,\(^10\) as they represent the objective rules by 
which the group interacts. This, in turn, is only possible through language. Mead argues 
that it is only because of language that we may objectify our generalised experiences. 
In his words, “language is a part of conduct. […] The whole process is not a mental

\(^1\) Ibid., pp.61-82
\(^2\) Ibid., p.66
\(^3\) Ibid., pp.61-81
\(^4\) Ibid., pp.69-71
\(^5\) Ibid., p.74
\(^6\) Ibid., p.77
\(^7\) Ibid., p.78
\(^8\) Ibid., pp.82-90
\(^9\) Ibid., pp.152-164
pp.124-133. See also p.93, below.
product and you cannot put it inside the brain.”¹ Mead explains this with a story of a man and a dog.² While a dog cannot cross a canyon, a man will respond to the canyon by seeing possibilities that did not exist before. The man will see a tree to use as a ramp, or a narrowing of the chasm. These possibilities exist because they are symbolically in our mind, which is itself stretched in our social and physical locale. Physical and social reality, as Goff puts it, “is always reality-for-man in that knowing is an active, selective ‘process’”³. This seems to accord with the work of Heidegger. For Mead and Heidegger, our stretched physical and social engagement with a shared world is the ground for language. This language, in turn, also alters our engagement, as it objectifies some ‘things’, or reveals only some ‘things’ as real for our active Being-in-the-World-with-and-alongside-others. Language, in this sense, is a stream of potentiality and actuality that is implicated in, and implicating, our circumspective involvement with the world. Consequently, the generalised other is an abstraction, but it is grounded in the world.

The fourth stage is when this generalised other, including its shared language, is internalised by the whole group. This is, as Scheffler puts it, “a community of selves, in a distinctively human sense.”⁴ If, as Carr suggests, we must take stock of our narratives, this internalisation can be further clarified. While the individuals of a shared world may have universalised their particular experiences, they may not yet have unified this into a coherent whole. However, by collectively taking stock of the story so far, the group as a whole may share in the same sense of we. This is why Mead emphasises the importance of historians, leaders and the Greek tragedians.⁵ These storytellers may take stock of the shared story and unify us in a common generalised other. Of course, this is not to say individuality and ‘I’ do not exist. As we will see later, Mead does give an account of creative individuality grounded the existentiell ‘I’ and the World’s ‘me’.⁶ For now, though, we may see how the egocentric individualism of Hobbes is overcome. The development of mind and society is, as Mead argues, a

² Ibid., pp.122-124
⁵ Mead, G.H. (1967), Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.257
⁶ See p.83, below.
creative process of development.1 This, of course, accords with the insights of Bergson, Dilthey, Husserl, and so forth, as well as with Carr, Hegel and Heidegger. Having creatively overcome our particular independent-mindedness, we may live as ‘we’ rather than as a simple ‘I’, ‘I’, ‘I’ and so forth. Moreover we may live as, and in, stories.

v. Narrative World and Tradition

Through this movement of ‘I’ to ‘we’, we find ourselves again with the notion of World. When we, living our storied lives, articulate our visions of individual and collective life to one another and to ourselves, we begin to undertake a shared project. Over and above the common world necessary to even begin speaking, this telling of stories itself develops our common culture, where each of us speaks as ‘we’. Though Aristotle would not have defended our notion of narrative, he is a good example of this process. Due to the military and political agon, and subsequent storytelling, that precede him, Aristotle is able to speak as we; as a member of a young Athenian cultural community.2 Through such stories, whether of events, such as the fall of Troy or the foundation of democratic Athens, or lives, such as that of Achilles or Socrates, we shape our common Being-in-the-world. We are in a narrative World.

However, when Carr and MacIntyre speak of narratives, they do not speak of a World, as we often shall. Rather, they speak of narrative tradition. While conservative or vulgar uses of the word ‘tradition’ are commonplace, we should integrate into our vision of the World a more fruitful sense of tradition.

What, though, is a tradition? Is tradition simply that which is sung to justify a lack of imagination, or the inability to take responsibility for the ownmost existence of my life-until-death? Is tradition simply, as Kaufmann says, “an honorific name for the critic’s own prejudices”3? In response, we should note that Carr speaks of tradition as a passing along or handing down, though his use of the word seems more commonplace.


1 Culture and the Narrative World
than self-consciously chosen. In Ricoeur and MacIntyre, however, we see a much fuller expression of the term. For Ricoeur, tradition is both an inherited World within which we find ourselves thrown, and also a horizon of possibilities that may be projected. In this sense, tradition cannot simply be handed down. Rather, we are thrown into it, and then the task of embracing the horizons it gives us, altering them, or discarding the tradition itself is open to us. While Carr allows for this in his articulation of narratives, he does not link it to tradition, and so the latter remains a somewhat simple expression of sediment. For MacIntyre, tradition also has a sedimented character. Moreover, while the narrative of the community has a telos, the tradition only ever unfolds towards a not-yet-completed narrative end. The tradition, as opposed to the narrative, then, has a kind of backward gaze. In this respect, tradition is again like the World of Heidegger. For Carr, as for MacIntyre, it is our backward gaze into our historical past that gives us our future individual and collective possibilities. Still, this idea of tradition still retains a sedimented character, albeit one that shows the relationship between past, present and future ecstasies of individual and collective time.

A tradition is a World, though understood for the Dasein in terms of its past rather than its future. This past not only includes the common past of the we, the historical past, but also the possibilities open to the ‘I’ from the work of those acting as ‘we’. In this sense, the notion of tradition complements our earlier analysis of childhood development and socialisation. The child inherits objects in a field of relations, the source of which is the sediment of a passing World, a tradition.

Moreover, because we are not born alone, but born Being-with-others, we inherit each tradition as a generation. Indeed, Carr and Heidegger seem to agree on this point. However, we are also Being-with many from earlier generations, those who have contributed to our World, and the memory of those who have died and also contributed to the sediment of our tradition. To actively bear the gifts of those who have died, of

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8 *Ibid.*, p.113
course, we must have the social equivalent of retention, recollection. Here, we return in the present to the past as passed. Moreover, we may tell stories to one another and ourselves about those who have died, and their roles in contributing to our tradition. In this sense, our social story, like our personal story, can involve a certain taking stock of our past, seen as the creative sediment of passed life. Indeed, it is this that allows present academics or intellectuals to develop insights of depth and breath, even within a corrupt and shallow culture.

Having thus recollected, we, in turn, can contribute to this tradition ourselves. This contribution can be to the historical subject of the ‘we’ proper to the social narrative, but it can also be to the existentiell possibles constitutive of our tradition. Here, as MacIntyre writes, “what [can be] called history is an enacted dramatic narrative in which the characters are also the authors.”1 Of course, we cannot be the entire authors. Rather, as Carr notes, we should be storytellers, where we tell and retell the stories bequeathed to us by those who lived before.2 Similarly, Mead speaks of ‘information’ and knowledge.3 We internalise sediment as information and form the ‘me’, but we also creatively develop this as knowledge as a free ‘I’.4 In this sense, we are taking up the tradition given to us, and creatively bringing it to light through art, science, craft, politics and so forth.

However, we are not doing this without purpose. On the contrary, we are working with a telos that is implicit or explicit in the social narrative of the World we live through. In this sense, we are also experiencing the social equivalents of protension, expectation and deliberation. While the former is an implicit orientation to the future, the latter is an explicit relation, though both relate to the tradition as a not-yet. This entails not only, as Heidegger would emphasise, the resolute expectation of our own individual deaths, but also the future possibilities of the ‘we’ subject, the community. Indeed, the end of a community, such as the increasing decadence of democratic Athens, may itself be seen as a futural possibility expected by those in a given community, such as Plato.

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2 Ibid., pp.84-85
3 Goff, T.W. (1980), Marx and Mead: Contributions to a Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp.75-76
4 See p.83, below.
Nonetheless, the *teloi* of a tradition, from this perspective, can be seen as an expansive not-yet, over and above the individual end of death.

Moreover, we may explicitly tell stories, or deliberate, to one another and ourselves about these *teloi* of our ‘I’ and ‘we’ possibilities, further reconceptualising the future and, with it, the past. This, in turn, will influence our actions which will themselves be understood as narratives with beginnings, middles and ends. It is for this very reason that Kaufmann’s pejorative use of ‘tradition’ and ‘prejudices’ is unfair. The prejudices of the tradition are omnipresent, for we can never escape them. What we can do, however, is let the tradition be part of a living narrative. We can come to terms with the past tradition and enjoy the fruit of its future possibilities in the present. Here, again, we see the form of the narrative. As Carr writes, “the roles of agent (we act), narrator (we tell), and audience (to ourselves), turn up again, this time in a plural form.”¹ In this sense, tradition always involves narrative, even though every narrative is not a tradition. To make sense of the inheritance and creative development of a cultural tradition, we must think in terms of narratives. It seems no coincidence that Gelertner’s ‘low’ state of learning and deep creativity involves the ancient Hebrew narratives.²

Certainly, it is for these reasons that the classical authors found stories, with beginnings, middles and ends, the most fruitful way of presenting human behaviour.³ In Christianity, for instance, time begins with the Hebrew creation, and ends with the Hellenised Kingdom of God. In Augustine’s *City of God*, the creation story is retold from the perspective of the Christian future, effectively taking stock of the whole of time from the perspective of a single World. Within this time, life is lived through a set of sacred Biblical stories, representing the lives of individuals, peoples and kingdoms.⁴ Within each life is a set of events, such as Easter, Christmas, or the Eucharist, with

³ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1450b:24-34; Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, III.1
beginnings, middles and ends. Each event, in turn, is emplotted as a temporalised process, relative to the unfolding narrative whole of a Christian life, death and afterlife.

However, we need not concern ourselves solely with the peoples of the book. Perhaps it is cheating to give as examples those whose book of faith ends with words on the story of the book of life.\(^1\) Fortunately, the narrative lends itself to concrete articulation in many instances, including those secular ones most modest in their scope and scale. Even the smallest actions are stories.\(^2\)

For the humble barber, for instance, each patch of hair has a story of its own. It begins with a flourish with the scissors, its middle consists of a ‘snip…snip…snip…snipsnipsnip’ rhythm, and the end comes when the hair is brushed in another direction. Then the story, or what Carr would call an ‘event’,\(^3\) begins again. This, of course, ties the ready-to-hand of the scissors to the towards-which of the haircut, and the Being-ahead-of-himself of the barber, whose role is ‘barber’. The role, as we have seen, is taken up from the tradition and lived as a story. Consequently, barber, may be tied to notions of boyhood, apprenticeship, adulthood, expertise, and the further passing on of skill; to the tradition of barbering itself; and to the trade needed to marry, bear children, grow old, and die with a legacy of work and family. This trade qua project may also be opposed to affluent or pretentious hair salons, and valorised as a sufficiently masculine working-class undertaking. He may say: “We must protect our craft,” or “they don’t have the same tradition, the same skill as we have.” This shared undertaking, as a tradition, may in turn be linked to a founding political past of labour politics in the nineteen-seventies, experienced as a shared, mutually-supportive, storytelling, taverna-frequenting fraternity in the present, looking to the future for the mutual recognition developed between all independent, skillful craftsmen often denied a political voice by representative democracy. If this mutual recognition is achieved, and a new community of craftsmen is developed, this group will no doubt retell its story to account for a new sense of ‘we’. The story takes stock of the life of the we-subject, the community, society, or World. Here, we see beginnings, middles and ends within beginnings, middles and ends, and so on. From experience, to action, to socialisation

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1. Revelation, 22:19
and education, to autobiography, to culture itself. Here, cultural life is a complex of stories, and we are storytellers.

vi. Freedom and Death

“Freedom or death,” he muttered, shaking his head fiercely. “Freedom or death! O poor Cretans! Freedom and death – that’s what I should have written on my banner. That’s the true banner of every fighter: Freedom and death! Freedom and death!”

-Nikos Kazantzakis, Freedom and Death, pp.464-465

However, storytellers as we may be, we can only have so much artistic license. We are not able to simply retell our World whenever or however it suits us. Because we live in a World where not everything ‘is’ for us, we are not free to be or do just anything. The facticity of our past always makes itself felt. Moreover, if we are free in any way, it is not simply because we can easily do what we want. This is more Lockean freedom, grounded in the mere lack of impediment.1 Rather, our freedom is or is not because we have already understood what is, and what our ‘is’ is. As Gadamer writes, “what comes into being is free, but the freedom from which it comes is always limited by what has come into being – i.e., by the situation into which it comes.”2 As we have seen, this situation is always one of Dasein. This Dasein “is ontically not only near or nearest – we ourselves are it in each case.”3 We can never be free of Being-in-the-World. Rather, we are free by Being-in-the-World.

Freedom is not an easy matter of individual responsibility and choice.4 Rather, our choices, and our ability to act on these choices, is prefaced on our tangled involvement in the world.5 Bourdieu makes a similar point.6 Moreover, the roles available to us in

4 Sartre, J.P. (1973), Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, p.710
this world are not fake, or kinds of play, as Sartre would have it. ¹ Rather, they only make sense in the narrative within which we live, and cannot be understood out of this.² They are existentiell possibilities for us to live, prefaced on an ontic whole. We are only free, then, when we realise that to “choose at all…we need intelligible alternatives. And they can be provided only by a culture, that is, by an unseen host of collaborators. Culture is necessary to make rational choice possible. It is the condition of freedom.”³ In this way, we do not try to deny our prejudices. Rather, we admit that we are our prejudices, or dispositions in Bourdieu’s language.⁴ This, in turn, means that freedom must be historical.⁵ To develop kinds of freedom, we “will have to make conscious the prejudices guiding understanding so that what is handed down, as a different opinion, stands out and makes itself seen.”⁶ We must, then, come to terms with the stories that give us our freedom.

Here, we embrace a kind of cultural revolution. We are not necessarily freed by killing the Tsar and his family, or by acquiring more money and power. Rather, we embrace our freedom by embracing the World. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “I can pass freedom by, only if I try to get over my natural and social situation by refusing…to take it up, instead of using as a way into the world.”⁷ This World we are thrown into is our facticity, our factual past.⁸ We can only be free by Being-in-the-world without the dissolution of the narrative that occurs when the factual past and its existential possibles are treated as irrelevant pasts that may be transcended. Free Being-in-the-World is the only freedom possible for those understood as Dasein.

Greek poet Yannis Ritsos (1909-1990), for example, was a noble defender of his fellow Greeks, and inspired many to great deeds during the rise of the fascists and the later military coup. Indeed, Ritsos has a truly poetic understanding of free Being-in-the-

¹ Sartre, J.P. (1973), Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, pp.101-103
World. As he shows us in ‘Process’, the storied life is ‘made’ through our relation to “small jars, poems, and men”\(^1\). Freedom can only exist within a World that has objects that are ready-to-hand, \textit{poiēsis} and our Being-with-others. Heidegger would agree, no doubt.\(^2\) There is more, though. During his second period of island exile and imprisonment, weakened with tuberculosis, Ritsos writes:

\begin{quote}
Clumsily, with a thick needle, with thick thread,
He sews the buttons on his jacket. He talks to himself:

Have you eaten your bread? Have you slept in peace?
Have you been able to speak? To stretch out your arm?

Did you remember to look out of the window?
Did you smile at the knock on the door?

If death always is – it is second.
Freedom is always first.\(^3\)
\end{quote}

Here, we again see freedom very much in-the-world, and everyday. Moreover, we see that freedom is created and recreated as we live within our mortality. As we have shown, Heidegger would also agree with this.\(^4\) As a poet, Ritsos realises our mortal thrownness and, as I have shown elsewhere, this connection between poetry and death is not coincidental.\(^5\) He realises that we must all “stand naked before the night and its lengthy road”\(^1\). We all must die. Ritsos, then, understands his storied life, characterised by beginnings, middles and ends, and Being-in-the-world. By coming to terms with his mortality in this way, Ritsos may better come to terms with the narrative World and, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, the \textit{existentiell} and ontic possibilities open to him. For this reason, freedom always comes first as an existential mode; an \textit{existentiell} ‘choice’ made in \textit{Angst}.

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Freedom, then, is a matter of struggling with the very tensions and contradictions that occur as a result of the World being revealed for us. Freedom is the very state of understanding, creating and recreating the stories we have been thrown into. This, of course, entails disagreement, struggle and conflict. Here, though, we have seen the “role of conflict and potential for conflict, but have described the community as existing when the conflict is overcome”\(^2\). Consequently, as Carr notes, we are following in the footsteps of Hegel.\(^3\) Even if it is never overcome, we see how conflict is the lifeblood of free existentiell and ontic existence. It is for this reason that “[n]o one should ever be ashamed of turning back to tradition. […] When traditions conflict, they need more care, not less: they should be keenly scrutinised, not casually discarded.”\(^4\) If we are to freely live in stories, we must acknowledge them, understand them and then tell them differently. To do this, it is essential that we make efforts to understand our roles within, even if it is to reject them.\(^5\) We must discover our roles, never ignoring the past scenes and characters, or the parts these have played in shaping our life. We must understand the past so that we can better understand our present futurality. This, in turn, will help us to understand others, and situate this understanding relative to a narrative World and, finally, to a precious world we share.

However, even if Ritsos was able to come to terms with his narrative tradition, and to poetically express its tensions and harmonies, this in and of itself was not enough to remove the military junta. For seven years parts of Greece were under harsh military control. Similarly, Sartre’s writings on Vichy France, or Kazantzakis’ poetics of Ottoman Greece, depict for us conditions of oppression, subservience and often barbaric cruelty. In such times and places, surely we cannot say that all the people were free? Certainly, people such as Ritsos poetically came to terms with the possibilities open to them within the World by reflecting on their own mortality. This enabled them to live through their ‘tangled’ involvement in the World. However, Ritsos was exiled, unable to go where he pleased, publish his poetry, talk with old friends, vote, or greet knocks at

\(^3\) Ibid.
his study with a smile. Sartre, Camus and Merleau-Ponty worked secretly in occupied France, their own country, unable to speak freely of their part in the resistance, or their own ethical and political passions. Captain Michales from *Freedom and Death*, though wilful and fearsome, still spilt his lifeblood in a failed uprising in Crete. To call these people free would mean to discard and, indeed, to ridicule the ‘commonsense’ notion of freedom we call upon in times of evil. If these people were free – let alone the millions who followed the junta, ignored the resistance and bowed blindly to the Ottomans – then freedom seems worthless.

However, they were not truly free. Rather, they were acting freely. Acting freely, as we have seen, is always a matter of coming to terms with our Being-in-the-World. Absolute freedom, on the other hand, is not simply in the free action, the “binding oneself to…[and] freedom for”\(^1\) of the revolutionary poet, philosopher or warmonger. Rather, freedom itself is “self-determination in terms of one’s own essential law”\(^2\). Of course, this does not mean a simple rule, axiom or tautology. Rather, the ‘essential laws’ will always be a multiplicity of ontological, ethical, eschatological and etiological ‘major premises’. Freedom thus means that the character of a given process, its ‘major premises’, must be allowed to creatively develop from itself to itself, by itself.

For a World or community, this has to do with the way in which it creatively reveals Being, and the many forms of scientific, literary, technological, political, ethical, aesthetic and gastronomic expression that stem from this clearing of Being. It is for this reason that Vichy France, Ottoman Anatolia and Greece, French Prussia and so forth, were not free. The creative becoming of each World was stunted from without. Similarly, an entire people, by virtue of internal or external evil, may be unable to creatively develop, so that they are unable to think and act historically. They also cannot act freely. As we will see, modern Western culture has itself developed to such a stage, so that it has fallen away from the facticity of its own narrative World. It cannot be free, act freely or gain its freedom where lost.

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A World is free when it is able to creatively develop the tradition it has inherited in accordance with the ‘major premises’ of its character. Of course, this is not to say that every World is good or just. Rather, a World can be free for some and not for others. However, we will address this later with our accounts of power and justice.¹ For now, we should focus on freedom and creative development. This creative development does not mean sameness or repetition, but development-from. The ‘major premises’ of a culture are not sufficient, but only necessary, for the ‘syllogism’ to proceed. *Fasolada*, the Greek bean soup eaten in homes, and post-junta democracy, seem to be indicative of the Greek people’s freedom. They represent the creative development of the Greek tradition by Greeks. *Yalactobouriko*, a Turkish custard sweet sold in cake shops, and the vibrant *plaka* district, developed by the Turkish occupiers, are not. They represent foreign interference, cultural imperialism and ‘lawlessness’. Of course, the Greeks may creatively incorporate such places and foods into their everyday life and, indeed, profit by it in the many senses of the word. Indeed, *fasolada* itself may be an Ottoman word, like *dolma* and *fasolia*. Nonetheless, there still remains for some Greeks a sense of coming out of the ‘Dark Ages’,² or that “the Turks are the only conquerors who gave the defeated nothing.”³ This sense, in turn, is reflected in places, foods and many other ‘things’ Being-alongside-in-the-World, personal recollection and the taking stock of the people of Hellas on every Greek independence day. Of course, the waters are muddied by such abstractions as the nation-state, economy and the movement of multinational corporations. It was never the Turks of a Turkish nation-state who occupied Greece, for example, but the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, we have seen how we may speak of a people’s freedom. For neatness, we will call this ontic freedom,⁴ for it has to do with the free development of factual Being by a transcendent World. Later, we will see the antithesis of this freedom, ontic *akrasia*, where an entire people lose their moral will.¹

How can we speak of our own personal freedom? Like a World, we can only be absolutely free when we are living according to our own ‘essential law’. This has naught to do with legalities, axiomatic rationality or logical necessity. These would go against our earlier explication of the narrative World as creative and open-ended.

¹ See pp.85-97, below.
² English Tourist (6/10/01), Ithaca, Greece, personal communication
³ Greek National (5/10/01), Ithaca, Greece, personal communication
⁴ See p.31, above.
Rather, we should keep in mind the affinity between *nomos*, or ‘law’, and habit. Like each *nomos*, our personal *ethos* must be cultivated. In this sense, living according to our ‘essential law’ means developing and redeveloping our character. As Carr writes, “I can live out my fate...as a mode of existence freely and consciously chosen.” Put simply, we are free when we can, as Marx understood, ‘make’ our selves. This also accords with the work of Mead. His ‘I’ is this ‘maker’. The I, as Mead writes, “gives the sense of freedom, of initiative.” However, this ‘making’ of the self is not a kind of creation *in vacuo* or *ex nihilo*. This is why Mead has the notion of the ‘me’, the social self. We are only ever Being-in-a-world, and our ‘I’ emerges from the interpretive internalisation of our world. We only are free as individuals when we can creatively take from, and contribute to, the free World of which we are a part. We are, in the words of Mead, “a social self, [and] it is a self that is realized in its relationship to others”, including others in the past. Though each was an ‘I’ that took stock of their narrative, Jesus, Buddha and Socrates were each “living with reference to a larger society.” Consequently, we always say ‘we’ when we are in a community.

If we cannot say ‘we’ are free, but only ‘I’, then were are not truly free. As the modern Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet (1902-1963) wrote from a Turkish prison, “No,/ my century doesn’t scare me./ I’m not a deserter./ My miserable,/ shameful century,/ my daring,/ great,/ heroic century. [...] I’m satisfied/ to join its ranks/ on our side/ and fight for a new world”. Elsewhere, he writes, “You’re a cry for help – I mean, you’re my country;/ the footsteps you hear running toward you are mine.” While in prison, true freedom for Hikmet meant living freely in a free time and place. For this reason he saw

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1. Culture and the Narrative World 83
in the Hellenophile Byron more nobility than a great Ottoman poet.\textsuperscript{1} Byron fought for a Hellas he knew the greatness of, whereas ‘patriotic’ Yahya Kemal aped the style of the Persians, and sided with the Ottoman oppressors. True freedom of the individual comes when the World they are in develops according to its own ‘essential law’, and those who dwell in their World will act freely to try and free their World and themselves. We will call this existentiell freedom,\textsuperscript{2} for it has to do with the free development of factical Being-there by transcendentell Dasein.

The Worlds of Ritsos, Hikmet, Michales, Sartre, Camus and Merleau-Ponty were not free ontically, and neither were they existentielly. Rather, they or their ancestors only became free after they had acted freely. They had, in Heidegger’s terms, freedom for, but they were unable to act according to their ‘essential law’, as the World of this law was not free.

Many in our World have freedom for, but they do not act. They cannot make a conscious, informed decision about their selves. They squander the potential of their Dasein. However, we will come to this later.\textsuperscript{3} For now, we should give an account of ‘what should be’. We should continue our ‘speculative flight’ on human nature, so that we may later land on the harsh ground of our modern reality. Ideally, creative Worlds create free, creative people. In freely acting, these people create and recreate themselves and the World. Without such Worlds, people may act freely, but they cannot be ontically or existentielly free.

However, even ontic and existentiell freedoms are not the same as being able to do or be anything we want. This is more of the Epicurean tradition. Rather, freedom is inextricably wedded to ontological and existential necessity in the World. However, this ‘is’, as Heidegger says in his explication of Schelling, “must be understood creatively, not as an empty repetition.”\textsuperscript{4} In this sense, freedom is not the same as necessity. Rather, freedom creates necessity, the necessity from within which we can be

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2 See p.31, above.
3 See pp.117-166, p.348, below.
free. *Existentiell* freedom, then, is the necessary extension of a given *ethos* in a given *oikos* or *polis*.\(^1\) Once Jesus *qua* Jesus freely chose to be the Son of God, he could not live as a man, bear children or escape crucifixion. Similarly, due to the ontological reality of cultural life, ontic freedom for the World is the necessary actualisation of past, present and future possibilities. Once Greece *qua* Greece chose democracy, or France the *bourgeoisie* Republic, they could not be a tyrannical or feudal state until they became ontically unfree again. Put simply, we freely develop our World and ourselves to and from freedom, precisely so we cannot say, think, eat, draw, or legalise anything or everything. We can only be ourselves.

**vii. Power**

Stories, you see, are not just entertainment. Stories are power. They reflect the deepest, most intimate perceptions, relationships and attitudes of people. Stories are how a people, a culture, thinks.

- Lenore Keeshig-Tobias, ‘Stop Stealing Native Stories’, p.71

This account of freedom seems to accord with the general theoretical framework of hermeneuticists such as Carr, MacIntyre and Heidegger. Heidegger, for instance, emphasises this very fact when he speaks of our thrownness in a given World, and Carr begins from a similar assumption. Both emphasise our individual and communal creativity, and tie these to themes of freedom and necessity. However, our concrete ability to change our world is only conceived in homogeneous *existentiell* or ontic terms, so that our possibilities are only understood insofar as they apply equally to those people Being-in-the-world with us. We ‘are’ as modern Greeks, or urban Black Americans, or suburban white, middle-class quasi-American Australians. Though we have shown that individuals require the opportunity to contribute to a World, there it not yet enough detail of difference. Our account of freedom does not emphasise enough the fact that a single World may accord different ways of being to different groups and individuals, and institutionalise these differences. Moreover, one group or individual may be given more opportunity to realise their thrownness, come to terms with their clearing, and alter it accordingly. Put simply, the World gives some people more freedom, and thus more power, than others.

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Moreover, these differences in power may continue in the time of autobiographies, nations, or the great time of cultures. In Hinduism, for example, individual men in high-caste Hindu families are accorded quite different possibilities of Being to women in the villages of subaltern leatherworkers. These individuals, families and villages in turn, are situated in the cultural narrative of Hinduism, founded by the invasion of the Aryans millennia ago, and wedded to the imposition of the Brahmanic myths. Similar phenomena are seen in the indigenous peoples of Australia, occupied France or Greece or, as Marx would point out, the working classes of many capitalist countries. What we must do is develop our account of the narrative World to make sense of these differences in power.

Certainly, with his critique of capitalism, Marx is able to account for the different ways of being in the capitalist world, and how these differences benefit some people over others. Moreover, Marx, like Carr and MacIntyre, tells us that such people make themselves in history, but do not “make it just as they please; they do not make it in circumstances chosen by themselves”.1 In this sense, Marx shows us the stubborn persistence of power qua sediment.

However, Marx lacks the hermeneutic ontological and existential analysis shared by Carr and Heidegger. He is, on the contrary, a dyed-in-the-wool Aristotelian humanist, where our ‘nature’ can be perfected once and for all. What is required, then, is an account that reconceptualises existentiell and ontic difference qua power through phenomenological hermeneutics, tradition and narrative. For such an account, we will turn to Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Though Bourdieu is a sociologist, he is influenced by philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger,2 and the psychologist Sigmund Freud. Of course, Bourdieu is sceptical of Heidegger’s political philosophy,3 and is by no means a narrative theorist. Indeed, he explicitly repudiates narrative. However, by giving an account of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’, in particular, we can reconceptualise his understanding of power in history to accord with the phenomenological hermeneutics of Heidegger and the narrative theories of MacIntyre and Carr.

1 Marx, K. (1977), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.10
Showing his debt to Freud, Bourdieu tells us that power influences us because “socialization tends to favour the transformation of the original libido”\(^1\). For Bourdieu, ego formation, resolution of the Oedipus complex and other Freudian developmental processes are linked, through the introjection of the super-ego, to the ‘objective’ society.\(^2\) In this way, some areas of the World are not simply there for us, but desired as we desire catheceted or introjected objects. Moreover, not only do we desire, and have desire for, symbols or images, but also ways of speaking, acting, eating and so forth. Each of these is expressive of a particular region of culture.\(^3\) Our very biological being \textit{qua} cultured therefore structures, and is structured by, power.\(^4\) As Bourdieu writes, the “body is in the social world and the social world is in the body.”\(^5\) This dialectic of the subjective and objective is an attempt to overcome vulgar dualisms of self and society. Having established this, then, we may move on the core of Bourdieu’s work.

Within what Bourdieu calls a ‘field’, our character is not “a socially constituted destiny, fixed and frozen.”\(^6\) Rather, character is understood through the notion of \textit{habitus}. Similar to the Aristotelian notion of \textit{ethos}, the \textit{habitus} is a “set of choices of persons, goods, practices”\(^7\) taken up in our childhood, education, professional training and so forth. Like the notion of character in Carr, we embody this \textit{habitus} temporally, acting with unconscious expectations and motivations with regard to the future story.\(^8\) Just as a story’s characters enable the narrative to unfold through them, so too does this \textit{habitus}, through each person, “tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of [its] generative principle”\(^9\). A good example of this is the character of Prince Vasili in Tolstoy’s \textit{War and Peace}. Vasili does exactly what he has to do to develop his power in the Russian aristocracy, even though he rarely thinks about it.\(^10\) When our \textit{ethos}, the \textit{habitus}’ ‘generative principle’, displays the persons,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.164-167
  \item \textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p.143ff
  \item \textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.172-188
  \item \textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ibid.}, p.152
  \item \textsuperscript{6} \textit{Ibid.}, p.164, n.1
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Bourdieu, P. (1998), \textit{Practical Reason}, Polity Press, Cambridge, p.8
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Tolstoy, L. (1978), \textit{War and Peace}, Penguin Books, Ringwood, p.231
\end{itemize}
goods and practices similar to the orthodox values of the field, we accrue what Bourdieu calls ‘capital’. This capital allows us to define ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ against those who are unorthodox, or ‘heterodox’.

Put simply, we accrue capital when our cultural labour is valued by those in our field. Capital, therefore, is a form of power, characterised by the vicissitudes of the sublimated libido. By cathecting objects in the world, and being approved of by these objects, we see ourselves as an object through them, and we love ourselves through their eyes. In Bourdieu’s words, “capital enables forms of domination which imply dependence on those who can be dominated by it.”

In this sense, the power of domination is the ability to accrue enough capital to be the kind of person someone wants to gain capital from. Prince Vasili, for example, along with most Russian aristocrats, cathects the King as an object and accords him capital. Vasili, in turn, wishes to gain capital from the King by doing all the kinds of things that further the ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ of the aristocracy. The field, finally, is the space of possible ‘persons, goods and practices’ available to us at any one time. Consequently, in the words of Bourdieu, “the structure of the field…is nothing other than the structure of the distribution of the capital of specific properties which governs success in the field…”

The field, then, is like a state of play. Moreover, a healthy field, like our World, is “a separate social universe having its own laws of functioning and its own relations of force independent of those in politics and economy.” Conversely, fields are unhealthy when they cease to be independent from whatever field is dominant.

At this point we may note that, because each is a separate social universe, the capital of healthy fields is quite difficult to acquire. Each *habitus* is fixed to a given field. The clothes, mannerisms, language and titles of a Professor of Sociology at the *Collège de France*, for example, may have little capital in the fields of bricklaying or traditional
Japanese martial arts instruction. Similarly, a rich beer-drinking industrial engineer may have little capital in the field of French sociology. How, we may ask, does this fit with Heidegger, and our account of Being-in-the-World?

Certainly, Bourdieu’s notion of the field reminds us that characters within a narrative World cannot do everything or anything. Because of the contingencies and exigencies of history, only certain habitus are valorised, and each person only has a certain amount of capital, that is to say power. Indeed, Heidegger’s statement on unconcealing and the lichtung can be read in light of this.\(^1\) Put simply, not every possibility is true, or ‘is’, for us. This is not simply a matter of logical truth. Rather, it is the way in which our everyday Being-in-the-World deals with ‘things’ Being-alongside-us and other people who are Being-with-us. This informs our practices of dealing with objects ready-to-hand, our language and our bodily circumspection of the World as we live within it. Our ethos, our habits, cannot be seen apart from our World. In Bourdieu’s words, the habitus is “the principle of a specific conception of reality”\(^2\), a nomos roughly akin to that of Aristotle and Heidegger.\(^3\) By revealing Being, then, we ‘make’ a World where things are more or less real, true, beautiful, powerful and so forth, for us. Consequently, only some ways of Being-in-the-World are possible. As Dreyfus writes,

Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the social field highlights the way social practices govern which actions show up as possible…Just as the sensibility of culture allows only certain moods, so the for-the-sake-of-whichs, the [goal oriented] norms, and the equipmental whole in which I am already involved…allows in any specific situation an open-ended but limited range of possible activities to show up as sensible.\(^4\)

This space of possibles accords with Heidegger’s account of Dasein, with its emphasis on existentiell possibles and preconscious futural projection. We are thrown into a World where a specific revealing of Being, and the ethos of each being, is more or less real and more or less valued. Therefore, the character, or ‘agent’, must engage in “strategies which depend for their force and form on the position each agent occupies in

\(^3\) *Ibid.*, p.143
the power-relations…[and where e]very position-taking is defined in relation to the space of possibles”\(^1\). In this sense, Being-in-the-World also means Being-in-Power.

This idea of a World’s space of possibles can also be wedded to our narrative approach, inclusive of our articulation of the notion of tradition. We have already seen how the *habitus* is akin to an *ethos*, a character playing a specific role in a specific world. Moreover, as MacIntyre writes, “characters of course never start literally *ab initio*; they plunge *in media res*, the beginnings of their story already made for them by what and who has gone before.”\(^2\) The field may be seen as an atemporal slice in an ongoing narrative, though this does not do justice to Bourdieu. While the field is a picture of the state of play, Bourdieu emphasises the historical dimension within which we find ourselves *in media res*.\(^3\) The *habitus*, as Bourdieu writes, “is a product of history”\(^4\). It is also a product we inherit.\(^5\) In this sense, the field is also a kind of narrative tradition that ‘remakes’ itself, often in opposition to other stories.\(^6\) Just as the present tradition can be seen as incorporating the sediment of the past and also future horizons, so too does the actual past inherited with the state of play of the field only allow us certain choices, possibilities, futures and so forth, in the present.\(^7\) The field, as a cultural tradition of practices, attributions and valorisations, is thus characterised by the past-present-future relationship of the storied life. By taking up a past in the present, we live futurally. In projecting these, we also interpret and reinterpret the World.\(^8\) This, in turn, means that we may once again reject a Vichian, Hegelian, or Marxist historical determination. ‘Ends’ are not necessarily fixed like the Kingdom of God, but are retrospectively self-interpreting horizons.\(^9\)

In this sense, then, Bourdieu’s field, Heidegger’s World, and MacIntyre, Carr and Gare’s narrative acknowledge the bounded nature of the *Dasein* thrown into history, and

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\(^7\) *Ibid.*, pp.150-155

\(^8\) *Ibid.*, pp.222-224

the consequences of this for power. Not everything is possible in a field; not everything can be. Moreover, by Being one being rather than another, we are ‘given’ more or less capital. We cannot refuse this process. Rather, each culture gives us Being, our fellow beings and our reasons for being. That is, the social world, as Bourdieu writes, “is capable of giving meaning to life, and to death itself.”¹ The price we pay for this compromise, of course, is the omnipresence of power. As Arendt notes, we only have power, rather than brute violence or force, within a World of varying people, institutions and so on.² What we see here is that, as Gadamer writes, “power is…potentiality [and is] only experienced as an indwelling.”³ Bourdieu makes this point also.¹ Our Being-in-the-World is riddled with power. We may change from one field to another, or one story to another, but we cannot get away from power. Put simply, Bourdieu, Heidegger and the narrative theorists, show us that we cannot live and tell good stories if we do not take note of this power.

viii. The Conditions for Justice

On this account, we see that the World accords power by virtue of the way in which different roles are valorised, and by virtue of the way in which people Being-in-the-world successfully embody the practices associated with these roles. These, in turn, exist by virtue of a World that bequeaths freedom to those who, in coming to terms with their ethos, live through it mindfully but authentically, so that freedom itself is only ever a matter of what is brought to light for us. Yet this is not enough. We must still ask of any World, free or otherwise, the question asked by the more prudent of the ancient Latins: cui bono? Who benefits, and who does not? Who gets less of power, freedom, capital, food and clean air, and who gets more? Do they need it? What is ‘it’?

Hindu India may serve as a fruitful, albeit simplistic, example. For Hindus, the ‘law’ of karma means that they are born into a given role because of past deeds. Misery, then, is the reward of vice, and happiness is the reward of virtue, though this is not reward per se, but the natural fruit borne of every action. Lower caste Hindus in rural areas, for

instance, may have little capital in any field, few opportunities to express their human creativity, a high rate of infant mortality, and this often continues because Hindu India is the only reality they know. It is their karma. High caste Hindus in city areas, on the other hand, may have much capital in many fields, many opportunities to express their human creativity, low rates of infant mortality, and this often continues because Hindu India is the only reality they know. It is their karma. For high and low castes, this is their Hindu Being-in-the-World. Yet, for those of us with no faith in karma or the cosmic justice of the Aryan invading classes, this World of Brahmin India gives less to some and more to others. Yet it is the lot of each. How can we make sense of what goods each group has relative to the other, what these goods are and how much is due to each if they are defined by this lot? What is due, to whom, and why? To account for this, of course, we need some articulable sense of justice, proper to our account of the narrative World.

MacIntyre, in *Whose Justice, Which Rationality?*, articulates several accounts of justice, including Homeric, Platonic, Aristotelian, Augustinian and Thomist. Though his account is unashamedly Thomist, MacIntyre is at pains to point out that there could be a similar argument for justice along Humean or Augustinian lines.² The reason for this is that, for MacIntyre, our sense of justice depends upon what cultural tradition we are born into and develop from.³ This is because our understanding of what is just depends on our particular rationality, and this should be understood in our terms as the theoretical and practical ‘logic’ associated with our mode of Being-in-the-World. Justice, then, requires the practical rationality of a given World. However, rational action in any given field or culture will require a sense of the futural projection of these milieus, and this sense often requires us to successfully participate in these milieus to the extent that we can accord dues to others that are similarly successful. In the language of Aristotle, the *teloi* of actions are the goods internal to practices, and the good of human life. To develop these goods people must have the requisite virtues, and to recognise these goods and give excellent characters their dues, we must ourselves have developed such virtues. Without them, we cannot act rationally, for we cannot

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³ *Ibid.*, passim

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comprehend when dues are due. Thus, if justice requires rationality, then rationality requires justice.¹

Certainly, by articulating how to live freely, and how to understand power, we have already given an implicit account of what it is to be rational, to have a ratio. When acting freely and accounting for capital in a given field we are, in essence, coming to terms with the ‘major premises’ of the community, which MacIntyre believes are essential for the syllogisms of practical rationality to succeed.² For Aristotle, who MacIntyre draws on liberally on this point, nous allows us to find the arche, or principle, hiding beneath the nomoi of a society. In our terms, there is a ‘logic’ to the World, the field, or the narrative tradition, and this may be induced from observation, dialogue, the perusal of specialist texts on particular instances, and a dialectical movement between the fruit of these inductions and the conflict generated as we try to deduce future particulars from this archê.³ We are, in essence, trying to understand how the World worlds, while Being-in-the-world. In this sense, though we have not looked into the debates between classical and hermeneutic rationality, ‘primitive’, oral and illogical rationality versus civilised, literary, logical rationality, and other such worthy debates, we have nonetheless given a place to the actual rationalities of traditions to be found. However, what we have not developed, implicitly or explicitly, is an account of how to do justice to the individuals and communities of our narrative World, or the Worlds of others.

For the purposes of our investigation, though, an extensive account of justice per se is not necessary. Rather, we should emphasise two key points. Firstly, justice is simply impossible in the absence of a community, or polis. This, as we saw earlier,⁴ is a thoroughly Aristotelian conclusion, and one which MacIntyre develops insightfully.¹ Secondly, justice to individuals outside our cultural community, our narrative World, is impossible unless we have some idea of their World and ours. This, in turn, involves a sense of cultural diversity which is not an irreconcilable mess, but the starting point of any further understanding. In MacIntyre’s words, “[f]rom the standpoint of traditions of

¹ Ibid., p.137
² Ibid., pp.124-133
³ Ibid., pp.132-135
⁴ See p.4, above.
rational inquiry the problem of diversity is not abolished, but it is transformed in a way that renders it amenable of solution.”2 We must understand the various ideas of justice embodied in concrete traditions if we are to do justice to these traditions, and the many people within them.

The way to begin this is simple, in theory at least. We must recognise that others, like ourselves, are processes of creative cultural becoming. They are not passive, individual ‘things’, but poetic Beings-in-the-world. Thus, our just interaction with them cannot be one of mere utility, or benign hedonism. Rather, we should assume that they live through a given World and, by virtue of this, are more or less free and have more or less power. This, in turn, will mean that there are some things that they deserve, and many things that they think they deserve. Thus, we should recognise the importance of “the ability to give them their dues or, indeed, to realise that they deserve such dues in the first place.”3 This also has to do with freedom, for people are only free insofar as they can contribute to their World in given capacity, and to do them justice we should recognise this contribution. This done, we should recognise that these dues can only be comprehended if we come to terms with their culture. We must understand what ‘major premises’ underpin their everyday production and allocation of goods.

This allocation, in turn, is a matter of coming to terms with what Collingwood called “potentiality, nisus, and teleology.”1 The potentiality of the person or people is associated with their possible self-development and possible contribution to the narrative World they live through. The potentiality of the World involves the various possibilities for Being per se capable of being unconcealed, the various possibilities for Being given what has been revealed, and the possibilities in each case for a given Dasein. The teleology of the person involves the existentiell projection of the Dasein, the not-yet of the implicit narrative tradition, and the taking stock of the explicit narratives articulated. For people, this involves the relationship between the various existentiell projections and the role these, in their individual mode of taking stock for others and themselves, have played in the poiētic or phronētic ‘making’ of the World.

2 Ibid., p.10
The World also sees an implicit horizon of not-yets, and a shared taking stock of the narrative by small groups or individuals of the ‘we’ of the culture in question. The nisus involves an appreciation of the movement between potentiality and actuality, vice versa as actions and experiences shift the space of possibles, and the change in various actualities as revealed Being is organised and reorganised qua ‘things’.

ix. Justice and Stories

In this manner, then, justice is not simply about what is; it is not about distributing ‘things’. Rather, justice is the ability to understand the unified past, present and future of a World; the roles of those Being-in-the-World; the way in which the former allows for inequalities to arise and perpetuate in the latter; and the way in which the latter gives rise to and perpetuates the former. Indeed, free communities and people demand justice in these modes. Each of these, whether event, autobiography, or history, is a story that must be known if it is to play its part in a more just understanding. More properly, we are trying to minimally employ the set of ‘major premises’ underpinning the narrative World, a basic act of fantasia, so that the ‘potential, nisus and teleology’ of each Dasein therein can be situated relative to a deeper and wider story. It is a kind of deep regard for the other as other. From this comes justice.

However, we have not shown here what justice is, for there is no ‘is’. Just as Being is only ever brought to light for us within a World, so too is our ‘distribution’ of goods, capital, freedom, bread and wine, and our common understanding of what this distribution should be. Indeed, it is only within certain Worlds that we come across this idea that justice is a process of distribution, which implies ‘things’ to be given, taken, bought and sold. By shifting our attention to potential, nisus and teleology, we move away from a justice of ‘things’, and approach a justice of creative process, centred on the notion of the narrative World, and how to give it its dues.

For example, we cannot do the low caste Hindus justice unless we come to terms with the narrative World, factical and transcendent, of which they are a part. Over and above an account of the need for food, shelter, safety and a philosophical and sociological

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an analysis of their present conditions, we would need to gain a better grasp of their historicity. This would firstly involve us acquainting ourselves with the ‘major premises’ of Hindu culture, such as *karma, moksha* and so forth. Where have they been, what are they doing and where are they going? Secondly, though, we would need to search for ancient literature, poetry, pottery, painting and clothing of the Southern region of India, and any extant oral record of non-*Brahmin* culture. Were we to do this, we might find that the ancient indigenous culture of pre-*Brahmin* Southern India was rich in many of the goods ascribed to the high *Brahmin* castes, such as courage, beauty and wisdom. Indeed, we would probably find they had a World with their own essential law that had been broken by the arrival of the Aryans. Indeed, by listening to the lived stories of the lower castes themselves, we might also find autobiographical stories of courage, creativity, wisdom or patience. By looking into where they had been, what they were doing and where they wanted to go, we might find that they lost their freedom. They had lost their ontic and *existentiell* freedom, as well as their ability to act freely. This done, they could examine the justice of their World, and see whether they were being given the dues appropriate to their past actuality and future potentiality. This, in turn, could well question the scant freedoms open to the lower castes, and some of the ontic and *existentiell* assumptions made by all Hindus, such as *karma, moksha*, and the divine nature of the castes. Misery would no longer be simply their ‘*karma*’.

Moreover, by questioning the primacy of these Hindu ‘major premises’, lower caste Hindus would be able to criticise the ontology of the *Brahmins* with alternatives from Vedic pantheistic monism, Jainism, Judeo-Christian monotheism, or even Whiteheadian process philosophy. Certainly, Ghandi argued for a different kind of justice for Indians by drawing on Hinduism, Jainism, Western liberalism and developing some insights akin to Whiteheadian process thought.¹ Alternatively, like the Satnami of Central India, low caste Hindus could draw the stories of Hinduism into their own monotheistic narrative, one lacking a caste system, for instance.² Consequently, by coming to terms with the narrative World of Hinduism, we may find that giving the lower castes their dues does not mean keeping them poor, hungry, raped and wretched. Rather, it means

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² See p.104ff, below.
nurturing their access to clean water, nourishing food, good schooling, art, craft, song and the dignity of recognition as creative cultural beings.

Consequently, justice, as I have argued elsewhere, is quite simply a matter of narrative understanding. Here, as Gare writes, justice is “the proper appreciation in thought and practice of what all beings are, of what is their present situation, of what they have been through, of what they contributed to the common good of the world and what are their potentialities”. This is what we must minimally do if we are to find out what justice ‘is’ for any given World, and the people of that World. This minimum is the most basic understanding of the ‘major premises’ of a World. More importantly, it is the understanding that such an understanding is necessary. Put simply, our stories must give the stories of others their dues. From this comes justice, or at least the conditions for justice.

However, what of our World? Is our Western World one of cultural justice? It is to these questions that we must now turn. Finally, the time has come for us to land after our ‘speculative flights’. Having articulated notions of cultural freedom, justice and power in accordance with the Aristotelian tradition, we will look into actual cases of people doing justice to the cultures of themselves and one another. Moreover, we will give an account of how this is achieved. This will enable us to grasp what cultural justice might look like. We will see that it involves deep respect for narrative traditions, a quality absent from the Epicurean worldview. This, in turn, will pave the way for an analysis of cultural injustice in the form of superficiality. We will see that superficiality, and hence injustice, is the cultural ethos of late modernity. This superficiality is grounded in modern Epicureanism, and its inability to do justice – in thought or practice – to the reality of the narrative World as articulated. First, though, we will turn to our first case study of superficiality: cultural appropriation.

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2. SUPERFICIALITY AND POPULAR CULTURE

Not only does the apocalyptic reduce the consumer to that undifferentiated fetish that is mass man, but while accusing mass man of reducing even the worthiest artistic product to a pure fetish, he himself reduces the mass-produced object to a fetish. Rather than analyse these products individually in order to render their structural characteristic visible, the apocalyptic negates them *en masse*.

- Umberto Eco, ‘Apocalyptic and Integrated Intellectuals’, p.39

A. Cultural Appropriation

Having developed our account of culture, narrative and justice, we must turn to modern Western society. How does our vision of the narrative World fit with our reality? We must look into history and everyday life, and see whether our World does justice to our creative, open-ended nature. To do this, we will look into cultural appropriation.

Cultural appropriation is the movement of cultural ‘artefacts’ – such as words, clothes, songs, symbols or stories – from one narrative World to another. It has always been with us.¹ To prove this, we need not embrace any ideas of ‘designer tribalism’ or ‘culture cult’ feared by conservatives such as Sandall.² On the contrary, cultural borrowing is essential for a World’s creative development.³ Similarly, Turner shows how creative ‘blending’ is a fundamental human capacity in our storied life.⁴

By looking into this blending, we are able to glean how people treat culture, and why. In late capitalist superficial appropriation, for example, those whose cultural lives are hollowed out seek to replace the fruit of their own creativity with stolen idols and trinkets from other narrative traditions. “An entire population,” as Rose puts it, “is

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² Sandall, R. (12/5/01), ‘Black is the New Black’, *The Age*, SATURDAY EXTRA, p.1, p.6
crying out for help, for alternatives to the spiritual barrenness they experience.”¹ We try to overcome this malaise with the same ‘logic’ of mechanistic commodification and egoistic individualism that made our world barren. Cultural appropriation is thus a fruitful indicator of ennui, and the ‘logic’ this ennui is associated with. It allows us to see whether we are doing others’, and our own, narrative World justice.

Consequently, to better understand superficiality and injustice, we will begin with an account of depth and cultural justice. Our first analysis will be of the cultural appropriation of the Jews, Satnami, African-Americans and Australian Indigenous activists. This shows that cultural appropriation need not be shallow, and that it can actually empower oppressed peoples. We then develop this with a theoretical discussion of cultural reform and revolution, drawing on the linguistics of Saussure and Ricoeur. We see the reform of orthodoxy by heterodoxy, and the revolutionary overcoming of doxa. These are not accomplished through bloodshed, coercion or covert manipulation. Rather justice is done by coming to terms with the ‘major premises’ of a narrative World, and creatively drawing on its words. This reveals the taken-for-grantededs of the World, and allows the oppressed to gain the symbolic capital of the oppressor, or to stop the oppressor from making certain claims to righteousness. This, in turn, accords with our account of freedom, power and justice. It is an account of rightful power that is grounded in a deep creative relation to the narrative World.

Following this, we move from ‘what should be’ to an account of ‘what is’. We look into cases of popular cultural appropriation where the appropriators do not do justice to others or themselves. After our ‘speculative flights’ into the narrative World, this is a rough landing. Without their own creative relations with a culture of any depth, these people steal from the cultures of others to add meaning – however transient, glib or decontextualised – to the meaningless world late Epicurean modernity has created. At other times they gain economic or symbolic capital by selling this meaning. This is superficial appropriation, and it can be seen in the work of New Age ‘guru’ Jasmuheen, Hollywood writers, directors and producers, journalists from The Age newspaper and other New Age ‘spiritualities’. Moreover, we will eventually see how superficiality is

The dominant ethos of our World, grounded in egoistic individualism, machine ‘logic’ and depthlessness. With this comes injustice, and the triumph of the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. First, we will turn to Judaism, and the appropriation of the skull-cap.

i. Cultural Appropriation I: The Jews

Interaction is inevitable; influences must occur. What need not be inevitable are exploitation and the movement toward a denial of one’s own identity.

- Kwame Dawes, ‘Re-appropriating cultural appropriation’, p.118

The yarmulka, or skull-cap, is worn by practicing Jews across the world. It is a basic part of ritual within the ancient faith. This custom, however, was not originally Hebrew. Bareheadedness was common amongst Jews of the Biblical period. Having been exiled from Palestine in the time of Nebuchadnezzar’s rule, however, many Jews settled in Babylon, and remained as the region was conquered by the Persians and the Muslims. Over the centuries, the Jews, as a gesture of courtesy, began to wear the Babylonians’ head-coverings. With the fall of the second Temple in the first-century, this became all the more important. Here, every Jew became a rabbi. The appropriation of the Babylonian custom served this role well. Other Jews, however, having settled again in Palestine, Egypt, or other areas, remained uncovered. With the decay of the Babylonian region, many of the Babylonian Jews settled in Spain. This community, the Sephardim, continued the practice. Indeed, they sanctified the custom as a form of reverence towards their God.

However, by the thirteenth-century, French and German Jews knew nothing of the custom. As Sigal puts it, the custom had little “significance in the Christian lands until

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4 Brasch, R. (1956), The Star of David, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, pp.171-172
the seventeenth century.”¹ We see here the modern nature of the custom. By the seventeenth-century, however, after the exile of the Jews from Spain in the fifteenth-century, the practice was more widely adopted. Nowadays, it is rare to see any significant Jewish ritual being undertaken without the presence of the yarmulka, or some form of head-covering. As Brasch points out, the Jew covers his head just as the Scot wears his kilt.² Certainly, Brasch’s sentiment is ironic given the modern English origins of the kilt.³ Nonetheless, we see here how cultural appropriation and the vicissitudes of culture have sanctified a custom. First is Jewish humility in the face of God. Second comes the destruction of the Hebrew sacrificial altar and, mutatis mutandis, High Priest role. Third, the Jews participate in Babylonian, Persian and Muslim cultures. Lastly, the Jews’ practices are disseminated as they flee from Medieval and Renaissance pogroms. All these have intertwined, creating a custom intimately associated with the narrative of Hebrew existence. The yarmulka, as Brasch writes, “has come to reflect a complete philosophy of living and at the same time to reveal a long story of historical experience.”⁴ To make sense of this appropriation, we need to understand the ‘major premises’ of the Jewish narrative World, and the relation of this to the Babylonians.

The Jews’ appropriation of the Babylonian custom was not contrary to the ‘major premises’ of the Hebrew World. The Babylonian practice of covering the head, like that of the Jews, was associated with Babylonian modesty. However, this was not grounded in the sanctity of any particular deity or deities. The covered head meant humility in a variety of religious and social occasions, as it does in many modern Western countries. Put simply, it was a matter of humility per se, rather than humility before Yahweh. Moreover, the Babylonian religion was quite diverse. Many cults, spiritualities and religions lived side by side. This distinguished the Babylonian religion from Judaism, a distinction present in the Mesopotamian roots of Babylon.¹ The humility of the covered head in Babylon was thus a general custom within a diverse lay religion. It was this

² Brasch, R. (1956), The Star of David, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, p.175
⁴ Brasch, R. (1956), The Star of David, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, pp.177-178
custom that the Jews appropriated, and this could in no way violate the ‘major premises’ of Babylon. Consequently, the Jews appropriated without doing an injustice to the Babylonians. How was this so? How did the Jews preserve their identity, that of their Babylonian neighbours, while still appropriating from an alien culture?

The Jews had a clear narrative World, and a very strong sense of sacred tradition, though this was tradition in the sense of sediment. The Jews created a strong narrative tradition during the exile, and much of this strength was due to their exclusive, ‘nostalgic’ nature. While most Jews had a sense of their own ‘major premises’, and the profane ‘major premises’ of others, they did not necessarily cultivate their narrative creativity. Rather, they closely guarded their Bible against change, and kept to themselves. Any proselytising was selective and cautious. Put simply, they were civil to the Babylonians and gentiles, but as God’s chosen people their sacred World was too precious to defile. Associated with this was the uniqueness of their own monotheism, and the wrath of their omniscient and omnipotent Yahweh. Nonetheless, we see here how it is possible for us to appropriate from another culture, and to do both Worlds justice. Put simply, it is deep appropriation. It relies on the appropriators having a basic grasp of the ‘major premises’ of their World and others’.

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3 See p.73, above.
9 See pp.308-315, below.

2. Superficiality and Popular Culture

103
ii. Cultural Appropriation II: The Satnami, Indigenous Australians and African Americans

Moreover, people may use deep appropriation to deliberately grasp the power of other Worlds, while still doing justice to them. It is to these that we will now proceed. This analysis will give us concrete examples of cultural appropriation that develop the conditions for justice, and accord with our account of creative Being-in-the-World. We will begin with the Satnami.

The Satnami sect of Central India were leather workers. They were untouchables, treated with disgust and contempt by other Hindu castes. To overcome this, they embraced monotheism, drawing power from this abstract antithesis of polytheism. Moreover, they took pains to understand the nature of orthodox Hinduism, even triumphing over Hindus in spiritual debates.1 Put simply, they grasped the ‘major premises’ of Hinduism, and more. From this, they were able to appropriate Hindu iconography, words and insights best suited to gaining symbolic and cultural capital.2 Furthermore, the Satnami did not simply accept tradition qua sediment. Rather, they took stock of the narrative tradition and retold the story of their past. Here, there was “the fashioning of traditions, the making of myths and the institutionalisation of pasts.”3 By appropriating and subverting the symbolic capital of the dominant field, the Satnami were therefore able to gain the “power to impose a legitimate vision of the social world.”4 The result was a more just telling of the Hindu narrative World. Moreover, the Satnami developed a greater capacity to resist the colonial British.5 Here, dialogical phronēsis combined with artistic poiēsis to do justice to the World of Hinduism and the World of the monotheistic Satnami.6 Contra the implicit appropriation of the Jews, this was explicit appropriation. Moreover, it was subversive appropriation, and its efficacy came from its grounding in the nature of the narrative World. Those who have taken up their creative, open-ended nature recognise it in others.

3 Ib., p.183
5 Ibid., p.59, p.204, pp.220-221
Similar subversive appropriation is seen in the appropriation by minorities or oppressed groups of discriminatory or offensive language. Good examples would include ‘wog’ by Australians of Italian or Greek descent, ‘nigger’ by Americans of African descent, ‘coon’ by indigenous Australians, ‘fag’, ‘gay’, ‘queer’, ‘dyke’ and ‘poof’ by those who self-identify as non-heterosexuals,\(^1\) and perhaps even ‘bitch’ by many modern women.

However, this subversive appropriation is not weak ‘political correctness’. We must remember that these words are wedded to the cultural reality of a World.\(^2\) For this reason, as Freedman and Coombs write, “[s]peaking isn’t just neutral or passive[, and e]very time we speak…we give legitimacy to the distinctions that those words bring forth.”\(^3\) As their words are subversively appropriated, people in the hegemonic narrative World may be frightened or angry. In the *Herald-Sun* newspaper, for example, one woman tells us that “[h]omosexuals took our lovely word gay for themselves and now rainbow is their next word. What next?”\(^4\) This is combined with a telling cartoon.\(^5\) Here, the word is tainted by being associated with a *habitus* in the heterodox areas of the field. If not unconcealing *doxa*, this has still had the effect of reallocating symbolic capital to the heterodox areas of the field. If not revolution, this is certainly a kind of free creative reformation of the narrative World.

Similarly, indigenous poets Chi and Pigrim also taint the conventions of polite Australian poetry by appropriating ‘coon’. They begin one poem with words of hope and confidence. Soon, however, they find that “when you reach somewhere no matter how soon/ you’re nothing more than an acceptable coon.”\(^1\) Here, Chi and Pigrim attack the parochialism, oppression and corrupted freedom of the Australian World by using ‘coon’ to speak for itself through metonymy. By speaking of ‘coon’ within poetry, they link their own *Dasein* to the limited possibilities-for-being available to them in the Australian World. If this is not necessarily unconcealing *doxa*, it does allow Chi and Pigrim to accrue the symbolic and cultural capital associated with the artistic field,

\(^2\) See pp.63-66, above.
\(^4\) Finlay, S. (31/599), ‘Your Say: 50/50’, *Herald-Sun*, p.16
\(^5\) See ‘Untitled’, p.407
while simultaneously retaining the authentic *Dasein* associated with our history of indigenous oppression. This appropriation of ‘coon’ subverts, if ever so slightly, the *status-quo* of Australian race-relations.

We can see similar subversion with the word ‘nigger’ in the United States, again with oppressive race-relations. On *Niggaz4Life*, Andre Young says that he gets “paid to say this shit here,/ Making more in a week that a doctor makes in a year.” In this sense, why should he not see himself as a ‘nigger’? To be a rapper is better than being a criminal, going to jail, being poor and being called a ‘nigger’ anyway. He goes on: “So, to cut out all that bullshit/Yo, I guess I’ll be a nigger for life.” As Harvey tells us, simply calling a ‘nigger’ an ‘African-American’ does not remove oppression. Rather, the oppression itself must be undermined. Here, by claiming this word as his own, Young removes the strong metonymic link between ‘nigger’ and oppression. In Bourdieu’s terms, the dominant forms of capital in the economic field and medical fields are inverted, and the *habitii* associated with poverty and incarceration are brought to light as rejected possibilities-of-Being. The same could be said for Ice-T, who also appropriates the word ‘nigger’. As he puts it, “[w]ith every one of these words, the definition boils down to its real context. […] I’m proud to be a nigger. I know I’m in the majority. […] If the white racists want to play this little game of supremacy, let’s at least get the sides right.” In these cases, ‘nigger’ loses its orthodox association with hatred, and comes to mean fraternity, solidarity or aggression in the face of injustice. These attributes are shared by those in the heterodox areas of the field, and thus elements of their *habitii* also become valorised.

Similarly, in Public Enemy’s ‘Brothers’ Gonna Work it Out’, Chuck D and Favour Flav say that “[h]istory shouldn’t be a mystery,/Our story’s real history/Not his story.” ‘His

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3. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp.144-145
The word’s oppressive meaning is thus subverted by way of an historical unforgetting; a suspension of the World in order to introduce an alternate story. In Bourdieu’s terms, the *habitus* of the white American historian – whose symbolic capital is associated with objectivity, neutrality and so forth – is undermined. This radical hip-hop does justice to the World while subverting it at the same time. Moreover, the music of hip-hop is itself a form of creative appropriation, taking the parts of mainstream music, and redefining them in terms of a valorised black voice. These are postmodern weapons, but with a modern agenda of freedom and justice.

As we learnt from the Jews and Satnami, it is not only words that may be appropriated. We may see similar subversive appropriation of images and icons. Like Young, Ice-T and Public Enemy, a good example comes from an African-American artist. Visual artist Kara Walker takes the black stereotypes of America’s Deep South and makes satirical political statements. She tells an interviewer that even romantic relationships can be suffused with political tension. Without warning, “the entire history of the United States of America or the American South…comes crashing down on you.” In response, Walker appropriates the orthodox images of white oppression and reconceptualises them from the heterodox areas of the field. In one image, young white children at play tie up a young black woman to a tree by the neck. Her breasts are bared, and the young man’s ‘innocent’ toy sword points savagely at her vagina. Themes of slavery, rape and violence are linked to labour and progress, all the while grounded in familiar ‘apple pie’ American images. Walker is aware of the ‘major premises’ of the orthodox field, and so her radicalism is never just a matter of simple copying. As she says, “you can’t borrow racist stereotypes that are already out there and…make up new ones. On the other hand, you can’t really survive without satire can

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3 See ‘A Work On Progress’, p.407
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

Her satire is a form of subversive appropriation. By working with orthodox images of the American World, Walker empowers herself with the symbolic capital of her oppressor. The historicity of the master helps to liberate the slave.

All these acts of appropriation show us an appreciation of justice. They have strengthened the heterodox against the orthodox, and done so in accordance with the deep creative cultural nature of humanity. This is a reminder that, as Marcuse puts it, “[t]he horizon of history is still open.” If we had more regard for our narrative traditions in this manner, “the struggle would be waged for a revolution hitherto suppressed in the previous historical revolutions.” Marcuse’s words affirm the work of Chi and Pigrim, Young, Ice-T, Public Enemy and Kara Walker. They clarify the role of deep appropriation in grasping the ontic and existentiell freedom we developed earlier.

However, what the Indigenous Australians and African-Americans also have in common is their failure. Certainly, their deep appropriation opposed the orthodox with the heterodox, and gained the necessary symbolic capital. They gained their dues while appreciating those of others. This is certainly in accordance with our vision of the just narrative World. However, their efforts have not radically reconceptualised the narrative World of Australia and United States. If anything, both countries have become more conservative and xenophobic. Nonetheless, we should recognise their struggle, and try to gain an appreciation of their success. We should look further into the revolutionary potential of subversive appropriation. To do this, we must first look into metonymy, metaphor and semantics. As we will see, the appropriation of groups like the Satnami can be integrated into a larger vision of justice. Appropriation is not the only fruit of movements like rap music, but it is fertile site for analysis. This, in turn, further clarifies our account cultural creativity, to which our later analysis of superficiality can be compared.

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1 Ibid.
2 Marcuse, H. (1978), The Aesthetic Dimension, Beacon Press, Boston, p.73
3 Ibid.
4 See p.77ff, above.
iii. Metonymy, Metaphor and the Revolution of the Epoché

How does subversive appropriation work? More often than not, it relies on metonymy. As Gibbs writes, “[m]etonymy involves only one conceptual domain in that the mapping or connection between two things is done within the same domain”¹. The mapping, in turn, is one of parts and wholes. In the case of Kara Walker, the domain of racial oppression maps stereotypical images of slavery with those of innocence. This, in turn, forces advocates of ‘apple pie’ values to confront the present conditions of poverty and violence in urban Black America. The images of slavery and innocence are parts, the domains of Black America and the Deep South are wholes. These wholes can be brought together when their parts are joined. How, though, does this create new meanings, or reconceptualise old ones? How can one domain, or cultural community, develop heterogeneity and still affirm justice?

Firstly, we should accept the Saussurian distinction between combination and selection, syntagm and association.² Syntagm and combination are characterised by ways of understanding order. Consider, for instance, the difference between ‘from deserts prophets come’ and ‘from prophets deserts come’.³ This is a difference of syntagm and combination. Selection and association, on the other hand, are characterised by ways of understanding similarity. Consider, for example, the difference between “Miss America is such a superficial, insubstantial pageant,” and “the great globe itself, yea, all which it inherit, will dissolve, and like the insubstantial pageant faded, leave not a rack behind”⁴. This is a difference of selection and association.

Secondly, we should note that metonymy requires nearness, syntagm and combination, while metaphor requires likeness, selection and association.⁵ Therefore, it is possible to alter the metaphorical associations between various meanings of a World by metonymic recombination.⁶ ‘Coon’ is combined with ‘rosy’, ‘world’ and so forth.

³ Frankel, B. (1992), From the Prophets Deserts Come, Boris Frankel and Arena Publishing, Melbourne
⁶ Another good example if this process, as argued by Bakhtin, is given by Bennett, T. (1979), Formalism and Marxism, Methuen and Co., New York, pp.86-91
while ‘nigger’ is associated with wealth, prestige and fraternity. Here, as Ricoeur writes “[n]ew possibilities of signifying are opened up, supported by meanings already established.”¹ Turner makes a similar argument.² Unjust narratives may become liberated by metonymic recombination and metaphorical reassociation. Put simply, justice is done by retelling a story with the same words. This, in turn, accords with the creative role of storytelling in cultural life we earlier articulated.³

Still, how are new meanings created? As the words are confined to what Gibbs calls a ‘single domain’, they are limited. Put in Heideggerian terms, we are Being-in-the-world, and cannot so easily dwell in more than one World. Not only are we Being-alongside objects and Being-with other, but we are also confined to a given discourse. If the Satnamis limit themselves to Hinduism, or Young to American English, there are only so many icons, symbols and words to use. How do we move from one discourse to another? How does Kara Walker rupture the taken-for-granted of American racism, for example, if Blacks and Southern bigots are in different discourses? As Ricoeur writes, “[o]ne can pass from one discourse to the other only by an *epoché*.”⁴ What is this *epoché*?

For Husserl, the *epoché* is a way of ‘bracketing out’ our assumptions about the world in order to formally grasp phenomena as they reveal themselves. Thus, it is a tool in his epistemology of existence, based on a “reduction to consciousness”⁵ of the phenomenological lifeworld. For Heidegger, this is linked to a kind of existential duality in Husserl’s work. Here, *Dasein* is irreconcilably subjective and objective; a psychologised particular and a de-psychologised absolute.¹ This does not overcome the shortcomings of either, but merely says ‘yes’ to both. Thus, the *epoché* is not part of Heidegger’s ontology of *Dasein*.

However, for Ricoeur, the *epoché* is also a utopian suspension of our understanding of the World. *Contra* Husserl, this is a reconceptualisation of the *epoché* that recasts the

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³ See pp.63-68, above.
academic tool as a revolutionary practice. With Ricoeur’s *epoché*, we are able to imagine alternatives to our given discourse, our World. In Heidegger’s terms, it is part of our *existentiale* that allows the taking up of ontic and *existeniell* possibilities. Once we have overcome the limits of the discourse in this manner, we may begin the task of subversive appropriation, critique, satire and so forth. If it is subversive appropriation of the kind we have seen, the *epoché* can then be associated with reallocations of symbolic capital, the passing over of the dominant *habitii*, and the reauthoring of the narratives associated with the dominant fields. Certainly, we would expect Bourdieu to approve of this, and he does speak favourably of the “symbolic transgression of a social frontier”.

In *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, though, Bourdieu argues that the *epoché* cannot be revolutionary in and of itself. Quite simply, the *epoché* will not work. This is due to the fit between *habitii* and fields. With this fit, hegemonic cultural elements are part of *doxa*, or the “universe of the undiscussed”. Thus, the methodical, academic suspension of the “ naïve adherence to the world” indicative of the *epoché*’s creation is practically impossible without there first being an objective crisis, a mismatch between the subjective elements of the *habitus* and the objective elements of the field’s presentation of the World. This objective crisis, where “the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon”, then presents itself as a forum within which the suddenly contingent elements of the lifeworld can be suspended via the *epoché* and evaluated in comparison with alternatives. Put simply, we can only doubt our World when it is in crisis.

However, there are two problems with accepting this *in toto*. Firstly, Bourdieu’s discussion takes place in the context of an empirical analysis of the Kabylia people. This analysis is not a universalisable theory of all societies, but a refutation of Sartrean

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5 Ibid.

2. Superficiality and Popular Culture 111
phenomenology and Levi-Straussian structuralism. While his conclusions concern Sartre and Levi-Strauss, his empirical analysis does not necessarily apply to our Western World. For the Kabylia, *doxa* may be more stable and less reflexively explicated than in our class society. Certainly, our Western debates are still more likely to involve *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy* than *doxa per se*. Nonetheless, there is still the opportunity for people, such as Bourdieu, to dig up *doxa* and question it. Consequently, the *epoché* is more likely in a heterogeneous Western society with a history of academia, however disappointing this history may be. Put simply Bourdieu’s argument does not apply to our narrative World.

Secondly, Bourdieu’s notion of a ‘crisis’ may not be as straightforward as it appears *prima facie*. This is because our lives exist in many times. One of these is the *longue durée*, or ‘great time’ of the Annales historians. As Braudel writes, “[e]ach ‘current event’ brings together movements of different origins, of a different rhythm: today’s time dates from yesterday, the day before yesterday, and all former times.” Consequently, the crisis Bourdieu requires may exist, but it may have to be accounted for in cultural time, the time of the narrative World.

**iv. Great Time and the Revolutionary Epoché**

Paul Ricoeur, who earlier gave us the utopian *epoché*, helps us to make sense of the crisis in terms of the *longue durée*. This also accords with our account of tradition in the narrative World. In the first volume of *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur introduces the ‘quasi-event’. This quasi-event is congruent with our attempts to conceptualise Bourdieu’s objective crisis as multi-temporal, for it allows the epochal processes of the *longue durée* to be conceptualised as mere moments, akin to Bourdieu’s objective crisis. Ricoeur describes the quasi-event as “the slow changes that [history] foreshortens in its memory by an effect similar to that of a speeded up film.” In order to develop this, Ricoeur also develops the ‘quasi-plot’ and the ‘quasi-character’. Quasi-plot and quasi-character are simply the plot and character of everyday time projected onto Braudel’s

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1 I should thank Arran Gare for this insight, which forced me to rethink the logic underlying Bourdieu’s fieldwork.
2 See pp.201-250, below.
3 Braudel, F. (1980), *On History*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.34
great time. As Ricoeur notes, this allows the *longue durée* to be characterised by “growth and decay,…creation and death, and [the] analogy of fate.” Fate, understood as fortune in the Aristotelian sense, is thus the culmination of each quasi-event, the harvest of history, sown and reaped by an historical people. The Satnami, for instance, are a quasi-character. Over time, they created *epoché* upon *epoché* in the Hindu World through multiple appropriations of elements underpinned by *doxa*. In doing so, they subverted the Hindu World, changed their fortune, thus creating a quasi-event. All of this must be seen as taking place within the quasi-plot of Indian history, the story of which began, perhaps, when the Aryans invaded middle and southern India, bringing with them the fruit of Brahmanism, and thus the seeds of widow-burning, death-pollution and caste oppression. This quasi-plot, then, renders sensible the actions of the quasi-character, and stresses the importance of the quasi-event, this being the objective crisis of the Hindu faith in central India. In this way, the objective crisis necessary for Bourdieu’s revolution is integrated with the great time of the narrative World. This reaffirms the *epoché* as revolutionary.

Consequently, we do not need to sit idly by and wait for a revolutionary crisis. Rather, we may ‘make’ one with deep appropriation, as dialogue within the *longue durée* slowly undermines the fit between subjective world and objective conditions. This undermines the World’s orthodoxy. As Bourdieu himself explains, “heretical discourses…draw their legitimacy and authority from the very groups over which they exert their power…from their capacity to objectify unformulated experiences, to make them public”⁴. We saw these heretical discourses with quasi-characters such as the Satnami and the African-Americans. Here, the construction of the *epoché* through subversive appropriation was in itself an objective crisis, gradually making explicit the significant elements of *doxa*, drawing symbolic power from this appropriation and refuting the malicious elements through critique, satire or debasement.¹ In this manner, belief in present realities is suspended by explicating taken-for-granted notions upon which the realities depend, and allowing tensions to emerge within the suddenly

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polyphonic narrative. Put another way, the *epoché* explicates doxa, and allows the tensions of the *orthodox* and *heterodox* to appear. Previously, *doxa* had rendered the storytelling, and thus the narrative World, univocal. Now, polyphony is revealed. In this manner, the “order which has been taken for granted suddenly appears queer and contingent.”

Suddenly, the crisis Bourdieu requires is developed, and the ‘major-premises’ of the narrative tradition are laid bare. This fosters the conditions for justice to emerge within the World.

Furthermore, the *epoché* also allows us to grasp other roles to play in the World. This is because the space-of-*Daseins*-possible constitutive of Bourdieu’s field is grasped in its scope by the *epoché*’s ability to undermine ideology and project utopias. Certainly, we will account for utopias in more detail later. Still, we see here how the *epoché* may allow us to develop new roles for ourselves within a World and its possibilities of reality. As Ricoeur puts it, “the best function of utopia is the exploration of the possible, what Ruyer calls the “lateral possibilities of reality.”

As with Midgley, Ricoeur acknowledges that “to be here is glorious”, but adds that “to be elsewhere would be better.” Bourdieu does not seem entirely opposed to this argument. Our utopias are not simply places with fruit, sunshine and high minimum wages. They are also *existentiell* possibilities, lives to be lived. Such is the fruit of the *epoché*.

v. ‘What Should Be’: Deep Appropriation

Rather than the violent revolution of Lenin and Stalin, this is the revolution of Vico, Herder, Heidegger and possibly the early Marx. The appropriation of ‘coon’, ‘nigger’, ‘history’ and stereotypical imagery help the oppressed “envision a universe which, while originating in the given social relationships, also liberates individuals from these
relationships.”¹ Habiti may be unearthed and criticised, symbolic capital may be redistributed or devalorised and the story of the field may be retold. In this sense, “[w]e not only live our lives in such a way that we can tell stories about our experiences and actions. We also, in telling these stories, change the meaning of our experiences and actions.”² Deep appropriation shows us that we can develop justice by retelling stories in their own words. This is how we write a living oeuvre. Whether by argumentative critique, or by deep appropriation, our stories can be lived and told, observed and heard, relived and retold. We see here a vindication of MacIntyre’s belief in the storied life as a ‘continual argument about the goods that constitute the tradition’.³ We also see here a vindication of Bourdieu, where we come to terms with power through a continual to-and-fro between subjective and objective forces in the World. Lastly, we see a vindication of the narrative World itself, where character, storyteller and listener come together in one role over many times.

What can we learn from this? Quite simply, deep appropriation is just. To do justice to words, clothes, foods or songs is to be informed about the narrative Worlds whence they came. It is to understand the creative nature of Worlds, fields and stories. It is to understand the place of each Dasein; the place the habitus occupies in the field’s space-of-possibles; and the role of the character in the story. It is to account for the ‘major premises’ of a World, and the many temporalities that this World involves. To use Turner’s simple example, the vizier of must know what donkeys and humans are before he can tell a story where Shaherazad is an ass.⁴ This account of subversive appropriation shows that we need an understanding of what is before we dare to creatively develop what may be. This accords with our articulation of freedom. Moreover, it shows us how we may deal with issues of power and justice in a World without the instrumentalist policy or bloodshed of Lenin.¹ This is an account of cultural revolution wedded to our understanding of the creative and open-ended nature of the narrative World.

¹ Marcuse, H. (1978), The Aesthetic Dimension, Beacon Press, Boston, p.71

2. Superficiality and Popular Culture 115
vi. From ‘What Should Be’ to ‘What is’: The Need for Analysis of Superficial Appropriation

However, as we saw earlier, neither the Jews nor the African-American or Indigenous Australians were able to properly develop justice in accordance with our vision of the narrative World. In the case of the Jews, this was because of the orthodox, insular nature of their story, and the theological grounding of their cultural life. Put simply, they had a deep story, but this story was grounded in faith and hardly open-ended. The Satnami, while showing us subversive appropriation and the fruit of the *epoché*, were not part of the Western World. They cannot redeem our modern Western superficiality, as their World is not ours. In the case of Public Enemy, Chi and Pigrim and Walker, this was because of the marginalised, heterodox nature of their subversion. They were able to deeply appropriate the power of orthodoxy and, in so doing, create the conditions for just race relations. However, they were not revealing the *doxa* of the entire field, or rearticulating the World in terms of a deeper or wider story. We should not understate the courage and success of all these struggles, but neither should we see justice and freedom where it is not.

If we are to make sense of this malaise, we must face superficiality in its reality. Again, we must hold true to Whitehead’s articulation of speculative philosophy. Having taken off with the narrative World, landed with deep appropriation, taken off again with the revolutionary *epoché*, we must again land with superficial appropriation. We will look into the work of the New Age ‘guru’ Jasmuheen. We will then turn to Hollywood and a variety of other sites of popular culture. This will allow us to better understand how superficiality has corrupted the potential of movements like punk, hip-hop and so forth. More importantly, we will also see how superficial appropriation is grounded in the tradition of Epicurus, and has become our World *ethos*.

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1 See Appendix VII, p.423
B. Popular Culture and Superficiality I: Jasmuheen

The work of New Age ‘guru’ Jasmuheen is a fascinating example of modern cultural life, and of appropriation in particular. She writes in a New Age journal with hundreds of thousands of lay readers every year. Philosophy Today or Journal of Philosophy, by contrast, have no such lay or academic saturation. Moreover, Jasmuheen has her own popular website selling many tapes, books and international seminars. Along with many New Age writers and speakers, Jasmuheen has more direct influence on lay ‘spiritualists’ than most modern philosophers. By looking into her dealings with Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and science, we will gain a better understanding of cultural injustice, and the superficial state of our World.

i. Jasmuheen and ‘Quantum Prana’

In a popular New Age magazine, Jasmuheen tells us that “[p]rana is the energy of the quantum field, [and that] religions call it the God Force.” Elsewhere, Jasmuheen talks about the “quantum void” and “pure God force energy” in similar terms. If we find the correct tuning of this quantum energy, we may “find the right formula that allows…life to work to a degree where telepathy, self-healing, living on light etc becomes part of [our] everyday reality.” When Jasmuheen writes ‘living on light’, she means that the ‘quantum pranic energy’ will nourish us. Put simply, we do not need to eat. Jasmuheen also says she has not eaten a substantial meal in six years. Certainly, this is a remarkable claim. However, is it Jasmuheen’s suggestion of telepathy that we will first look into, albeit briefly. By doing so, we may better understand Jasmuheen’s work.

