UDF-PAL-08-245 – Democratic dialogue in Palestine: Acculturation towards tolerance (Occupied Palestinian Territories)

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I. Executive Summary

i. Project Data
The Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies (RCHRS) is based in Ramallah, in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). From 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2011, the organization ran the project: Democratic dialogue in Palestine: Acculturation towards tolerance. The project received USD220,000 in support from UNDEF.

The project focused on building the capacity of young people in the OPT – primarily students at university in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – to contribute to understanding of tolerance and “difference”, with a view to bridging two identified socio-political gaps: within Palestinian communities, and between the public and the three main authorities (the legislative, judiciary and unions) in the OPT.

The project included workshops and conferences to teach democratic principles and models and provide frameworks to put them into practice; meetings between young people and Palestinian decision makers; encouraging young people to volunteer and conduct education and outreach in their communities; and providing forums for the participants to meet and follow up their meetings and networking. Towards the end of the project, a study visit to Europe was organized for two participants with two coordinators, to “see democracy and tolerance at work”.

ii. Evaluation questions
In evaluating the relevance of the project, the evaluators interviewed participants, RCHRS personnel, academic participants, decision makers, journalists and representatives of United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both the West Bank and, by phone, the Gaza Strip. All confirmed the situation analysis underpinning the project’s design, however there were repeated mentions of the broader political reality of life in the OPT that impose restrictions that undermine the enjoyment of human rights for young Palestinians and colour their perception of human rights and justice.

In exploring the project’s effectiveness, the evaluators focused particularly on the comments of the participants, who confirmed the usefulness of the training and in particular the privileged access they were given to decision makers. The students reported that they liked the methodology used, especially the small group discussions. Both facilitators and decision makers commented on the enthusiasm of the students and their willingness to participate. The final conferences elicited less enthusiasm and the evaluators noted that links between the West Bank and Gaza conferences were weak. The students emerged from the training eager to act and their major criticism was that they were not given enough concrete guidance on what form this action might take or how they should go about organizing it.

In relation to efficiency, it was noted that the project budget was appropriately constructed and that all planned activities had been carried out to time and budget. The only variation to plans was that two final conferences were held towards the end of the project (one in the West Bank and one in Gaza) instead of four conferences. Media activity was limited, however the study visit organized for four participants to the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands was highly motivating for those who participated.

The evaluators considered that the impact of the project was significant at an individual level, with a number of participants putting their training into action within their communities – through training, organization of meetings, campaigns and on-line exchange. However it was clear that the political situation in the OPT and in particular the imposition of movement...
restrictions, the impasse in peace negotiations and the continued frustration of the Palestinians in relation to their human rights limit the impact of the projects at a wider societal level. This limitation was of course beyond the control of RCHRS.

RCHRS had set indicators for sustainability that related to individual follow-up, and these were largely met. There were many examples of participants following up the project with individual initiatives, and additionally the RCHRS continues to engage with the participants through a monthly discussion group, on-line forum and informal contacts. The students themselves are active as a Facebook group. This, however, is the only real link between the West Bank and Gaza participants, and the evaluators noted that links between the two OPT areas are a continuing challenge.

In attempting to identify UNDEF value-added, the evaluators met with representatives of relevant UN agencies and NGOs and concluded that UNDEF had filled a significant gap in programming in the OPT. Additionally, several interviewees commented that UNDEF’s support of the project had added to its legitimacy and was a unique initiative.

iii. Conclusions

- This was a well designed project, effectively implemented and with significant support from both participants and other stakeholders. The body of the report contains some detailed comments that the RCHRS may wish to take into account in planning future initiatives of the same nature.

- Restrictions on movement were taken into account in project implementation as far as possible, however they are a significant hurdle to full implementation and effectiveness as well as, ultimately, to impact.

- The training focused on improving understanding of theoretical concepts – tolerance, human rights, discrimination – and did not cover practical skills such as project design and management, fundraising and reporting, and evaluation and monitoring, which would have better equipped students to put their newly established knowledge into practice in their communities.

- Media outreach was in general a weak point in the project. Although there was media coverage of the project and some events, it was left up to individual (interested) journalists to use these opportunities to cover the issues at the heart of the project.

- The evaluators consider that the project had significant impact on individuals who participated. The reality of living under occupation limits the impact of the project on Palestinians on a broader developmental scale, however it seems clear from the comments of many interviewees that hope persists that democracy, justice and human rights will one day prevail, and that the future will be brighter for their children. As a result, a focus on teaching children about tolerance, democracy and human rights, and supporting more school-based programmes was regularly suggested.

- The project is likely to be sustainable, since a large number of participants are active in carrying the results of the project forward.

- The project delivered high value-added for UNDEF, which was seen by most stakeholders as the only organization capable of delivering such an initiative and as a trusted partner adding credibility to the actions and outcomes.
iv. Recommendations

For RCHRS

- Given the positive evaluation of the project, the evaluators believe that the project could be replicated, taking into account the feedback provided in this report. The evaluators suggest, in particular, that RCHRS might consider minimizing the risk of disengagement by providing a neutral facilitator for the meetings with decision makers.

- The evaluators recognize that making links between the West Bank and Gaza is a challenge, and recommend that videoconferencing, Skype and other social media should be explored more systematically, perhaps with the input of a specialist in these areas.

- One weakness of the project was the lack of a comprehensive media strategy, and the evaluators suggest that RCHRS might consider taking on short-term media expertise, as necessary, to develop a comprehensive media and communications strategy for projects.

- Given the enthusiasm of trainees to act on their training, but comments from some that they did not know how to do that, the evaluators recommend that, in training courses with a largely theoretical content, RCHRS should consider what practical skills might be taught to help the trainees to put their theoretical training into practice (for example: project design and management, fundraising and reporting, evaluation and monitoring).

- Many interviewees commented on the importance of beginning tolerance training with young children, and suggested that RCHRS explore the potential of piloting the same (suitably adapted) methodology for school-aged children – or of supporting trainees to do this.

For UNDEF

- The value-added of this project for UNDEF was very high, since there is a significant gap in the OPT for UN-led activities in the areas of democracy, governance and leadership, as well as human rights in general, and the evaluators considered that UNDEF may wish to consider this in focusing future support.
I. Introduction and development context

i. The project and evaluation objectives
From 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2011, the Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies (RCHRS) coordinated the project: Democratic dialogue in Palestine: Acculturation towards tolerance. The project, which was implemented in the West Bank and Gaza Strip of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), received USD 220,000 in support from UNDEF. USD 22,000 of this was retained for monitoring and evaluation.

The project focused on building the capacity of young people in the OPT to contribute to democratic processes and promote these in their communities, focusing on changing attitudes towards tolerance and discrimination. Its main objective, as stated in the original Project Document, was: “to bridge two major socio-political gaps: within Palestinian communities, and between the public and the three main authorities (the legislative, judiciary and unions) in the OPT through young people, the future leaders of Palestine”.

The project had a large number of intermediate objectives:

- Raise awareness and knowledge, primarily among young Palestinians, of key democratic concepts;
- Increase tolerance and national dialogue within Palestinian society;
- Give young Palestinians access to decision makers and political institutions and processes;
- Encourage legitimate political participation of young people and give them democratic tools and models through which to voice their opinions;
- Raise awareness of democratic challenges such as women’s rights, representational and political participation, and involve disenfranchised groups in inter-group dialogue and exchange;
- Develop a core of young Palestinian advocates for democratic principles and tolerance, who actively promote and practice these values through community outreach and education; and
- Create and encourage democratic models for public forums, journalistic reporting, and political transparency.