1 This section contains portions of Young, D.A. (2002), ‘Stealing the Voice of Orpheus’, Concrescence, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp.1-12
2 Miles, R. (29/4/02), Editor of Elohim, personal communication
3 Pellauer, D. (24/4/02), Editor of Philosophy Today, personal communication
For Jasmuheen, telepathy is a matter of moving thought. Our thoughts can be transferred from one place to another in the same manner as electromagnetic energy. This, in turn, is because of the biological manifestation of prana. The pranic force “resides in the brain and nervous system and is capable of generating a subtle radiation impossible to analyse in the laboratory.”\(^1\) Put simply, this ‘quantum energy’ is powerful but mysterious. Indeed, this ‘energy’ is similar to the ‘forces’ seen in many traditional cultures. Words such as ‘\textit{mana}', ‘\textit{wakanda}' and ‘\textit{oki}' all denote powerful but mysterious forces in the world.\(^2\) These forces are in plants, animals, or inanimate objects. They endow them with certain characteristics, or animate them in some way. Moreover, for these traditional cultures, these forces are in the world. Here, then, Jasmuheen is drawing on a more traditional idea of \textit{physis}.

The ‘energy’ of ‘quantum energy’, though, is a scientific abstraction. It is not ‘traditional’. It is used to describe dynamism, oscillation or movement in the physical world. Even if they do not agree on its exact nature, for biologists, quantum physicists and other scientist, ‘energy’ is a theoretical construct for best describing and predicting physical systems. As Davies writes, the “concept of energy…is a familiar one today, yet it was originally introduced as a purely theoretical quantity in order to simplify the physicists’ descriptions of mechanical and thermodynamical processes.”\(^3\) Indeed, ‘energy’ is simply the ability to do work.\(^4\) Therefore, although it is has a colloquial meaning, ‘energy’ is a garden variety scientific word, particularly when used with ‘quantum field’, ‘frequency’ and so forth. Here, then, Jasmuheen is drawing on the scientific tradition.

However, all people, traditional and scientific included, live and work within Worlds. Whether through ritual and prayer, or experiment and calculation, the words these people use are somewhat fixed within these Worlds.\(^5\) Moreover, their words cannot be

\(^1\) Ibid.

\(^2\) Jung, C.G. (1972), \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp.61-64


understood outside the common sense of the people. While traditional Yoga, for instance, treats prana as an a priori, intuitive given in the natural world, science uses ‘energy’ as an abstract, theoretical method of description and prediction. Phrased ontologically, in traditional conceptions the dynamic force is real and there in the everyday world, while in science it is describing the real and here in this particular system. Phrased epistemologically, the dynamic force is obviously there and unquestionably real in traditional conceptions, while it is a contingent, presently believable description of the real in scientific conceptions. Of course, in Western society we may draw on both, as the energy of batteries, solar cells, or computers is discussed. Nonetheless, scientists and traditional societies have access to different ways of being, and of understanding Being itself. Jasmuheen, however, is not a trained scientist. Moreover, she is not a Hindu, Buddhist, Yoga adept, Jew, Muslim or Christian. Despite this, she is using their words, and she is not using them as we would speak of batteries, solar cells, or computers. There are problems with this.

Firstly, ‘energy of the quantum field’ makes little sense outside physics. Certainly, a philosopher of science may speak of such things in the context of a metaphysical discussion. However, this discussion would still rely on an appreciation of the work of physicists and their narrative tradition. Similarly, we may speak of ‘energy’ in an everyday sense. As we have seen, ‘energy’ may refer to how tired we are, or how long a battery will last. ‘Energy of the quantum field’, however, is clearly a scientific concept. Thus, for Jasmuheen to claim the existence of a ‘subtle radiation’ and, more specifically, a ‘quantum field’, without any mathematical, theoretical, or empirical evidence, is curious. Indeed, our curiosity must be further pricked when we read that this ‘subtle radiation’ is “impossible to analyse in the laboratory”\(^1\). For a scientist, this is akin to saying: “We have found a new species called *Histrionicus histrionicus furtivus*.\(^2\) Buddhists call it the Duck of One Hand Clapping, while the Eastern Orthodox Church calls it the Blessed Mallard of St John Chrysostom. Unfortunately, it is invisible, makes no sound, leaves no footprints, does not defecate, and no biologist can possible find it.” Even though we are using scientific words, this, of course, is hardly scientific. Similarly, Jasmuheen is not doing justice to science.

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Secondly, the words ‘prana’, ‘God-force’ and ‘quantum energy’ all represent concepts from quite different cultures. In Yoga, for instance, prana does not emanate from any deity or person.\(^1\) Certainly, it may work through people. As Majumdar writes, “Yoga is the religion of man.”\(^2\) However, Yogic prana itself is not human, and it is certainly not Divine in the Judeo-Christian sense of the word. Similarly, in the Vedic period prana was the breath of the pantheistic god Prajapati, and later Brahma, and this breath was later linked by Classical Hindus to Brahman, the Absolute.\(^3\) In Vedic myth and Hinduism, monotheism is thus monist pantheism,\(^4\) and prana is therefore never the force of a Judeo-Christian God. ‘God-force’, however, particularly when associated with our “Christed Being”\(^5\), is Judeo-Christian. For the Abrahamic peoples, ‘God-Force’ is of the Divine will of the One God, Allah or Yahweh.\(^6\) This God, in turn, will have no Hindu or Yogic polytheism.\(^7\) Of course, the Judeo-Christian ‘God’ of Spinoza was one of monotheistic pantheism. Other thinkers may have had similar insights. In this sense, some well-read and well-traveled Jews or Christians may have been able to reconcile Hinduism with the Judeo-Christian tradition.

However, as with her use of scientific words, Jasmuheen gives us no reason to believe she is drawing on non-traditional thinkers, or even arguing in any depth about the matter. She does not show, for example, how ‘God-Force’ is from the monist pantheistic monotheism of Spinoza, and ‘prana’ from the monist pantheism of the early Vedas. Rather, she simply speaks of ‘God’ and ‘Christ’, as if the words were quite at home in Hinduism. Yet ‘prana’ and ‘God-Force’ are not the same, and should not be treated as such until further accounts can be given. Furthermore, as Einstein reminds us, God does not play dice.\(^8\) The apparent indeterminacy of the ‘quantum realm’ is opposed to traditional Christian notions of an omniscient and omnipotent God for

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\(^1\) McCarthy, J. (1972), Yoga: The Key to Life, Rider & Company, London, p.20
\(^4\) Smart, N. (1979), The Religious Experience of Mankind, Collins, Glasgow, pp.87-97, pp.150-162
\(^7\) Exodus 20:3
epistemological, and possibly ontological, reasons.\(^1\) Therefore, ‘God force’ is not the same as ‘quantum energy’. Again, Jasmuheen is not doing justice to Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism or other Indian spiritual philosophies.

There is, of course, no need for this. Carl Jung, for instance, uses words like ‘mana’, ‘wakanda’ and ‘oki’ from traditional worlds, and ‘energy’ from science. For Jung, the ‘God-concept’ serves a similar function in religion as ‘energy’ does in science, and as ‘mana’ does in the Melanesian islands.\(^2\) Indeed, they make sense of physis. These words, then, ‘God’, ‘energy’, ‘mana’ and so forth, do not mean the same thing to Jung. Rather, they refer to concepts that serve similar functions in different Worlds. Put another way, ‘broomstick’ and ‘BMW M Series’ may refer to things which have the same function in totally different worlds, such as transport. Nobody, however, who had any idea of witches or yuppies would use these words as if they meant the same thing. We do not sweep our kitchen with an imported luxury sedan, or drive speedily along the autobahn on a mop. We may use metaphors in what Turner calls a ‘blended space’, but, as we saw with Shaherazad,\(^3\) this relies on an understanding of the spaces being blended.\(^4\) Jung understands this, and he does justice to the various cultures associated with the words he uses.

Jasmuheen, on the other hand, has merely taken the words from various narrative traditions, without doing justice to them. Though she speaks of “cellular memory”\(^5\), “quantum physics and universal law”\(^6\), or the “Morphogenic Field”\(^7\), she is not a scientist. Moreover, she is not a Christian, Buddhist, or Yoga teacher. She is not even using lay language metaphorically, or scientific language professionally. To a reporter from The Age, however, she appears “scholarly in metaphysics and Eastern philosophy and articulate in her arguments”\(^1\). She appears to be living out these narratives, when in fact she is not. On the contrary, she denies the very reality of the narrative World.

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\(^3\) See p.115, above.
\(^6\) Ibid.
It may be argued that this is not any kind of denial. Rather it is merely a matter of polysemy, or “more than one sense for a name.”2 ‘Prana’ could mean anything to anyone and everything to everybody. Jasmuheen’s ‘philosophy’ would be merely another way of revealing Being. Certainly, this would find some sympathy with Heidegger himself.3 This understanding of revealing, however, ignores the role of *logos* in our everyday Worlds. Both Vico and Herder show us how our words are intimately wedded to the Worlds we are in. Indeed, for Heidegger, language allows Being to stand forth, and thus ‘makes’ our World. Moreover, in these Worlds people have spoken to one another for millennia. Consequently, Bakhtin reminds us that each man

is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe. And he presupposes not only the existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – his own and others’ – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation or another.4

Like each *Dasein* and each World, each word has a history of its own. We do not need to prove any onomatopoeic bind between a word and its meanings. Rather, we know that there is always a bind between words and each World, and between people.5 As Heidegger writes, “language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks being.”6 Because of this, parts of a language are always untranslatable,7 and we cannot act as if language were merely in the mind of each individual. Language, as Vico and Herder argued, is the way the World speaks us, and allows us to speak to one another. *Logos* is not merely a matter of revealing Being, but of revealing beings to one another.
Consequently, Jasmuheen’s contradictory appropriation is not simply a matter of polysemy. If we are to do justice to a given word and its World, polysemy should reflect the diverse meanings therein. As Ricoeur writes, “it is not enough that a word should have several acceptations at a given moment in a state of a system, that is variants belonging to several contextual classes. It should be able to acquire a new meaning without losing its earlier meaning.”1 If earlier meaning is lost, it should be a matter of the ‘major premises’ of each metaphorical space contributing to new meaning,2 rather than both being simply forgotten. If a new meaning is created, the historicity of the word should be respected.

With the superficial appropriation of Jasmuheen, however, this respect is denied. It is denied because Jasmuheen’s appropriation robs the word of the narrative World whence it came. It becomes a hollow sound, “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”3 Crombie describes this as “superficiality, the denial through suppression or oppression of the deeper cultural bonds that tie people together”4 Elsewhere, I have called Jasmuheen’s behaviour ‘semantic superficiality’.5 Here, we will simply speak of superficial appropriation. Because of this appropriation by Jasmuheen, justice has not been done to the Worlds of the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Jews, the Christians, the Yoga adepts and the quantum physicists. Their creative nature has been denied. The dangers of this are manifold. While not wishing to endorse a consequentialist approach, let us briefly see more of what happened when the injustice of doublespeak was inflicted by Jasmuheen upon a World, its people and its words.

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1 Ricoeur, P. (1997), The Rule of Metaphor, Routledge, Cornwall, p.116
ii. Cultural Superficiality and Tragic Consequences

As noted earlier, Jasmuheen claims that it is possible to live well without eating, and uses appropriated words to underpin her argument. This gives her the counterfeit capital of fields she is not in. Her argument is falsely prestigious. As we will see, the popularity of counterfeit capital points to a serious problem in our cultural status quo.\(^1\) For now, however, we should merely note the fake nature of her prestigious argument.

Moreover, this argument is deadly. Verity Lynn, one of Jasmuheen’s five-thousand followers, recently died from starvation after trying to ‘let the Divine One sustain her’ rather than eating. Verity’s body was found on the edge of a Scottish loch, half naked and severely emaciated, obviously the result of not eating.\(^2\) Another woman, Marcia Roslyn Harris, died after starving herself while adhering to Jasmuheen’s principles. After over a week of not eating, she was vomiting, incontinent, unable to breath and exuding ‘black stuff’ from her mouth. Instead of calling an ambulance, her ‘carers’ placed a tube down her throat to help her become ‘nourished on air’.\(^3\) Jasmuheen herself, when put to the test by Australia’s *Sixty Minutes* program, became quite ill. The *Sixty Minutes* team put her in a locked room without food or water for seven days. After the fifth day, Jasmuheen was incredibly dehydrated and appeared dazed. Indeed, the *60 Minutes*’ doctor terminated the experiment rather than put Jasmuheen’s life at risk.

iii. Jasmuheen’s Injustice and the Need for a Broader Study

We can therefore give a provisional account of Jasmuheen’s superficiality. It is the absolute antithesis of justice. Justice requires that we give dues to people in their capacity as creative, cultural beings. Moreover, justice also requires that we understand the roles they play in their culture, and the necessities of their life insofar as they embrace these roles. In the first sense, Jasmuheen has unjustly treated those from whose world she has stolen: the quantum physicists, the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Christians. This injustice involves a misunderstanding of the creative cultural nature of

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\(^1\) See p.158ff, below.

\(^2\) Mann, S. (26/9/99), ‘How Verity Linn lived, and died on thin air’, *The Sunday Age*, WORLD, p.13

\(^3\) Klotz, S. (11/11/99), ‘Lawyer tells court of tragic ‘air diet’ death’, *The Age*, p.4
other human beings, and the reduction of their sacred or canonical writings to smorgasbord. She has also unjustly treated the people to whom she preached, people like Verity Lynn and Marcia Harris. By not recognising the cultural nature of the physicists, Hindus, Christians and so forth, she has corrupted the culture of her own people. This corrupts our words and our capacity to make informed decisions. The final injustice for people like Verity Lynn was death, where the necessities of dignified life were taken away. Jasmuheen’s superficial appropriation is akin to the unscrupulous grave robber in a B-grade ‘Mummy’ movie. She not only does an injustice to the dead from whom she steals, but also to the folk who unwittingly accept her plundered goods, bringing doom upon themselves and their loved ones with some ancient curse. Indeed, ‘grave robber’ is used by native activists to describe similar New Age practices.\(^1\)

What kind of World do we have if Jasmuheen is flourishing? Jasmuheen has no background in the traditions she appropriates from. She uses their common words for her own gain, relying on symbolic and cultural capital she has not herself created. Moreover, by trading in counterfeit capital she inadvertently plays a role in the deaths of her vulnerable followers. What kind of World would involve the theft of capital, and the deaths of the ignorant?

Certainly, we may speculate that this superficiality is the mark of an unjust ethos, involving Epicurean self-interest, and a Hobbesian denial of tradition and logos. It also involves the shallow mechanism of Gelernter’s high end, where depth is lost in favor of reified abstractions. That Jasmuheen is read by more people that those published in *Philosophy Today* or the *Journal of Philosophy* indicates an widespread ethos of self-interest and shallowness.

However, Jasmuheen is only one person. Despite her many followers, her example is best understood as a deep case study in superficiality. Certainly, this enables us to account for the scope of superficiality. For a better account of the corruption of our modern World by superficiality, we will turn to cinema, mainstream media and more New Age writers. We will develop a fuller understanding of superficiality, and the triumph of the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

\(^1\) See p.153, below.
B. Popular Culture and Superficiality II

Words are spoken with great care, and they are heard. They matter, and they must not be taken for granted; they must be taken seriously.

- M.Scott Momoday, *The Man Made Out of Words*, p.15

Jasmuheen has acquainted us with the injustice of superficiality. To further develop our account, we will turn to Hollywood, print media and New Age spirituality. We will analyse in detail the appropriation of stories and, in particular, the corruption of language by superficiality. In doing so, we will show the hollowing out of our capacity for communication and, *mutatis mutandis*, freedom and justice. We will also develop our case for how superficiality is associated with capitalism, technological rationality, and the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

i. Superficiality in Hollywood

Hollywood is the ‘myth factory’ of Anglo-American culture. DreamWorks, in turn, is a powerful studio founded by Steven Spielberg, Jeffrey Katzenberg and David Geffen. These men are multimillionaires, and some of the most influential people in the massive American entertainment industry. Moreover, these men are Jews, and the film we will look into is the story of Moses, *The Prince of Egypt*. Consequently, this film tells us much about Hollywood, contemporary Anglo-American culture and the influence of these on the Jewish narrative World. As with Jasmuheen, we will heed to the distortion of the ‘major premises’ of the World.

*The Prince of Egypt* is a recent animated epic by the Hollywood studio DreamWorks. It tells the story of Moses from *Exodus*. Katzenberg, one of the founders of DreamWorks, tells us: “Our goal was to be faithful to the text…to embrace the themes and fundamental aspects of the story as they are presented in the Bible.”\(^1\) Similarly, the film’s producer tells us that “what we discovered was that where the Bible is specific, you should respect that specificity, but when the bible is silent, we could be more

creative and interpretive.”
DreamWorks uses what is ‘fundamental’ to the Bible to lend the film prestige. Similarly, the slogan for the film is: “The Story is Forever”. *The Prince of Egypt* is thus accorded the cultural capital of Judaism’s eternal eschatology. In this sense, it is not a radical political text. It is not, as Barthes would say, “an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary”. On the contrary, *The Prince of Egypt* uses the ‘fixed meaning’ of the Bible as its marketing slogan. The film is branded by God, and the ancient story of Moses.

However, *The Prince of Egypt* perverts this very same story. Moses frees the Israelites, parts the Red Sea and is soon descending Mount Sinai with the ten commandments. The Golden Calf is not portrayed, nor is the slaughter of pagan tribes, the smashing of the first commandments or the Israelites’ lack of faith. The God of the Bible inflicts His people with leprosy, plague and incineration. The God of the Bible banishes almost an entire generation of Israelite, including Moses. None of this is shown in *Prince of Egypt*.

Indeed, in *The Prince of Egypt* God is given a ‘bit part’. Katzenberg quips: “We have eighty-eight minutes to tell the life of Moses. We’ve edited God, we have not rewritten Him.” Instead of exulting God, the film emphasises Moses’ individual victory, and the ‘positive thinking’ of the Israelites. In the Torah, however, Moses is not a confident orator or brilliant leader. He reluctantly leads the Israelites because God chose him to do so. As Rad argues, these stories were never “really written about Moses. […] God’s words and God’s deeds, these are the things that the writers intend to set forth.” Moreover, it is not only Moses who ‘stars’ in *The Prince of Egypt* over God. Miriam and Tzipporah sing to the Israelites: “[w]ho knows what miracles/You can achieve/When you believe/Somehow you will/You will when you believe.” At this point in the story, God has delivered the Israelites from bondage, and destroyed their enemies with vast power. He is not mentioned in this song.

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2 *The Prince of Egypt* press kit booklet, DreamWorks L.L.C., Hollywood, cover
4 Jeffrey Katzenberg, cited in Masters, K. (14/12/98), ‘The Prince and the Promoter’, *Time*, p.73
5 Exodus 4:10, Numbers 12:3
Similarly, in *When You Believe – Music From The Prince of Egypt*, Mariah Carey hopes that ‘When You Believe’ “inspires all of you with us tonight to follow your dreams and have faith that they will come true.”\(^1\) God is not required – we can all achieve miracles when we believe in ourselves. For the Jews and Christians of the Bible, however, we do not achieve miracles. As Browning puts it, “[t]he readers of the gospels…saw healings as authentic works of God in which believers received the power of the Kingdom [to come]”\(^2\). God performs miracles – we do not. To deny this is to insult God, and it is exactly this kind of insult that led to Moses’ banishment from Canaan.\(^3\)

Consequently, *Prince of Egypt* upholds individual belief over and above faith in God. It affirms egoism over humility, and personal success over the fate of the people. The ancient ‘Old Testament’ has been perverted to tell the story of Moses’ personal charisma, and the individual egoism of his friends. Certainly, there is an argument to be made regarding the role of charismatic men in Judaism.\(^4\) As we have seen, though, the story of Moses was not written to foster trust in Moses, or even humanity. The *Torah* is a story of trust in God and fear of His wrath. *The Prince of Egypt* does not do justice to the Jewish narrative World.

**ii. Capitalism, Self-Interest and Self-Help**

Similar superficiality can be found in other Hollywood films and television.\(^5\) Why would Hollywood do this? Put simply, capitalist Hollywood has turned the story of Moses into a self-help text. With *Prince of Egypt*, the *Torah* is a story of ‘positive thinking’ and ‘finding the power within’. This the same gospel of books by the management gurus of the business world.\(^1\) As Micklethwait and Wooldridge observe in *The Witch Doctors*, these gurus all tell us that “we can close the gap between promise and achievement if we understand ourselves…remove inner blockages…and generally

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\(^3\) Deuteronomy 32:51,52


\(^5\) See Appendix IX, p.428
‘unleash the power within’.” 2 Moses’ story is no longer one of the omnipotence, omniscience and personal divinity of Yahweh. It is an inspirational product that serves to reinforce the egoistic individualism of the viewers, and increase the wealth of DreamWorks. Consequently, as it is grounded in global capitalism and corporate profit, 3 Hollywood has corrupted culture in the service of capitalist self-interest.

New Age philosophies, however, are seen as alternatives to this modern life. 4 The mission statement of Sedona, for example, writes of a reconnection with “our Higher Selves” 5 and an “unprejudiced overview of the human journey into Light and Love” 6. A recent ‘Sedona Tour’ was supposed to give people “a clearer picture of each of our roles in the unfolding of our planetary story.” 7 Similarly, the New Age promises to give us ‘pathways to better living’. 8 Consequently, we should expect the New Age to avoid the individualism, self-interest and instrumentalist ‘logic’ of capitalism. However, this is not so. As with the Prince of Egypt, we will look into the language of the New Age. Rather than dismissing it prima facie as gobbledegook, we will analyse where the words have been appropriated from, and how. We will see that New Age superficial appropriation is grounded in Hobbesian capitalism and egoism.

iii. Superficiality in the New Age: Alton

Alton is a ‘clairvoyant channel’ and initiate of ‘The Alpha Omega Order of Melchizedek’. 9 In ‘The Receiving of the Ankh’ he explains that our memory of ourselves is ‘coded’ in the ‘spacetime continuum’ around us. For Alton, the ‘time space continuum’ is a cocoon. Every person’s self-knowledge is ‘encoded’ in this ‘cocoon’.

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1 See also Appendix V, p.421
5 Sedona, Volume 3, Issue 6, p.2
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p.3
8 See ‘New Age Expo’, p.410
9 See p.409, below.
Furthermore, by activating the “five triple holograms of love”\(^\text{1}\) and similar extensions of the “Holographic Body Computer”\(^\text{2}\) agents may discover an earlier encoding of being in the space-time continuum. By using ‘kundalini energy’, we can activate the “natural spiritual extension of [the] spine back to God, which is once again the spiritual center of [the] light body which automatically illumes with this surge of energy. […] This bares the soul to God and you surrender yourself to your divine higher intention.”\(^\text{3}\) The result of this is that we can return to our ‘Adam Kadmon light body’, and “enter into the Cosmic Christ Consciousness form of Creation”\(^\text{4}\). In this way, we “become living, walking Ankhs of God’s grace”\(^\text{5}\). What does this mean? Moreover, what does this mean if we take the scientific language seriously?

For cosmologists or physicists, the spacetime continuum is hardly spoom of as a personal ‘cocoon’. It is a description of the physical universe within relativistic physics. Space and time are no longer discrete, and are schematised as three and one dimensions in a continuum. In this sense, to say that “the memory of you is encoded in the time space continuum attached to you”\(^\text{6}\) is to say that the memory of you is stored around you. Having ‘bared your soul to God via the serpents’ energy and the holograms of love’, you will “awaken your cosmic encoding and return to the source of All That There Is. This is not a promise, but a certainty.”\(^\text{7}\) This coding is stored in the universe, or Alton’s ‘All That There Is’.

How do we make sense of this? Let us draw on Alton’s scientific jargon, grounded in relativistic physics. The ‘universe wrapped around the agent like a cocoon’ can only be understood as the curvature of spacetime around matter. This ‘cocoon’ is gravity. As Paul Davies writes, a “gravitational field is not a field of force at all, but a curvature in the geometry of spacetime.”\(^\text{8}\) Put simply, Alton’s ‘cocoon’ is the gravity around us. In this gravitational field, we may may use the ‘hologram of love’, encounter the ‘encoded memory of ourselves’ and become the ‘Cosmic Christ Consciousness form of Creation’.

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\(^3\) Ibid., p.58
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., p.59
\(^6\) Ibid., p.58
Soon after, the “lower vibration”¹ of this life will cease. Apparently, the ‘Cosmic Christ Consciousness form of Creation’ vibrates at a high frequency. There are a number of problems with this pseudo-scientific account.

Firstly, while Alton has proposed a ‘non-physical self’ vibrating at a high frequency, ‘vibration’ and ‘frequency’ only make sense in physical terms. If not physical particles or energetic fields, what could possibly be oscillating, and where? These scientific words ‘frequency’ and ‘vibration’ make little scientific sense.

Secondly, this ‘vibrating cocoon of gravity encoding the agent’s memory’ must be storing information in interacting gravitational waves, or storing information with the individual ‘bits’ represented by gravitons.² Of course, gravitons and gravitational waves are not universally accepted by modern physics. Consequently, this cannot be a scientific account. Nonetheless, Alton is drawing on scientific words, and we must see whether his proposals are within the realm of scientific possibility. The “White light from God”³ eventually illuminates the ‘cosmic encoding’ in the ‘time space continuum’ which then allows the initiate to return to the ‘original blueprint’. Are we to understand that gravity is illuminated? Certainly, gravity affects light by slowing its frequency relative to an observer, such as the ‘red shift’ of distant stars described in the Doppler Effect. It is meaningless to say that the light ‘illuminates’ the encoding, as you cannot ‘see’ gravity. Photons do not ‘bounce off’ gravity. If they did, there would be no Doppler Effect. In this sense, the ‘White light from God’ could not encode the ‘Adam Kadmon’ with the interactions of photons, gravitons or gravitational waves. Rather, it could only do so with degrees of frequency-differentiation relative to the original radiation. However, there are more problems with this. The ‘original encodements’ are ‘timeless souls’, so any ‘encoded’ information remains constant over time. The gravitational fields must therefore stay constant. However, alterations to mass entail alterations to the gravitational field,⁴ and so the slightest change in clothes, for example,

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² Gravitons and gravitational waves have not been successfully detected by modern physics. Consequently, this is not a true scientific explanation. However, Alton is drawing on scientific words, and we must see whether he has done them justice.
⁴ For example, the increase in gravitational force between a 50kg mass and a 100kg mass, and a 100kg mass and a 100kg mass, both 100 metres apart with no change in speed is 100%. 6.664 x 10⁻¹¹ versus
would alter the ‘encoded’ Kadmon. Without any schematics, mathematical proofs or the like, this is a problematic proposal. It is nearly impossible for this ‘cocoon of gravity’ to ‘encode’ a ‘timeless’ message with gravity. Alton’s ‘spacetime encoding’ makes no scientific sense, even though he is drawing on scientific language.

Thirdly, the ‘Ark of the Covenant’ did not refer “to an experience of the arcing [sic] of energy by God through man, returning him to his original blueprint/Adam Kadmon or Covenant.”¹ The Ark of the Covenant refers to “a kind of portable shrine with a lid carried in the wilderness and round Jericho and…containing the Law”², later placed by David within the Holy of Holies in Jerusalem. This Covenant was a sacred agreement between God and the Israelites. It symbolised the bond between them, and was kept in an ark made of acacia.³ The only possible reason for defining ‘Ark of the Covenant’ through the ‘arc-ing of energy’ would be the homophony between ‘Ark’ and ‘arc’. However, the Jewish Bible was not written in English, but Hebrew. The Hebrew for ‘ark’ is aron, meaning ‘container’. ‘Arc’, on the other hand, comes from the Latin arcus, meaning ‘bow’ or ‘curve’. Consequently, ‘ark’ has little to do with ‘arc’, and similar arguments can be made for New Testament Greek.⁴

Fourthly, kundalindi is a concept found in Yoga. While Yoga incorporates divinity, there is no Divine Being in the Judaeo-Christian sense.⁵ However, Alton is drawing on Christianity and Judaism when he speaks of God, the Ark of the Covenant and so forth. yet the God of these narratives is monotheistic.⁶ As Hadas writes, “monotheism is by nature exclusive and hence cannot tolerate rivals.”¹ Alton is not doing Christianity and Judaism justice. These are all examples of superficial appropriation.

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³ Deuteronomy 12:3
⁴ The Greek tokso also means ‘bow’ and ‘arc’. ‘Ark’, however, is kivotos.
⁶ Exodus 20:3, Deuteronomy 6:4, Romans 1:21-31, Mark 12:29
iv. Superficiality in the New Age: zho-de-Rah and Zon-A-Ray

In ‘The Origin of Our New Species’, zho-de-Rah and Zon-A-Ray explain how the ingestion of particular foods contributes to the changing of “peoples lives and consciousness in preparation for co-citizenship in harmonic resonance with higher intelligences.”

They then explain how the Life Force of DNA can enable us to transform ourselves to ‘light bodies’, just as chlorophyll carries new cosmic energies into the ‘cellular data banks, the DNA’. Thus, for these ‘gurus’, plants contain the Life Force in their chlorophyll that, when ingested, turns into blood and then communicates with our DNA. The change in DNA then causes us to become light bodies, where we can then begin “taking our rightful places as cosmic citizens of new universes.”

Firstly, chlorophyll is not ‘constituted the same as blood is’. Chlorophyll contains a porphyrin ring with a magnesium atom in its centre, just as the heme portion of hemoglobin – the oxygen-carrying pigment in blood – carries an iron molecule in its centre. While hemoglobin consists of this ring and a hydrocarbon tail, ‘blood’ per se contains proteins, hormones, dissolved gases, salts, water, glucose, white blood cells, red blood cells and platelets. These have a variety of molecular and atomic configurations. Secondly, chlorophyll does not ‘become blood’ any more than anything catabolised and anabolised by the body’s metabolism ‘becomes’ blood, skin and bone. The carbon and nitrogen ring within the porphyrin ring, as with the magnesium atom and the hydrocarbon tail, would be broken up and taken up into the cells. Also, DNA is not made from polypeptides, magnesium or carbon-nitrogen rings, but phosphate groups, pentose sugars and bases primarily consisting of nitrogen and hydrogen. Therefore, chlorophyll is not ‘constituted the same as blood’, nor does it ‘become blood’ or turn into DNA. Indeed, chlorophyll has no consistent contact with the DNA. Lastly, without substantial evidence, DNA cannot support the

3 *Ibid*., p.75
4 *Ibid*., p.75
“transubstantiation process, the transition from density to light body”\textsuperscript{2}. DNA can do nothing but replicate, and produce RNA and proteins.\textsuperscript{3} Certainly, DNA can produce polypeptides involved in the emission of light, such as luciferase combined with FMNH\textsubscript{2} in the \textit{Vibrio fischeri} bacterium.\textsuperscript{4} However, DNA cannot emit light, or convert atoms or molecules into photons. Consequently, it cannot aid “this forward movement into the light body.”\textsuperscript{5} Even ignoring the use of ‘frequency’, ‘vibration’, ‘etheric’, ‘electromagnetic’, ‘resonant’, ‘low frequency level matrices’ and ‘evolution’, this does not do justice to science.

\textbf{v. Superficiality in the New Age: Murrabah}

In ‘Angels?’, Lisa Forbes Murrabah explains that “there are many forms of angelic beings who are accessible to all people of Earth. To all dimensions and universes outside of ours. They are the one galactic truth.”\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, they “watch over all religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Muslims, etc”\textsuperscript{7} and are apparently understood by these religions. She then goes on to give a table of angels, and their names in other religions, philosophies and mythologies.\textsuperscript{8} These include ‘Tao/Krishna’, the “Angel of unconditional love”\textsuperscript{9}, ‘Adonis’, the “Angel of Discernment”\textsuperscript{10}, ‘Hades/St. Germain’, the “Angel of the creative word”\textsuperscript{11}, and ‘Quan Yin’, the “Angel of spiritual strength and will”\textsuperscript{1}.

Firstly, by citing Muslims and Islam separately, Murrabah shows an unfamiliarity with the words she is using. While Christianity, Judaism and so forth, are all faiths, Muslims are the constituents of a faith. This is akin to listing ‘Muslims, Jews, Christians, Christianity.’

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.47-49
\item \textsuperscript{6} Marrabah, L. F. (1998), ‘Angels?’, Sedona, Volume 3, Issue 6, p.8
\item \textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{8} \textit{Ibid.}, p.9
\item \textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
Secondly, if angels are the ‘one galactic truth’, and if all religions have ‘easy access’ to this truth, Murrabah’s philosophy should do justice to these various religions. ‘Tao’ is used synonymously with ‘Krishna’, and both are described as the “angel of unconditional love.”² Certainly, Krishna speaks of unconditional love.³ However, Krishna is the sentient deification of Brahman.⁴ The tao, on the other hand, is simply ‘the way’. It is a way of understanding physis,⁵ rather than any kind of sentient deity.⁶ ‘Tao’ is not ‘Krishna’.

Similarly, ‘Hades’ used is synonymously by Murrabah with ‘St. Germain’, the ‘angel of the creative word’. Hades is the lord of the underworld in Greek myth, and the underworld itself. Hades is a place of limbo where the dead are neither punished nor pleased. They are shadows, similar to Sheol in Judaism. In Classical literature Hades is thus identified with death, and not with ‘the creative word’.⁷ Far from being an ‘angel of the creative word’, Hades “is not to be soothed, neither overcome, wherefore he is most hated by mortals of all gods.”⁸ Similar attitudes are found in Seven Against Thebes, Suppliant Maidens and Hercules.⁹ In this sense, there is no evidence that Hades is the ‘Angel of the Creative Word’. Ignoring Murrabah’s use of ‘Quan Yin’ from Buddhism and ‘Isis’ from Egyptian mythology, this is a clear case of superficial appropriation.

v. Capitalism and the Pursuit of Wealth

Why would people superficially appropriate like this? As we earlier inferred, the imperatives of capitalism result in people using ‘things’ from narrative Worlds for self-interest and corporate profit. The imperatives of Epicurean egotism are at work here. Certainly, this is confirmed by the great number of advertisements in popular New Age

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¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ Bhagavad Gita, 10.7-10.8, 13.10
⁴ Bhagavad Gita, 10.20
⁵ Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, I:56, 58
⁶ Ibid., I:4-6
⁸ Homer, Iliad, 9.159
⁹ Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 850-873; Aeschylus, Suppliant Maidens, 785-790; Euripides, Hercules, 474-485
journals. This superficial appropriation makes good copy, and brings in readers and potential consumers. The website of *Elohim* magazine, for instance, is filled with statistics of circulation and readership for advertisers, and many vendors are placed next to ‘puff pieces’ on their products. It is no coincidence that in business management, “[t]oday’s most pervasive self-improvement philosophy comes under the general rubric of ‘new age’. […] Management consultancies peddling new-age cure-alls of some kind or another seem to be doing flourishing business.” Like *Prince of Egypt*, New Age philosophy is a business that affirms the individualist, self-interested Epicureanism of capitalism. Indeed, in so-called ‘pop icon’ Madonna, friend of Deepak Chopra and millionaire ‘kabbalist’, we see the perfect integration of business acumen, wealth and superficial appropriation. For those characterised by the self-interest of Hobbes, the novelty of the ‘other’ is a perfect item of individual production and consumption.

Like those in the media and Hollywood, many New Age ‘gurus’ superficially appropriate to gain power and make money. Not coincidentally, Herman Mueller, popular Australian ‘guru’, writes that “with money you become successful. Money is a vehicle of energy and by creating it, energy expands and enables you to do your work more successfully.” New Age spirituality has hardly abandoned capitalism. On the contrary, as Brown writes, “it celebrates capitalism by viewing money as just another form of “energy” that can be transferred, acquired, or lost as part of one’s personal evolution.” Brown explains that some New Agers have even attempted trademark protection for the spirit entities they channel. Indeed, the words of New Age vendors make this link between superficiality and the pursuit of wealth even clearer. When confronted with a browsing customer, one New Age bookseller snaps “Go on, buy something. I’ve got bills to pay.” Elsewhere, an iridologist is exulting the ability to attract customers in any way possible. He tells his friend, “all you’ve got to do is get them in the door. Once I get them in the door, I can do astrology, iridology, palmistry, astrological

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3. On Madonna, see Appendix IV, p.419
6. Ibid., p.10

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136 2. Superficiality and Popular Culture
whatever”¹. Lastly, one New Age ‘aura specialist’ questions what a doctorate in philosophy ‘gets you’. She is told that “an understanding of over two-thousand years of human culture comes in quite handy.” In response, she simply asks: “Is there any money in it?”² Superficiality and the pursuit of wealth are clearly linked.

In the New Age, we again see how superficial appropriation is linked to the pursuit of wealth. The Hobbesian notion of the egoistic individual leads people to corrupt culture. Moreover, there seems little reason to doubt that the same motives apply to our media. Like Hollywood and New Age publishers, the media are also the agents of capitalism.³ The Age, in turn, is most popular broadsheet print medium in the state of Victoria, Australia.⁴ Our analysis of The Age newspaper will show us the pervasive presence of superficiality in this respectable Melbourne daily newspaper. This, in turn, highlights the infiltration of superficiality in all those fields now grounded in capitalism and technological rationality. It also shows the final corruption of our language by superficiality, and the kind of ethos we have embraced in modern Western culture.


The word ‘karma’ is Sanskrit Hindu, though it is often used in relation to Buddhism as well. ‘Karma’ is used frequently in The Age, particularly considering that this is a secular English-language newspaper in a predominantly Christian country. In ‘Modra’s sudden leap into the big time’, for instance, sport reporter Patrick Smith writes the following about Adelaide Crows’ football player Anthony Modra: “Modra admits that he was uncomfortable in the limelight then, but he now has a better understanding of how his deeds can affect the karma of Adelaide’s citizens.”⁵ In this instance, the actions of a footballer are supposedly affecting the karma of an entire city. However, in

¹ Iridologist A (17/1/99), ‘New Age and Psychic Expo – A New Day of Psychic Discovery’, Rosebud Memorial Hall, personal communication
² Aura Specialist A (17/1/99), ‘New Age and Psychic Expo – A New Day of Psychic Discovery’, Rosebud Memorial Hall, personal communication
⁴ Tensen, B. (27/5/02), Marketing Service Manager, The Age, personal communication
⁵ Smith, P., (26/7/93), ‘Modra’s sudden leap into the big time’, The Age, p.25
Buddhism and Hinduism, we can only make our own karma, not that of others. This mistake occurs again in relation to cafes in St. Kilda, software packages, living in Brighton, a radio show, the films of Ron Howard, the creation of a corporation, a Richard Gere film, the Australian cricket team, a band’s CD, a vegetarian restaurant, a newspaper report on a golfer, and middle-aged sex. In many of these cases, karma was used to mean ‘mood’, far removed from the ontological morality of karma in Hinduism and Buddhism. These are cases of superficial appropriation.

Similarly, in ‘How to retire with good karma’, Peter Semple explains how $120,000 can buy retirement hostel accommodation, while $157,575 can buy retirement cottages. There is no mention of good acts, or the absence of evil. However, karma is not something we can buy, and expensive possessions or riches do not mean ‘good karma’, unless our intentions are good. When our intentions are simply to have a “bowling green with pavilion, tennis courts..., barbecue area, billiards room..., and corner store,” ‘good karma’ is unlikely. We cannot buy karma. This mistake occurs again in relation to Microsoft software and real estate. Given the emphasis on money...
and property, it is unlikely that these people will be released from samsara, or the worldly ties of birth and rebirth, for some time.

In ‘Tough lessons in test debacle’, Malcolm Knox writes the following about the Australian cricket team’s bad luck: “[T]he dominant force gets all the luck. In recent Australian summers, Mark Taylor’s men have been the beneficiaries. Here, their karma has turned on them.” However, karma cannot ‘turn’ on a person. ‘Good karma’ does not mean ‘bad karma’. To incur ‘bad karma’ because of ‘good karma’ would render senseless the onto-ethical meaning of karma in Buddhism and Hinduism. Similarly odd causal links are made in relation to films helping sex lives, Jodie Foster’s face, the Grammy statuette, sleeping on a train, internet stocks, and the tribunal attendance of the Geelong football team. In all these cases, ‘karma’ has been superficially appropriated by professional journalists.

Finally, in ‘Lee’s wedding is a comedy feast’, Pat Gillespie describes one episode in a trilogy of ghost stories, directed by Tracy Moffatt: “…a sacred Aboriginal spirit casting bad karma on an opportunistic landlord.” However, the notion of karma itself has almost no currency in Aboriginal mythology, folklore and religion. Aboriginal mythology is described as essentially an “organic whole, consisting of the same fundamental concepts of faith”. For example, the belief that proper burial releases spirits to the sky, or ‘beyond the sea’, is quite common. Although most Aboriginal cultures therefore believe in spirits, these do not commonly return to the body in a ‘karmic’ manner. In the Torres Strait Islands, where this film is shot, the people

1 Sutton, P. (11/3/98), ‘Buying karma’, The Age, PROPERTY, p.4
5 Zion, L. (2/4/98), ‘The truth is way out there’, The Age, GREEN GUIDE, p.29
7 Clarke, A. (2/1/99), ‘The rail thing’, The Age, TRAVEL, p.9
8 Pavey, A. (24/5/99), ‘Bad karma on Internet stocks’, The Age, BUSINESS, p.1
11 Ibid., p.231

2. Superficiality and Popular Culture
mummify their dead in preparation for an irreversible death.\(^1\) While spirits from the Dreamtime may inhabit the bodies of humans, or past heroes may leave behind sacred spiritual tokens,\(^2\) there is no general belief in ‘karmic’ cycles of rebirth.\(^3\) This is certainly true the case for the islanders of the film. Even though there is mythological reference to rebirth within the Dreaming, the “finality of death is indisputable, no matter that eternal renewal was once possible.”\(^4\) In this case, not only have the Hindu and Buddhist Worlds been superficially appropriated from, but also the ancient World of the Australian indigenous peoples.

v. Superficiality and the Lust for Money

We have seen that Hollywood, print media and New Age writers do not understand the Worlds from which they appropriate. Even more examples of superficial appropriation in advertising,\(^5\) Hollywood, music, television, the New Age and politics, can be found in the appendices.\(^6\) These people have no sense of the ‘major premises’ of the cultures they appropriate from. Moreover, they corrupt language in the process.

Sadly, the ‘respectable’ media are as corrupted by capitalism as were Hollywood and the New Age. Superficiality is mainstream. We need only turn to the free newspapers MX and Melbourne Express, with their mix of gossip, sexual titillation and ‘light news’, to see this. The Age has further confirmed this. As Shaw reminds us, “the mass media are themselves economic giants, resembling other capitalist conglomerates in their management, organizational structures, corporate culture and business interests.”\(^7\)

What all of these media want is amusing but benign ‘good copy’, for this keeps the elite

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\(^3\) Eliade, M. (1973), *Australian Religions*, Cornell University Press, London, p.166, pp.171-172. Some tribes believe in reincarnation of the immortal soul, though most do not. Moreover, there is no record of these beliefs in the Torres Strait Islands. Lastly, the ascendence of the immortal soul is rarely, if at all, subject to concerns of morality, as is the case with *karma*.


\(^5\) For advertising that avoids superficial appropriation, see Appendix I, p.413

\(^6\) See Appendix II, p.415f, Appendix VI, p.422, and Appendix IX, p.428

safe, the masses entertained and the profit margins ‘healthy’. This, in turn, leads to the corruption of language as words become ‘copy’ to be used for quick profit. Here, an Epicurean lust for personal gratification has corrupted our words.

D. Superficiality

i. Agamemnon and Jasmuheen: Ancient and Modern Superficiality

For there are some who, through thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to make no arbitrary statement but to always give a reason, often unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle – this they do sometimes from ignorance, sometimes because they are charlatans – by which reasons even men experienced and able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are capable of having practical and constructive intelligence. And this happens to them from want of culture…

- Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1217a1-9

However, modern superficiality is not simply the result of the lust for money and power. While modern Epicureanism is the ground of superficiality, it is not simply a matter of individualist egoism. This is too simplistic. The corruption of language by the pursuit of wealth has existed for some time. For example, it was cursed in Petronius’ *Satyricon* almost two millennia ago. Talking to Agamemnon, the young student Encolpius accuses the teacher of making words stale and ‘used up’.1 In reply, Agamemnon tells Encolpius that he must corrupt his words in order to please students.2 Unless the teacher, in Agamemnon’s words, “baits his hook like a fisherman with what he knows the fry will bite on, he will idle on the rock with no hope of a catch.”3 In short, the pursuit of wealth is more important than the World and its words. False flattery, a form of superficiality, is encouraged. Yet Agamemnon also tells Encolpius that education in culture may help people understand their World and overcome the corruption of language.4

However, Agamemnon studies stories, but he does not authentically live a storied life. If Agamemnon were authentically in the narrative World, he would not support the very processes that are corrupting his profession. In Bourdieu’s terms, he is undermining the very field that accords him his symbolic capital. Thus, he is destroying the World that gives his life meaning. He is destroying the story he lives

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2 Ibid., pp.2-3
3 Ibid., p.2
4 Ibid., p.3
through, reducing himself, in MacIntyre’s words, to an ‘anxious stutterer’.\(^1\) Agamemnon is superficial.

Written in first-century Rome, this shows us that there have always been people, intellectuals included, who are willing to debase the narrative World and its language for personal gain. The debate between poor Socrates and the rich Sophists is older still. Here, individual self-interest takes priority over a people, their World and their language.

However, there is a distinct difference between the superficiality of Agamemnon, and the superficiality of Jasmuheen and our friends in cinema, television, politics and so forth. In our time, superficiality and superficial appropriation are not simply a matter of individualist egoism and the pursuit of wealth. There are deeper forces corrupting our narrative World. To better understand this, we should turn to Nazism. Of course, Nazism is not the same as superficiality. Similarly, our time is not that of Nazi Germany. Rather, by looking into the development of the Nazi *swastika* we can see how the superficial appropriation of the Nazis was associated with capitalism, technological rationality and self-interest. This, in turn, will further develop our account of superficiality, and articulate the role of Epicureanism in hollowing out our World.

**ii. Nazism, Heidegger, *Gestell* and Consumption**

We have preferred the power that apes greatness, first Alexander and then the Roman conquerors whom the authors of our schoolbooks, through some incomparable vulgarity, teach us to admire. We, too, have conquered, moved boundaries, mastered heaven and earth. Our reason has driven all away. Alone at last, we end up by ruling over a desert.

> - Albert Camus, ‘Helen’s Exile’, p.135

The Nazi movement rose to popularity in a poor and defeated Germany. Like Agamemnon, the German masses wanted wealth. Spiritual renewal was linked to economic prosperity, and the plight of the many unemployed was compared with the

greedy bourgeois Jews. Nazism promised employment for the masses, and the security of a strong economy with high production and consumption.\footnote{Shirer, W.L. (1975), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pan Books, London, pp.322-333} By analysing the relationship between the lust for wealth, capitalism, instrumentalism and appropriation, we will develop a fuller account of superficiality.

Nazism waxed and waned under the banner of the hakenkreuz, or ‘Hooked Cross’. After Hitler had redesigned this Nazi emblem, the Society for the Study of Ancestral Heritages and other academics instructed the officers of the SS on the meaning of the hakenkreuz and other Aryan symbols.\footnote{Quinn, M. (1998), The Swastika: Constructing the Symbol, Routledge, New York} The notion of Aryan supremacy was wedded to the influence of the light-skinned Brahmin caste in India, who were seen as the original Aryans. This, in turn, wedded white Germans to ancient purity. As Shirer tells us, “[t]his may not have been ‘art’, but it was propaganda of the highest order.”\footnote{Shirer, W.L. (1975), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pan Books, London, p.64} Indeed, in Mein Kampf Hitler himself tells us that such propaganda is of the utmost importance, for it “tries to force a doctrine on the whole people”\footnote{Hitler, A. (1969), Mein Kampf, Hutchinson, London, p.529}. Thus, the SS were told what the cross meant, and why it was Nazi. This was willed appropriation and ‘re-education’. The hakenkreuz soon became the rallying point for millions of loyal Germans, including Heidegger.

However, the hakenkreuz was not German, but Hindu. Its importance for Hitler was due to its supposed ‘Indian Aryan’ heritage. Over the millennia, the Hindu swastika meant ‘good fortune’, ‘prosperity’ and so forth.\footnote{Littleton, C. S. (ed.) (1996), The Sacred East, Duncan Baird Publishers, London, p.27, p.45} As a traditional Hindu symbol it was utterly foreign to the modern world of the Nazi officers. Alien to German society, the swastika became estranged from the Worlds of the Hindus, the Hebrews and even the Schutzstaffel themselves. When the Nazi party rose to prominence, the swastika therefore lost its grounding in goodwill, even amongst those who once esteemed it.\footnote{Heller, S. (2000), ‘Swastika Guilt’, Print, July/August, pp.30-33; Boxer, S. (29/7/00), ‘A Symbol of Hatred Pleads Not Guilty’, New York Times, p.11} Indeed, a Canadian Hindu was recently fired from his job for drawing a swastika.\footnote{Adhopia, A. (1/9/99), ‘Misinterpretation of Hindu Symbol Causes Pain’, Toronto Star, OPINION, p.33} This annihilation of Hindu meaning, as we saw in Hitler’s words, was a forceful act of propaganda. The Hindu World was being forced to provide iconography, the World of

The SS was forced to accept it, and this was all done in the name of an economically and spiritually forceful Germany. In a world of ‘things’ – *on as ousia* – all is forced to bend to the greater will. Consequently, the Nazis treated culture just as they treated Jewish gold or French artworks. The human and non-human world became a mass of ‘bits’ for mechanistic use, and was understood accordingly. Consequently, the value of each ‘thing’ was a matter of will, rather than cultural creativity. The *swastika*, as Quinn puts it, “made German nobodies into Aryo-Germanic somebodies in much the same way as the commodity sign continues to set standards for judgments of value, class and gender”¹. Only when creations are so torn from their lifeworld – only when they are ‘bits’ – can this wilful valuing flourish. In this sense, the *swastika* was not just used to gain ‘things’ – it was a ‘thing’.

In this sense, modern superficial appropriation is more than just the Hobbesian pursuit of wealth. We also see here why Heidegger should never have welcomed Nazism and its vulgar *Führer*. The Nazi *hakenkreuz*, with its forced character, is part of what Heidegger calls ‘self-assertion’. This is *Gestell*, technological ‘enframing’. The world, understood as present-at-hand, becomes a mass of tools for our calculated use.² All the appropriated ‘things’ we have seen, including the *swastika*, are present-at-hand things to be used for consumption. In each case, justice is not done as each World is gathered into the dull unity of mere uniformity. For Heidegger, this is not only linked to the pursuit of wealth, but also modern capitalist production and consumption, and its ‘willful valuing’.³ In our time this is grounded in the faceless, purposeless ‘logic’ of mechanistic materialism, and the egoistic individualism defended by Hobbes and Locke. Lust for money or power is added to mechanism. For Heidegger, this ‘logic’ is poetically brought to light by the beautiful words of Rainer Maria Rilke. Wrenched from the earth, the “ore is homesick. And it yearns/ to leave the coin and leave the wheel/ that teach it to lead a life inane.”⁴ Here, the link between Nazi gold and the *swastika* is poetically revealed. In Heidegger’s words, we see that the ‘will to will’

takes all of Being into itself, dominating it with capitalist quantification.\(^1\) As a result of this, we find ourselves in “a world of objects available to a subject but with the central subject removed and everything reduced to open availability.”\(^2\) This ‘logic’ cuts off all possibilities outside itself, and forgets it has done so. This is Gestell.

With Gestell, Being is revealed, but it is revealed in a way that wrenches truth out of its hiddenness, and does this everywhere without concern for its own forgetful logic.\(^3\) The result of this is that the Being of beings, and beings themselves, are forgotten. All that we encounter in the world are ‘things’. Being, the World and authentic Dasein are thus hidden amongst a standing reserve of ‘things’ that are precisely no longer hidden. As we are also ‘things’, the processes of consumption and production are not human per se, but a meaningless ‘logic’ of endless control and manipulation of Being and beings. Moreover, as the relentless order of Gestell – increased control, power, speed and so forth – is applied, life becomes more and more fragmentary, and its apparent meaninglessness increases.\(^4\)

In this Gestell we also see the high end of Gelernter’s spectrum, that of Hobbes and Locke. The ideas of self-interested superficial folk are as hollow and depthless as the rigorously formalised symbolic logics of computer programs.\(^5\) Abstractions, atomistic axioms, formalisations and specialisations narrow cognition to admit only ‘things’. However, without any kind of deep professional education in the sciences, this ‘thingly’ mentality can only commodify, steal and fragment the World. The World as a whole cannot be understood in its depth, nor can it be creatively internalised and developed.

Consequently, superficiality is more than superficial appropriation.\(^6\) It can also be superficial rejection, where conflict or ‘other’ is dismissed without any depth. The popular musical commodity Madonna, for example, is a good example of superficial

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\(^6\) I must thank Michael Dix for asking me to further develop these notions of superficiality.
rejection and superficial appropriation.\(^1\) She steals from native cultures, but then dismisses them without a thought. In this sense, those enframed by capitalist modernity taste the flavours they want and spit out the rest with contempt.\(^2\) Similarly, superficial dismissals can be found in the work of New Age writers and those in business.\(^3\) Indeed, the effects of *Gestell* are dismissed by even the most educated of us.\(^4\) Superficiality can also be shallow role playing, like Fitzgerald’s Gatsby or the politicians of the Australian National Party.\(^5\) In this sense, even those who are not superficially appropriating are superficial. We take up the abstractions or axioms of our World, we absorb ‘things’, but we are unable to treat our own past or present with any breadth or depth.

This hollow World engenders precisely the kind of circumstances for superficial appropriation to arise. As we feel hollow, estranged from place, people and history, we try to fulfil our need for meaning by appropriating the cultures of others. However, we have not learned how to treat culture, or even that culture *per se* exists. Consequently, we treat words, icons or trees as a mass of ‘things’. These things, divorced from the narrative Worlds whence they came, are then as equally hollow as we feel. “The result,” as Marcuse puts it, “is euphoria in unhappiness.”\(^6\) Sadly, even this feeling of bland rapture does not last long. These ‘things’ are very quickly rendered obsolete by new ‘things’, or are simply unable to grant us any meaningful contentment. Like video-recorders, cars and serialised soap operas, superficially-appropriated ‘things’ are soon exchanged for something newer. They thus increase profit, as turn-over speed is heightened. As Irvine has pointed out, this is a culture grounded in *ennui*.\(^7\) Our dead world of ‘things’ creates a sick yearning for novelty, only alleviated by the ceaseless consumption of more ultimately unsatisfying ‘things’.

We see here the difference between Agamemnon and the modern superficial appropriators such as Jasmuheen. Agamemnon was superficial because of his egoistic

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\(^1\) See Appendix IV, p.419  
\(^3\) On the New Age, see Appendix IX, p.436. On business and advertising, see Appendix IX, p.434.  
\(^4\) See p.163, below.  
\(^5\) See Appendix IX, p.430  
\(^7\) Irvine, I. (1998), *Uncomfortably Numb: The Emergence of the Normative Ennui Cycle*, PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia, pp.5-6, p.9, pp.192-193 and *passim*
pursuit of wealth. With this wealth, he could buy goods and live. Jasmuheen and our other superficial appropriators also love wealth. However, like the Nazis, Jasmuheen does not simply pursue wealth to live in the world. Rather, for Jasmuheen the narrative World itself is egoistically consumed as if it were composed of ‘things’ to be used or exchanged, and thrown away. This, in turn, is grounded in a more general mechanistic depthlessness in our culture. What characterises our modern superficiality against that of Agamemnon, then, is not the simple pursuit of wealth. Rather, much of our modern World is characterised by meaninglessness, fragmentary life, endless consumption and the forgetting of Being and beings.

iii. Marx, Consumption and Commodities

If mass communications blend together harmoniously…art, politics, religion, and philosophy with commercials, they bring these realms of culture to their common denominator – the commodity form.

- Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, p.58

What, then, is this ‘consumption’? What is the link between consumption, on the one hand, and superficiality and *Gestell* on the other? We have seen that *Gestell* is linked to capitalism and consumption, but we have not clearly shown the nature of this process. For this, we should turn to Marx, and then to Heidegger and Baudrillard.

For Marx, consumption is simply a part of labour. In *Capital*, he writes that “[l]abour uses up its material factors, its subject and its instruments, consumes them, and is therefore a process of consumption.” As we have seen, labour is essential for our cultural life. More importantly, consumption is an essential part of this labour. Here, then, Marx is affirming the “everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence”. Labour may be creative or abject, altruistic or selfish, insightful or parochial. It is consumption in each and any case.

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2 Marx, K. (1977), *Capital*, Volume 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.179
However, it is also clear that consumption often means something other than it does to Marx. Gare, for instance, tells us that the late-capitalist ethos of postmodernity “has devalued works of art and literature. They are now consumed.” Here, consumption seems to be the hallmark of an Epicurean or Hobbesian world. It is used to denote the nihilism of mechanistic individualism. This, then, is a different idea of consumption to that of Marx, much closer to our description of Gestell and superficial appropriation. Thus, we have not given a good account of consumption. If we are to continue, we must remedy this.

As we have seen, Marx affirms the importance of creativity in our lives. Fundamental to humans’ Being is creative labour, where the transformation of the world develops human culture. After accounting for the role of consumption in labour, Marx applies the process of consumption to the worker himself. Here, Marx seek to show the estrangement of the worker from his creative activity, where creative work becomes labour. The products of this labour are appropriated and sold, and this sale accords the capitalist surplus-value, or profit. Here, the unpaid labour of the worker is transformed into capital, and the product of this work becomes a commodity by being estranged from its material history and context, and becoming “a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.” Whereas the consumption of material processes for use-value by early non-capitalists involves the connexion of creativity and the revealing of Being,

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\text{the existence of things qua commodities and the value-relations between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therein.}
\]

In capitalist societies, then, the product is abstracted from its original World and becomes a commodity. The product of poësis and physis is abstracted from its original earth and World and becomes a commodity. This commodity is a curious mix of use-value and exchange-value, magically calculated, reified and accepted into the realm of

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Being. Being, in turn, is being – *on as ousia*. *Physis* and the *poiēsis* of the worker thus become subject to a kind of fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The ‘thing’ *qua* commodity conceals the various interrelated processes of human and non-human creativity. These ‘things’ then begin to order the processes of life. It is for this reason that workers can be alienated. As individuals, they come to see their own personal creativity as belonging to the capitalist who buys their labour.\(^2\) This, then, makes workers unable to see the creativity inherent in other workers.\(^3\) What they have lost in themselves, they lose in others. Furthermore, because they have lost this in others and in themselves, they have lost the essence of their species. Because “*in his work upon* inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being”\(^4\), the worker loses his ability to ‘make himself’ *qua* human. This, as Marx writes, “estranges man from his own body, as well as external nature and spiritual essence, his human being.”\(^5\) We see here the removal of ‘things’ from their Worlds, the isolation of ‘thing-like’ individuals and the flight of these individuals from their very Being.

Indeed, this was how we characterised superficial appropriation and *Gestell*. Quite simply, superficial appropriation is akin to the production and exchange of commodities in capitalism. It leads to what Heidegger calls *Bestellbarkeit*, or ‘total availability’.\(^6\) Of course, what is available is only counterfeit, and we will account for this a little later. Nonetheless, we see here how the World is present to hand for us to use as we see fit. The capitalist commodity shown to us by Marx is the perfect ‘thing’ of a World set upon by *Gestell*, and the egoistic individualists that embody it. Consumption of these commodities perpetuates mechanistic Epicureanism.\(^7\)

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1. *Ibid*, p.77
4. *Ibid.*, p.113
iv. Imperialism, Fundamentalism and the Global Mall

For the West, I do not feel hatred; at most I feel a great contempt. [...] We have created a system in which it has simply become impossible to live; and what’s more, we continue to export it.

- Michel Houellbecq, *Platform*, p.361

Consequently, Being and the World are left behind as the ‘logic’ of technological rationality sets upon the world. However, despite increasing meaninglessness and confusion, capitalist *Gestell* plays a role in undermining freedom and justice along fairly stable lines of gender, class, race and so forth. Meaninglessness and purposelessness do not equate to a lack of ‘logic’. We will not find, with K. in *The Trial*, a seemingly arbitrary allocation of power, freedom and justice by the ‘uncanny machine’.¹ As we saw earlier, people are thrown into a World where a specific notion of Being, and the ethos of each being, is more or less real and more or less valued.² In Bourdieu’s terms, even if the field is characterised by a purposeless objective logic, it can still accord capital to some *habitii* over others. The Hobbesian or Lockean idea of the ‘right’ is a good example of this.³ The rich and powerful maintain their status with the tools of mechanism and individualism, while undermining the World itself. This, in turn, makes it impossible for the poor or powerless to be understood enough to have justice done by them. Moreover, these ‘rights’ are grounded in the same bourgeois principles applied to Being and beings in capitalist *Gestell.*⁴

Consequently, capitalist *Gestell* will favour the rich and powerful as the poor and powerless are confronted with “a social universe dominated by...an absolute and unpredictable power [where]...everyone is exposed...to the most brutal forms of manipulation of their fears and expectations.”⁵ The *habitii* that perpetuate this process are, of course, valorised and rewarded with capital. In this way, individual egoists can further their self-interest by embodying the ‘logic’ of *Gestell.* This, in turn, allows

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² See p.89, above.
⁴ See p.14, above.
them more power to keep the ‘game’ running.\(^1\) Moreover, the machines of domination and war that allow the West to extend its domination simultaneously assuage our feelings of guilt, legitimise brutality in the name of economics and fail to even cathexit our libido.\(^2\) As a consequence, even the violence that precedes economic imperialism is ultimately unsatisfying,\(^3\) and leads to further frustration and commodity consumption. This, in turn, is itself prefaced on the maintainance of a standing reserve of labour from poor peripheral regions or minorities in core regions, as well as ‘novel’ cultures to be commodified for temporary amusement.

Consequently, capitalist Gestell is not limited to America and the West, and superficiality also stains peripheral regions. As we earlier saw, even an apparently purposeless ‘logic’ favours some over others. In our age, it exploits poor and powerless peripheral, third-world peoples in favour of the bourgeoisie, the colonials or the empire.\(^4\) This commodified world of exploitative labour, exploitative resource appropriation and exploitative cultural appropriation, is not lost to indigenous theorists. On the plight of Native Americans, Shanley writes:

> Indians like…‘handy’ prisoners are being shuffled from the jail to the uranium mines and back again, accommodated only inasmuch as their labor is valued. Meanwhile, their lands are being stripped of both minerals and water. In that same zone between [post-structuralism and post-colonialism], other Indians ‘handily’ take their places as the ‘Indians’ America loves and reads. […] Playing Indian has become a national American pastime.\(^5\)

Cultural appropriation qua commodification parallels the exploitation of land and people. As Brown reminds us, the cry of many New Agers for traditional cultures to share goods with the Western world sounds a lot like the rhetoric of coal and uranium mining companies. In each case, “if Indians would just agree to share their knowledge with the rest of the world, their own economic well-being would inevitably follow.”\(^6\)

\(^{1}\) Ibid., pp.237-238
\(^{3}\) Ibid., pp.263-265
Not surprisingly, our description of Jasmuheen as a ‘grave robber’ is used by Native American theorist Lenore Keeshig-Tobias in the same way.\(^1\) Deborah Root compares superficial appropriation to necrophilia.\(^2\)

Consequently, the victims of this ‘necrophilia’ and their living kin show us how the commodification of the World is mirrored by the commodification of the people and the land. Indigenous Australians have endured a similar fate.\(^3\) Even sensitivity to other cultures cannot hide this commodifying mentality. The colonial attitude of ‘We want it, so we’ll take it’ seems to be a kind of empathy or kinship.\(^4\) However, this is merely aggression in the guise of love, making ‘a pet out of a victim’.\(^5\) Jasmuheen’s superficial appropriation is underpinned by this ‘logic’ of imperialistic commodification. Hobbesian self-interest and mechanistic ‘logic’ are wedded to the instruments of global capital. This is why Agamemnon was just greedy for wealth, while Jasmuheen is at one with pure capitalist commodification. As Marx puts it, “that which in the miser is a mere idiosyncrasy, is, in the capitalist, the effect of the social mechanism”\(^6\). This social mechanism is the *Gestell* of Heidegger in its capitalist guise.

For the superficial appropriator, then, the narrative World – like the material world – is torn blindly from its place and people, consumed and thrown away. This is captured in Plumwood’s work, where she articulates the devouring of nature.\(^7\) At the final stage of the mastery of culture or nature, the ‘other’ is either torn from its origins and assimilated into the master, or utterly rejected as ‘other’. *Contra* Plumwood, though, the nature of *Gestell* is devoid of rational subjective agency. Rather, as we have seen, *Gestell* is ordering for ordering’s sake.\(^8\) Still, some groups are the beneficiaries of this mindless mechanistic system, so that traditional peoples, disciplines and faiths are beset by our capitalist *Gestell*.

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3 MacDonald, J. (14/1/99), ‘Denuding the Dreamtime’, *The Age*, p.11
As Waters notes, many peripheral or third-world nations respond to this with fundamentalism rather than superficiality. While the West is our concern, we should briefly recognise this active variant of superficiality. With fundamentalism, we are still shallow, but we aggressively apply a few superficial rules to all life. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is a good example. With the September eleventh attacks, a few select principles from the Koran oriented action. The Islamic notion of jihad, or ‘struggle’, for instance, again lost its peaceful association with “the effort directed towards overcoming one’s inner passions and imperfections of the soul”. Rather, with al-Qaeda it slipped into its usual vulgar sense of xenophobic bloodshed with the ‘gloss’ of religious sanctity.

Why is this the case? We fundamentalism we again see the mien of capitalist Gestell. As liberalism and socialism failed, and as capitalist imperialism continued to rule as Arabia and Islam starved, the ‘indigenous glory’ of Islam seemed liberating. This story was repeated all across Arabia, Northern Africa, and the ‘Fertile Crescent’. As imperialism opened new markets and resource reserves, the familiar cycles of exploitation, alienation, poverty and oppression emerged. These cycles, inherent in the system itself, could not be alleviated by successive governments, secular, religious or otherwise. Amidst the subsequent frustration, confusion and uncertainty, fundamentalism seemed a fruitful response. For the writer of one fundamentalist Muslim ‘manifesto’ popular with the groups connected to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, Sayyid Qutb, “sovereignty belongs to God and all human authority derives from God’s sovereignty.” Here the narrowness of fundamentalism is explicit, for all reflexivity and critique is a blasphemy. Fundamentalism, like superficiality, lacks a sense of

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educated cultural depth. However, it replaces any depth it lacks by obsessively applying a few shallow principles to all parts of individual and communal life.

However, fundamentalism is not as pervasive in the West. Certainly, we have economic fundamentalism, yet this feeds back into capitalist Gestell and, mutatis mutandis, superficiality. In the days after the attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, for example, Bush emerged from his bunker to tell Americans to keep shopping, for “the American economy will be open for business”\textsuperscript{1}. The United States Federal Reserve was quick to tell the world it was ready to make credit available.\textsuperscript{2} Floyd Norris of the New York Times argued that “[e]xploding planes destroyed buildings. A resumption of trading will show that there are things they cannot destroy.”\textsuperscript{3} The result is a group of ‘good’ countries that will not bow to ‘evil’ by stopping the consumption required to stop capitalist over-accumulation. Economic fundamentalism is grounded in the same Gestell of capitalism.

\textbf{v. Gestell and Superficiality}

Consequently, we in Western society are also beset by modern Epicureanism, though this has led to widespread superficiality rather than fundamentalism. Of course, we should not see this deterministically. In the field of art, for example, the mere existence of capitalism can, as Marcuse argues, be resisted by enabling autonomous fields to ‘preserve their truth’.\textsuperscript{4} As Bate intimates, this involves the “obliteration of the scars of commodification”\textsuperscript{5} by art withdrawing into its own realm. Moreover, this is not the bourgeois ‘art for art’s sake feared by Habermas,\textsuperscript{1} or art in vacuo. Rather, it is the field of art developing its own capital, all the while relating itself to lives of the larger World whence it stems. Certainly, we saw this with radicals such as Kara Walker and Public Enemy. In Bourdieu’s terms, the products of cultural production may invert the symbolic capital of the dominant field. As Beasley-Murray writes, “Bourdieu’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Bush, G. (13/9/01), ‘Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America’, \textit{The Age}, p.2
\item \textsuperscript{2} Dabkowski, S. (13/9/01), ‘Business as usual for banks’, \textit{The Age}, p.12
\item \textsuperscript{3} Norris, F. (14/9/01), ‘Exploding planes destroyed buildings. A resumption of trading will show that there are things they cannot destroy’, \textit{The Age}, p.8
\item \textsuperscript{4} Marcuse, H. (1978), \textit{The Aesthetic Dimension}, Beacon Press, Boston, p.31, p.32
\item \textsuperscript{5} Bate, J. (2000), \textit{The Song of the Earth}, Picador, London, p.122
\end{itemize}
theory…enables us to see consumption outside the workplace as likewise productive consumption and not simply as need-driven utility.”

Capitalist production and consumption can be creative, and deep appropriation was a good example of this.

However, without this valuing of creative productive consumption, consumption under capitalism remains tainted by "Gestell. Consequently, our consumption remains intimately intertwined with commodification, and the technological rationality lamented by Heidegger. In this sense, we must agree with Gare’s notion of consumption. In our late modern world where the cycle of overproduction must be met with increasing demand and marketing rather than Keynesian policies, consumption and debt is all-important. In order to nurture more demand, signs are disconnected from actual products, and these signs are wedded to ‘capital-induced needs’ to increase consumption. This ‘logic’ is perpetuated in each generation, and commodifies culture as well as labour. Because of this, our World, as Gare writes, is characterised by “the celebration of surfaces, the rejection of the distinctions between…authentic and inauthentic and between the signifier and the signified.” In short, the narrative World loses depth.

Here, Gare is drawing on the account of simulacra developed by Jean Baudrillard. For Baudrillard, the ‘thingly’ mentality of capitalism does not mean that commodification only applies to the objects discussed by Marx. Rather, this commodity fetishism is the fetishism of signs, signifiers utterly devoid of meaning other than their value relative to other signifiers. These are simulacra – the perfect commodities. With simulacra, as Baudrillard puts it, “[i]t is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication…[but]
rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself.”¹ The mechanistic system of commodification eventually replaces the creative World it blindly mines for profit. A world of dead ‘things’ remains.

Consequently, with capitalist Gestell Gelernter’s high end “excludes creativity and intuition and spirituality.”² The mechanistic ‘logic’ of Gestell hollows out the world. However, it is not necessarily numb or unfeeling.³ These simulacra are lusted after, it is just that they are desired in the manner of pornography or heroin, not an intimate lover. As Baudrillard argues, the libido cathects these commodities so that they are desired, just as Agamemnon desired wealth.⁴ As a consequence, superficiality is not unfeeling like a stereotypical scientist or computer programme at the high end. On the contrary, superficiality is associated with feelings, emotions, desires and so forth. It is just that these feelings are motivated by a yearning for distraction from the general joylessness and fear of existence of a world of ‘things’.⁵ As Houellbecq puts it, “[p]rolonged boredom is not tenable as a position: sooner or later it is transformed into feelings that are acutely more painful”⁶. Narrative fragmentation combines with the vicarious desires engendered by meaninglessness. People do not know what is real and what is fake, but yearn only for novelty to refresh their detached amusement and interest.⁷ Tradition once again becomes sediment, rather than a living ground for creativity. The ‘Golden Age’ of the Romantic Age is gone,⁸ unless it can be united with a Coke marketing campaign. As Ewen laments, our “[h]istory becomes incomprehensible as people’s own collective past comes back to them in the hollow…forms of a sales pitch.”⁹ For we postmoderns, there is the sheer availability of

1 Baudrillard, J. (1983), Simulacra and Simulations, Semiotext(e), New York, p.4
3 Ibid.
5 Irvine, I. (1998), Uncomfortably Numb: The Emergence of the Normative Ennui Cycle, PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia, pp.181-192
8 Irvine, I. (1998), Uncomfortably Numb: The Emergence of the Normative Ennui Cycle, PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia, pp.163-165
Bestellbarkeit, but what is available is hollow. This is, as Baudrillard puts it, the ‘desert of the real’. ¹

vi. Doublespeak and Doublethink

Today, when everything under the sun is talked about in the same breath with everything else, when prophets and charlatans make use of the same phrases, except for shades of difference that no busy person has the time to track down, when newspaper offices are continuously being pestered with some genius or another that has turned up, it is very difficult to assess the value of a man or idea correctly.

- Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, Volume Two, pp.25-26

The result of this desert in the West is that we no longer see when and why capital ought to be accorded. This is why people like Jasmuheen can flourish. This is why superficiality leads to superficial appropriation. We are like children who have not properly internalised our own culture. We do not know when other people are real. We have lost what Bourdieu calls the ‘feel for the game’. ² We have no feel for human worth, and this is akin to what Heidegger describes as ‘ambiguity’ in Being and Time. In this state, “it soon becomes impossible to understand what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not.”³ Thus, our words, and the words of so many others, are victims of superficial Gestell. Our language is, as Heidegger tells us, “worn out and used up”⁴, like a means of privatised public transport that is useful, but impersonal, disinterested and owned by no-one.⁵ Here, people cannot tell when human words are worthlessly spoken, when dues are not due. In this sense, people are in no position to understand the ‘major premises’ of a culture, or to comprehend the goods associated with the practices of the people they may appropriate from. In this sense, they are incapable of doing justice to others, for they cannot even acknowledge that dues are due, let alone discover how justice may differ for those they have appropriated from.

¹ Baudrillard, J. (1983), Simulacra and Simulations, Semiotext(e), New York, p.2
³ Heidegger, M. (1985), Being and Time, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p.217. This is Heidegger’ characterisation of ‘fallenness’ in the everyday. It is ontological. However, in Heidegger’s later work, this is used to understand our historical age. Thus, the descriptions of ‘ambiguity’ and ‘novelty’ are apt.
⁵ Ibid.
Rather than *poiēsis* and *phronēsis*, we have ‘doublespeak’ and ‘doublethink’. However, our superficial World is not that of Orwell. In his brilliant dystopian novel *Nineteen-Eighty-Four*, Orwell certainly paints us a terrifying picture of our future society. In what used to be England, the nation of Oceania is ruled by a totalitarian form of English Socialism, or Ingsoc. With Ingsoc, everyone and everything is under the boot of the Party and its Stalinesque ‘leader’, Big Brother. For the Party, however, rule is not simply a matter of brute force. In Oceania, language itself has been torn apart and put back together again as Newspeak. Newspeak provides, in Orwell’s words, “a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc [so that] all other modes of thought are impossible.”\(^1\) Thus, any thoughts against the Party can only be understood “in a vague wordless form”\(^2\). This, in turn, helps Ingsoc to control people with ‘doublethink’ and ‘doublespeak’. Like the slogans ‘WAR IS PEACE’ and ‘FREEDOM IS SLAVERY’, doublespeak and doublethink give people the ability to think and say things that are utterly irreconcilable with one another, and with reality itself. Indeed, as Orwell shows us, doublespeak and doublethink help The Party to control reality.\(^3\) This would be commensurate with our account of the role of language in a narrative World.

In two-thousand-and-one, *Big Brother* plays happily on prime-time television to millions, many of whom have never read *Nineteen-Eighty-Four*. They have not come to terms in any depth with the creative expressions of their World. More frighteningly still, we have our own Newspeak. Sacked workers are ‘downsized’, driftnetted dolphins are ‘bycatch’, dissenters are ‘unAustralian’, promises are ‘core’ or ‘non-core’, refugees are ‘cashed-up queue-jumpers’, and freedom, justice, equality are all captured by ‘GDP’ or ‘America’. As in Oceania, the oligarchs, public relations experts and bureaucrats are taking our language apart and putting it back together again. *Gestell* has beset *poiēsis*.

However, there is more to fear in our time than the Newspeak of bureaucrats and spin doctors. It is superficiality that endangers our culture. Due to technological rationality, egocentric individualism and the spread of capitalism, culture has become a ‘thing’ to be carved up, sold, bought, exchanged and thrown away for individual gratification.

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Language itself has become a commodity to be used and discarded for personal profit. This does not mean, however, we have an ordered, coherent language like Orwell’s Newspeak. Rather, as we have seen in Hollywood, *The Age* and the New Age, the spread of technological rationality and capitalism has increased the amount of instability and uncertainty in our culture. This has also occurred in advertising, politics, music and television.¹ While scientific, political and economic jargon is ordered and reordered around us, the disorder of our everyday words is growing at a frightening pace.

As Posner argues, we are endangered here by a kind of ‘semiotic pollution’.² Posner explains this with concepts such as ‘signifier’, ‘signified’, ‘context’, ‘channel’ and ‘code’. While the former three are fairly straightforward, the latter two mean respectively the medium of the semiosis, and semiotic relationship between signifier and signified. As channels become filled with ‘noise’, it is harder to differentiate relevant from irrelevant signifiers. When polysemy – what Posner calls ‘homonymy’ – occurs, there are too many signified for one signifier. This causes the relationship between signifier and signified to be corrupted. Lastly, a context can become polluted, so that we cannot decode’ our messages. Obviously, these three processes can imply one another. For example, ‘noise’ in a channel is the result of technological ‘colonisation’ so that it is ‘flooded’ with information. This technological spread also colonises heterogeneous contexts, which creates confusion between what Posner calls the ‘semiosis-partners’. Signifiers have no meaningful relation to the signified.

In capitalist *Gestell*, we have all these processes corrupting our words. As forms of technological control and manipulation spread, we have access to more and more Worlds. Commodification, in turn, estranges the words from these Worlds, treating them as ‘things’. In this process, the relationships between the signifiers and signified are muddled, and so the words become meaningless, as did ‘karma’. In Posner’s account, this corruption is worsened as the physical environment is polluted. Increasing emails, mobile calls, street noise and smog make it more difficult to even see and hear, and thus to talk and be heard. These are also associated with capitalist *Gestell*, with its

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¹ See Appendix II, p.415, Appendix IV, p.419, Appendix VI, p.422, and Appendix IX, p.428
consumption, waste and technologies of automated communication. In this sense, *Gestell* pollutes ‘semiotic ecosystems’ as it pollutes biological ecosystems.

This ‘pollution’, in turn, is accelerated by the ‘process’ nature of language we articulated earlier. Precisely because language is a process, the further consequences of commodification are not so easy for us to foresee. Language, and the Being it brings forth, is not a simple tool that we may turn on and off, or use and casually discard. Rather, it is a process with its own ‘logic’, a ‘logic’ that may drive its own creative development like a cancer when the processes are unconstrained. The word ‘cyber’, for example, was constrained within the scientific World for about four decades. This, in turn, was associated with a given symbolic capital within a given field. However, once William Gibson allowed it out into popular culture, the word was torn from the narrative World that constrained it. When ‘cyber’ was spoken in the new World, its previously constrained semantic potentials were unconstrained and actualised, often all at once, and rarely consistently. This led to more use in more new contexts, which led to more inconsistent actualisation, which led to more use, and so on and so forth. At the same time, ‘cyber’ retained the symbolic capital of the scientific field, now ‘exchanged’ for cultural or social capital. Eventually ‘cyber’ lost its metaphorical origins in Greek, and became a mere prefix for superficial ‘counterfeit’ neologisms, a kind of *Neuromancer* doublespeak. ‘Cybernetics’ soon became ‘cyberspace’, which became ‘cyber-degree’, ‘cyber-class’, ‘cyberactors’, ‘cyberworld citizenry’, ‘cyberthing’, ‘cyberNewt Gingrich’, ‘cyberpopulis’, ‘cyberevents’, ‘cyberium’, and so on. A similar semantic corruption is occurring with the word ‘karma’, though without the development of neologisms. In each case, the destruction of cultural constraints leads to a kind of positive feedback that ‘generates’ cancerous words in a World.