The evaluation mission is part of a series of post-project evaluations funded by UNDEF. Its purpose is “to undertake an in-depth analysis of UNDEF-funded projects to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project, which in turn helps UNDEF devise future project strategies. Evaluations also assist stakeholders in determining whether projects have been implemented according to the project document and whether the intended project outcomes have been achieved”\(^1\).

ii. Evaluation methodology
An international expert designated to lead the evaluation prepared a preliminary planning note (Launch Note) in August 2012 based on a review of project documentation (see Annex 2). Meanwhile, a national expert began developing with the grantee a schedule of interviews that would take place during a joint mission to the OPT from 7 to 12 September 2012.

Because of restrictions on travel for the local expert and the risks involved in the international expert travelling unaccompanied to the Gaza Strip, the evaluation took place in the West Bank, with participants in Gaza being contacted by phone.

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2. Between 2000 and 2009, 6,700 Palestinians between the ages of 12 and 18 were arrested by the Israeli authorities, according to Defence for Children International’s Palestine Section (DCI/PS). In 2009, a total of 423 were being held in Israeli
The experts interviewed staff of the implementing organization, academics who contributed to the project, political representatives, journalists and a range of participants in the project’s activities, as well as representatives of relevant UN agencies and NGOs. Interviews were conducted in English and Arabic.

Information was collected, analysed and is presented in this report according to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation criteria are outlined in more detail in Annex 1.

### iii. Development context

The social, economic and political development of the OPT – including the stability of democratic processes, people’s participation in governance and the institutions of democratic freedom -- cannot be separated from the political realities on the ground.

The area known as the West Bank (from its location to the west of the Jordan River) and the narrow strip of land known as the Gaza Strip, make up the area now known as the OPT. Although nominally one territory, they are separated not only by a 60 kilometre land bridge but by checkpoints, the recently constructed Israeli “seam line” barrier, and restrictions on movement that are heavily policed by the Israeli army and civilian authorities. As a result, the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip live separate lives, even though they may be of the same family. Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip may not leave unless they have a permit to work in Israel, and these are infrequently given and often revoked. West Bank residents may only enter the Strip with special permission from the Israeli Government.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the two territories live under distinctly different political structures and regimes. Following the death of former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA leadership has its headquarters in the West Bank town of Ramallah. In February 2005, the PA and Israel agreed to the Sharm Al-Sheikh Commitments designed to move the peace process forward, and later that year Israel dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip and withdrew settlers from Gaza. Israel maintains control of maritime, airspace and land access to the Gaza Strip.

In January 2006, the Gaza-based Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, won control of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and took control of the PA. Negotiations with President Abbas to develop a common political platform for the West Bank and Gaza failed, however, and violent clashes ensued between HAMAS and the other main PA faction, Fatah. A negotiated agreement...
was signed in February 2007 (the Mecca Agreement), however this was revoked in June 2007. It took until May 2011 for HAMAS and Fatah to agree to reunification of the territories, although final decisions on governance and security structures have not been reached.

As a result, HAMAS retains control of the Gaza Strip and the Fatah-dominated PA governs the West Bank. Since HAMAS is considered by a number of governments to be an “international terrorist organization”, external support to the Gaza Strip has been limited almost exclusively to relief aid for Palestinian refugees living there, whereas the West Bank has witnessed modest investment. Nevertheless the deficit budget of the West Bank is propped up by annual foreign donor assistance of some USD 3 billion.

Although the OPT is ranked in the “medium human development” category (114 of 187 countries with comparable data) in the 2011 UNDP Human Rights Indicators, there are significant differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The West Bank has a population of approximately 2.35 million (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS], 2012); additionally some 300,000 Israeli citizens live in 355 settlements scattered across the West Bank. The median age is very young: 21.7 years in 2012, roughly equal for men and women. The total fertility rate is 2.98 children per woman. Unemployment is at 23.5% but youth unemployment is higher, at 46.9%.

The population of the Gaza Strip is approximately 1.65 million (PCBS, 2012). Almost all the residents of the Strip are registered refugees. The median age is just 17.9 years. Almost half of the population is under the age of 14. The total fertility rate is 4.57 children per woman (2012). Unemployment is at 44%. These figures reflect the fact that young people are not able to leave the Gaza Strip, a restriction leading to intense dissatisfaction and desperation.