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1 See pp.63-66, above.
3 Cervini, E. (24/3/98), ‘Virtually, a cyber-degree’, *The Age*, p.20
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

2. Superficiality and Popular Culture
Consequently, like Kauffman’s autocatalytic replication of polymers,\(^1\) language is partly a kind of self-creating process. Like processes in an ecosystem, this creativity is grounded in a deeper and wider environment – a narrative World. Just like an ecosystem, this World requires a deep regard to do it justice. We articulated this regard with our Aristotelian account, and the deep appropriation of the Satnami, African-Americans and other. With our superficiality, of course, this justice is lost. As a result, while commodification has spread ever so steadily and predictably, it has produced a unsteady and unpredictable mass of commodified cultural ‘things’, circulating back and forth between cultures. These ‘things’, including many words, have been so torn from their origins that they no longer mean anything, and can only serve to control and confuse. Indeed, as in Nineteen-Eighty-Four, the confusion feeds the control, and vice versa. Order gives us disorder, disorder gives us order. Therefore, it is not Newspeak that we must fear. Rather, we are in danger of being reduced to ethical, political and artistic impotence by doublespeak and doublethink.

vii. Tragedy: No Justice, No Freedom

This portrait of our world is tragic. It is tragic for its saddening ends, and for its nihilistic picture of cultural life. With our superficial ethos, the narratives of ancient cultures are reduced to ‘things’ to be exchanged like uranium ore. At the same time, the autobiographies of people like Verity Lynn are deprived of their dignified potential. Feeling hollow or like ‘anxious stutterers’, these people sought stories to help them make sense of their lives. They were trying to overcome their ennui. There is nothing unjust in this. On the contrary, the search for sanctity in this world of Gestell is to be heartily commended. However, many people, as Root writes, “cannot seem to imagine that exchange could take place outside of the consumption of commodities in a system regulated by capitalist exchange.”\(^2\) Similarly, those seeking enlightenment, education, or inspiration are left with ‘virtual universities’ and their educational simulacra, or generations of exhausted academics with no symbolic, social, cultural or economic capital.\(^3\) Culture, as Baudrillard puts it, is consumed.\(^1\)

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\(^3\) See pp.201-250, below.
Certainly, this is why a respectable newspaper like *The Age* can commodify ‘karma’. Indeed, *The Age* even prints stories where the writer “goes shopping”\(^2\) for religions, and glibly chooses “pieces of everything.”\(^3\) This superficial appropriation is practiced as part of the modern *habitus*, for cultural creativity has been reduced to the consumption of hollow signs. As Bourdieu writes, this “*habitus* tends to generate all those ‘reasonable’, ‘common-sense’, behaviours…which are possible within the limits of [a field’s objective] regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned” \(^4\). Indeed, we may see that the “commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing…”\(^5\).

Thus, people defend commodification by saying “it’s not like they’re hurting anyone…why don’t you leave them alone?”\(^6\) Another ‘everyday’ response is simply that “it’s just a harmless wank”\(^7\) or, worse still, that “it’s just consumption”\(^8\). In the latter case, it was not a New Ager speaking, but a medical student with an exceptional educational record. It is as if capitalist consumption, with its mechanistic and egoistic character, can be inflicted upon the World without irreparable damage being done to humans’ Being, and beings. Capitalist *Gestell* is ‘common sense’, and with it comes our *ethos* of superficiality.

We have seen this superficiality in cinema, television, advertising, politics, New Age ‘philosophy’, management ‘philosophy’ and mainstream media. Superficiality is our *ethos*. Once-radical hip-hop has moved away from the *epoché*, and become “the only art form that celebrates capitalism openly.”\(^9\) While some political content remains,\(^10\) hip-hop is mostly another form of consumption. The tension between liberation, on the one hand, and violence, misogyny and drug abuse, on the other,\(^11\) seems to have been flattened out as both camps have become commodities for the mainstream. Rather than

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2 Nancarrow, K. (15/7/01), ‘Choosing Your Religion’, *The Age*, SUNDAY LIFE MAGAZINE, p.8
5 Marx, K. (1977), *Capital*, Volume 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.76
6 Acquaintance A (28/8/99), personal communication, speaking about psychics who were fraudulent.
7 Male Student (1997), 3rd Year Undergraduate Literature Class, personal communication
8 Acquaintance B (4/1/99), personal communication
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

subversively appropriating from the hegemon, hip-hop has become “a consumer fetish for buppies, yuppies, and young consumers”\(^1\), corrupted by capitalism and *Gestell*. Kitwana makes a similar argument.\(^2\) As a result, millions of white, middle-class teens greet each other with ‘wassup nigga?’\(^3\) The punk and hippie movements have been similarly commodified.\(^4\) Consequently, we see now why these movements have been prevented from developing a just culture. The World they work within has been hollowed out. At the same time, the strong narrative World of Judaism produces millionaires like Spielberg, Geffen and Katzenberg, who in turn destroy the story of Moses with *The Prince of Egypt*. Perhaps even more absurdly, national tragedies like the bombing of the World Trade Centre become a General Motors marketing strategy.\(^5\)

Meanwhile, language itself is corrupted, so that these injustices cannot even be properly spoken of.

Our superficial World, then, is characterised by much injustice. Cultural narratives and individual autobiographies are not given their dues. Our language, and the language of others, is hollowed out. This does an injustice to millions of people as we become unable to give them their dues. Moreover, it makes further justice within our culture impossible, as people are unable to gather their difference through speech in any kind of a *polis*. We are stuck at the shallow high end of the cognitive spectrum, but without the depth of the specialist. We cannot undertake grounded dialogue with others, or even with one another. Thus, our own sense of justice, our appreciation of internal practices and goods, is compromised.

Consequently, we are also lacking freedom. Freedom for a narrative World is grounded in the way in which it creatively reveals Being, and the many forms of scientific, literary, technological, political, ethical, aesthetic and gastronomic expression that stem from this Being.\(^6\) Taking only free gastronomic expression, we can clearly see the the difference between Greece and Turkey, and our own modern Anglo-American culture. In Greece, the olives, cheese and wine are grounded in myths, rituals, socioeconomic

\(^{3}\) Guiliani, R. (25/8/01), ‘N is for no-no’, *Good Weekend*, p.54
\(^{5}\) Lewis, J. (28/10/01), ‘Darker sides of US patriotism’, *The Sunday Age*, p.13
\(^{6}\) See p.77, above.
status and countless practices with internal goods. Similarly, in Turkey the pide, the raki and the sweets are grounded in centuries of rich cultural life. On the other hand, we have MacDonalds, Starbucks or Hungry Jack’s. Rather than creatively developing an ‘essential law’ of cultural richness, we see in our modern world what can only be called ‘food simulacra’. We are too shallow to creatively develop our own food. As Ritzer puts it, the “clowns, the cartoon characters, the setting (a carnival, a ranch, a pirate ship) all promise excitement, [but w]hat could be less exciting to most Americans than eating yet another fast-food hamburger, chicken wing, or pizza slice?”¹ This ‘fast-food’ culture conceals the bland homogeneity of its commodity consumption behind the novel heterogeneity of a stolen veneer. The same could be said for music, education, politics and fine art. At the same time, deconstructive postmodernism ‘kills the author’ so that “there is no essential difference between…Kafka and a Kleenex ad.”² Devoid of history, we have lost Leavis or Kitto and gained McLiterary Criticism.

Consequently, we have ‘choice’, but we are not free. This veneer of pirates, ranches, Japanese Geishas and Aztec mozaics is simply the manufactured superficial appropriation of the creative expression of others’ cultural freedom. We lack freedom of our own ‘essential law’, and so we replace it with the stolen images, icons, flavours and costumes of others. In doing so, we do both Worlds an injustice. As we have seen, this injustice is itself prefaced on another kind of unfreedom. As we have no sense of the ‘major premises’ of our narrative World, we cannot freely contribute to it. We have neither the uncritical creativity of the faithful Jews, nor the critical creativity of the Satnami. Thus, we are in no position to creatively Be-in-the-world. Rather, we act in spite of our World and its shallowness, while stealing ‘signs’ from the Worlds of those we exploit, impoverish and imprison. We act freely, but we are neither ontically nor existentielly free.

viii. The Triumph of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke

These are the global scars of superficiality. Justice is lost, and with it the hopes of Aristotle, Vico, Herder, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger and so many others. Certainly, as we

¹ Ritzer, G. (1997), Postmodern Social Theory, MacGraw-Hill, New York, p.229
saw earlier, this academic tradition allows us to see this corruption and superficiality.¹ These thinkers and their tradition allow us to ‘stand outside’ the shallowness of our World and look with a critical eye. Moreover, there are thousands of academics writing papers, teaching courses, and marking theses drawing on these thinkers. However, as a cultural tradition it is weak, marginalised or corrupted by the postmodern contempt for tradition.²

We have therefore given an account of the kind of World within which Jasmuheen can flourish. It is a superficial World. We do not have a World characterised by culture, creativity and open-endedness. Rather, we see here a World wherein individual egoists blindly pursue self-interest. As language is not seen as the ‘common property’ of those in a World, this individualist pursuit is undertaken by appropriating from the Worlds of others. Moreover, however divided these people are by egoism, they are also united by a system of global capitalist manipulation and control that embodies the worst elements of technological rationality and mechanism. This global system, in turn, commodifies the Worlds that are appropriated from. The high end of Gelernter’s spectrum is no longer the mark of the specialist. Rather, this atomistic, mechanistic and individualistic ‘frame of mind’ encompasses everything, and even popular opposition to it is shallow and vulgar. Deep appropriation is therefore impossible for most. Rather than a world characterised by self-organising processes of creative development, we have a mechanical mass of self-seeking atoms. Rather than purposeful, meaningful physis to be respected, ‘nature’ is a mass of superficially appropriated anthropomorphisations to be worshipped, or a dead machine to be exploited. In short, we see here the final triumph of the worldview of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. These thinkers, who would have most misunderstood the sensus communis of Aristotle and Vico, have themselves become the ‘common sense’. Sadly, this ‘common sense’ is corrupting the polyphonic narrative World, debasing both the stories we live and learn, and the language in which we know and speak them.

¹ See p.74, above.
² Gare, A. (1995), Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, Routledge, London, pp.4-35;

166 2. Superficiality and Popular Culture
ix. The Need for a New Narrative

With superficiality, the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes, Locke and their tradition has ‘won’. What is required is not a reconceptualisation of the ontological and ethical postulates of this tradition. Similarly, a rearticulation of the importance of Aristotle, Herder or Heidegger will not enable most people to overcome their superficiality. Rather, what is required is a bold new vision of justice, freedom and the ‘essence’ of the narrative World. We must, in other words, take another ‘speculative flight’. It is to this task that we will now turn.
3. CONFRONTING SUPERFICIALITY: CHORUS, UTOPIA AND ETHICAL WEAKNESS

It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood.

Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.218

The shallow ‘logic’ of the Epicurean tradition has corrupted our culture. We have distorted our own nature by abjuring community, creativity and the narrative World. Moreover, this very same ‘logic’ has undermined our ability to change the situation. As we are unable to communicate within our own narratives, comprehend history, or engage with culture creatively, our efforts result in instrumental manipulation, commodification and meaninglessness.

In order to overcome superficiality, it is therefore essential that we redevelop our narrative World so that our traditions are creative. Rather than commodifying our culture and that of others, we should learn the many stories of our World, and emplot these in a grand narrative the makes sense of unity and difference. This would enable us to live in accordance with the vision of the narrative World we earlier articulated. We would be able to live out our narratives in a way that integrated our stories’ pasts, presents and futures with one another, and with the myriad individuals that take these stories up. Rather than individualistic self-gratification, we therefore require a narrative form that affirms justice and freedom, and gives individuals and group the power to develop their selves.

By articulating such a vision, we undertake two tasks in accordance with Whitehead’s proposed ‘take-offs, flights and landings’. That is, we integrate speculative imagination with concrete analyses. First, we give ourselves a vision of what should be; a goal that we may uphold in opposition to Hobbesian alternatives. Second, we enable ourselves to take stock of the past and present inadequacies of our culture from the perspective of this vision. As this vision confronts the reality of our Epicureanism and is corrupted, further characteristics of superficiality are revealed. By taking a speculative ‘flight’
with a vision of justice and freedom in the narrative World, we are therefore better able to grasp the characteristics of the superficial ground as we ‘land’. Consequently, there is again this to-and-fro between speculation and ‘facts’, imagination and critical analyses of our facticity.

We will begin this hermeneutic spiral by proposing a speculative vision of the kind of collaborative role necessary for justice and freedom in the narrative World. This role is the ‘Chorus’. The Chorus is a vision of what a narrative would look like if it were the embodiment of the Aristotelian tradition as we have articulated it. It draws on the same principles as our articulation of the narrative World, including the roles of character, audience and storyteller. It is concerned with justice and freedom, and the just development of power. It allows us to gain a sense of what is necessary to overcome superficiality, by upholding diversity in unity, and the importance of history, imagination and critique.

However, this proposal will also demonstrate how difficult it is to overcome superficiality, even when we have a vision of polyphonic justice. By undertaking a brief history of universities from the perspective of the Chorus, we are able to see how universities – particularly in Australia – have frequently failed to develop a Chorus. Rather, they have been corrupted by external monarchs, empire or governments, or internal orthodoxy, narrow-mindedness or embodied Epicureanism. In contemporary Australian universities, the ‘logic’ of capitalist *Gestell* has utterly corrupted academic culture. Universities have been reduced to factories, where academics produce branded information commodities to be consumed by student consumers. Consequently, in moving from our speculative Choral flight to the ground of history, it is argued that the Chorus is a utopia.

In order to defend the Chorus and, *mutatis mutandis*, our vision of the narrative World, it is then necessary to defend utopia. This is achieved by turning to the work of Plato, particularly *The Republic*. Popper and others have claimed that Plato’s work represents the danger of utopianism, in that its depiction of the ideal *polis* requires tyranny and bloodshed. However, by examining the role of Socrates in Plato’s work, we can see that the ground of the Platonic *polis* is not tyranny or absolutism, but Socrates. Socrates is Plato’s utopia – he is the embodiment of happiness, justice, freedom and goodness.
Over the millennia, Socrates has been taken up by many great figures as the ideal of moral or intellectual integrity; an existentiell possible to be taken up and lived. In death, Socrates was a utopia; a no-place – or ‘not-yet’ – for people to work towards. Similarly, the Chorus is a utopia; an existentiell possible that we may take up and work towards despite its lack of historical presence.

Having thus defended the utopian Chorus, we then reveal the limits of utopias. Again, we move from a ‘speculative flight’ to the ground of past and present cultural reality. Due to superficiality and the fragmentation of our World, we no longer have the traditions necessary for moral will. While we may be intellectually pursued by the Choral utopia – or any other academic proposal, for that matter – our own rootlessness leaves many people unable to act morally. This is explicated by turning to a historical case study. While Socrates was an inspiring utopian ideal, much esteemed by Alcibiades, the young general was unable to live an ethical life. He had what Aristotle would later call *akrasia*: ethical weakness. Due to superficiality, we as a people have *akrasia*. Even when our beliefs are ethically sound, our lack of a creative tradition means that we often lack the moral integrity to act on these beliefs. As a culture, we are unable to take up utopias; to grasp ethical alternatives to the Epicurean *status quo*.

Lastly, we turn to symbols. Drawing primarily on the work of Ricoeur and Tillich, we see that symbols are creative significations that well up from the depths of the narrative World. Moreover, symbols are inspiring; they urge us on to take up ethical practices and fight for our beliefs. In this sense, symbols can overcome collective *akrasia*, and enable us to uphold utopian visions such as the Chorus. However, as is argued by thinkers such as Baudrillard and Klein, our symbolic realm has been hollowed out by capitalism. Rather than symbols, we have branded commodities. By investigating symbols, then, we not only develop further our account of cultural creativity, but also our characterisation of superficiality. Superficiality renders us ‘homeless’ – devoid of a creative relation to place, people and history, and the symbols that rise up from these. This theme of ‘homelessness’ is then further investigated in the penultimate chapter, showing the symbolic decay of ‘home’ in canonic texts from Homer to contemporary cinema.
Consequently, by again moving between flights and landings, we reveal more of superficiality. We see that superficiality not only commodifies our culture and that of others, but also corrupts our universities, undermines our ethical will and hollows out our creative symbols. For now, however, we should address the Chorus. To develop our understanding of the Chorus, we must turn to Classical Greece, for this was its World.

A. The Chorus

Greek tragedy does its thinking in a form which is vastly more politically advanced than the society which produced Greek tragedy.

- Edith Hall, ‘The sociology of Athenian tragedy’, p.125

i. Athens, Tragedy and the Chorus

Certainly, compliments flow freely about Homeric and Classical Greece as a whole. It is Athens, however, that most captures our imagination. Jaeger often lets flow a torrent of praise when Athens is mentioned. In his funeral oration, Pericles called Athens an “education to Greece”. De Burgh refers to Athens as “the chief political and commercial city of the Hellenic world, whither flowed all the currents of literature, art, and knowledge.” While there has been much idealisation of the Athenian polis, there can be no doubt that its gifts were many. Indeed, we will explore one particular gift of Athens: the Chorus of Greek tragedy. First, however, we should come to terms with tragedy itself.

Tragedy developed in its extant form in the early fifth-century, and was usually a telling or retelling of stories from Homeric and Hesiodian myth. It was performed in a large outdoor theatre by two or three main actors, and a Chorus of fifteen. The main actors performed in the skênē, a stage towards the rear of the theatre, while the Chorus

4 Pericles, cited in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II.4. §6
occupied the *orchestra*, a large circular area near the audience. While the Chorus, true to its bardic and lyrical origins, danced and sang, the main actors played out the roles and responded to the words of the Chorus. By the time of Pericles, a large area under the Acropolis was set aside for such performances, and tens of thousands of Athenians gathered there during the great festival of Dionysus, at the expense of private philanthropists and the state, to watch the playwrights compete. By the end of the fifth-century, the City Dionysia was a major Greek festival, second only in prestige and popularity to the great Olympian festival of the northern Peloponnese.\(^2\)

However, and contrary to much contemporary drama, this was not a decadent escape from the realities of the *polis*. As Pericles told his fellow Athenians, “love of what is beautiful does not lead to extravagance; our love of the things of the mind does not make us soft. […] Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well”\(^3\). This spirit of intellect and imagination was not to be found anywhere else in Greece, least of all in major centres such as Lacadaemonia. While Sparta raised its children with military austerity, Athens combined its naval supremacy with the poetry, dance and song of the theatre. Indeed, as Meier writes, the “poetry and tragedy were just as crucial politically for fifth-century Attic life as were the council of the popular assembly”\(^4\). Thus, what we call ‘Greek tragedy’ was actually unique to Athens.\(^5\) Moreover, tragedy cannot be understood outside the philosophical, theological, social, political and ethical life of Pericles’ great city. Indeed, tragedy was a great turning point in the history of Athens and, in turn, Western civilisation. Quite simply, the Athenians ‘remade’ themselves, and did this partly through tragic theatre.

As we saw earlier in the work of Herder, Hegel, Marx and others, by ‘making’ the world, we ‘make’ ourselves. For Marx, for instance, our creative labour enables us to see ourselves ‘objectified’ in the world. Thus, each person “contemplates himself in a

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3 Pericles, cited in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, II.4.§5
world that he has created”, and through such contemplation develops another sense of self. This, in turn, means that our ‘nature’ can be developed and redeveloped in time. Drawing on the work of Marx, Vernant shows how the production of tragedy in fifth-century Athens ‘made’ people specifically capable of participating in democratic cultural life. Pozzi makes a similar argument. By taking pre-Dorian myths from the Homeric renaissance and presenting them to the Athenian audience, the playwrights objectified the cultural tradition of the polis. This enabled the audience of Athenian mimēsis to distinguish between myth per se and creative storytelling for the first time. This made action and speech a somewhat ‘distant’ object of critique, debate and reflection. In this sense, and “[t]hrough the interplay of dialogue and the clash between the major protagonists and the chorus, and through the reversals of fortune…, the legendary hero…becomes the subject of debate”. This critical reflexivity, in turn, was essential for healthy democracy. Moreover, by enabling the citizens of Athens to fear hubris, reject egoistic individualism, and embrace nomos, justice and ethical ideals, tragedy developed an emotional commitment to democracy. The latent ‘laws’ of the polis were made explicit and wedded to, in Freud’s language, the libido of the community. In this process, that which was “primary potential and in need of being shaped” in the Athenian people qua ‘political animals’ was actualised by what Aristotle calls katharsis, meaning distillation, purification, or purging. In this sense, by ‘distilling’ Athenians down to the telos of their political nature, tragedy was “crucial to the successful actualization of a good democracy”. Also, by acquainting the largely illiterate Athenians with rich legal and poetic language, tragedy gave its audience the ‘tools’ for complex debate and, indeed, enabled them to properly do justice to multiple points of view. With tragedy, then, an Aristotelian kind of debate and difference was

6 Ibid., p.301
7 Ibid., p.303
wedded to the intellectual faculty of critical reflexivity, and the emotional faculties of fear, sympathy and so forth.

Thus, the performance of tragic stories was an essential part of Athenian cultural and particularly democratic, life. As Vasillopulos tells us, “[in] Athens tragedy and democracy emerged together. […] Tragedy schooled Athenians in the political in a way that universities can only approximate”. Jaeger goes as far as to say that the “undisputed supremacy of Attic tragedy, which lasted for one hundred years, coincided chronologically and spiritually with the rise, greatness and decline of the secular power of Athens.” Even in Aristophanes’ Frogs, written as democratic Athens declined, it is political savvy and not dramatic style that eventually decides between Aeschylus and Euripides. Cartledge even goes as far as to say that the performance of tragic narrative was more democratic than the Athenian assembly. Certainly, with Greek tragedy, social and political culture, narrative and intellectual life converged with the ethos of each Athenian citizen in a way never seen before. Tragedy ‘made’ democratic citizens capable of saying ‘we’, rather than simply ‘I’.

Central to this convergence was the character of the Chorus. Moreover, we will see that the role of the Chorus in tragedy, properly understood, is essential to just cultural life as we have articulated it. The Choral role, properly ‘played’, would allow us to do justice to ourselves, each other and our narrative Worlds, within the stubborn finitude of our common mortality. Indeed, if modern intellectuals played this role, we would not be so


3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
superficial. What, however, is the Choral role? To answer this question, we will begin with some simple insights from the work of Aristotle, and gradually build a more complex picture of the Chorus in relation to tragedy and, more importantly, to the narrative World. The result of this will be an existentiel vision worth grasping, an ideal that allows us to ‘step back’ and criticise the past and present, and a more detailed characterisation of justice, freedom and power.

ii. The Chorus, Polyphony and the Parrhēsiastēs

In Poetics, Aristotle writes that the “Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and take a share of the action – that which it has in Sophocles rather than Euripides.”\(^1\) Aristotle’s argument is important because it explains two extreme roles played by our Chorus, roles we should avoid. Firstly, in Aeschylus (525-455\(\text{BCE}\)) the Chorus sings and speaks the tale while the two actors simply ‘give flesh’ to the performance. Secondly, in Euripides (484-406\(\text{BCE}\)) the three actors perform the story while the Chorus interjects but often remains aloof.\(^2\) In each case, the Chorus is somewhat outside of the story. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, for example, the Chorus is aware of the impending death of their King.\(^3\) They do nothing while Agamemnon is murdered.\(^4\) We may find similar scenes in Euripides’ Medea.\(^5\) In each extreme, the Chorus is detached from the story, either as an ‘objective bard’ or an ‘indifferent interjector’. This is not to say that these are not valid ‘literary devices’.\(^1\) For our purposes, however, they are dangerous. This kind of approach to intellectual and academic life leads to an elitist ‘ivory tower’ mentality, where radical political participation is reduced to a polite perpetuation of the ‘great seminar room’. Such extremes are too aloof for the justice of Being-in-the-World. This is not to say that Aristotle was right to see these extremes in Aeschylus and Euripides, only that these extremes exist, and are dangerous. For now, then, we should turn to Sophocles (496-406\(\text{BCE}\)), the favourite of Aristotle and friend to Pericles and Herodotus. This will help us to narrow down the role we wish our contemporary Chorus to play.

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1. Aristotle, Poetics, 1456a:25
3. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1335-1345
4. Ibid., 1367-1390
5. Euripides, Medea, 790-865, 1050ff, 1240-1300
In Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Creon must somehow avert Tireisias’ ghastly prophecy of doom. Here, the Chorus has a ‘feel’ for the story and, as Aristotle says, is a character in the story. Because of this, it may help Creon to understand his role, and do justice to Antigone and her unburied brother by telling the relevant stories. We can also see this in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* where, after passionate dialogue, the Chorus allows justice to be eventually done by Oedipus. Indeed, similar examples abound in the work of Sophocles. However, and contra Aristotle, we can find an even better example of such choral justice in Euripides’ *Medea*. Here, the Chorus advises Medea and Jason on matters of justice, sings of relevant mythical and historical stories, and, most importantly, helps to develop the case of each character. This also occurs in other works by Euripides. The Chorus attempts to create what Bakhtin calls a “freedom for others’ points of view to reveal themselves.” Thus, as Calame writes, the interventions of the tragic choreutai engage in a real polyphony, in the Bakhtinian meaning of the word. Masked productions and, more generally, the context of the cult in honour of Dionysos, have the effect of referring back to the public as spectator, as ‘you’, the drama in which it is invited to take part as a choral actor, as ‘we’…

As Calame indicates, the Chorus here helps to create what Bakhtinian ‘polyphony’, or ‘many-voicedness’. In Sophocles, for instance, the characters are not merely

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3 Sophocles, *Antigone*, 1091-1108  
4 Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 219-293  
5 *Oedipus Rex*, 409-412, 521-529, 614-688; *Oedipus at Colonus*, 456-555, 725-1015; *Ajax*, 370-645, 1116-1222; *Electra*, 177-255  
6 Euripides, *Medea*, 326-662  
7 Euripides, *Medea*, 576-579  
8 Ibid., 326-445  
9 Ibid., 767-811  
10 *Ion*, 1220-1260; *Helen*, 300-352; and *Women of Troy*, 967-970, though the tone of the Chorus in *Helen* is ironic.  

3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
phantoms, or puppets, but appear as if “begotten upon life by necessity”\(^1\). Their voices are human and diverse. It is not a finalising authoritarian voice that ‘fixes’ the characters, but the characters themselves\(^2\), and then only contingently.\(^3\) While Bakhtin does not see tragedy *per se* as polyphonic,\(^4\) we must remember that the tragic performance itself was set within what Bakhtin describes as the ‘carnivalesque’.\(^5\) Though tragedy often gave Apollo and Zeus their dues, this was nonetheless a Dionysian festival, and “Dionysus was the god not only of wine but also of the mask, of stepping outside oneself and identifying with others.”\(^6\) Indeed, Dionysus was the god of illusion and mirage.\(^7\) Under the sway of this god, tragedy often introduced heterogeneity into the homogeneity of the everyday. Moreover, despite its important connection to the mythic and political traditions of the *polis*, the Chorus itself is often a marginalised, powerless, or vulnerable group, suddenly given voice.\(^8\) Here, voices other than the elite may be heard, and the values of orthodoxy may be brought to light and questioned.

The Chorus here is like the *parrhēsiastēs*, or ‘truth-teller’, of the Athenian *polis*. The *parrhēsiastēs* was a courageous character,\(^9\) who had a ‘contract’ with the *polis* to always tells the truth,\(^10\) criticise wrongdoing,\(^11\) and to risk his self each time.\(^12\) Indeed, Socrates was a *parrhēsiastēs*.\(^13\) Like a *parrhēsiastēs*, the Chorus plays its role within the World by revealing the polyphonic truth of this World, criticising superficiality, and risking its self each time it does so. This self may be risked through violence, exile, or

\(^3\) *Ibid.*, p.63  
\(^9\) Foucault, M. (2001), *Fearless Speech*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, p.15  
\(^12\) *Ibid.*, p.16, pp.18-19  
\(^13\) *Ibid.*, pp.96-101
loss of prestige due to criticism, but the Chorus takes these risks with courage within the parrhēsiastic ‘contract’. This ‘contract’ allows us, in turn, to understand the place of characters within a larger narrative and, in doing so, treat one another as real, full consciousnesses within real, full cultures. By balancing the facticity of polis and myth with the transcendence of individual autobiography, the Chorus has an “authoritative collective voice, but surrounds it with other dissenting voices.”

With our Chorus, then, Bakhtinian polyphony is created by making the performance of the narrative an ongoing process of reevaluating the success of themselves and other characters in learning, living and critiquing their respective roles and the roles of others with whom they share stories. Consequently, if we had this parrhēsiastic ‘contract’ with the Chorus, we would not be so superficial. We would have a deep regard for the stories of others, similar to that which we articulated earlier.

iii. The Chorus: Polyphony, Paideia and the ‘I’

By coming to terms with the work of Bakhtinian polyphony in this manner, we may also reaffirm the insights of Vygotsky, who had much in common with the Bakhtinian Circle. This done, we are able to associate the Chorus with childhood development, and thus education more generally. Reconciled with Vygotsky, the tutoring of the Chorus is not a matter of abject socialisation, or ‘brainwashing’. Rather, it is the development of character through collaboration, dialogue and, as implied by the Aristotelian use of the term ‘katharsis’, the recognition of potential. This tutoring, as Holquist writes of Bakhtin and Vygotsky, “is not intentionally directed in any trivial sense toward specific goals, beyond that of teaching the world’s difference and

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1 Ibid., p.16, pp.18-19
3 See p.95, above.
diversity.”1 Here, education is not paideia in its narrower Platonic sense,2 nor is it Bildung as corrupted by many of the German aristocracy and bourgeoisie. 3 The role of the Chorus creates the conditions for “individual, organic self-development…”4, prefaced on a deep relation to society, history, culture, politics and art. In this sense, when we are emploted by the Chorus, we are amateurs rather than dilettantes in fields other than our own. As we see in the life and work of Goethe,5 an amateur is more humble, honest and deep than a dilettante. Dilettantes have an arrogant, trivial and shallow understanding of the various fields. Amateurs, however, know their ignorance in these fields, and respect the symbolic capital of experts in each. Consequently, they seek to systematically develop at least a competence in them, so that they may enjoy, appreciate and even judge their fruit. Moreover, they may develop this competence through practical experience, so that the abstractions of the field are grounded in sensuous and emotional life. In our terms, amateurism envolves critically Being-in-the-World, and appreciating the creative capacity of others to do the same. While this is nurtured by the Chorus, as we have seen, it also involves the development of competence so that the ‘experts’ of the Chorus may be judged. Put simply, then, our Chorus affirms amateur depth over dilettante superficiality. This is the paideia of Periclean Athens, and the Bildung of Herder, Goethe and Humboldt,6 grounded in emplotted polyphony.

Consequently, we need not, like Fotopoulos, be concerned that people will be trapped by ‘tradition’ into a process of socialisation aimed at conformity.7 As we have seen, tradition need not be mere sediment.8 Rather, it is the ground of our open-ended

2 Plato, Republic, 377b; Laws, 671c
8 See p.72, above.
creative horizons, and these horizons can be critiqued, as can the Chorus. With this notion of tradition also comes a notion of ‘character’, or ethos. This notion of character is, in the words of Bourdieu, “very far from being a mechanistic process of inculcation.”¹ By situating people within polyphonic narratives, helping them to understand and critique their roles, and mediating between rival perceptions and claims, the Chorus gives infants, children and adults the opportunity to develop within truly deep dialogue, filled with the tensions, possibilities and inspirations of ‘Other’. This makes so-called ‘academic’ dialogue become truly just dialogue. Even the ‘one-sided’ Medea has a place in this dialogue. When “in Euripides’ Medea Greek confronts Barbarian, and Man confronts Woman…[,]tragic experience [is] considered conducive to the formation of a better informed and more self-aware community”.² Thus, Medea’s one-sidedness does not destroy the polyphony of the narrative. On the contrary, this merely shows how real polyphony can be undermined by a character’s one-sidedness. As Kitto argues, Medea is a stark, willful, single-minded character because people like her are real.³ This is true polyphony, for only true polyphony acknowledges the possibility of its absence. The same, of course, could be said for the polis of Aristotle, where polyphony often degenerates into cacophony.

Certainly, this polyphony is not a case of ‘anything goes’. The possibility of absence indicated by Medea is taken by the Chorus as a possibility for change. For instance, having mediated between Medea and Jason, the Chorus is later confronted by Medea’s ruthless dividedness. Here, the Chorus simply says “I tell you, from a heart that wishes you well yet would not break mankind’s laws, do not do this thing.”⁴ Similarly, our Chorus may say to Agamemnon and Teucer, “[t]he best advice I can offer is that you should both become more reasonable”⁵, or say to Electra and Chrysothemis, “[f]or the gods’ sake, do not quarrel. There is something to be said on either side, and each might learn a lesson from the other.”¹ These are examples of the Chorus acting as a parrhēsiastēs. With a parrhēsiastic ‘contract’, they courageously help to create the conditions for polyphony, and then try to fight injustice within this polyphony.

⁴ Euripides, Medea, 811-813. Later, of course, the Chorus acts more like the old men of Agamemnon.
⁵ Sophocles, Ajax, 1270
Notably, these examples mostly come from Sophocles, though Euripides’ *Medea* is similarly developed. In each case, a deep regard for others’ stories is created, so that we cannot take from them what is not ours, or deny them their dues as creative, open-ended Beings-in-the-world. This, in turn, fights superficiality.

**iv. The Chorus: Polyphony and the World**

However, this ‘fight’ is not taken up simply by doing justice to individual characters and their roles. As Taplin writes, “in so far as tragedy teaches, it does so through the work *as a whole*, through the way that human life is portrayed.” The Chorus also tries to emplot the characters within the unity of the narrative World as a whole. It is not just Medea, Agamemnon, Oedipus and Antigone, that are relevant to polyphony. It is also Aphrodite, Zeus, Pallas, Cepheus, Narcissus and the lands of myth. Consider the Chorus’ oral tribute to Colonus from *Oedipus at Colonus*, where we read of “Cepheus’ slow meandering streams,” and the places where Aphrodite “rides with golden reins.” Here, by ‘bringing to light’ the past, the Chorus helps the characters become part of a larger plot. This happens again and again in Greek tragedy. When the Chorus of *Medea* tells us the story of ‘babes slain in days of yore’, it is, as Murray writes,

> the echo of many cries of children from the beginning of the world, children who are now at peace and whose ancient pain has become part mystery and part music. Memory – that memory who was mother of the Muses – has done her work upon it.

Certainly, this is somewhat of a vindication of the Euripidean Chorus. More importantly, though, we see here the effect of the narrative World on the present, and the role of memory in unforgetting this World. As Baldry argues, the Chorus deepened the meaning of the action, and unified the story. The dividedness of the characters can

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1 Sophocles, *Electra*, 370-373
3 Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 675-91
therefore be reconciled with the undividedness of the overall story and with one another. With polyphony, we are not dealing with radical homogeneity or heterogeneity, totalitarianism or neo-liberalism. Rather, we are attempting to justly mediate between such extremes. Of course, this idea is nothing new. For the Classical Greeks, the world was not fully ordered nor fully chaotic, but an open-ended cosmos of fruitful tensions.¹ We see this in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides*, written in the earlier democracy of Athens. Athena and the Furies choose “not the golden mediocrity of Delphi which avoids extremes, but in the interplay of one against another, a dialectic, a moral tension.”² We also see this in the Aristotelian virtues,³ and in countless academic mediations of homogeneity and heterogeneity, universalism and relativism, Object and Subject, or in the complexity theorists’ ‘edge of chaos’.

The role of the Chorus is to create this ‘edge of chaos’ in our World. Indeed, Marilyn Taylor has recently linked this notion explicitly to the Choral role.⁴ Born when the “pendulum of civilization [was] halfway between a sacred society and a society built around man”⁵, the Chorus reconciles *hubris* with *moira*, Subject with Object, or individual egotism with the hard lessons of Fate. While we obviously cannot live out the Greeks’ stories of Aphrodite, Apollo and the ‘slow meandering streams of Cephisus’, we should have our own stories of cultures, institutions and people, not to mention lands, birthplaces, graves and so forth. These all help to emplot our one-sided divisions, to help us live on the ‘edge of chaos’. There is no ‘absolutely undetermined’ *ethos*, or ‘absolutely determining’ *nomos*, but a mean between them, mediated by the Choral development and redevelopment of *mythos*. In this sense, the Chorus is essential for the kind of dialectical development we see in the work of Hegel.

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For Hegel, however, Greek tragedy is still quite primitive, a world away from the more ‘civilised’ Romantic art of his time. This is because tragedy tries to ‘fill’ corporeality with Divine Spirit, rather than moving away from corporeality towards the Absolute. Romantic art, on the other hand, turns our consciousness inwards in rational transcendence of the phenomenal Self. Thus, Hegel sees Romantic art as grasping at the Absolute through the Spirit as it is unfolded in the objective world. However, as Bakhtin writes, “the unified, dialectically evolving spirit, understood in Hegelian terms, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue.” We cannot possibly turn inward to grasp the Absolute without a sense of the multiple manifestations of opaque Being around us. We have seen how Hegel’s rational Absolute does not do justice to our somewhat opaque Being-in-the-World. With Schelling, contra Hegel, we should therefore see our historical becoming “as a play in which...we are collaborators of the whole and have ourselves invented the particular roles we play.” This would affirm the insights of Herder and Heidegger. We create and recreate the whole as an ongoing process of creative becoming, where the whole only exists as the unfinished interplay of dialectical tensions. The Absolute is grasped as a narrative of dialectical interplay, rather than as a conceptual self-subsistence. By ‘making’ polyphony, then, the Chorus enables us to approach the Romantic ideal of Hegel, tempered by the Schellingian insights of Heidegger. The Romantic Subjective grasping of the Objective requires the gift of Greek drama.

Consequently, the Chorus does not simply construct or reconstruct an a priori rational Absolute. Rather, our Chorus must seek to ‘remake’ the characters in their concrete actuality, unfinished, one-sided, or otherwise. For every real reflexive, unfinished, confused Raskolnikov, there may indeed be a real, blazing, willing, one-sided Svidrigailov, a “man who really lives as if all things were permissible to him”. For every real Napoleonic Svidrigailov, there may be a real weak, sickly, Sonya. A similar

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The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

point is made by Hirschkop. 1 Polyphony is not just a matter of ontology or existentiality, but of ontic and existentiell creativity. It is a kind of ‘sociology’. In the spirit of the Aristotelian polis, it is not simply a matter of ‘inward’ art, but ‘outward’, everyday human interaction between polyphonic manifestations of Spirit. Moreover, it gives the everyday some depth lacking in Hollywood, the New Age, or the ‘good copy’ world of capitalist media. It gathers difference, while preserving unity and depth, and thus is true logos. 2

iii. The Chorus: Poiēsis, Phronēsis and the ‘Generalised Other’

With this logos, the Chorus overcomes the more dangerous tendencies of Heidegger’s poiēsis. By affirming poiēsis and Being over phronēsis, praxis and beings, Heidegger cannot make sense of everyday political talk. As Heidegger is ontocentric rather than anthropocentric or ecocentric, poiēsis is characterised by an indifference to the everyday of the oikos or polis. The human face of the Holocaust, for example, is irrelevant to Heidegger. 3 However, this could equally be the suffering of AIDS victims of sub-Saharan Africa, the continued bombing of Iraq or the plight of Australia’s indigenous peoples. For Heidegger, as Bernstein writes, “the only response that is really important and appropriate is the response to the silent call of Being, not to the silent screams of our fellow human beings” 4. The ‘dull unity of uniformity’ 5 Heidegger fears can also be the result of misanthropic generalisations like ‘das Man’. 6 As we saw earlier, 7 Eco concurs with this with his accusation of fetishism. Without actual stories of relentless fallenness, the ‘they’ is an academic homogenisation of our World. 8

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7 See p.xxiii, above.
However, Heidegger has not yet ‘boxed himself into a corner’. As with his affirmation of Aristotelian *ethos*, Heidegger allows us to overcome this ontocentrism. Showing a sympathy to Herder, Heidegger writes that we “can only say ‘the same’ if we think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling of differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to light.”¹ This also seems influenced by the Hegelian notion of ‘identity-within-difference’,² though without absolute self-transparency. If we understand this ‘sameness’ anthropologically as well as ontologically and existentially, the Chorus may do justice to the everyday. To overcome the ‘they’, the Chorus must do justice to the stories of actual people, as well as the cultures within which they live. Moreover, they must see how these stories are respected or disrespected.³ This is a case of real dialogical interpenetration of narratives, where “an idea begins to live…only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with the ideas of others.”⁴ These ‘ideas’, of course, are not simply logical concepts, or mental pictures, but our ‘creative revealing’ of Being. If we are all playing the same ‘game’, there are many players, and many ways to play.

The Chorus is therefore a higher stage of human development than the ‘generalised other’ of Mead. Earlier, we saw the similarities between the ‘major premises’ of MacIntyre and the generalised other of Mead.⁵ Both were ‘rules’ that were grounded the particular practices of a community, and in Mead these ‘rules’ constitute the highest stage of development away from egocentrism. However, when extended to narrative Worlds, the generalised other is a somewhat monological notion of community. Certainly, Mead does speak of the integration of societies.⁶ Indeed, his articulation of a community of nations does give an important place to unified difference.⁷ Nonetheless, the ‘universe of discourse’ that Mead articulates is still an abstraction from the World, and grounded in the homogenisation of difference. It is a matter of universalisation, grounded in economic exchange and religious dualisms.⁸ While it allows for a common

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³ See pp.117-135, above.
⁵ See p.70, above.
language, it does so by hollowing out the very particularities that make life creative. With our Chorus, however, these particularities are not simply abstracted or universalised. Rather, they are rearticulated as narratives that may be taken up and lived. Certainly, this requires, as Mead notes, a sense of our many different languages.¹ However, as MacIntyre argues, it is only those who have lived a given narrative tradition that may properly ‘translate’ its words.² By reflexively Being-in-the-World, the Chorus is able to take up these narratives in their depth and breadth, and share them with others without universalising. Thus, the Chorus does not, like Mead, affirm the universality of the conqueror.³ The pax Romana that Mead draws on took Judaism into itself only by distorting its Hebrew particularities. Similarly, the Chorus does not assume that economic forms will be abstract but benign.⁴ Rather, the Chorus acknowledges that capital, for example, has hollowed out our World as it has conquered. As such, the Chorus draws on narratives to give universality and particularity their dues. It does justice to the particularities of each World, and allows each group or individual to play their roles in creatively coming to terms with the polyphony inherent in life. At the same time, the Chorus emplots this polyphony in stories we may take up and live.

Consequently, to develop beyond the generalised other, our Chorus must continually affirm and reaffirm a shared but polyphonic narrative. Only this kind of story can see “in the struggle of opinions and ideologies…of various epochs…an incomplete dialogue on ultimate questions…in the framework of great time”.⁵ In Heidegger’s terms, what is required of narrative World is not the bankrupt ‘equal’ of a homogeneity, but the rich ‘same’ of unified diversity. In Bakhtin’s terms, we require a polyphonic narrative. This is a creative, social and cultural commitment to the sharing of stories. The ‘I’ develops into ‘I’ only with the ‘We’, and the ‘We’ is developed as dialogue, debate or

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¹ Ibid., p.283
⁴ Ibid., p.279, p.289, p.292
⁵ Bakhtin, M.M. (1996), Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, University of Texas Press, Austin, p.151
conflict is overcome.1 This is how the Chorus ‘makes’ polyphony. Polyphony, in turn, would create the conditions for the doing of justice to people and peoples. As the higher stage of development, polyphony allows us to grasp the ‘major premises’ of the World, and then redevelop these to do justice to the diversity of human creativity.

vi. The Chorus: Polyphony, Power, Freedom and Justice

In this sense, polyphony has implications for freedom, justice and power. This is achieved by poetically making explicit, in MacIntyre’s words, the ‘major premises’ of a culture, and allowing these to become the subject of debate. This mix of poiēsis and phronēsis, in turn, allows justice to be done as the various ontologies, ethics, epistemologies associated with the competing and colluding practices and theories – the archē – of each tradition are explicated in relation to their teloi. Having done this, the freedoms, powers and justices associated with a given World can be situated relative to the competing and colluding stories thereof and therein, and ‘retold’ accordingly. We may see this by integrating the core concepts of Bourdieu with our notion of the Chorus.

As Bourdieu argues, to acknowledge success in any given field is to understand the place of the agent in their field. In any given field, in narrative terms, “individuals strive…to fulfil the expectations of their roles…[and] that they also understand and evaluate the significance of their roles within institutions.”2 However, when fields become ‘unhealthy’, people are able to ‘import’ capital. Rather than participating the the relevant field and creatively elaborating its practices, people ‘fake it’ by drawing on the forms of power relevant to other fields. Alternatively, they simply pretend to have the signs of power without the necessary labour. The result of this is that incompetent people gain power. The narrative of the field and its characters ‘lose their plot’. Indeed, this losing of the plot is precisely what occurs when those with no sense of narrative tradition grasp power. While they do not take up the practices of a field’s habitus, many ‘backwoodsmen’ may accrue the capital symbolic of success in that field, all the

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2 Gare, A. (1996), Nihilism Inc., Eco-Logical Press, Como, p.386
while acting on ‘major premises’ antithetical to the tradition and its telos.¹ This is often the case for universities, New Age cults, party politics, Hollywood movie-making and so forth. Here, French sociologists begin to teach traditional Japanese martial arts, and business graduates begin to teach Hinduism. This, of course, is superficiality.

However, knowing that capital may be “destroyed by suspicion and criticism”², the Chorus could reveal these habitii as unjust, defective, anomalous, or uncanny.³ Just as the Chorus of elders in Alcestis criticise Pheres and Admetus,⁴ so would our Chorus criticise the economistic Head of School, the jingoistic politician, or the superficial New Age charlatan. This would allow power to be ‘redistributed’, and go some way to reasserting the autonomy of the fields in question. The Chorus would, in other words, help to find the plot, and do justice to the various stories in the World. If this were done, then we could begin the task of critically moving, as Bourdieu writes, ‘to and fro’ between the logic of the field and the forms of capital available.⁵ Through this ‘to and fro’, the Chorus could help to nurture radical dialogue on cultural value and, as mooted recently by Jon Beasley-Murray, critically alter the relationship between cultural oppressor and oppressed.⁶ In this sense, the Chorus could properly address issues of power.

¹ In academia, for instance, we may speculate that there have been many people who have lacked capital, but not because they were heterodox. Rather, they were orthodox and yet lacked capital due to perceived mediocrity, parochialism, superficiality, and so forth. However, when the objective conditions of the field were altered by changed political and economic circumstances, academic habitii became ‘unfixed’. Thus, these university ‘backwoodsman’ were able to amass academic capital by questioning the values of the academic field, and by gaining the capital of the dominant economic field. Moreover, this was not done overtly, but as a partly unconscious process of adjustment to the contingencies and exigencies of the field. This ‘unconscious coup’ was then further institutionalised by those, such as managers and economists, whose habitii were similar to that of the orthodox economic field, but who purported to be ‘disinterested’. The result of this is an unhealthy academic field, lacking in autonomy and, indeed, unable to nurture democratic dialogue. In other words, the academic story and its characters ‘lost their plot’. I owe the seeds of this insight to Arran Gare.

² Bourdieu, P. (1993), In Other Words, Standford University Press, California, p.93
³ For example, the deus ex machina finale of Medea. See Euripides, Medea, 1315ff; and Euripides, Women of Troy, 965-968. For insightful commentary on the former, see Kitto, H.D.F. (1978), Greek Tragedy, Methuen & Co., London, pp.201-202. In the latter, the Chorus does not speak ironically, but is itself ’spoken’ ironically by Euripides. Nonetheless, it is a good example of the uncanniness of a group being shown, in this case the women of Troy bonding together to attack Helen.
⁴ Euripides, Alcestis, 649-651
Moreover, by drawing on Bourdieu in this way, we associated power – understood as the various forms of capital – with the redistribution of goods, and a given sense of what dues are due, and to whom. Not coincidentally, we see in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* an explication of rival claims to such dues, and a reconciliation of these through Athenian civic *sophia*.\(^1\) In short, by explicating power, the Chorus also explicates a given sense of justice in accordance with our earlier investigations.\(^2\) Also, by investigating the ability of people to accrue capital, we also find out how people are contributing to their cultural tradition in accordance with their *habitus*, or *ethos*. In this sense, we discover how they are enriching their narrative plot by expressing the ‘essential law’ of their character, and whether they have a fruitful critical reflexivity with regard to this *mythos* and *ethos*. Thus, by investigating power and justice, the Chorus also investigates freedom as we earlier defined it.\(^3\) Consequently, the Chorus enables us to properly come to terms with what we are and what we can do, how we can alter what we are and what we do, and our ability to decide when, why and how these ‘fit’ with a given *archē* and *telos*. In this sense, it is not only power, but also freedom and justice that are brought into the sway of Choral polyphony. The broader notion of ‘doing justice’ well describes each of these, hence its centrality to Aristotle and MacIntyre.

This ‘indwelling’ justice also avoids claims to simultaneous objectivity and situatedness, claims attributed to Bourdieu by Dreyfus and Rabinow. By understanding power from within the polyphonic narrative World, the Chorus *qua* character may “abandon…the claim to be speaking from a uniquely authentic position”\(^4\). Instead, as in tragedy, the Chorus “tries, moment by moment, to respond to, and come to terms with, action, as it unfolds, by bringing it within the sphere of their imagined experience.”\(^5\) Thus, the Chorus knows the narrative World from within. It can influence education, authenticity and power, while not denying the importance of the field’s practices to the people therein.\(^1\) The Chorus shows that these are not to be appropriated or misrepresented. On the contrary, as with the Satnami, these practices

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\(^1\) Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 575-1057
\(^2\) See p.91, above.
\(^3\) See p.77, above.
must be imagined, articulated, understood and reworked accordingly. Consequently, the Chorus avoids Dreyfus and Rabinow’s critique by upholding our creative Being-in-the-World.

vii. The Chorus: Storyteller, Character and Audience

We also see in the Chorus a reaffirmation of the three narrative roles explicated by Carr: storyteller, character and audience. The Chorus, as we have seen, is a participative storyteller. The Chorus learns and passes on the stories of the World and the people within it, and it does this from within the World. Certainly, the Chorus is not an author, such as Aeschylus. However, the Chorus tells and retells the stories of the tradition from within the cultural, social, mythic and political context it finds itself in, as did Aeschylus.2

Moreover, precisely because it is Being-in-the-World alongside everyone else in this way, the Chorus is also a character. Of course, simply because it is in the World, we must not think that the Chorus qua character is a mere ‘puppet’ of the story. As Hegel notes, the Chorus is a free, self-governing character.3 Certainly, it does not rush blindly into action, or commit acts of outrageous hubris. Rather, the Chorus enters into the action of the World because it “expresses its judgement as a matter of opinion; it warns, commiserates, or appeals to the divine law, and the ideal forces immanent in the soul”.4 Thus, the Chorus is not a voyeur, spectator, or objective scientist.5 Rather, it is Being-in-the-world, and Being-with-others. Nonetheless, the indwelling Chorus may help people to respect the lives and achievements of others, even if from afar. By telling the relevant autobiographical, political, mythic, geographic and communal stories the Chorus undertakes logos, ‘gathering’ the far into the near from within the horizon of its World, but expanding this horizon as the stories develop.

4 Ibid., p.316
5 Ibid., p.315
Our Chorus therefore has a defined role to play, and a defined relation to the overall plot. Indeed, it is this relation that allows the Chorus to define and redefine what the plot has been, is and can be. In doing so, it allows the other characters to properly live their roles. “Theirs,” as Carr writes, “is the rhetoric that unites the group and expresses what it is about, where it has come from, and where it is going.”\(^1\) In doing so, of course, they will be judged by those who constitute the audience for the story in question, just like the tragic storytellers of Athens. Here, the Chorus again acts as a *parrhēsiastēs*, risking “self” to speak the truth,\(^2\) yet still inextricably wedded to the shared story of the World.

Finally, the Chorus is also an audience, and this in two ways. Firstly, the Chorus, composed of many individuals with a common *telos* of polyphonic *mimēsis*, cannot know everything all the time. Thus, part of the Choral role is coming to terms with when we have the capital to tell a given story, when we should add many caveats to such a story and when we should stay silent. The weak Chorus of *Agamemnon*, for instance, is the only character that passes from boastful ignorance to tragic wisdom.\(^3\) In this sense, then, the Chorus must know when to act as an audience for others playing a similar role, or for those whose story contests theirs. Secondly, and more importantly, the Chorus is also an audience in the sense of bearing witness. This is because “the chorus is always there: actors come and go but the dramatic space is never empty. It is inhabited by collectivity.”\(^4\) Furthermore, this continual presence does not imply the ‘noise’ indicative of the ‘chattering classes’. There is no need for the ‘idle talk’ so feared by Heidegger.\(^5\) Rather, the Chorus can use stillness as its ‘weapon’: “Silent, often for long periods, they are none the less always there, and the pressure exerted by their presence is…a felt factor in the exchanges between the tragic agents.”\(^6\) In this sense, the Chorus not only acts as an audience for storytelling in the more general sense. The Chorus also acts as a critical ‘gaze’, always embedding the speech and action of individual characters and groups in the larger narrative whole of the collectivity. The

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\(^2\) Foucault, M. (2001), *Fearless Speech*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, p.13, p.16


Chorus can do this because they are always present, ever changing as the narrative unfolds, but acting as companion, biographer and witness to generation after generation. This also links the Chorus in the *epoché* we saw earlier. The time of the Chorus is not simply that of the everyday. While it plays its part in the here and now, it also bears witness over generations, and tells stories from ancient times. For our Chorus, then, a crisis is not always a change played out in a day’s headlines. Rather, it may be a slow change, ‘stretched out’ like the lives of cultures, empires, civilisations and ideas.\(^2\) In this sense, the role of audience implies the other Choral roles of fellow character and grand storyteller. As Easterling writes,

> the Chorus combines witnessing with trying to understand, and its guidance is intellectual or even philosophical as well as emotional. [...] Its job is to help the audience become involved in the process of responding, which may be a matter of profoundly contradictory issues and impulses.\(^3\)

Consequently, our Chorus witnesses the World as an audience, tries to understand the World as a character, and speaks for the World as a storyteller. As characters, we too may find ourselves in a given World, and try to develop polyphony with others of the same World. We may then tell these stories to one another as individual characters and as a ‘we’. We can also say what we do not know. Moreover, we can seek to say the same of others in the same World. Also, we can bear witness, taking up our roles as ‘I’ and ‘we’ as part of an older, wiser tradition of cultural inheritance. We can be the critical ‘gaze’ of the past on the present, and *vice versa*. All of these are *existentiell* possibles that we may ‘be’, united in the role of the Chorus. With this role in our World, we may do justice, and avoid the corruption of our superficiality. We may develop our society and ourselves to a higher stage than heretofore achieved.

**viii. Who Are the Chorus?**

\(^2\) Braudel, F. (1980), *On History*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.75-78
Who, then, are ‘we’? Who are the Chorus? Who is it that will do justice to Worlds, and overcome superficiality? We must give an account of the people best suited to the Choral role. For the Chorus of Classical Athens, of course, it was mostly the young men. For the *ephēboi*, participation in the Chorus of the Dionysian festival was a kind of *paideia*. They were initiated into the *polis*, learned lyrical odes of their mythic lands, the stories of their past, and the machinations of the ethical and political *status quo*.1

However, the Chorus was of a depth and breadth above and beyond that of the young men of Athens. The Chorus was part of the whole World of Athens and Hellas, rising up from the Homeric and Hesiodian Renaissance, and part of the great unifying force that was mythic tragedy. The Chorus was, as Vidal-Naquet puts it, “the truth of the city.”2 In this sense, the Chorus was only truly alive when grounded in the *mimēsis* of tragedy, and this tragedy in Homeric and Hesodian myth. Homer was, as we will see, the poet that ‘made’ Greece and, *mutatis mutandis*, Athens.3 From this mythic ground, tragedy could develop, and the Chorus within tragedy. From these, as we have seen, blossomed democratic Periclean Athens.

However, in our time we have no great unifying myths or legends of any depth or breadth. We have had no tragic renaissance akin to that of fifth and sixth century Athens. As we have seen,4 mechanistic materialism and individualism are the dominant worldview, but they have failed to develop our culture in any depth. As Gare has argued, the result of the domination of the Hobbesian worldview is not a new grounding myth. Rather, it is nihilism.5 We are ‘homeless’, and we will see this in more detail later.6 As a consequence, our young men and women are rarely initiated into our World within a Choral role that emplots us all within a deep polyphonic narrative. Rather, they gain driver’s licences, hold twenty-first birthdays, lose their virginity, dance at debutante balls, or gain superficial vocational degrees.7 They do not learn lyrical poetry,
the ancient narratives of their past, or the relevant political and ethical debates. Like everyone else, they watch television and read magazines.¹

Consequently, we will have to look elsewhere for our Chorus. We require a group capable of analysing our histories, articulating the diversity therein and emplotting these within a grand narrative. This narrative, in turn, must make sense of the smallest events to the largest stories of civilisations. At the very least, this group must be capable of articulating the ‘major premises’ of their World, and allowing the people of this World to properly do these ‘premises’ justice. They must nurture a deep regard for the World. The only group capable of this in our society is institutionalised intellectuals – academics. Academics are the only people capable of the intellectual breadth and depth necessary for the Choral role. This is not to say that they must be solely academics. We may require poets who are philosophers, or ecologists who are politicians. Nonetheless, it is only academics who are in position to critically account for their narrative traditions.

However, it could be argued that intellectuals, rather than academics, are more Choral in their roles. Certainly, as we will see,² it has often been thinkers outside of our universities who have contributed to the creative development of our civilisation. They can be, as Knopfelmacher argues, ‘freelance political guerillas’, rather than simple soldiers in a corps.³ Still, these ‘guerillas’ would not be a Chorus, for they would have no unity, and no *parrhēsiastic* ‘contract’ with their community. It is only when grounded in a community like a university that intellectuals can come together with any *mimētic* and teleological unity.

This unity is why Plato founded his *Akadēmeia*, whence we have ‘academy’ and ‘academics’. Plato was never a lone ‘freelance political guerilla’. Instead, he founded his own ‘corps’ based on an *existentiell* vision. In this sense, Socrates was the utopian vision grounding Plato’s work. Indeed, just as Solon and Lykurgus were the

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¹ See p.348, below.
² See pp.201-250, below.
³ Knopfelmacher, F. (1968), *Intellectuals and Politics*, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, p.54
‘lawgivers’ for Athens and Sparta, Socrates was the ‘lawgiver’ for the Academy.¹ As MacIntyre has argued, Plato founded the Academy to establish this ‘law’ within the Athenian polis.² The Academy was not ‘outside’ the polis, but rather an alternative political community within the polis.³ Here, Plato was not an exile, or victim of Epicurus’ ‘sour grapes’. Rather, in the Academy he was able to collaborate with others in a communal multidisciplinary capacity. It was, as Cubberley puts it, “a union of teachers and students”⁴. Moreover, the Academy was a place where Plato was free from the diversions and distractions of the corrupt polis. Put simply, the Academy was autonomous. Here, Plato was able to develop unified polymathy, and wed the wisdom of the teacher with the creative passion of the student.⁵ This, in turn, was taken up in order to develop justice, truth and freedom.

ix. Universities: The Chorus of Academia

As a sanctuary for academia, the university shares much with Plato’s academy. The university is also a unity of disciplines, a creative bond between teachers and students, and an autonomous community. Moreover, these principles are also characteristic of our Chorus. Consequently, academics are best able to act as Chorus, for they share a basic ethos with this Chorus. We may better see this ethos by drawing on the work of Whitehead and Humboldt.

Firstly, in ‘Universities and Their Function’, Whitehead argues that universities are places where intellectuals can come together and overcome their finitude.⁶ Individually, we strive for a breadth and depth of character, but we are still finite in time, space and ‘energy’. However, in a university, we may bring our finitude together and, in so doing, overcome it. As Whitehead puts it, “[u]niversities are the chief agencies for…fusion of progressive activities into an effective instrument of progress.”¹ Despite the instrumental and mechanistic tone, here Whitehead is essentially arguing

² Ibid.
³ Ibid., pp.98-99
that we are social animals, and that our creative development must always be in a
community. Put simply, in universities we can complete one another, and better contribute to our World. Similarly, in his memorandum on the founding of Berlin University, Humboldt argued that collaboration is essential to intellectual life.² Within a university, not only does “one individual supply what another lacks”³, but each also carries on the creative development of another. Here, diversity should be nurtured, and then unified within a cohesive worldview.⁴ This, in turn, is polyphony, the ethos of our Chorus.

Secondly, universities are places where teaching and research, knowledge and imagination, are unified. As Whitehead argues, if we have brute ‘facts’ without imagination, we will be pedants. If we have imagination without ‘facts’, we will be fools.⁵ For this reason, universities bring together the knowledge of the teacher with the imagination of the student, and thus “the proper function of a university is the imaginative acquisition of knowledge.”⁶ Similarly, Humboldt argues that universities cannot simply be repositories of knowledge.⁷ Rather, they must combine research and teaching in a way that develops our creative capacity, while at the same time developing our tradition. Here, again, we see the ethos of the Chorus. For freedom, justice and the just ‘distribution’ of power, tradition cannot simply sediment. It cannot simply be a pile of ‘facts’. Rather, we must dwell in our tradition so that the sediment is creatively conceptualised and reconceptualised. Intellectual creativity is, as Humboldt puts it, “ceaseless effort.”⁸ This, in turn, develops our open-ended existentiell and ontic horizons.

Lastly, this development in universities must be autonomous. For Whitehead, students and teachers both require a safe distance from the dangers of the marketplace, state, or

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¹ Ibid.
³ Ibid., p.243
⁴ Ibid., p.245
⁶ Ibid., p.96
⁸ Ibid., p.244
judiciary. They need ‘space’ to develop their imaginative capacities. Then, inspired by curiosity and enthused by cooperation, they are able to open themselves to the world of praxis. These activities, however, are beyond any vulgar quantifications, so that “imagination cannot be…kept indefinitely in an icebox.” Moreover, these universities must be governed by the academics themselves. Universities must not be mere tools of the business or the state. Similarly, Humboldt argues that the university must first involve “freedom and the absence of distraction.” The state must not interfere in any way in the curriculum or governance of the university. Rather, it must affirm the autonomy of the university, in good faith that collaborative creativity is more fruitful when left to itself. This autonomy, in turn, is essential for the Choral role. While the Chorus is always Being-in-the-World with its community, it is a free, self-governing character. This is captured in the role of parrhésiastēs. The Chorus is free, but it has a ‘contract’ with its community to develop truth and justice.

Consequently, academics in universities are best able to live the Choral role. Academics should ideally affirm a unity of teaching and research, knowledge and imagination, and the various ‘stories’ of the World. Moreover, they should do so with autonomy, so that they try to do justice to their World, and do so according to their own ‘essential law’. Put simply, academics must strive to take up the Chorus. However, have they in the past? Are they now? Can they in the future?

x. The Need for a History of Universities

Let us take stock of the story so far. We have situated ourselves in an intellectual tradition from Aristotle to Heidegger. With these thinkers and others, we have shown how we are creative, open-ended processes of cultural becoming. Moreover, we have further developed this picture by articulating an account of childhood development that makes sense of our creative Being-in-the-World. We have then integrated culture and

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., pp.88-89
5 Ibid., p.244
6 Ibid.
development with the notion of narrative. This allows us to make sense of tradition, and explicate notions of power, freedom and justice congruent with our intellectual tradition. Nonetheless, we have also found that these have no currency in our superficial age. Our culture has been corrupted by commodification, individualism and technological rationality. We are superficial.

In opposition to superficiality, we have proposed the Chorus. The Chorus is not simply a ‘band-aid’ solution to the ills of our world. Rather, it is the finest expression of our polyphonic narrative World. Consequently, the Chorus is ‘what should be’, and not ‘what is’. It is a vision of potential, and not actuality. It is what our universities and academics should be, and not necessarily what they are.

With this in mind, we will undertake a brief history of universities from the perspective of the Chorus. We shall, to put it crudely, ‘use’ our Chorus to evaluate the past and present of universities. We will show ‘what is’, and ‘what has been’ from the unique perspective of ‘what should be’. This, in turn, will achieve three things. First, it will demonstrate the utopian nature of our Chorus. Second, it will give us an account of the degeneration of our cultural life into superficiality, capitalism and technological rationality. Lastly, it will articulate the necessity of our Chorus in the face of this degeneration. Generally speaking, it will show us more deeply the need for an alternative utopian vision of life.
B. Universities and the Chorus

It is easy for a student to be a radical,
showing off his style as liberal dissenter,

but look how the poor devil accepts the muzzle
and though he still bristles like a porcupine
his first-born’s nappies are already on the line
like a meekly offered white flag of surrender.

- Yevgeny Yevtushenko, from ‘Lobachevsky’

In response to our superficiality, we have articulated the vision of the Chorus. This Chorus is the finest expression of our authentic Being-in-the-World. It ‘pulls’ us away from the ‘here and now’, and gives us existentiell possibilities to take up. It also allows us to criticise the ‘here and now’. Moreover, such visions also allow us to learn from history.

Consequently, we will briefly analyse the history of the university from the perspective of the Chorus. By doing so, we will demonstrate in detail the utopian nature of the Chorus, allowing us to later develop our sense of utopianism and its role in creative cultural development. Furthermore, we will try to gain a better sense of the failings of the Western academic tradition, and the relationship between these failings and the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. We will see how universities and intellectual groups have not taken up the example set by the Academy, or sympathised with the principles developed by Humboldt or Whitehead. Rather, we have tended to be ossified, self-interested, lazy, or homogeneous. Furthermore, this history will also depict our own time. In late modernity, technological rationality, individualism and capitalism combine to develop superficiality. Indeed, we will see that superficiality and commodification corrupt Australian university life as a general modus operandi.

However, this is not meant as a bitter snipe at universities. As we saw earlier, this historical analysis of universities will bear a number of scholarly fruits. Firstly, it will show the truly utopian nature of the Chorus, and thus pave the way for an analysis of the role of utopias in creative cultural development. Secondly, it will allow us to see the
failings of the academy, and the relationship of these failings to the Epicurean tradition. Lastly, it will demonstrate the modern need for a utopia to overcome our superficiality. In this sense, the Chorus is a self-knowing and self-justifying utopia, and not a disenchanted rejection of the world in toto.

However, as this thesis is concerned primarily with Australian superficiality, there is no need to examine North American universities. Of course, our own superficiality is highly influenced by American cultural and economic imperialism. However, Australian universities and academics have their origins in the British tradition of Oxbridge and the University of London. Consequently, we will begin with Paris and Bologna, move into Europe, and then trace the British tradition to Australia.

i. Medieval Europe

The *studium generale*, or ‘international place of learning’, was a term first applied to the schools of Bologna and Paris in the mid-to-late twelfth century.¹ Occurring first in Bologna, such schools were groups of international students, organising themselves in a guild structure for protection against local citizens and civic authority. It was to this body that the term *universitas studii* was first applied. Later, this arrangement was formalised by Emperor Frederick (1152-1190). Local students and local teachers, of course, were offered no protection by these guilds and, indeed, “the professors were kept in absolute and even humiliating subservience to their students.”² Thus, rather than standing their ground alone, the local teachers sided with the city for protection.³ While this made the professors beholden to the civic authorities, this was seen as a far lesser evil than the disciplinarian students.⁴ In Paris, later the Sorbonne, ‘university’ could also mean a guild of foreign teachers.⁵

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¹ This section contains portions of Young, D.A. (2000), ‘The Myth of the Golden Age’, delivered to the public forum ‘Universities: Are They Finished?’, hosted by the Australian Catholic University and the Association for the Public University, July 2000

3. Confronting Superficiency: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
were formed in opposition to the wider community of local students and professori,¹ not to mention the peasants and other ‘lesser’ classes.

Certainly, these universities may be seen as heirs to the Classical and Byzantine traditions. However, the universitas studii can more readily be understood as a professional requirement of the urbanising society.² In Bologna and Paris, and in the many that followed, the greater proportion of activity in universities was the preparation of students for degrees in law, medicine and theology.³ Therefore, most students were far more interested in their careers than in truth, freedom or justice.⁴ Here, the incentives of commerce were strong influences, and soon many students, such as those in law, were seen as “educationally superficial and motivated by pecuniary reward.”⁵

This, of course, had some unfortunate consequences. Aristotelian empiricism, ingenuousness and virtue ethics, for instance, were replaced by lifeless abstractions and instrumental legalism.⁶ It is no surprise, then, that by the end of the seventeenth century “Aristotle’s logic had ceased to be an adventure and had become a drill.”⁷ Greek wisdom, along with any other knowledge previously in a social context, became a ‘thingly’ commodity to be sold.⁸

Still, the Medieval universities did enjoy certain freedoms. Many schools, for example, enjoyed the freedom associated with “mutual help and protection”⁹ and ad hoc property arrangements.¹⁰ This, in turn, was maintained because their interests converged with those of the governmental and ecclesiastical powers.¹¹ Also, many scholars were yet to

⁵ Ibid., pp.17-18
⁷ Ibid., p.183
attach themselves to specific institutions. This led to a high mobility amongst scholars, often necessary in a time of war, famine and plague. Indeed, high mobility and transient property gave academics in these earliest universities much intellectual freedom.\(^1\) However, the *studium generale* and *universitas* soon became a tool of orthodoxy, founded by the resident monarch for internal prestige, subject to the regulatory control of the anti-guild municipalities, and then the Pope.\(^2\) In France, for instance, universities were simple ‘pawns’ in the Machiavellian games of church and state.\(^3\)

Certainly, many original thinkers such as Aquinas created radical ideas for which they were attacked.\(^4\) Indeed, as MacIntyre argues, Aquinas coherently integrated the two rival traditions of Aristotelian Scholasticism and Augustinian neo-Platonism. This integration, by doing justice to alternative ways of seeing the world, was somewhat polyphonic. However, original thinkers and geniuses like Aquinas were still working in institutions far removed from the people.\(^1\)

During the Medieval period, then, most universities were international and ‘free’. Sadly, despite occasional flickers of genius, these universities were eventually stifled by their commodifying mercantile culture and, later, the increasing interests of local politics. Even this early learning, then, was dogged by commodification, pre-packaging and political interference from the local governments and Church. While some isolated academics were creative, this creativity was internally ‘thingified’. Moreover, the universities were controlled by exclusive internal political bodies, and external cities, states and the Church.

Our Chorus, however, opposes the estrangement inherent in commodification. By nurturing polyphony within narratives, the Chorus undermines the abstractions of the capitalist ‘thing’ mentality, or ‘pre-packaged’ education. Moreover, while it is Being-

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\(^4\) MacIntyre, A. (1990), *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, pp.127-143, pp.153-158
in-the-World, the Chorus cannot serve the interests of any single group. While it may have a *parrhēsiastic* ‘contract’, the Chorus cannot simply accept the political *status quo*. Rather, it is the role of the Chorus to emplot people within their narrative World. This, in turn, enables people to critically engage with the traditions they have inherited, and accept or reject them accordingly. Lastly, and as we have said, the Chorus is not estranged from the people of the society as the Medieval universities and thinker were. Rather, it is Being-in-the-World with them. Consequently, our Chorus could not have existed in such Medieval universities.

**ii. The Renaissance and Humanism**

By the time of the Renaissance, with humanists sheltered in Italian academies, it was only in the newer universities that the ‘New Learning’ was accepted. Indeed, this usually occurred only after lengthy compromises with the previously established traditionalists. Even if they held a monopoly on the ‘sale of knowledge’, universities would not easily allow their syllabii to change.

However, this was not always the case. In th Medieval age, most university students were of the merchant classes. Soon, though, the novelty of classical antiquity was a ‘drawcard’ for the aristocracy, who did not need education for their careers. As a result of this, the ambit of the universities was expanded to entail a “passport to the much-desired honorific status of a gentleman.” Peasants, craftsmen and the poor were, of course, excluded from this status. This, in turn, simply exchanged the system

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The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

of freeman and slave for one of literate and illiterate.¹ Still, aristocratic interest in the ‘social’ aspects of the Renaissance eventually weakened the universities’ resistance to humanism.

Certainly, this had the effect of altering the syllabus. However, as Cobban writes, “[u]niversities…can be said to have accepted individual humanists as specialised teachers of Greek or Latin literature more willingly than they accepted humanistic proposals about syllabus reform.”² Thus, when the Classical studies of the humanists were eventually admitted, the logic of ‘thingly’ knowledge very soon enframed their work also. Thus, the wisdom of each ancient author became “a source from which knowledge flows into the later recipient.”³ The Latin of Cicero, for instance, was the only way of writing.⁴

Here, the task was not to achieve wisdom in one’s affairs, and certainly not to develop freedom or justice as we understand them. Rather, the task of the university was to supply law with lawyers, medicine with doctors, the church with theologians.⁵ These Renaissance universities, then, “were teaching institutions that transmitted received wisdom. This assumed a predominant role in the life of fifteenth-century universities, often to the exclusion of creative scholarship.”⁶ Put bluntly, as with the Medieval period, the pre-packaging of knowledge for merchants or aristocrats led to the ‘dumbing down’ of universities.⁷ Gradually, the brightest minds sought refuge in alternative communities or enclaves. As Giard writes,

> it was the princely courts, the public and private academies, the schools [solely] run by religious orders, which attracted the most original minds, drawn there by favourable

conditions. […]Many] factors conspired to make these institutions, removed from universities, the new pole of attraction of philosophers, scientists, and men of letters.¹

During the Renaissance, then, the universities were still dogged by parochialism and monologism. This was due to the orthodoxy of the scholars themselves. Alternatively, education became a ‘passport to the status of gentleman’ and this reduced it to a ‘pre-packaged thing’. This, in turn, distorted the symbolic capital of the academic field, and was due to the demands placed on scholars by merchants, guildsmen and the aristocracy. Consequently, while some Renaissance humanists were tolerant and creative, internal forces commodified and ‘pre-packaged’ this creativity. Moreover, external groups such the Church and aristocracy were oppressive or parochial. Lastly, any possible Choral role nurtured by the more tolerant external courts and societies was undermined by the elite and insular nature of these bodies.

Our Chorus, however, is antithetical to orthodoxy. It seeks to develop the conditions whereby orthodoxy, heterodoxy and doxa can be better understood. Moreover, the Chorus cannot be subject to the demands of any particular group, such as the European aristocracy. Rather, it is an autonomous, ‘free, self-governing character’. Lastly, the Chorus opposes the self-interested search of the merchants and aristocrats for prestige and profit. Rather, it affirms justice, freedom, polyphony and cultural critique. Thus, no Chorus developed in the Renaissance universities, courts, or societies, though this period did maintain the corporate freedoms of the late Medieval period.

### iii. Reformation

With the Reformation, however, any corporate freedom the universities may have had was forcibly removed as the various states and empires divided along religious lines. In Britain, Catholic students were removed from supportive ‘papal’ colleges by the Protestant monarchy,² and Italian professori had to swear oaths to Roman

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¹ Ibid., p.21
Catholicism. Spanish universities were made to burn Protestant books and endure their ‘dissenting’ teachers being tortured. In France, many Protestant scientists had their doctorates revoked and were forced to leave the country, while humanists were aggressively marginalised by religious universities such as the Sorbonne. For those without patronage, university life was often vulgar and unfruitful. Indeed, the situation was so dire that one square on a sixteenth-century board game would send players back to the start with ‘your patron dies’.

The Reformation had a severe impact on student and staff mobility as well as intellectual freedom. In the Medieval and Renaissance universities, students and academics could come and go as they pleased. This, in turn, allowed original thinkers to move between universities and, more often than not, out of universities into the courts, academies and societies. However, during the Reformation, as de Ridder-Symoens writes, the “ambition of each ruler was to have his own ‘controlled’ university in which his officers and clergy could be trained in his particular religious and political ideas.” Moreover, with the rise of a large administrative class in the early seventeenth-century, the persecution of dissenting students and scholars was made more cohesive. This explicitly divided universities into three classes: Catholic, Protestant and Tolerant, with the latter exemplified by the University of Padua, protected by the Venetian Republic. Was Padua an example of our Chorus?

Certainly, Galileo (1564-1642) saw his years at Padua as the “happiest of his life”. Academic freedom and a “richness of cultural interests” made Padua a haven for those

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2 Rudy, W. (1984), The Universities of Europe, 1100-1914, Associated University Press, New Jersey, p.73
6 Ibid., p.420

3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiency

seeking refuge from the Church. Sadly, this was not to last for Galileo. After almost two decades in the Venetian Republic, Galileo found that he was not paid enough by the university to live, and the lessons he gave to supplement his income undermined his research.\(^1\) Also, he missed his native Florence and regretted leaving in order to study. Like so many others, Galileo left Padua for a wealthy court, that of Duke Cosimo II of Florence.\(^2\) Nonetheless, the Paduan period contributed much to Galileo’s development.\(^3\) In this sense, Padua did nurture a real autonomous intellectual dialogue akin to our Chorus.

However, Galileo, like others in his Epicurean tradition, was not interested in polyphony *per se*. Instead, he was concerned with prediction, measurement and the most efficacious and efficient methods of these.\(^4\) For Galileo, this entailed an epistemological commitment to Archimedean geometry,\(^5\) and an ontological commitment to atomistic materialism.\(^6\) This included a notion of primary and secondary qualities,\(^7\) later taken up in Locke’s metaphysics.\(^8\) The only way out of our minds’ ‘secondary’ prison to the real ‘primary’ reality was through mathematics. It was mathematics that provided “the divine feature of the human intellect”\(^9\), for the universe “is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures”\(^10\). While this may have been, as Butts puts it, a “rush of bravado”\(^11\), there is in Galilean thought a certain Platonism in amongst the Epicurean atomism and Lockean nominalism. Here, matter “is no longer the bearer of Becoming and of quality but…the bearer of unchangeable and eternal Being.”\(^12\) Put

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1. Ibid., pp.20-22
2. Ibid., p.22
3. Ibid., pp.22-34
8. See p.11, above.
simply, Galileo and his scientific tradition are linked to mechanistic materialism and atomistic individualism.¹

Certainly, as earlier argued, true polyphony *qua* ‘sociology’ may contain monological ‘voices’ like Medea.² Thus, we could say that mechanistic materialism or atomistic individualism were some of the diverse monologisms within Padua’s polyphony. However, the role of the Chorus is to develop ‘sociological’ polyphony and then overcome this with dialogical polyphony.³ Conversely, the mathematical materialism of Galileo and his colleagues was not associated with this many-voicedness. Rather, it was associated with a static notion of absolute truth.⁴ Furthermore, these were not simply ‘ideas’ of static, eternal and perfect truth. Neither were they simply ‘ideas’ of individualism and mechanism. Rather, these were embodied in their World as heterodoxy in opposition to Church orthodoxy. As I have argued elsewhere, we must continue to affirm the relationship between ontology and ethics.⁵ Bourdieu makes a similar point.⁶ Consequently, we should not assume that a Chorus would easily develop in a place where the dominant culture is antithetical to the Chorus. As we have said, these ideas may have a place within a polyphonic Chorus. However, when they are dominant the Chorus will struggle to maintain itself. Indeed, Galileo’s ‘polemical, didactic and combatative’⁷ dialogues are good examples of this.⁸ Here, we become “Godlike in insight and understanding”⁹ solely through mathematics. This vision of static, eternal and perfect truth is antithetical to even the Platonic dialogues, let alone the polyphonic narrative Chorus, with its creative, open-ended, ‘process’ ontology and ethics. Moreover, the academics of Padova were so separated from the people of their Republic that the development of a Chorus was nearly impossible. Thus, Padua may have nurtured dissent and diversity. However, the intellectual culture that flourished

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¹ See p.8, p.10, above.
² See p.181, p.184, above.
³ See pp.181-193, above.
within it and eventually dominated the Western world was antithetical to polyphony and the Choral role. In this sense, there was no place for a Chorus in Padua.

Nonetheless, we have certainly seen in Padua the affirmation of precious internal freedom, and a “tolerant though critical” intellectual climate. This was certainly a part of the Chorus, and was a strong ethical stance given the culture. It is this kind of courage, tolerance and creativity that gives us hope that the Chorus will develop in its fullness given the right cultural conditions. Certainly, in universities apart from Padua, Reformation “education was a counter in the religio-political game”; external religious oppression was the rule.

However, religious thought in the Reformation, as with many ages, was characterised by the creation and recreation of narratives and tradition. These, in turn, are a key element in our development of the Chorus. The Biblical tradition is characterised by the storied life. As we have seen, time begins in Christianity with the Hebrew creation, and ends with the Hellenised Kingdom of God. In Augustine’s City of God, the creation story is retold from the perspective of the Christian future, effectively taking stock of the whole of time from the perspective of a single World. Within this time, life is lived through a set of sacred Biblical stories, representing the lives of individuals, peoples and kingdoms. Within each life is a set of ‘events’, such as Easter, Christmas, or the Eucharist, with beginnings, middles and ends. Each event, in turn, is emplotted as a temporalised process, relative to the unfolding narrative whole of a Christian life, death and afterlife. However, as Phillips puts it, the “Biblical claim is that there is a meta-narrative which is descriptive of all, and normative for all. God is the sovereign creator.” The character of these stories are monological, not polyphonic, for they rely

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1 Drake, S. (1978), Galileo at Work, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.48
3 See p.75, above.
on God as the ‘ontological guarantor’. There was no Chorus in the churches of the Reformation.

Certainly, some many-voicedness may have developed outside the Church and universities during this period in the carnivalesque atmosphere depicted by Rabelais and explicated by Bakhtin. However, this was more properly an ‘earthing’ of the Church’s ‘heavenly’ Platonism than polyphony per se. The static, universal and eternal was ‘sucked into’ the “incomplete unfinished nature of being.” In this sense, there was a many-voicedness, but the voice of the people was not one of diverse ontological or existential ‘voices’. Rather, it was the voice of the one ‘body of the people’ laughing, being born, dying, eating, defecating and so forth. Certainly, this is an ancestor of the polyphony we see in Dostoyevsky. Still, it is not Choral polyphony, regardless of how erudite Rabelais himself was. Also, the folk carnivals were short-lived utopian festivals. Indeed, unlike Athenian festivals, they had no role in a democracy. Consequently, due to the abyss separating the churches from folk culture, these brief ‘laughing choruses’ never influenced the Reformation ‘furnace of power’. Rather, they allowed the Church to develop its power while ‘the masses’ lived their brief ‘second life’. Thus, no Chorus was to be found in carnival folk culture.

Our Chorus is characterised by narrative polyphony, autonomy and democracy. Thus, it cannot abide the monological fundamentalism of orthodox religion, or the oppression of political states. Moreover, the ‘logic’ of the Chorus is antithetical to the tradition of mechanistic materialism and individualism associated with Galileo and mechanistic science. Also, the Chorus emplots polyphony into a larger reflexive whole, so that toleration of many voices becomes critical understanding. The carnivalesque, while proto-polyphonic, lacks the dialectical unity sought by the Chorus. Lastly, the Chorus cannot abide capital unjustly accorded. As the Church gained prestige and authority through coercion and control, a Chorus would have destroyed their capital with

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2 Ibid., p.52
3 Ibid., pp.19-27
6 Ibid., pp.6-p.10
7 Ibid., p.8
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

'suspicion and criticism'.¹ In the Reformation, however, there was no Chorus to act as *parrhēsiastēs*, and no *parrhēsiastic* ‘contract’ with the church or states. Consequently, our Chorus was not to be found in the universities of the Reformation, in the Church, or in the folk culture excluded from both. There was the tolerance of the Chorus in Padova, and the critical polyphony of the Chorus in the carnival. These are causes for cautious hope. However, there was no Chorus.

iv. Enlightenment

During the Enlightenment, empirical science and positivist philosophy emerged as a competitor to the old religious worldview. Scotland, like Holland, was a particularly innovative region.² Due to the remaining religious influences of the Reformation, however, Italy and France stagnated. As Giard argues, these “the universities were thought to be unsuitable for the realisation of the ambitions of the enlightenment.”³ The English universities of Oxford and Cambridge were also dogged by traditionalism, religious conservatism and pernicious state intervention.⁴ To oppose this accusation, it may be argued that scholars of the calibre of Newton held residence in universities such as Cambridge. However, as Ogg writes,

> the significance of the Newtonian physics was first expounded not at Cambridge, but at Edinburgh. The great Cambridge scientist Henry Cavendish conducted his researches in London. Apart from a few exceptions [Cambridge and Oxford]…were little more than annexes to the established church.⁵

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¹ See p.189, above.

212  3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
In this European quagmire, most of the important innovations emerged in academies external to the universities, such as ‘Academie de Sciences’ in Paris, ‘Academia del Cimento’ in Florence, the ‘American Philosophical Society’ in San Francisco, the ‘Philosophical Academy of Dublin’, Leibnitz’s ‘Akademik der Wissenschaften’ in Berlin, the ‘Invisible College’ of the early ‘Royal Society’ and others in Madrid, Lisbon, Bologna and Rome. Indeed, before calling Aristotle an ‘ass’, it was the members of the early Royal Society that judged the learning of Oxbridge as “but pedantry”. For this reason, the formal education required for scientific and technological development was undertaken outside universities. Again, this was merely the continuation of a theme prominent since the Renaissance. Universities were not places where original research or ‘free thought’ happened. What eventually emerged was a modern Europe with nation-states instrumentally controlling everything for the ‘national interest’. Consequently, the “great thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were singularly detached from universities.” In short, if radical or original thinking would not take bloom in universities, the rich merchants and tolerant courts were at hand to oblige. These circles, however, were removed from the everyday life of the people, and often corrupted by concerns for prestige, authority, or profit.

Eventually, though, universities began to ‘patchily’ contribute to the scientific development which, for many, characterises the Enlightenment. If not at the leading edge, “the universities and their intellectual traditions provided at least a matrix for the Scientific Revolution.” They supplied what Porter describes as “basic training and protection”. However, it was the academies and societies that nonetheless flourished,

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5 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p.554
9 Ibid., p.549
growing as the ‘basic’ universities lagged behind. ¹ Certainly, in Britain it was skilled craftsmanship and centuries of guild life, and not universities, that enabled the technological advances of the late Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution. ² The universities of the Continent were equally weak in scholarship and imagination. Indeed, Ben-David writes quite plainly that “in Europe as a whole (including Italy where the universities flourished), the major contributions to science...were made outside the universities.”³ Yet even these contributions were of the objectivist, positivistic, individualist, or mechanistic type.

As we have seen, these philosophies are opposed to the Choral polyphony of the narrative World. Even the progressive universities of Holland and Scotland, with their positivism and classical rationalism, were unsuitable for the Chorus. In Holland, for instance, mechanistic materialism combined with Protestantism to develop a worldview thoroughly dependent on God for its movement and meaning.⁴ Of course, the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677) dissented against this Protestantism, as well as against his own Jewish heritage. Rejecting academic fetters and the threat of religious intolerance, he gave up a prestigious professorship at Heidelberg for his life as a lens grinder.⁵ In this capacity, he was able to think and speak with extraordinary freedom. Indeed, instead of popular Protestantism, we see in Spinoza’s pantheist monism a neo-Platonic influence,⁶ and a rare affirmation of religious tolerance. For Spinoza, as Copleston puts it, “[p]rovided...that the line of conduct to which a certain set of religious beliefs...leads is not prejudicial to the good of society, full liberty should be allowed”⁷. These insights, along with his commitment to Nature as Divine self-creation,⁸ certainly place Spinoza much closer to our Chorus than many other Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, the writings of Spinoza were an influence on Herder

3 Ben-David, J (1971), The Scientist’s Role in Society, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p.54
5 Dunner, J. (1955), Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy, Philosophical Library, New York, pp.21-23
and Schelling, who in turn influenced Hegel, Marx, Heidegger and Tillich. Spinoza was an influence on process thinkers Whitehead and Hartshorne, and the hermeneuticist Schleiermacher. Consequently, Spinoza contributed strongly to the intellectual tradition of our Chorus.

Nonetheless, in many other ways Spinoza’s intellectual outlook and life were far removed from our Chorus. Firstly, the Hobbesian and Lockean nature of Spinoza’s work is characterised by individualism, mechanism, and a commitment to the social contract. Indeed, Spinoza saw few differences between Hobbes’ ethical and political work and his own. Like Hobbes’, Spinoza’s work must be seen as an individualist response to the political and economic turmoil of Holland, and a defence of free trade. Indeed, while Spinoza was initially a liberal democrat, as the military and economic climate in Holland worsened he became more supportive of oligarchy in his views. Certainly, Spinoza’s early conception of positive freedom overcomes many of the shortcomings of Hobbes’ negative freedom. Spinoza’s freedom is based on conatus, the will to endure in individual processes. We are free when we rationally come to terms with the infinite unity of mind and matter we are finite within. We can see the seeds of Schelling and Hegel in this. Nonetheless, Spinoza places rational self-interest at the core of his philosophy, placing him within the Epicurean tradition. It is no coincidence that Dunner often compares Spinoza to Freud. As Midgley puts it, “[T]he


3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

foundation of Spinoza’s ethics is Egoism. For him, each of us seeks merely his own.”¹ While, as we saw earlier, we should have a deep regard for diverse otherness,² this approach develops only liberal tolerance at best. Moreover, this approach was embodied in the culture of Holland. Secondly, while Spinoza’s work is filled with, as Bergson puts it, “treasures of originality”³, it nonetheless atomises matter, and reduces creative development to a kind of mechanical necessity.⁴ Schelling makes a similar criticism,⁵ seeing an “abstract and mechanistic conception of God and the world”⁶ in Spinoza’s work. This, as Weber argued, led to a fatalism amongst many of his followers.⁷ Fatalism, of course, is antithetical to the open-ended, democratic nature of the Chorus. Lastly, Spinoza’s individualist and mechanistic rationalism is unable to account for poïēsis. Whereas Schelling, Hegel and Heidegger are all able to make sense of beauty, art and aesthetics, Spinoza denigrates art and beauty as Lockean ‘secondary qualities’.⁸ At best, art is a mere ‘medicinal’ aid to rational self-inquiry; at worst, a corrupting influence that should be avoided.⁹ In these ways, it seems that Spinoza was less able than Vico to transcend the Enlightenment assumptions of his time. As we saw with Galileo, the ontology of a time, even when heterodox, can hinder the development of a Chorus. A World may support tolerance and creativity, but the embodied principles underpinning these practices may be antithetical to dialogue, community, narrativity and so forth.

Still, as Spinoza’s outlook indicates, Enlightenment Holland was certainly able to tolerate diversity. Even if Spinoza could not work in the universities without compromising his philosophical and religious integrity,¹ he found freedom in the Dutch state. Nonetheless, Spinoza’s was not a Choral voice, and his contribution to the

² See p.95, above.
⁴ Ibid., pp.347-354
⁵ Fackenhein, E.L. (1996), The God Within: Kant, Schelling, and Historicity, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, p.103
⁹ Ibid., pp.359-365

216 3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
Choral intellectual tradition was equivocal. Moreover, this contribution was made outside the universities, and in a cultural climate of mechanistic, individualistic and monological Protestantism. Certainly, Holland developed the creativity and tolerance of the Chorus. However, these were prefaced on an embodied culture of individualism, fatalism, mechanism and faith. Consequently, there was no Chorus in Holland.

Generally speaking, then, in Enlightenment Europe it was religious orthodoxy and scholastic conservatism that ruled inside the university halls, and mechanistic materialism or individualism that ruled outside them. The Chorus, however, is characterised by open-endedness, creativity and polyphony. It cannot abide reactionary conservatism, monologism, Platonic mathematicism and so forth. Thus, our Chorus could not have survived in the Enlightenment universities, or even in its societies, guilds and academies.

v. Age of Revolution – Continental Europe

In the Age of Revolution that followed, many universities were again utilised to provide the sovereignty with “trained personnel to serve the complex social order that had appeared”\(^2\). By this time, the bureaucratic control developed in the Reformation had been firmly linked to the states, rather than the Medieval period’s market, the Renaissance’s social hierarchy, or the Reformation’s churches.

In post-Revolution France, for instance, education was meritocratically specialised according to individual profession. Thus, universities were a tool of the *bourgeois* revolutionaries, and associated with a state that merely “prevented crime and preserved social contracts.”\(^3\) Old universities such as the Sorbonne were formally disaggregated, and replaced by a fragmented mass of professional schools.\(^1\) However, in order to maintain overall control, Napoleon’s government created the imperial University of France. This, put simply, was a single institution for training the French in loyal

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1 Dunner, J. (1955), *Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy*, Philosophical Library, New York, pp.21-23
service to “prince, fatherland and family.” The colleges thus remained specialised and technocratic, but were subserved to a state bureaucratic order as a way of producing “patriotic and obedient citizens”.

Judging by the successful oppression of academic staff, this approach bore bitter fruit. Indeed, many academics, rather than attacking the government’s draconian approach, simply lamented that the imperial University’s membership fees were too high. In other words, contracts were of more importance to academic staff than intellectual freedom, or a truly democratic state. Needless to say, these 
bourgeois contracts were not of the parrhēsiastic kind. While attempts were made well after the fall of Napoleon to lessen the role of this autocratic French state, it maintained strict control of its universities for most of the century and, if Rudy is correct, well into the twentieth century. Ben-David simply writes that the universities endured “complete subjection to the central government.” H.C. Barnard, however, is more blunt, stating that the post-Revolution “education system was organised to subserve the state and to be an agent of propaganda for the government, which meant in this case the autocratic rule of Napoleon.” For the French, more important than profundity, academic freedom, or truth, was the subjugation of previous regimes, internal dissenters and foreign threats such as Prussia, Austria and Russia. Certainly, such conditions could not have nurtured our Chorus, for the Chorus is opposed to instrumentalist thinking. Instead, it seeks to do justice to alternative points of view, and to emplot them in a meaningful whole. To see education as a mere means to a political end is to embrace closed-mindedness and monologism over open-endedness and polyphony. There was no Chorus in France.

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2 Ibid., p.102
In Prussia after the battle of Jena, Fichte (1762-1814) believed that Germany required an education centred on the definite shaping of character. Critical education was less important. Of course, this must be understood in terms of bildung, the German notion of ‘moulding’, ‘or ‘shaping’ character in concert with integration into a cultural heritage. Here, “conduct must find its motives in love of the right and not in coercion or self-interest” Still, bildung was often undermined by the elitism of the aristocrats and the greed of the bourgeoisie. Bildung became simply the instrumental shaping of education and, mutatis mutandis, character. Nonetheless, independent thought was eventually sought after. However, it was to be Prussian independent thought for the good of Prussia. Ben-David is worth quoting at length:

[A]fter their subjugation by Napoleon, Germans had little left to fight with but spiritual strength. This seemed all the more so because political and military defeat coincided with an unprecedented flowering of German philosophy and literature. […] Prussia’s rulers, even when…heeding the propaganda of intellectuals…were no intellectuals themselves. They were converted to the idea of the university, since…philosophy served the political interests of the nation….Hence, the freedoms effectively granted to [universities] were limited, and the functions assigned to them were much more practical and trivial than designed.

Thus, the German states acted opportunistically, using the schools as tools to form ‘instant nations’. Of course, not all in the German governments were so instrumental. As we have seen, the Prussian Minister Wilhelm von Humbolt (1767-1835) was quite obviously committed to academic freedom and fruitful research. Nonetheless, the Prussian state very soon made sure that “the German university of the nineteenth century was a self-administering, but not a self-governing corporation.” Students and

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3 Ibid.
student teachers were utterly subordinate to their superiors. Indeed, this mood characterised Germany as a whole. Political gatherings, flags, tree plantings and even moustaches were banned. Worst of all, dissenting professors were simply dismissed. Of these we should pay particular heed to “the ‘Göttingen Seven’ (they included the Brothers Grimm...), dismissed by the King of Hanover, who rejected protests with the surly observation that ‘professors and whores can always be had for money’.” The dissenters were later offered places at Berlin in Prussia, though Prussia was itself marked by brief periods of academic dissent followed by swift and successful acts of state control. While universities were obviously places where dissent developed, academics were so removed from the popular culture that any change was impossible. Rather, any influence they had was the result of a Faustian bargain with the Prussian state.

As a result of this, the stifling climate continued long after eighteen-forty-eight’s uprisings. Each time the state was threatened by political subversion, supervision was tightened and made ‘more thorough’. Agents in each university reported to a new, more reactionary Minister of Education, all professors’ promotions were directly controlled by this minister. Indeed, staff engaged in ‘enterprise bargaining’ with the minister for their pay. This, in turn, undermined Humboldt’s popular idea that academics should work towards truth. Rather, in Germany “[u]niversity freedom was markedly restricted; the institutions lost their earlier vigor; and the number of students suffered a marked decline.” Consequently, Humboldt’s reforms were not borne out.

Certainly, the original university policies were drafted in good faith by Schleiermacher and Humboldt. Still, they were also developed in an intellectual climate “infused with the ambition and self-confidence of a belief in romantic heroism generally shared by intellectuals of the era.” This was a necessary and noble belief to hold. However, this view was not shared by the ruling parties of the century. For the Prussian state

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p.582
particularly, the university system epitomised by Berlin was merely a compromise between a defeated state and a precariously-placed, rootless academia.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, the policies of Schleiermacher and Humboldt eventually became a method of aristocratic and state influence.\textsuperscript{3} Here, Mann is worth quoting at length:

[The early century] was an extraordinary time and it gave extraordinary men a chance. Under Humboldt’s guidance there developed the Prussian school system as it remained to our day: elementary education for all, classical education for the middle classes and the civil servants, universities as institutions for scientific research and teaching. Education was not thought of as what it later tended to become in Germany, a means of hardening class differences, nor was it thought of as vocational training, but simply as free, classical education. How far it was to achieve this aim is open to question. But it was more than nearly achieved in the first half of the century than in the second, and more nearly in either half than in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{4}

As Prussian internal politics combined with the professional interests of the state and the German middle-classes, strict professionalism quickly replaced education \textit{per se}. As with the earliest Medieval universities, the liberal arts faculty soon became a mere ‘stepping-stone’ to the more lucrative professions.\textsuperscript{5} Instrumentalism and self-interest replaced a concern for culture, creativity and justice. The Prussian university lost its unique vision. Moreover, the many gifts of the Humbolditan university were more heartily received in America than in Germany. As Fallon writes, “it seems clear that almost a century since the founding of the new university in Berlin Humboldt’s enlightenment vision of a wise Ministry of Culture acting on behalf of an enlightened state had not yet evolved.”\textsuperscript{6} Quite simply, the Prussian universities were failing, even in their Humboldtian role.

Nonetheless, we should not be ungrateful. The modern university – its research, doctorates and freedom – owes much to the Prussian university of the early nineteenth-

\begin{footnotesize}  \begin{itemize}  
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.136; Rudy, W. (1984), \textit{The Universities of Europe, 1100-1914}, Associated University Press, New Jersey, pp.103-104  
\end{itemize}  \end{footnotesize}
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

Moreover, we have seen the relationship between Humboldt’s vision, the Academy and our Chorus. We would not have our vision of the Chorus if not for this Aristotelian tradition of which Humboldt is a part. However, the Humboldtian university, like that of Padova or the University of London, did not actualise its Choral potential. State politics undermined the autonomy of the German universities and, *mutatis mutandis*, the academics within them. Without the ability to protest openly and criticise the political *status quo*, the Chorus lost its autonomy, and was unable to reaffirm the capital of the authentic and disaffirm that of the inauthentic. Without this, Choral justice was lost, and *Bildung* remained corrupted by the aristocracy and the more superficial *bourgeoisie*. Academics, powerless but for the ‘benevolence’ of the state, were isolated and weak. Thus, our Chorus did not emerge in Prussia, or in Germany more generally.

Austrian universities had little international influence relative to France, Prussia and Russia. Still, Austria is worth a brief examination. During the same period, its universities lacked the *liberte* of Napoleon and the *Bildung* of Humboldt. As signatories to the Karlsbad decrees, the Austrians were quick to join Metternich’s crusade against the ‘anarchistic conspiracy’. Here, the professors themselves were seen as bureaucrats, servants of the emperor. Strict routines were to be followed by staff and students alike; the universities were scrupulously observed by police spies and directors of studies appointed by the state. As we have seen, the Chorus is opposed to this kind of instrumentalism and oppression, and could not have existed in such circumstances. There was no Chorus in Austria.

Russia endured two decades of ill-fated university reform under Alexander I. After Alexander, Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) utilised universities as mere training-grounds

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5 Flynn writes that the “Alexandrine university reform…gave Russia a set of institutions that met world standards in scholarship and academic service and that continued to serve Russia as long as Russia was governed by men…unwilling to answer the university question by choosing one of the extreme solutions and by pressing that choice in the universities by truly draconian means.” See Flynn, J. (1988), *The University Reform of Tsar Alexander I, 1802-1835*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, p.259

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222 3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
for bureaucrats, with dissent met predicably with arrest and exile.\(^1\) As the *intelligentsia* were of little influence, this dissent failed. Nicholas was free to control the universities on a whim. As Riasonovsky writes, under Nicholas I

[c]ensorship reached ridiculous proportions….The censors…deleted “forces of nature” from a textbook in physics, probed the hidden meaning of an ellipsis in an arithmetic book, changed “were killed” to “perished” in an account of Roman Emperors…and worried about the…concealment of secret codes in musical notations.\(^2\)

Clearly opposed to university freedom, the state of Nicholas I was not interested in reform, but in preserving the status quo.\(^3\) Nicholas’ successor, Alexander II (1855-1881), made some attempts at conciliation with the growing masses of vocal but isolated *intellegentsia*. However, after the Tsar was assassinated in eighteen-eighty-one, the education ministry under Alexander III (1881-1894) developed a draconian university code that included supervision by police and inspectors, the banning of student organisations, and various measures to exclude Jews and poor students.\(^4\) Hated university inspectors used their excessive power with impunity.\(^5\) This climate was far from conducive to intellectual endeavour, and certainly not to the Chorus.

With the accession of Nicholas II (1894-1917) sporadic reforms were enacted, including the inclusion of women in some university courses, the allowance of student organisations, and university control over various affairs. However, such reforms still took place against a backdrop of continuing state interference, including the whipping of student protesters, the exile of academics holding a national conference, a rise in the number of university inspectors, and the banning of all non-academic meetings. These policies and practices continued right up until the October Revolution of nineteen-seventeen.\(^1\)

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Certainly, there was a brief flourishing of university culture under Lunacharsky, the Soviet ‘Commissar of Enlightenment’. Lunacharsky was not of an instrumental, manipulative character. While able to censor, edit and disclaim ‘non-Marxist’ works of art, he was also an erudite and good-natured intellectual. Though not as deep or systematic as Bogdanov, he was certainly more cultivated than Lenin. As Tait puts it, “if Lenin approached Party matters as a practical politician, [Lunacharsky’s] approach in the early days was that of a philosopher, indeed a poet of the revolution.” During the period from nineteen-seventeen to nineteen-twenty-nine, Soviet universities saw many new freedoms, and a spirit of creativity, nurtured by the Prolet’kult, apparently pervaded many academic bodies. Despite a spirit of antagonism between workers and ‘bourgeois’ professors and continual arrests, the presses were free and active, and lecturers were given some freedom over the content of their courses. Eventually, though, practical, utilitarian education was favoured, and the education system became a forum for the punishment of ‘bourgeois’ Soviets and their children. Indeed, Lunacharsky is quoted as saying, “with a ‘bourgeois twinkle’ in his eye, that the Soviet school teaches children only the truth, and the truth produces good and loyal Communists.” By nineteen-twenty-nine, Lunacharsky had resigned in protest over censorship, and the ‘dumbing down’ and instrumentalisation of education. Before long, Stalin and the Central Committee had transformed the universities into instruments for the systematic promotion of Party ideology and mediocre technical science.

Our Chorus, however, is inherently concerned with freedom, justice and the dialogical critique of the political and cultural status quo. In Russia, the universities were marked by continual suppression of freedoms, injustice and exclusion. Certainly, it was in the

2 Tait, A.L. [sine anno], Lunacharsky: Poet of the Revolution, Birmingham Slavonic Monographs Number 15, Birmingham University, Birmingham, p.105
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.106
7 Counts, G.S. (1957), The Challenge of Soviet Education, Greenwood Press, Westport, p.89
universities of Russia that the most revolutionary activity occurred. In this respect they are owed our respect for their courage. Sadly, as the *intelligentsia* had little support from the workers or the peasants, a sign of the Chorus’ absence, change could only come through vulgar revolutionary zeal. Moreover, the revolutionary zeal of Lenin was also characterised by an instrumentality, ruthlessness and vulgar materialism completely at odds with our Chorus.  

Rather than tolerating dissent, the original dissenting ‘new men’ became totalitarian themselves. This was exacerbated, of course, by Stalin, putting an end to any brief achievements of Lunacharsky. Thus, our Chorus was doomed in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, then, the Continent’s universities did not nurture our Chorus during the Age of Revolution. The French, the Prussians, Hapsburgs and Russians ‘reined in’ their people using various forms of implicit and explicit coercion. In each case, the result for higher education was the same. For most of modern Europe, the interests of the empire or the state took precedence over those of the universities, and this occurred to the detriment of university freedom and profundity. The internal governance of the universities, controlled by external forces such as the state, were characterised by a myopic, reactionary spirit. This was often complemented by an internal culture of complicity, as in Napoleonic France or the ‘self-censoring’ Prussian universities. Even when ‘new blood’ entered, these institutions very quickly became established. Science, for example, was seduced by the lure of ‘great tradition’, leaving behind dissent, heterodoxy, or critique. Of course, there were sporadic outbreaks of rebellion against the established order within the universities of the Continent. As the academics and intellectuals were isolated and unpopular, however, such outbreaks failed. As Rudy puts it, “by 1849 the counterrevolution was triumphant”

Previously the defenders of ‘Enlightenment freedoms’, even the scientists “became, after the fiasco of 1848,…the staunchest defenders of the official State machine.” Apart from Russia, where rebellion continued with universities at the forefront, the states of the Continent stifled

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2 See Appendix IX, p.423

3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
their universities during the Age of Revolution. Sadly, when the men of the Russian universities gained power, they very quickly became as instrumental and oppressive as the Tsar. The oppressed internal bodies became the external oppressors. Again, the dominant ontology, this time of the new orthodoxy, was antithetical to the Chorus. This, as we have seen, meant that the Chorus never developed.

vi. Age of Revolution – England

In England, however, things were different. Oxford and Cambridge, or ‘Oxbridge’, remained firmly entrenched within Church dogma, simply providing training for the Anglican church. This, in turn, was linked to the standing of the Church of England in the English state. As Gascoigne argues, the bonds between Church and State were strong in Oxbridge, where the universities remained unreformed throughout the eighteenth-century and most of the nineteenth. Consequently, from the eighteenth to late nineteenth-centuries, these “English universities were backwaters in national life, characterised by dull and mechanical teaching, an absence of intellectual zeal and Anglical domination.” Indeed, while the French maintained rigid regulation of academic qualifications, English teachers merely required the ‘moral certification’ of an Anglical bishop. However, with the state control of France, many Britons came to see Oxford and Cambridge as noble bastions of an ancient order, unimpeded by revolutionary zealous. This, in turn, supported the conservatism of the Anglicans and their Tory representatives.

Bills calling for freedom of religion were put to parliament in the early eighteenth-century by progressive clerics and moderate Whigs. However, these were always defeated by the conservative Tory majority. The momentum of the Whigs soon waned and, aside from Jacobite uprisings, the end of the century saw little parliamentary interest in secularisation. As late as eighteen-thirty-four, the House of Lords affirmed

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the Thirty-Nine articles of the Church of England in universities. Indeed, it was not until eighteen-seventy-seven that all restrictions barring non-Anglicans from universities were lifted by Parliament. It was as if everyone in England except those in the universities were ‘liberalising’. Indeed, it was only when the liberals became the political elite that the universities could be disentangled from the Church of England.

Eventually, ‘disentanglement’ came in the form of the University of London, the first secular university in the history of England. Again, though, this change was not due to the foresight of Oxbridge. London, like many of the later secular and ‘red brick’ universities, was a reaction to the ‘moribund exclusivity’ of Oxford and Cambridge. Moreover, it was bodies such as Manchester’s Statistical Society, rather than Oxbridge, that tried to better understand the needs of education in poor areas, and similar societies emerged in London, Leeds and other such places. Despite the growing liberalism of England, secularisation of Oxbridge lagged behind these institutions by almost fifty years. Oxbridge wanted little to do with open, accountable, accessible, or diverse education.

The supporters of the University of London wanted little in return to do with Oxbridge. It was, in fact, a Glaswegian poet named Thomas Campbell who suggested the idea of a university for London in a now-famous letter to MP Henry Brougham in *The Times*. This was affirmed by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. Like Campbell, Mill was educated in Edinburgh, while Bentham was unimpressed by his own Oxford education. Bentham and Mill were joined in this by Jewish, Catholic and other dissenting lobby-groups. Put simply, liberalism and religion united to champion the new university. Was there a Chorus here?

Certainly, Judaism, Catholicism and the Church of England give us ancient and beautiful narrative Worlds. They represent ‘tradition’. However, this is often tradition

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3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols 227
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

qua sediment, rather than as we have understood it. Moreover, truth, justice and so forth are given by God as received wisdom rather than developed by us creatively. Furthermore, these religions are often characterised by monologism or fundamentalism rather than polyphony and cultural freedom. We saw this during the Reformation.

In the nineteenth-century, the strongest alternative to this religiosity was the liberalism of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), James’ son. Did this liberalism develop into a Chorus? Certainly, Mill did develop an account of the state and society that gave a place to dissent, dialogue and diversity. August describes On Liberty as “a dazzling defence of free discussion”. Here, we see influence of Humboldt, the Prussian academic and educational reformer. Rather than just being left alone, Mill was concerned with the liberty of “determining one’s own conduct, being in control of one’s destiny.” This destiny, of course, could only be developed in the context of society, education and public opinion. Indeed, Mill was somewhat of a ‘polite parrhēsiastēs’, using his ‘contract’ with the British public and state to critically articulate the truth, and risk reputation over this truth. Moreover, Mill even saw himself as a socialist, opposed to overtly oppressive class structures. Consequently, the tolerant democratic character, concern for development, and truthfulness of Mill were a necessary precondition for the development of the Chorus. Moreover, Britain as a whole was developing the mindset required to further develop these ideas.

However, the Chorus never developed. This occurred for the same reason Galileo and Spinoza were not fully-fledged Choral ‘voices’. The metaphysical framework that underpinned Mill’s work, and most of British society, was still that of the Epicurean,

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2 See p.72ff, above.
3 See p.210, above.
5 August, E. (1975), John Stuart Mill, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, p.143
Hobbesian and Lockean tradition, characterised by capitalism, individualism, atomism and mechanism. In Mill’s utilitarianism, rules concerning the maximisation of happiness took the place of narrative justice, while the very idea of the ‘cultural human’ was overlooked in his calculative individualism. Despite his emphasis on public opinion, education and society, Mill’s ontology was unable to do justice to human nature, including culture. We are not creative, open-ended beings in a self-creating Nature. Rather, Nature is a murderous sum of ‘things’, and Men are Epicurean individuals who seek pleasure. Moreover, being a rationalist and idealist, Mill supposed that the truth of a World must always be freely open to attack. Mill also had a Hobbesian and Lockean notion of language, where words have meaning “independently of each other and of their context of utterance”. Thus, we must always have the right to say anything we want. However, as Britton puts it, “it is sentimental to suppose that truth must prevail over…ridicule, slander, provocation, bogus philosophizing, and vituperation”. As with the commodification of culture in New Age spirituality, the truth of those in a World may be done grave injustices by the ‘tolerant liberty’ of superficial others. Words can only be done justice if justice is done to the narrative World. An individualist focus on happiness and the right to speak ignores this, and it is typical of calculative individualism, however tolerant, to overlook culture in this way. It is also typical of a philosophy that conflates justice with law. Consequently, we may have the right to speak freely, but it is not always just to do so. This is particularly the case when, like ‘karma commodifiers’, we embody the Epicurean tradition. Certainly, as we have seen in the work of Spinoza, tolerance and liberty are both good and necessary. However, these alone are not enough to nurture a polyphonic Chorus, particularly when grounded in the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

5 Ibid., pp.225-229
7 Ibid., p.114
Thus, the people of England, including those involved with the University of London and radical academies, were mostly adherents to the tradition of instrumentalism, mechanism, capitalism and individualism. Meanwhile, though external pressures were benign in democratic England, Oxbridge was internally characterised by insularity and religious dogmatism. Despite the University of London, then, the universities of England did not support the Chorus.

However, the reforms set in place by the University of London did not only affect Britain. They affected her colonies also. One of these colonies, of course, was Australia. As the heir to the reformed British system, Australia can be seen as the bearer of a university tradition some eight-hundred years old. We saw some dissent, innovation and diversity of thought in Italy, Scotland, France, Prussia and Russia. While these are not Choral per se, they are fruitful. What of Australia, then? Having told the ‘story’ of Britain and the Continent, it seems timely that we move to Australia, for it is here that we search for the Chorus. Was there ever a Chorus in Australian universities?

To answer this question, we will confine our investigation to the oldest and most prestigious of these Australian universities, Sydney and Melbourne. This is mainly because Australian universities, “[a]lthough founded with diverse intentions and structures,…have drifted towards one another, [often because of a] lack of resources, limited academic mobility, and parochialism.”¹ This trend is also noted by Blainey.² Put simply, the Universities of Melbourne and Sydney give us a good idea of Australian universities per se. This is our primary reason for looking into them.

However, we also explore Melbourne and Sydney because they are the oldest, most powerful, and most influential universities in Australia. This is not to say that they are sacred, profound, or in any way fruitful. This is not to say that they are necessarily making Australia, or the world, a better place. Rather, we should admit that, insofar as

² Blainey, G. (1989), *Australian Universities: Some Fashions and Faults*, La Trobe University, Bundoora, pp.3-4
Australian universities have an influence on our world, Melbourne and Sydney have the most. This is important because it addresses a ‘key’ aspect of the Chorus. Our Chorus is characterised by its ability to influence the world within which it dwells. Indeed, an uninfluential Chorus, as we have seen, is not a Chorus. Consequently, if Melbourne and Sydney have had no Chorus, those universities with less economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital are hardly likely to have done so.

vii. Australia: Sydney

The lands of Australia were first invaded by Britain in seventeen-eighty-eight. Some sixty years later, the first universities of Melbourne and Sydney were founded almost simultaneously. They were an attempt to ‘graft’ the better elements of Britain onto the young settlement. Unfortunately, these alien “universities were regarded from the first as transplantations. They did not grow from the soil.”¹ The public and government did not share the ‘lofty ideals’ of the university founders.² These ‘practical and ambivalent’ Australians, unlike Harvard’s pious pilgrims,³ were not particularly interested in university life. The reasons for this were many, but one in particular is worth emphasising. In the mid-century, the gold rush engendered mass individualist self-interest.⁴ Consequently, Royal endowments and legislative grants were a world away from the city where “[h]undreds of Sydney youths were off to the diggings, along with their schoolmasters.”⁵ It is in this climate that Sydney, Australia’s first university, was founded.

The University of Sydney, officially founded in eighteen-fifty and ‘open for business’ in eighteen-fifty-three, was established with an annual royal endowment, a large

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³ It took New South Wales over sixty years to develop its first university. Harvard, on the other hand, was founded only thirty years after New England’s colonisation, and with only a fraction of Sydney’s population. See Auchmuty, J.J. & Jeffares, A.N. (1959), ‘Australian Universities: Historical Background’, in Price, A.G. (ed.) (1959), The Humanities in Australia, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, pp.14-15
⁵ Ibid.
legislative grant, a Grammar school from which pupils could come,\(^1\) one-hundred-and-fifty acres to build, and four denominational colleges to accommodate the “jarring elements of...religious life”.\(^2\) William Charles Wentworth, influential in the university’s founding, was said to have given a “very able and eloquent speech”\(^3\) in favour of the University’s development, and stressed a secular institutional framework not unlike the University of London. Wentworth was seen as an English gentleman, but without the Oxbridge pretence of religion. J. Sheridan Moore, Australian poet of the mid-nineteenth-century, stressed that Wentworth wanted to rid Australian education of the religious fetters of Europe and America.\(^4\) This message of a somewhat distant and polite religiosity was echoed by the Principal of Sydney College, Dr. John Woolley, himself a religious minister.\(^5\) Sir Charles Nicholson, the first vice-provost of the University council, had similar feelings.\(^6\) Not surprisingly, Nicholson was educated at the University of Edinburgh rather than Oxbridge. As with the University of London, those outside Oxbridge influenced Australia’s first university. This, in turn, meant the opportunity for a Chorus, unimpeded by the monologism or fundamentalism of religious tradition.

However, the university had almost no influence whatsoever on the Sydney community. Certainly, the three early Professors were often prominent in well-to-do public life, delivering speeches to “the intelligent sections of the general public”\(^7\).

Nonetheless, the University’s contribution to Sydney culture over the first two decades was minimal. Gardner writes:

\begin{quote}
The university had open doors – to the tiny handful who could reach them, and wanted to reach them. It was not the poor man’s university of Wentworth’s rhetoric, nor was it his school of statesmen. For many years the great ark of Wentworth’s conservative covenant
\end{quote}

\(^1\) Moore, J. S. (1865), ‘Univerity Reform; Its Urgency and Reasonableness’, an oration delivered in the Temperance Hall on Wednesday Evening, 12\(^{th}\) July, Sydney, Cole.pr., p.7
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Barff, H.E. (1902), A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p.6
\(^4\) Moore, J. S. (1865), ‘Univerity Reform; Its Urgency and Reasonableness’, an oration delivered in the Temperance Hall on Wednesday Evening, 12\(^{th}\) July, Sydney, Cole.pr., p.6
\(^5\) Ibid., pp.31-32
\(^6\) Nicholson, Sir C. (1852), cited in Barff, H.E. (1902), A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p.23
\(^7\) Macmillan, D.S (1968), Australian Universities, Sydney University Press, Sydney, p.29
stood nearly empty, its gargoyles outnumbering the graduates. The deliberate and expensive attempt to create an ‘instant’ European environment for students…failed.¹

The university was neither diverse enough in its curriculum to serve the community’s needs, nor popular enough to teach this curriculum. However, this changed in eighteen-sixty-seven. Impassioned pleas supported the eventual relaxation of policy requiring pupils to attend lectures before being granted degrees.² Simultaneously, the curricula were extended to include medicine, earth sciences and oriental languages. Lastly, public-entrance examinations were introduced. In short, they broadened the curricula, but relaxed the entry requirements so that more students could enter.

Nonetheless, there was still little community interest until the early eighteen-seventies, when government support enabled the public-entrance exams to be free to rural dwellers, and also available to women.³ Certainly, these measures attracted students who were previously excluded. Also important was the Public Instruction Act, passed by New South Wales in eighteen-eighty-one. As a result of this act, state primary and secondary schools provided education ‘for the masses’, with an increase in secondary-school student numbers of twenty-five thousand within only nine years.⁴ Though the increase in university students was still comparatively small, numbers certainly increased faster than those of Melbourne University. This, combined with massive endowments from private benefactors,⁵ and an increased annual grant, enabled the University of Sydney to maintain a fairly stable financial position during the nineties. With this stability, of course, came the freedom necessary to ‘build’ a Chorus.

However, it was the notion of ‘social utility’ that kept the university afloat, not freedom, justice, truth or any such things. While many still wished to preserve the ‘aristocratic’ nature of the institution, by eighteen-eighty-one, the ‘gentleman’s

² See, for instance, Moore, J. S. (1865), ‘University Reform; Its Urgency and Reasonableness’, an oration delivered in the Temperance Hall on Wednesday Evening, 12th July, Sydney, Cole.pr., p.7
⁴ Ibid., p.180
⁵ Blainey, G. (1989), Australian Universities: Some Fashions and Faults, La Trobe University, Bundoora, p.3
university’ had become the ‘professional university’. The university established courses in law, pharmacy and massage, and by the end of the nineteenth-century Sydney was a ‘practical’ provider of ‘practical’ young men and women for the workforce.

This utilitarianism had a price. Previously, arts subjects were compulsory for streams such as medicine, balancing the technical and pragmatic with a more general, liberal syllabus. This requirement was soon removed for practicality. Moreover, many later changes to the arts syllabus were undertaken with little consultation with the academics and students. As a result of this ‘push’ for the ‘professional university’, by nineteen-twenty-four enrolments for arts were significantly overshadowed by those from the professions. The price for ‘professional practicality’, then, was the disempowerment of philosophy, the classics and so forth. These subjects, of course, are essential to the cultural role of the Chorus. While some academics called for a liberal, multidisciplinary university, the “University as a whole rapidly became preoccupied with the realities of a phase of recovery and growth involving such matters as student enrolments, staffing, curriculum, and buildings.” ‘Housekeeping’ replaced Wentworth’s ‘lofty ideals’.

By the nineteen-thirties, the University sat at the apex of a pyramid of primary and secondary education. What mattered here was the fairly uncontroversial goal of “training young minds.” In this climate, John Anderson, Sydney’s Professor of Philosophy, dared to speak publicly on communism with the intent of encouraging debate. The University responded initially with silence, but soon censured him, warning him against similar ‘outbursts’. Anderson had no parrhēsastic ‘contract’ with the university or state. Rather, the ‘professional university’ simply safeguarded its ‘professional interests’ from bad publicity. Sydney’s Vice-Chancellor of the early nineteen-forties, even after extolling the university’s vocational strengths, confided that


3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
“commercialism...had invaded...the seats of learning.”\(^1\) While the Chorus is associated with debate, criticism and polyphony, we see here in Sydney University stifled debate, censured criticism and monologism. We also see commercialism, associated with the dearth of our Chorus in the Medieval period.

As the Second World War persisted, however, military utility replaced commercialism. The university played a significant role in the community, and this role was characterised by naïve patriotism, instrumentalism and a singular lack of debate. Utilising its vocational skills to further the war effort through the production of well-trained professionals, the University presented a conservative response to the conflict, and, indeed, “[i]n the early months of the war there was a general sense of urgency within the university: a desire to show a commitment to the national war effort.”\(^2\) Central to this commitment was the Universities Commission, established in nineteen-forty-three and chaired by Professor R.C. Mills, the Chair of Economics at the University of Sydney. For the first time, the Commonwealth began to play an important role in the administration and funding of education. Indeed, it is no coincidence that “[d]uring the war...the association of the central government with the universities inevitably became much closer than before.”\(^3\) The war, however, still put a strain on Sydney’s finances, with only the ‘reserve’ professions encouraged to study, while the remaining students were expected to enlist. This financial strain continued when massive enrolments of ex-servicemen combined with the Public Instruction Act’s educational pyramid.

However, this strain was soothed somewhat with the Mill and Murray reports to the Commonwealth in nineteen-fifty and nineteen-fifty-seven. The recommendations in these secured ongoing Commonwealth funding for universities. Sydney University, of course, received the largest proportion of the funding.\(^1\) However, the Menzies’ government was quick to decrease funding, preferring instead a scheme of small

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3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
‘survival allowances’ for each university.\(^2\) Eventually, with the Martin Report in nineteen-sixty-four, Colleges of Advanced Education were developed, mostly to provide cheap alternatives to universities for those “whose ability [was] of a lower order”\(^3\), and for rural Australians. Thus, the universities did not have to provide costly higher education for the ‘lower orders’. This had the effect of disadvantaging students in many country areas, while allowing the city universities, such as Sydney University, to save money.\(^4\) Simultaneously, Sydney alleviated many of its financial problems by simply decreasing student numbers with a quota system, allowing other students to flow on to the University of New South Wales and, after nineteen-sixty-seven, to Macquarie. A quota of sixteen-thousand was the University’s ideal target, and this was continued for some years, the result being a robust financial stability. In this comfortable environment, the University secured its modest place for the next decade. Rather than focusing on ‘cutting-edge’ graduate and postgraduate research, cultural debate and dialogue, or political relevance, the university simply saw itself as “a predominantly undergraduate university for pass students.”\(^5\) In short, the University was rich, stable, but mediocre.

However, our Chorus is opposed to mediocrity. Mediocrity undermines the creative, open-ended nature of our being-in-the-World by uncritically settling for the commonplace. Moreover, because mediocrity is often uncritical and narrow, it falls into instrumental professionalism, and supports the ethico-political status quo. These, of course, are antithetical to our Chorus, characterised by a critical attitude to tradition, and the treatment of ‘things’ as creative processes of becoming rather than means to an end.

Consequently, we can see that Sydney University has been characterised by isolation, commercialism, instrumental professionalism and mediocrity. These, in turn, are antithetical to our Chorus. At this point, however, we will examine the University of

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\(^2\) Ibid., p.65

\(^3\) Merrylees, W.A. (1965), *City Sorcery*, Riverine University League, [sine loco], p.12

\(^4\) Ibid.

Melbourne. We will return to Sydney to articulate the rise of our superficiality after nineteen-seventy-five.

viii. Australia: Melbourne

Like Sydney, the University of Melbourne was founded with noble goals in mind. In his inaugurating speech, Chancellor Redmond Barry said that “the results of a toilsome culture, physical or intellectual, must be waited for, and come after many days; and it is vain to expect that scholars can be manufactured…” Patience notwithstanding, though, Barry was certain that the goal of the university was the “noblest and loftiest social objects”.

However, it is more likely that the University of Melbourne was borne of affluence. Melbourne had lots of money. This was partly to do with a brief fall in American wool exports, and also to British investment. Largely, though, this affluence was a matter of gold. Like Sydney, Melbourne was ‘booming’ with gold, and the impact of the mid-century gold-rush on Melbourne cannot be underestimated. Put simply, Melbourne was a gold-mining city, and her wealth, youthful vigour and hope stemmed from this. The prompt arrival of the University owes much to this spirit.5

Sadly, Barry’s patience and the gleam of gold could only do so much. Thirty-five years later, the university had failed to make any significant impact on Melbourne life. It was little more than a small training school.6 Criticism has been as severe as to suggest that the early University of Melbourne “was far more popular as a pleasure resort than as an institution of learning.”7 In the two decades spanning from eighteen-fifty-eight to eighteen-seventy-eight, the number of graduates in any one year ranged from one to

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1 Redmond Barry, cited in The Argus, 14 April 1855, in Grant, J. and Serle, G. (1978), The Melbourne Scene, Hale & Iremonger, Melbourne, p.105
2 Ibid.
4 Grant, J. and Serle, G. (1978), The Melbourne Scene, Hale & Iremonger, Melbourne, pp.77-78
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p.142
7 Blainey, G. (1956), The University of Melbourne: A Centenary Portrait, Melbourne University Press., Melbourne, p.4
twenty, with a yearly average of just under nine.\textsuperscript{1} Indeed, as with the University of Sydney, a large number of those degrees taken in Melbourne during this period were honorary degrees bequeathed in order to make up the hundred students necessary to form a parliamentary electorate.\textsuperscript{2} Certainly, external interest in the university was not great, perhaps reflecting Melbourne’s lacklustre intellectual culture.\textsuperscript{3}

The ‘noble and lofty’ University itself, however, was in no rush to speak to Melbournians. The University’s statutes in principle barred professors from certain public lectures, and continued to do so for forty years until the statute was amended in late eighteen-ninety.\textsuperscript{4} Indeed, up until the amendments, university policy on public comment approached the ridiculous. On this point, Scott is worth quoting at length:

\begin{quote}
[In] July 1890, when the Professor of Philosophy (Laurie) asked for permission to deliver a lecture before the Melbourne Head Teachers’ Association on ‘The Teaching of Morality in State Schools’, the Chancellor exclaimed, “That is a very dangerous subject indeed!” The Council thereupon passed the resolution: “That having regard to its title, the Council considers that Professor Laurie should not deliver his lecture as proposed.” Laurie entered a dignified protest, expressing surprise that “the Professor of Moral Philosophy is not allowed to lecture on the teaching of morality in schools!” The Council thereupon graciously lifted the prohibition on condition that Laurie did not “introduce either party politics nor sectarian discussion”.\textsuperscript{1}
\end{quote}

Like Anderson in Sydney, Laurie had no parrhēsiastic ‘contract’ with the authorities, who were content to remain insular and politically narrow. This insular character of Melbourne University continued through the end of the nineteenth-century and into the twentieth in various forms, not the least of which was a fairly strong class divide. Quite simply, the University excluded the lower socioeconomic classes. H.C. Pearson, a British scholar and politician, had delivered a report on Victorian education as early as eighteen-seventy-seven, demonstrating the inability of the less ‘abled’ to gain access to the education system. Pearson’s report essentially showed that the dearth of public education in Victoria removed ‘pathways’ whereby the ‘disadvantaged’ classes could

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] Scott, E. (1936), \textit{A History of the University of Melbourne}, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, p.39
\item[4] \textit{Ibid.}, pp.44-46
\end{footnotes}
participate in higher education. Similar criticisms were common. Unfortunately, “[i]n Victoria Pearson’s report gathered dust[, though i]n NSW it was a different story.” Indeed, these class divisions remain, almost one-hundred years later. Generally speaking, the combined result of the city’s class divide and the University’s insularity was that Melbourne University stagnated while the more ‘practical’ Sydney grew.

Though Melbourne apparently tried to mirror Sydney’s ‘utilitarian’ success, by the outbreak of the First World War many other technical schools appeared independently of the University, pointing to a definite shortfall. Indeed, Melbourne, fresh from fraud and embezzlement charges, still continued to educate the children of the ‘well-to-do’. Certainly, it would be difficult to have a Chorus that only engaged with the wealthy or powerful in a given community. Added to this elitism, however, was the sudden appearance of a war mentality. In nineteen-fifteen, the University Council unanimously passed a resolution that, among other things, called for public lectures on the war, and suggested the formation of a rifle club. Moreover, the resolution recommended that Council approach the Federal and State governments for suggestions as to how academic staff could aid or supplement wherever possible the work of the scientific, technical or professional branches of the Government departments during the war, on any matter connected with Imperial defence, in which their assistance may be useful.

We can see here a carte blanche approach to war. Students and staff immediately gave up studies to enlist, staff pledged to abstain from alcohol during the war, and “and a

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1 Ibid., p.45
4 Indeed, Melbourne still has the second-lowest proportion of students from low socioeconomic areas in Victoria, second only to Swinburne University, whose main ‘catchment areas’ are the affluent Eastern Suburbs. See DETYA (1999), *Equity in Higher Education*, Occasional Paper Series 99-A, Commonwealth Government, p.44
5 Blainey, G. (1989), *Australian Universities: Some Fashions and Faults*, La Trobe University, Bundoora, p.5
7 Ibid., p.233, emphasis added
student was thrown in the lake for preaching pacifism.”¹ Certainly, staffmembers and students should not be too severely criticised for their ‘naïve patriotism’, and apparently they stood their ground in religious matters.² Here, however, their approach to ‘unpatriotic’ philosophies, such as pacifism, was dogmatically nationalistic and hardly collegial. Added to this was the University Council’s unwillingness to question the community’s nationalistic claims. The Council, for instance, approved racism within the university’s walls by expelling German academics.³ Here, even with academic freedom and healthy coffers, we see that the University responded to criticism with a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction,⁴ and other examples of this conservatism abound.⁵

However, our Chorus is characterised by healthy debate and polyphony. That the Council unanimously embraced the war with little or no debate is a sign of homogeneity of opinion, and perhaps a politically naïve kind of patriotism. More seriously, the expulsion of people on the grounds of race, and the physical assault of pacifists, are actions antithetical to the peaceful polyphony of the Chorus. Even if the latter was undertaken by students, this hardly points to a tolerant intellectual culture. Certainly, there was no Chorus in wartime Melbourne.

By the nineteen-thirties, however, the University of Melbourne had appointed a Vice-Chancellor, apparently raising its profile and facilitating meaningful interaction with the community.⁶ The University, “despite a double reputation as a ‘playground of the idle rich’ and a ‘hotbed of communism’, was coming in closer touch with the community.”⁷ Important here was the expansion of ‘technical and utilitarian courses’

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¹ Blainey, G. (1956), The University of Melbourne: A Centenary Portrait, Melbourne University Press., Melbourne, p.28. This has been disputed by an anonymous reviewer of my work, who wrote that “Guido Baracchi was put in the lake (and later prison) for his political opposition to the war and not for pacifism.”
³ Scott, E. (1936), A History of the University of Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, p.197
⁴ Ibid.
of the type emerging at Manchester and Leeds in Britain in the late nineteenth-century.\(^1\) Perhaps the radical spirit of modern art and poetry also had a hand in this, forging a new sense of national identity.\(^2\) Certainly, MacIntyre and Marginson argue that this period saw an increased interest in academic freedom and intellectual responsibility, where the university was seen “as a place of open inquiry that should lead and inform public discussion.”\(^3\) This, in the terms of our Chorus, was certainly an encouraging period for the University. Like our Chorus, the University had a closer relationship with the community. The University was not riddled with religious fervour or commercial activity. Moreover, the exigencies of war were rejected in favour of intellectual freedom and responsibility.

During the Second World War, though, the University gave up any pretensions of being a sanctuary for the ‘noblest and loftiest social objects’. Melbourne set about to remedy any of the military’s research shortcomings.\(^4\) As with the First World War, Melbourne’s sandstone walls quickly became filled with patriotic fervour, transforming the University into a ‘war factory’ for chemicals, drugs, munitions and so forth.\(^5\) Certainly, these are hardly the ‘noble goals’ spoken of by Sir Redmond Barry, let alone those of our Chorus. It is this war period, however, that secured Melbourne University’s future, and, indeed, that of all Australia’s universities.\(^6\) Rewarded for its role in the war by generous grants and overseas scholarships, and bolstered by a massive influx of men from military service, by nineteen-fifty the University had more students than Oxford or Cambridge.\(^7\) Where previously the University had been an isolated and bleak colonial ‘experiment’, the Second World War and post-war reconstruction gave it wealth and power. As with Sydney University, it was this period that led to the Mills and Murray reports, linking higher education to the Commonwealth

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\(^7\) Blainey, G. (1956), *The University of Melbourne: A Centenary Portrait*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp.31-33
as never before, and increasing narrow specialisation. This period also saw the creation of the Australian national University. Still, A.N.U. Professor of Social Philosophy P.H. Partridge accused universities of being apolitical and ‘sterile’, and this “probably contributed to some intellectual impoverishment both of themselves and of the nation.” This is hardly a vote of confidence in a time of growth.

However, it was not necessarily this political and social mediocrity that worried academics during and after the war. Many academics were concerned that the wartime influence of the state had corrupted the universities’ ability to undertake free and open research. Moreover, this ‘cloak and dagger’ mood was combined with ‘dictatorial’ management and a “comparative weakness of academic bodies”. This, for Auchmuty and others, led to a “certain diminution of the true value of university education.” Nonetheless it was during this period that Melbourne University’s halls and coffers filled, and the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of Australian university life developed. For less than forty years, education was free, meritocratic and occasionally critical of the status quo. Nonetheless, this was grounded in a more fundamental utilitarian programme of training, instrumentalism and nationalism of the kind not associated with Herder, Goethe or Humboldt. As with the later Medieval, or nineteenth-century Prussian universities, Melbourne University grew because it shared its interests with those in power, in this case the Commonwealth. Through a gold rush and two World Wars, Melbourne University was uncritical, apolitical and obedient, even if all its staff were not. These characteristics, as we have seen, are hardly indicative of our Chorus.

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1 Blainey, G. (1989), *Australian Universities: Some Fashions and Faults*, La Trobe University, Bundoora, p.6
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p.22
ix. Australia: National Gestell

[A]ll the American conditions – which are so rapidly becoming established here; the rootlessness, the vacuity, the inhuman scale, the failure of organic cultural life, the anti-human reductivism that favours the American neo-imperialism of the computer.

F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, p.206

By the late-seventies, however, the Australian Government’s confidence in universities began to wane.¹ This period saw the rise of neo-liberal economic rationalism, which has its roots in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke,² and which colluded in Australia with entrenched anti-intellectualism, utilitarianism and vulgar positivism.³ Neo-liberalism, in turn, was heartily embraced by the Labor and Liberal parties of Australia, and translated into university policy. From this time to the end of the twentieth-century, what has marked Australian universities, Sydney and Melbourne included, is corporatisation, little funding and myopic policy.⁴ The Commonwealth has ensured the “centralisation, rationalization, and bureaucratization”⁵ of Australian universities. Indeed, from the late-seventies onwards, growing in popularity though the ‘Dawkins’ eighties and nineties, “there was always ‘fat’ that could be identified by smart management consultants and trimmed by zealous governments.”⁶ Even as available funds and academic securities deteriorated, the centralisation, rationalisation and bureaucratisation grew.

Consequently, Australian higher education has involved more administration and control, while having less and less monetary and institutional support.⁷ In short, we

⁴ Marginson, S., ‘Universities: when is the penny going to drop?’, Dissent, Number 1, Summer 1999/2000, p.42
have mechanism and technological rationality, combined with forced Darwinian scarcity. At the same time, the Lockean individualism of this economic rationalism has redefined students. They are now egoistic consumers, and buy education. This, in turn, enables them to further their own self-interest as workers and consumers in a competitive environment of scarcity. Self-interested consumerism and technophilia, in turn, have been complemented by the development of new information technologies. Put simply, we see no ethos of creative, open-ended dialogical learning. Even the narrow rote instrumentalism of the Scholastic Continental past is impossible with these online subjects. Rather, we have superficial learning, where the worst power-relations, hierarchies and monologues of the traditional past are heightened. Information is simply bought to gain a title, and education is the brief memorisation of simplistic rules of manipulation and control. This, again, is the high end of Gelernter’s spectrum, where axiomatic or instrumental ‘education’ leads to superficiality. Teachers and students alike succumb to ‘abbreviated thinking’, as space-time compression and technological rationality corrupt their capacity for deep reflection. Academics, in turn, are the deprofessionalised labour that provide the ‘information services’ of this ‘education’. While some thinkers have argued that universities should serve to unify this cacophany of knowledge into meaningful whole, this is hardly Choral polyphony. As Cooper argues, it still conflates information with knowledge, and thus does not redevelop the cultural relations required to overcome commodification. This whole dismal picture is painted in detail by Arnold, who shows where this ‘Virtual University’ ethos is likely to lead us.

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3. Ibid., pp.80-84
Indeed, this picture bears all the scars of capitalist Gestell, and it looks similar across the Anglo-Celtic Western world. In the film Ennui, for example, we see a portrait of bored, distracted, obsessive and meaningless academic life. Moreover, internationalised Australian universities are also exporting individualist, capitalist and technologically rational education to Asia and the Near East. In Australia itself, any remnants of university culture have been enframed within the logic of commodification and technological rationality. Academic worth is judged in terms of ‘knowledge production’, an activity that increases indulgent over-specialisation, abstract dehumanised professional relationships and uncritical pedantry. As a result, even the oppressive orthodox homogeneity of the past are lost. In Bourdieu’s terms, academic orthodoxy has lost the conditions for its very existence. Heterodoxy is either swallowed up into orthodoxy, or helps to weaken the field itself. Lastly, the doxa that grounds the entire field becomes more simplistic and shallow as it react or yields to the ‘logic’ of Gestell.

Meanwhile, the self-congratulatory ‘radicalism’ of deconstructive postmodernism fetishes this very same cultural corruption. While thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Baudrillard are original and insightful theorists, their Anglo-American followers seem to have little sense of the cultural or philosophical tradition they have inherited, particularly that of constructive postmodernism. Treating history like sedimentary ore to be mined for novelty or simply discarded, deconstructive postmodernism is remarkably similar to New Age commodification. Both movements affirm solipsism over Being-with-others, ‘play’ over sobriety and timeless immediacy over history. Consequently, while the Satnami were able to question Hindu history from within,

1 Arnold, M. (1999), ‘The Virtual University’, Arena Journal, Number 13, pp.85-100
deconstruction denies the very reality of historical Being. Postmodernism, as Oldmeadow puts it, “can easily lead us into a ghastly celebration of a meaningless present, exiled from the past, bereft of any vision of the future.” With Oldmeadow, Gare argues that this supports the very same capitalist *Gestell* that is responsible for oppressing the Other, the subaltern and voiceless.

Certainly, these are all fine reasons for widespread and radical dissent. However, judging by anecdotal evidence, personal experience, and university documents, there is an air of fatalism on many campuses. When grounded in mechanistic rationality and egoism, this leads university managers to impose change from above without consultation or due process. Those in university management, and perhaps even many academics, are simply dead as critical voices, letting their embittered ideals fertilise the new crop of ‘management thugs’. Moreover, technological rationality, egoism and space-time compression have diminished our capacity for fantasia, and hence our capacity for empathy with the weak, and political mobilisation. This reflects the grim harvest of the past three decades of neoliberal consolidation, and centuries of Epicureanism. When the initially generous Commonwealth funding waned, universities and university staff did little to publicly question the Epicurean and Hobbesian *status quo*. Rather, as Hinkson puts it, “these processes have transformed

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6. As executive members of the Swinburne University Postgraduate Association (SUPA), I and other students publicly denounced ‘top down’ managerialism in our union. We were soon threatened with legal action by the union staffmembers assigned to SUPA.
8. See Appendix III, p.418
9. SUT (2000), *Swinburne University Academic Board Minutes*, Swinburne University of Technology, AB/00/17, pp.7-8
10. SUT (1999), ‘Response to Green Paper ‘New Knowledge, New Opportunities’’, *Swinburne University of Technology Academic Board Agenda*, Swinburne University of Technology, AB/99/88
the university with hardly a whimper of protest.” The conservatism and selective apoliticism of the past one-hundred-and-twenty-five years remain.2 As Ely writes of those in Australian education,

[from an historical perspective, instrumental, economic arguments promoting government involvement in education have served men of compromise…well. They have avoided possible conflict. They have been politically and religiously neutral; they have been designed to persuade rather than confront an economic or political elite; and they have been employed by this elite, together with their administrators, to control, diversify, and if necessary, stratify the provision of education and social opportunities. They conveniently ignore existing social and political tensions, promoting acceptance of the status quo.3

In Australia, then, there seems a particular lack of parrhēsia and the parrhēsiastic ‘contract’. Supporting this insight and that of Ely, Deem argues that local factors always play a role in the control and commodification of universities.4 Weiss and Pusey concur with this.5 Consequently, global capital and technological rationality have a ‘logic’ to their spread, but the Australian response to this has been just as important to the local development of Gestell.

Certainly, this accords with what we have seen so far. Externally, Australian governments have sought to use universities for narrow utilitarian ends. Internally, Australian university governance has been content to be used in this way, and this complicity has been complemented by political apathy, orthodox political affiliations, snobbery or academic parochialism. Our most prestigious universities have been stifled by the ambivalence of the lay communities, and their own elitism, commercialism, parochialism, militarism and even racism. Indeed, we should add sexism to this list.6

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4 Deem, R. (2001), ‘Globalisation, New Managerialism, Academic Capitalism, and Entrepreneurialism in Universities’, Comparative Education, Volume 37, Number 1, pp.7-20
Our Chorus is antithetical to the monologism of elitism, parochialism and racism, the instrumentalism and brutality of militarism and the estrangement inherent in commercialisation. There has been no Chorus in Australian universities.

x. The Myth of the Fall

As for the intellectuals: petty jealousies, petty quarrels, gossip, and arrogance.

-Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, p. 190

In conclusion, there has been no Chorus in our universities, Continental, British or Australian. The Chorus has never existed. External bodies such as kings, empires and states have been the very ones oppressing university freedom, creativity and open-endedness. Furthermore, the external bodies capable of nurturing a Chorus, such as academies, societies, courts and guilds, have either been estranged from common society or, in the case of Britain, adherents to the Epicurean tradition.

Worse still, the internal culture of universities has been incapable of overcoming external oppression or internal parochialism. This has been because academia itself perpetuates the cultural orthodoxy,\(^1\) or simply because it is lax. Many academics, nurtured by mediocre universities, have simply not been up to the task. As Koestler writes, “academic backwoodsmen have been the curse of genius from Aristarchus to Darwin and Freud; they stretch, a solid and hostile phalanx of pedantic mediocrities,

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\(^1\) Bourdieu, P. (1973), 'Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction', in Karabel, J. and Halsey, A.H. (eds.)(1978), Power and Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.487-511. Here, Bourdieu is speaking of France. There is no reason to suggest that this is not true of other countries, including Australia, particularly given the present domination of neoliberalism and managerialism in and out of universities.
across the centuries.”¹ However, it may be that the destruction of education turns this pedantry to mere sloth, insularity or moral decay. Indeed, after an expansive journalistic study, Driver adds to this articulation of mediocrity what he calls “decadent academic professionalism”², something that is “nothing new in universities”³. Thus, abuse of academic norms by the state are complemented by the inability of many academics to live by these norms.¹ If universities are not controlled from without by kings, empires, or nation-states, they are often corrupted from within by the academics themselves. We found the former in the Continent, the latter in Britain and both in Australia. Consequently, the history of our universities seems at times to be a tragic story of the silence of our Chorus.

As we have seen, however, this is not so say that we in universities have always been superficial. Far from it. Rather than cacophony or polyphony, we have had monologism. Rather than Hobbesian or existentiell freedom, we have had oppression, self-censorship, or economic and political influence. Rather than a polyphonic narrative World, we have had ‘tradition’ in the most vulgar sense of the word. Rather than authentic or inauthentic creativity, we have had mediocrity. In most of these cases, the Chorus was not stifled by superficiality per se. Rather, it was stifled by academic homogeneity, rigidity or mechanism, or straightforward oppression. While commodification occurred, it was mercantile, and not wedded to Gestell, space-time compression and late capitalism. When superficiality was rampant amongst the intelligentsia, as in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Oxbridge, it was that of religious myopia, rather than late modern secular capitalist Gestell. This superficiality was characterised by the shallow dismissal of secularism and non-Anglicanism, rather than depthlessness per se.

Consequently, it is only in late modernity that superficiality is the dominant cultural ethos. It is now that we are facing superficiality and postmodernity, with all the cultural and technological forces that drive them. Universities, as we have seen, are also affected by this. Furthermore, because universities have so entrenched themselves in

³ Ibid.
Western education, we no longer have any strong societies, academies, courts or salons to take their place. Superficiality is the new orthodoxy.

xi. The Rise and Fall of the Chorus: Chorus as Utopia

With this historical analysis, we have drawn on our vision of the Chorus, and given an overview of the ‘life’ of the university. In doing so, we have shown how very fragile our Chorus is. Our Chorus is truly a ‘not yet’ existentiell possible for each of us. However, the Chorus has achieved more that this. We have also stood back from this position, and critically examined the only institutions that seemed capable of overcoming superficiality without lapsing into homogeneity, fundamentalism and so forth. They were supposed to affirm autonomy, polyphony and the unification of wisdom and creativity. They were supposed to develop justice. Sadly, universities seem historically incapable of doing this. While in the past, this was because of external oppression or internal complicity, modern Australian universities are afflicted by the very same forces that have engendered superficiality in our ‘lay’ World.

With this critical history, we have vindicated the power of our Choral vision. It has allowed us to critically examine the past, and keep in our minds a possible future, taking stock of our narrative past. Moreover, it has also justified itself. In the face of superficiality, what is required is a vision like the Chorus that enables us to take stock of the situation and ‘build’ a better future.

However, what has become most plainly apparent in this analysis is the utopian nature of the Chorus. While we have a vision of the kind of role necessary to develop narratives capable of abjuring superficiality, this vision does not exist. It is nowhere. It is utopian. Consequently, in order to defend our Chorus against the charge that it is merely ‘up in the clouds’, we must defend utopias. We must uphold the capacity to imagine alternatives in the face of obstinate corruption. This will defend the Chorus, and allow us to get a better sense of our ability to overcome superficiality.

1 Ben-David, J (1991), Scientific Growth, University of California Press, Oxford, p.213

250 3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
C. Utopia

Ideology is finally a system of ideas that becomes obsolete because it cannot cope with present reality, while utopias are wholesome only to the extent that they contribute to the interiorisation of changes.

- Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, pp.313-314

Stifled with fear and sense, the mind is yoked to need, but you, O heart, keep two doors, and when sorrow strikes, fling wide imagination’s golden gate and send bold Freedom strutting like a peacock through the streets.


Superficiality characterises our culture. Rather than creativity, open-endedness and a respect for culture, we have individualism, technological rationality and greed. Instead of grasping justice and freedom in our narrative World, we do an injustice to those we commodify. Moreover, we do ourselves an injustice as we lose our existentiell and ontic freedom.

Furthermore, we have found that our most ‘civilised’ and ‘civilising’ institutions, the universities, have been corrupted. While previously at the whim of kings, popes, empires or their own orthodox academics, universities have now been undermined by superficiality and the ‘logic’ of capitalist late modernity. Our Chorus has never fully existed, despite being partially realised in a number of times and places. In this sense, the Chorus is a utopia. As it stands, utopias are precisely what is needed to overcome superficiality in our age. We require ‘creative blueprints’ of a possible personal and communal future in order to overcome our present malaise. To evidence this, we must articulate what utopias are, and defend them. To do this, in turn, we will draw on Plato, and his utopian vision of Socrates.

What, then, is utopia? Put simply, it is a ‘not place’, or ‘no place’. However, this ‘no place’ is not the same as the non-Being of Parmenides. The utopia is real. It simply is not real in the same manner as a chair, table or pot plant. Rather, the utopia is a creative vision of what may be. Moreover, it is so explicitly. Thus, the utopia is, as Ricoeur
writes, “what is nowhere; it is the island which is nowhere, the place which exists in no real place. In its very self-description, therefore, the utopia knows itself as a utopia and claims to be a utopia.”¹ Consequently, the utopia is an imaginative vision that lives in the ‘here and now’ but shows us the ‘there’ and ‘then’.² At the very least, it is our capacity for creative, open-ended ‘flights’ of critical imagination.

This capacity, in turn, has been criticised for being ‘idealistic’, ‘up in the clouds’ and so forth. Popper, for example, argues that the polis of Plato’s Republic is a dangerous kind of utopianism.³ The Platonic polis is so idealistic, so absolute, that it can only lead to bloodshed and misery when taken up. If we look more closely at this argument, though, we will see that it is more a criticism of Platonic methodology than of utopias per se. Moreover, Popper does not fully appreciate the artistic and philosophical contribution of Plato to Western civilisation. It is not only the polis of The Republic that should inspire us. Rather, Plato’s vision of Socrates is the more fruitful utopia. Certainly, this utopia grounds that of his polis. Nonetheless, in the utopian vision of Socrates, we can see the role of utopias in overcoming superficiality.

However, Socrates himself is not the right utopia for our time. He alone will not help us overcome superficiality. Certainly, there are some similarities between Socrates and our utopia that we will later articulate.⁴ However, these similarities are secondary. Primarily, Socrates shows how utopias are more than atemporal, aprioristic, universalising harbingers of bloodshed, as Popper would have it. Rather, they are visions grounded in the creative, open-ended nature of Dasein. In short, then, we will give a more fruitful account of utopia than Popper, reconceptualised through our account of Being-in-the-World. Along the way, we also see how Plato’s rejection of drama still allows for a narrative role – the Chorus – grounded in drama. We will see here how the Chorus is a fruitful utopian vision in opposition to our superficial Epicurean World, and how utopianism is a bona fide form of creative cultural development. To achieve this, we will first turn to Plato, Socrates and utopia.

⁴ See p.258, p.266, below.
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

i. Utopia in Athens: The ‘Ideal Dream’

In *The Republic*, Plato develops one of the most memorable visions of ethical and political life in Western civilisation. Written in the first bloom of systematic Athenian philosophy, *The Republic* is a so-called ‘speculative myth’, written to show “what a society would be like in which...a hierarchy functioned on the principle of justice.” Rather than speaking of Athens and its greatness, as Pericles had done generations earlier, Plato articulates a new vision of the *polis*. Here, Plato gives us his vision for society. With references to marriage, architecture, music, ethics, statecraft and childrearing, it is a grand blueprint for life. This Platonic blueprint, in turn, is utopian. Certainly, Plato does not use this word. Though Greek etymologically, the word ‘utopia’ only flowered with the publication of More’s *Utopia*, some eighteen-hundred years after Plato.

However, More was himself inspired by Plato, and the tradition of the Socratic dialogues. Moreover, the *polis* Plato describes is akin to Ricoeur’s earlier characterisation. Socrates speaks of the Platonic *polis* as “an ideal dream”. Similarly, Plato has his brother state plainly to Socrates that his *polis* will never exist on earth. In reply, Socrates says that the *polis* may be “laid up as a pattern in heaven, where he who wishes can see it and found it in his own heart.” Consequently, Plato is well aware that his *polis* does not exist, and he makes this clear in the dialogues. What we see here is what Ricoeur describes as a ‘self-knowing’ utopia, a ‘no place’. It does not exist anywhere but ‘in’ the imaginative capacity of Plato and his comrades. Moreover, this ‘no place’ is wedded to a vision of the Good and the Just.

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2 Pericles, cited in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, II.4
6 Plato, *The Republic*, 540d
7 Ibid., 592b
8 Ibid.
However, as Popper has argued, Plato’s utopia is also characterised by lies, forced exile, forced infanticide and abortion. Indeed, in his Laws and Statesman, Plato also shows us desolate internment camps and instrumental murder. Certainly, these things are a world away from the ‘gentle removal of prejudices’ of Socrates, or the bourgeois depthlessness of our superficial citizens. Moreover, they are hardly Good and Just. Rather, they seem to corrupt freedom, justice and creativity. What sort of utopia is this?

For Popper, it is utopianism itself that leads to this bloody totalitarian vision. It is Plato’s naïve intention to ‘paint the world anew’ with a single brush stroke. This, he calls ‘Utopian engineering’. For Popper, if we want to ‘paint the world anew’ in this way, we need absolute power, and absolute adherence to an absolute ideal. Thus, Popper’s “fundamental criticism is methodological…the utopian method…seeks to impose in toto a rational unchanging aprioristic blueprint.” Certainly, on methodological ‘apriorism’, ‘universalism’ and so forth, we must agree with Popper. We have no need to defend Plato’s utopia in toto.

Nonetheless, to accept the whole of Popper’s critique would do Plato, Socrates and ourselves a grave injustice. Plato’s methodological flaws have little to do with utopia per se. Utopias can be much more than this, even in the work of Plato. To show this, however, we must ‘take a few steps back’. We must articulate the reasons why Plato wrote The Republic. Indeed, we must account for Plato’s oeuvre itself. In doing so, we will see Plato’s polis and utopia in a more fruitful light.

ii. Justice as Utopia

The Republic was not, as Popper writes, “the…attempt to realize an ideal state, the reconstruction of society as a whole…” Plato’s Socrates was not responding to calls for a new polis. Rather he was replying to questions about justice from Polemarchus,
Glaucón and Adeimantus. This, in turn, was because the time of Plato was characterised by corruption, decadence and superficiality. For Plato, this was linked to democracy. For the ‘democratic character’, “all pleasures are equal and should have equal rights. […] There’s no order or restraint in his life, and he reckons his way of living is pleasant, free and happy, and sticks to it through thick and thin.”² This, of course, is like the mien of superficiality. In modern capitalism, the ‘equality of pleasures’ Socrates describes is central to the commodification of the narrative World.³ Similarly, Plato shows how dialogue has become merely ‘point scoring’.⁴ Indeed, the Greek world of Plato’s time was characterised by the corruption of language.⁵ Like our time, Plato’s was one of ‘doublespeak’.

Consequently, Plato’s utopia can only be understood in the context of a World whose cultural traditions were being corrupted.⁶ While Plato does not speak of superficiality, we share with him a time of decadence, shallowness and cacophony. As Gare writes, the “description in Book VIII of The Republic of what is involved in falling away from justice, in the advance of decadence, has been one of the most powerful images affecting European political life.”⁷ Here, education and intellectual life were of little use.⁸ Participation in ‘party politics’ was therefore impossible for Plato.⁹ Any fruitful development could only be realised by questioning the polis in its entirety.¹⁰ To flourish, morality and politics needed a utopian vision.

² Plato, The Republic, 561a-e
³ Daly, H. E. & Cobb, J. B. (1994), For the Common Good, Beacon Press, Boston, p.92
⁴ Plato, The Republic, 325
⁵ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, III.5.§20
⁸ Plato, The Republic, 405-409b, 425e-426d
¹⁰ Plato, The Republic, 500d-501c
Therefore, *The Republic* is not merely a vision of the *polis*. For Plato, the real question was not ‘What is the perfect state?’. Rather, he was asking “what is justice, and who is happier, the just or the unjust person?”. As we can see justice in the large more than the small, Plato looks into justice by drawing analogies between characters and Greek states. This, in turn, leads to an articulation of the *polis* in *The Republic*. Here, Socrates argues that justice in both the individual psyche and the *polis*, is a matter of the various parts ‘knowing their place’. Thus, Plato articulates a vision of a ‘well ordered’ *polis* and psyche. In this manner, we are, as MacIntyre writes, “able to recognise Thrasymachus as having a democratic soul; Polemarchus and Cephalus, plutocratic souls”, and so forth. Eventually, Plato shows what justice would look like in the soul and in the state.

Consequently, the *polis* of *The Republic* is not fully utopian in the Popperian sense. Plato was not developing a new state in the same way as Lenin or Mao. On the contrary, despite his aristocratic character, Plato disavowed political life. Rather, as a philosopher, he was articulating a vision of justice. *Contra* corrupt Athens, Plato was drawing on his creative capacity to develop a blueprint of the future ‘there and then’ in order to better account for the present ‘here and now’. This more fully articulated his notions of justice, while also developing a lasting critique of Athens. Moreover, if we look more closely at the psyche of this *polis*, we will see that Platonic justice had a human face. This ‘face’, in turn, was also utopian. Indeed, this utopia is what will allow us to develop our own utopia, grounded in the creative freedom of Being-in-the-World. To do all this, we will look into the psyche of justice in *The Republic*.

### iii. Socrates the Utopia

What, then, is the ‘soul’ of Plato’s utopian *polis*? It is Socrates. Just as the *Symposium*’s final description of Love is of Socrates, and *Apolo*gy and *Phaedo* show

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2 Plato, *Republic*, 368e-369
3 Plato, *Republic*, 434d, 444d
6 Plato, *Symposium*, 215a-222c
us Socrates’ Piety and Courage, the *The Republic* shows us Socrates as the ‘soul’ of the Good and the Just. Under Plato’s philosophical, ethical and political vision is the wicked face of Socrates.

Consequently, *The Republic* is not simply a vision of totalitarian bloodshed. Rather, it is a blueprint of justice, grounded in a utopian vision of Socrates. Socrates is Plato’s answer to Polemarchus’, Adeimantus’ and Glacon’s questions of justice. Moreover, this vision of Socrates grounds Plato’s whole body of work. Plato was, as Jaspers writes, “captivated; in him Socrates called forth a movement which transformed his whole life and it is only through this movement that he discloses the reality and truth of Socrates”. Similarly, Hadas and Smith write that, in *Phaedo* at least, it “is his image of Socrates rather than any specific doctrine that Plato wished to crystallize and perpetuate”. For Plato, this image of Socrates grounds the other dialogues in the face of the corruption and decadence of Athens.

Certainly, it is this corruption and decadence that ultimately killed Socrates. However, this death shows us the fruits of Plato’s conception of justice. Death, toil, labour and so forth, are not always dark, dreary or mournful. Camus, for example, tells that the mythical Sisyphus is happy because, as a mere mortal, it is his task, his responsibility, his life, to push the heavy stone for eternity. With Plato, if “as Camus insists, we must imagine Sisyphus as happy, then, for different reasons, we must imagine Socrates the same way.” When asked ‘What is justice?’, and ‘Who is happy?’, Plato answers with ‘Socrates’. Whether it be in his playful irony, gentle satire, or noble last words, Socrates is just and Socrates is happy. Here, we see Plato’s utopia in a different light to Popper. Plato’s absolute ‘utopian totalitarianism’ in the *polis* is replaced by Plato’s ‘utopian man’ in Socrates. Socrates is good, just and happy in the face of death.

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1 Plato, *Apology*, 29b; Plato, *Phaedo*, 115d-118
7 Plato, *Phaedrus*, 234c
8 *Ibid.*, 238e-241c
9 Plato, *Phaedo*, 115d
Moreover, this vision of Socrates is commensurate with our vision of the narrative World. First, justice is done when those truly within a World are ‘given their dues’.\(^1\) As we have seen, we cannot do this when we pretend to understand the ‘major premises’ of people or peoples. Socrates, of course, was the champion of this philosophy. As Camus tells us, “Socrates, facing the threat of being condemned to death, acknowledged only this one superiority in himself: what he did not know he did not claim to know. The most exemplary life and thought of those centuries closed on a proud confession of ignorance.”\(^2\) Second, Socrates was able to affirm his freedom in the face of death. As we have seen, this is essential for ‘the good life’.\(^3\) Lastly, Socrates inspired and goaded people into open, creative dialogue against a background of corruption. He forced them to confront alternative possibilities, and imagine these being taken up and lived. Certainly, this vision of Socrates is a precious gift from Plato.

**iv. Utopian Socrates:** Antisthenes to Aquinas

Moreover, this vision of Socrates has inspired people through the ages. As we have seen, Socrates was the ‘human face’ behind Plato’s work. Socrates gave Plato a lived sense of justice, ‘the good’, open dialogue and relentless cultural critique. Socrates the gadfly was Plato’s utopia, and the inspiration behind his Academy, the first ‘university’.\(^4\) However, the utopian vision of Socrates did not just inspire Plato. For Xenophon (c.430-354\(^{BCE}\)), Socrates was “the perfect example of goodness and happiness.”\(^5\) As Howland argues, Socrates was also the ‘great-souled man’, or *megalopsychia*, of Aristotle.\(^6\) Here, a man must aspire to greatness in all his deeds, live according to his word, and try to affirm these things in the face of corruption. While this also means that the *megalopsychia* may be proud or arrogant, Socrates’ critical

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1. See p.91, above.
3. See pp.77-85, above.
4. See p.196 , below.
5. Xenophon, *Memoirs of Socrates*, IV.viii.§8
reflexivity in the face of ignorance overcame these also.\footnote{Ibid., pp.55-56} In short, the life of Socrates was also esteemed by Aristotle.