In the West Bank, in addition to being confined to allocated zones (see box below), Palestinians must cope with the fact that Israeli settlements often cut off or cut across roads to villages, forcing villagers to take dirt tracks traditionally used by livestock, to get to shops, schools and workplaces. Young people are regularly stopped and questioned and frequently imprisoned. Not only young people but also most of their parents were born in a land without statehood or sovereignty, unable to exercise their democratic rights fully because even voting does not always provide representative government (there is more on this in the evaluation below). International conventions cannot be ratified because of non-recognition of Palestinian statehood, but are accepted and then implemented by presidential decree. Laws are consequently often taken as non-binding and, in any case, people do not accept them because they have had no chance to discuss them or vote on them. The rule of law consequently has to be imposed by force. In such a situation, extremism seems inevitable when even those who wish to live quietly and peacefully face daily reminders of occupation and what they see as externally imposed and condoned injustice and internal submission and manipulation.

Given its difficult history, the reality of occupation, fractured government and ongoing risks to peace, it is not surprising that Palestinian society struggles to engage with democracy and governance. Political divides are reflected in social mistrust and there is little interaction between people and their leaders. It is in this complex and difficult context that the current project was conceived and implemented.

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2 Between 2000 and 2009, 6,700 Palestinians between the ages of 12 and 18 were arrested by the Israeli authorities, according to Defence for Children International’s Palestine Section (DCI/PS). In 2009, a total of 423 were being held in Israeli administrative detention or interrogation centres and prisons.
II. Project strategy

i. Project approach and strategy

The project strategy was to:

- Teach democratic principles and models and provide frameworks that put them into practice (workshops, forums, conferences, exchange visits);
- Bring together young people from diverse backgrounds, encouraging cross-cultural, religious and socio-economic dialogue across divisions in Palestinian society;
- Create public forums, workshops and meetings between young people and Palestinian decision makers;
- Send young people back into their communities to volunteer and conduct education and outreach;
- Allow young people to lead and share knowledge by providing venues through which they create programming for their communities;
- Emphasize the involvement of marginalized populations by building diverse youth coalitions across Gaza and the West Bank, urban and rural, and refugee camps;
- Engage with the media to disseminate democratic principles and models by encouraging free reporting of the project’s goals, achievements and methods.

Activities and project outputs are summarized in the logical framework diagram that follows.

ii. Logical framework

This logical framework is derived from the Results framework provided in the original Project Document. It has been modified to fit this format. (See over)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project activities and outputs</th>
<th>Intended outcomes</th>
<th>Short-term objectives</th>
<th>Development objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshops, forums, conferences and exchange visits</td>
<td>Raise awareness and knowledge of key democratic concepts (particularly tolerance and human rights), primarily among young Palestinians</td>
<td>Young people are aware of core democratic principles of human rights, tolerance and constitutional processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring together young people from different backgrounds to encourage cross-cultural, religious and socio-economic dialogue</td>
<td>Raise awareness of democratic challenges such as women’s rights, representational and political participation, and involve disenfranchised groups in inter-group dialogue and exchange</td>
<td>Increased tolerance and national dialogue within Palestinian society through coalitions of young people learning to work together</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build youth coalitions across Gaza, the West Bank, urban and rural communities and refugee camps</td>
<td>Increased public debate on the value of democratic processes within Palestinian society and between civil society and Palestinian leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public forums, workshops and meetings between young Palestinians and decision makers</td>
<td>Give young Palestinians access to decision makers and political institutions and processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send young people back to their communities to volunteer and conduct education and outreach</td>
<td>Develop a core of young Palestinian advocates for democratic principles and tolerance, who actively promote these values through community outreach and education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow young people to lead and share knowledge by providing venues through which they create programming for their communities</td>
<td>Encourage legitimate political participation of young people and give them democratic tools and models through which to voice their opinions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with the media to promote democratic principles and models by encouraging free reporting of the project’s goals, methods and achievements</td>
<td>Create and encourage democratic models for public forums, journalistic reporting, and political transparency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be key actors in promoting the values of democratic dialogue, tolerance and human rights in their communities</td>
<td>Contribution to developing an enabling environment for increased collaboration among young people and diverse groups</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bridge two major socio-political gaps:
- Within Palestinian communities;
- Between the public and the three main authorities (legislative, judicial and unions) in the OPT through young people, the future leaders of Palestine