Similarly, through his influence in Antisthenes (c.445-360\textsc{BCE}), Socrates inspired the Cynics. This inspiration was not that of systematic philosophy, but a way of life. Indeed, the Cynic Diogenes (400-325\textsc{BCE}) was, like Socrates, someone who ‘lived truth’.\footnote{Foucault, M. (2001), \textit{Fearless Speech}, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, pp.124-133} In this sense, the vision of Socrates was the ‘model’ of the good way of life. Diogenes’ student, Crates (365-285\textsc{BCE}), was the teacher of Zeno (334-262\textsc{BCE}), the founder of Stoicism. While the Stoics were more metaphysical than the Cynics, they also required a utopian vision to ‘inspire their hearts’ and ground their metaphysical and ethical speculations. The most popular of their visions of the good life were Socrates and Diogenes. Stoicism, in turn, remained a popular philosophy through the Hellenistic and Roman eras. The Stoic thinker Cicero (106-46\textsc{BCE}) drew on Socrates’ even temper to support his account of character,\footnote{Cicero, \textit{Offices}, I.xxvi} and cited Socrates when arguing for honesty against pretense.\footnote{Ibid., II.xii-xiii} These traits, of course, were to be lived rather than simply admired. Fellow Roman Stoic Seneca (4\textsc{BCE}-65) used the vision of Socrates throughout his tracts and letters. Here, it was not the ‘logic’ of Socrates that necessarily moved him, but the life. As he puts it, “Plato, Aristotle, and the whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his different way, derived more benefit from the character than from the words of Socrates.”\footnote{Seneca, \textit{Moral Epistles}, VI.vii} As he took his own life, Seneca must have drawn strength from the noble death of Socrates. For Epictetus (55-135), Socrates was true freedom, even with a wife and children.\footnote{Epictetus, \textit{Moral Discourses}, IV.i.§18} Lastly, the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121-180) was a Stoic, and the vision of Socrates inspired him in the face of war and corruption. As he writes of Socrates in his \textit{Meditations}, “all that he stood upon, and sought after in this world, was barely this, that he might ever carry himself justly towards men, and hollily towards the Gods.”\footnote{Aurelius, \textit{Meditations}, VII.xxxvii} Before they were supposed to hold Christ as their idol, the Roman emperors were given a pagan vision of ‘the good life’.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1} Ibid., pp.55-56
\bibitem{2} Foucault, M. (2001), \textit{Fearless Speech}, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, pp.124-133
\bibitem{3} Cicero, \textit{Offices}, I.xxvi
\bibitem{4} Ibid., II.xii-xiii
\bibitem{5} Seneca, \textit{Moral Epistles}, VI.vii
\bibitem{6} Epictetus, \textit{Moral Discourses}, IV.i.§18
\bibitem{7} Aurelius, \textit{Meditations}, VII.xxxvii
\end{thebibliography}
Utopian Socrates also influenced the Christian middle and Medieval ages. Justin Martyr (c.110-170), for example, saw Socrates as model of integrity for Christian martyrs.¹ Similarly, Augustine (354-430) praised Socrates for his character. While more a follower of Plato than Socrates, Augustine nonetheless describes the latter as “[i]llustrious…both in his life and in his death”². He then goes on to articulate the wonder of Plato, while grounding Plato’s work in a love for Socrates.³ In this sense, Augustine, writing as Western Rome crumbled, also acknowledged the power of the vision of Socrates. Boethius’s (480-524) *Consolations of Philosophy*, written as he awaited execution in a climate of increasing barbarity, drew heavily on the life and death of Socrates.⁴ As Boethius sat in his cell, the noble vision of Socrates and his hemlock was no doubt in his mind.⁵ Socrates’ was, as Boethius puts it, a ‘victorious death’.⁶

Similarly, in the early Medieval period, Heloise (d.1164) and Abelard (1079-1142) recalled the continence of Socrates and Cicero as they faced exile, mutilation and shame.⁷ Even St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), more Aristotelian than Platonic or Socratic, had a habit of using Socrates in all his philosophical arguments.⁸ Moreover, he praised the effect of Socrates’ character. Like Jesus, Socrates developed “that manner of teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers”⁹. As we have seen, it is ‘in the hearts of men’ where the utopia puts root and blooms. Moreover, it does so over and above the power of words alone. It is a matter of character. Certainly, this is not to say that Socrates was as influential on Augustine, Heloise and Aquinas as he was on the Stoics of Cynics. Rather, it is to highlight the lasting impact of the vision of Socrates’ life even in Christendom.

Lastly, during the Renaissance, Erasmus (c.1466-1536) drew on Socrates as the model of virtuous balance. Similarly, in ‘On Physiognomy’, Montaigne (1533-1592) speaks of

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² Augustine, *City of God*, VIII.3
³ *Ibid.*, VIII.4
⁵ *Ibid.*, p.43
⁸ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, passim
⁹ *Ibid.*, I.42.vi
the righteousness of Socrates’ life. Indeed, Montaigne is particularly utopian in his account. Of Socrates, he writes that he “owed his life not to himself, but to the world, as an example.”\(^1\) Lastly, it may be that even Shakespeare (1564-1616) used Socrates as a ‘model’, drawing on the ‘wicked’ Socrates for his memorable portrait of Falstaff.\(^2\) While these men were not living as Socrates, their life and art were still developed with the ‘touchstone’ of the Socratic life.

Consequently, the utopian vision of Socrates has inspired life and art over the millennia. More recently, Foucault was open in his indebtedness to Socrates’ ‘care of the self’.\(^3\) Even Nietzsche, who raged against Socrates,\(^4\) seemed unable to shake this vision.\(^5\) This utopian Socrates, in turn, is ultimately the fruit of Plato’s oeuvre. Thus, the critique of Popper is doubly flawed. First, The Republic was not a tome of practical statecraft or ‘utopian engineering’. It would be more correct to characterise Laws in this way. Rather, Plato’s Republic was a vision of justice in opposition to the corruption of Athens. It is, as Frye writes, a ‘speculative myth’,\(^6\) developed to systematically oppose the ‘might is right’ worldview of Athenian realpolitik. Secondly, Plato’s utopia need not even be a polis. Rather, grounding this whole vision is another utopia, that of Socrates. For Plato, Socrates was the ‘human face’ of justice. Socrates inspired Plato to develop his philosophy, and to creatively seek answers to questions through meditation and dialogue. This vision of Socrates, in turn, inspired people over the millennia. Confronted by corruption, decadence, greed, weakness of will and so forth, men like Epictetus and Diogenes drew on the vision of Socrates to live.

v. Utopian Dasein: The ‘No Place’ and the ‘Not Yet’

In all of these cases of utopia, though, Socrates was long dead. He no longer took up his place in the world, and was thus a ‘not place’. Yet, this past vision of the Socratic

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\(^3\) Ibid., pp.157-188
life in some way inspired creativity, justice and existential freedom. *Qua* utopia, Socrates was somehow able to transcend the sediment of the past, and come alive ‘in the hearts’ of men. How, then, was Socrates able to live again, particularly in the lives of the Stoics and Cynics?

This was due, in fact, to the nature of *Dasein*. As we have seen, the existence of a *Dasein* is not a matter of brute facticity. Rather, as Heidegger writes, “[e]xistence is decided only by each *Dasein* itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities.” Consequently, we can see how the vision of Socrates was taken up. The Stoics and the Cynics, for example, ‘seized’ on Socrates as a blueprint for their lives. They took up the possibilities of Socrates, and neglected those of Epicurus or Alcibiades. In this sense, Socrates is an *existentiell* possibility that may be recollected, projected and lived. For this very reason Socrates says to Glaucon that each man must grasp the vision and “found it in his heart.” Similarly, this is why Ricoeur argues that utopias are fruitful only when they can be taken up and lived. Camus made a similar argument with the myth of Sisyphus. We take utopias into ourselves and live them, even if they are from the past. In this sense, “history is a characteristic of the living *Dasein* rather than the dead past.” By coming to terms with our mortal ‘thrownness’, we may ‘take a stance upon ourselves’ from within our World. This ‘stance’, in turn, can be utopian.

Consequently, the living utopia, like Socrates, is not strictly a ‘no place’. Rather, it is a ‘not yet’. It may exist as an *existentiell* possibility within the horizons of our World. This said, for each *Dasein* it does not exist as an actuality. This is why it is a ‘no place’, for it is not real. Instead, it is a possibility that goads us: ‘not yet’. We may see a utopia in the sediment of our narrative tradition, and treat it as a ‘not yet’; a possibility we may soon actualise with our very selves. Of course, when we take up these utopias from our narrative past, we are not trying to ‘be’ the past. Rather, as with ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, ‘virtue’, ‘paideia’, ‘university’ and so forth, utopias are visions that show us what may

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2 Plato, *Republic*, 592b
be. For this reason, we do not become slaves to tradition, or poseurs aping the lives of others. As Carr writes, “I can have heroes, emulate them, and be loyal to their memory”\(^1\). If I do choose to take these up, it is only ever “I who choose them.”\(^2\) As we have seen,\(^3\) this ability to take up the past is always grounded in existential freedom. This freedom is ‘the very state of understanding, creating, and recreating the stories we have been thrown into.’

This freedom, in turn, is why we should affirm the vision of Plato. We should not, with Popper, dismiss him as a mere ‘utopian engineer’. Plato travelled extensively, founded his Academy, and abjured the bloody, vengeful politics he saw in Athens and Syracuse.\(^4\) Instead, he developed an alternative philosophical community inspired by the Socratic utopia.\(^5\) Here, he could devote himself entirely to teaching and writing. Indeed, “Plato…not merely wrote a very great deal; he left behind him the first systematic body of philosophical literature that the ancient world had produced.”\(^6\) This literature makes us aware of many subtle aporias of self and culture, and spurs us on to think for ourselves.\(^7\)

Moreover, we see here why the Chorus, though a form of ‘dangerous’ drama,\(^8\) is not antithetical to Plato, over and above the kinship between the Socratic dialogues and polyphony.\(^9\) Rather then writing systematic analyses, tracts, or speeches, Plato wrote drama. Many seem to forget the literary nature of Plato’s \emph{oeuvre}. His utopian dialogues, as Seekin writes, are “unsurpassed works of art”\(^10\). They are not simple abstract tracts, but utopian stories that inspire us to think critically, and examine our

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2 \emph{Ibid.}
3 See p.82ff, above.
4 Plato, \emph{Letter VII}, 337
8 Plato, \emph{Republic}, 398b, 607b
own existence. Often they are speculative myths, a world away from Aristotelian syllogisms or science. In this sense, they are artistically and philosophically creative, and partake in ‘untrue’ mimēsis. This creativity, in turn, gave us these seeds of Western civilisation. As Nisbet writes, “in so many areas of understanding we have found ourselves looking at the world and man through spectacles fashioned in the first instance by Plato.” While he wrote of forced abortion, infanticide, censorship of art, and murder, Plato’s more utopian vision was of justice, grounded in the life of Socrates, and expressed as dramatic art. This utopia inspired many over the ages, and still inspires us today.

Certainly, this does not acquit Plato. He need not have described any absolute ideal. Socrates himself was not an absolute and unchanging ideal. Rather, he was a mere man, undertaking contingent, immediate and peaceful dialogue with other men. Plato was not true to this. Characterised by Bakhtin as monological, Plato’s utopian eidos “is a dead ideal, not a living one, as he found out later when he was forced to admit life, and therefore movement, in to the world of the Forms.” Plato’s oeuvre portrays for us the utopia, Socrates, but describes a polis that would have kept Socrates a stonecutter for life. Indeed, Plato’s polis may have put Socrates to death. Certainly, Plato’s mistake was to require monological absolutism where Socrates never did. There is, then, a degeneration from Socrates’ more human truthfulness to the Platonic realm of

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2 Nisbet, R. (1976), The Social Philosophers, Paladin, Herts, p.114
6 Ferguson, J. (1975), Utopias of the Classical World, Thames and Hudson, London, p.68
8 Plato, Laws, 909a
philosopher-kings. Here, we must admit that Plato was unfair to Socrates, his utopian vision.\(^1\) However, contra Popper, this has little to do with the Socratic utopia, or with utopias \textit{per se}. Shklar makes a similar mistake.\(^3\) As we have seen, \textit{The Republic} is utopian because it gives us a utopian \textit{polis} grounded in the utopian vision of Socrates. Socrates drew others into the Good, the Just and the True, and into creative dialogues on these very same things. Moreover, these dialogues were concerned with goodness, justice and truth, rather than self-interest, hedonism and shallowness. In our time of superficiality, we need art like this. We need visions to take us out of the ‘here and now’. We need our World to be ‘ruptured’.

\section*{vi. ‘Shattering the Obvious’: The Need for Utopia}

Consequently, we also see here the kinship between the utopia and the \textit{epoché}. The utopia, as Ricoeur writes, “introduces a sense of doubt that shatters the obvious. It works like the \textit{epoché} in Husserl [in that it] requires us to suspend our ideas about reality.”\(^4\) Just as deep appropriation can uncloseal the World subversively, so can a utopia suspend our present World and give us another. Similarly, it can doubt the actuality of our selves and give us other \textit{existentiell} possibilities. Faced with superficiality and the corruption of language, “we should”, as Polak writes, “give far more attention to constructive counter-utopias….Such deliberate, positive counter-images are…an essential prerequisite to…progress.”\(^5\) Rather than remaining buried in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[2] Nietzsche, of course, sees Plato’s injustice to Socrates as Socrates’ own fault. As the ‘buffoon’ responsible for undermining Greek culture and civilisation with his intellectualism, Socrates corrupted Plato, the ‘beautiful aristocrat’. In turn, Plato misunderstood any last remnants of ‘instinct’ left in his noble teacher. While Nietzsche’s criticism of extreme intellectualism, universalism, and so forth, is brilliant, his wholesale rejection of the Socratic project is short-sighted. To reject Socrates, the ‘gadfly’, is to also reject midful cultural change, the basis of any healthy community. See Nietzsche, F. (1990), \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, Penguin Books, Ringwood, p.32; Nietzsche, F. (1993), \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}, Penguin Books, Ringwood, pp.59-89; and Nietzsche, F. (1990), \textit{Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ}, Penguin Books, Ringwood, pp.39-51.
\end{footnotes}
the sediment of the World we are thrown into, we must try to creative inspiring alternatives. As Polak writes, “Man is the only living being who can consciously split reality in two: into the existent and the other.”¹ This split, however, is not ontological or existential, but ontic and existentiell. Our ontology is always one of Being-in-the-World, and the ‘other’ Polak speaks of must always come from this.

For this reason, we must in some way ground our utopian visions in the exigencies of ‘here and now’. This is what Harvey calls a ‘dialectical utopianism’,² and Bourdieu ‘reasoned utopianism’.³ We must be mindful of the places we dwell, the ‘things’ we are being-alongside, those people we are Being-with, the past, present and future of each of these. Moreover, we need the wisdom to realise that some of this World will always be ‘opaque’ to us.⁴ This ‘opacity’, of course, is what “gaining the courage of our minds is all about.”⁵ We must have the courage to ‘make’ our World from our ‘thrownness’, and ‘make’ ourselves as we do. Consequently, the idealism of utopia may be overcome. While we must not be lost in fantasy, “we must also…reopen the past, to revivify its unaccomplished, cut-off – even slaughtered – possibilities.”⁶ We must let utopias live or die.

In our World of superficiality, then, we are left with a choice. On the one hand, our possibilities can lie dormant in the sediment of a lifeless tradition. They can truly be a dead ‘no place’ for us. If this is the case, superficiality will stay, and we will never develop our creative, open-ended nature. On the other hand, our possibilities can act as futures on the horizon of our Being-in-the-World. They may be a live ‘not yet’ for us. If we are to overcome superficiality, we must choose life. We must develop a embrace a utopian vision of justice for our time, the Chorus. Like Socrates, the Chorus is a vision that may be upheld in opposition to the corruption of civilisation. Just as Socrates inspired debate, undermined superficiality and maintained his personal autonomy, so

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⁴ See p.24, p.29, above.
too does the Chorus. Just as Socrates defined himself by his truth-telling, endangering himself in the process, so too does the Chorus.

However, Socrates was only one man, and lacking institutional form. Consequently, he was unable to fully emplot his fellow Athenians into any larger story of justice and the good. Rather, he simply shamed, provoked, or inspired them. The Chorus, however, allows characters to place themselves in a larger narrative whole, so that they are not isolated individuals, but as Beings-in-the-World. This vision can be integrated with the insights of Bakhtin, who shows us the phenomenon of polyphony. Choral polyphony affirms the civilising ‘generalised other’ of Mead, and then overcomes its monological universalism. This also abjures the universalising tendency in vulgar Platonism and, *mutatis mutandis*, Platonic distortions of the Socratic utopia. With polyphony, the whole of the World is understood in relation to the many smaller stories that dwell within it. With polyphony, then, we are able to do justice to the stories of others, placing them in relation to our own, and to the larger narrative whole of which we are a part. This means that we are better able to come to terms with who should have power, and why. With the Chorus, then, we may better do justice to one another. By doing justice to ourselves and one another, we are also able to grasp existentiell and ontic freedom. This, in turn, allows us all to creatively contribute to our communities, as did Socrates. The Chorus, then, may be a bold utopia for our time.
D. Utopia and Superficiality: Akrasia and Narrative Corruption

However, utopias have limits. Indeed, if we examine these limits more closely, we will see that utopias are also corrupted by superficiality. This further develops our account of superficiality and its spread. Moreover, it allows us to consider alternative ways of grasping our Choral utopia.

We have seen how Socrates is a utopia for Plato, and we have developed our own utopia, the Chorus. Utopias are not static, atemporal blueprints, but existentiell possibles. Moreover, utopias allow us to critically examine our past and present, allowing these existentiell possibles to be more relevant. In our case, we have shown how the Chorus has never existed, and this has clarified the past and present failings of the academy. Our Chorus can be seen as an existentiell possible for each of us in and out of academia who are enframed by technological rationality, individualism and capitalism. By coming to terms with this utopia, we may develop the Chorus and overcome our superficiality.

However, it is not this simple. Utopias, by their very nature, are fragile and difficult to realise. Indeed, academic utopias like the Chorus are utterly corrupted by superficiality. We will see that superficiality not only renders us hollow, but also makes the ethical life nearly impossible. We will see that, as a World and, mutatis mutandis, as individuals, we are ethically weak. To account for this, we will turn to Socrates, Alcibiades and Aristotle.
i. Socrates’ Failure and the Limits of Utopia

Why, just when I was most capable of being conscious of every refinement of the ‘good and the beautiful’, as they used to put it once upon a time, were there such moments when I lost my awareness of it, and did such ugly things – things that everyone does probably, but that I did precisely at moments when I was most aware that they shouldn’t be done.

- ‘Underground Man’, in Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes From Underground, pp.93-94

We know what is right and understand it, but we don’t put it into practice, some out of laziness, others by letting some other pleasure come first, and life has many pleasures….

- Phaedra, in Euripides, Hippolytus, 375

Socrates is not a failed utopia per se. Rather, Socrates fails when he conflates scientific or technical knowledge of the just, and the good with a just and good character and, mutatis mutandis, just and good action. Quite simply, he assumes that “all that is necessary for a virtuous life is clear knowledge of what virtue is.” Certainly, the life of Alcibiades is proof enough that this is not true. Superficial or otherwise, the famous statesman and stratēgos Alcibiades, was quite in love with Socrates and his logos. Nonetheless, he failed to cultivate moral virtue. As Seeskin makes clear,

Alcibiades is not an ordinary person who has trouble assessing the consequences of his choices: he is in the presence of the greatest example of the philosophic life the world has ever known – an example whose beauty he sees and admires.

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Thus Socrates failed to develop in Alcibiades an ethical life. As Laistner puts it, Alcibiades’ “intellectual intercourse and friendship in early manhood with...Socrates sharpened his wits; it could not mend his morals”\(^1\). While Socrates was the perfect utopian man, Alcibiades was unable to grasp this utopia. Lacking what Aristotle describes as a ‘kinship to virtue’, Alcibiades would rather ashamedly flee in the face of Socrates’ moral virtue than change his ways.\(^2\) Although he knew of the ‘just and the good’, the utopian blueprint of Socrates and Plato, Alcibiades could not become morally virtuous. If Socrates, alive or dead, was unable to persuade Alcibiades to take up utopia, how are we to take up the Chorus? How can such a beautiful moral vision be left to die? How do we explain this?

As it stands, Aristotle develops a fine critique of Socrates. He shows in detail that it is not merely epistēmē, or scientific or technical knowledge, that leads to an ethical life.\(^3\) Rather we need what can be generally called ‘ethical knowledge’. Ethical knowledge entails not only knowledge per se, but also enkrateia, or conviction,\(^4\) and this conviction comes from phronēsis, ‘practical wisdom’ oriented towards definite ethical ends in concert with good character.\(^5\) If we do not have this conviction, we have what Aristotle calls akrasia: incontinence, or weakness of will. Consequently, we will need enkrateia to take up our utopia, the Chorus. How does enkrateia arise?

**ii. Ontic Akrasia: Weakness of Will and the World**

For Aristotle, enkrateia is associated with ethikē, meaning roughly ‘moral virtue’, and ethos, meaning ‘habit’.\(^6\) As a habit, or custom, the ethical life does not ‘arise in us by nature’,\(^7\) but must be cultivated in a manner similar to that of nomoi. As we saw originally in Aristotle’s polis, by participating in everyday life with others, including logoi informed by nous, epistēmē, phronēsis and other forms of ‘knowing’, a person may further cultivate a good character, or ethos. However, this cultivation, as Aristotle

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\(^2\) Plato, *Symposium*, 215e-2116d

\(^3\) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b:27ff


\(^6\) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a:16-18

\(^7\) *Ibid.*, 1103a:19-20
notes, is itself necessary for any arguments, such as those relying on *elenchos*, to successfully continue.\(^1\) Thus, “[t]he character must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base.”\(^2\) This dilemma has also been acknowledged by MacIntyre, who notes that “only insofar as we have already arrived at certain conclusions are we able to become the sort of person able to engage in such an enquiry so as to reach sound conclusions.”\(^3\) Put simply, in order to take up an utopian vision of ‘the good and the just’, we must already have an affinity with the good and the just. MacIntyre, like Aristotle, thus emphasises preparedness as essential in cultivating the kind of moral virtue seen in our utopia, the Chorus.

Aristotle does not equate the virtues with *enkrateia per se*. Nevertheless, *enkrateia* is still associated with habit. Where ‘laws’ can be read dually as legislation and customs, Aristotle notes that the “incontinent man is like a state that...has good laws but makes no use of them.”\(^4\) If we are aware of what is right, and yet still cannot conquer our fears or pleasures, we are not truly ‘in’ the World. Here, we see why Aristotle stresses the unity of a single life and full complement of virtues.\(^5\) We cannot be truly good without a whole character; ethical life is not possible with a fragmented, piecemeal *ethos*.\(^6\) It is only by taking up and living through our World that we can grasp the wholeness necessary for a utopian life. When we dismiss in *toto* the many ethical *nomoi* of our time, we undermine the utopian preparedness shown by Aristotle and MacIntyre.\(^7\) We free ourselves from the *enkrateia* that comes from the “sense of completeness, wholeness and magnitude”\(^8\) of a political community. If we move away from our time, our *ethos* and *nomoi*, we cannot truly grasp any utopias. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “it is by living my time that I am able to understand other times, by plunging into the present...I can go further.”\(^9\) Only insofar as we live fully in our World will it become meaningful for us. Only insofar as things are meaningful for us

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*, 1179b:4-31  
\(^2\) *Ibid.*, 1179b:29-31  
\(^4\) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1152a:20-21  

3. Confronting Superficiality: Chorus, Utopia and Symbols
will we act. This is one of the ripe fruit of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. When our World, and thus our *ethos*, becomes fragmented, our will loses its meaning, its inspiration, passion and fire. We cannot grasp our utopia. Certainly, utopias themselves may give people the will to ‘shape’ the future.\(^1\) However, two consequences often arise from this. When wedded to eternal and universalised utopias, this will becomes brutal. Otherwise, lacking ‘anchorage’ in our World, these utopias can leave us withdrawn and weak.\(^2\) Indeed, these can combine so that one group submits to the aggressive utopia of another. As a World, this leaves us lacking justice and freedom as power is abused.

Consequently, *akrasia* does not simply arise through a lack of theoretical precision. *Akrasia* occurs when we fall away from our narrative World. Academics are good examples of this. In this sense, even our articulation of narratives, Being-in-the-World and so forth, does not develop *enkrateia*. It simply shows us what we should do, and nothing more. For this reason, the utopian vision of the Chorus still requires *enkrateia* to develop in life. Without a free relation to our World,\(^3\) we cannot wilfully grasp our utopias and live the ethical life.

Plato’s Athens was a good example of this. Much of Athens was riddled with superficial cynicism and fundamentalist irrationality.\(^4\) Many of the people were characterised by unpreparedness. Plato’s utopia and Aristotle’s rational ethical life were therefore doomed. This seems to have been recognised by Plato.\(^5\) Perhaps it is this conclusion of a doomed utopia that led Plato to the totalitarian methods described in *The Republic*, *Statesman* and *Laws*.\(^6\) Perhaps the same insights led Aristotle to the methods of state control mooted near the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and described in *Politics*.\(^7\) This is not individual *akrasia*, but ontic *akrasia*. It is the incapability of a transcendent people to freely develop factical Being. Consequently, *existentiell akrasia* arises, as each Dasein takes up weak *existentiell* possibles. We each learn to be

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\(^3\) See pp.77-85, above.
Alcibiades. This, in turn, is the antithesis of ontic and existentiell freedom.¹ As a World, it is to lose freedom.

Sadly, our modern superficiality shares much with the Athenian world of Plato and Aristotle. As we have seen, our World is riddled with corruption. First, our narrative World has been fragmented and distorted by the ‘logic’ of modern Epicureanism. Second, our language is being deformed by superficial appropriation and the divorce of communication from a meaningful lifeworld. Third, the universities wherein we might engage in dialogue and further develop our traditions and language are themselves enframed by Gestell. Last, ontic and existentiell akrasia are undermining any ethical conclusions we may intellectually derive. As a consequence, we are alienated from the narrative traditions wherein we could properly develop an ethical life, unable to properly speak of such a life, and prevented from grasping such a life by akrasia. Meanwhile, justice and freedom are compromised to gain economic, cultural and symbolic capital. Logos is of the mechanistic, atomistic kind. Poïēsis is a private luxury. Due to our falling away from history, we even lack the concrete sense that things have ever been substantially different. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, we do not even have a Golden Age to turn back to. Nonetheless, we certainly share with these thinkers a time of decadence.

However, we wish to avoid the totalitarian methods recommended by Plato and mooted by Aristotle. How, then, do we avoid the ‘Alcibiades problem’, a problem that now characterises our entire age, and is thoroughly institutionalised in media, politics and education? If we as a people have akrasia, how will each of us, in the words of Socrates, “found [utopia] in his own heart”?² Even if we are ‘making’ ourselves rather than some grand polis, our hearts seem bloodless. Can we overcome akrasia and superficiality, thereby upholding the integrity of the narrative World and affirming our own creative nature? Can we succeed where Athens apparently failed?

¹ See pp.77-85, above.
² Plato, The Republic, 592b
We found earlier that utopias were a fruitful way of overcoming superficiality. However, we have found that superficiality and cultural *akrasia* leave these fruit to rot. With *akrasia*, we can have a utopian vision of right and wrong, and yet fail to live this vision. As a people we are weak of will and shallow, ‘floating’ above the world in a sea of commodities. Certainly, some people in universities may be academically deep. However, they themselves are often existentially weak of will, fragmented and isolated from their World. In Australia, as we have seen, many academics are superficial, and unable to escape the ‘logic’ of technological rationality, individualism and capitalism. They do not necessarily superficially appropriate. Rather, they ‘cruise’ through the world, rarely theoretically or practically questioning the *doxa* that underpins the *status quo*. They ‘go through the motions’ with no deeper relation to the Choral nature of intellectual life. Thus, the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke has made our Choral utopia impotent. Without the capacity to be inspired, and to wilfully take up an alternative ethical vision like the Chorus, superficiality will continue to grow.

Consequently, the strength of will needed for utopianism must come from elsewhere. This ‘will’ must also be wedded to our Being-in-the-World, lest our utopian vision be shallow and fragmented. For this reason, we will look into symbols. Symbols have the ‘will’ necessary to overcome superficiality and *akrasia*, and allow our utopia, the Chorus, to develop. Moreover, symbols are Being-in-the-World with us. Like Aristotelian virtue, they are related to the unity of a single life. In this sense, they are the best expression of creative, open-ended life wedded to coherent ethical will and inspiration. However, we will see later that symbols, too, have been hollowed out in our Epicurean superficial age. In order to more fully account for superficiality and its overcoming, we should therefore find out where symbols are from, and what they are.
i. What Are Symbols?

The modern notion of ‘symbol’ comes from the tradition of Herder, Humboldt, and Schelling. Against Hobbes and Locke, this tradition, as we have seen, understands language as in a given World. However, while Heidegger inherited this tradition, he did not develop a theory of symbols per se. Rather, this was taken up by Paul Ricoeur, who is in the phenomenological, hermeneutic and existential tradition along with Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others, with the notable exception of Sartre. Also helping us to understand symbols will be theologian Paul Tillich, whose religious notion of ‘symbol’ closely approximates that of Ricoeur. Indeed, Tillich is also in the tradition of Herder, Schelling and Heidegger, and a friend of Ricoeur. His insights should be taken seriously. Nonetheless, it is Ricoeur who will give us the most aid. With symbols, including those of Freudian psychoanalysis, Ricoeur wishes to revive an interest in the ‘psychologism’ of Husserl without the later Cartesianism.

This, in turn, complements the work of Heidegger. For Ricoeur, Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein is a kind of ‘short route’. Instead of starting with a Hobbesian individual and trying to figure out how she understands the world, Heidegger simply asks: “What kind of being is it whose being consists of understanding?” As we have seen, this account of Dasein is fruitful, for it intertwines phenomenal reality with interpretation and, mutatis mutandis, understanding. Indeed, Ricoeur desires this very same ontology. However, Ricoeur shows that, by taking the ‘short route’, we forget to come

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.7
to terms with the various interpretations of Being that make up our shared ontic and existentiell reality. Heidegger’s forgetting of phronēsis and the homogeneity of das Man seem grounded in this route. Thus, Ricoeur argues that the “coherent figure of the being which we ourselves are, in which rival interpretations are implanted, is given nowhere but in this dialectic of interpretations.”\(^1\) In turn, this dialectic can be grasped only by ‘listening’ to symbols. What are these symbols? If they can help Ricoeur with an ontology of Dasein, can they help us with akrasia?

At their simplest, symbols are signifiers. However, they are different to everyday signs, icons, and the symbols of logic. In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur argues that symbols “are opaque, because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself points…to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in itself.”\(^2\) To use Ricoeur’s example, ‘defilement’ symbolises defilement because of its association with ‘stain’. Stain, of course, evokes feelings of impurity, of uncleanness, of dirtiness. It is these feelings that are then associated with transgression, with ethical misconduct, with disobedience, and so forth. Thus, ‘defilement’, “through the physically ‘unclean’, points to a certain situation of man in the sacred which is precisely that of being…impure.”\(^3\) Symbols like ‘defilement’ point analogically to referents, such as religious transgression, that share their internal characteristics, in this case, the feeling of ‘stain’. Put another way, symbols point to the larger whole of which they are a part, and they also share attributes with this whole. In this sense, symbols are both metonyms and metaphors. As Lakoff and Johnson write of the Christian ‘dove’, “its natural habitat is the sky, which metonymically stands for heaven, the natural habitat of the holy spirit.”\(^4\) Moreover, the “dove is a bird that flies gracefully, gliding silently, and…is seen coming out of the sky and landing among people”\(^1\), attributes that it metaphorically shares with the Holy Spirit.

As this shows, symbols can also be combined within complex narratives, such as that of the Judaeo-Christian World we explored earlier. To use another of Ricoeur’s examples, the symbol of the Crucifixion, for instance, combines pain with the figure of Christ, the

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1. Ibid., p.23  
3. Ibid.  
latter being both the ‘Son of Man’ and the ‘Servant of God’. The former, symbolising humanity collectively, and the latter, symbolising the King who suffers for his God, are thus combined in the Messiah. Therefore, while Jesus is the King, the ‘Servant of God’, who suffers for our collective sins, he is also the ‘Son of Man’, the ‘Second Adam’. This, in turn, is symbolic of a new humanity after the Final Judgement. For Christians, when this Messiah is crucified, we must acknowledge that it “is through [the Messiah,] who substitutes his suffering for our [collective] sins[,] that pardon is announced”, leading to the final Judgement and the Kingdom of God. While this example, incorporating several symbols, is obviously more complex than that of ‘defilement’ or ‘dove’, the same characteristics of symbolism apply. The symbol, like defilement or crucifixion, must have within it characteristics such as impurity or pain, that metaphorically relate to that which is being symbolised, like defilement or collective sin, suffering and redemption. These, in turn, are part of the larger narrative World of Christianity. In other words, symbols are signifiers that metaphorically share attributes with the larger metonymic whole they signify. Symbols are deeply Being-in-the-world alongside us.

ii. Symbols and Signs

Lacking this depth are signs. The word ‘moon’, for instance, is merely a sign, for it lacks any qualities that analogically relate to the moon. ‘Moon’ could equally mean ‘topknot’, or ‘to build’. The moon itself, however, is a symbol associated with the qualities of coldness, renewal, or decay. Qualities such as these relate analogically in different Worlds to social alienation, mystical femininity, or the inescapability of death. Consequently, the symbol, rather than the sign, is “bound, bound to its content”. Conversely, then, signs are characterised by ‘unboundedness’. At their very worst, like abstract grammar, signs are, as Heidegger puts it, “mere mechanisms...totally and

1 Ibid.
2 Ricoeur, P. (1979), The Symbolism of Evil, Beacon Press, Boston, p.268. Note that Adam is Hebrew for ‘man’. The ‘Second Adam’ is the also ‘Second Man’, the ‘new humanity’ in the Kingdom of God.
3 Ibid., pp.265-278
4 Ibid., p.266
6 Ricoeur, P. (1979), The Symbolism of Evil, Beacon Press, Boston, p.17
incomprehensible shells.”¹ Normally, though, the significations of signs are simply irrelevant to their obvious attributes.

However, the abyss between symbols and signs is not so vast. Things are often more than their obvious attributes. This is because, as we noted earlier, it is not as if anyone is “the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe.”² This principle, of course, extends to images, icons and signs as much as it does to words. For Vico, Herder, Marx and so forth, we never encounter the world in vacuo. As Heidegger writes, “we do not…throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-to-hand”³. Therefore, what is considered obvious – just like what may be a ‘fact’ – will depend on which narrative World it is within. In this way, a sign in a given World may also become more than its obvious attributes. Indeed, a sign may become a bound symbol in one World and not in another. Christianity’s cross, for instance, is no longer simply a sign of the cross. Certainly, the word ‘cross’ is still a sign, as may be Eyck’s The Crucifixion. However, the cross is now a symbol, and has been for millennia.⁴ Thus, a sign may become a symbol.

Moreover, a symbol may become a sign. As we saw, Hitler and the Ahnenherbe had the swastika symbol signify qualities external to its bound attributes, such as hate, genocide, mechanistic destruction and German purity. This meant an ‘unboundedness’ for the swastika. Consequently, the swastika went from symbol to sign, and back again.¹ Indeed, we see here the similarity between analytical logic and Gestell, where all symbols become signs to denote anything according to sheer calculating will. While the signs of symbolic logic are cut loose from the World, symbols have no meaning apart from a World.

Thus, with the cross and the swastika, the status of ‘sign’ or ‘symbol’ was contingent upon the World in question. As Tillich writes, “symbols can…die if the situation in

² Bakhtin, M.M. (1996), Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, University of Texas Press, Austin p.69
which they have been created has passed.” The terms ‘sign’ and ‘symbol’, then, are not designating elements in any *a priori* taxonomy. Rather, they are potentially unstable and unreliable, depending on the cultural World, the ‘situation’, within which they are born, live and die. They are part of our creative nature.

**iii. The Power of Symbols and the Godless Ground**

Moreover, living symbols are very powerful. What they lack in calculated reliability, symbols supply in ‘will’. This motive force may be what is required to overcome *akrasia* and build our utopia, the Chorus. Whence comes this power?

Commensurate with our notion of culture, the power of symbols may be explained by the psychological phenomena we explored earlier through the work of Freud and Piaget. Specifically, we may reintroduce the notion of object. As we saw earlier, objects in the Freudian sense become introjected as symbols of identification, or cathected as external symbols of desire. Objects, in the Piagetian sense, are also introjected. However, they can only be understood as dense symbolic relations. If we integrate these two notions of object, the child not only develops quasi-scientific schemas within which to make sense of a world of similarly internalisable objects. The child introjects or cathects the symbolic objects of her culture. In this sense, symbols *qua* objects are related to subjective desires and the relations of an objective World, while not existing as ‘things’, divorced from the creative capacity of the historical people. Consequently, symbols in a given World are not only constitutive of personhood. Rather, they also stand outside the person as objects of desire, while maintaining themselves within the World of this ‘stretched’ person.

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5 See p.41ff, and p.87, above.
While we are abjuring Freud’s positivistic scientism, we should also reject Freud’s emphasis on purely sexual symbolism and desires, while keeping the notion of ‘desire’ per se. Desire, from this perspective, is simply ‘that which draws us on’. Through scarcity and labour, power relations, or the ‘gaze’ of others, for instance, we are drawn into Hegelian dialectics of material economics, politics, or worth.¹ We saw this in the work of Bourdieu, who also draws on Freud.² Symbols, then, can be associated with non-sexual feelings of ‘production and appropriation’,³ “intrigue, ambition, submission, [and] responsibility”⁴, or “works and monuments of law, art, and literature”⁵ associated with Dasein’s myriad possibilities of human existence. The symbols of God and Christ, for instance, are desired by Christians.⁶ These symbols also allow cultural self-identification and personal guilt displacement to occur, by bonding Christians in the symbolic acts of the Eucharist and Crucifixion.⁷ These, in turn, have helped to build the Christians’ utopia, the Kingdom of God. Consequently, symbols may help us to overcome akrasia and superficiality, and grasp our utopian Chorus.

However, before we accept in toto this Christian notion of ‘power’, we must briefly confront Tillich. For Tillich, contra Ricoeur, this power is God. As Clayton writes, “[a]ccording to Heidegger, the existential is grounded in the ontological. According to Tillich, however, the ontological…is…grounded in the theological.”⁸ While Tillich accepts that the Divine may express itself through culture,⁹ this will simply not do for our purposes. The Chorus cannot be underpinned by religious faith on the one hand, or atemporal universalising abstractions on the other. Our Chorus, whilst doing justice to God, cannot be grounded in Him. Rather, it must be grounded in our creative Being-in-the-World. We cannot all have faith. For Tillich, this means that our ethos becomes, among other things, “conditional, dependent on fears and hopes, [and] a result of psychological and sociological compulsion”¹⁰. However, contra Tillich, each of these

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² See p.87ff, above.
⁵ *Ibid.*, p.510
⁶ John 17:26; 1 Corinthians 13:13; 1 John 2:15-17
fears and hopes plays a part in the negotiation and renegotiation of the Dasein as the Dasein. We are each of us self-grounded and self-creating in the ‘absolute reality’ of the polyphonic narrative World. Consequently, people and symbols, as Weisbaker puts it, “participate in an absolute reality…which transcends subject and religious symbol in which they find an identity.”¹ For Tillich, certainly, this ‘absolute reality’ is God. Indeed, we do not wish to conflate this God with the Hegelian or Schellingian Absolute or the Heideggerian World or Being.

Nonetheless, the Christian God and the World are akin in an important way. For Aquinas, the names of God stem metaphorically from His creations.² In this sense, they develop from the larger whole, but then refer back to that whole. God, then, is a self-referential process of self-creation. In the same way, the symbols of a World are parts that refer back to the larger whole. The symbol of the ‘Son of God’, for example, developed from Hebrew culture into Christian culture, and then allowed the Christians to see their God in the world. Thus, like the Christian God of Tillich, the human World is a self-creating, self-referential universe. Of course, the ‘Spirit’ within us, though incalculable and somewhat mysterious,³ is more like that of the Phenomenology of Spirit, than that of the Bible.⁴

Nonetheless, we see here how the symbols of Tillich can be secular. These symbols, as Tillich writes, “have become not only signs pointing to a meaning which is defined, but also symbols standing in for a reality in the power of which they participate.”⁵ Moreover, because of this, many symbols “have a power through centuries, or more than centuries.”⁶ For example, the symbols of ‘King’, ‘Son of Adam’, ‘Servant of God’ and ‘Crucifixion’ we saw earlier were manifestations of powerful symbols in the Judaic World.⁷ Thus, when they were renegotiated in the Bible through the figure of Jesus, it

³ Tillich, P. (1964), Systematic Theology, Volume 3, James Nisbet and Co., Digswell Place, pp.398-399
⁶ Ibid.
was not only a new ‘leader’ that was proclaimed. Rather, the world saw the birth of a powerful new eschatological narrative centred around Christ as the desired herald and vessel of the future Kingdom of God. Incidentally, it is this that Eyck’s *The Crucifixion* is signifying, rather than symbolising. Rather than working on metaphor and metonym itself, Eyck’s art merely signifies the more primordial symbols of the Christian narrative. This utopian narrative conquered much of the Western world, with a little help, of course, from Constantine and monasticism.\(^1\) Since then, the symbols of Christianity have had enormous power to influence socio-cultural change.\(^2\) Similarly, they have fought change to maintain the ‘ontological status quo’ over volatile millennia.\(^3\) Is this the kind of power that could help realise our Chorus *qua* utopia? Can symbols overcome *akrasia* and superficial unpreparedness? Moreover, can symbols do this for all of us?

First, as in the work of Freud, Piaget and Tillich, symbols can be objects of desire. Symbols, as Hick puts it, “strengthen men’s practical commitment to what they believe is right”\(^4\). Thus, symbols may certainly be a method of overcoming weakness of will and claiming our utopia. This is not to overlook the disastrous consequences of this ‘desirous’ power when wedded to evil. Rather, we are simply admitting that *akrasia* and unpreparedness may be overcome, and the utopia taken up. Second, in order for symbols to do this for all of us, they must either overcome our incommensurabilities,\(^5\) or be common to us all. As Campbell writes “[n]o one has…reported of a Buddhist arhat surprised by a vision of Christ, or a Christian nun by the Buddha. The image of the vehicle of grace…puts on the guise of the local mythic symbol of the spirit.”\(^6\) Put

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simply, symbols are always in a given World, and thus cannot overcome incommensurability. If we are to grasp our utopia, then, we must find a symbol common to many of us within the Western World. To do this, though, we must ask more questions. Are there common symbols for the Western world? Will they help our utopia, the Chorus, to live?

Sadly, before we can properly ask these question, there are some harsh realities we must face. Our ‘speculative flights’ into utopia and symbols must again land on the harsh ground of superficiality. In doing so, we will further reveal the nature of our shallow malaise.

iv. The Desert of the Real

Each time that the Coca-Cola Bottling Company informs us that their product is ‘The Real Thing’, implicit is the message that it isn’t the real thing after all; and what is more, people do feel the need for the actual, real thing.

- Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness*, p.189

If our Chorus requires another symbol in order to make it manifest, this is a fairly unambiguous admission that the Chorus itself is a weak symbol, if a symbol at all. Even if our utopia were to compel us for ontological or ethical reasons, it is not symbolically bound in our World. This is hardly surprising. Greek tragedy emerged in its extant form in fifth-century Athens, intimately wedded to the Athenian *polis* and the Hellenic World more generally.¹ As we have seen we are not in Classical Athens. It should come as no shock, then, that the Chorus is not a powerful symbol for us. It may be fruitful but, in and of itself, it is not powerful. The Chorus is one of those “fragmented remains of symbols”², not commonplace, but definitely with “nothing but a past. […H]ere the work of symbolism is no longer active.”³ The Chorus, as a symbol at least, is all but dead.

¹ See p.172ff, above.
³ Ibid.
Moreover, most of the symbols in our World are dead or dying. Rather than being metaphorically and metonymically linked to a larger narrative whole, our images, icons and words are often just signs. They are not, as Ricoeur put it, ‘bound to their content’. Like the symbols of logic and mathematics, these signs are depthless significations of significations, with lived reality removed. As Baudrillard puts it, “[a]ll things, deprived of their secret and their illusion, are assigned to a radical visibility, to the objective make-believe assigned to publicity.”¹ In Heidegger’s terms, Being is forced from its hiddenness, made into a ‘standing reserve of things’, and then Being and forcefulness are forgotten. This, again, is late modern capitalist Gestell. The ‘M’ of McDonald’s, for instance, is not bound to anything like itself, or to any whole other than the exchange of commodities in capitalism. There is no deep metaphorical or metonymic signification here. Rather, ‘M’ signifies whatever it is that McDonald’s wants it to signify, such as ‘taste’, ‘fun’ and so forth. These meanings are, ironically, meaningless. They are not from life qua creative, open-ended polyphony, but rather life qua ‘lifestyle choice’. Incestually hollow, these signs refer to nothing other than themselves, and are not given by deep creative life, but by other signs. McDonald’s is a ‘restaurant’, but it sells toys and clothes, and these have printed on them copies of animations which are simulations of ‘fun’.² Signs referring to signs which draw on signs. Culture, in this sense, “loses its symbolic meaning, its millennial anthropomorphic status, and tends to disappear in a discourse of connotations…one capable of integrating all signifiers whatever their origin.”¹ These, again, are the scars of superficiality in late capitalist modernity’s ‘desert of the real’.

Indeed, this desert is blooming with the thorny wildflowers that are capitalist signs. Calvin Klein, Gucci, Versace, Gap, Nike, Disney, Starbucks – these are not bought because they signify anything real in the World, but because they are Calvin Klein, Gucci, Versace, Gap, Nike, Disney and Starbucks. They are signs or, as Naomi Klein has written, ‘brands’. As Klein has argued in her popular book No Logo, brands such as Disney and Nike are bought simply because they signify themselves. This, in turn, means that they can mean anything to anybody. Absolut Vodka, for instance, brands

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² McQueen, H. (2001), The Essence of Capitalism, Hodder Headline Australia, Sydney, p.186
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

itself in advertisements with the Absolut bottle. In each new advertisement, a different image is in, on, or around the bottle. The sign of Absolut is thus, as Klein writes, “intellectual in Harper’s, futuristic in Wired, alternative in Spin, loud and proud in Out, and ‘Absolut Centerfold’ in Playboy.” Similarly, General Motors “launched a car built not out of steel and rubber but out of New Age spirituality and seventies feminism.”

As McQueen has pointed out, even Madonna is a brand. These brands, as signs, are not bound to their content, but wedded to whatever meaning it is that the corporations want. Like the ‘x’ and ‘y’ of symbolic logic, they mean nothing and everything.

Consequently, that these signs only refer to themselves is not to say that they do not have meaning per se. It is just that, unlike symbols, these meanings do not develop out of life in the World. Rather, these signs have meaning added to them in the form of significations of the significations of life. They are simulacra. The signs of Nike, for instance, have nothing to do with the actual experience of any one sport, or with the products themselves. Rather, the products, the tools ‘ready to hand’ in the World, are slaves to the sign of Nike. As Klein puts it, “Nike is checking off the spaces as it swallows them: superstores? Check. Hockey? Baseball? Soccer? Check. Check. Check. T-Shirts? Check. Hats? Check. Underwear? Schools? Bathrooms? Shaved into brushcuts? Check. Check. Check.” Here, Nike is a signifier with no signified, but with the ‘meaning’ created by the manipulation of the signifiers associated with what is ‘cool’. Similarly, the Tommy Hilfiger sign is affixed to perfume, underwear, jeans, jackets, shoes and so forth. However, as Klein explains, Tommy Hilfiger actually makes “nothing at all.” This sign sells ‘black coolness’ to “middle class white and asian kids who mimic black style in everything”, while the clothes themselves are created by women locked in sweatshops on a small Pacific island. Lastly, while

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2 See ‘Absolut’ and ‘Absolut Athens’, p.411
4 Ibid.
5 McQueen, H. (2001), The Essence of Capitalism, Hodder Headline Australia, Sydney, p.153
6 See Appendix IV, p.419
8 Ibid., p.61
9 Ibid., pp.69-94
10 Ibid., p.26
11 Ibid., p.84
12 Ibid., p.368
Starbucks, the ‘coffee’ brand, sells “community…camaraderie…connection”\(^1\), they have actually no relation whatsoever to the actual experience of a community. Rather than being the creative expression of the dialectic of recognition, this is a fake, instant community. Starbucks is a multinational brand that sets up clones of the same store around the world, all with identical facades, and coffee of exactly the same temperature.\(^2\) The Starbucks brand, then, has nothing to do with a product, but with ‘meaning’. This meaning, in turn, is nothing other than the signification of significations created by a commodifying ‘logic’, and manipulated by the experts employed by multinationals. Here, as Baudrillard says, “the truth of objects and products are their \textit{trademark}.”\(^3\) What is outside the trademark, the sign, the brand? Nothing at all, save the market, property laws, neoliberalism, the World Trade Organisation, the World Economic Forum, the military might of the United States, poverty, ecocide, and the victorious tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke.

What we are looking at, then, is not just the depthlessness of video games and Hollywood blockbusters, but of our symbolic order. This, in turn, is not just ‘text’, but our very human creativity. Here, the autonomy of fields is eroded before the ‘logic’ of the economic field. Capital ceases to be the fruit of deep cultivation and creativity, and becomes another ‘thing’ to be bought and sold. It ceases to be capital \textit{per se}, and becomes equivalent to cash. This cash, in turn, is given to those who simulate the signs of success, drawing on the dead symbols of dying fields. Our World, our culture is thus, as Baudrillard puts it, “reduced to a form of \textit{curiosity} – not necessarily a casual or indifferent curiosity…but a curiosity subject to the constantly changing cycles and dictates of fashion”\(^4\). As we have seen, this curiosity is necessary to encourage economic growth and overcome underconsumption. Of course, this is not to say that all consumption is a matter of simulacra.\(^5\) Nonetheless, our curiosity for signs cannot be understood outside of the commodifying culture of the market. To feed this curiosity, to affix ‘meaning’ to the trademarks and brands, we are encouraged to cathect the

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\(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.146, pp.153-155
\(^4\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.73
objects of corporate capitalism.\textsuperscript{1} In this way, the “real does not efface itself in favour of the imaginary; it effaces itself in favour of the more real than real: the hyper-real. The truer than true: this is simulation.”\textsuperscript{2} Nike does not simply make shoes. Rather, it places its sign on ‘Nike Town’, which “is a temple, where the swoosh is worshipped as both art and heroic symbol.”\textsuperscript{3} This ‘Nike Town’, of course, is not a real town, but a ‘realer than real’ simulation of the signs of towns, each of which is tied to the brand of Nike. Similarly, the Baker’s Delight chains play the music from their advertisements in the stores, turning the commodity exchange into ‘hyper-real’ entertainment. The same is true of our casinos, theme parks and even museums.

However, as we have amply seen in superficiality, the homogeneous expansion of these sign commodities does not result in boredom. Rather, “[n]ationality, language, ethnicity, religion and politics are reduced to their most colorful, exotic accessories”\textsuperscript{4}. Novelty takes the place of actual diversity and the satisfaction of creative labour. The result of this in all the places enframed by capitalist modernity, is what Klein calls “a One World placelessness, a global mall in which corporations are able to sell a single product in numerous countries”\textsuperscript{5}. Rather than being at home in a specific place, with a specific language, religion, or politics, rather than Being-in-the-World, we are at home everywhere and nowhere.

\textbf{v. Homelessness and the Way Home}

We seem homeless, then. Many theorists, including Heidegger,\textsuperscript{6} have come to this conclusion. Leach, for instance, argues that America and, by implication, all the modern Anglo-Celtic colonies, have become a ‘nation of exiles’.\textsuperscript{7} In place of the now “atomised and vulnerable”\textsuperscript{8} cultural centers, Americans have bureaucracy, freeways,

\textsuperscript{2} Baudrillard, J. (1990), Fatal Strategies, Semiotext(e), New York, p.11
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, p.133
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ibid.}, p.131
\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Ibid.}, p.181
transient meaningless work, placeless cosmopolitanism and the free market.¹ Moreover, it is not as if we can simply ‘go native’, or buy ourselves ranch-style utopias. Placelessness and homelessness, as Arefi puts it, “are as much embedded in our consciousness as they are rooted in modernism and global capitalism.”² Similarly, Casey speaks of the “displaced, secular, and postmodern age”³ of Western society. Here, “no single place or group of places seems to offer an abode for a more capacious selfhood.”⁴ While we are not emphasising place as stringently as Leach, Casey and Arefi, we may share their fears. Without a sense of place, people, or time, our modern narrative World is no longer a home for us.

However, to properly confront our ‘desert of the real’, we should see how we have been ‘at home’ over time. Have we always been homeless? What has home been for our World? Moreover, what are the implications of homelessness for symbols, and for our utopia, the Chorus? We should therefore see how home has been symbolised, and what this tells us about our World. To this end we will undertake a search for the symbol of home in our narrative World. We will look into the creative expressions of our narrative tradition, and see what they can tell us about our being ‘at home’ in the world. Do we have a symbol of home, or is it another victim of Epicureanism and superficiality?

¹ Ibid., pp.178-183, passim
³ Casey, E.S. (1993), Getting Back Into Place, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, p.309
⁴ Ibid.
4. SUPERFICIALITY AND SYMBOLS OF HOMELESSNESS

That people could come into the world in a place they could not at first even name and had never known before; and that out of a nameless and unknown place they could grow and move around in it until they knew and called it with love, and called it HOME, and they put roots there and loved others there; so that whenever they left this place they would sing homesick songs about it and write poems of yearning for it, like a lover; remembering the groupings of old trees, the fall of slopes and hills, the lay of fields and the running of rivers; of animals there, and of objects lived with; of faces, and names, all of love and belonging, and forever returning to it or leaving it again!


We have proposed a radical utopian vision to overcome superficiality, yet even utopias are debased by superficiality and weakness of will. Symbols may be able to overcome weakness of will and superficiality by providing common objects of passion that well up from the World itself. However, Baudrillard, Heidegger, Klein and Ewen depict our culture as one where all the symbols are dead. We are no longer ‘at home’ in our culture, and so our symbols are hollowed out. Heidegger calls this era ‘homelessness’, and this notion of placeless, rootless existence is echoed by other modern thinkers. However, what does it mean to speak of ‘home’ and ‘homelessness’?

To answer this question, we will look into the symbols of ‘home’ in our narrative World. This undertaking will achieve two things. First, it will further our account of modern ‘homelessness’ and superficiality. It will show how we do not dwell, and why our symbols are hollowed out by the ‘logic’ of the Epicurean tradition. This, in turn, reveals ‘homelessness’ as another form of Epicurean superficiality. In this sense, a symbolic investigation of ‘home’ is a further articulation of what it is to be superficial.

Second, this analysis of symbols will attempt to trace the development of ‘homelessness’ in our Western story. It is, essentially, a brief history of ‘home’ from Homer to Steven Spielberg. The importance of this is that it enables us to grasp what it is to not be superficial; to see alternatives outside the narrow horizons of our commodified World. In doing this, we do not valorise Homeric wars or Shakespearian gender relations. Rather, we simply recognise that the Epicurean status quo is not our
only space of *existentiell* or ontic possibles. At the same time as we reveal these alternatives ways of Being, we also articulate another story of Western civilisation: from ‘home’ to ‘homelessness’. Consequently, any subsequent developments of ‘home’ – and, *mutatis mutandis*, our creative nature – can then be seen as contributions to both the Aristotelian tradition and the larger World of Western civilisation. If, indeed, we have lost the plot, this symbolic analysis is a way of finding it again, as we search for ‘home’.

However, this will not be a search for a simple ‘thing’ we already know of. Rather, it will be a quest for home. The quest is never a matter of instrumental discovery. We cannot simply identify an end, and the means to realise it. As MacIntyre writes, “it is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions…that the goal…is to be finally understood.”\(^1\) Put simply, it is only in walking the path of the symbols of our ‘home’ that we may discover this ‘home’. This ‘quest’ is also similar to Heidegger’s notion of a way. For Heidegger, “when we walk on it, and in no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questioning, are we…on the way.”\(^2\) The ‘way’, like a woodcutter’s woodpath, is made only in the process of walking it.\(^3\) Here, we again wed our human creativity to the open-endedness of Herder and Heidegger. We will only find home *in media res*, while we are walking.

Where will we walk? As Hegel writes, “it is the vocation of art to find for the spirit of a people the artistic expression corresponding to it.”\(^4\) We must turn to the artistic works of our Western tradition, and try to find their sense of ‘home’. Indeed, it is with the stories of the Western World that we must concern ourselves. These stories are the *poiēsis* of each people. Consequently, we will begin our quest where our own cultural story begins: Greece of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Following this, we will search the narratives of the Jewish and Christian Bibles, the works of Shakespeare and Goethe, and the popular cinematic culture of George Lucas and Steven Spielberg.

A. Early Hellenism – The Iliad and The Odyssey – ‘The Estate of Men’

[N]othing is as sweet as man’s own country, his own parents, even through he’s settled down in some luxurious house, far off in a foreign land and far from those who bore him.

– Odysseus, in Homer, The Odyssey, 9.38-41

We begin with Homer because our World began with the Greeks. Hellas gave us the Greek and Roman pantheon, tragedy, democracy, Plato, Aristotle, mathematics, biology, physics, Alexander the Great, Epicurus, Hellenism, Hellenised Judaism, Eastern Christianity and so on. Our own philosophical tradition, and that of Hobbes, Locke and modern mechanistic materialism and individualism, can both trace their roots to Greece.

To account for Greece, we must turn to Homer. For the Greeks, and for Hellenism more generally, Homer was an historian, nation-builder and creator of the divine pantheon.\(^1\) He did not simply write a few novels, or entertain, as do many modern writers. If \textit{poiēsis} brings forth a World for us, Homer was the original \textit{poiētēs}, or ‘builder’.\(^2\) In his epics, he gave form to the narrative World itself, taking stock of oral tradition, and shaping the Greek etiology, eschatology, ontology and ethics.\(^3\) For Plato, Socrates, Xenophon, Aristotle and the tragic poets, Homer was a standard reference, well-known to all Greeks.\(^4\) Indeed, Kitto calls Homer “that first articulate European”\(^1\).

Similarly, Moses Hadas suggests that he is the most influential teacher of European


\(^{2}\) Ehrenberg, V. (1976), From Solon to Socrates, Methuen and Co., London, p.5


\(^{4}\) Plato, Symposium, 190b, 220c; Plato, Republic, 388a-395d and \textit{passim}; Xenophon, Socrates’ Defence, §31; Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates, I.ii.§56, I.iii.§4, I.iv.§3; Xenophon, The Dinner-Party, IV.§43, VIII.§28; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a:32, 1116a:33-1117a:4 and \textit{passim}; Aeschylus, Agamemnon; Euripides, Women of Troy
civilisation. If, then, we wish to gain a firm grasp of the development of ‘home’ in our World, we will do well to begin with Homer. This will allow us to better account for our World itself, and serve as a reference point for our quest for ‘home’ in Judaism, Christianity, and so on.

i. Longing for Achaea: Family, Fellowship and Land

In the *Iliad*, when Agamemnon wants to prove the mettle of his troops, he contrasts the joy of ‘home’ with the return to this ‘home’ in disgrace. He tells his exhausted men that the time has come for them to “[c]ut and run…[to s]ail home to the fatherland”.

Here, we see that ‘home’ is what settles the character of a man. To fight for ‘home’, and yet miss it dearly, is to be courageous and honourable. Moreover, in the face of fear or weakness of will, ‘home’ is what spurs men on. Of course, this is not limited to the Achaeans. The Trojan Hector also fights for ‘wife’, ‘child’, ‘people’ and ‘shelter’. ‘Home’, to Argive and Trojan alike, is a sacred familiarity. Moreover, this ‘home’ is not merely house, but also ‘wife’, ‘children’, ‘stallion-land’, and so forth. Consequently, the loss of ‘home’ is the most important test the Achaeans must face. As Nestor argues, to return ‘home’ early means death. ‘Home’ is both ‘origin’ and ‘destination’, and worthy of ‘death’ in many ways.

Indeed, Nestor’s advice to Agamemnon may further develop our idea of ‘home’. In order to find out which of the Argives will prove faithful, Nestor suggests that the men fight in their clans and tribes. This way, Agamemnon can “see which captain is a coward, which contingent too, and which is loyal, brave, since they fight in separate

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3 Homer, *The Iliad*, 2.130-135. Unless otherwise indicated, all *Iliad* and *Odyssey* references are from Fagles’ Viking Press translations. Note that Fagles’ line numbers do not correspond with those of the original Greek.
4 *Ibid.*, 2.164
6 *Ibid.*, 2.158, 2.341-344
7 *Ibid.*, 2.158
8 *Ibid.*, 2.335
9 Homer, *The Iliad*, 2.331-350
10 *Ibid.*, 2.424-427

292 4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
contingents of their own.”1 Homer gives many lines to the Achaean contingents, at pains
to show us the beautiful homelands.2 Thisbe, for instance, is “thronged with doves”3,
while Epidaurus is “green with vines”4. Thus, ‘home’ is not only the wives, the children,
and the beauty the men have left for battle. ‘Home’ is also a way of keeping these men
together. Like the nomoi of a polis, ‘home’ bonds men together. Moreover, this is true
of the Trojans and their allies.5

As the Iliad unfolds, ‘home’ is also seen as the prize of one’s ‘land and wife’6; as a
‘benchmark’, with battle being more ‘thrilling than the journey home’7; as inspiration
for battle, keeping ‘wife and sons unscathed’8; as a beautiful alternative to grim death,
with ‘rich dark soil’9; and as a tragic loss in death, or end for the dead.10 Indeed, the
lack of ‘home’ is even used as a taunt by Achilles. After killing Iphition, Achilles
mocks the dead man, speaking of Iphition’s distant ‘shelter’ and ‘land’.11 Here, the
bond between death and ‘home’ is a telling one. In fact, it is essential to the Iliad.
Specifically, the Iliad’s later tragedy and nobility are underpinned by the custom that
requires the soldier’s body to be returned ‘home’ for proper mourning. Starting with
Hector’s challenge to the Achaeans, and promise to observe the custom,12 the death of
Patroclus sees the Trojans and the Argives fighting a macabre battle to claim the corpse
and decide its fate.13 We read that “Hector, tearing the famous armour off Patroclus,
tugged hard at the corpse, mad to hack the head from the neck with bronze and drag the
trunk away to glut the dogs of Troy.”14 By the time of Hector’s death at the hands of
the ‘raging’ Achilles, this theme of corpse violation has reached its peak.15

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1 Ibid., 2.433-435
2 Ibid., 2.584-862
3 Ibid., 2.592
4 Ibid., 2.652
5 Ibid., 2.927-989
6 Ibid., 2.236
7 Ibid., 11.14-16
8 Ibid., 15.574-579
9 Ibid., 17.348-350
11 Ibid., 20.443-446
12 Ibid., 7.86-105
13 Ibid., 17.101-852
14 Ibid., 17.143-146
15 Ibid., 22.435-476

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness 293
Here, the symbol of ‘home’ is combined with death, but also with ‘defilement’. Ricoeur avoids an analysis of ‘defilement’ in Homer, assuming the associated symbolic notions of stain and guilt to be Aeschylean and Sophoclean rather than Homeric. However, we may still find ‘defilement’ in Homer. It is not in death or murder per se, as Ricoeur found in tragedy, but in the relationship between ‘death’, ‘stain’ and ‘home’. This, in turn, will tell us more about ‘home’.

**ii. Patroclus and Hector: Birth, Death and Defilement**

While the dead body of Hector is at home on the soil of Troy, it is not fully ‘home’ in the richer sense of family, children, shelter, hearth and so forth. Indeed, because the remains are in the hands of the Achaeans, he is vulnerable, unsheltered, ‘homeless’. Achilles may therefore ‘stain’ the beauty of the dead Trojan prince with the soil of his own ‘home’, and thus Hector becomes “defiled in the land of his own fathers.” However, the corpse of Hector, ‘adored by Zeus’, must not become bloody, deformed, or dirty in such a manner. This is why Apollo preserves Hector’s corpse from corruption. The body must not be stained lest ‘defilement’ occur. As MacIntyre writes, “the ultimate evil is death followed by desecration of the body. The latter is an evil suffered by the kin and the household of the dead man as well as the corpse.” It does not matter that Achilles wants to defile Hector and Hector’s ‘home’, only that he does not do so. This is because Achilles’ timē, or ‘honour’, is associated with ends, and not with his aims. Thus, Achilles may try to do evil, but will be stopped. Consequently, he will remain ‘godlike’. Nonetheless, due to the threat of ‘stain’ on ‘home’, it is not until the Iliad’s final lines that Hector’s body is finally ‘home’.

Cassandra cries to her fellow Trojans:

> ‘Come, look down, you men of Troy, you Trojan women!
> Behold Hector now – if you ever rejoiced

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2 Homer, *The Iliad*, 24.476
3 *Ibid.*, 24.21-25
6 Homer, *The Iliad*, 21.158
7 *Ibid.*, 24.813-844
to see him striding home, home alive from battle!
He was the greatest joy of Troy and all our people!1

Here, ‘home’ is birthplace, grave, soil, vines, shelter and family, and also a place hostile to ‘defilement’. Just as ‘defilement’ symbolises defilement through ‘stain’ and ‘impurity’, so too does ‘home’ symbolise life at home through ‘estate’, ‘wife’ and ‘family’; ‘hills’, ‘streams’, and ‘dirt’; and ‘birthplace’ and ‘grave’. We may also see this in The Odyssey.

iii. Longing for Ithaca: Family, Fellowship and Land

In the story of Odysseus, ‘home’ is again shown as wife, child, land, people, birthplace and grave.2 Moreover, Odysseus’ story is often compared to that of Agamemnon’s gruesome homecoming.3 While the son of Atreus reached home but lost his life, Odysseus lives but has lost his home.

Odysseus, the ‘luckless man’, is called ‘one who has died far from home’4 by his faithful swineherd. Still alive, Odysseus laments his faraway homeland,5 and is seen weeping for familiar shores.6 He would be happy to die upon his homecoming.7 Odysseus, like the men of the Iliad, yearns for the familiarity of land, wife, child, estate and so forth. As he says to his host Alcinous, “‘[N]othing is as sweet as man’s own country,/his own parents, even though he’s settled down/in some luxurious house, far off in a foreign land/and far from those who bore him.’”8 He yearns for ‘home’.

For this reason, Odysseus’ homecoming is especially painful. Firstly, Pallas Athena lays a ‘mist’ before his eyes, stopping him from recognising his own land.9 Once his

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1 Ibid., 24.827-830
2 Homer, The Odyssey, 1.16-24, 4.580, 5.239-243, 6.199-203, 7.258-261, 9.30-41, 15.381, 15.396-400, passim
4 Ibid., 17.343-343
5 Ibid., 5.239-243
6 Ibid., 5.91-95
7 Ibid., 7.258-261
8 Ibid., 9.31-32, 9.38-41
9 Ibid., 13.214-236
land is revealed, of course, he is ‘filled with joy’, kissing the ‘good green earth’.1 Secondly, however, Odysseus is forced to disguise himself as a filthy beggar, shielding his mien from those he loves as well as from his enemies. Consequently, the familiar safety of ‘home’ has been made unfamiliar and unsafe. We are shown much sorrow on the part of Odysseus’ and his loved ones. They grieve as they recount his fate,2 while Odysseus himself laments as he sees his loved ones’ sadness.3 While the gods have their roles to play, all this misery is due to the suitors of Penelope, ‘the hateful plotters of mischief’4. Indeed, these suitors are essential to the Odyssey. Through their wickedness they highlight, in addition to ‘wife’, ‘family’, ‘soil’, ‘birthplace’, and so forth, the notion of ‘hospitality’. To demonstrate this, however, we should briefly turn to Telemachus and the Cyclops.

iv. Cyclops and the Suitors: Death, Defilement and Hospitality

When Athene appears to Telemachus as a family friend, he is quick to make her welcome.5 Indeed, he says that that he would rather die than watch a guest maltreated.6 In contrast to this hospitality of Telemachus and others, is the Cyclops, who murders and eats his Achaean guests. Indeed, the whole story of Polyphemus is a macabre violation of the customs of Hellenic hospitality. It begins with ‘eating the guests’ as opposed to ‘eating with the guests’. It ends with a curse rather than a blessing.7 If we bear in mind that the Trojan war itself was due to the “violation of the laws of hospitality by the son of an Asiatic prince”8, the Cyclops’ sad end should not surprise us. He is eventually blinded by Odysseus, who calls to his victim: “Your filthy crimes/came down on your own head, you shameless cannibal,/daring to eat your guests in your own house – /so Zeus and the other gods have paid you back!”9 In short, the Cyclops is punished for his violation of the customs of ‘home’.

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1 Ibid., 13.400-411
3 Ibid., 17.333-341, 19.242
4 Ibid., 17.553-554
5 Ibid., 1.144-146
6 Ibid., 20.353-355
9 Homer, The Odyssey, 9.535-536
The suitors, too, violate the customs of ‘home’. After showing us the gracious hospitality of Telemachus, Homer gives us these ‘swaggering’ suitors. Not only do they greedily and thanklessly take Odysseus’ food and wine, but they also begrudge others the same charity. This hypocrisy is not lost on the beggar-king, who mocks the suitors for their miserly ways. Worse still, they plot the death of the ‘son’ of the ‘home’, Telemachus. Consequently, unlike the ‘right minded’ men of the story, whose homes are always hospitable, the suitors are like the Cyclops. They have ‘defiled’ ‘home’. Moreover, they are not at war in Troy, or ‘godlike’ like Achilles. The scene of their doom is thus bloodsoaked, brutal, and macabre.

v. Nomoi, Oikos and the Symbols of Home

Here, we again see home’, ‘death’ and ‘defilement’ in Homer. E.R. Dodds, whose work informs that of Ricoeur, makes much of this. For Dodds, the fate of the suitors in the Odyssey is the first appearance of the themes of ‘defilement’, ‘guilt’ and ‘justice’ of the Sophoclean age. In Odysseus’ revenge we see that “punishment proceeds ineluctably from defilement”, as does the dread associated with “the unleashing of the avenging wrath of the interdiction.” The violation of ‘home’ is the ‘defilement’, while the ‘avenging wrath’ is Odysseus himself. Indeed, this vengeance is ensured by Zeus and Athene. Ricoeur refers to this as the ‘objective’ component of defilement. They are ‘in the world’ to Hellenes of these nomoi. The suitors’ dread that “gripped them all, blanched their faces white”, is the ‘subjective’ component. It is ‘in the minds’ of those who have defiled and who must be punished. Contra Ricoeur, then, the ‘defilement’, dread and punishment of Classical Athens begins with Homer. Certainly, the Homeric homologies with Periclean Greece must be limited by their ‘primitive’

1 Ibid., 1.169-179
2 Ibid., 1.144-146, 3.38-69, 4.38-42, 7.189-215, 14.50-70
3 Ibid., 2.161-187, 5.26-31, 13.451-453
4 Ibid., p.33
5 Homer, The Odyssey, 2.161-187, 5.26-31, 13.451-453,
6 Ibid., 17.500-507
7 Ibid., 17.500-507
8 Ibid., 3.753-757
9 Ibid., 1.144-146, 3.38-69, 4.38-42, 7.189-215, 14.50-70
10 Ibid., 22.8-21, 22.597-504
12 Ricoeur, P. (1979), The Symbolism of Evil, Beacon Press, Boston, p.31
nature relative to ‘sin’, ‘confession’ and so forth. Nonetheless, Dodds’ argument shows how fundamental ‘defilement’, dread and punishment are. Moreover, it allows us to see the importance of ‘home’. In an ancient story that is almost “a sequence of hospitality scenes”, ‘home’ is fundamental.

Simply speaking, ‘home’ must not be defiled, nor must it defile. Those who defile ‘home’ will be punished. They will die justly, and with due dread. Such is the fate, ‘objectively’ and ‘subjectively’ in Ricoeuer’s terms, of those who defile ‘home’. In this sense, the crimes of the suitors are not simple insults to Odysseus, but against society itself. In turn, “Odysseus’ response to the suitors’ crimes is not that of a vindictive hero…but that of a morally upright king, who, as an instrument of divine justice, purges wickedness [and] reasserts moral integrity.” This reminds us again that ethics and society are almost identical in Homeric Greece.

For this same reason, the Odyssey shares with the Iliad an emphasis on community. As we saw, ‘home’ bonds men together. In ‘home’, we see the laws of a ‘people’. When Odysseus finds himself in Nausicaa, woken by the shrieks of “girls with lovely braids”, he asks himself: “Man of misery, whose land have I lit on now? What are they here – violent, savage, lawless? [οὐδὲ δικαιοὶ] or friendly to strangers, god-fearing men?” and this is often heard. The word δικαιοὶ, or dikaioi, here means ‘lawful’. However, this is ‘law’ in the sense of nomos. It is not ‘law’ per se, but custom; civilised, well ordered and, as Eumaeus the swineherd is described, ‘right-minded’. This dikē, as Vidal Naquet observes, is of the ‘domain of man’; the place of the oikos that Odysseus affirms when he returns to Ithaca, the ‘real’ world of ‘home’.

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3 Ibid., p.186
5 Homer, The Odyssey, 6.246
6 Ibid., 6.131-133
7 Ibid., 8.645-647, 9.195-196, 13.227-229
From the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, then, we find ‘home’ to be ‘family’, ‘people’, ‘land’, ‘soil’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’ and ‘hospitality’. The ‘homeless’ Achaeans and Odysseus do not long just for their houses, but for a whole web of people, properties and possessions all associated with ‘home’.\(^1\) Furthermore, as we have seen, while the Divine may dwell in this ‘home’, it is thoroughly material.\(^2\) ‘Home’ in this sense is thus the Greek *oikos*, conceived of as family, household, estate and so forth.\(^3\) Indeed, as Patterson writes, “[r]ather than simply ‘house’…, *oikos*…would seem to have a larger, more inclusive…sense of ‘home’”\(^4\). This is why the bonds of ‘home’ are so strong in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In Homeric society, the *oikos* was a unified place of life, with almost no social groupings above it.\(^5\) Home’, the *oikos*, is the “place around which were focused experiences of living and dying, producing and reproducing…the primary focus of both family loyalty and identity”\(^6\). M.I. Finlay comes to similar conclusions, describing the *oikos* as ‘pre- eminent’.\(^7\) This is why transgression of the *nomoi* associated with *oikos*, ‘hospitality’ in the *Odyssey* particularly, is akin to death. While ‘godlike’ Achilles was stopped from ‘defiling’ Hector in his ‘home’, the suitors of the *Odyssey* were doomed. As Schein notes, “[i]n the *Iliad* there are no villains, so every death is tinged with tragedy. In the *Odyssey*, however,] the gods validate the hero’s right to kill…suitors, all conceived as thoroughgoing villains”\(^8\). Though sacred, this Homeric ‘home’ is the ‘Estate of Man’.

Having found ‘home’ in the work of Homer, then, we should move onto Judaism, the second great World of our story. However, before we do, there are some questions we must answer.

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vi. The ‘Home-Complex’: Libido, Practices and Creative ‘Dwelling’

When we began our investigation of ‘home’ in Western culture, we described it as a symbol. However, having found ‘family’, ‘people’, ‘land’, ‘soil’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’ and ‘hospitality’, can we truly say that ‘home’ is a symbol?

As we saw earlier, a symbol must point metonymically to that with which it metaphorically shares qualities. However, the ‘home’ we have found is not a simple symbol. Firstly, ‘home’, unlike ‘Son of Man’ or ‘Servant of God’, is not pointed to by one symbol. Rather, it is ‘origin’, ‘destination’, ‘birth’, ‘death’, ‘grave’, ‘family’, ‘shelter’, ‘land’, ‘hospitality’ and the many manifestations of each of these. Secondly, ‘home’ does not appear to point to anything metaphorically in the texts we have analysed. Rather, it is that which is metaphorically and metonymically pointed to. ‘Home’, then, is not a symbol in our sense. Rather, it is that which is revealed by many symbols. Our quest seems to have changed in media res. Is this a problem? Are we truly ‘lost in a woodcutter’s path’? Fortunately, we may reconceptualise ‘home’ with the notions of ‘overdetermination’ and complex.

Firstly, these symbols of ‘home’ are overdetermined. Overdetermination is discussed by Ricoeur in opposition to Freud. Quite simply, overdetermination refers to the capacity of symbols to metaphorically signify more than one metonymic whole at a time. This is more, however, than the dual symbolism of wine we might see in the secular and Catholic Worlds – ‘blood of Christ’ in one, ‘social lubricant’ in the other. Overdetermination occurs within a single World. In Classic Hellenism, for instance, the blindness of Oedipus may be a psychology of denial, an expression of existential alienation, and a manifestation of retribution in the natural order. This is vertical overdetermination, where several psychological or cultural meanings are sedimented. We will also see this in Faust. Alternatively, in Christianity Jesus is the ‘Son of Man’, ‘Son of God’, ‘Servant of God’, ‘King’ and ‘Messiah’. This is horizontal overdetermination, where a symbol expresses itself in diverse ways. It may result from a dialectical movement between the ‘pull’ of ‘sedimented’ symbolism, and the ‘push’

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1 See p.276, above.
towards a novel horizon. It may also result from the inherent diversity of the symbol. In the *Odyssey* or *Iliad*, for example, ‘land’ is horizontally overdetermined, expressed by ‘soil’, ‘trees’, ‘vines’, ‘sky’, ‘birds’ and so forth. Consequently, one symbol can mean many things, and many signs can be the same symbol.

Secondly, ‘home’ is indeed not one symbol, but what Jung calls a complex. A psychological complex is a network of ‘feeling-tones’ tied together by a common theme.\(^1\) This complex, however, is not merely psychological, in the narrow sense of conscious, intangible and passive. On the contrary, complexes are defined by their ability to influence somatic innervation. They facilitate strong emotional and physical responses, and are tied by a common theme.\(^2\) The ego-complex, for instance, ties all intellectual, emotive, and phenomenal experiences through ‘feeling-tones’ to the common psychic and somatic theme of ‘I’.\(^3\) This ego-complex, as understood by Freud, who agreed with much of Jung’s early work, is the result of the child properly overcoming the Oedipus-complex we explored supra. The ego-complex is thus an example of a healthy and essential complex. There are other complexes explored by Jung, however, that are neither healthy nor essential. Because of this, and because they are linked with unpleasant memories, these pathological complexes are repressed by the ego-complex into the unconscious.\(^4\) They may only be indicated by pauses in word association tests, somatic symptoms, hallucinations, or dreams.\(^5\) In dreams, the complexes are alluded to by symbols, and here Jung gives a definition of symbolism very similar to that of Freud.\(^6\) Symbols are metaphorical devices which are only “indistinct, subsidiary associations to thought”\(^7\), and which may be derived from myth.\(^8\) This does not mean that all complexes must be unpleasant in order to be manifested through symbolism. As with Freud, Jung clearly places elements of the ego-complex in

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2 Ibid., p.42
3 Ibid., p.40
4 Ibid., pp.44-45ff
5 Ibid., pp.64-66

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

Consequently, our libidinous relation to the World is manifested in life and art. Powerful symbols are grounded in, but creatively ‘point’ to, this World. This, of course, accords with the account of language we developed earlier.3 Our Being-in-the-World cannot be extricated from those people Being-alongside and ‘things’ Being-with us. As was argued in the analysis of the works of Freud, Piaget and Vygotsky, this World is internalised as schemae that represent our bodily and vocal relations with this World. Our libido, in turn, is cathexed into the people and objects that these schemae make sense of, while not committing us to a positivistic science of subjecivity prefaced on ‘things. When we learn language, our words are also associated with these schemae. This is why, as we saw, the child “secretly hears his own name called whenever he hears any region of Being named within which he is vitally involved.”4 Put another way, our words are tied to what Jung calls ‘feeling tones’, and these are stretched over the World within which we dwell. Thus, as Mead writes, “[y]ou cannot convey a language as a pure abstraction; you inevitably in some degree convey also the life that lies behind it.”5 Our schemae are not dead abstractions, but lived.

Moreover, as Turner has argued, metaphor, metonymy and other tropes, are able to rearticulate these schemae.6 This is also argued by Lakoff and Johnson.7 To understand the Christian ‘dove’ symbol, we must draw on metaphor and metonymy. We must have a lived sense of the airy brightness of the sky, the burden of weight, the wonder of flight and the joy of freedom.1 Also, we must be able to use the word ‘dove’ in a way that brings forth the schemae associated with it, and reconceptualise our view of the World in accordance with these. With the ‘dove’, for example, the schemae associated with

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2 Ibid.
3 See pp.34-38, pp.63-66, p.70, above.
5 Mead, G.H. (1967), Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.283
7 Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1981), Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
sky, flight, weight, lightness and so forth, are used to reconceptualise Hebrew eschatology to take up the Heavenly Kingdom. Similarly, Lakoff shows how the welfare metaphor of ‘safety net’ is reconceptualised as a ‘hammock’ by American conservatives. The conservative senator, as Lakoff puts it, “is imposing another worldview.”

This worldview, in turn, is grounded in a primordial Being-in-the-World. Jung’s work on archetypes makes sense in this light, as archetypes are metaphors which reveal the world in such a way that libido is cathected to certain objects, such as symbols. Symbols, in turn, can reconceptualise these deeper metaphors, and thereby redevelop how Being is brought forth. The metaphor and metonymy thus redevelop the metaphorical whole of which they are a part. When the redevelopment is primordial, it is what Heidegger calls ‘poiēsis’, where we bring forth new realities with words. Certainly, then, as Heidegger writes, “language is the house of Being.”

However, our primordial dealings with a shared world are the foundation stones of this ‘house’. The ground for poiēsis is that we are Being-in-the-World, and this is grounded in poiēsis as we become ‘worded’. In both cases, our words cannot be understood outside of the practices associated with them.

This also accords with the work of MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, justice is associated with the recognition of the ‘goods’ internal to the various practices of a narrative tradition. Virtues, or ‘excellences’, are essential to the successful development of these goods. To be a good chess player, for instance, requires the excellences associated with the practices of chess. To even speak of ‘virtue’, then, we must have a sense of the requisite practices. We must know what ‘virtues’ mean by developing them. Without the circumspective dealings associated with the practices of the World, ‘virtue’ becomes a hollow word. Without ethical practices in a lived tradition, we “possess a simulacra of morality, [while] we continue to use many of the key expressions.” Similarly, Kagan argues that children only understand ‘social justice’ when they have experienced it.

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1 See p.276, above.
6 Ibid., p.2
7 Watson, P. (5/7/02), ‘Why our psychology is beyond words’, The Australian Financial Review, REVIEW, p.3
An understanding of these words requires the internalisation of the requisite schemae in a world where social justice is practiced. Consequently, our words are grounded in life, and our life becomes grounded in our creative words. Rather than rejecting a terrifying world in toto, and then hoping life will bombard us with ‘noise’ to distract us from our own busy worldlessness, we reenchant the world by creating and recreating it – and, mutatis mutandis, ourselves – from within. Symbols, in this sense, are the fruit of a creative life, rather than our mere cathexis of meaningless ‘things’. They allow us to come to terms with our Being-in-the-World, and also redevelop this relationship with poiēsis. At its best, this creative engagement would allow us to develop a sense of the depth of our World, those people Being-with us, ‘things’ Being-alongside and the relations thereof.

Heidegger calls this creative engagement ‘dwelling’. In ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, he tells us of an old farmhouse in the Black Forest. This farmhouse shows us ‘the fourfold’, or the ‘four’: the earth, sky, divinities and mortals. The earth is our physical and social habits; the taken-for-granteds that ground our life. The sky is our possibilities-for-Being. The divinities are our gratitude for the World we inherit and creatively develop. We are the mortals, those beings that can die. This fourfold, in turn, is a vision of authentic Being-in-the-World. The farmhouse brings forth this vision of the fourfold, as it was built by peasants authentically Being-in-the-World. Moreover, it ‘gathers’ them into a unified vision, while allowing each to ‘come forth’ in its heterogeneity. As we saw earlier, this is why Heidegger speaks of language as logos, or ‘gathering’. This gathering occurs when a people are ‘at home’ in a place and time. They then cultivate their habits, inherit their ontic and existentiell possibles, await feelings of gratitude, and educate each generation in these very same things. Heidegger calls this ‘dwelling’. Quite simply, dwelling is being ‘at home’ in a given

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1 Ibid.
2 Irvine, I. (1998), Uncomfortably Numb: The Emergence of the Normative Ennui Cycle, PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia, pp.135-175
5 See p.54, above.
region of the world, so that “dwelling…is the basic character of Being, in keeping with which mortals exist.” Consequently, the farmhouse is a ‘home’ because the peasants are creatively dwelling within it.

However, this farmhouse is richer than simply the fourfold of Heidegger. It is also rich in symbols of ‘home’. In the terms of the Homeric oikos, this farmhouse affords a view of ‘land’ qua meadows and spring; affords a ‘shelter’ for the German ‘family’ when the ‘land’ is not ‘hospitable’; affords a place for the Christian rituals of the ‘people’; affords a place for the ‘birth’ of a ‘child’, heralding the movement of generations; and affords a place for ‘death’ and movement to the ‘grave’. Here, then, is a vision of ‘home’, brought forth by symbols. Each of these symbols, like the fourfold, has been gathered by the poiēsis of the peasants. Through their circumspective dealings with objects and people Being-alongside and Being-with them, these peasants internalised the schemae of the Black Forest. These schemae were then manifested in the poiēsis of the farmhouse. The farmhouse ‘made way’ for the various practices of the place. Heidegger, in turn, was able to draw on the words that best ‘built’ these practices anew.

Consequently, the symbols of ‘home’ are the fruit of a creative life ‘at home’ in the world. They rise up from the lived practices of a narrative tradition, and draw their power from this tradition. In this sense, while some ancient Greeks may have been victims of akrasia, their World as a whole was not. When they spoke of ‘home’, it spurred them on to war, hospitality and justice. We will draw on this later to help us.² If we are superficial, however, surrounded by simulacra, we will be unable to gather the World. We will have no practices to ground our language, and the polyphony of these practices will not be gathered in turn. Put simply, if we are not ‘at home’, we cannot dwell. If we cannot dwell, our symbols will be hollow, or will simply die. We will lose our ontic and existentiell freedom and develop ontic and existentiell akrasia.

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¹ Ibid.
² See p.387, below.
vii. The Quest for ‘Home’

Consequently, ‘home’ is not a symbol. Rather, it is a complex of symbols, metaphorically and metonymically signifying the subjective and objective psyche of a people. This ‘home-complex’ has powerful somatic and psychic power. However, this ‘home-complex’ is not the result of trauma, *per se*. On the contrary, it is the most healthy complex. If individuals are to be understood in a narrative World, they must be characterised by the following story of ‘home’: they must be born to parents into a given family and people; they must have shelter; they must live on land or lands; they must understand which individuals, families and peoples are able to share their shelter and land; they must die. Symbols well up from the practices of this story, and then creatively ‘point’ back to them for communities and individuals. With Jung, we may describe such symbols as *a priori* in the collective and *a posteriori* in each individual,¹ though without Jung’s commitment to innate archetypal categories.² Moreover, it is for this reason that ‘home’ is not the same as place. If place is ontological and existential, ‘home’ is *existentiell*. Place may be, as Malpas argues, the *a priori* ground for our very humanity.³ However, ‘home’ is the way we express this humanity *a posteriori*. The symbols of ‘home’ are the result of creatively dwelling authentically in the World in this way. By looking into the stories of our Western World, then, we are gleaning insights on our own dwelling.

Will this help us? Certainly, we have seen the *poiēsis* of the Greeks. Their symbols are deep and strong, tied to a *poiēsis* ‘at home’ in Homeric Attica, Achaea and so forth. Similarly, their words like ‘virtue’ are tied to the practices in their narrative tradition.⁴ As a people they were creatively ‘dwelling’, and had *enkrateia*. As a people they were not weak of will. Consequently, when we are analysing the canonic and popular texts of Western civilisation, we are asking: Do we dwell? What is our ‘home’? Are we ‘at home’?

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As we have ‘made our way’, then, our quest has already begun to take shape. In the following analyses, ‘home’ is no longer to be understood as a symbol per se. Rather, ‘home’ is to be understood as a home-complex. ‘Home’ is capable of coexisting with other overdetermined symbols, and manifested culturally in each of the narrative Worlds through the primordial symbols of dwelling. To be ‘at home’ is to lack akrasia and be inspired by your own cultural identity. This is why it is essential to come to terms with ‘home’. Of course, this does not mean we are looking for the Being of ‘home’ itself. Home ‘is’, but we are not looking into what this ‘is’ is. Thus, we are not developing an ontology of places and Dasein, for instance. Rather, we are looking into the symbolism of this ‘home’ in our Worlds, and the way in which these symbols relate to the ontic and existentiell possibilities of Dasein. Moreover, we are inquiring in the creative richness of a people, and the inspiration this creativity affords. We should bear this in mind as we move onto the Tanak and Judaism.
B. Judaism – The Tanak – ‘The Divine Home’

Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the great river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates

- Genesis 15:18

Certainly, Judaism has not been as influential on our World as Hellenism or Christianity. Nonetheless, it is Judaism that gave us our second mythical etiology and eschatology after Homer. Here, we see creation, sin, repentance and salvation. We also see the development of strict monotheism, and adherence to explicit ethical laws. These, in turn, have characterised much of the Western world since the fifth-century. Of course, without aggressive proselytisation, Judaism remained an exclusive, insular tradition. Nonetheless, Christianity grew from the soil of Judaism. As Brasch puts it, the “first Christian was a Jew, and Christianity could not exist without…Judaism.” Consequently, with Constantine’s adoption of Christianity in the fourth-century, the etiology and late eschatology of Judaism conquered much of the Western world.

To account for Judaism, of course, we must turn to the Jewish Bible, or Tanak. For the Jews of the Babylonian exile, the scriptures were a source of pride, ethical clarity and communal identity. From the exile until the Roman conquest, the Jews developed their sense of self through ‘the book’. Moreover, this continued for millennia, and continues today in Australia. Nonetheless, it is not modern Jewish Australia that concerns us. Rather, we wish to account for ‘home’ in the pre-Roman World of Judaea and Israel. This, in turn, will more fully develop our sense of ‘home’ in the Western story, and allow us to move on to Christianity.

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1 Brasch, R. (1956), *The Star of David*, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, p.3  
4 Tanak is preferable to ‘Old Testament’, as ‘old’ implies a new Christian covenant that is not recognised by the Jews. Tanak, or knt, is made up of the first letters of Torah (‘Law’), Nebi’im (‘Prophets’), and Ketubim (‘Writings’). Books, chapters, and line numbers, however, are given according to the Authorised King James Bible.  
i. Exile and Hospitality

As with the *Odyssey*, the *Tanak* begins with ‘exile’ and ‘homelessness’. In *Genesis*, the primordial exile from Eden\(^2\) is followed by the exile of Cain,\(^3\) Abraham,\(^4\) Noah,\(^5\) Jacob,\(^6\) and Joseph.\(^7\) In each of these cases, we see ‘home’ left behind. Cain, for instance, laments being “driven…from the face of the land”\(^8\), while Abraham is commanded by the Lord to leave ‘his country, his kin and his father’s house’\(^9\). Similarly, Noah’s ark is a ‘home’ made to provide shelter for flora, fauna and ‘family’\(^10\) while the ‘land’ is reborn.\(^11\) Again, then, we see ‘land’, ‘family’, and ‘shelter’ as ‘home’, this time through the theme of ‘exile’. However, there is a brief respite from this exile in *Exodus*, as the Israelites are brought to their promised ‘home’, Canaan.

Moreover, Canaan gives us more symbols of ‘home’. The Lord describes this ‘land of the covenant’ as the “land from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.”\(^12\) As Eden is the source of both these rivers, the Gihon and the Euphrates,\(^13\) we see that Canaan itself stems from the ‘origin’, the place of original exile. Thus, the ‘final home’, Canaan, is bordered by that which flows from the ‘original home’, Eden. ‘Home’ in the *Tanak* therefore involves ‘origin’ and ‘destination’. In this manner, Canaan is constructed both as a ‘lost home’, and as that which the Israelites ‘come home to’. ‘Home’ is that which we leave, and that which we come home to.

‘Hospitality’ is also essential to the ‘home’ of the good Jew.\(^14\) Good welcome is a *mitzpah*, a “word which cannot be readily translated since it means ‘commandment’ and

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2 Genesis 2
4 *Ibid.*, 12:2
5 *Ibid.*, 8:7-11
6 *Ibid.*, 28:5ff
8 *Ibid.*, 4:14
9 *Ibid.*, 12:1
10 *Ibid.*, 6:18
11 *Ibid.*, 8:7-11
13 *Ibid.*, 2:10-14
14 Genesis 18:3-6
benevolence”¹. Thus, those who violate this custom are swiftly punished. The princes of Succoth, for instance, are punished by Gideon, who tears “their flesh with the thorns of the wilderness and with the briars”². Similarly, the Pharaoh of Egypt violates this mitzpah in Exodus. Certainly, his predecessor is hospitable to Joseph and his kin, giving them “the best of the land”³, and allowing Joseph to leave Egypt in order to honour Israel his father.⁴ As in the Odyssey, ‘hospitality’ involves a warm welcome and quick exit.⁵ The Pharaoh Ramses, however, makes the Jews’ “lives bitter with hard bondage”⁶, and refuses to let them return to their homeland.⁷ As punishment for this, all the first-born in Egypt, ‘man and beast’, are killed by the Lord in a single terrifying night.⁸ Here, ‘home’ is ‘land’, ‘family’ and ‘hospitality’, and the latter is not to be violated.

We may also see ‘shelter’ and ‘defilement’ in this story. In Exodus, the blood of a young and thus ‘undefiled’ lamb is smeared on the lintels of the Hebrew houses. This prevents their doom, ⁹ and enables them to go ‘home’.¹⁰ The Pharaoh, however, is not ‘hospitable’. He loses the firstborn of his ‘family’, and has his armies destroyed by the Red Sea’s walls of water.¹¹ Again, ‘home’ is ‘shelter’, ‘family’, ‘origin’ and ‘destination’, and is not to be ‘defiled’. Defilement results in doom.

For the Jews, however, their own ‘defilement’ results often in ‘exile’. In the time of the great exile from Canaan, the events of Exodus are used by the Lord as a threatening reminder of ‘homelessness’.¹² Soon, the children of Israel are ‘ruined’, sent forth from ‘home’ as punishment. This is because they have forsaken Yahweh, and therefore must be “cast out of [their] land into a land that [they] know not…”¹³. This exile is associated by the Lord with “parched places in the wilderness, in a salt land [that is] not

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¹ Brasch, R. (1956), The Star of David, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, p.141
² Judges 8: 9
³ Exodus 47:6
⁴ Ibid., 50:6
⁵ Homer, Odyssey, 15.74-81
⁶ Exodus 1:14
⁷ Exodus 7:14, 7:22, 8:15, 8:32, 9:7, 10:27, 11:10
⁸ Ibid., 12:29-30
⁹ Ibid., 12:21-23
¹⁰ Ibid., 12:25
¹¹ Ibid., 14:25-28
¹² Jeremiah 16:14-15
¹³ Ibid., 16:13
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

inhabited”\(^1\). This is as opposed to Canaan, the good, the plentiful, the fruitful land.\(^2\)
Indeed, if this were the *Odyssey* or *Iliad*, Canaan would be “green with vines”\(^3\), have
“rich dark soil”\(^4\), or be filled with “god-fearing men”\(^5\). However, for the ‘defiling’,
Godless Jews, they will miss “the bride, the sound of millstones, and the light of the
candle”\(^6\), that is to say ‘wife’, ‘food’, and ‘shelter’. The Jews will suffer, then, in a
place that is not ‘home’. Indeed, as with the suitors of the *Odyssey*, they have defiled a
sacred place, the ‘land of God’\(^7\) or ‘house of God’\(^8\).

In *Ezekial*, too, we can see ‘home’ and punishment. Through the prophet Ezekial, the
Lord condemns the Jews. He compares their sacred life in “the land…flowing with
milk and honey”\(^9\) with the ‘wilderness’ they have made by not ‘living in the Lord’s
statutes’.\(^10\) As punishment for this, Yahweh slays many of the Jews living in Jerusalem,
starting in his own ‘home’, the Temple.\(^11\) Here, as with the last plague of *Exodus*, the
‘stain’ of defilement is contrasted with the mark of God’s ‘purity’. We also see here
God’s ‘home’ as the ‘origin’ of the punishment, and as an ‘origin’ that must begin with
its own ‘defilement’. The Jews are thus punished by the defilement of ‘home’ of their
Lord, God’s dwelling place, and the mark of the glorious reign of the House of David.\(^12\)
Moreover, when the Lord foretells of the days when the Jews’ “iniquity will have
an end”\(^1\), He makes mention of the place where it will occur:

> I will judge thee in the place where thou wast created, in the land of thy nativity. […] Thou
> will be for fuel to the fire; thy blood will be in the midst of the land; thou shalt be no more
> remembered; for I the Lord have spoken it.

Here, Canaan is again ‘defiled’. This Canaan is both a ‘lost home’, and that which the
Israelites ‘come home to’. Consequently, the etiological and eschatological symbol of

\(^{1}\) Ibid., 17:6
\(^{2}\) Ibid., 2:7
\(^{3}\) Homer, *The Iliad*, 2.652
\(^{4}\) Homer, *The Odyssey*, 17.348-350
\(^{5}\) Ibid., 6.131-133
\(^{6}\) Jeremiah 25:10
\(^{7}\) Ibid., 2.7, 16:18
\(^{8}\) Ibid., 32:34
\(^{9}\) Ezekial 20:15
\(^{10}\) Ibid., 20:13
\(^{11}\) Ibid., 9.6-7
\(^{12}\) Ibid., 24:21

4. Superficiency and Symbols of Homelessness
the Covenant is defiled where it once was sanctified. While Canaan of the Covenant was sanctified as a future Eden, Canaan becomes a ‘home of death’. The Israelites have thus made ‘home’ the ‘abundant birthplace’ into ‘home’ the ‘barren grave’. In the later Haggai, ‘house’ itself is brought into the nearness of ‘home’, again by the ‘infidelity’ of the Jews. In this instance, the Jews make themselves ‘at home’, but do not build a temple for the Lord. As the Jews refuse to build a new Temple, the Lord smites them with barrenness and drought. When a new ‘House of God’ is built, Yahweh acknowledges the lesser splendour of the Temple, but promises future glory.

In the ‘defilement’ of this Jewish ‘home’, then, we see the defilement of ‘shelter’, ‘children’, ‘family’ and the ‘home’ that bonds Jews together in strength, the ‘House of David’ and its Temple. We also the symbols of ‘origin’ and ‘destination’. Lastly, we see Yahweh Himself linked to ‘shelter’, ‘land’ and ‘exile’.

**ii. Godlessness, Homelessness and the Jewish House**

Indeed, Ezekial and Haggai add another symbol to the Judaic ‘home’: God. Put simply, unless God is also ‘at home’, there is no Jewish ‘home’. In the love and wrath of the Almighty we see ‘home’, either as reward, or as a punishment. Indeed, it is ‘godlessness’ that leads to the defiled ‘home’ or ‘homelessness’. Conversely, while the last lines of the Tanak do not emphasise ‘home’ per se, they do prophesise a holy future bound with themes of ‘God’, ‘family’ and ‘children’. Here, ‘God’ is again associated with ‘home’. It is for this reason that Jews leave a seat empty for Elijah during Passover, so that “he is invited to enter and announce the advent of the messianic age”. There will be a new kingdom when the Lord, through Elijah, is in the house. The Kingdom of God will come when He is ‘at home’ with the Jews.

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1. Ibid., 22:29
2. Genesis 15:18
3. Haggai 1:2-4
4. Ibid., 1:10-12
5. Ibid., 2:3-7
6. Genesis 7:1
7. Jeremiah 16:11-13
8. Malachi 5:4-6
Moreover ‘home’ and ‘house’ are at the centre of Jewish material life. With the destruction of the Temple in the first-century, the Jewish house became the primary site of worship. ‘Home’ *qua* ‘shelter’ is thus the place where “daily prayer and study take place, the Sabbath and festivals are celebrated, and the life-cycle events, from birth to death, are ritually observed.”\(^1\) Furthermore, as we noted *supra*, each Jew became his own priest. Thus, as ‘Father’ becomes ‘father’, and the Divine home’ becomes ‘shelter’,

the home is like a ‘little sanctuary’ (Ezekial 11:16) in which the father is like a priest, the mother is like a priestess, and the dining-table like an altar (Berachot 55a), where children can enjoy their childhood and grow to maturity under the loving protection and guidance of their parents, and where the Jewish religion can be practiced, experienced and transmitted from generation to generation.\(^2\)

Thus, in ‘House of God’ built by Solomon,\(^3\) and rebuilt by the post-exilic Israelites, we find the many ‘Houses of God’.

### iii. Jewish Theocentrism and Greek Anthropocentrism

This Judaic ‘home’, then, marks the lives of the mighty patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Like ‘home’ in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, this Jewish ‘home’ is the manifestation of life. ‘Home’ is ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’, ‘origin’, ‘destination’, ‘family’, ‘food’, ‘shelter’, ‘land’ and ‘God’.

However, while Hellenism shares with Judaism these symbols, there is no place for God in the Homeric ‘home’. This is not to say that the Greeks were godless. The role of the gods in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and the Homeric use of ‘God-fearing’ as a blessing,\(^4\) show the groundlessness of this assertion. Nevertheless, the World of the Hellenes was anthropocentric, not theocentric.\(^5\) The Greek gods are powerful and immortal, and sometimes even just. They are not, however, relevant to the greatness of men. Indeed,\(^6\)

\(^1\) ibid., p.320
\(^2\) ibid., p.371
\(^3\) II Samuel 24:18ff, I Kings 6-7
\(^4\) Homer, *The Odyssey*, 6.131-133

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness 313
they often lack the dignity of Man. 1 As Finlay writes, “the humanisation of the gods was a step of astonishing boldness. To picture [the gods]...as men and women, with human organs and human passions, demanded the greatest audacity and pride in one’s own humanity.” 2 For the Homeric narrative World, ‘man is the measure’.

In Judaism, however, this would be blasphemy. As we saw in Ezekial, Israel’s ‘excellence of strength’ is due to the Lord’s Temple, and not to the Lord’s people. Indeed, for the Hebrews, most Achaean ‘excellence’ is sinful. While Achilles gleefully boasts of his victories, 3 Rabbi Brasch writes that “there is no room for God in him who is full of himself” 4. Similarly, while Achilles’ father urges his son, “Now always be the best, my boy, the bravest” 5, as does the father of Glauces, 6 King Solomon says that God only “giveth grace to the lowly” 7. When the men of Babel try to “build a…tower, whose top may reach unto heaven” 8, God ‘punishes’ them by imposing different tongues upon them and thus “confound[ing] the language of the earth” 9. While Athena gives victory to a boastful, bloodthirsty Odysseus, 10 God rewards the humble Ahab who “rent his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted, and lay in sackcloth, and went softly” 11. This ‘holy humiliation’ occurs again a little later. 12 In each case, Jewish ‘excellence’ is from God, not Man.

iv. Jewish Divinity and Greek Physis

Moreover, the ‘Divine Home’ also has effects on ‘land’, effects we will see by first looking back to Homer. In the Homeric ‘home’ land is physis. Thus, the oikos may be built in a way that lets beings ‘rise up of themselves’. By crafting his bed from a tree in a manner that allows it alētheia, Odysseus may “create a system in which the raw vitality flows from the earth up through the marriage bed and then through the oikos and

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3 Homer, The Iliad, 390-397 and passim
4 Brasch, R. (1956), The Star of David, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, p.52
5 Homer, The Odyssey, 11.936
6 Ibid., 6.247
7 Proverbs 3:34
8 Genesis 11:4
9 Ibid., 11:9
10 Homer, The Iliad, 22.36-42, 22.65-71
11 I Kings 21:28
12 II Kings 22:11-20
everything it represents.”\(^1\) The Homeric man may thus do justice to \textit{physis}, while also glorifying man’s \textit{oikos}. Of course, this is not to say that the gods do not have greater mastery over \textit{physis}.\(^2\) Rather, it is to say that Man may bring forth the earth with the gods and their many forms. Thus, the “Divine receives its honour through the respect paid to the Human, and Human in virtue of the honour paid to the Divine”\(^3\). ‘Home’ is made holy as Divine and Human honour one another.

In Judaism, however, the flora and fauna are entirely dependent on the Lord for their life.\(^4\) As Hegel writes, in Judaism “Nature…is…depressed to the condition of mere creature; and Spirit now occupies the first place. God is known as the creator of all men, as he is of all nature, and as absolute causality generally.”\(^5\) Indeed, when men try to claim the glory of the ‘land’, they are met with Yahweh’s wrath.\(^6\) Again, there is no ‘home’ in Judaism without God. ‘Home’ is the fruit of life, and life itself comes from God.\(^7\) This is the ‘Divine Home’.

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\(^3\) Hegel, G.W.F. (1991), \textit{The Philosophy of History}, Prometheus Press, New York, p.239
\(^4\) Genesis 1-2; Deuteronomy 30:20; Job 38-41:34; Jeremiah 5:28, 51:25; Ezekial 13:11-13; Haggai, 1:10-12; Zechariah 8:12
\(^6\) Deuteronomy 32:51,52

The young man exulted in his sleep to see the holy water and soil. He stretched forth his hand to touch them, but the Promised Land, made up of dew, wind and age-old human desires, and illuminated like a rose by the dawn, suddenly flickered in the fluffy darkness and was snuffed out.

- Nikos Kazantzakis, *The Last Temptation*, p.13

As we saw earlier, the Christian narrative has had a profound influence on Western civilisation. While the Jews remained exclusive and particular, the Christians were inclusive and universal. From the time of Constantine to the Age of Revolution, Christianity in its various forms has dominated our Western World. The Church itself gradually grew in power so that, by the time of the thirteenth-century, it was “the sovereign mistress of society.” However, it was the early Medieval period that most entrenched Christian culture. While vying for ecclesiastical autonomy against the sovereigns, Christianity was also giving the people of the West a worldview. Put simply, Christianity made the world intelligible, and it did so in a way that incorporated all other narratives into its own. As paganism waned, and Judaism remained exclusive and particular, it was Christianity that gave the world inclusive and universal faith. Here, the neo-Platonic ‘great chain of being’ combined with pastoralism, the power of excommunication, and the power of salvation to take a firm grasp on our World. Certainly, the cultural influence of the Church waned after the Reformation. Since then, the Protestant and Catholic churches have divided the West along lines of faith, class and place. Nonetheless, since the Reformation, Christianity per se has been involved in the rise of humanism, capitalism, the development of

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1 See p.282, above.
6 See p.282, above.
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

For Christians, as for Jews, the narrative World cannot be accounted for without the Bible. In the Tanak and New Testament, we see etiology, eschatology, ontology, ethics, ecclesiastical law and countless stories to live through. Of course, as Ricoeur argues, the biblical narrative has been interpreted and reinterpreted over the millennia. Nonetheless, it still remains that it has been this one book, the Bible, that has served to bond Christians the world over. Consequently, if we are to come to terms with the ‘home’ of Christianity, we should turn to the New Testament.

i. Hospitality and the Heavenly Home

In the New Testament, we again find ‘hospitality’ in ‘home’. When Jesus sends his disciples into the world, he expects them to be warmly welcomed. In Luke, Christ castigates Simon the Pharisee for his lack of hospitality, saying “I entered in to this house, thou gavest me no water for my feet”. Similarly, the ‘sinning woman’ in Simon’s house is forgiven by Jesus because of her ‘hospitality’. In the later epistles, ‘hospitality’ is essential to the bishops, and a show of community love.

However, it is on the mount of Olives that we see the most powerful expression of ‘hospitality’. Here, ‘hospitality’ towards one’s fellow men is an expression of love towards Christ, the ‘Son of Man’ and herald of the Kingdom of God. Certainly,

4 Mark, 6: 10-11, Luke 10:5-11
5 Luke 6:44
6 Ibid., 6:45-47
7 I Timothy 3:2-6; Titus 1:7-9
8 III John 1:5
9 Matthew, 25:34-40

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
‘hospitality’ in the *Odyssey*, *Iliad*, or Tanak was an issue of great reward or harsh punishment. However, in the *New Testament* punishment for those who violate ‘hospitality’ is eternal damnation. Conversely, those who are ‘hospitable’ are rewarded with eternal life in the Kingdom of God. Of course, the Jews also had a Kingdom of God. However, by opposing ‘this life’ to the ‘eternal life’, Christ “frees [this kingdom] from the coarse material notions which had become connected with it.”

Thus, ‘hospitality’ and, *mutatis mutandis*, ‘home’ is no longer ‘earthly’ in the Homeric sense. Indeed, it is not even the Jews’ Divine ‘Land of God’. The ‘earthly home’ of the Greeks and Jews has been rejected in favour of a ‘heavenly’ Kingdom of God.

Moreover, ‘shelter’ leaves the earth and becomes heavenly. When Peter laments the loss of his house, Jesus tells him of God’s ‘future home’. We can also see this in *Matthew*. Indeed, Elijah is taken from the ‘shelter’ of the Jews, and becomes John the Baptist. John, in turn, moves away from ‘land’ to God, baptising not with water but with the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the Church fathers declare that the ‘shelter’ of the future is what they seek. *Contra* the Greek and Jewish ‘shelter’, these Christians “have a building from God, a house not made with human hands, eternal, in the heavens”. The Hebrew Temple, the former ‘home of God’, must crumble and be replaced by the risen Christ. Through the body of this risen Messiah, not ‘of this world’, the faithful may grasp the ‘divine home’ for eternity. This ‘home’ is, of course, ‘not of this world’. ‘Earthly’ Babylon will crumble, and a new ‘unearthly’ kingdom will emerge. While the conservative Qumran Essenes want a real, earthly temple for God, the Hellenised Christians want only heaven as their Kingdom.
We may also see this movement with ‘family’ and ‘children’. When told that his
‘family’ are at a sermon, Jesus replies that his disciples are his ‘mother’, ‘brothers’ and
‘sisters’. This sentiment is also expressed in Mark, and Luke. Later, having
embraced ontological dualism, Jesus explains this ‘unearthly’ mission. Contra the
‘family’ of the Judaic Malachi, Jesus promises to “turn the heart of the fathers to the
children, and the heart of the children to the fathers”. In this sense, Jesus undermines
the notion of ‘earthly family’ in ‘home’, even doing so as a child. Similarly, Jesus
states plainly that there is no marriage in His ‘home’. Thus, ‘family’, ‘wife’ and ‘birth’
are also made ‘unearthly’.

Moreover, ‘earthy’ imagery, particularly of ‘land’ and ‘shelter’, pervades the Christian
bible. However, this use of ‘land’ and so forth is a rhetorical one. It draws on the
strength of the Judaic ‘home’, while rejecting this ‘home’ in favour of an ‘unearthly’
one. ‘Birth’ and ‘death’ are similarly renegotiated.

Consequently, this change in ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘shelter’, birth’ and ‘death’ changes the
way ‘home’ bonds the Christians. As we saw, the Hellenes were bonded together in
‘home’ through nomoi, lands, estates and so forth. Similarly, the Jews were bonded in
‘home’ through a personal God. The Christians, however, are only bonded in the
‘family home’ through the Christ. Christ is “the unique son (cf. Mark 1.11, ‘beloved
son’), and we are sons only as we are found in him”. Christ, in turn, is ‘at home’ in
his father’s ‘house’, away from all flesh.

1 Chadwick, H. (1976), The Early Church, Penguin Books, Ringwood, p.17
2 Mathew 12:48-50
3 Mark 3:33ff
4 Luke 8:19-21
5 Matthew 10:28
6 Ibid., 10: 34-37
7 Malachi 5:4-6
8 Luke 2:40-51
9 Mark 12:25
Galatians 6:8; Ephesians 2:19-22; Philippians 2:22; I John 2:12-14, 3:1-2; Revelation 22:1-5
11 Ephesians 5:22-6:9; Timothy 3:2-5
12 Galatians 9:22-31
13 Ephesians 1:5, 3:14-19
p.264. For an account of Christological ‘adoption’ closer to this symbolic methodology, see Tillich, P.
(1964), Systematic Theology, Volume 2, James Nisbet and Co., Digsowell Place, pp.126-127

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness 319
What can account for this movement from ‘earth’ to ‘heaven’? Certainly, Hellenism was an influence on Christian dualism. However, this ‘uneartly home’ is better explained by the corruption and occupation of Jewish Canaan by Rome. It is a symptom of ‘exile’. Of course, ‘exile’ was common in the Iliad, Odyssey and Tanak. However, in these works ‘home’ was far away. In the New Testament, ‘home’ is not elsewhere per se. There is no ‘exile’ in the earlier sense. Rather, these Jews are ‘at home’ but this ‘home’ has itself gone. The land of ‘milk and honey’ has been ‘defiled’, ‘stained’ by Rome.

Consequently, while most post-exilic orthodox Jews became less ‘fickle’ and more exclusive, a small group of Nazarenes searched for a new Hebrew ‘home’. As Hegel explains, this ‘stain’ means that the less orthodox Jews took refuge in their Subjectivity. The Divine ‘home’, including ‘land’, ‘family’, origin and ‘destination’, becomes defiled as an Objective external reality. What occurs, therefore, is a universalising of the Subjective. The Subjective, taken as both human will and spirit is universalised as God. Through the power of this omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent Willing Spirit, the Hellenised Jews see ‘home’ as immaterial but real. Spirit Wills and Thinks the world qua ‘home’, not as earthly ‘land’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’, ‘family’ and so forth. Rather, ‘home’ is taken into the etiological and eschatological narrative explored supra via Ricoeur. We find, as Hegel writes, “an abstraction from all that belongs to reality…[E]verything that had been respected is treated as a matter of indifference”.

Consequently, the Colossians are exhorted to turn their minds to “the things that are above, not on the things that are below”. The Jewish

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1 Moore, G.F. (1941), *History of Religions*, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, pp.132-134
5 To attract more followers, the Australian Anglican Church has ‘secularised’ its ontology. The Subjective is not universalised through the Absolute, but left as ‘conscience’. Divine Subjectivity is simply secular subjectivity. This may be an example of our ethical and ontological degeneration, as expressions of the Infinite or Absolute are put in the ‘too hard basket’. See Gross, D. (19/8/00), ‘At last, a God atheists can believe in? Hallelujah!’, *The Age*, NEWS EXTRA, p.3
7 Colossians 3:2
Divine in Nature has thus become the whole of reality in the Divine God through Christ. Nature, including Man, is left behind.

Is this Kingdom of God a utopia like Socrates? Certainly, Christ says that “the kingdom of God is within you”\(^1\). In this sense, both Socrates and Christ see their blueprint inside the hearts of men. However, the utopia of Socrates and Socrates himself were to be developed through everyday human *logos, agon* and *polemos*. The ‘home’ of Christ, on the other hand, was to be ‘built’ in *fides*, and in Spirit through Christ. As Hegel writes, “the relationship to God remains a relationship to something above and beyond, which in no sense lies present-at-hand.”\(^2\) ‘Home’ is therefore a more distant, more inhuman utopia than Socrates. In this way, it is kept from pagan Rome. Moreover, it is kept from the Jewish Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes. As Nietzsche argues, Christianity is the last of the great Jewish negations, that of reality itself, including Jewish reality.\(^3\) Having excluded all these people, the Christian ‘home’ is then open to all those ‘faithful’ in Christ.\(^4\) This whole movement can be seen in the words of John:

\[\text{He that cometh from heaven is above all. [...] He that hath received his witness hath set his seal to this, that God is true. For he whom God has sent speaketh the words of God: for he giveth not the Spirit by measure. The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand. He that believeth in the Son hath eternal life….}\(^5\)

In Hegel’s terms, the eternal Infinite Spirit of the Absolute invisible Father is given to Man through the Finite Son.\(^6\) Thus, the Spirit in Man is at ‘home’ for eternity in the Absolute, ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ merge through Spirit, and ‘home’ is again Divine. In this ‘eternal home’, the hospitality of Jesus welcomes the few faithful Laodiceans, who need but only knock to be received. Now in their ‘home’ for eternity, they will be sheltered and share ‘hospitality’ with the Messiah.\(^8\)

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\(^1\) Luke 17:21


\(^4\) Matthew 21:43

\(^5\) John 3:31-36

\(^6\) I Timothy 1:17

\(^7\) Revelation 21:6

\(^8\) Revelation 3:20; 22:14-15
The ‘unearthly’ character of this Christian ‘home’ was furthered in the work of Augustine (354-430). In his City of God, we see the further development of the Christian ‘home’ under the influence of Platonic, neo-Platonic and Manichean philosophy. Of course, this is not a canonical or popular narrative per se. However, Augustine had more influence on the Western Church than any other thinker. Consequently, to account for the development of Christianity up until the Renaissance, we should look into City of God. Of distinct importance is Augustine’s Manichean separation of the ‘earthly city’ and the ‘city on high’, the City of God.

Written as the barbarians sacked Rome, Augustine’s City of God was an attempt to find safety and certainty for his faith in a world of fear and uncertainty. Like Plato, he saw safety and certainty in the eternal, the universal and the perfect. Contra Pelagius, he affirmed the old Orphic and Platonic idea that the body is a ‘fallen’ prison. This, in turn, affirmed a dualism with bodily Man on one side and spiritual God on another. Indeed, for Augustine, all people fall into one of the two ‘cities’, the City of Man and the City of God. From this, Augustine reconceptualised the symbols of ‘home’ in the Tanak. First, Augustine explains that God’s Covenant was not with Israel, but with the “whole seed of Abraham, referring rather to spiritual than physical descendants”.

Consequently, Christians may inhabit Canaan, the Hebrews’ Promised Land, without contravening the covenant with the Jews. Secondly, the Kingdom of God begins with the end of the City of Man. God’s promise of a Jewish kingdom “for ever” simply means that Canaan will be inhabited until the end of the ‘earthly realm’. Thus, the ‘old testament’ between God and the Jews is null and void. Thirdly, through the story of Cain and Abel, ‘exile’ becomes a temporary state of ‘homelessness’ before the eternal Christian Kingdom of God. Consequently, ‘exile’ is taken from the Jews, whose

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2 Augustine, City of God, XV:4
4 Ibid., pp.227-232
5 Augustine, City of God, XIV:28
6 Ibid., XVI:21
7 Ibid., XVI:21
8 Genesis 13:15
9 Augustine, City of God, XV:1

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
Kingdom was and is earthly and temporary. ‘Exile’ becomes a temporary state of Christian ‘homelessness’ before the eternal Kingdom of God through Christ. Similar renegotiations are made of Genesis, Noah and Rebekah to reinforce the distinction between the ‘homes’ of earth and God.¹ Augustine even reconceptualises the Genesis’ creation story, seeing the City of God as the seventh ‘day’ of history, the eternal Sabbath.²

With ‘exile’, ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘origin’ and ‘destination’, Augustine thereby renegotiates the symbols of the Jewish ‘home’. Pagans and gentiles are allowed in the Judaic ‘home’; the kingdom of the Jews is ‘earthbound’ and lowly; and ‘home’ qua Kingdom of God is torn from its ‘earthly’ moorings and placed in Heaven. As Daly and Cobb write, the “true home of the Christian is not any particular land but the coming realm of God or an otherworldly heaven itself.”³ The ‘Divine Home’ of the Jews has therefore become the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. This Augustinian ‘home’ continues then through the Medieval World, tempered perhaps by the neo-Platonic ‘great chain of being’, and the peasant tradition of the carnival.⁴

¹ Ibid., XV:26
² Ibid., XXII:30
³ Daly, H.E. and Cobb, J.B. (1994), For the Common Good, Beacon Press, Boston, p.103
⁴ See p.211, above.
D. Western Renaissance – Shakespeare – ‘The House of Dreams’

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

- Prospero, in William Shakespeare, The Tempest, IV.i

The Renaissance was not the end of Christianity. However, it was, as Braudel suggests, a rich conversation between Christian Rome and pagan Rome. As Byzantine Greeks fled Constantinople, and European ships traded with Arab, the works of antiquity made their way to the West. After the Christian middle ages, the Renaissance saw the ‘rebirth’ of Classical life. Consequently, the pagan joi de vivre of Homer and Classical Athens was redeveloped and challenged the ‘dry’ domination of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. In Britain, the Tudor monarchy used this ‘new learning’ to train the bourgeoisie in civil service. Playwrights, in turn, cultivated this learning for a public more attuned to listening than to reading. In this sense, the capitalists, the educated aristocracy and the masses were equally influenced by the treasures of antiquity. Certainly, the Renaissance saw the birth of a new World amongst the people of the West, even if this did not occur in their universities.

To account for this World, we can only turn to William Shakespeare. Shakespeare was himself influenced by the revival of antiquity. However, he was hardly an expert in Greek tragedy. Rather, he took both the stories and language of Classical humanism and the creative language of his people. This, in turn, as Greek tragedy had done,
forged a new national sense of dramatic self. It is for this reason that Shakespeare was called ‘genius’. As we see in the Latin genus loci, ‘genius’ has to do with ‘spirit’, and often the spirit of a time and place. In this sense, the work of Shakespeare is not a political stance, or single-minded critique of society. Rather, it is a poeticisation of his World; of the old, the new and of creativity. For this reason, Fluchere calls Elizabethan drama, including Shakespeare, the “voice of an epoch”. Shakespeare did not follow Aristotelian rules of narrative, nor the dictates of Scholastic eschatology. Rather, he developed a new voice of English national culture, and the English-speaking world. Consequently, we will turn to Shakespeare to account for the ‘home’ of the English Renaissance.

i. Pericles, Hospitality and Recapitulation

In the work of Shakespeare, we again see ‘hospitality’ in ‘home’. In Pericles the ‘hospitality’ of King Antiochus is associated with his ‘defiled home’. The King is in an incestuous relation with his daughter, and tries to kill the suitors in his ‘home’. By defiling ‘family’ and ‘hospitality’, the King is described as ‘evil’ and a ‘serpent’. Later, he and his daughter are ‘shivell’d up by a fire from heaven’. Punishment, as with blinded Polyphemus, proceeds from defilement of ‘hospitality’ in ‘home’.

With the fishermen Pericles meets when he in ‘exile’ on Pentapolis, we also see ‘hospitality’. They quickly offer Pericles ‘shelter’ and ‘food’, and are described by Pericles as ‘honest’. There is even, as in the Odyssey, an exchange of gifts to mark proper ‘hospitality’. This ‘hospitality’ occurs again as Pericles visits the King and Queen of Pentapolis. Meanwhile, Pericles’ Lords fear that Tyre will be like “a house

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1 See p.173, above.
3 Ibid., pp.162-163
5 Fluchère, H. (1959), Shakespeare and the Elizabethans, Dramabooks, New York, p.17
7 Ibid., pp.1019-1021
8 Ibid., p.1018, p.1019
9 Ibid., p.1026
10 Ibid., p.1023
11 Ibid., p.1024
12 Ibid., pp.1025-1026
without a roof”\textsuperscript{1} without him. However, Pericles soon marries the ‘daughter’ of the King and Queen of Pentapolis. The ‘shelter’ of Pentapolis keeps Pericles safe. Moreover, by wedding the daughter of Simonides, Pericles makes sure that his ‘children’ will reign in Tyre.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, by marrying the ‘daughter’ of the ‘hospitable home’, Pericles affirms his own ‘home’, Tyre.

Here, the ‘home’ of Pericles is symbolically reorganised to ensure its survival. All the symbols remain, but their relationships are reorganised. What is this unified development and redevelopment of ‘home’? Fascinatingly, it is similar to the first movement of a piano concerto. In Mozart’s ‘Piano Concerto in E flat major’, for example, the main theme of the first movement develops its tone, mood and colour in various ways. The theme is at times a bright major, others a sad minor. Nonetheless, the movement still returns to the ‘home’ key in the end. From exposition, to development, to recapitulation. So too for the Renaissance ‘home’. ‘Family’ and ‘family’ are bonded, ‘hospitality’ is ‘defiled’ and joins another ‘home’, or ‘land’ is affirmed over ‘people’. In the end, like the Mozart sonata, the themes are reorganised but always return ‘home’. In keeping with the example of Mozart, we will call this reorganisation ‘recapitulation’. Of course, this only refers to the end of a sonata, and not the movement. However, it does emphasise the stability of the Renaissance ‘home’ despite the development and diversity of its parts. Moreover, it has the advantage of being a musical metaphor, which suits process ontology,\textsuperscript{3} and accords with narrative phenomenology.\textsuperscript{4} Certainly, there was little or no recapitulation in the \textit{Iliad}, \textit{Odyssey}, or Tanak. It is akin to the reorganisation of the Hebrew symbols of ‘Son of Man’, ‘Servant’, ‘Messiah’ and so forth, in the \textit{New Testament} and \textit{City of God}.

There are also three kinds of recapitulation. Firstly, as in \textit{The Tempest}, new external symbols are taken into the ‘home’. Secondly, as in \textit{Pericles} or \textit{Titus Andronicus}, ‘home’ is reorganised internally. Thirdly, as in \textit{Timon of Athens} or \textit{Antony and Cleopatra}, ‘home’ is affirmed though a small number of symbols, such as ‘family’ or ‘grave’. These, in turn, reaffirm the other symbols. To develop our account of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p.1026
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p.1040
  \item See p.58, above.
\end{itemize}
Western Renaissance, we will look into recapitulation in Shakespeare. Moreover, we will see how this account contrasts with the Christian ‘Heavenly Kingdom’.

ii. Titus Andronicus

In *Titus Andronicus* ‘hospitality’ is violated rather than affirmed. Upon returning ‘home’ from battle, Titus Andronicus find the brothers Saturninus and Bassanius vying for leadership of Rome. Each needs Titus’ recognition for their success.\(^1\) In this sense, Titus is drawn into the greater ‘home’ of Rome. To rule this ‘home’, Saturninus promises to ‘marry’ Titus’ daughter. By being drawn into the ‘home’ of Titus, Saturninus becomes Emperor.

Once crowned, Saturninus rejects Lavinia, and chooses the Queen of the Goths, Tamora, whose ‘son’ Titus slew in cold blood.\(^2\) With this ‘marriage’, Rome invites the Gothic queen into her ‘home’, an act of ‘hospitality’. However, Tamora repays this with ‘defilement’, including the rape of the ‘daughter’;\(^3\) the the murder of her betrothed, the king’s brother;\(^4\) the maiming of the ‘father’;\(^5\) and the murder of the two ‘sons’.\(^6\) Thus, Tamora violates Rome’s ‘home’ and ‘defiles’ its ‘hospitality’. During this period of ‘defilement’, the ‘earth’ of the Roman ‘home is mixed with blood, death and tears.\(^7\) Moreover, ‘burial’ is of the living rather than the dead.\(^8\)

Consequently, Tamora must suffer the ‘avenging wrath’ of Titus. Titus avenges himself and Rome, his ‘home’, by killing the sons of Tamora and serving them to her in a pie.\(^9\) This, like the acts of Cyclops, is a ghastly violation of the customs of ‘hospitality’. Saturninus, too, is murdered, by Lucius the ‘son’ of Titus. Thus, the emperor dies due to his defilement of Roman ‘home’ and ‘hospitality’. In turn, the order of ‘home is restored when Lucius himself is proclaimed emperor. Lucius, the ‘son’ reclaims the

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2 Ibid., p.720
3 Ibid., pp.727-728
4 Ibid., p.726
5 Ibid., p.731
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p.727, p.729
8 Ibid., p.727, p.743
9 Ibid., pp.741-742
honour of the ‘father’, and the ‘father’s house’.\(^1\) As with the *Iliad*, ‘home’ is also restored with proper ‘burial’ of the dead.\(^2\) Here, again, is recapitulation. ‘Home’ survives through a reorganisation of ‘family’ and ‘hospitality’, and the affirmation of ‘burial’.

### iii. Timon of Athens

Timon, of *Timon of Athens*, is ‘hospitable’. Surrounded by false flatterers, he welcomes his guests, feasts and toasts with them, and leaves them with gifts.\(^3\) He may be, as Speight infers, a failure in *oikonomia*, ‘household management’.\(^4\) However, he is certainly ‘hospitable’ and, indeed, wedded to a greater *oikos*. As with the estates of Athenians, Romans, and the well-to-do Renaissance British, Timon’s ‘home’ extends to servants and friends,\(^5\) and to Athens as a whole.\(^6\)

When Timon’s fair-weather friends will not help him with his debts, Timon ‘exiles’ himself. He rejects his household,\(^7\) and the whole ‘home’ of Athens, including his ‘people’.\(^8\) Indeed, Odysseus’ notion of the civilised household itself is forsaken. Timon leaves the walls of Athens, the boundaries of his ‘home’, for the woods, the wild ‘land’. Like that of the *Iliad*, *Odyssey* and *Tanak*, this ‘land’ is rich.\(^9\) While ‘wild nature’ is used to mock Athens,\(^10\) Timon likes the ‘land’ of his ‘home’, but not the ‘family’, ‘shelter’, ‘people’ and so forth. For Timon, ‘home’ remains only ‘land’ and ‘grave’, both linked to the ‘shelter’ of an “everlasting mansion”\(^11\). Moreover, he calls

\(^{1}\) Ibid., pp.742-743
\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp.722-723, p.743
\(^{3}\) Ibid., pp.777-779
\(^{6}\) Athen is most hospitable ‘home’ in fifth-century plays such as *Medea* and *Oedipus at Colonus*. Of course, Periclean Athens and Shakespearian London are not the same at all. However, there is some similarity between ‘home’ *qua* estate and ‘home’ *qua* city-state. The Renaissance ‘country house’, with its servants, land, earth, family, and so forth, is compared to a city in the work of early Italian Renaissance writer Leon Battista Alberti. See Alberti, L.B. (1450), ‘The Perfect Country House’, in Ross, J.B. and McLaughlin, M.M. (eds.) (1977), *The Portable Renaissance Reader*, Penguin Books, Ringwood, pp.332-339.
\(^{8}\) Ibid., pp.788-789
\(^{9}\) Ibid., p.793
\(^{10}\) Ibid., p.792
\(^{11}\) Ibid.
the beasts civil, and the people ‘beastly’. Consequently, while all the symbols of ‘home’ bonded Odysseus and his ‘people’, for Timon the Athenians are bonded only in evil.

However, this evil ‘home’ is in danger. The Athenians wait in fear for the arrival of the general Alcibiades, whose violence will ‘stain’ the ‘home’ as men do virgins. Moreover, Alcibiades is one of the few ‘friends’ in Timon’s ‘home’. In this sense, he is the avenging wrath that proceeds from the defilement of the Athenian ‘home’. In the face of this wrath, the senators of Athens bargain with Alcibiades, who agrees to only punish a guilty few, and these only by Athenian law. Thus, through Alcibiades the notion of Athenian civil justice is vindicated. ‘Guilt’, ‘dread’, ‘defilement’ and ‘avenging wrath’ reaffirm ‘home’. Moreover, a gracious and uncorrupted ‘friend’ from the ‘shelter’ of Timon has saved ‘home’. Thus, an evil ‘home’ is made ‘good’ with the recapitulation of ‘earth’, ‘land’, ‘friend’, ‘people’, ‘shelter’ and so forth. ‘Land’ offered stability, while the other symbols were reorganised.

iv. Troilus and Cressida

‘Land’ is also the stable symbol of ‘home’ in Troilus and Cressida. Calchas betrays Troy, his ‘home’, and relies on his ‘exile’ to gain ‘hospitality’ from the Achaeans. Here, ‘land’ seems to stabilise the ‘cosmic order’. When ‘land’ is lost in ‘exile’, the world itself is awry. Indeed, we can see this ‘topsy-turveydom’ in all the symbols of ‘home’. For instance, when the ‘rude son should stroke the father dead’, we see the instability of ‘land’ grasp ‘family’.

Indeed, this kinship between ‘family’ and ‘land’ occurs again later. Cressida shows her love for Troilus by speaking of ‘family and ‘land’. However, the same ‘family’ is

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1 Ibid., p.796
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.797
4 Ibid., p.667
5 Ibid., p.656
soon in competition with Troilus. While Troy is still ‘home’, Cressida rejects her own ‘family’ to prove her love. Thus, Troilus has replaced ‘family’ in the ‘home’. However, ‘land’ is still how Cressida shows her stable love. In *Troilus and Cressida*, then, recapitulation affirms the familiarity and stability of ‘home’ through ‘land’.

v. *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Julius Caesar*

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, ‘marriage’ affirms ‘home’. Antony has rejected his ‘home’ in favour of Egypt. However, by marrying the ‘sister’ of Caesar, Antony will join with Caesar and imperial Rome.

For Cleopatra, however, ‘home’ is conquered by Rome, but affirmed by ‘land’. ‘Death’ is linked to ‘grave’ and ‘land’, and so Egypt’s ditches and mud can be her final ‘home’. We can see a similar affirmation of ‘home’ and ‘land’ in *Julius Caesar*. Here, Mark Antony weeps over the corpse of Caesar, crying the beautiful lines: “O! pardon me, thou bleeding piece of the earth,/Thou art the ruins of the noblest man/That ever lived in this tide of times.” In the face of decrepit ‘shelter’, Caesar affirms the Roman ‘home’ with ‘land’, ‘death’ and ‘grave’. Similarly, it is the dead Caesar that destroys the enemies of Rome. In *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Julius Caesar*, then, we see more recapitulation. The Roman ‘home’ is saved with ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ and the stability of ‘land’.

vi. *Coriolanus*

In Coriolanus, the stability of ‘family’ affirms ‘home’. Here, Caius Marcius Coriolanus, a battle-scared soldier, is nominated for the position of consul. In his pride, however, he mocks the ‘people’ of Rome. Soon, he is driven into ‘exile’. Due to his hatred of the ‘people’ of Rome, however, this ‘exile’ is no tragedy. Rather, Coriolanus finds his
place in the ‘home’ of his former enemy, Aufidius the Volscian. Discarding his ‘people’ along with his ‘birthplace’, Coriolanus laments: ‘My birth-place hate I, and my love’s upon this enemy town.’ To prove this love, he shows he is no threat to the Volscian ‘shelter’. Aufidius welcomes Coriolanus into Antium, for the old soldier is no longer ‘at home’ in Rome. Here, ‘hospitality’ gives them a common enemy, Rome.

However, other symbols of ‘home’ appear. Coriolanus’ ‘mother’, ‘wife’ and ‘son’ come to him to plead peace with Rome. Soon, ‘family’ draws Coriolanus back into his former ‘home’. Indeed, ‘family’, ‘birth’ and ‘destination’ combine with ‘country’ qua Rome to bring Coriolanus ‘home’. In returning ‘home’, however, Coriolanus defiles the ‘hospitality’ of Aufidius. Aufidius explains that he took in Coriolanus his enemy, and yet this guest “sold the blood and labour” of their action “At a few drops of women’s rheum, which are/As cheap as lies”. In this sense, not only has Coriolanus violated ‘hospitality’. He has also violated the customs of ‘family’. For this, Corionalus must die. As in the Iliad and Odyssey, punishment proceeds from the defilement of ‘home’. Consequently, Coriolanus is murdered by the Volscian mob.

However, once slain as a Roman, Coriolanus is again in his ‘home’ as a ‘father’, ‘son’, husband’ and ‘sheltering’ hero. Thus, Coriolanus is given a respectful death by his enemies. Here, recapitulation occurs as ‘home’ is affirmed with ‘family’, death’ and ‘burial’.

vii. The Tempest

In The Tempest, Prospero is an ‘exile’ from Milan, far from his ‘birthplace’ and ‘origin’. However, his island ‘shelter’ is his new ‘home’. This is because Milan is evil, and the ‘land’ of the island is linked to Caliban. Thus, ‘home’ is ‘shelter’, particularly for Miranda, against the danger of Milan and Naples, and the wildness of
Caliban and his witch mother. As with *Troilus and Cressida*, then, ‘home’ is divided. ‘Home’ is both the ‘evil family’ of the brother Antonio and his friend Alonso, and the ‘good family’ of the daughter Miranda; both the ‘evil origin’ of Milan, and the ‘good destination’ of the island ‘shelter’; both the ‘good land’ of spirits and nymphs under Prospero’s control, and the evil ‘land’ of Caliban.

To affirm ‘home’ as a whole, in *Tempest* the loss of ‘family’ reaffirms ‘home’. 2 This loss, of course, is ‘marriage’. When Miranda marries Ferdinand of Milan, the ‘evil origin’ of Milan and Naples joins the ‘good destination’ of the island; the ‘evil family’ of Ferdinand joins the ‘good family’ of Miranda; and Caliban is wise as he drinks the alcohol of civilisation. 3 Soon after, Prospero says “retire me to Milan, where every third thought will be my grave.” 4 Consequently, ‘family’ joins ‘good origin’ and ‘good destination’ with ‘death’ and ‘grave’. Indeed, it is finally ‘death’ and the ‘grave’ that make us ‘at home’. For Prospero, ‘land’, ‘shelter’, ‘birth’ and ‘death’, are all unstable. 5 We are ‘at home’ only in the ‘origin of birth’ and the ‘destination of death’, and no more can be safely said of the ‘dream’ that lies between. 6

**viii. *Macbeth***

In *Macbeth*, ‘hospitality’ is violated, so that ‘home’ is nearly lost. With the King as his guest, Macbeth is kinsman, subject and host. 7 However, Macbeth does not protect and honour his guest. Rather, he murders him. Like the Cyclops of the Odyssey and the Pharaoh of Egypt, his punishment will proceed from such defilement. Indeed, like the ‘white faced’ suitors, he dreads this punishment. 8 Still, Macbeth has been told he cannot be harmed by a ‘man of woman born’. Similarly, he cannot be ‘vanquished until Birnam wood rise against him in Dunsinane hill’. 9 As these things are reliable and

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2 *Ibid.* p.28  
3 *Ibid.* p.29  
5 *Ibid.* p.25  
7 *Ibid.* p.826  
stable in ‘home’, Macbeth thinks he will “live the lease of nature, [and] pay his breath to
time and mortal custom.”1 ‘Home’ makes MacBeth feel safe.

Yet, as ‘home’ is violated, it is not safe. As Macduff cries, “Bleed, bleed, poor country!
I think our country sinks beneath the yoke...It weeps, it bleeds, and each day a new
gash/Is added to her wounds....”.2 With ‘land’ stolen, ‘family’ murdered and ‘shelter’
ransacked, the ‘home’ is a ‘home’ no more. All the stability and familiarity of ‘home’
are gone. This, in the end, is why Macbeth himself is not safe. Burnim Wood does rise
to Dunsinane Hill,3 and Macduff was born not of a woman.4 Thus, ‘land’ is mutable,
‘birth’ is unfamiliar and his ‘shelter’, the castle, is vulnerable.5 These reorganised
symbols of ‘topsy-turvydom’ make sure that the son of Banquo reigns in the end. The
‘family’ of the ‘home’ of Scotland is saved, ‘land’ loses its ills, and the ‘people’ regain
their king. To do this, of course, the whole of ‘home’ is reorganised, affirming a sense
of great instability, uncertainty and flux within ‘home’.

ix. Hamlet

In Hamlet, there is even more of this sense. Hamlet’s ‘father’ is murdered, and his
mother is living in “the rank sweat of an enseamed bed stewed with corruption”6.
Consequently, “[s]omething is rotten in the state of Denmark.”7 Thus, ‘Birth’,
‘marriage’, and ‘family’ are rejected;8 the ‘land’ and ‘earth’ are barren.9 Hamlet speaks
often of illusion and indecision.10 Put simply, Hamlet’s ‘home’ is ‘defiled’. For
Hamlet, ‘exile’ seems the only option.11

However, it is ‘death’ that affirms the stability of ‘home’, not ‘exile’.12 Contra the
instability, uncertainty and flux he feels, ‘death’ makes Hamlet a Stoic: “If it be now, ‘t

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p.839
3 Ibid., p.843
4 Ibid., p.844
5 Ibid., pp.834-844
6 Ibid., p.868
7 Ibid., p.852
8 Ibid., p.862, p.867
9 Ibid., p.858
11 Ibid., p.862, p.870
12 Ibid., p.870, p.877
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

is not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it not be now, yet it will come: the readiness is all. Since no man has aught of what he leaves, what is't to leave betimes? Let be."¹ While Horatio gives Hamlet a way out of doom, he chooses to live and fight. Making a ‘home’ in ‘death’, he then rids Denmark of the ‘father’ and ‘family’ that defile it. His ‘home’ is thus affirmed.

x. Renaissance Creativity: Taming a ‘Home’ in Turmoil

In these stories, ‘home’ is still ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘shelter’, ‘earth’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’, ‘origin’, ‘destination’ and ‘hospitality’. However, in the Greek, Jewish and early Christian Worlds, ‘home’ was a stable, reliable complex. In Shakespeare’s Renaissance, the symbols of ‘home’ are unstable and unreliable. Linked to this are uncertainty, indecision and relativism. Hamlet cries, “[t]o be or not to be: that is the question”². Elsewhere, the Prince says that “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so: to me [the world] is a prison”³. Similarly, the ‘people’ of the time are seen as fickle and false.⁴ Honour, a stable virtue in the Iliad, is a ‘fickle host’ in Troilus and Cressida.⁵ A similar sentiment is seen in Pericles.⁶ Contrary to the Greeks, the Jews and the Christians, the Renaissance ‘home’ is an ever changing composition. All that affirms this ‘home’ is the continual reorganisation of ‘home’ itself. All the symbols of Homer remain, but their relations are renegotiated.

However, this description of the Renaissance ‘home’ should not surprise us. For Renaissance thinkers like Lipsius, the Renaissance “towns, provinces, and kingdoms…are but only theatres and places…wherein Fortune plays her bloody tragedies.”⁷ The Renaissance period was characterised in Britain and on the Continent by transition, fluidity, relativism and uncertainty.⁸

¹ Ibid., pp.880-881  
² Ibid., p.861  
³ Ibid., p.858  
⁴ Ibid., p.870  
⁵ Ibid., p.669  
⁶ Ibid., p.1025  
This is not to say that the eschatological narrative of Christianity had not left its mark on Elizabethan England. Certainly, much of Shakespeare’s work can be read in light of Christian morality. Along with the ‘pagan’ Renaissance was a Christian naissance in the form of Protestantism. In England the reformed Church influenced the creation of a literate and interpretive public.

However, much of this new Christianity was itself a source of despair. Man was trapped in a material world that was “passive, inert, and incapable of moving or forming anything by itself.” The Medieval neo-Platonic great chain of being was lost, political doctrines such as Machiavellianism developed and a distant and mechanical Calvinism was founded. Consequently, the Christian life towards salvation and the utopian Heavenly Kingdom seemed irrelevant. Moreover, the plague continued to corrupt much of the social and material fabric of life. As ‘home’ was beset by unreliability and instability, the crumbling neo-Platonic Deity and distant Calvinist eschatology were little comfort. Indeed, as Pearson writes of Shakespeare himself, “the silly and barbarous actions of plotters and counter-plotters, of Catholics and Protestants, of ritualists and recusants, must have jarred on his nerves. If this were Christianity, he was no Christian.” For Jaques of As You Like It, “all the world’s a stage,” and the end of the story is not Augustine’s ‘City of God’. Rather, life ends in “mere oblivion, sans teeth, sans taste, sans every thing.” Therefore, contra Christianity’s ‘Heavenly Kingdom’, ‘home’ is not ‘in the clouds and eternal’. Rather, it is on the ground and fickle. While influential as a moral doctrine, Christianity was waning as a path to the Augustinian ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. The indecision and uncertainty of Hamlet is a good social setting.”

9 Ibid.
example of this. Similarly, while the ‘Roman’ plays were a kind of creative history, their subjects lost their early association with stability, certainty and reliability. Shakespeare’s Greece, Scotland, or Denmark were ‘homes’ built in the image of Shakespearian Britain. However, Shakespeare, whom Speaight calls “too wise a man to believe in the stability of human affairs” did not develop an eternal, universal utopia to cope with this Renaissance. Rather, the beauty and profundity of Shakespeare comes from his ability to poeticise his time, and to do this in spite of its imperfections.

xi. Renaissance Creativity: Individualism in ‘Home’

Central to this poïēsis was Shakespeare’s ability to characterise the unresolved uncertainty of other individuals in his ‘home’. Similarly, Goethe argues for the importance of modern individual morality and individual necessity in Shakespeare. Like Dostoyevsky in his novels, Shakespeare brought onto the stage the unresolved tension of many individual voices. Of course, each individual could still be uncertain or indecisive. Still, the diverse ‘people’ were unified in the Shakespearian ‘home’.

However, Hegel argues that Shakespeare’s characters are “decisively delineated”. If this is true, which it is, how is Hamlet such a character? Surely Hamlet is not decisive, nor clearly delineated? To clarify, it is the self-subsistent individuality of Shakespeare’s characters that Hegel draws on. In this sense, it does not matter that the characters doubt the world around them. Like Hamlet, they may doubt the world but act

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5. Fluchère, H. (1959), Shakespeare and the Elizabethans, Dramabooks, New York, p.249
8. Bakhtin, M.M. (1984), Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp.158-159. As we have seen, though, Dostoyevsky deals with the tension of many individual voices through dialogical polyphony, whereas Shakespeare’s method would more properly characterised as ‘dialogical pluralism’, i.e. diverse but psychologically relativistic. This ‘many-voicedness’ is also described by Bate, J. (1997), The Genius of Shakespeare, Picador, London, pp.327-331ff.
decisively. Hegel seems to agree with this.\footnote{Ibid., p.587} Moreover, Hegel sees these Renaissance individuals in a “unity which is essentially firm-rooted.”\footnote{Paolucci, A. & H. (eds.) (1962), Hegel: On Tragedy, Harper and Row, New York, p.162} In this sense, even indecisive, doubtful, or uncertain characters can form a unified whole. In this sense, Brutus, Jaques, Macbeth and Hamlet all lament a ‘topsy-turvy’ world. However, they all play a part in the unified development of the story, and they all find ‘home’.

The Renaissance ‘home’ maintains this unity over and above the reorganisation of the symbols within it. As Hegel writes, to “retain a hold on life a man requires a constantly expanding breadth of ethical sustenance, which alone requires an objective stability.”\footnote{Ibid., p.211} ‘Home’ is similar to this ‘objective stability’. For the Elizabethans, nationhood may have been the fruit of this ‘home’.\footnote{Weimann, R. (1987), Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater, John Hopkins Press, Maryland, pp.161-169, p.251ff and passim} Here, all the diversity of individuals, and all the instability and uncertainty of a changing world, were unified, stabilised and given certainty. In this way, the people of the Western Renaissance were ‘at home’. Here, we must keep building and rebuilding its ‘home’, for we are merely “such stuff as dreams are made on.”\footnote{Shakespeare, W. [sine anno], The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Abbey, London, p.25} The eternal, universal, and perfect ‘Heavenly Kingdom’ of the the early Christians has become the ‘House of Dreams’.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p.587}  
\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} Paolucci, A. & H. (eds.) (1962), Hegel: On Tragedy, Harper and Row, New York, p.162}  
\footnote{\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p.211}  
\footnote{\textsuperscript{4} Weimann, R. (1987), Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater, John Hopkins Press, Maryland, pp.161-169, p.251ff and passim}  
\footnote{\textsuperscript{5} Shakespeare, W. [sine anno], The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Abbey, London, p.25}
E. Early Western Modernity – Goethe’s Faust – ‘The Estate of a Man’

By the early Age of Revolution, the bourgeoisie were taking over from the Church and the kings. Rather than feudal lords or monarchies, the time of Napoleon saw the rise of huge empires founded on capitalist trade and colonisation. Moreover, statehood was beginning to replace Church, fief and kingdom as the main form of community. Slavic, Gallic, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon nations all competed for domination and, as we saw in universities, with this came a worldview concerned with manipulation, control and accumulation. Any pagan humanism of the Renaissance was replaced by Enlightenment science and philosophy. By the end of the nineteenth-century, the dominant empires and states had taken up capitalist liberalism and laissez-faire developed from an economic form into a global ethos. Generally speaking, our late modern capitalist World is partly the fruit of this period, spanning from the French Revolution to the end of Victoria’s reign in Britain.

However, Romanticism was also developing in opposition to this ethos. As we saw in the work of Vico, Herder and Hegel, cultural nationhood opposed itself to individualism, the abstractions of the nation-state, and the sameness of vulgar bourgeois internationalism. While France was the early ‘engine’ of global bourgeois theory and practice, many of the German middle-classes and aristocracy affirmed Teutonic myth, language, history and so forth against this. Following Herder, one such man was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832). Like Homer and Shakespeare, Goethe was a ‘genius’; someone whose art lay in his ‘natural and artless’ development of a time and place. Even now, many Germans look to Goethe for their national ‘Golden Age’. However, Goethe was not just a national philosopher, scientist, dramatist and poet. Rather, he was able to reconcile the nationalist, localist spirit of the Romantics with the internationalist, universalist spirit of the Enlightenment. Thus, Goethe’s work is of

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1 See pp.217-226, above.
4 See pp.16-24, above.
6 Bate, J. (1997), The Genius of Shakespeare, Picador, London, p.163
global and historical significance. For this reason, Braudel calls him one of those “few rare spirits [that] mark the limits of vast periods, summing up in themselves a number of generations”\(^1\). Goethe was a truly cosmopolitan thinker, ‘at home’ on the world stage.\(^2\) Consequently, while affirming German national culture, Goethe was also able to grasp the spirit of his time, depicting in his work the pagan, Medieval, Renaissance and early modern World. For an account of ‘home’ in early modernity, we should turn to his *Faust*.

i. Faustian Homelessness, Defilement and Exile

*Faust* begins with the ‘two cities’ of Augustine, ‘divine’ and ‘earthly’. The Lord is seen in his ‘Heavenly Kingdom’, where he speaks of things ‘immortal, eternal and enduring’\(^3\), and shows Mephistopheles gracious ‘hospitality’.\(^4\) In contrast to this, of course, is Mephistopheles’ ‘earthly city’. Here we see the “plaguey state of men”\(^5\); with torment, evil and fault.\(^6\)

Living in the ‘earthly city’, elite academic Heinrich Faust feels himself torn between things abject and things exulted.\(^7\) He tires of his ‘shelter’\(^8\), dismisses the grandeur the ‘earth’\(^9\) and the heritage of his ‘people’.\(^10\) He even curses the certainty and stability of ‘family’ and land’.\(^11\) Elsewhere, he says he wants to “lay the world to ruins”\(^12\). Put simply, Faust is ‘exiled’ from his ‘earthly home’.

Soon, though, Faust violates ‘hospitality’ by keeping Mephisto prisoner.\(^13\) Having made a deal with Mephisto, however, he also rejects the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. He has left

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both the City of God and the City of Man. One of the “shipwreck of mankind”, he is utterly ‘homeless’.

Now ‘homeless’, Faust wanders from ‘home’ to ‘home’, taking the ‘hospitality’ of others. In each case, however, Faust violates ‘hospitality’. When accepted into a cellar in Leipzig, Faust passes his judgement on the revellers. Meanwhile, Mephistopheles humiliates the patrons. Later, while mocking a witch’s chant, Faust is happy to accept her gifts, including a love potion. Thus, Faust accepts the ‘hospitality’ of ‘shelter’ and ‘food’, but is himself ‘inhospitable’.

The object of this ‘love potion’ is Gretchen. Fooling her with ill-gotten jewels, Faust is welcomed into Gretchen’s ‘home’. In short, Gretchen is ‘hospitable’. However, by the end of the story, Gretchen has betrayed her ‘mother’, is called a whore by her dying ‘brother’ who is killed by Mephistopheles, is bedevilled by an evil spirit, has drowned the ‘child’ of her and Faust, and is sentenced to ‘death’ for the murder of her ‘child’ and her ‘mother’. In her cell, Gretchen feels that “the flowers are torn” and the “garlands trampled on”. In short, even the fruits of the ‘land’ are spoilt. Faust, with Mephistopheles, leaves Gretchen to die. Thus, ‘family’, ‘shelter’, ‘hospitality’ and ‘land’ are ‘defiled’, and only in ‘death’ does Gretchen find a ‘home’.

After this, however, Faust seems more at ‘home’. He affirms ‘land’ and ‘earth’, and this would certainly accord with Goethe’s philosophical position. These symbols of Nature are forgotten, however, as Faust is welcomed into the Emperor’s court. After

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1. Ibid., p.90
2. Ibid., p.108
3. Ibid., pp.108-109
4. Ibid., p.119
5. Ibid., pp.114-115, p.120
6. Ibid., pp.127-128, p.131
7. Ibid., p.155
8. Ibid., pp.162-163
9. Ibid., pp.165-166
10. Ibid., p.193
11. Ibid., p.190
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p.197
15. Ibid., p.25
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

‘solving’ the Emperor’s fiscal problems,¹ Heinrich promises his eager host that Helen and Paris will soon appear before him. However, Faust is told by Mephistopheles that this is beyond the devil’s powers. Thus, Faust must seek the Mothers in order to fulfil his hasty promise.² Here, the ‘mother’ of ‘family’, deep in the ‘land’, gives Faust the most power. Thus, the symbols of nature reappear. Faust is given the chance to affirm “the nipples…Nature’s springs…[t]he living source that feeds the universe”³. Here, in a typically Romantic fashion, ‘mother’ is linked to ‘earth’ and ‘land’. Soon, Faust delves into the realm of the Mothers and brings out Helen and Paris.⁴ Faust, of course, falls in love with Helen, and finds her in the Kingdom of Menelaus. Helen, home from Troy, gives an exultation of ‘home’ of the kind found in the Iliad and Odyssey, replete with ‘family’, ‘shelter’, ‘land’, ‘origin’ and ‘destination’.⁵

Faust soon arrives, however. Here, he is helped by Mephistopheles as Phorkyas, the evil guest in a ‘hospitable home’.⁶ Mephistopheles divides Helen’s ‘home’ by alluding to her ‘defilement’. He explains that Menelaus’ wants to purge his ‘home’ of ‘stain’ by ritually sacrificing Helen.⁷ This done, Faust violates ‘home’ by luring Helen from her estate to a castle he has stolen from the warring Achaeans.⁸ Here, Faust shows his love for Helen. However, Faust compares his love for Helen to an unstable ‘home’, with unstable ‘friends’ and ‘allies’, and in a ‘shelter’ where the “walls lose resistance.”⁹ Put simply, Faust’s ‘home’ is one of fickle loves and crumbling walls.

Faust then conquers Menelaus ‘at home’, wins Helen, and joins the kingdoms of many times and places.¹⁰ In this way, he expands his own ‘home’. This done, Faust rejoices benevolently.¹¹ Here, ‘land’, ‘earth’, ‘people’ and ‘family’ are affirmed as ‘home’ grows. However, this ‘home’ is built on the murder of others and the seizure of their lands.¹² Moreover, this ‘home’ of Faust is short-lived. His ‘son’ Euphorion, borne of

¹ Ibid., pp.68-75  
² Ibid., pp.75-79  
³ Ibid., p.46  
⁴ Ibid., pp.83-86  
⁵ Ibid., p.157  
⁶ Ibid., p.167  
⁷ Ibid., p.179  
⁸ Ibid., pp.176-177, pp.182-184ff  
⁹ Ibid., p.186  
¹⁰ Ibid., pp.195-196  
¹¹ Ibid., p.194  
¹² Ibid., pp.192-193  

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
Helen, soon dies, and Helen herself returns to the Underworld.¹ Thus, Faust soon loses his ‘son’ and ‘wife’ to ‘death’, and leaves the ‘land’.

‘Homeless’ again, Faust is soon joined by Mephistopheles. Faust is asked whether he was inspired by his travels. Faust speaks of a huge plan to control the sea of the ‘land’.² Soon, Mephistopheles’ magic gives Faust and his Emperor a military victory.³ As a result, Faust is granted an estate. Here, he develops his vision of ‘home’.

However, the ‘home’ of the elderly Baucis and Philemon is in the way of Faust’s development. Their ‘home’ is truly ‘hospitable’.⁴ Weary of treating the aged couple justly, Faust orders Mephistopheles to remove them from their ‘home’. They soon die in the fire the devil’s men have set.⁵ Here, again, Faust’s ‘home’ violates the ‘home’ of others. Certainly, he rejoices in his “high estate”⁶, and speaks fondly of ‘his people’.⁷ Indeed, his vision of ‘home’ is one of ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘shelter’ and hospitality.⁸ However, this is not the vision of a World, or a ‘people’. Faust still says that to “end the greatest work designed[, a] thousand hands need but one mind.”⁹ In short, it is from the individual that all ‘home’ comes.

**ii. Faustian Individualism and Egocentrism**

Here, we can see how Faust’s ‘homelessness’ and violation of ‘home’ are a kind of egoistic individualism. Of course, this Early Modern ‘home’ is still ‘family’, ‘shelter’, ‘earth’, ‘people’ and so forth. However, ‘home’ no longer needs the ‘objective unity’ we saw in the Renaissance. Rather, ‘home’ is always a matter of Faust himself. Certainly, he grasps the ‘grave’ and ‘death’, and returns to his ‘origin’ with Gretchen. However, Faust himself never expresses anything but egoism. While Faust’s quick forgetting of Gretchen is blamed on Mephisto, this amnesia is also linked to vulgar

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⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.251-252
⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.259-262
⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.269-270

342 4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
individualism. Indeed, Faust never repents this egotism on his death bed. Still thinking he ‘has set the people free’, he does not even know that he is dying. As Pascal writes, “he has the same insatiable egoism as before, he has not learnt balance, harmony, self-restriction.” It is only through the spirit of ‘Eternal Womanhood’ that Faust ascends to the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. Moreover, this ascent is in spite of his defilement’ of ‘wife’, ‘mother’ and ‘daughter, and his violation of ‘home’

iii. Lukács, Stalinism and Modern Individualism

Lukács, however, argues that this individualism is only emphasised in liberal bourgeois theory. Lukács explains that Goethe’s Helen, for instance, is not the victim of Faust’s lustful egotism. Rather, she is a symbol of humanity’s progress from the Medieval period into the Renaissance. From Lukács’ Hegelian perspective, then, Goethe’s Faust is an individual allegory, representing the objective dialectical movement of civilisation from pre-Classical times to bourgeois Germany of the early nineteenth-century. Without doubt, this argument is extremely persuasive. Certainly, there is much written on the symbolic meaning of Faust. Moreover, much of what is written can be accounted for by overdetermination, the capacity we earlier explicated of symbols to harbour various simultaneous significations. In this sense, the more ‘abstract’ interpretations of Faust can coexist along with our more primordial sense of ‘home’. However, Lukács sees his own work as primordial. Thus, we should face his criticisms. Indeed, it is Lukács work that will best shed light on Faust, Goethe and his time.

Firstly, Lukács argues that he avoids the problem of destructive egotism in Faust. Speaking of the ‘incorruptible nucleus in man’, quite an individualist notion, Lukács

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5 Lukács, G. (1979), Goethe and his Age, Merlin Press, London, pp.158-175
6 Ibid., p.187
7 Ibid., pp.176-181
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

defends Faust’s insensitivity, callousness and egotism. However, he only dismisses these on the grounds that the “evolution of the species is non-tragic”. Thus, egoistic individualism in Faust does not matter. This ‘slaughterbench of history’ account is typically Hegelian. Indeed, this account found expression for Lukács in Soviet Russia. Of course, Lenin rejected Lukács’ philosophy. Still, Lukács supported Lenin and Stalin, the latter having an overwhelmingly destructive egotism. Indeed, in both Stalin and Faust we see what Lukács admiringly calls “great historical necessity”. Here, things will go along as they must, but it will take a Great Man to help things along. This Great Man, the egotistical individual par excellence, will then emerge from the ‘slaughterhouse of history’ with his bloodied hands clean, as Stalin did for Lukács. As Vazsonyi argues, this use of literary theory can then “be used to recategorise the Stalinist political reality from criminal to necessary.” Here, the dual qualities of individual egotism and ‘historical necessity’ that Lukács admires in Stalin are given to the literary figure of Faust.

However, this is at odds with Goethe’s philosophy. Indeed, Lukács seems to misunderstand much of Goethe’s ‘Romanticism’ and affinities with the naturphilosophie of Schelling. For Goethe, the notion of Bildung, or ‘self-cultivation’, is central. Bildung is, as Bruch writes, “individual, organic self-development…” Consequently, the Bildung of Goethe is nothing like the autocracy of Stalin, which embodied the worst of individualism on one hand, and historicism on the other. Put

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2 Ibid., pp.179-182, p.191, p.197, pp.210-211, p.234, pp.250-251
3 Ibid., p.180
7 Ibid., p.251
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

simply, Lukács cannot defend Faust against egotism, as he valorises actual slaughter to do so. Moreover, he distorts Goethe at the same time.