Increased public debate on the value of democratic processes within Palestinian society and between civil society and Palestinian leadership.
III. EQ answers / findings

i. Relevance

Many of those interviewed confirmed that division among young people – and indeed in Palestinian society more generally – is a growing problem. This division, and discrimination that results from it, is primarily among political party lines, the problematic relationship between the Fatah wing of the PA and HAMAS being reflected both among individuals and structurally/organizationally.

Many young people insist that they do not belong to either party, but in reality it is difficult to identify as an ‘independent’, when criticism of Fatah (or the West bank-based PA) is seen as a pro-HAMAS statement, and criticism of HAMAS (or the situation in Gaza) is seen as irrevocably pro-Fatah. These political realities lead people also to see Gaza and West Bank Palestinians as distinct and different, with little in common.

Respondents also mentioned a growing tendency to stereotype people in relation to their hometown. While stereotypes of this kind are common in popular folklore in most countries, combined with the political and socio-economic divisions that are such a prominent feature of Palestinian society, they lead to a widely held concern that Palestinian society is increasingly divided and discriminatory.

Contrary to what many outside observers might expect, the divisions and discrimination in Palestinian society do not focus on sex or religion. While the population of the Gaza Strip, for example, is almost entirely Muslim (99.3%), West Bank Palestinians are made up of 90% Muslims and 10% Christians and Samaritans (Palestinian Jews). While there may indeed be a lack of tolerance at an individual level among some followers of these religions, no respondents mentioned systemic or systematic discrimination or intolerance on religious grounds.

The situation analysis on which the RCHRS project was predicated was therefore accurate and the project founded on a good understanding of the reality of Palestinian society today, particularly in relation to young people.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (i).

Workshops and final conferences

The principle activity of the project was a series of training workshops in both Gaza and the West Bank over two years, with a final conference in each location (see Effectiveness, below, for full details). This methodology was considered by respondents to be relevant, although there are three obvious caveats:

Firstly, participants in the project were recruited through student associations at universities in the West Bank and Gaza through advertisements and word of mouth, followed by interviews and a selection process that aimed primarily to ensure that there was a wide diversity among the participants. Nevertheless, the process was “closed” to the extent that it did not include young people not attending university.

Secondly, the numbers reached through this process were modest – five groups of 20 students participated (three groups in the West Bank, two in Gaza), for a total of just 100 official participants, although numbers were later expanded by some “unofficial” participants who were not turned away.
Thirdly, the unavoidable separation of the activities between Gaza and the West Bank meant that one of the most obvious divides – that between young people in these two areas – could not be addressed (see box below on movement restrictions).

This finding contributes to Conclusion (ii).

- **Meetings with decision makers**
  The second major component of the project – meetings between the participants and decision makers – aimed to help bridge another perceived divide. Those interviewed confirmed that there is a worrying perception, among young people in particular, that their political representatives and decision makers respond more to the contingencies of external politics – in particular to US and other donor government requirements – than to the will of the people they represent. Organizing meetings between the participants and a range of decision makers was therefore highly relevant, although again this is subject to two caveats: Firstly, because the meetings were unstructured and led somewhat informally by the decision makers themselves, some seem to have been taken more seriously than others. While one decision maker interviewed, for example, spoke in detail about the participants’ questions and the incisive, lively nature of the discussion, another could not even remember the meeting. Secondly, because the decision makers were precisely that – in a position to make decisions and engender change – the participants left the meetings with high expectations and these were not always met. This can lead to disillusionment and indeed disengagement if not handled carefully.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (i).

- **Community outreach**
  The third component of the project was outreach to others beyond the participants. The idea was that the participants would carry the message into their communities – their family, student group, club or friends (including on-line).

In theory, this was a logical follow-up to the training workshops, however it was again not structured (perhaps because RCHRS is a research and training organization rather than an implementer of community-based actions), and so little guidance was given to the participants on the form this outreach might take. They were given copies of the project’s brochure and posters to distribute, but these simply described the project’s aims. This was therefore a relevant activity but potentially with limited impact. However the strong relationship between RCHRS and participants through the

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**Restrictions on movement**

Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three administrative divisions: area A, covering some 18% of the West Bank, is home to 55% of the Palestinian population and is under PA administration; area B, also under PA civil administration but whose security is under Israeli control, covers 21% of the land and is home to 41% of the population; area C is under Israeli administration and covers 61% of the West Bank with just 4% of the population being Palestinian.

Area A comprises Palestinian towns, and some rural areas away from Israeli settlements in the north (between Jenin, Nablus, Tubas and Tulkarem), the south (around Hebron), and a small central area south of Safiat. Area B covers other populated rural areas, many closer to the centre of the West Bank. Area C (including East Jerusalem) contains all the Israeli settlements, roads used to access the settlements, buffer zones (near settlements, roads, strategic areas and Israel), and almost all of the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert.

Areas A and B are themselves divided into 227 separate areas, 199 of which are smaller than 2 square kilometres and separated from one another by Israeli-controlled Area C.

Movement between the various zones is restricted and allowed only to non-Palestinians and Palestinians who hold a permit from the Government of Israel. The Gaza Strip is closed to anyone not having specific permission from the Government of Israel and there is no exit from the Strip for Palestinians living there. For Palestinians, movement between the West Bank and Gaza is therefore impossible.
training, and among the participants as a result of RCHRS’s facilitation and encouragement, provided an impetus to the participants to organize outreach activities independently, including after the end of the project (see Impact section, below).

- **Exchange visit**
  As part of the effort to help Palestinian young people to interact with decision makers, democratic processes and institutions, the project included a visit towards the end of the implementation period to “see democracy and tolerance at work”. The original plan was for two participants (one from each year, chosen on the basis of their performance during the project) and two coordinators to travel to Norway. However, the Norwegian embassy decided not to facilitate the trip, and eventually a visit was organized instead to the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands.

  The idea of the visit was conceptually sound, however the limitations imposed by the social and political realities of life in Palestine imposed severe restrictions on the possible candidates for the two places available: the “visitors” were all male because it would not have been possible for a female student to go on the visit unaccompanied; and only those who already had a European passport or visa could travel (in one case, for example, a participant whose mother is Cypriot held a Cypriot (EU) passport, and one of the coordinators was Jordanian and had a Schengen visa already in his Jordanian passport).

  This finding contributes to Conclusion (iii).

- **Note on life in the OPT**
  No project focusing on the promotion of individual and social rights in the OPT can be considered in isolation to the situation in which Palestinians live. While most interviewees more broadly mentioned this at some point in the discussions, the young participants focused on it particularly. Although at first they talked about their participation in the project, once they relaxed and formed an opinion on the neutrality of the evaluators, they spoke candidly and passionately about their lives, their desperation and their lack of hope in the future.

  As one student said, “Tolerance within our society is difficult when people cannot find work, cannot enjoy their rights, live with injustice and feel there is no hope”.

  Unavoidably, the project’s relevance and impact must be seen within this context of daily violations of human rights.

  These comments contribute to Conclusion (iii).

**ii. Effectiveness**

- **Training workshops and final conferences**
  Most interviewees commented positively on the training workshops, with less enthusiasm for the final conferences held in Gaza and the West Bank.