Secondly, in Goethe’s Germany, if not in Europe as a whole, the Bildung of Goethe, Schleiermacher, Fichte and Humboldt was corrupted. Rather than ‘cultivation’, Bildung became the egotistical individuality of the aristocratic elite or the greedy bourgeoisie.1 Whether with the inwardness of vulgar Romanticism, or the Hobbesian individualism of the Enlightenment, the people of Germany and the West proper were egoists. For these people, we “are more free of finite conditions than mortals can be”2. Sadly, this sense of freedom was dangerous and destructive,3 as was the ‘creativity’ of Heinrich Faust. Certainly, it is no coincidence that Campbell sees Goethe “representing his hero…as a pattern of the yearning, striving, creative spirit of specifically European man”4. If the ‘home’ of Goethe is unreliable, it is not because of safe, comfortable Weimar.5 Rather, it is because it has been undermined in its ‘objective unity’ through its subjugation to the individual who, in most cases, is a ‘homeless’ middle-aged European capitalist male. Like Faust, this individual must keep striving, often in opposition to humility, sensitivity and human finitude.6

Indeed, Goethe himself was no stranger to this ‘restless striving’.7 Nor, indeed, was he adverse to a little individualism, writing that “only egotism pure and simple can save us.”8 This, of course, was the egotism of Bildung, seen in Faust in the transcendent ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. Goethe, as we have seen, was a deep, wide and humble thinker.9 Still, the artistic poverty of Goethe’s life and times led to a sense of creative isolation

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3 Ibid., p.425
9 See p.180, above.
for him. Goethe, in turn, cultivated an elitist egotism in response to this. While in Goethe’s case this may be the restless egotism of tortured ‘aristocratic’ genius, it was egotism all the same. As Bloom has argued, if Faust is ‘about’ anything, it is Goethe himself. While Bloom would avoid any ethical conclusions here, there can be no doubt that individualism had some influence on Goethe. It is no coincidence that, for Goethe, Faust “was clearly meant...to be a figure held up for sympathy, admiration, and emulation.” In short, then, Goethe himself may have been influenced by the individualism of his time. Like Spinoza, he was unable to truly transcend his World. Indeed, Lukács is in some agreement with us here. He writes that “the realization of [the] ideal is obstructed by the very social reality that engendered it”. It seems, however, that this applies equally to Lukács, and perhaps even to Goethe. German social reality engendered Hegelian dialectics and the Bildung and Naturphilosophie philosophies of Hegel, Goethe and Schelling. However, this social reality was often characterised by the very egotism that foiled these philosophies in reality.

From Lukács’, then, we have learnt more about Goethe, Faust and early modernity. First, the egoistic individualism and the destruction of ‘home’ in Faust is not safe. Indeed, they are as dangerous in life as they are in Faust. To defend one or the other on the grounds of ‘historical necessity’ is callous, and does not avoid the danger. Secondly, Goethe, like others of his time, adhered to a rich and noble idea of Bildung. However, also like others of his time, he was unable to overcome the bourgeois or aristocratic egotism of modernity. Here, Hegel would later lament in literature that “Romantic inwardness [that] can display itself in all circumstances”. This inwardness, this egotism, moves “relentlessly from one thing to another.” Even Hegelians like Lukács are touched by this ‘Faustianism’, let alone the masses who have embraced the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. This is what Campbell describes as the

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“aloneness of the Faustian soul”¹, a soul characteristic of “Western…culture that is unfolding still.”² This ‘soul’ has no ‘land’, ‘earth’, or ‘shelter’, no ‘family’ or ‘hospitality’, and no care for a ‘people’ and their culture.

Certainly, if this egotism is Christian, it lacks the pre-Reformation humility of the ‘Divine Home’ and the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’. Rather, it prefers the belief that “[a]rmour of self-trust is best. Citadel all shocks defying [is] the man of iron breast.”³ Our Faust is a man alone. ‘Homeless’, he simply wills his ‘home’ again and again. Consequently, the ‘home’ of Augustine or the Renaissance neo-Platonists has gone. The rich tension of individual voices and the unified ‘home’ of Shakespeare’s Renaissance has collapsed into egocentric individualism, and blind faith in the will to power of each individual. As Watt puts it, “the order and plenitude which had in previous centuries been ascribed to the Great Chain of Being is now, in the usual Romantic style, being sought only in the individual’s personal life”⁴. Capitalism, individualist Protestantism and Hobbesianism, the rationalism of Galileo and the Archimedeanism of the Cartesian cogito have all led to an obsession with the ‘I’.⁵ In the face of this, the Romantics Goethe scorn develop an equally parochial egoism.⁶ In each case, we see egoistic individualism. This is not the ‘shame-cultured’ social individualism of the Homeric ‘Estate of Men’.⁷ Neither is it the introspective individualism of Shakespeare’s ‘House of Dreams’. Rather, this is a more isolated, more egocentric individualism. It abjures all ties of nomos when necessary, and is indifferent to physis.⁸ All we need for ‘home’ is a man like Faust. Quite simply, ‘home’ is the ‘Estate of a Man’.

² Ibid.
F. Late Western Modernity – Star Wars and Indiana Jones – ‘The Homeless Family’

When a Euroamerican hears that I give poetry readings all over the country, she or he invariably turns wistful and remarks, “You’re so lucky. You have all the freedom to travel. I sure wish I could.” (Could what? Write poetry? No, travel). Native people, on the other hand, often extend genuine condolences that my work forces me to spend so much time so far from home, away from the obligations and responsibilities which lend a central meaning to life.


We have looked at ‘home’ in the bibles of the Greeks, Jews and Christians. We have found ‘home’ in the works of Shakespeare and Goethe. Why, then, are we turning to the work of Lucas and Spielberg? Why have we moved from ‘high culture’ to ‘low culture’? Firstly, in Australia, people spend far more time watching or listening to audio-visual media than reading books, plays, epic poems and so forth.¹ There is no reason to suggest this is not the case with other Anglo-American nations such as the United States,² and United Kingdom. Indeed, schools in America are places where American children cannot escape television, advertising, and ‘branding’.³ Secondly, for the small group of people who read, the subject matter is not the ‘high culture’ of the Western canon. Rather, it is popular fiction, newspapers, or magazines.⁴ Thirdly, the movies of Lucas and Spielberg have the most influence of all contemporary filmmakers. Certainly, the ‘high culture’ movies of Fellini, Kubrick, Bergman, or Kurasawa are profound and insightful. However, they have little to do with the people of our World. They do not even appear in the top fifty most popular films.⁵ Lucas and Spielberg, however, have four out of top five. Indeed, their films are forty-percent of the top-grossing films of this period.⁶ Consequently, the works of Lucas and Spielberg are the

⁵ http://www.worldwideboxoffice.com
⁶ Ibid.
voice of late modernity. They speak to and from our World. Lucas’ Star Wars trilogy, in particular, inspires a spiritual devotion of religious or mythical proportions.¹ As Brabazon writes, Star Wars “has been a primary popular culture social formation for a generation. […]illions of men and women possess an emotional attachment to this film trilogy.”² While these films are not as deep or wide as others, they are the voice of our people. It is thus to the work of Lucas and Spielberg that we will turn in order to better understand the ‘home’ of the our Western World.

i. Star Wars I

In the Star Wars cycle, the most primordial ‘home’ is the Force. The Force is an “energy field created by all living things. It surrounds us and penetrates us. It binds the whole galaxy together.”³ Contra the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’, the ‘home’ of the Force cannot be deified.⁴ However, it is split into two distinct parts, the good ‘light side’ and the evil ‘dark side’. Through intracellular organisms called midi-chlorians, one may ‘listen’ to the Force, master it, and uphold good or evil.⁵ The Jedi knights, “guardians of peace and justice in the galaxy”⁶, are good masters of the Force, and are thus continually ‘at home’ in the universe. This primary insight, in particular, will continue to inform our appreciation of ‘home’. Also, secondary portrayals of ‘home’, less concerned with the Force, will elaborate on ‘land’, ‘shelter’, ‘people and so forth, and thus further enrich our conception of ‘home’ in Star Wars.

The secondary treatment of ‘home’ in Star Wars I: The Phantom Menace occurs on the planet of Naboo. Here, the kingdoms of the ‘civilised’ Naboo and ‘primitive’ Gunguns remain separated by mutual animosity, but threatened by the evil Darth Sidious. Both, however, are ‘at home’. Gungan Jar-Jar Binks expresses delight at returning to Gungan

² Brabazon, T. (1999), ‘Star Wars and Writing a Popular Memory’, Youth Studies Australia, December, Volume 18, Issue 4, p.12, p.15
³ Lucas, G. and Kasdan, L. (2000), Star Wars IV: A New Hope, Faber and Faber, London, p.45. Though the Star Wars films involve a number of directors and writers, the story itself was conceived by George Lucas, and his involvement in each of the movies has been considerable.
⁶ Ibid., p.2

4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness 349
Naboo. Queen Amidala of the Naboo risks her life to save her ‘people’ by returning to her ‘home’ planet: “I feel I must return to [my home]. I have decided to go back to Naboo. My place is with my people.” Here, both ‘peoples’ are ‘at home’, but apart from each other. However, the Jedi, on behalf of the Naboo Queen, are taken into the underwater ‘shelter’ of the Gunguns by the ‘exiled’ Jar-Jar Binks. Here, they speak of the unified nature of Naboo, Obi-Wan telling the Boss of the Gunguns that “you and the Naboo form a symbiotic circle.” Always ‘at home’, the Jedi soon join the Gunguns and the Naboo in their ‘home’ planet. This begins when Jar-Jar literally collides with Qui-Gon. From then on, their fates are intertwined, and the ‘homes’ of the people of Naboo begin to converge. Eventually, the two kingdoms are joined, and Jar-Jar is no longer ‘exiled’. Thus, the ‘home’ of Jar-Jar and the two ‘peoples’ becomes Subjectively and Objectively unified through the Jedi. This ‘happy ending’, however, does not deal with the Force, the most primordial expression of ‘home’. The more primary story of hero Anakin Skywalker, however, soon reaffirms the Force qua ‘home’.

With a high midi-chlorian count, Anakin is a young boy with ‘special powers’. He was the property of Tattooine’s Gardulla the Hutt, an influential gangster. Now, he is the slave of a scrap-dealer Watto. Indeed, Anakin is a ‘servant’ whose ‘hospitality’ jars with the ‘inhospitable’ planet of Tattooine. As Shmi says of her son, “he deserves better than a slave’s life.” His ‘home’ on Tattooine is neither good nor bad. Rather, it is unimportant, irrelevant and dull. His ‘land’ is a lifeless desert, his ‘shelter’ is a small, nondescript hovel, his ‘people’ are nowhere to be seen, and his ‘mother’ Shmi, while kind-hearted, seems weak and defeated.
However, the ‘home’ of Anakin is not only Tatooine. The ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ of Anakin are mysterious, and linked to his missing ‘father’. Perhaps even born in the Force itself, Anakin is a ‘virgin birth’. In this case, ‘father’ shows the Force as a ‘birthplace’, ‘origin’, ‘grave’ and ‘destination’. These remain far away, however, as long as he is a ‘servant’ in the ‘home’ of Watto and Tatooine proper. In this sense, the ‘homes’ of the Force and Tatooine pull Anakin in different ways.

However, Jedi Qui-Gon soon sees Anakin’s special powers. Soon, Qui-Gon makes sure that Anakin is no longer a ‘servant’. In turn, he is to be separated from his ‘mother’. Moreover, as he must leave for the plant Curascant, and he is soon removed from his ‘land’ and ‘shelter’ on Tatooine. Through the ‘fathers’ of Qui-Gon, Obi-Wan and Darth Sidious, Anakin is suddenly ‘homeless’ from Tatooine. From this, he is given access to the Force, and the ‘destinations’ of ‘light’ and ‘dark’. This ambivalent future can be seen in the ‘clouded’ visions of Jedi master Yoda, who views Anakin’s ‘mother’ as a source of ‘fear, hate and suffering’. Eventually, due to unresolved problems with his ‘mother’ in *Star Wars I: The Phantom Menace*, Anakin chooses Darth Sidious as his ‘father’. In doing so, he makes himself ‘at home’ in the dark side of the Force.

**ii. Star Wars IV**

By *Star Wars IV: A New Hope*, Anakin has become the evil Darth Vader. Previously a master of machines, now Anakin is a machine. More importantly, Vader is a ‘servant’ in the ‘home’ of the Emperor, Darth Sidious. This will prove important in our final primary treatment. Firstly, however, the secondary treatment of ‘home’ in *Star Wars IV: A New Hope* is the Empire’s Death Star, a huge space station capable of obliterating planets. It is this threat to ‘home’, taken in the planetary sense, which is used to show the evil of Emperor Darth Sidious, Darth Vader, and his minions such as Tarkin. Despite Princess Leia’s cooperation, Vader and Tarkin destroy Alderaan, her

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1 *Ibid.* p.61, pp.96-97  
2 *Ibid.*, pp.82-86  
home planet. As she watches in horror, a “huge beam of light emanates from within a cone-shaped area and converges into a single laser beam out towards Alderaan. The small green planet of Alderaan is blown into…dust.² Here, Princess Leia, the ‘daughter’ of Darth Vader and ‘sister’ of Luke Skywalker, is rendered ‘homeless’. This allows her to access the Force of her ‘father’ and ‘brother’. It also shows Darth Sidious’ ‘home’ to be a ‘defiler’ of others’ ‘homes’. Indeed, this bond to ‘home’ is made stronger by Obi-Wan. Light-years away, Obi-Wan ‘feels’ the planet’s destruction as “a great disturbance in the Force.”³ The primary treatment of ‘home’, however, centres on the ‘son’ of Darth Vader, Luke Skywalker.

Luke, like his ‘father’ Anakin, lives in mediocre Tattooine.⁴ Here, he is ‘at home’ with dismal ‘land’⁵ and ‘shelter’,⁶ and oppressive ‘mother’ and ‘father’.⁷ Like Anakin, Luke’s true ‘father’ is mysteriously hidden. Consequently, when Obi-Wan, the pupil of Qui-Gon, makes contact with Luke, he gains access to the Force. Like Anakin, this occurs by his being torn away from his ‘family’, ‘shelter’, and away from the ‘land’ he abhors.⁸ As soon as he discovers the burnt bodies of his aunt and uncle, he is free of his ‘home’: “There’s nothing for me here now. I want to learn the ways of the Force and become a Jedi like my father.”⁹ By choosing Obi-Wan as his ‘father’, the briefly ‘homeless’ Luke makes himself ‘at home’ in the light side of the Force. Helped by this ‘father’, Luke eventually destroys the Death Star, grounding its secondary obliteration of ‘home’ in the more primary ‘home’ of the Force,¹⁰ a task also undertaken by Obi-Wan.¹¹

Still, Anakin, as Darth Vader, continues to be ‘at home’ in the dark side of the Force. He is, moreover, a ‘defiler’ of ‘home’. His ‘son’, however, is becoming more ‘at home’

¹ Brackett, L. and Kasdan, L. (2000), Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back, Faber and Faber, p.73. Although this refers to the fifth rather than the fourth episode, this merely affirms the relationship between Vader and Sidious developed in episodes two and three.
³ Ibid., p.70
⁴ Ibid., pp.17-18
⁵ Ibid., p.5
⁶ Ibid., p.31
⁷ Ibid., pp.31-33
⁸ Ibid., pp.49-50
⁹ Ibid., p.50
¹⁰ Ibid., pp.170-171
¹¹ Ibid., p.70
in the light side of the Force, affirming the importance of ‘home’, and moving into the next story, Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back.

### iii. Star Wars V

In Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back, we find the young Skywalker with the Rebellion forces on the planet of Hoth. Like Tatooine, the ‘land’ of Hoth is thoroughly ‘inhospitable’.\(^1\) After barely surviving this lack of ‘hospitality’, a vision of his dead ‘father’, Obi-Wan, leads Luke to the Degobah system.\(^2\) Here, Luke meets his new ‘father’, Yoda. The ‘land’ of Degobah itself is a “slimy mudhole”\(^3\) permeated with the dark side of the Force.\(^4\) However, Yoda, like Anakin, is quite ‘hospitable’\(^5\) despite his ‘land’, as he is ‘at home’ in the Force.\(^6\) After some indecision, where we see Luke’s potential for evil, Yoda agrees to teach the ‘son’.\(^7\)

Meanwhile, Darth Vader is obsessed with finding Luke. Believing Obi-Wan to be of no consequence, Vader sees himself as the true ‘father’ to Luke, and thus wishes to make his ‘son’ into an ally.\(^8\) By wandering into ‘land’ permeated with the dark side of the Force, Luke has a vision of Darth Vader. In the vision, Luke fearfully begins a duel, beheading his opponent. Vader’s mask then ignites, opening to reveal the face of Luke, his ‘son’.\(^9\) Here, the ‘son’ sees himself ‘at home’ in the dark side of the Force through the his evil ‘father’. Indeed, through his ‘sister’ and ‘brother’, Leia and Han,\(^10\) Luke is lured to an actual duel with Vader. Here, this struggle replays itself.\(^11\) In the ensuing battle, Vader’s true identity as ‘father’ is revealed,\(^12\) Leia is alluded to as a ‘sister’\(^13\), and Luke’s hand is severed, replaced by a mechanical one like that of Darth

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\(^1\) Brackett, L. and Kasdan, L. (2000), *Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back*, Faber and Faber, pp.3-5, pp.13-15
\(^2\) Ibid., pp.15-17
\(^3\) Ibid., p.67
\(^4\) Ibid., p.83
\(^5\) Ibid., p.68, p.74
\(^6\) Ibid., p.67, pp.89-90
\(^7\) Ibid., pp.75-76
\(^8\) Ibid., p.73
\(^9\) Ibid., p.83
\(^10\) Ibid., pp.94-95, pp.102-104
\(^11\) Ibid., pp.123-125, pp.128-131
\(^12\) Ibid., p.129, pp.136-137
\(^13\) Ibid., pp.130-131
Vader. Thus, by giving into the weakness of ‘family’, Luke has become more like his ‘father’. Having learnt his lesson, when Vader tries to contact Luke, the ‘son’ turns his thoughts to Obi-Wan instead, the ‘father’ of light replacing the ‘father’ of the dark side.

iv. Star Wars VI

By Star Wars VI: Return of the Jedi, Luke’s ‘brother’ has been kidnapped by Jabba the Hutt, and is being held on Tatooine. Jabba is shown to be evil through his lack of ‘hospitality’ to Luke’s ‘family’ and others. Tattooine itself is again shown to be ‘inhospitable’. Indeed, as punishment, Luke and his ‘family’ are to be swallowed into the ‘land’ itself. Once Luke has shown himself to be ‘at home’ in the Force, however, he and his ‘family’ escape this ‘inhospitable home’, and young Skywalker returns to Yoda on Degobah. Yoda, however, soon goes to his ‘death’ and, as is the case with Jedi, soon finds his ‘destination’ in the Force.

The secondary treatment of ‘home’ in Star Wars VI: Return of the Jedi occurs as Luke leaves Degobah and joins his Rebel companions on the forest moon of Endor. Like Naboo, Endor is divided between the ‘civilised’ Empire and Rebellion, and the ‘primitive’ Ewoks, who are ‘at home’ in the ‘land’. The Ewoks, however, soon take the robot C3PO to be a god. Luke then uses the Force to make C3PO seem more like a God. In doing so, he allows the Ewoks to accept the rebels into their ‘home’. Here, as in Star Wars I: The Phantom Menace, we see the unifying Jedi. Luke is ‘at home’ in the light side of the Force. C3PO is his ‘servant’, and thus is also in the ‘home’ of the light side of the Force. Luke uses the Force on C3PO, and C3PO is taken into the ‘home’ of the Ewoks, bringing Luke and his ‘family’ along with him. As C3PO is a

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1 Ibid., p.140
2 Ibid., pp.136-137
4 Ibid., p.16, p.26
5 Ibid., p.27ff
6 Ibid., pp.20-21, p.23, pp.28-34
7 Ibid., p.42
8 Ibid., p.61, p.65, p.89ff
9 Ibid., p.66
10 Ibid., p.71
‘servant’ in the ‘home’ of the light side, the evil Empire is left out of this unification. By ridding the Rebellion and Ewoks of the Empire’s Death Star, this secondary unification of ‘home’ allows the primary treatment to proceed.

Here, the primary treatment of ‘home’ is of Anakin Skywalker, who now must face his ‘son’ in a final confrontation. In essence, ‘father’ and ‘son’ are deciding where Darth Vader will make his ‘home’. Luke’s ‘fathers’ have all died, leaving only Vader. Luke must therefore choose where to make his ‘home’, by accepting or rejecting this ‘father’. If he chooses Darth Vader as his ‘father’, or if he kills his ‘father’ in cold blood, he will be a ‘servant’ in the ‘home’ of Darth Sidious, the evil Emperor. Leia, as a vulnerable ‘sister’, is used to goad Luke into killing Vader. However, no symbols of ‘home’ are relevant to the Force but ‘father’, and Luke makes himself ‘at home’ by accepting his ‘father’ qua Anakin Skywalker: “I’ll never turn to the dark side. You’ve failed, Your Highness. I am a Jedi, like my father before me.”

v. The Force, the Father and the Bourgeois Family

Here, by reconceptualising Vader as Anakin Skywalker, Luke rejects the Emperor’s ‘home’. He may choose his ‘father’, and yet not face ‘death’. This allows Vader to act as ‘father’, but not as Darth Vader, ‘servant’ to the ‘home’ of the evil Darth Sidious. In effect, Anakin has been freed from his second slavery by his ‘son’, a theme acknowledged explicitly by Lucas. After this, Vader dies, seeing Luke ‘with the eyes of Anakin’. Therefore, the ‘son’ has saved the ‘father’, redeeming him from being a ‘servant’, and allowing his ‘origin’ in the Force to become his ‘destination’ in ‘death’. Finally, in Star Wars VI: Return of the Jedi, all the elements of ‘family’ combine to welcome Anakin back ‘home’ from the dark side of the Force into the light side. This conclusion, as Gordon writes,

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1 Ibid., p.39, p.41, p.44
2 Ibid., p.83, p.88, p.96, p.99,
3 Ibid., p.45, pp.102-103
4 Ibid., p.103
5 Ibid., pp.104-105
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

resembles [a] loving family reunion....Although Luke has left his home...he is surrounded in the end by his extended family and community: sister Leia and prospective brother-in-law Han Solo, loyal helpers Lando, Chewbacca, the two robots, and the Ewok tribe. Even Luke’s three dead father figures – Obi-wan Kenobi, Yoda, and Anakin Skywalker – are resurrected as ghosts to attend the reunion.¹

This story, which Lucas admits is more about Anakin than Luke, Leia, Obi-Wan and so forth,² affirms ‘home’. However, this only occurs through ‘family’, and specifically through ‘father’ and ‘son’. Indeed, these symbols seem to have ‘colonised’ the ‘home-complex’. Certainly, secondary treatments of ‘home’, such as those on Naboo and Endor, involve ‘people’, ‘land’, ‘exile’ and so forth. However, the only relevant symbol in the primary treatment is ‘family’. While in the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’ the ‘earthly home’ was replaced by the ‘heavenly home’, this involved ‘earthly’ symbols.³

In Star Wars, however, ‘land’ is simply irrelevant, except when a threat.⁴ Moreover, ‘grave’ is not anywhere in Star Wars. Rather, ‘unearthly’ cremation is at all times preferred.⁵ Similarly, while the ‘people’ of the Naboo, Gunguns and Ewoks are important, Anakin and Luke have no ‘people’. This, of course, is because they may be ‘at home’, for good or evil, in the Force.

Thus, ‘home’ is still associated secondarily with ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘shelter’, ‘earth’, ‘birthplace’, ‘origin’, ‘destination’ and ‘hospitality’. However, in the primary stories, ‘home’ has collapsed. ‘Family’, excluding ‘servant’, is all that matters. Moreover, as each myth and religion is “as good as another”,⁶ ‘land’ and ‘people’ also do not matter. This, in turn, means that ‘exile’ has no meaning for the heroes. What matters is the

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Force, and the Force *qua* ‘home’ is found over and over again through ‘family’. In the *Odyssey*, *Iliad*, *Tanak*, and *New Testament*, all the symbols of ‘home’ played primary parts. In *Star Wars*, only the domestic ‘family’ is primary. Indeed, Lucas seems to agree with this.1

In *Faust*, Heinrich was ‘homeless’ from his egoistic individualism, and his ‘defiling’ of ‘home’. In *Star Wars*, the Jedi are similarly ‘homeless’, but they find ‘home’ through ‘family’. Indeed, Lucas sees the ‘family’ of *Star Wars* as a reaction to the Faustian individualistic egoism of our Western World.2 Against the unpredictability, perceived malevolence and ephemerality of the world, the small Anglo-American nuclear ‘family’ is all that is needed. While not completely characterised by the Reagan presidency,3 the virtues of Star Wars were often affirmed by the conservative Reagan government.4 Certainly, *Star Wars* presents us with a ‘home’ closer to the Reaganite vision of American suburbia than to the *oikos* of the *Odyssey*, or even the Weimar of Goethe. However, to more fully appreciate the *ethos* of late modernity, we should turn to *Indiana Jones*. Indeed, the ‘home’ of Indiana Jones will allow us to appreciate the links between the Reagan years, technological rationality, capitalism and superficiality.

**vi. Indiana Jones I**

*Indiana Jones* may also be understood through its primary and secondary treatments of ‘home’. The primary treatment begins with Henry Jones and Indiana Jones, that is to say, between ‘father’ and ‘son’. We can see this in the early scenes of *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade*, though this is the third film. On a Scouts hike through the American desert, Indiana has strayed away and stolen an ancient relic from an abandoned mine. Stating that it “belongs in a museum”1, Indiana believes he is returning the item, a golden crucifix, to its ‘home’. Unfortunately, a band of relic-hunters gives chase, and Indiana risks a number of dangers to escape. Interestingly,

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4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness 357
most of these dangers are manifestations of ‘land’. When Indiana finally returns ‘home’ to his ‘shelter’ triumphant, his ‘father’ is uninterested. As an eminent archaeologist searching for the Holy Grail, Henry is too busy with his manuscripts to listen to his ‘son’. Indeed, it is for this reason that Indiana’s ‘mother’ is absent. Like Anakin and Luke Skywalker from Star Wars, then, the absence of ‘mother’ emphasises the relationship between ‘father’ and ‘son’. While the ‘father’ may be ‘at home’ in the greater glory of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’ through the Grail, Indiana is in a state of near ‘homelessness’. More specifically, with no ‘mother’ and a distant ‘father’, Indiana’s link to ‘home’, and thus to ‘shelter’, is weak. For this reason, the band of relic-hunters may easily enter Indiana’s ‘shelter’ and take the crucifix. By the time we meet Indiana as an adult in Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom, this divided ‘family’ remains. It is the unification of this ‘family’ that informs the primary treatment of ‘home’ in the Indiana Jones cycle.

In Temple of Doom, the young adventurer has grown into a mercenary-like archaeologist for hire. We find the mature Indiana returning the ashes of a Chinese patriarch, Nurhachi, to his ‘family’, caring little that the ashes are finally ‘home’. Upon receipt of the ashes, gangster Lao Che speaks approvingly of his ‘people’, while Indiana treats Nurhachi with disrespect, only interested in his own remuneration. The negotiation fails, Indiana’s ‘friend’ is killed, our hero is poisoned, and the antidote eventually comes into the possession of Lao Che’s mistress, cabaret singer Willie. As Indiana escapes, he must take Willie with him in order to survive. The pair are saved by Short-Round, a young orphan Indiana has raised. The three then take off in a plane owned by Lao Che. The pilots of the plane dump the fuel, parachute out, and leave Indiana, Willie and Short-Round to die in the crash. Having survived dangerous ‘land’, the three land safely in India.

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2 Ibid., pp.1-2
3 Ibid., pp.4-5
4 Ibid., ~p.30
5 Ibid., pp.4-5
7 Ibid., pp.6-10
8 Ibid., p.16
9 Ibid., pp.19-20
10 Ibid., pp.44-46
11 Ibid., p.46
In India, we see the secondary treatment of ‘home’. The three encounter an Indian village filled with misery. The ‘mothers’ are miserable,1 the ‘children’ have been stolen,2 and the ‘land’ is dying.3 Indeed, it could be said that the oikos of the Indians is ill. This is because their sacred stone, the Sivalingam, has been stolen by an evil Thuggee cult that resides in the Maharaja’s palace in Pankhot.4 Indeed, the palace itself is the centre of an evil ‘home’. ‘Hospitality’, acknowledged as an important institution,5 attests to the moral status of the two ‘homes’. While the village is ‘hospitable’,6 the ‘people’,7 ‘shelter’8 and ‘land’9 of Pankhot Palace are not ‘hospitable’. Indeed, deep in the ‘earth’ of the evil ‘home’ are hundreds of ‘servants’, the ‘children’ of the village.10 Thus, the removal of the Sivalingam from the village speaks of the removal of the ‘children’, binding the children to evil and undermining the good ‘home’.

Indiana, however, is cynical of such things. While he is sensitive to the ‘hospitality’ of the people, he shows no actual faith in their culture, describing their plight as “ghost stories.”11 Indeed, Indiana is much more interested in “fortune and glory”12, and is described by Pankhot’s Prime Minister as a “grave robber.”13 By the time he actually sees the Thuggee rituals, however, Indiana has become less dismissive, though this lapse in skepticism does not last.14 Soon, deep in the ‘earth’ of the evil ‘home’, he is ‘inhospitably’ forced to drink the ‘blood’ of Kali.15 This has the effect of rendering him a ‘servant’ in the evil ‘home’, described as a “black sleep”16, “like nightmare”17.

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1 Ibid., pp.49-50
2 Ibid., p.53
3 Ibid., pp.49-50, pp.52-53, p.56
4 Ibid., pp.52-53
5 Ibid., p.51, pp.98-100
6 Ibid., p.51, p.57
7 Ibid., pp.109-110, pp.123-125
8 Ibid., p.114, p.116
9 Ibid., p.115, pp.117-118
10 Ibid., pp.131-133
11 Ibid., p.54
12 Ibid., p.77, p.127
13 Ibid., p.99
16 Ibid., p.136
17 Ibid.
Indeed, when in the ‘black sleep’, Indiana chants “we are the children of Kali-ma”\(^1\), affirming that he is a ‘child’ in the ‘home’ of ‘evil’. Short-Round, however, saves Indiana by burning him with fire.\(^2\) While the Thuggee cult sacrifices their victims using fire, their fire is lava, linked to the ‘land’,\(^3\) whereas the fire of Short-Round is on a flaming torch, removed from the ‘land’ and linked to human creativity. Once Indiana as a ‘servant’ is freed from the evil ‘home’ the ‘children’ are soon freed, and the stones returned to the good ‘home’. Thus, the various ‘families’ are reunited, and the ‘land’ is once again fertile.\(^4\) Thus, the secondary treatment of ‘home’ is concerned with ‘hospitality’, ‘land’, ‘shelter’, ‘family’ and, through the Lao Che scenes, ‘death’ and ‘people’.

The primary treatment of ‘home’, however, is concerned with ‘family’. Short-Round, orphaned when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour, was ‘homeless’.\(^5\) Indiana, also estranged from his ‘mother’ and ‘father’, took on Short-Round as his ‘son’. Used to Indiana as his sole ‘parent’, Short-Round attempts to thwart the growing intimacy between his ‘father’ and Willie.\(^6\) Indeed, the ‘father’ and ‘son’ relationship, rather than that of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, is integral to the narrative. When Indiana has been made a ‘servant’ of the evil ‘home’, it is his ‘son’\(^7\) that frees him.\(^8\) Short-Round then saves Indiana again when he attacks the Maharaja, also a ‘servant’ of the Thuggee ‘home’. When Short-Round burns the young ruler, he stops the evil ‘home’ from affecting its ‘king’. Moreover, he stops the Maharaja torturing Indiana with a curious Hindu voodoo doll.\(^9\) Eventually, once the ‘children’ are freed and the village saved, we see Indiana, Willie, and Short-Round hugging like the ‘father’, ‘mother’ and ‘child’ of the nuclear ‘family’.\(^10\)

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\(^1\) Ibid., p.156  
\(^2\) Ibid., pp.169-170  
\(^3\) Ibid., pp.120-121, pp.154-155  
\(^4\) Ibid., pp.212-216  
\(^5\) Ibid., p.74  
\(^6\) Ibid., p.76  
\(^7\) Ibid., p.47  
\(^8\) Ibid., pp.169-170  
\(^9\) Ibid., p.183  
\(^10\) Ibid., pp.214-215
vii. Indiana Jones II

By *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, however, Short-Round and Willie are nowhere to be seen. Instead, Indiana is invading the sacred ‘home’ of South American Indians, stealing a gold icon. He hacks away at the ‘land’,\(^1\) ignores the ‘people’,\(^2\) and begins the destruction of their ‘shelter’.\(^3\) He does not care about the mythological themes that terrify his ‘servants’,\(^4\) but Indiana eventually gains the icon. However, he soon loses it to his competitor, another archaeologist Belloq. Belloq overpowers him because he better understands the ‘people’.\(^5\) Overcoming various dangers of South American ‘land’\(^6\), ‘shelter’\(^7\) and ‘people’\(^8\), Indiana’s ‘servant’ is killed,\(^9\) and Indiana barely escapes with his life, only to confront more dangerous ‘land’ in the form of his pilot’s pet snake, Reggie.\(^10\) Back in his American university, Indiana sells some stolen relics to the museum curator, Marcus Brody.\(^11\) While apparently ‘at home’ again, Indiana seems out of place in the conservative setting.\(^12\) He is soon approached by the American government to recover the ancient Israelites’ Ark of the Covenant, lost somewhere in Egypt.

In order to find the Ark in Egypt, however, Indiana must travel to Nepal. In Nepal Indiana finds Marion Ravenswood, whose archaeologist ‘father’ found the trinket necessary to pinpoint the Ark’s location. Marion, a resentful ex-lover of Jones, links Indiana to the Ark through her ‘father’ and ‘daughter’ relationship, though in her anger, Marion intimates that Indiana violated their ‘home’.\(^13\) Nepal, the ‘land’ of the present ‘home’ of Marion, is itself not ‘hospitable’.\(^14\) Marion, however, provides ‘food’ and ‘shelter’, and has a loveless bond with the ‘people’.\(^15\) In this manner Marion is

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2. Ibid., pp.2-3, pp.7-8
3. Ibid., p.18ff
4. Ibid., pp.2-5, p.8, p.11
5. Ibid., pp.22-23
6. Ibid., p.1, pp.9-10
7. Ibid., pp.9-21
8. Ibid., pp.8-9, p.19, pp.22-25
9. Ibid., p.21
10. Ibid., p.27
11. Ibid., p.38
12. Ibid., p.35
13. Ibid., p.40, p.68
14. Ibid., p.55ff
15. Ibid., pp.64-65, p.67
established as ‘hospitable’ and thus good. While she does not want to leave Nepal, the Nazis arrive. They threaten to torture her, and mistakenly burn down her ‘shelter’. Consequently, Ms. Ravenswood has no ‘family’ or ‘shelter’, is with a loveless ‘people’, and is on ‘land’ that is not ‘hospitable’. The ‘homeless’ Marion is thus free to join Indiana on his quest in Egypt.

It is in Egypt that the secondary treatment of ‘home’ begins. The Ark, which is “not of this earth”\(^2\), has within it the wrath of the Hebrew God. As Indiana says, apparently quoting Moses, with the Ark “your enemies will be scattered and your foes fell before you”\(^3\). It is for this reason that Hitler has shown interest in the Hebraic relic. Indiana, however, as in *Last Crusade*, simply wishes to see the artefact in a museum.\(^4\) Certainly, he is troubled by warnings that the Ark should not be disturbed.\(^5\) Nonetheless, Indiana wants the ‘destination’ of the Covenant far away from its ‘land’ and ‘people’ in Judaea. Indeed, he seems most interested in further scientific research on the Ark.\(^6\) However, in a *denouement* that is as critical of American bureaucracy as it is of Nazi imperialism, the Ark is left with the military.\(^7\) Here, the Ark is stolen from ‘graves’, and estranged from its ‘land’, ‘people’ and ‘origin’. Despite its link to the ‘Divine Home’ of the Hebrews, the Ark is depicted as ‘homeless’, just as is Indiana Jones.

Indeed, it is this state of ‘homelessness’ that concerns the primary treatment of ‘home’ in *Raiders*. With the archaeological piece from Marion, Indiana bonds himself again to the ‘father’, Professor Ravenswood. Marion says angrily that she was a ‘child’ when they were first together.\(^8\) She yells to Indiana that “[i]t was wrong. You knew it.”\(^9\) Thus, by being with the young ‘daughter’ of the ‘father’, Indiana has furthered the ‘defiled’ the ‘family’. He adds incest and perhaps even paedophilia to the divisions between himself and his first ‘father’. Rather than reacting with care, Indiana tells Marion to “shut up and listen”\(^10\), offering her money in return for her help. While

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1. *Ibid.*, pp.75-78

362 4. Superficiality and Symbols of Homelessness
Marion considers this offer, the Nazis arrive and destroy her ‘shelter’. With her ‘father’ killed in an avalanche, that is to say, ‘buried’ alive, there is no ‘family’, ‘land, or ‘people’ to keep Marion at ‘home’. Marion thus refuses Indiana’s offer of money, holding the relic and shouting “I’m your partner!” Certainly, Marion is a kind of tomboy. However, she is better seen as a “tough-tender heroine”. Consequently, she can express her anger physically, but she is more and more soft, feminine and helpless as the story unfolds. Marion thus develops her ‘family’ link to Indiana, and their sense of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ develops as the film progresses.

A similar primary treatment also occurs with Sallah, the Egyptian digger. Sallah treats Indiana like a ‘brother’, showing much ‘hospitality’, and using his ‘children’ to welcome Indiana into his ‘shelter’. The children even call Dr. Jones “Uncle Indy”, further affirming Sallah’s role as ‘brother’.

Consequently, the ‘brother’ and ‘sister’, and ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ bonds are developed. These, in turn, take the role of the missing ‘family’ bond to ‘home’. At the same time, ‘land’, ‘people’, ‘origin’, ‘destination’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’ and even ‘hospitality’, are rejected, violated, or ignored. As with Star Wars, Raiders of the Lost Ark ends only with the nuclear ‘family’.

viii. Indiana Jones III

By Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, we find Dr. Jones at his university, still without ‘wife’ and ‘son’. Again, he is not ‘at home’, even climbing out of a window to get away from his academic duties. However, he is soon approached by Donovan, a rich antiquities collector and philanthropist, who recruits him to search for the Holy Grail.

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1 Ibid., pp.75-77
2 Ibid., p.77
5 Ibid., p.96, pp.121-122, p.172
7 Ibid., pp.85-87, p.9
8 Ibid., p.85
9 Ibid., ~pp.104-105
10 Ibid., p.181
Donovan describes the Grail as the secret of eternal life.1 Indiana, showing the same
cynicism and lack of faith from Raiders and Temple of Doom, dismisses Donovan’s
accounts as “bedtime stories”2, and the Grail as “an old man’s dream.”3 In this manner,
Indiana rejects the offer, saying that his ‘father’ would be a better choice. Donovan
then tells Indiana that his ‘father’, Henry Jones, was working on the project, and has
gone missing.4 When Indiana arrives at the ‘shelter’ of his ‘father’, Marcus Brody says
“[y]our father and I have been friends since time began. I’ve watched you grow up,
Indy. And I’ve watched you grow apart. […] I’ve never seen you this worried about
him before.”5 Here, the division in ‘home’ between ‘father’ and ‘son’ is seen in the
danger to Henry’s life. This life is then linked to the quest for the Holy Grail.6 In this
manner, the primary and secondary treatments of ‘home’ are linked, and the quest for
the Holy Grail becomes a development of the relationship between ‘father’ and ‘son’.

Donovan, however, is shown to be a Nazi sympathiser.7 Consequently, his view of the
Grail as a source of eternal life is ‘stained’. Brody, on the other hand, who is another
‘father’, gives us another view of the Grail. Brody explains that the “search for the Cup
of Christ is the search for the divine in all of us.”8 In this manner, the divine
immortality of the Christian ‘Heavenly Kingdom’ is rejected in favour of divine
mortality.

By shooting Henry, Donovan uses this mortality to force Indiana into undertaking the
final tests of the Grail. This, in turn, bonds the Grail to the ‘father’ and ‘son’
relationship, and to the ‘death’ of the ‘father’.9 In order to pass the tests, Indiana must
display penitence, adhere to the Word of God and undertake a leap of faith.10 The final
test is particularly important, because it overturns the cynicism and irreligiosity of
Indiana’s past. His ‘father’ yells out to him “you must believe, boy, you

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1 Ibid., p.9
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.10
5 Ibid., p.11
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p.48, pp.56-57
8 Ibid., p.51
By taking the leap of faith, Indiana becomes closer to the Grail, and thus closer to his ‘father’. This closeness is the finale in a series of developments, each bringing the ‘father’ and ‘son’ together in their quest. Thus, as the Holy Grail is left in its ‘shelter’, near to its ‘origins’ in ‘land’ and ‘people’, Marcus Brody’s description of the Cup of Christ is vindicated. The movie ends not with a religious eschatology, but with the light humour of ‘family’ squabbles between ‘father’ and ‘son’ and the ‘brother’ Sallah. Therefore, by searching for the Christian Grail, the ‘son’ has been reunited with the ‘father’, but the faith of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom’ is irrelevant. More relevant, of course, is the secular morality of the white, affluent, middle-class ‘family’.

ix. Postmodernity, Museums and Gestell

As with Star Wars, the Indiana Jones cycle sees ‘home’ almost entirely as ‘family’. This ‘family’, in turn, is one of ‘father’ and ‘son’. As Lucas states, this “is about a father and son finding one another, rather than going after some specific thing. They find the Grail in each other.” Indeed, even the movement from Temple of Doom’s paganism, to Raiders’ Judaism, to Last Crusade’s Christianity parallels Indiana’s eventual unification with his deeply Christian ‘father’. Other elements of ‘home’ do not fare so well. ‘Land’, for instance, is dangerous, or not ‘hospitable’. Similarly, ‘grave’ is only used unnaturally, and ‘people’, ‘birthplace’ and ‘hospitality’ are absent or incidental. Furthermore, the ‘origin’ of a ‘people’ and its culture are almost always bonded to the ‘destination’ of the museum.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., pp.60-61
3 Ibid.
The museum, in turn, is a place where the conflict of other times and places can be, as Marcuse argues, made ‘safe’ for superficial moderns. Museums, in the this sense, are another form of superficial rejection, this time of conflict. Moreover, as Baudrillard has argued, this ‘museum’ mindset is a kind of ‘recycling’. As he puts it, “we witness the historical disintegration of certain structures which in a sense celebrate, under the sign of consumption, their real disappearance as well as their farcical resurrection.”

Similarly, Marxist geographer David Harvey argues that this obsession with the museum is associated with the attempt to preserve or create ‘dead’ identity in contemporary modernity. What each of these accounts has in common is the argument that our time is shallow, fragmented, and yet beset by the logic of capitalist gestell. It is Harvey that gives the best general account.

For Harvey, the capitalist agenda of perpetual growth has combined with the ‘machine of modernity’ that developed in the time of Faust. This, in turn, has increased the amount of flux, uncertainty and unpredictability in the world. These are associated with postmodernity, and were heralded most prominently by the rise of Reaganism in the United States, a political theme mentioned often in discussions of Lucas and Spielberg. Rather than the works of the latter auteurs, Harvey uses Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner as an example of this postmodern condition, extensively characterised by “fragmentation and ephemerality”. Blade Runner, in turn, influenced the work of William Gibson, who created a critical vision of postmodernity not unlike Baudrillard’s. Not coincidentally, Blade Runner is described by Lev as being opposed to stories such as Star Wars and Indiana Jones, which represent “a return

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4 Ibid., p.16
5 Ibid., pp.104-112, pp.284-331, and passim
6 Ibid., pp.166-168, pp.329-331
to…traditional morality.”1 The ‘return’ of these films is a response to the same forces of ephemerality and flux that have reduced ‘home’ to ‘family’.

However, we should not see Star Wars and Indiana Jones as entirely characterised by ‘traditional morality’, but not postmodernity. As Gunden notes, these films are also permeated by the mentality of ‘cultural recycling’ indicative of postmodernity.2 Even Spielberg’s biographer, John Baxter, whose prose is light on cultural critique, notes “a sort of Third World theme park”3 mindset in Indiana Jones. Authentic traditions are rebuilt according to the often parochial tastes of popular culture.4 Here, we see the superficial rejection of museums and the superficial appropriation of commodity culture. This is also noted by Harvey, whose account of the postmodern ‘search for roots’ describes both Spielberg and Jasmuheen. As he puts it, “tradition is now often preserved by being commodified and marketed. The search for roots ends up at worst being produced and marketed as an image, as a simulacrum or pastiche.”5 Consequently, the museum mindset of Indiana Jones, the postmodern ‘recycling’ of Spielberg and Lucas and the commodifying ‘quantum karma’ of many New Agers, are ultimately responses to the same ephemerality and flux of contemporary postmodernity.6 Indeed, as we saw earlier,7 the corruption of Australian universities is also associated with cultural ephemerality, post-Fordism and the post-Keynesianism of neo-liberalism. These universities are now being destroyed by Gestell, commodification and superficiality. Instead of the traditional guilds of Bologna or Padua, we have the Virtual University.1

All of these destructive themes are associated in our time with postmodernity. For such people, ‘home’ qua ‘family’ is a response to ‘homelessness’ itself, or a ‘home’ that is

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5 Harvey, D. (1997), The Condition of Postmodernity, Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.303
7 See pp.243-248, above.
characterised by danger, uncertainty and fear. Home is no longer seen in *The Odyssey*, but in *The Trial*, *The Outsider*, or the recent *Atomised*.\(^2\) Certainly, late modernity is not the first period to be characterised by uncertainty and so forth. As we saw in Shakespeare, uncertainty and flux also characterised the Renaissance, a fact that Harvey acknowledges.\(^3\) Indeed, we should not doubt that in times of uncertainty, including the time of Shakespeare, “the desire for stable values leads to a heightened emphasis upon the authority of basic institutions – the family, religion, the state.”\(^4\) Shakespeare, for instance, responded to his time with recapitulation and the richness of ‘home’, perhaps even with the notion of British nationhood with a national theatre.\(^5\) Nationhood, however, is another victim of *Indiana Jones*’ postmodernity,\(^6\) along with the very idea of a unifying metanarrative.\(^7\) Rather than redeveloping the ‘home’ of a narrative World, we grasp for ‘safe’ museums and the *bourgeois* ‘family’.

**x. Homelessness and the Protean Man**

Far removed from the Shakespearian World, then, is our modern Western culture. This culture is characterised by egotism, hedonism and historical ignorance.\(^8\) Each of these is associated with estrangement from the World and from Being itself. Having looking into superficiality and its relationship to *Gestell*, this should not surprise us. The modernity of Spielberg and Lucas is characterised by “increasing penetration of technological rationality, of commodification and market values, and capitalist

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1 See p.244, above.
accumulation into… the ‘life world’…together with time-space compression”¹. Late modernity has thus threatened the dwelling inherent in ‘home’. Heidegger, as we saw, comes to a similar conclusion. He writes that “the proper plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses.”² Rather, the plight of dwelling lies in being estranged from ‘home’; from questions of a World’s concern for Being. Homelessness is thus “the abandonment of Being by beings. […] Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought.”³ We are trapped in the high end of Gelernter’s spectrum, though without the intellectual rigour that this implies. When this becomes the universal state of Western humanity, according to Heidegger, we are in a time of ‘the darkening’.⁴ Like Harvey, Heidegger associates this era with space-time compression and commodification.⁵ Here, again, is Gestell.

Not coincidentally, late modern Gestell is also associated with the rise of an international bourgeoisie, restlessly ‘at home’ everywhere and nowhere.⁶ This seems to have been prevalent as early as the nineteen-twenties when Fitzgerald wrote The Great Gatsby,⁷ and Heidegger Being and Time. Fitzgerald depicts a modern world of commodified selves and language,⁸ alienation from community and tradition,⁹ and distorted placelessness.¹⁰ Heidegger gives an account of ‘das Man’.¹¹ Of course, das Man is associated with the a priori ontology of Dasein, but in his account of Western society and later work, there does seem to be something ‘modern’ in Heidegger’s work. Most modern people, and those under the sway of their hegemony, are marked by what Heidegger prophetically describes as ‘novelty’. They wish to ‘bring things close’ qua commodities. However, they do not want to understand these ‘things’, but “just to see

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⁶ Gare, A. (1995), Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, Routledge, London, pp.8-12
⁸ Berman, R. (1996), The Great Gatsby and Modern Times, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, pp.6-8, p.64, pp.61ff
⁹ Ibid., p.11
¹⁰ Ibid., pp.41-42, pp.51-53, p.63, pp.85-106
in order to see.’”¹ Baudrillard describes the same thing as ‘curiosity’.² As many of the bourgeoisie have embraced the “placeless logic of an internationalised economy enacted by means of information flows,”³ this is hardly surprising. Advertising and the media combine with new technologies to ‘enframe’ all places near and far. Here, nothing is ‘closed off’ for us except ‘home’ itself, and we find ourselves contentedly “never dwelling anywhere”⁴. This, in turn, means that all the ‘libidinous’ practices that grounded our creative symbols have themselves been hollowed out. Consequently, the modern age is one of superficiality.

However, ‘early moderns’ Jay Gatsby, Daisy and the ‘they’ of das Man took up only one existentiell ‘choice’, however shallow this ‘choice’ may have been. This was a kind of Fordist consumption, prefaced on durability, homogeneity and conformity.⁵ We in the more ‘homeless’ postmodern age have no such ‘constancy’. While creative or disciplined moderns and pre-moderns could move from ennui to authenticity or depth, our late-modern world simply embraces flux, inauthenticity and surfaces.⁶ We have moved from the superficial rejection of existentiell depth per se, to fully-fledged ontic and existentiell superficial appropriation, with all the postmodern characteristics that this suggests. Our consumption of personas is post-Fordist, characterised by continual flux, uncertainty and fragmentation, in an effort to embrace the ‘logic’ of Gestell. In Bauman’s brilliant terms, we are ‘homeless tourists’ who ‘switch on and off’ our relations with the world,⁷ just as we would control our hotel’s air conditioning. In this sense, ‘homelessness’ is linked to the rise of what Lifton calls the ‘Protean man’, who placates ‘homelessness’ by consuming and discarding personality after personality.⁸ We have seen similar behaviour with superficial appropriation, where ancient words and clothes are bought and sold with a frantic yearning for lost roots. For Proteus, ‘things’

¹ Ibid., p.216  
are near, but not because they are Being-alongside-in-the-World. These ‘things’ are consumed as entertainment in a vain attempt to replace the death of “key organisational symbols”\(^1\), such as those of ‘home’, and Dasein in this ‘home’. In our World, they serve as ontological ‘safety blankets’ for those to whom ‘family’ is the only ‘home’ left, or for those without even ‘family’.

What Spielberg and Lucas show us, then, is that modernity’s ‘darkening’ lies in the fact that we are ‘homeless’ from our own creative, open-ended nature, and thus from Being itself. In the face of our Protean society, we have sweetened this ‘homelessness’ with the ‘sugar-pill’ of the restless bourgeois ‘family’.

**xi. Bourgeois Families and Bourgeois Homelessness**

Moreover, this ‘family’ is of a particular type. As Lakoff has argued, conservative America is grounded in a ‘family’ metaphor of the ‘Strong Father’.\(^2\) This ‘father’, of course, is the punishing, disciplining, authority figure in the face of a terrifying modernity. Here, morality is strength, independence, self-interest and asceticism, the very characteristics of Indiana Jones and the Jedi. Similarly, in an observation that could equally apply to the work of George Lucas, Kolker writes that in the Spielberg films many “individual acts are done in the service of returning or bringing the self and the world to a state of calm protected by a strong, patriarchal force.”\(^3\) This, as Engels noted some time ago, is partly a function of capitalism, which has traditionally affirmed the patriarchal family model.\(^4\) Therefore, as opposed to the Shakespearian Renaissance, the quest for ‘basic institutions’ in the face of our contemporary Western ‘homelessness’ has reduced ‘home’ to a white, bourgeois ‘family’, headed by the ‘father’. Perhaps the significance of the ‘father’ in our ‘home’ is that we feel we have

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4. Engels, F. (1940), *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, pp.58-61. This is not to say that there have been many matriarchal societies. Rather, we should simply note the capitalist familial division of labour, and the role this played in the development of the bourgeois nuclear family. While the men laboured, the women performed unpaid labour and produced more reserve labour.
not yet developed our egos, suppressed our id, and introjected a super-ego. In this way, the ‘father’ becomes a kind of ‘holy grail’ to be introjected to ensure maturity or a life without primal guilt. Certainly, as Mumford writes of our individualistic, mechanistic suburban life, it seems a “childish view of the world, in which reality was sacrificed to the pleasure principle.” In any case, contemporary anthropology finds that ‘home’ is virtually identical to this nuclear ‘family’. For some, of course, this ‘family’ and ‘shelter’ is a prison, and ‘home’ is the street. Here, still, home is only in homelessness. In either case, the dream of the bourgeois ‘family’ is all there is left.

While some meaningful practices remain undistorted by capitalist Gestell, they are characterised by the same parochialism of ‘home’ as Indiana Jones and Star Wars. This is further confirmed by the Australian film about ‘home’, The Castle, Spielberg’s recent AI, and the ‘environmental’ science-fiction film, K-PAX. In each case, ‘family’ is the salve for our lost World.

Furthermore, against the collaborative effort of those who would build and share a polis, this ‘family’ is often merely a private refuge for the Faustian egoistic individual. As Engels wrote many years ago, “modern society is a mass composed solely of individual families as its molecules.” With the increasing spread of capitalism and mechanistic materialism, this characterisation of ‘family’ has grown more potent, if not always, as in the case of Thatcher, for the right reasons. Of course, this is not to ignore the internal reorganisation of the family unit as the composition of the labour force changes. However, we may still note the family as a basic capitalist unit, particularly in its isolated, ‘nuclear’ form. As Marx writes of the capitalist worker, “[h]e is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home.” ‘Home’ is nothing

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1 Marcuse, H. (1972), One Dimensional Man, Abacus, London, pp.70-72
5 See Appendix VIII, p.426
8 Engels, F. (1940), The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p.61
10 Ibid., p.105
more than ‘house’, perhaps inclusive of ‘wife’ and ‘children’ – all else is dead, dangerous, or irrelevant.

For those of us characterised by the egoistic individualism of *Faust* and the postmodern confusion of *Indiana Jones* and *Star Wars*, this ‘family’ is a kind of ‘shelter’ for self-interest. As the world – controllable or dangerous – becomes meaningless or unpredictable, inwardness becomes valorised. The ‘family’ then becomes one site for a superficial narcissistic self-obsession. Alternatively, it is the sole place of authenticity, or at least control. We simply “flee, and to find in the private realms of life, especially in the family, some principle of order in the perception of personality.” This would certainly make sense of the personal eccentricity valorised in *The Castle*. Against the ‘selfless maelstrom’ of modern life, the Faustian individual attempts to find authentic ‘personality’ in the discrete privacy of immediate kin. Here, “man…only feels himself freely active in his most animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up”. Consequently, the house is no longer our ‘place in the world’, but is tied up with mere ‘necessity’; with notions of labour, private property, wealth and commodity consumption. Free time, leisure and so forth, all cease to be tied to our human creativity. These are not the meaningful practices affirmed by MacIntyre, or the ‘dwelling’ of Heidegger. Rather, they entail further commodity consumption, and thus the ‘hollowing out’ of these practices and their symbols.

This consumption, whether of words, automobiles, or television sets, is also characterised by continually heightening speed, ‘chatter’ and commodity obsolescence. We all need ‘down time’ from this, so we soon retire to our alienated ‘shelters’, further developing the urge to spend, consume and ‘play’. Indeed, for those ‘vagabonds’ who

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3 See Appendix VIII, p.426
6 See pp.300-305, above.
are not ‘tourists’, there is only the chance to cling grimly to some foreign place before being moved on again. In both cases, though, ‘home’ comes to be a prison or self-imposed solitary-confinement. This, in turn, requires constant distraction. We see in the suburban ‘home’ what Mumford calls ‘families in space’, a sad depiction of “an encapsulated life, spent more and more either in a motor car or within the cabin of darkness before a television set.” In the wake of the terrorist attacks of the eleventh of September, this ‘in house’ syndrome has apparently grown stronger. ‘Family’ has become the soft, privative, ‘warm and fuzzy’ selling-point for the brand names. ‘Family’, in this sense, is not a solution for egotism, hedonism and the historical depthlessness of Gestell. It is a private forum for this very same egotism, hedonism and depthlessness.

xii. Home and Homelessness

Walked out this morning
Can’t believe what I saw
A hundred billion bottles
Washed up on the shore
Seems I’m not alone in being alone
A hundred million castaways
Looking for a home

Sting, ‘Message in a Bottle’

We have attempted to further our characterisation of superficiality by investigating the symbols of ‘home’ in canonical texts of Western culture. To begin, our analysis of the works of Homer proposed that ‘home’ can be understood as a unified structure of symbols that is expressed in ways analogous to healthy psychological complexes. When we are creatively engaged with a meaningful cultural tradition, we cathect the people Being-with and objects being-alongside us in the World; qua Being, they are

5 Bellafonte, G. (13/2/02), ‘Hello, mellow advertisements’, The Age, THE CULTURE, p.5
revealed and then permeated with libido. In this sense, we do not imbue a meaningless world with Freudian libido, but draw on the self-rising of physis to collaboratively create a World within which we find meaning.¹ Moreover, through poiēsis we express symbols that metaphorically resemble these people or objects, and metonymically allude to the ‘major premises’² of our tradition. These symbols, in turn, are also cathected, so that they are powerful forces of motivation that well up from our shared cultural narrative. In the Iliad, for example, the symbols of ‘land’ and ‘family’ are used to spur on the men to fight, or to taunt them. Similarly, in the Tanak or New Testament, all the symbols of ‘home’ are drawn upon to depict sorrow and triumph; to warn, commiserate and inspire. Even in Faust, where the egoistic individual is primary, we see the sporadic valorisation of the symbols of ‘home’, and the power inherent in the various expressions of ‘family’, ‘land’, ‘people’, ‘birthplace’ and ‘grave’. For these historical peoples, the cohesion of their narrative tradition afforded them certainty, security, inspiration and moral will. While individuals may have sometimes lacked the capacity to undertake ethical thought and practice, the people as a whole were characterised by an empowering relation to their own place and heritage, and to one another. Consequently, presented with alternative visions of life associated with powerful symbols, these people – Hellenised Jews and the Kingdom of God, for example – were able to overcome their immediate concerns and undertake ethical practice in accordance with the utopian visions presented. In the most basic sense, they had a creative relation to the world, and this relation was inspiring.

This analysis accords with the early articulation of the narrative World, and concomitant notions of freedom, justice and power. Human nature was characterised as a creative, open-ended process of cultural development, where the World is revealed by collaborative labour and poiēsis. Moreover, freedom was associated with the capacity of people and peoples to engage with their cultural traditions and contribute to their self-creation. In this sense, symbols are indicative of the free collaborative self-creation of historical peoples. By articulating symbols as expressions of metonymic and metaphorical poiēsis, and by grounding this in the shared practices of a tradition, this self-creation was also integrated with the dynamics of libido and cathexis. This, in turn,

¹ See p.49, p.279, pp.301-305, above.
accords with the analysis of power, as power for Bourdieu can be reconceptualised as the cathexis of objects, people and relations indicative of the ‘state of play’ within the reality of the narrative tradition. Consequently, collaboratively developing power and freedom within a shared narrative is inclusive of the poiēsis associated with the revealing of symbols, and the cathexis of these symbols in accordance with the power-relations of the narrative World. By creatively engaging with their narrative tradition people are making themselves ‘at home’ in a world suffused with creative power, inspiration and the potential for justice and freedom. Moreover, by doing this they continue to perpetuate and develop the conditions for moral strength, as they are cathecting the World wherein they think and act. In the Worlds of Homeric Greece, Biblical Palestine, Renaissance England, and even Goethe’s early modernity, we see people internalising these rich narrative traditions, and contributing to them within, and with, powerful symbols of ‘home’. This is what it means to be ‘at home’

In contrast to this, it is clear that our late modern ‘home’ lacks these inspiring relations. In the popular texts of Indiana Jones and Star Wars, the symbols of ‘home’ are rarely valorised, if they appear at all. When they do appear, such as with the ‘land’ and ‘people’ of Naboo in Star Wars, they are invariably articulated in relation to peripheral characters. In Star Wars ‘home’ is articulated mystically through the Force as nowhere and everywhere, though ‘home’ is eventually associated with the bourgeois ‘family’, and particularly ‘father’ and ‘son’. Indiana Jones depicts a world wherein all symbols of ‘home’ are threatening obstacles to be overcome, or commodities to be traded. Again, ‘home’ is eventually retained with the ‘family’ relationship between ‘father’ and ‘son’. The creative relations characteristic of the earlier pre-modern and early-modern texts have therefore been diminished, or have ceased to be cathected. In their place is a narrow focus on the ‘family’, a symbol grounded in the conservatism and extreme capitalist Epicureanism of Reaganite America. More specifically, ‘family’ no longer entails an extended family and their shared places and practices, or alludes to other symbols such as ‘land’, ‘hospitality’, ‘birthplace’ or ‘grave’. ‘Family’ is merely the discrete nuclear productive and consumptive unit of the bourgeoisie. This has become the sole cathected symbol of ‘home’, so that all authenticity and leisure time concerns the practices of production and consumption relevant to the immediate household.

1 See pp.87-91, above.
These practices, far from creatively contributing to our cultural heritage, exacerbate the flux and uncertainty associated with capitalist Gestell. This is what it means to be ‘homeless’.

xiii. Superficiality, Homelessness and Akrasia

It is proposed that this analysis of ‘homelessness’ further clarifies the depiction of superficiality articulated earlier, particularly that of akrasia. The egoism of modern Epicureanism, for example, is not simply a matter of callous indifference or consumption. Granted, the egoistic commodification of those involved in superficial appropriation is an expression of the ‘logic’ of technological rationality and self-gratification, grounded in the ennui engendered by cultural alienation. However, the foregoing analysis of symbols proposes that this Epicureanism is also expressed as the privative individualism of the modern ‘family’, which is itself a conservative response to the confusion and uncertainty engendered by capitalist Gestell. While people may care for their immediate kin, the greater goods associated with the narrative practices of land, people and history are seemingly devalued.

More importantly, this ‘homelessness’ is also central to the phenomenon of akrasia. It was earlier argued that the conditions for justice are a cohesive narrative tradition, and a creative engagement with this tradition. Drawing on the work of Aristotle, it was further argued that akrasia arises wherever this cohesion and engagement is lacking, as people are estranged from the cultural integrity required for an active moral will. They are unable to act with confidence, or make sense of the context for such action.

With the notion of ‘home’ and concomitant analyses of its symbolism, this articulation of akrasia was reconceptualised. By creatively engaging with the World, it was proposed that we are able to reveal and cathect symbols, suffusing them with libido.¹ These symbols, in turn, work within narrative traditions to inspire or motivate ethical will, what Aristotle would call enkrateia. The Hellenised Jews of the New Testament, for example, found themselves in a cultural tradition suffused with significance and inspiration. As these Jews developed early Christianity, the symbols of ‘home’ were

¹ See p.49, p.279, pp.300-305, above.
continually drawn upon to encourage their narrative practices, the Hebrew symbols themselves becoming revivified in the process. As a people, the Christians could therefore not regress into akrasia, because they participated in a coherent tradition permeated by symbols of ‘home’ that invigorated their capacity for action. Put simply, the Christians were ‘at home’ in the World, and were thus motivated to protect, promote and develop this ‘home’.

It is proposed that late modern ‘homelessness’ – and thus superficiality – distorts these symbolic relations, resulting in akrasia. Those who are ‘homeless’ do not transform libido by investing in the objects, object-relations and people revealed by poiēsis in the context of a cohesive narrative tradition. Rather, they cathect the ‘things’ that result from the Epicurean mechanistic and individualistic abstraction of the world. In late modernity, we find a world of ‘things’ invested with libido – fetishised – for the purposes of self-gratification. Superficial appropriation, for example, takes the place of meaningful creativity, providing individual gratification without the sustained creative practices necessary to engage with, and develop, a narrative tradition. As a result, the inspiring symbols investigated in the bibles or Shakespeare have declined in favour of the inchoate words of the New Age, or the precisely controlled signs of the corporate world. In this climate, utopian visions like the Chorus are not abjured simply because they are apprehended as intellectually complex or impractical. Rather, they are disavowed because the inspiring power indicative of sustained creativity has waned in favour of instant gratification through commodities. As a result, we not only lack the coherence required by Aristotelian ethics, but also the moral will to act in accordance with such an ethics. ‘Homelessness’ thus engenders communal akrasia.

In addition to this, we also frequently lack the capacity to properly communicate. Firstly, the commodification of language explored in the analysis of superficial appropriation renders it a tool for manipulation, or a vague bearer of heteronomous capital. This, combined with semiotic pollution, makes it increasingly difficult to speak and be heard. Secondly, other signifiers such as symbols are divested of their meaning and power so that they no longer inspire people to begin discussing justice, freedom or creativity, or to act in accordance with the conclusions of these discussions. Similarly, words including ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ are rendered incomprehensible and weak as the practices associated with the narrative traditions wherein these words have
meaning are corrupted. While the Aristotelian tradition contends that language is essential to a community and its creative development, late modernity is apparently losing the capacity for reasoned speech.

It is argued that this, combined with the foregoing account of akrasia, further elucidates the present malaise of universities. While the historical analysis of these institutions maintained that they have frequently been corrupted by external exigencies or internal orthodoxy, in late modernity universities have themselves been subsumed into the ‘logic’ of Gestell. This has engendered similar superficiality to that explored in the analyses of superficial appropriation, as was revealed in the discussion of ‘virtual universities’ and the commodification of knowledge. However, this investigation of symbols also raises the possibility that academics – like many in late modernity – are also afflicted by the communal akrasia associated with the withdrawal of libido from the World, and the more general loss of narrative integrity engendered by mechanistic, individualistic and ahistorical metaphysics. The contemporary failure of the Chorus in our educational facilities may be grounded in the same processes of disenchantment and commodification as superficiality in popular culture.

Consequently, ‘homelessness’ means that people are rarely in a position to overcome the immediate concerns of day to day capitalist production and consumption with a broader concern for distant places, people or times. Many remain driven by matters of individual satisfaction, indifferent to questions of justice or freedom, particularly insofar as these require narrative traditions to be rendered sensible, and symbols of ‘home’ to be acted upon. In this sense, superficiality not only hollows out and commodifies our narrative traditions as the ‘logic’ of shallow mechanism is internalised, but it also undermines the very conditions wherein alternatives to Epicureanism can be imaginatively developed and taken up.

What are required, then, are suggestions regarding the possibilities for thought and practice open to those who wish to abjure this malaise of modern Epicureanism, and uphold the worldview of the Aristotelian tradition. To this end, we will speculate briefly on the kinds of knowledge required to overcome superficiality without falling victim to its various pitfalls. The aim of the succeeding section is thus not to rigorously articulate every form of possible avenue for cultural development, but rather to broadly
suggest the forms of wisdom required to begin the task of reclaiming our creative nature. Following these considerations, we shall turn to the conclusion.
5. OVERCOMING SUPERFICIALITY: SPECULATION ON FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The goal of The Silent Chorus has not been to articulate instrumental mechanisms designed to immediately alter the course of our civilisation. Rather, it has been to give a theoretical and analytical account of superficiality in Western culture. It is essential to grasp the defects of the past and present before beginning the task of speculating on how to develop the future. Of all the dangers facing society, superficiality is characterised by its capacity to distort, neutralise and assimilate such projects. Consequently, it is imperative to recognise its various forms before attempting to overcome it, and we have devoted much space to this task.

Nonetheless, in the following section we shall briefly outline some possibilities for the creative development of ‘home’ in a superficial world, before our final conclusion in the closing chapter. Following our earlier accounts of poiēsis and phronēsis as forms of knowledge relevant to creativity, we shall examine more closely the roles that these may play. Moreover, we shall also highlight the importance of epistēmē, the knowledge associated with systematic, ‘scientific’ thought, and the ways in which these three forms of knowledge could be integrated. It will be argued that these forms of knowledge, properly integrated, could begin the task of reclaiming our creative nature while abjuring the worst aspects of superficiality.

Indeed, it is precisely the integration of these forms of knowledge that avoids many of the defects of modern Epicureanism. For example, if poiēsis is to reveal Being in such a way that our World is rearticulated, it cannot solely be a matter of individual self-gratification. Poetry, for example, is a form of poiēsis that Heidegger valorises, and it has been argued that this craft can harbour some revolutionary potential.1 Nonetheless, if poetry is simply a matter of indulgence, whimsy or ‘play’, it will be reassimilated into capitalism as a form of entertainment or self-interested catharsis with little liberatory potential.1

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1 See pp.34-38, pp.104-115 and passim, above
Similarly, *phronēsis* has been articulated as an essential element in the development of narrative communities, associated with the capacity to collaborate in political contexts and develop an ethical ‘know-how’. By focusing too narrowly on *poiēsis*, Heidegger did not adequately conceptualise the role of *phronēsis* in the development of just and free communities. However, if *phronēsis* is not integrated with an imaginative capacity, it will remain an unreflexive aristocratic ‘knack’ that perpetuates the narrative tradition without critically reflecting on its various prejudices. In this sense, *phronēsis* must be integrated with *poiēsis*, so that the capacity to undertake political collaboration serves to facilitate ends – utopian or otherwise – other than those that unquestioningly serve the *status quo*. We require a tacit know-how inherited and developed in community life to facilitate social ends, and also the creative capacity associated with our reflexive imagination.

*Poiēsis* and *phronēsis*, in turn, must be grounded in an alternative metaphysics to that of Epicureanism. The articulation of the Aristotelian tradition, and the subsequent notions of the narrative World and Chorus, require a metaphysics and science capable of rigorously clarifying the world wherein any projects could possibly be developed. Following Aristotle, this can be articulated in terms of an *epistēmē*, a set of abstract principles that attempt to clarify the nature of the world. By drawing on ‘process’ philosophy, for example, it has been argued that it is possible to reconceptualise Being in terms of *physis*. *Physis* enables us to overcome the static ‘thing’ mentality of Epicureanism, oppose mechanism and understand *poiēsis* in terms of the revealing of Being. Moreover, it grounds narratives in a metaphysics appropriate to their emphasis on stable change and creativity. Without an appropriate *epistēmē*, any attempts to reclaim our creative nature will lack the rigour and clarity afforded by a systematic appraisal of the nature of the world.

With *poiēsis*, *phronēsis* and *epistēmē*, we shall propose some ways to begin this task of reclamation. We must work with others to forge new poetics of place, people and history. At the same time we must develop a radical new metaphysical schema to do

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2 See pp.66-68, above.
4 See p.5, p.30, pp.54-77
justice to the world. In what follows, some speculative suggestions for the task of ‘rebuilding home’ in accordance with this will be proferred. We shall articulate firstly the details of *poiēsis*, then turn to *phronēsis* and then give an account of *epistēmē*. Lastly, these shall be briefly presented in a form that integrates each into a single project. Being as it is a final speculative suggestion, this should not be taken as a systematic account of community development. Rather it is imaginative and heuristic in tone. It is an attempt to demonstrate the ways in which the various forms of knowledge – *poiēsis*, *phronēsis* and *epistēmē* – could be integrated, and to begin the task of considering the initial forms in which future narrative traditions could realise themselves.

### i. *Poiēsis* and Creativity

If mortals dwell in that they save the earth and if poetry is the original admission of dwelling, then poetry is the place where we save the earth.

- Jonathan Bate, *The Song of the Earth*, p.283

“If poetry cannot absolve us” – he whispered to himself – “then let’s not expect mercy from anywhere.”

- Yannis Ritsos, ‘The Poet’s Space’, p.131

We have seen how we ‘struggle’ with nature and one another to form communities.¹ Not only does our creative labour reveal nature, but it also reveals Being and, in doing so, reveals *Dasein*.² By ‘making’ the world we ‘make’ ourselves. We do this together, and alongside the ‘things’ with us in the world. In doing so, we create stories of peoples, people, ‘things’ and places. Finding ourselves thrown in these stories, we develop and redevelop them and ourselves. We develop our storied lives, and if these are deep and wide, they are also rich stories of ‘home’.³ In this sense, we have already seen how to ‘make’ ourselves ‘at home’ through *poiēsis*.

¹ See pp.20-27, p.68, above.
² See p.36, above.
³ See p.304, above.
This *poiēsis* is not the mediocrity of the apolitical poetaster, or the harmless fantasy of idle romantics. It is not the tired ‘life of the mind’, the mantra of the defeated academic. Just as physicist Fritjof Capra sees the ‘cosmic dance of energy’ in a beach,\(^1\) so too must we begin to see ‘home’ in our world. As Bachelard writes, the “image is created through co-operation between real and unreal”\(^2\), and if any ‘thing’ is “a living value, it must integrate an element of unreality.”\(^3\) This image is not a mere sense impression, but a symbolic creation of the World. What we see and hear, as Ricoeur writes, “merely serves as a vehicle and as material for the verbal power whose true dimension is given to us by the oneiric and the cosmic. […] The] word-image, which runs through the representation-image, is symbolism.”\(^4\) It is possible for us to imagine, in the least idealist sense of the word, a World. In Bachelard’s *The Poetics of Space*, for instance, we see imaginative creation of cellars that dwell in the depths of familiar ‘earth’;\(^5\) attics that touch the fabric of heaven;\(^6\) creative dialectics between a house and universe;\(^7\) houses that are nests, sheltering and protecting one’s confident potential;\(^8\) flowers that are gifts from the world;\(^9\) shells that are Nature’s first attempts at human form;\(^10\) words that are little houses, with pedantic philosophers only living on the ground floor;\(^11\) and Being that is round.\(^12\)

Whether in dreams, daydreams, or myths, this is a form of *poiēsis* that reworks our disenchantment so that it is not destructive. As Ricoeur writes, this imagination is one “through which fantasies are interpreted symbolically, [that] arises from the very nature of the fantasies insofar as they speak of the lost origin, of the lost archaic object, of the lack inherent in desire”\(^13\). Put simply, in a world devoid of creative significance, we

\(^1\) See Capra, F. (1991), *The Tao of Physics*, Flamingo Books, London, p.11. The passage reads: “As I sat on the beach my former experiences [of physics] came to life; I ‘saw’ cascades of energy coming down from outer space, in which particles were created and destroyed in rhythmic pulses; I ‘saw’ the atoms of the elements and those of my body participating in this cosmic dance of energy; I felt its rhythm and I ‘heard’ its sound….”


\(^3\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid., pp.45-47

\(^8\) Ibid., pp.103-104

\(^9\) Ibid., p.111

\(^10\) Ibid., p.113

\(^11\) Ibid., p.146

\(^12\) Ibid., p.232, pp.239-241

desire what we lack. If this desire is guided toward *poiēsis*, our ‘homelessness’ may allow us to transcend past injustices and redevelop our narrative traditions in accordance with bold new visions of reality. This, in turn, reveals the openness, the emptiness and the hope inherent in our own lost ‘home’.\(^1\) Similarly, Bakhtin sees in ‘homelessness’ a ‘rupture’ akin to the *epoché*,\(^2\) though this has more in common with our marginalised Dionysian Chorus than with the ‘rootlessness’ of an entire World.\(^3\) In this sense, while ‘homelessness’ is the corruption of our nature, it remains our historical condition, and we must therefore develop strategies that attempt to overcome it from within. If what remains is the desire for something more than the relentless commodification of capitalist *Gestell*, then there is the opportunity to draw on this desire creatively.

This upholds our creative relation to Being, while not uncritically accepting the Epicurean exigencies of the present. At the very least, it is an opportunity to uphold the potential of *poiēsis*. As was argued earlier,\(^4\) this *poiēsis* is not to be conflated with poetry. Any craft that reveals Being and, in so doing, simultaneously upholds our creative nature and allows the Being of beings to rise in themselves is *poiēsis*. However, insofar as poetry is a form of *poiēsis* – and, for Heidegger,\(^5\) the primordial form – then poetry may ‘make’ ourselves ‘at home’.

‘Land’, for example, is marginalised in our culture, and this was revealed in the symbols of *Indiana Jones* and *Star Wars*. However, ‘land’ can be symbolically revealed to each of us through the *poiēsis* of ecological poetry and literature. Outside my study is a huge elm tree. While this is not an indigenous species, the role of *poiēsis* in revealing its character as a society of interpenetrating processes can still be maintained. After reading the simple lines “You linger your little hour and are gone,/And still the woods sweep leafily on,”\(^6\) in Robert Frost’s ‘On Going Unnoticed’,

\(^{1}\) *Ibid*.
\(^{3}\) See p.178, above.
\(^{4}\) See p.35, above.
I could see the tree anew. I began to see, for the first time, the ‘leafyness’ of it: the mix of pale yellow and green, the way in which the leaves cluster on the upper boughs, and the contrast between the slow growth of the trunk and limbs, the wax and wane of the leaves in each season, and quick flutter of the yellow and green in the breeze. This, in turn, allowed me to see the friendly bond between the hot summer sun of Melbourne, the shading ‘leafy sweep’ of the elm, and the cool eastern windows of my study and balcony.

Similarly, after spending time relishing the later works of Monet, and working with pastels in the same vein, I began to see the liquid amber tree next to the elm afresh. Rather than a simple tree with autumn leaves, I saw the entire garden as a play of rich reds, oranges, greens and golds. This ‘play’ was itself suffused with the mingling of the organic processes, as the fallen leaves rotted brownly into the rich brown earth, and the trees began to again prepare for the cool winter. All this contrasted in tone with the evergreen dark of the eucalypts over the road, with their sparse, proud foliage and shedding bark – the fruit of a hot, dry and ancient land.

Consequently, through poiēsis qua poetry and painting, I was able to see the World anew; it was ‘being’ differently for me. As I have argued elsewhere, “truly poetic words go ‘into the depths’ of us, reminding us of those hidden elements of our Being that are removed from the ‘ready to hand’ nature of our everyday lives.”¹ In each case, the ‘work of imagination’ is present in reality. While these were not native trees – indicative of the character of the Melbourne’s Inner Eastern suburbs – it was nonetheless possible to reconceptualise my relationship with them in their capacity as processes of development rather than as ‘things’. Indeed, in revealing the manifest difference between these and nearby gums, it is also possible to highlight the alien nature of this deciduous flora, and problematise its role in a post-colonial culture. With this poiēsis we are able to ‘open ourselves up’ to previously hidden places near or far, and rebuild our ‘home’. Similar poiēsis could be undertaken for ‘people’, ‘grave’, ‘origin’, ‘shelter’ and so forth.

ii. *Phronēsis*, Friends and Foes

Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have wisdom, but not practical wisdom….we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek.

-Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b:4-7

However, as was earlier argued,¹ Heideggerian *poiēsis* alone is not adequate for the task of reclaiming our creative nature. Drawing on Aristotle,² Berstein reminds us that *poiēsis* is similar to *technē*, or craft.³ Of course, this is not to say that Heideggerian *poiēsis* is like computer programming or automotive mechanics.⁴ Unlike these, *poiēsis* is not tainted by the ‘logic’ of technological rationality. Rather, it nurtures the ‘emerging and rising in itself of all things’. Nonetheless, *poiēsis* is limited. Even if the people and places of our World well up in *poiēsis*,⁵ poetry is a solitary art, far removed from the hustle-bustle of the *polis*. Poets, as Heidegger writes somewhat melodramatically, “shut their eyes to reality. Instead of acting, they dream.”⁶ As a kind of knowledge, the *poiēsis* of literature and poetry is rarely a matter of democratic collaboration.

While this is often its strength, this solitude also reveals an important difference between *poiēsis* and other forms of knowledge. Works in the public sphere, corporate sector, university or industry are only ever realised by people undertaking tasks of everyday, often banal, collaboration with one another. Moreover, we require a knack, a know-how to get things done right in this vague and clumsy ‘real world’. This knack, however, is not something we ‘know’. As Aristotle writes, “some who do not know, especially those who have experience, are more practical than others”⁷. Such people have *phronēsis*, or ‘practical wisdom’, an embodied “capacity to act with regard to

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¹ See pp.66-68, above.
² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a:1-23
⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b:16-17
human goods”¹. Unlike technē, such as architecture, poetry, painting or other such things, this phronēsis cannot be taught. Phronēsis cannot be written down, or distilled into axiomatic rules or computer programmes. Rather, it must be acquired in diverse political situations through practice, and only through practice.² Of course, poiēsis is also something that cannot be distilled down to axioms, formalisms, or textbooks. However, it is not an ethical ‘practical wisdom’. This wisdom is the ‘self-knowledge’ that ethical practice brings, rather than the kind of knowledge a workman has of his tools and materials.³ If poiēsis is needed, then, it must be combined with the phronēsis of everyday words and deeds.

This concern for the everyday is essential to any kind of poetic liberation, however utopian. As Harvey makes clear, a future utopos can only come from a topos here and now, including its people.⁴ Our Chorus, like Socrates, is such a utopos. It is an ‘existentiell’ possible; a no place for us to make, though ‘not yet’. If poiēsis is to help us ‘reworld’ ourselves, we will need to work with the people around us. We must not be so concerned with the ‘bursting blossom of Being’ that, like Heidegger, we forget about the lives – superficial, authentic or otherwise – of real people.⁵ We cannot simply “step back before one who is not yet here, and bow, a millennium before him, to his spirit”⁶. We cannot simply ‘do philosophy’, or retreat to the Black Forest. Rather, we must affirm that the “hidden unity of Being...has been and is to be practically worked out...through work and creatively elucidated and unified as...Being through philosophy, art, religion, and so forth.”⁷ Indeed, it is these very practices that may develop our ‘dwelling’ as it did for the Homeric Greeks or peasants’ huts of the Black Forest.¹ Our symbols, in turn, would then be deep and impassioned, rather than hollow and manipulative. Consequently, we may overcome our ‘homelessness’ by working

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¹ Ibid., 1140b:20-21
⁵ While Heidegger sees this criticism as a ‘misunderstanding’, even his attempt to redress this misunderstanding smacks of ‘otherworldliness’. See ‘Martin Heidegger in Conversation’, in Günther, N. and Kettering, E. (eds.) (1990), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, Paragon House, New York, p.82
with others. We do not need to ‘wait for a god’ or devote our lives solely to Heideggerian poïēsis. Rather than leading us only to Heidegger’s hut in Todtnauberg, poetry wells up in us and inspires us to praxis.

However, we cannot develop poïēsis and praxis with all people, as we cannot be everywhere at once. Moreover, we cannot be all things to all people. There are many who will simply oppose us. As Bakan writes, “[t]hose who share our telos are those with whom we can speak and act collectively. Those who oppose our telos are those against which we should engage in struggle.”2 Sadly, there will be more people to struggle against than with and, as with all phronēsis, there will be mistakes of judgement. Nonetheless, if schoolgirls can scare businessmen with their community art,3 there is still hope that we may as a group create a new ‘home’. We must therefore seek to find groups of people with whom we share the possibility of ‘building’ and dwelling. These groups, as Arendt reminds us, must not necessarily love one another, but should at least try to nurture respect.4

Certainly, some hope for this is given by the world-wide protest movements opposed to the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation and World Economic Forum. Reclaim the Streets, Critical Mass and other such groups disrupt the habits of thought and action that characterise mechanistic materialism and egoistic individualism. Rather than accepting the status quo, they display alternative ways of collaborating, travelling and consuming. Indeed, they often reject the ethos of capitalist consumption outright, including the need for more and more ‘things’, and the will to will of Gestell. Moreover, they create debate in the popular press about capitalist excesses.5

However much of the alternative movement or ‘global left’ seems characterised by superficiality.6 Protests such as Melbourne’s S11 and M1 were often permeated with

1 See pp.300-305, above.
2 Ibid., p.93
3 Sexton, J. (19/7/01), ‘Schoolgirl’s art makes a show of council’, The Australian, p.6. A young schoolgirl painted a critical picture of her local deputy mayor – a developer – destroying a local park. The deputy mayor had the work banned from exhibition, and called any critics ‘absolute losers’.
scenes of commodity consumption and superficial heterogeneity. Alternatively, much of the Left rhetoric is distinguished by the instrumentalism of utilitarian socialism, an approach antithetical to the anti-mechanistic postulates of the Aristotelian tradition. Also, these groups are often transient in their action, and marginalised in their causes. They neither involve the majority of the people of their communities, nor are they continual efforts to articulate and develop alternative worldviews. While the Athenian *polis* ‘fixed’ the passing words and deeds of men,\(^1\) these ‘mass’ political movements are often brief and reactive.\(^2\) Lastly, these myriad grass-roots groups are often divided, or unable to work together due to political or logistical barriers.\(^3\) Their relations are variously strained, brief or superficial. They are thus unable to integrate *poiēsis* with *phronēsis*, as they often lack a ‘knack’ for ethical and political action.

Nonetheless, these movements should not be abjured *in toto*. Their courage, creativity, tenacity and hope are essential. The ‘culture jamming’ of some radical groups, for instance, is a fruitful kind of deep subversive appropriation.\(^4\) Earlier, it was maintained that Absolute Vodka manipulated signs in the interests of commodity consumption. With this culture jamming, Absolut Vodka is shown as a source of impotence rather than a ‘cool’ kind of art. When ‘Old Glory’ is starred with multi-national brands, America is shown for the ‘corporate whore’ it is. The superficiality of signs is disrupted, and commodity consumption is revealed. Similarly, the instant street parties of Reclaim the Streets may each act as a kind of carnivalesque *epoché*, disrupting the *doxa* underpinning the dominant economic field.\(^5\) Lastly, it is precisely the street parties, the squats, the radical warehouses and the communal farms that may nurture the ‘homebuilders’ of the future, or at least their leaders, muses or co-conspirators. As these allegiances build in their day to day intimacy, we may well see the birth of new oppositions to modern Epicureanism.\(^6\) These broad-based grass-roots cultural movements may be precisely what is required to revive academic life in a balanced,\

\(^2\) I am indebted to Terry Eyssens for reminding me of this in a timely fashion.  
\(^4\) See ‘Absolute Impotence’ and ‘American Flag With Logos’, p.411  
non-reductionist way. Such people may indeed be those with whom creative radicals will share their telos.

Nonetheless, it would not be free or just for these groups to simply ‘build’ us a new sense of ‘home’. ‘Home’ cannot be created by proxy by ‘radicals’ in marginalised subcultures, or by academics. As Freire puts it, “[n]o one can…unveil the world for another.” The conditions for the development of our creative nature, then, should be collaboratively achieved, at least insofar as this is possible. For this, it is necessary to develop the imaginative capacity of poiēsis and the ethico-political ‘knack’ of phronēsis.

iii. Epistēmē and Creativity

Philosophy is the critic of abstractions.


Lastly, to poiēsis and phronēsis we should integrate epistēmē. With epistēmē, we work from abstract principles and demonstrate true ‘scientific’ statements about the world. These true statements come to constitute, as Hanksinson puts it, “an organized body of systematically arranged information”, on topics such as biology, physics and metaphysics. The importance of this epistēmē is twofold. First, any attempt to creatively develop culture without a systematic account of the world will be characterised by unreflexive assumptions, and fragmentation akin to that observed in contemporary culture. Insofar as we require abstractions to make sense of the world and communicate with one another, and insofar as we embody such abstractions, without a cohesive account that puts these abstractions in perspective, we will be unable to overcome the injustices of the past or the present, or relate them constructively to a desired future. Moreover, without some form of systematic worldview, the rigour and cohesion required to organise and integrate the contributions of the various disciplines

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The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiency

will be lacking. Consequently, the individualism inherent in specialisation will prevent
the necessary *phronēsis* from emerging.

Second, without this kind of systematic appraisal of the world, it will be difficult to
supplant the Epicureanism of late modernity. Insofar as we wish to critique and
overcome the *status quo*, it will be necessary to develop an alternative. Faced with the
complexities of the volatile interconnectedness and speed of postmodernity, people will
require a cohesive worldview to make sense of their lives, and their possible
contributions, and are unlikely to collaborate with whose who seemingly lack an
appreciation of the complexity of the problems. Indeed, those without a systematic and
reliable appraisal of the world are unlikely to properly recognise the problems of
superficiality in the first place, and thus concomitant with the task of overcoming
superficiality is the obligation to explore and develop modes of systematic thought, such
as that proposed by many thinkers of the Aristotelian tradition.

*Epistēmē* presents us with the basic framework to begin speculating on the nature of the
world, and to take up the task of overcoming the defects of the world this speculation
reveals. However, this is not strictly the *epistēmē* of Aristotle, with his wholesale
commitment to “things which are eternal…ungenerated and imperishable”2. Rather,
like Herder, Schelling and Whitehead, we should seek to affirm a science that does
justice to our account of us as creative and open-ended processes of development.

Certainly, this *epistēmē* would avoid the dangers of a pure Heideggerian ‘home’
grounded in *poiēsis*. In his late work, Heidegger comes close to dismissing the entire
tradition of Western philosophy as ‘metaphysics’.3 For Heidegger, even Nietzsche
succumbed to metaphysics, willfully valuing the world as an ‘ought’ in response to the
ontological primordialisation of beings.4 Consequently, it is argued that philosophy *qua*
metaphysics is at an end.5 For ‘late’ Heidegger, we do not need to develop new

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*Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, Routledge, London, pp.431-449
abstractions, or properly replace the dominant metaphysics with one that allows us to do justice to the world at large, lest we regress into the ‘will to will’.

However, by disavowing systematic metaphysical or scientific speculation and analysis, Heidegger conceals the defects of his project, defects he shares with Nazism. In the face of the domination of Gestell, Heidegger argues that we should open ourselves to the essence of Gestell and submit to the destiny of Being,\(^1\) or wait for a ‘God’ to save us. The problem with this is not so much the ‘god’ – this can be read both as gratitude, and also the awesome revealing of Being in the everyday.\(^2\) Rather, what is difficult to accept is the emphasis on passive resignation. Not coincidentally, this resignation accords with elements of Heidegger’s Nazi rhetoric, where the German people ‘at home’ in Mitteleuropa can passively wait for the destiny of Being to develop, submitting to the charismatic rule of the Führer.\(^3\) This, as Wolin argues, is grounded in Heidegger’s collectivist place-bound anti-modernity,\(^4\) which can regress into a dangerous parochialism.\(^5\) Heidegger’s disavowal of systematic philosophy promotes this form of unreflexive ‘dwelling’, as rigorous speculative and empirical analysis is abjured in favour of apolitical poiēsis.

Contra Heidegger, thinkers like Herder, Schelling, Hegel, Marx and Whitehead try to develop a science of life to replace that of Gestell. This project, in turn, grounds our phronēsis and poiēsis of ‘home’ in a new ontology. Indeed, rather than upholding solely poiēsis, we must affirm the bond between ontology and ethics, epistēmē and ethos.\(^6\) With an account of the narrative World founded on ‘process’, our phronēsis and poiēsis will therefore not create a ‘home’ like that of Heidegger’s Nazi Germany, dependent on local parochialism and charismatic authority. Rather, the earlier account of creative ontology upholds a critical reflexivity and polyphony that empowers just heterodoxy against unjust orthodoxy, or the creative powerless against the destructive

\(^3\) Wolin, R. (1990), The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, Columbia University Press, New York, pp.104-105
\(^4\) Ibid., pp.63-66
powerful. The ethos of our Chorus is similarly underpinned by a creative, open-ended epistêmē. Grounded in these ‘process’ abstractions, we will not be parochial or narrowly ‘place-bound’ as was Heidegger’s Nazism, even if we do embrace ‘land’.

Moreover, epistêmē, poiēsis and phronēsis are capable of being tangibly integrated in a manner that retains the key insights of Heidegger, Whitehead and Aristotle. For example, in recent ‘process’ articulations of environmental ethics, Gunter has applied Aldo Leopold’s ideas of the ‘land ethic’ to the Big Thicket bioregion in Texas. The result is an ethos that combines the metaphysical precision of ‘process’, a poetic concern for beauty, and a practical everyday wisdom that valorises local cooperation between different groups. Leopold seemed to integrate these approaches in life, if not in print. This ethos, like that of Heidegger, is also prefaced on a deeper concern for the dangers of space-time compression, technological rationality, and ecocide. In Gunter’s rearticulation of Leopold’s oeuvre we see an ethos that attempts to overcome orthodox metaphysics, poetically ‘reveal’ physis, and develop a practical sense of ‘getting things done’. This accords with the earlier integration of Heideggerian poetics, Whiteheadian metaphysics and an Aristotelian account of ethico-political ‘know-how’. We can also recognise in this articulation of a nascent ecological community the beginnings of a people ‘at home’ in their place, and creatively related to their past, present and future.

Consequently, while this account has focused on community and place, and hence relates more directly to the symbols of ‘land’, it suggests that it is possible to undertake projects that integrate these three forms of knowledge, epistêmē, poiēsis and phronēsis. Rather than approaching superficiality with the tools of instrumentalism and

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1 See pp.77-97, above.
2 See pp.169-193, above.
3 Young, D.A. (2002), ‘Not Easy Being Green’, Ethics, Place, and Environment, Volume 5, Number 3, pp.189-204
6 Ibid., pp.219-221
mechanistic thinking or, alternatively, upholding individual gratification and New Age heterophilia, it may be possible to collaboratively reveal a new meaningful World while simultaneously developing an appropriate alternative to the metaphysics of Epicureanism. In the case of the foregoing articulation of ecological communities, this project would uphold the narrative form and the importance of tradition, whilst ensuring the presence of a critical reflexivity and imaginative capacity required to further develop the World, and do justice to other points of view that require fantasia. Moreover, it would ensure that this community was not the formalised expression of an ontological schema, but the creative expression of an ongoing cathexis of people Being-with and objects Being-alongside us in the World. This, in turn, would present the conditions where those involved in the formative stages could again be inspired by people, place and history, and develop utopian visions capable of being realised.

iv. Speculation, Tradition and Hope

Certainly, this is only a speculative gesture. To again draw on Whitehead’s metaphor, it is an imaginative flight that has yet to land. Nonetheless, it is imperative that any future attempts to reclaim our creativity are mindful of the distorting forces inherent in the metaphysics of capitalist Epicureanism. If we do not successfully integrate the various forms of knowledge, our attempts to develop our creativity – and, mutatis mutandis, a more free and just World – will fail, as they will perpetuate the ‘logic’ of bourgeois Gestell we have endeavoured to more clearly reveal. Our well-meaning efforts will degenerate into individualist insularity, thoughtless perpetuation of prejudices or dry metaphysical conversation with no concrete referents. What is required is a determined openness to artistry, a practiced sense of democratic collaboration and a rigorous attention to the kind of worldview associated with process, growth and creativity. These may be the ways in which we plant seeds for the future, doing justice to the traditions of the past and justifying our present. This is grounds for hope. Hope, in turn, is precisely what is required as we proceed to the conclusion.

CONCLUSION

But now the woman opened up the cask,
And scattered pains and evils among men.
Inside the cask’s hard walls remained one thing,
Hope, only, did not fly through the door.

– Hesiod, *Works and Days*, ~93-94

i. Taking Stock

In conclusion, the argument of *The Silent Chorus* is that superficiality represents the late modern corruption of human Being-in-the-World by Epicureanism. To make sense of this human Being it was first necessary to characterise people in terms of the personal and cultural narratives they live through, and the creativity required to develop and maintain these. It was proposed that the Aristotelian tradition upholds the basic principles necessary to defend this position, and to recognise the defects of Epicureanism. By focusing solely on individuals, conceptualising these only in terms of self-gratification, and prioritising prediction and control over creativity, modern Epicureanism distorts cultural narratives. Abstracted from the knowledge and practices required to render their lives sensible and meaningful, people feel uninspired, powerless and hostile to genuine creativity. Similarly isolated from their cultural traditions, words and objects lose the cultural contexts wherein they derive their significance, and language is thus distorted. Intellectual knowledge is likewise commodified and divested of its liberatory potential. Culture therefore loses its capacity to inspire and motivate, and people their capacity to collaborate in matters relevant to their political community, or even act in accordance with their own speculative visions. Superficial Western civilisation is thus characterised by its inability to engage with its own Epicurean tradition, to develop alternatives to this tradition and to collaboratively take up these alternatives. This represents the corruption of our creative cultural nature.

To develop this critique it was necessary to integrate the theoretical contributions of thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition with analyses of popular culture and historical texts. Speculative accounts of superficiality were tested against the relevant evidence,
while this evidence was clarified and contextualised by the theory. It was argued that
this dialectical movement between speculation and analysis revealed more of
superficiality than either method could alone.

Beginning with Aristotle, the first task was to theoretically explicate two alternative
traditions, Aristotelian and Epicurean. For Aristotle, humans and their dealings cannot
be understood outside the communities wherein they collaboratively deal with matters
of justice and freedom. For Epicurus, however, humans are egoistic individuals seeking
gratification. Their speech is individualised, and devoid of cohesive social content.
This was later integrated with mechanism, so that society was conceptualised as
machine with humans as the parts seeking gratification. The Aristotelian tradition was
eventually dominated by Epicureanism.

In opposition to this, and drawing on thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition such as
Herder, it was proposed that humans are cultural and creative. Culture entails not only
shared places and ideas, but also a common past and projected future. Particular
emphasis was placed on language, which emerges out of our shared dealings with the
world to order and colour these dealings. It was further argued that, through language
and labour, people are able to take up and creatively develop their culture, and the
dynamic relations between past, present and future can be conceptualised as a narrative
tradition or World. Essential to the Aristotelian tradition were culture, creativity and
open-endedness, and the notions of freedom and justice associated with these. From
this perspective it was then possible to turn to case studies of cultural exchange, and
thus integrate the speculation of the Aristotelian tradition with concrete analysis.

The first analysis was that of cultural appropriation. Particular emphasis was placed on
the capacity of people to do justice to their culture and the culture of others as they used
foreign cultural artefacts. Deep appropriation, such as that of the Satnami, not only
engaged with the narrative traditions of the dominant culture, but also enabled the
appropriators to critically reconceptualise their own history. Actively relating to their
own and others’ cultural stories, the Satnami vindicated the emphasis on narratives, and
showed a commitment to notions of justice, power and freedom in accordance with the
notion of the creative narrative World.
In contrast, superficial appropriation, such as that of Jasmuheen, not only displayed the egoism and hostility to social language of Epicureanism, but also the commodification inherent in capitalism. It was argued that this abstraction, reification and manipulation of culture distorts the unified character of narratives, and results in the withdrawal from cultural artifacts of the contexts wherein they derive their meaning. As a consequence, people are left with a world devoid of significance, and where the consumption of cultural commodities serves as a distraction from this world. Furthermore, the commodification of language revealed in superficial appropriation demonstrated the distortion of words, such that the capacity of people to speak and be heard is weakened, thereby divesting people of their ability to collaborate, undertake creative labour and thus contribute freely to their tradition.

The speculative vision of the Chorus was proposed in opposition to superficiality. Earlier it was argued that humans live out autobiographical and cultural narratives, and develop their creative nature by critically engaging with these stories. Building on this argument, it was proposed that the Chorus is a collective character whose role it is to mediate between characters in narratives, characters and narratives, and narratives themselves. Drawing on Greek tragedy and democracy, it was argued that the Chorus would emplot people into narratives, thereby aiding their capacity to engage creatively with their traditions. Moreover, by upholding polyphony, the Chorus would allow for the development of heterodox narratives such as those promoted by the Satnami. The Chorus is thus a necessary character in any narrative characterised by freedom and justice as conceptualised by the Aristotelian tradition. It was further proposed that the people best suited to the Choral role were academics, as their institutions – universities – ideally exhibited three principles essential to the Chorus: autonomy, collaboration and the integration of knowledge and imagination. With academics acting as a Chorus, Western society would not be superficial.

As the second case study, this speculative vision of the Chorus was used to take stock of the history of universities from Continental Europe to Australia. It was argued that universities rarely engendered the culture required for the Chorus to emerge. Rather, the Chorus was undermined by external power struggles or internal reactionary politics, orthodox religion or commercial interests. In those places and times where universities were creative, the resulting philosophies were frequently characterised by Epicureanism...
and, hence, were not amenable to the Chorus. In late modernity, capitalist Epicureanism dominates universities, to the extent that academic knowledge is commodified, students are treated as consumers and universities as degree or information factories. Consequently, by analysing the history of universities it was possible to argue that the Chorus is a utopian vision never actualised in reality, and that Epicurean superficiality is entrenched in our education facilities. This not only broadens the conception of superficiality, but also highlights the necessity for an alternative vision to overcome this.

Moving from case study to speculation, it was then necessary to defend utopia, thus defending the Chorus as an alternative vision to Epicureanism. It was proposed that the work of Plato was utopian more for its depiction of Socrates, than for its vision of the ideal polis. Socrates is a utopian vision that not only inspired and grounded Plato’s oeuvre, but also acted as an ethico-political ideal for thousands of years after his death. In the same way, the Chorus – despite its unreality – could act as a vision for people to take up as they recognise and develop their narratives. In the process, alternatives to superficiality could be identified and adopted.

However, a brief case study focusing on Socrates and Alcibiades grounded this speculation. In the face of Alcibiades’ intransigence, it was maintained that even the most convincing speculative visions are impotent in the face of ethical weakness. Developing the Aristotelian notion of akrasia, it was argued that the fragmentation of narratives associated with superficiality engenders this weakness in contemporary society. Alienated from the ethical principles of their traditions, and from the stability afforded by personal and cultural integrity, people are unable to act ethically. The unified morality made possible by a rich cultural tradition lacks both cohesion and relevance for them. Consequently, Western society itself is characterised by moral weakness, and this compromises people’s capacity to transcend superficiality.

Speculating further on inspiration and motivation, it was then argued that symbols are capable of overcoming this weakness of will. Like the figures of Son of Man and Lamb in Christianity, symbols emerge from the creative practices of a healthy narrative tradition, and are permeated with the desires people have for their culture and all it reveals as good. Consequently, it was proposed that Western symbols would have the
inspiring power necessary for people to transcend their *akrasia* and reclaim their creative nature. This would draw on shared sources of significance and motivation to abjure the reification and fragmentation of superficiality.

Turning to popular culture, it was then maintained that the symbols of contemporary Western society are subject to similar forces as the language distorted by superficial appropriation. Divested of the cultural contexts wherein they might inspire, symbols have become signs such as those used by McDonald’s, Nike and Calvin Klein. The symbolic realm therefore lacks the relations of meaningful desire associated with creative narrative traditions. They are arbitrary signifiers, fetishised solely in the interests of capital. Consequently, superficiality has corrupted the ability of people to overcome their weaknesses and become inspired by their own culture and its expressions of creativity. This condition was described as ‘homelessness’.

In order to more clearly articulate this condition, it was argued that an analysis of the symbols of ‘home’ in Western culture would reveal both the meaning of ‘home’ itself, and its antithesis, ‘homelessness’. In the works of Homer, ‘home’ was revealed as a complex of symbols emerging from the creative practices of a narrative tradition, and in accordance with the earlier articulation of culture and creativity. The Homeric heroes were inspired by such symbols, and these allowed the men to accomplish feats of courage and tenacity. The same was found in the works of Judaism, Christianity, Shakespeare and Goethe, though in the latter they were becoming subservient to the will of the egoistic individual.

In the contemporary works of Spielberg and Lucas, the symbols of ‘home’ are deprived of their inspiration, or are simply irrelevant to the heroic protagonists. It was argued that Epicurean commodification, individualism and mechanism have fragmented and abstracted the narrative traditions of Western society, such that the creative practices required to maintain meaningful symbols have waned. People consume commodity-signs rather than create. The sole remaining symbol of any power is that of ‘family’, particularly ‘father’ and ‘son’. It was proposed that this manifestation of ‘home’ engenders the capitalist conservatism of the Reagan era, and is itself the expression of egoism and commodification. Together with narrative fragmentation, this ‘homelessness’ also engenders *akrasia*, withdrawing fundamental sources of symbolic
encouragement and significance from the World. Without these, people lack the cultural context and inspiration to act ethically, or grasp alternative visions of the world. Consequently, superficiality has distorted the most basic expressions of creativity, weakening people’s capacity to make themselves ‘at home’ in the world, while simultaneously furnishing them with a passive veneer of comfort and security that maintains the Epicureanism than engendered this ‘homelessness’.

The dialectical movement of this thesis between speculative ‘flights’ and analytical ‘landings’ has justified the distressed laments of the poets, painters and writers. Modernity – and late modernity in particular – is characterised by the meaninglessness of *The Trial*, the ethical malaise of *The Man Without Qualities*, the hyper-real sexualised aggression of *American Psycho*, and the warped individualism of *Atomised*. Weak, distracted, self-loathing and hedonistic academics like the philosopher of Khan’s *Ennui* allude to the commodification and instrumentalisation of universities, and the *akrasia* that results from this process. The expression by artists and writers of alienation and moral helplessness therefore cannot be dismissed as self-indulgent whimsy. On the contrary, it is proposed that many of these sentiments are accurate in their basic observations and intuitions, and express the fundamental problems of our age.

Nonetheless, *The Silent Chorus* is an attempt to go beyond mere lamentations. If Western society is superficial, it will not develop the new narratives called for by Gare, Carr or MacIntyre, the global revolution of Marx or the ‘saving power’ of Heidegger. The *status quo* will remain, as we will have lost the very capacities of reflexivity, imagination and moral character required to creatively develop these projects. This thesis proposes that we resist this malaise, and attempt to collaboratively overcome superficiality.

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1 See pp.xvii-xix, above.
To this end, it was argued that any attempts to develop our creative nature must avoid the pitfalls associated with superficiality, such as atomistic individualism, mechanism and a lack of reflexivity. While only speculative, it was maintained in the penultimate section that these failings can be avoided by integrating in thought and practice three kinds of knowledge: poiēsis, phronēsis and epistēmē. This would ensure that we were able to reveal Being and beings in alternative ways, develop a ‘knack’ for change and underpin these activities with a rigorous philosophy of ‘process’. Consequently, we would not become self-indulgent, mindlessly perpetuate prejudices or succumb to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Rather, we would work together to gain a more radical sense of the world and its potential, and undertake systematic thinking and practices in accordance with this worldview. Put simply, we could overcome superficiality, build a new ‘home’, and thereby develop the conditions wherein speculative visions such as the Chorus could be realised.

Assuredly, the fiery passion or stolid enthusiasm required to successfully bring forth this project will not be easy to maintain in a World devoid of inspiration. Perhaps the initial requirement is that we at least recognise the possibility of something other than the status quo, and to this end the articulation of narrative traditions is justified. By turning to the Aristotelian tradition, we recognise the continual effort by great thinkers to promote the best of human nature, and the capacity of each of us to creatively develop this nature. If we find ourselves thrown into a World characterised by the distortion of this very project, what is essential is that we continue to maintain the existence of such a tradition, and the hope inherent in its project. Quite simply, it is the continual affirmation that we can be more than we are, and that this potential is yet to be realised. If the Chorus is silent, it is therefore not due to simple muteness, but because their genuine potentiality for a voice is yet to be actualised. In accordance with this, we should assume that people still harbour some desire to redeem themselves and their civilisation, and would grasp the opportunity to do so constructively. At the very least,

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1 ‘Redemption’, from the Latin redemere, means ‘buying back’. Similarly, litrois in Greek and ga’al and padah in Hebrew give the same commercial sense. While this is hardly the commercialism of late capitalism, the creativity of ‘home’ is not a kind of economic transaction. There is no ‘thing’ for us to buy back, barter, or exchange. Moreover, religious redemption can lead to a kind of self-indulgent catharsis, instrumentalism, or even egoism. We ‘use’ the World to save ourselves, or ‘ransom’ our selves. Certainly, this is the case with much of Protestantism. Similarly, Catholic redemption can be a matter of hedonistic sin and ritualised confession, with little real moral or spiritual development in the process. Lastly, Christian redemption has a dualist transcendent character, far removed from pagan notions of ‘the good
this is sober grounds for hope. If this age of superficiality is fruitless, our humble task is to plant seeds for the future.

Veins blue beneath his
thin leather skin,
the old swineherd groaned,
his swollen knees bent to the soil.

The south-eastern wind-
warm-
smelled of sage, fire and baking bread.
The dew lifted.
Birdsong.

Yet his morning had passed,
and the long night grew near.

From the dust of his tough pouch
he took an olive pip,
still moist with pulp and spit.
He made a hole in the wet soil –
slow, old lovers’ foreplay –
and in it dropped the seed.

When his bones too were dust,
in the womb of the soil
was rooted an olive tree,
sheltered by a courtyard –
sheltering the courtyard.

A Man of Sorrows took the crown,
trunk, limbs and fruit,
and made a bed in their place.
Sheltered now by warm stones and pine beams,
from this bed
the fruit of his loins would burst,
with soil, bones
oil, sweat and seed
between his lanky toes.

Long after man, wife, child and bed were
dark dust and ashes,
the blind builder spat into his hands, and
made these dust and ashes into clay.
He took his clay, and –
eyes in darkness –
dug his fingers into red soil,
climbed a hill sheltered by hills, and
shaped a stone olive tree.

The white heat of day
blackened this tree –
humble –
it gave the good gift of shade.
As blood, spit, sperm and bile
ran rivers in its shadow,
the clay tree bore fruit.
The hill and valleys grew
pale bluegreen olive groves,
statues and
laughing Dionysos.

Here, fat with time and olivebread, the
Old Man of Air
and
Young Man of Flesh
slept in a grove and
dreamt of
the King, the Wolf Brothers and the Lamb.
They, too, would one day seek shade beneath
this ancient,
ever childlike,
fertile tree called
Hope.
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

ILLUSTRATIONS

“Homosexuals took our lovely word gay for themselves and now rainbow is their next word. What next? Here, the word is ‘tainted’ by being associated with a habitus in the heterodox areas of the field. If not ‘unconcealing’ doxa, this has still had the effect of ‘reallocating’ symbolic capital to the heterodox areas of the field.” – from p.105.


“For Walker, it is not merely a matter of stating ‘we have been oppressed’, or disseminating history textbooks. By working with images associated with the American World, Walker used the symbolic capital associated with her oppressors to make her point. Themes of bondage, slavery, and violence are associated with notions of labour and progress, all through the appropriation of familiar ‘apple pie’ images.” – from p.107.
"Clearly, it’s the driving gene, states BMW’s advertisement. Playing on the concept of technological inheritance, the piece writes that the new BMW Series...is...[t]he purest expression of a true driving machine, automotive DNA for a new generation. What may we make of this?” – from p.432.

“...the ‘Gatineau Laser’ is nothing like a laser. In this sense, while the ‘science’ behind the product seems perfectly reasonable, these ‘light captors’ have little to do with laser technology.” – from p.433.
“…the velvet jacket brings with it ends, feelings, or aesthetics linked to the Eastern notion of *karma*. This is ‘instant karma’. In short, we will personally gain ‘good karma’ by buying this product. Unfortunately, this at odds with both Buddhism and Hinduism.” – from p.433.

“…*kundalini* is a concept found in Yoga. Kundalindi Yoga, however, with its overt polytheism, is antithetical to the Hebrews and Christians Alton is drawing on when he speaks of God, the Ark of the Covenant, and so forth. Alton is simply not doing Christianity and Judaism justice.” – from p.132.
“New Age spirituality has hardly abandoned capitalism. On the contrary, as Brown writes, *it celebrates capitalism by viewing money as just another form of “energy” that can be transferred, acquired, or lost as part of one’s personal evolution.* Indeed, Brown tells us that some New Agers have even attempted trademark protection for the ‘spirit entities’ they channel.” – from p.136.
“…they can mean anything to anybody. Absolute Vodka, for instance, brands itself in advertisements with the Absolut bottle. In each new advertisement, a different image is in, on, or around the bottle. The sign of Absolut is thus, as Klein writes, intellectual in Harper’s, futuristic in Wired, alternative in Spin, loud and proud in Out, and ‘Absolute Centerfold’ in Playboy.” – from p.285.
“The ‘culture jamming’ of some radical groups, for instance, is a fruitful kind of informed, subversive appropriation. Absolut Vodka is shown as a cause of impotence rather than a ‘cool’ kind of art. Similarly, when ‘Old Glory’ is starred with multi-national brands, America is shown for the ‘corporate whore’ it is. Here, the superficiality of signs is revealed, and commodity consumption is problematised.” – from p.390.

Illus. 10. ‘Absolut Impotence’ (13/2/02), http://adbusters.org/spoofads/alcohol/absolutimpotence/

Illus. 11. ‘American Flag With Logos’ (13/2/02), http://adbusters.org/campaigns/corporate/culturejam/flag_download.jpg
APPENDICES

Appendix I: LG’s Air Conditioning System

The dialogue in LG’s new air-conditioning system advertisement runs as follows:

ENTHUSED SCIENTIST: [on podium, with overhead projections over his face and torso] LG – recreating the true dynamics of the wind…

NEW AGE/YUPPIE FEMALE:[curled up casually on couch with male partner] Yeah, now we can be at one with nature-

NEW AGE/YUPPIE MALE: And never leave the house…

ENTHUSED SCIENTIST: [apparently even more enthused than before, eyes bright behind heavily reflecting prescription glasses] chaos theory, fluctuations, moving the air in random patterns, tiny variations, it’s all within our grasp! We can-

NEW AGE/YUPPIE MALE: [casually] Sit around like this all day…

NEW AGE/YUPPIE FEMALE: It’s so cool-

NEW AGE/YUPPIE MALE: Or warm.

ENTHUSED SCIENTIST: [with a curiously unnerving tone of obsession in his voice, colours from the overhead playing on his face] In a world of order, chaos rules…

In this instance, scientific language is utilised as a deliberate contrast to the vague and imprecise musings of the couple. As LG Australia’s Marketing and Planning Manager states, the idea of the campaign is to show that “what [was] heaven or good for one person was not that of the next.” Thus, the scientist is passionate about the technical detail, while the couple simply want comfort and convenience. By dividing the characters into ‘specialist’ and ‘laymen’, the advertisers give the scientist the opportunity to properly use scientific language. This, in turn, enables LG to build on the ‘high tech’ image of its technology.

This technology is a distributive fan which relies on the non-linear dynamics of gaseous systems to render macro-system changes via micro-fluctuations – the ‘butterfly-effect’. It is thus presented as a technological analogue to temperature changes as a result of the wind, where thermodynamic processes entail similar non-linearities in weather systems. Hence the advertisement, in stating that it ‘recreates the true dynamics of the wind’, does not necessarily assume that the audience will understand the link between non-linear thermodynamical systems and chaos theory. Rather it means that LG has developed a technology which, in its emulation of certain natural processes, gives practical results beyond that of its competitors. This theme of competition is also alluded to by the last words of the scientist. By creating an overt dichotomy between ‘chaos’ and ‘order’, he develops a rhetorical tension between the two, which makes LG

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1 Atton, P. (24/3/99), Campaign Manager of LG Electronics, personal communication
2 Ibid.
‘chaotic’ but ‘cool’ while its competitors remain ‘ordered’ and thus ossified, traditional and so forth.

Consequently, the appropriation of scientific language here is not superficial. Of course, the advertisement itself, playing on shallow stereotypes and rhetorical play, is in itself superficial. It is aesthetically pleasing, vulgar and self-interested. Nonetheless, it is not superficially appropriating.
Appendix II: Calvin Klein and Victoria’s Secret

1. Calvin Klein’s ‘cK Be’ Fragrance Campaign

The notion of ‘soul’ is fundamental to Western thought. Through Platonism and Christianity, the notion of the ‘soul’ exercises a profound influence on Western civilisation. Essential to most notions of ‘soul’ is dualism, where the soul is understood as antithetical to the body. Here, though, Calvin Klein has used ‘body’ and ‘soul’ as if they were interchangeable. However, they have used these words in a way that suggests they know of this antithesis. Moreover, they have not discussed the concept, drawn on any radical non-dualistic traditions, or in any way attempted to overcome this antithesis. What may we make of this?

Paulanne Mancuso, president and CEO of Calvin Klein Cosmetics, states that these advertisements are really about “this lifestyle, this generation, and the values they stand for.” However, David Lipke, a researcher with the firm responsible for the advertising campaign, had no such pretence. He simply said that there was no “like, deep meaning to it” and that “[p]eople can take whatever meaning they want from it.” In short, these words are simulacra.

‘Soul’ thus keeps its symbolic capital, associated with almost three millennia of dualism, but loses its meaning. It becomes a commodity to create, in Lipke’s words, “kind of, like, arty commercials”. ‘Soul’ has been taken from its philosophical, mythical, theological and religious Worlds, and used to promote aesthetic style in the field of advertising. This lends symbolic capital to the advertisers and clothing manufacturers, and cultural capital to those who buy the clothes. This is an example of superficial appropriation.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
2. Victoria’s Secret ‘philosophy’ Range of Cosmetics

Here, ‘soul’ is something you can own. Because “you own your values, your integrity, your thoughts, your words, your actions and therefore, your destiny”, you are a ‘soul owner’.

Certainly, the areas associated with ‘soul’ seem akin to the Hebrew nephesh, ruach and neshamah. They also seem akin to the Aristotelian notion of appetites, will and intelligence in the psyche. Thus, we may speculate that this is a Christian notion of ‘soul’, influenced by two millennia of Christianity, and incorporating parts of scholastic Aristotelianism and Judaism.

However, the notion of ‘owning’ a soul is antithetical to Christianity, not to mention Judaism and Islam. While the phrase ‘to sell one’s soul to the devil’ is well known in popular culture, there is no mention of any such thing using nephesh, ruach, or neshamah in the Tanak, nor nafs or ruh in the Koran. There are, on the other hand, some uses of the word ‘soul’ in the King James Bible that appear to indicate its ‘selling’. These, however, can be readily explained.

i. “each will pay a ransom for his soul [sky tcpn-lx] unto the LORD” (Exodus 30:12):

Nephesh is utilised to designate the person by virtue of the passions, the life of the blood. ‘Soul’, for want of another word, has therefore been used. The English translation in the Hebrew Torah actually reads “each will pay a ransom for himself unto the LORD”. Thus, the ‘soul’ used in the King James version is simply a translation of the ‘proxy’ meaning of nephesh, and does not mean ‘soul’ per se as a commodity.

ii. “But if the priest buy any soul [cpn-amf-lkb] with his money, he will eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11):

Again, nephesh here means simply ‘person’, in this case the slave of the Rabbi. The English translation of the Hebrew in the Torah actually reads “but a person who is a priest’s property by purchase may eat of them”. Again, then, the ‘soul’ used in the King James version is simply a translation of the ‘proxy’ meaning of nephesh, where the passions of the blood serve to indicate the whole person.

iii. “what will a man give in exchange for his soul [αυτον]?” (Mark 9:37):

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Here, ‘soul’ replaces the more conventional English ‘thyself’ (1 Samuel 22:26) or ‘myself’ (1 Samuel 22:24). Auton, meaning ‘himself’ in Greek, is used rather than psychē, meaning ‘soul’. In other words, auton is used in the Greek because man may sell himself, but not his psyche, pneuma, nephesh or ruach. Thus, the ‘soul’ used in the King James version does not mean ‘soul’ per se, but ‘himself’, and so it is not a soul that is being sold.

From this we may glean that the soul is something that cannot be sold and, mutatis mutandis, owned. On the contrary, the living soul is God’s gift to man. Thus, the soul may be compared, however theologically shallow this may be, to a house we do not own. We may borrow this house, lease this house, rent this house and even destroy this house, but it is not something we own – we live in it. Similarly, we borrow our living soul from God, and may even destroy this life through suicide, but it is not something we own – we live in it. We may redeem it through virtuous conduct or faith, but we cannot buy or sell it. Thus, when the makers of ‘philosophy’ speak of ‘owning a soul’, they are using words that lend them prestige. However, they are speaking in a manner antithetical to these very concepts, at least in their Jewish, Christian and Muslim guises. Though it is possible that the makers of ‘philosophy’ are drawing on Hindu or Greek notions of the soul, this is unlikely given the great influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This, then, is superficial appropriation of a sacred word by secular advertisers.

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1 The relation of the Judeo-Christian God to the living soul is discussed in Richardson, A. (1966), An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament, SCM Press, London, p.71ff; and Salmond, S.D.F. (1896), The Christian Doctrine of Immortality, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, pp.198-200. The Divine origin of the Muslim ruh is given in Sūrat Al-Hijr, 15:29, Al-Isrā’, 17:85, while the Judeo-Christian ruach or pneuma is described in Genesis, 2:7. In a personal communication, Sheikh Isse, from the Islam Council of Victoria, explained that there were no references to such things in the Koran, although he had heard the phrase colloquially amongst the Arabic population. His explanation for this was that it was most probably an Arabic translation of the popular phrase in English.

2 See p.403, above.
Appendix III: ‘Academic Calendar Project’ – Swinburne University

In 1999, academic staff at Swinburne University of Technology were given the opportunity to consider a new Academic Calendar. One argument for the changes read as follows:

[D]emand for [the third semester option] will grow as higher education moves inexorably down the track of a user-pays political agenda and further options open up for students as outlined…. The question is not whether universities will move in this direction, but rather when they will do so and which universities will ‘get their acts together’ most expeditiously to protect their viability and harvest the opportunities presented in the new market structure.¹

Here, the university justifies its movement to a competition-based corporate model by appealing to the competition posed by other universities. Note, it does not appeal to a notion of free education for all citizens, with the aim of educating Australia and allowing it to flourish as a wealthy community of informed participants committed to improving the welfare of all. Rather, it invokes fate. With their ‘weak will’, universities furnish self-fulfilling prophecies of competition and ‘user-pays’ education. Instead of actively promoting syllabuses and theoretical strategies for ridding the education environment of instrumentalism, superficiality and economic fundamentalism, they embrace these characteristics. Alasdair Crombie summarises their approach:

Deregulate, reduce the role of the government, level the playing field, let the managers manage and the market decide! […] Reality is always a bit too rich for orthodoxies and the true believers are usually poor learners. The roots become pillars and can no longer be modified by the flush of rich experience. A virtue is characteristically made of this inflexibility, however.²

As with many universities since the twelfth century, Swinburne is content to ‘play along’ with the orthodox elite, rather than drawing on its symbolic and cultural capital to try and change its circumstances.

The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

Appendix IV: Madonna the Postmodern

The so-called ‘pop icon’ Madonna is a symptom of late modernity. Now in her early forties, she is a multi-millionaire, and has continued to ‘dominate the charts’ by reinventing her image with every new album release. She has been a geisha, a Catholic, a 1930s tapdancer, a 1950s pinup and various other ‘selves’. More recently, she has been a Hindu:

Madonna, who rattled Christians in 1989 with a sex-on-the-altar routine in her ‘Like a Prayer’ video, has moved on to Hindus. The World Vaishnava Association issued a statement condemning the singer for ‘gyrating in a sexually suggestive manner’ onstage…in a see-through singlet while wearing a holy facial marking.¹

Madonna replied to the World Vaishnava Association as follows:

“Here,” says Madonna, who reckons her intensive three-hours-a-day yoga exercises and interest in [the Jewish] Kabbalah…gives her license to speak on such matters, “is another group of judgemental people who think that they alone possess some special knowledge to unlock the secrets of the universe. I thought I was introducing spirituality to the masses, while this very elitist group thinks that only the smug get to be enlightened.”²

Firstly, to believe Yoga and the Kabbalah have any bearing on Hinduism is odd. Certainly, the World Vaishnava Association itself has been dismissed by some Hindus as an “unknown organization run by people with doubtful credentials”³. However, they are still Hindu, and entitled to creatively redevelop their tradition. However, Madonna’s familiarity with Yoga and the Kabbalah give her absolutely no Hindu credentials whatsoever. Thus, the World Vaishnava Association writes that

Madonna either misunderstood the significance of wearing tilak[, the holy facial markings of purity,] or treated it very cheaply. We sincerely hope it was the former and not the latter. If she is sincere about her newly expressed interest in Vedic teachings and mysticism, we are sure she will recognize her mistake and tender an apology. And of course she will be forgiven. Hindus and Vaishnavas are very tolerant and always open to people sincerely interested in understanding the Vedas and Vaishnava philosophy and religion. And Madonna is also welcome if she is a sincere seeker.⁴

Certainly, this is the response of someone interested in ‘bringing spirituality to the masses’. This Vedic scholar is worried about misunderstanding and cheap appropriation, but equally interested in learning and forgiveness.

Madonna, however, shows no such patience, forgiveness, or even respect. On the contrary, she simply “waved a henna-painted hand and replied: ‘If they are so pure, why are they watching MTV’?”⁵. Consequently, Madonna is not simply a superficial appropriator. She is also guilty of superficially rejecting the criticism of actual Hindus, those whose tradition she has drawn on for her ‘counterfeit’ capital. Rather than

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showing what we have call a deep regard, she dismisses them without a thought like the capitalist self-aggrandising egoist she is.
Appendix V: ‘Powering Up Organisations for Renewable Results’

In ‘The Powering Up Organisations for Renewable Result Method’, Director General of QLD Roads, Jim Varghese, writes the following:

Structure refers to the positions and reporting arrangements in an organisation. People refer to any person or persons working in an organisation. Systems refers to the combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole of an organisation. […] I found that the identification of the pattern and the possibilities of using the alignment pattern to achieve management success on a continuing basis exciting. […] I felt that I had inadvertently discovered a method which could shift management from a problem focus to a delivery focus in ways what would be easy to understand and apply. I decided to coin this alignment method or fractal as PURR – Powering Up organisations for Renewable Results.¹

The use of the term ‘fractal’ to mean ‘alignment method’ is curious. The term ‘fractal’ was coined by mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot. It is utilised to denote self-similar geometric patterns, often arising from so-called ‘chaos’ equations, where the self-similarity is independent of scale. For instance, in the ‘Mandelbrot Set’, the overall shape of the image is repeated around its edges. If these were magnified, they would also reveal the same shape. These recurrent self-similarities are understood as being fractal in nature.

Varghese’s ‘PURR’ model, however is not a ‘fractal’. On the contrary, it is a fairly typical, ‘garden variety’, top-down and centralised management method. It does not show any more self-similarity than most hierarchies where management try to create the same simple ‘logic’ on every level of organisation. Consequently, the use of ‘fractal’ has no deep bearing on the ‘PURR’ system. This is an example of superficial appropriation.

Appendix VI: The Nolan Waterfront Apartments

“What’s your view on the latest Nolan?” we are asked by this advertisement for the NewQuay apartment buildings, an MAB enterprise. One of the many new structures identified with famous artists, the Nolan apartment buildings link the name and work of Sidney Nolan to “a unique fusion of art and architecture”. These apartments feature “sizeable balconies and European appliances”, all complemented by “sweeping views of the Victoria harbour and Melbourne’s city skyline.” On these ‘sizeable balconies’, we may find well-groomed, affluent couples sipping wine and gazing at the water. While the Ned Kelly motif adds an ‘edge’ to the image, we see here that Nolan’s name is wedded to a vision of rich, bourgeois and petite-bourgeois cosmopolitanism.

However, Sidney Nolan, along with the other artists and writers of the Angry Penguins group, was “in flight from…the petite-bourgeoisie with all its potential hollowness and flat philistinism”. Indeed, Nolan’s Ned Kelly series was trying to remythologise the Australian landscape in opposition to ‘city views’, pastoral Romanticism, and those Australians acting like “displaced Europeans”. Nolan sought artistic freedom and Australian expression in Murrumbeena and the sparse lands of Glenrowan, not in waterfront luxury and ‘European appliances’. Indeed, if they were not supported by John and Sunday Reed, Nolan and many of his friends could not have afforded to work, let alone buy expensive waterfront apartments. In addition to this, it seems that MAB have breaches copyright by using the Nolan name without permission. This is superficial and, for once, illegal appropriation.

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*1 New Quay promotion, in The Age, 19/5/01, p.13
*2 Ibid.
*3 Ibid.
*5 Ibid., p.253
*6 Lubienska, E. (2/8/01), Copyright Co-ordinator, Bridgeman Art Library for the Nolan Estate, personal communication
Appendix VII: On Lenin

As a Marxist, Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin (1870-1924) was reacting against the spread of capitalism, itself associated with the tradition of Epicurus, Hobbes and Locke. In this capacity, Lenin refused the economic determinism of Marxism in favour of a ‘voluntarist’ radicalism.\(^1\) Put simply, in order to overcome tsardom and the existing forces of capitalism, it was necessary for there to be a practical struggle for freedom grounded in class consciousness. This struggle was to be one of critical reflexivity, and the mastery of passions with Marxist rationality. In practice, however, Lenin took up the neo-Epicureanism of Marxist thought.\(^2\) Indeed, Buick tells us that

> Lenin was expounding bourgeois materialism. Certainly he called himself a dialectical materialist…but…he believed…there were general laws of dialectics operating like natural laws in the universe of physical matter.\(^3\)

For this reason, Lenin tended to ignore “[h]istorical materialism…the latter based on social not natural science.”\(^4\) Thus, he had little ‘taste’ for cultural dialogue. If the ‘laws of the material universe’ were readily understood, the Socialist state would steadily appear like Laplacian clockwork. There was no attempt made to seriously come to terms with “education of members of society in organisational skills; that is, through mass education and proletarian culture.”\(^5\) Rather, Lenin sought change in the material conditions.

The discipline of the revolutionary proletariat class, for instance, had nothing to do with education in culture, poetry, or any such ‘idealistic’ notions. Rather, it simply “grows out of the material conditions…and out of them alone.”\(^6\) Thus, if the material conditions that spawned the ‘revolutionary discipline’ were changed, society would change accordingly. Indeed, for Lenin, revolution only requires “rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, rule that is unrestricted by violence.”\(^7\) Quite simply, the dictatorship of the proletariat, having smashed bourgeois Russia, would ‘work it all out in the end’, and no ‘cultural creativity’ was needed.\(^8\) While this may seem to owe much to Marxist materialism, as Arendt writes, “Marx was aware of the role of violence in history, but this role was to him secondary”\(^9\). Plamenanz’s view of the Marxist Dictatorship of the Proletariat seems to accord with

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For Lenin, however, violence was primary, for it changed the material conditions and thus changed society.

After the violent October Revolution, this soon meant that Providence, not willing to ‘mirror’ the material base, reasserted itself. Put simply, Lenin ignored the fact that the most illusive of historical causations is ‘culture’, because culture is both the context and the co-conspirator of all human action, and what is problematic about it is that the most important elements of it are by definition unspoken and inexplicit.

Indeed, not long after the dust had settled, Lenin’s dreams of a modern socialist state began to wane under the ‘hidden yoke’ of old Russian culture. Lenin, for instance, was horrified that the people of Russia were deifying him. What Lenin ignored in his hurry to change the material base was the faith and idolatry of the Orthodox Russian people, where the humble Russian needed to “find some holy shrine or person, to fall before him and worship him”4. This idolatry, of course, undermined the Bolsheviks’ political vision. Indeed, it was this culture of deification, Tsarist or otherwise, that later allowed Stalin to rule by ‘cult of personality’. We see here that, as Tumarkin writes,

the new Bolshevik order, seeking to impose itself upon Russia, was itself molded by precisely those elements of old Russian culture that Lenin so desperately sought to destroy.

As we have seen, at the heart of this failure was Lenin’s ‘pre-critical materialism’. Althusser excuses this on the grounds that Lenin was actually ‘practicing philosophy’ rather than ‘philosophising’. Certainly, Lenin wrote much and worked hard, and occasionally the two intertwined. However, in ‘practicing philosophy’ of this kind, Lenin doomed the Bolshevik party and, mutatis mutandis, Russia to cultural bankruptcy. Lenin’s preoccupation with materialism, with culture understood only as a function of the economic or productive base, “resulted in a vulgar reductionism which denied culture any possibility of distance from the power of a ruling class and tended to ‘wipe away the whole as with a sponge’.”

Again, it is because of this materialism that Lenin ignored Aristotle’s logos when he actually engaged in debate. Speech amongst different people in a political community is irrelevant when only material changes change society. The only serious way to

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4 Dostoyevsky, F. (1958), *Brothers Karamazov*, Volume 1, Penguin Books, Ringwood, p.31
9 See, for instance, Lenin, V.1. (1947), *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p.336
revolution was the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, ruthlessly enforced by Stalin after his ‘inheritance’ of Lenin’s Bolshevik party.¹ Certainly, it was this callousness that was foreseen by the reactionary Dostoyevsky in *The Devils*. In Russia, this ruthlessness led to a situation where the ownership of the means of production changed, while the culture of autocracy and idolatry perpetuated itself. Even now, newspaper reports tell us of conditions close to tsarist serfdom in ‘capitalist Russia’.² At the same time, many post-*Perestroika* Russians stripped of historicity by instrumentalism uphold both the neoliberal economics of Western late modernity, and the sedimented ‘backward glance’ of pre-modernity, such as pagan naturism.³

*Contra* Althusser, these are the degenerate and often bloody consequences of Lenin’s ‘pre-critical’ embrace of the Enlightenment’s *bourgeois* materialism, a materialism that tends to reduce culture, as with Hobbes and Locke, to a passive object of external manipulation.⁴ Ultimately, Lenin’s rejection of culture was more a vindication of Hobbes and Locke than of Marx, or at least the ‘Marxist project’. We must be wary of Leninist, or vulgar orthodox Marxist approaches. Rather, we should try to appreciate the insights of Marxism in terms of Aristotle, Vico and Herder.

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³ See, for example http://www.russiannudistnaturist.com; http://kcm.naturway.ru.
**Appendix VIII: On The Castle**

In the recent Australian film *The Castle*, we see a ‘home’ only marginally different from *Star Wars* and *Indiana Jones*. Certainly, *The Castle* should be congratulated for its reaffirmation of the sanctity of ‘shelter’ and ‘family’. However, it is also a fairly typical conservative response to ‘homelessness’ by those who have successfully embodied the metaphysics and ethics of modern capitalism. The notions of ‘people’, ‘birthplace’, ‘grave’, ‘birth’, ‘death’, ‘land’ and even ‘hospitality’ are barely acknowledged, and the gender roles of the *bourgeois* family are strictly adhered to. Despite its mocking attitude to lawyers themselves, *The Castle* unquestioningly affirms the role of the legal system wherein all problems are solved. It also endorses the notion of the ‘family’ as a place where individual eccentricities can be ‘authentically’ displayed, a characteristic associated with modern capitalism and the death of public citizenship.

However, Siemienowicz argues that *The Castle* is “a reassertion of the values of home…[where] the values of home are fiscally irreducible and contrary to the logic of flexible capital accumulation.” Siemienowicz believes that *The Castle*, in valorising blissful ‘home-making’ within ugliness, under-education, soil toxicity, air, soil and noise pollution, and legal rights, is “[i]nverting the values of capital….” By reasserting these values, the Kerrigans are showing that their “inelegant” red-brick dwelling is not merely a house, but a home. Certainly, the Kerrigans do not have an *ethos* of market fundamentalism. In their defence of their house, they ground their lives in a meaning beyond that of economic value. The ‘pool room’, for example, is a place where sanctified items are displayed. In the rituals of the Kerrigan family, then, we see the grounding of words and meaning in practices. They have a ‘libidinous’ link to their ‘shelter’. In this sense Siemienowicz is right to valorise *The Castle*.

Nevertheless, this valorisation of *The Castle* is still problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the usual modern conflation of ‘shelter’ and ‘family’ with ‘home’. Secondly, the Kerrigans do not offer a radical critique of capitalism. Certainly, they do not have the newest, most stylish, most expensive items of consumption. Nonetheless, the ‘kitchy’ Kerrigans affirm their commitment to commodity consumption and abstract exchange-value by playing a game where they inquire about items in *The Trading Post*, amusing themselves by attacking over-inflated value. They are well within the ‘rules of the game’ of modern capitalism. Thirdly, the life of the Kerrigans is not necessarily one we can valorise apart from its sheer refusal of market fundamentalism. They have lead in their air and soil, mercury in their seas and cancer-causing power lines near their children. They are apparently happy with these. If this is “utopian longing for home”, what this means is that their standards of ‘home’ are corrupt. They find meaning in the practices of their ‘house’ and ‘family’, but these are grounded in sickness, parochialism, pollution and so forth. In this sense, their ‘utopian longings’ are not nearly utopian.

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2 See p.373, above.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 See p.303, above.
7 Ibid.
enough. Lastly, and associated with this, their ‘alternatives’ to flexible capital accumulation are hardly indicative of a creative, open-ended and free ‘home’. While Siemienowicz uses Harvey to develop her picture of globalisation, Harvey in fact problematises the isolated, fragmented and parochial home of the type valued by the Kerrigans.\footnote{Harvey, D. (2000), \textit{Spaces of Hope}, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp.71-71 and passim; Harvey, D. (1997), \textit{The Condition of Postmodernity}, Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp.303-307} Harvey also problematises the notion of ‘heterotopia’ \textit{qua} ‘other for the sake of other’, which the Kerrigans seem to be a good example of.\footnote{Harvey, D. (2000), \textit{Spaces of Hope}, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp.183-185} Consequently, like \textit{Star Wars} and \textit{Indiana Jones}, \textit{The Castle} is a symptom of ‘homelessness’, not a cure.
Appendix IX: More Superficial Appropriation

With Earthworm Jim, Godzilla and the Fantastic Four, science, engineering and Greek history are corrupted, and this is seen as standard children’s entertainment. Godzilla, of course, is as much a product of capitalist Hollywood as Prince of Egypt, while television is also associated with capitalism, self-interest and shallowness, where even the most ‘left’ programs are subsumed into the dominant ethos. Lastly, with the National Party, we see the superficiality of elected representatives, and their institutions. Here, democracy is clearly corrupted, along with the stories of rural Australia. This, in turn, seems linked to the neoliberal capitalism of the Liberal Party, instrumentalist realpolitik, and the self-interest of politicians trying to keep their positions in a party dominated by the agenda of the Liberals.

i. Superficiality and Godzilla, Fantastic Four and Earthworm Jim

Godzilla tells the story of a giant lizard, mutated by nuclear testing. In one scene, the pilot of an F-18 aircraft prepares to fire on New York’s Madison Square Garden. The pilot states: “I am showing a good laser track on top of the Garden. Selecting LGB.” One of the pilot’s lower display panels is then pictured, depicting the choice of weapons for the strike. This panel reads “AGM-84 Harpoon (2)” and two air-to-ground missiles are shown. These missiles are shown again in the subsequent action sequence. Unfortunately, an LGB is not an AGM. On the one hand, an LGB is an externally-guided, free-falling explosive often used on armoured vehicles. On the other hand, an AGM-84 Harpoon is an internally-guided, self-propelled munition, often used for naval targets. In this instance, military language and imagery has been used to denote the ‘no-nonsense’, ‘down-to-business’ combat ethos. Unfortunately, the terms and images only sound ‘military’, for the movie lacks an appreciation of the weapons to which they refer.

The Fantastic Four is an early-morning children’s cartoon, based on a Marvel comic series of the same name. In one episode, the superheroes known as the ‘Fantastic Four’ have been sent back in time from present-day North America to Classical Greece. They land in the middle of a battle between the Persians and the Greeks. The leader of the group, Dr. Reed, says to his fellow superheroes: “We don’t want to affect the course of history, but the Persians were merciless tyrants while the Greeks gave birth to the ideals of democracy we hold so dear, so…” Thus justified, the Fantastic Four then use their special powers to annihilate the Persians. Later on, the Fantastic Four show the Greeks how to make primitive napalm, referring to it as ‘Greek Fire’. This ‘Greek Fire’ is then used by the Fantastic Four against the Persian fleet.

4 Ibid.
5 Ironically, ‘tyrant’ comes from τυράννος, or tyrannos, a word used by Greeks to describe many despotic leaders of the Greek world. See Laistner, M.L.W. (1968), A History of the Greek World: From 479 to 323 B.C., Methuen & Co., London, pp. 346-347. The Greeks seem to have taken the word from the Lydians of Asia Minor.
6 The Fantastic Four, aired 27/11/98, Cheez TV, Channel 10, Melbourne. Not a verbatim transcript.
Firstly, we should note that ‘Greek Fire’ was used in Constantinople by the Byzantine Greeks against Muslim invaders in the eighth-century of the common era, not in the fifth-century B.C.E. by Greeks against Persians. This would be equivalent to saying that the knights of the crusades used American cruise missiles against Constantinople in the thirteenth-century. Also, while the peoples that ‘gave birth to the ideals of democracy’ were ‘Hellenic’, Greek societies displayed and developed various forms of government, including despotism, oligarchy and democracy. Indeed, the citizens of the Athenian democracy were adult males of Athenian descent, excluding women, slaves and ‘resident aliens’. These were hardly the modern democratic citizens of the North American nation-state.

Secondly it is worth noting that Greek society itself could quite readily be, in Laistner’s words, “characterised by not a little cruelty and barbarism.”\(^1\) In this sense, there is certainly no easy moral dichotomy between the ‘good’ Greeks and the ‘evil’ Persians. Certainly, history is always a contested terrain.\(^2\) However, these are as close to ‘facts’ as any historian would come. Indeed, this would be obvious to anyone who even vaguely understood the ancient Greek World and its stories, and the ‘major premises’ of its culture.

The writers of this *Fantastic Four* episode could have presented a fair and yet entertaining account of the Persian invasion of Greece. The absurdity of war, for instance, would have made a poignant theme, particularly given the later Peloponnesian conflicts. Instead, the writers chose to use the clothing, names, places and so forth, of Classical Greece, with no understanding whatsoever of the Greek World. Furthermore, they did so knowing that the program would be shown to young, impressionable viewers. For this reason, the writers’ use of the Greek World as the origin of democracy was not informed. On the contrary, this is an example of corruption and inauthenticity.

*Earthworm Jim* is also an early morning cartoon, based on a computer game. In one episode, a large superhero worm and a talking dog are travelling through space and unfortunately encounter a black hole. The worm discharges his weapon at the black hole in an attempt to destroy it, thus saving their lives. Fortunately, the black hole begins to weaken. To explain this, the talking dog says: “We’re slowing down. The energy of your space-gun is reversing the polarity of the particles in the Schwarzschild radius.”\(^3\) Does this, we should ask, do justice to the scientific World?

The Schwarzschild radius is the perimeter of a black-hole, the region where information, once within, cannot escape. Thus, this radius becomes an ‘event horizon’, where observers external to the radius cannot possibly gain information about the internal state of the system. Particles specifically ‘within’, or more correctly, on the Schwarzschild radius would be those which cannot break free of the gravitational force, but which, by their lesser proximity to the singularity, are not attracted back towards the latter. Thus, such particles, relative to an external observer, would be completely


static. They would not be Doppler-shifted to black, but would have no momentum. Reversing the polarity of these particles would not weaken the black hole’s gravitational field, or alter the radius of the event horizon. The particles would therefore remain trapped, but with reversed polarity. This polarity would not effect the pull of gravity, and thus there is no reason to suggest firing the gun at the Black Hole would achieve anything at all. Thus, the scientific notion of the ‘black hole’ has simply been used to suggest danger and immense power. Unfortunately, it has been used in a manner which does not do justice to the World of Western scientific thought. These terms, ‘black hole’, ‘Schwarzchild radius’ and ‘polarity’ have been superficially appropriated.

ii. Superficiality and the Country Party

The Victorian Farmers’ Protection Association was one of the regional organisations that lead to the formation of the Victorian Country Party in Australia. Among many political ‘gripes’, the farmers saw the cities growing rich from their labour, while legislating to make their lives more difficult. Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, they wanted to be unified like trades Hall, only with more lobbying power. The Victorian Farmers’ Union expressed a similar sentiment.

Eventually, the Country Party arose, formed officially as a united party in August of nineteen-hundred-and-two. After some confusion and uncertainty, it was strengthened and properly institutionalised in the time during and after World War One in response to marketing and price controls. As with the VFPA and the VFU, the message of the Country Party was clear. To those in the rural World, the land and the workers of the land were the source of all prosperity. This was an image of farmers as honest, hard-working, noble and most of all, necessary to a good society. While this may be rightly dismissed as self-serving rhetoric, the Country Party was nonetheless essential to Australia. As B.D. Graham writes,

through the Country Parties, about one-sixth of the Australian people were brought back into a political system from which they felt excluded. Quite simply, the Country Parties survived because they were needed. Given the undercurrents of anti-liberalism and authoritarianism in Australian society, such reconciliations to the parliamentary system are historically important.

Growing from a ground-swell of small farming associations, and stemming primarily from interaction with disinterested ‘city slickers’, harsh agricultural conditions and a largely resource-based economy, the Country Party carried the narratives of separatism, individualistic ‘battling’, and a sense of moral indignance to the state and federal arena. They wished to stop the massive flow of resources from rural to urban areas, which led to the impoverishment of entire rural areas, and the decimation of their communities. This, then, is not simply an economic issue, it is one of acknowledgment and respect

4 Ibid., p.39
5 Ibid., p.296
for rural life in the face of international competition and national priorities. This is why the Country Party is ‘historically important’, not just for rural citizens, but for all Australians. It is no coincidence that this involved a deep engagement with rural narratives and mythology, the farmers participating to no small extent in song and storytelling. \(^1\) In short, the Country Party was founded to uphold the voice of a very specific World.

Nowadays, the Country Party is the National Party. However, senior National Party members are involved in managing the Crown Casino and the Victorian Grand Prix. Both of these are located in the Melbourne central business district, and were linked to the Kennett Liberal State Government, known for its decimation of rural areas through deregulation and privatisation. Furthermore, when asked about specific events in the history of the Victorian Country Party, such as the State coalition formed with Labor, or early political battles between rural conservatives and radicals, an elected member of the Victorian National Party had “no knowledge of key figures and history”\(^2\). Indeed, he simply expressed confusion when such things were discussed.\(^3\) Again, in Hamilton, rural Victoria, when four hundred townpeople gathered to voice their concerns with the Government’s imposition of catchment rates, one endorsed Federal candidate of the National party responded sardonically with “It’s only four-hundred out of twenty-thousand people…”\(^4\). Of course, the members of this ‘minority’ have fathers, mothers, brothers, cousins, workmates and friends, most whom can be assumed share their discontent. Even if we grant that four-hundred is a small number, we should remember the VFPA, VFU, Country Party, and National Party were formed to specifically represent the this rural World. The very existence of this Party is to give voice to a given history, tradition and heritage. This politician, then, is not ‘living’ the story of the rural World. If he were, he would feel compelled to at least express his outrage. Again, as Ellos writes, people whose narrative has been corrupted should feel an “apprehension that things are not of a piece, a sense of direction perceived or lost.”\(^5\) This politician, however, is a fraud, for he feels no sense of personal incompleteness when his World and the traditions it represents are being destroyed. It is not simply this one politician that is inauthentic, however. As Robert Manne writes,

> the emergence of …geographical inequality [has] imposed on the parties of the Coalition lethal strains. The Liberal party has become, above all things, the party of economic rationalist reform. Yet it is precisely because of this marriage to a party of this type that the National Party is currently fighting for survival in Country Australia.\(^6\)

In short, the National party has forgotten its origins in the narrative World of the rural people. These origins have been compromised by a quest for urban wealth and political power. Unfortunately, then, the ideological rifts tentatively identified by Jupp three decades ago have not been ‘smoothed over’.\(^7\) They have merely led to the redundancy of the ‘lesser’ party. By bowing to the agenda of Liberal Party, one

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\(^2\) Hancock, B. (8/5/99), Honours Student and National Party Member, personal communication

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Recorded by Hancock, B. (8/5/99), Honours Student and National Party member, personal communication


\(^6\) Manne, R. (19/3/01), ‘Why Howard is Doomed’, *The Age*, p.13


Appendices 431
of privatisation, deregulation and trade-liberalisation, the National Party has therefore formed a ‘traitor’s alliance’. While they use the words ‘bush’, ‘battler’, ‘rural issues’ and so forth, the National party no longer ‘lives the story’ of the rural narrative World. Thus, these terms are superficial, if not superficially appropriated.

### iii. Superficiality in Advertising

Like Hollywood, advertising is also associated with modern capitalist society. It allows products to be consumed despite their negligible use-value, and stimulates new demand. Moreover, advertising permeates our media, making it essential in almost all forms of modern mass communication. Thus, by looking into advertising we are gaining a sense of the ‘logic’ of our society.

“Clearly, it’s the driving gene” states BMW’s advertisement. Playing on the concept of technological inheritance, the piece writes that the “new BMW Series…is…[t]he purest expression of a true driving machine, automotive DNA for a new generation” What may we make of this? Each BMW is a carefully designed product of human engineering. DNA, on the other hand, is our main source of biological inheritance, which ‘records’ mutations and gives us our distinct genotype. These mutations, for the most part, are random. Though nature may be characterised by entelecheia, it is certainly not a ‘natural’ product of human engineering. What we see here, then, is conscious, contrived, engineering versus unconscious uncontrived ‘niche-filling’. The notion of a ‘driving gene’ makes little scientific sense. Later, we are told that the inherited features of the vehicle are “an example of a perfect chain reaction, its prime characteristics refined and honed over years.” This use of ‘chain reaction’ makes no sense. It is possible that the advertisement’s writers are alluding to Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). The PCR, however, is a technique for deriving large quantities of DNA from small amounts in extremely short periods of time by using each strand as a transcription template, thus doubling the quantity of strands every generation. This, has little to do with the production of the BMW.

Similarly, the advertisement from Baby Gap simply reads: “instant karma”. Sitting on a silken pillow, an infant dressed in an Eastern manner looks knowingly at the camera, perhaps alluding to the ‘child sages’ of Tibetan Buddhism. Here, it is difficult to say what we are being told. If anything, the velvet jacket brings with it ends, feelings, or aesthetics linked to the Eastern notion of karma. This is ‘instant karma’. In short, we will personally gain ‘good karma’ by buying this product. Unfortunately, this at odds with both Buddhism and Hinduism. Theravada Buddhist monks renounce all worldly

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2 BMW promotion, in *Vogue*, November 1998, p.6
3 See p.408, above.
4 *Ibid*.
5 This is not to say that blind chance is exhaustively responsible for biological diversity, morphogenesis, or even heredity, only that DNA is not a fruitful metaphor for deliberate and purposeful cultural heredity. Cf. Dennett, D. C. (1995), *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea*, Penguin Books, Ringwood, pp.342-338
6 *Ibid.,* p.9
7 This is giving the authors the benefit of the doubt. The reference to the chain reaction most probably has nothing to do with DNA at all, but if it does, the PCR is an extremely successful and widely-used technique in genetic science.
8 Baby Gap promotion, in *Vogue*, November 1998, back page (p.334)
9 See p.409, above.
The Silent Chorus: Culture and Superficiality

possessions. While Mahayana Buddhists monasteries may accumulate wealth and power, neither Mahayana or Theravada Buddhists are personally engaged in the exchange of goods for personal gain. Hindus, who also believe in karma, believe that it is a function of virtuous actions. Thus, karma cannot be linked to any particular commodity. ‘Karma’ is not a ‘thing’, but a ‘law’ or consequence of individual action. Thus, advertising on the assumption that an agent could purchase and wear an item and thus gain ‘instant karma’, would be akin to stating that one could gain ‘instant gravity’ by purchasing a particular brand of socks. Thus, karma is not a commodity that can be exchanged for profit, let alone purchased for thirty-four pounds. Secondly, in Buddhism – for the child is dressed similarly to a Chinese or Tibetan infant – karma is not a matter of consequentialist ethics. Karma, quite simply, is not a matter of ends, such as bought goods. Thus, karma and cannot be understood as an incentive to consume. Indeed, this would be precisely the kind of approach required to ensure ‘bad karma’.

The promotional material for the ‘Gatineau Laser’ facial cosmetic claims that it is “the first cosmetic laser product, containing ‘optical captors’ which transforms the light wavelengths to ensure your skin received the best of light.” It states that “the laser ray is extraordinarily effective in erasing the marks of age”. Its advertisement shows a vague ‘scientific’ image to complement this ‘laser’. However, the cream contains tiny prisms which reflect certain wavelengths away from the skin, while allowing others to pass through. Conversely, a laser uses the energetic properties of crystalline atoms to stimulate coherently-phased photon bursts, which, because of their coherent nature, can be used as a directed energy beam with the intent of destroying tissue. Thus, while the prisms do reflect certain wavelengths away from the skin, they do not emit phased, coherent light due to the ‘jumping’ of electrons from one energetic state to another. Unfortunately, then, the ‘Gatineau Laser’ is nothing like a laser. In this sense, while the science behind the product seems perfectly reasonable, these ‘light captors’ have little to do with laser technology.

Lastly, ‘Country Life’ soap is made by Pental Soap Products, a subsidiary of F.H. Faulding and Co.. The packaging for ‘Country Life’ soap boldly tells us that ‘Country Life’ is “Glyceryn Enriched Pure Soap”. Moreover, it is “Now with added Glycerin”. Here, we are led to believe that ‘glycerin’ is a chemical additive that contributes to the overall effectiveness of the product. That is, ‘glycerin’, as a term utilised by chemical scientists, is denoting a ‘technologically-advanced’ additive which Pental Soap Products use.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.26; Radhakrishnan, S. (1996), Indian Philosophy, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, Delhi, p.249
7 Ibid.
8 See p.408, above.
9 In Coles Supermarket, Glenferrie Rd., Hawthorn, 3122, 7/5/99
10 Ibid.
However glycerin is not an additive in their products. This was confirmed by technicians from the Pental Soap laboratory.\(^1\) Rather, glycerin is a by-product that Pental tries to remove from its soaps. Often, as the manufacturers “are not able to separate it fully”\(^2\), glycerin may constitute ~1% of the eventual product.\(^3\) Indeed, the technicians explicitly say that they do not add glycerin to the mix.\(^4\) Thus, where glycerin constitutes a larger proportion of the product, it would appear that inefficient or ineffective production processes are being ‘fudged’ by the ‘creative’ use of a scientific term.

The Brand Manager at F.H.Faulding and Co. said that such things were matters of “give an inch and take a mile”\(^5\). Regardless of how dishonest an advertisement may be, “if it meets regulatory affairs, well then that’s enough”\(^6\). Certainly, the Brand manager was surprised at the difference between the production process and the packaging. Nonetheless, she defended the advertising. For her, it is just an example of “fluffery, [where F.H. Faulding] aren’t the first [to do this] and…won’t be the last.”\(^7\) This is an example of superficial appropriation. Furthermore, it is an example of superficial dismissal, where the deeper issues of capitalism, truth and justice are irrelevant. Superficiality is blindly defended as the \textit{status quo}.

\textbf{iv. Superficiality in the New Age}

In ‘Fear is our Enemy – Chaos is our Friend’, Aluna Joy Yaxk’in exhorts her readers to “walk the path of love”\(^8\). If we do this, we will attract paradise to us rather than Armageddon. She writes:

\begin{quote}
The great dream/hologram is splitting into many paths and focuses. What is important right now is to anchor the dream you wish to be a part of….If you believe in all the millennium computer bug hysteria, you’ll create that drama. Focusing your time and energy on negative, dramatic, conspiracy based and survival issues will waste precious time and energy and anchor you deeper in the dream/hologram of fear….\(^9\)
\end{quote}

A dream is, among other things, a subjective, often irrational, psycho-chemical process with an abnormal temporal framework occurring during unconsciousness. A hologram is a three-dimensional image formed ‘in the mind’ as a result of the interaction between a photographic image and a subtle interference pattern on glass. Holograms and dreams are not the same, and any work that sought to poetically link them would have to do more than Joy Yaxk’in.

Joy Yaxk’in goes on to tell us that we “are living through an unprecedented acceleration of frequencies….Every time we receive a stepped up vibration, our bodies

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^1\) Laboratory Technician (12/5/99), Pental Soap Products, personal communication
\item \(^2\) Ibid.
\item \(^3\) Ibid.
\item \(^4\) Ibid.
\item \(^5\) Ibid.
\item \(^6\) Ibid.
\item \(^7\) Pirello, S. (12/5/99), Brand Manager at F.H. Faulding & Co., personal communication
\item \(^8\) Ibid.
\item \(^9\) Ibid.
\end{itemize}
have to work hard to keep up.’¹ What, though, does she mean by ‘frequency’? ‘Frequency’ can mean the repeated occurrence or renewal of a process, through greater speed, for instance.² ‘Frequency’ can also mean the rate of vibration of a particular wave or particle.³ Certainly, the former would make sense. Therefore, does Yaxk’in mean that are lives are getting faster? She later tells us that “frequencies are also quickly stimulating the pineal and the pituitary glands”⁴. Certainly, an acceleration of the ‘renewal’ or ‘occurrence’ of most processes would not stimulate one’s pituitary or pineal glands, per se. A faster life would, if anything, inhibit the pineal gland,⁵ while the pituitary gland affects too many organs to be merely ‘stimulated’ by speed.⁶ Our lives are not simply getting faster, then. Yaxk’in is apparently referring to electromagnetic frequencies of some kind, frequencies that are stimulating our glands. However, given that television, radio, microwave and infra-red transmissions continue unaffected, an ‘unprecedented acceleration’ in electromagnetic frequencies seems unlikely. Furthermore, given that biologists do not yet wholly understand what the pineal gland does, we may assume that Yaxk’in has made no ‘ground-breaking’ physiological discoveries.⁷ Perhaps, then, Joy Yaxk’in means to say that the intensity of these ‘frequencies’ is becoming more and more powerful. Unfortunately, she would then be referring to ‘amplitude’, and not to ‘frequency’.

To continue, though, Yaxk’in tells us that we should ‘walk the path of love’ Certainly, this would seem reasonable. However, the ‘path of love’ is not important in and of itself. The ‘path of love’ is important because the

creative force of the universe and the Great Creator is impersonal and [sic] non-judgemental entity and will give us just what we want, expect and most of all, fear. What we prepare for, and what we hold in our hearts, is what the universe will supply! It is a natural universal law. The universe adds support to the realities that we have put into action in our minds and by our action.⁸

The universe serves to give us all we want. This, certainly, is a startling discovery.⁹ However, the “path of love is about seeing the problems and acting from love, compassion and non-judgement”¹⁰. As there is to be no judgement, there is also to be no evidence and no criticism. Yaxk’in writes:

If you are experiencing confusion, stop asking for outside advice. Learn to tune into the temple of the heart within and listen to your own wisdom. Turn off the TV, radio, and toss the

¹ Ibid., p.44
² e.g. ‘Here he comes again, arriving again and again with such frequency.’
³ e.g. ‘Welcome to DOG FM, frequency 108.6 on your FM dial.’
⁵ Tortora, G.J. and Grabowski, S.R. (1996), Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, HarperCollins, New York, pp.539-540. That is, if we are continually ‘up and about’, living faster, more ‘productive’ days, our pineal gland will not produce melatonin.
⁶ Ibid., pp.509-520. The hypothalamus stimulates the pituitary gland to produce a variety of hormones, and both play a major role in the autonomic nervous system, as well as growth, development and so forth. To say that the pituitary gland is ‘stimulated’ is to say very little. It also indicates a ‘bypassing’ of the hypothalamus. If this is the case, then we must again assume an electromagnetic cause.
⁷ Ibid., p.539
⁹ The statement is also callous, solopsistic and naïve. Why does she not ‘walk the path’ of attracting a wider audience, ‘walk the path’ of converting them to her viewpoint, and then ‘walk the path’ of halting world poverty?
You are not protecting yourself by staying informed of what is happening in the world through mass media.¹

Quite simply, Joy Yaxk’in does not want to be criticised, and other New Age thinkers say similar things.² This, of course, is because she has sole access to truth, however solopsistically this may be understood. At this point, we may conjecture that Joy Yaxk’in wants to superficially appropriate from biology, physics, Yoga and so forth, but does not want this to be obvious. Thus, all truth is ‘real’, though we are to live according to her words, and not anyone else’s. This, like that of Madonna,³ is a kind of superficial rejection, which has no regard for any kind of deep argument with anyone else. However, as MacIntyre argues, these ‘epistemological defenses’ that avoid being questioned are simply the mark of a ‘degenerate tradition’.⁴ Here, we see superficial appropriation, and its defence, ontological and existential relativism.

In ‘Zoosh – The Nature of Predictions’, Robert Shapiro writes that “mysticism, philosophy (these things are religion also) are not designed to serve the mind. They are designed to serve the heart….”⁵ Here, ‘heart’ is used colloquially to mean ‘romantic capacity’ or ‘emotional memory’. However, Shapiro then tells us that the heart is ultimately the organ you cannot live without. Science will tell you that you cannot live without a brain, but in fact you can; but you certainly cannot live without a heart. It is this clear-cut, philosophical fact that’s intended to draw your attention to the heart as being the perhaps least understood mystical aspect of any being…⁶

Firstly, this use of ‘heart’ is odd. Previously, ‘heart’ was meant metaphorically. Here, though, the metaphor has been extended to become a ‘philosophical fact’. No evidence is given, though we are told about the role of various organs, and the errors of biological science. Secondly, philosophy is very much ‘designed for the mind’, as the Greek philosophia, or ‘the love of wisdom’, suggests. If, however, this is too vague, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines ‘philosophy’ as a “study of the most general and abstract features of the world and categories with which we think”⁷. This, then, is a superficial appraisal of philosophy and its terminology.

¹ Ibid., p.45
³ See Appendix IV, p.419.
⁴ MacIntyre, A. (1977), ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science’, Monist, 60, p.461
⁶ Ibid.
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PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS

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x. Young, D.A. (2002), ‘Emergence, Poetry and Being’, delivered to the Joseph Needham Centre for Complex Processes Research, Swinburne University, September 4th 2002