  The training sessions were led by specialist facilitators and covered: democracy, human rights, citizenship, freedom of speech, elections, the right to education, women’s rights, marginalized groups, children’s rights and tolerance. The Director of RCHRS explained that a central theme of the training was helping participants to understand that “tolerance” is not a
negative value; too often, he explained, Palestinians see tolerance as meaning “submission”, so the project focused on tolerance as meaning “understanding and accepting difference”.

The students reported that they liked the methodology used, with small group discussions following the presentations described as “animated and not boring”.

A number of interviewees, both facilitators and decision makers, commented on the enthusiasm of the students and their willingness to participate, with the decision makers in particular noting the incisive nature of the students’ questions.

The final conferences elicited less enthusiasm, with a number of interviewees commenting that the format – presentations of research papers on a number of diverse subjects – was dry and lacked creativity. Several respondents also expressed concern that there were not enough “external people” (i.e. not participating in some way in the project) present and that the media left soon after the opening session. Links between the West Bank and Gaza conferences were also seen as weak, with respondents lamenting the intermittent videoconference link. One participant in Gaza was even unaware that the project had run in the West Bank too.

These findings contribute to Conclusions (i) and (ii).

- **Community outreach**
  It was evident from interviews with the students that they emerged from the training eager to do something, and their major criticism was that they were not given enough concrete guidance on what form this action might take or how they should go about organizing it. To some extent, this support came through follow-up contacts with RCHRIS and on-line exchanges, although this was less structured and did not include guidance, for example, on skills such as fundraising or media relations. One student, for example, said he felt that he would like to visit schools to talk to schoolchildren about the issues covered in the training but he did not know how to go about doing this.

  This finding contributes to Conclusion (iv).

- **Interactions with decision makers**
  A number of interviewees, including one high-level representative of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), commented favourably on this component of the project, and the students themselves were very appreciative of the opportunity to discuss openly with leaders and decision makers (although, as mentioned above, one decision maker interviewed could not remember the meeting he had as part of the project).

  The 30+ decision makers involved in the meetings cut across party lines and represented a wide range of sectors. The students noted that the opportunity to meet the leaders was exceptional and that they would normally have no access to such people.

  This finding contributes to Conclusion (i).

**iii. Efficiency**

- **Budget**
  The project budget was logically constructed, with appropriate allocation of resources between the organization’s costs and project activities and outputs. Of the USD 198,000 expended over two years (total budget = USD 220,000 including final evaluation), just over 25% was spent on staff salaries; 14% on training workshops and decision-maker meetings; 8% on the final conferences; 8% on the study tour; 6% on media and communications; 15%
A personal experience of human rights and the law

Rami, 23, joined the project in its second year. He was chosen from a short-list of students at Birzeit University, where he was studying law. He says he has no political affiliation but was active in the student union.

Rami was interested in joining the project because he believed it would add to his law studies and help him to understand human rights better. “I was looking for something new and different,” Rami says. “I wanted to meet decision makers and spend time with religious students to learn how they approached human rights.” It was the diversity of the participants, he says, that made the training sessions lively. “There was often disagreement,” Rami reports, “but we learned how to handle it.”

During the project, Rami wrote regularly for Tasamuh, and has since published in a journal in the UK.

The most important part of the Europe trip for him, he says, was the visit to The Hague and the International Court of Justice. As a lawyer, he learned much about the law, for example that in the Netherlands the law allows criticism of Islam but not of Muslims, protecting the person but not the belief. He also learned about alternative forms of punishment and would like to see community service introduced in the OPT for young offenders instead of automatic jail. “The whole experience became part of me,” Rami says. “It has been absorbed into my skin.”

Activities

The project completed all planned activities according to schedule, with the exception of the final conferences (see below). The training sessions in the West Bank took place approximately once a week between 6 January and 14 March 2011 in three West Bank locations: Jenin, Salfit and Al-Aroub. Training in Gaza was organized between 10 January and 21 March 2011, again weekly and in two separate locations in Gaza City.

Each programme consisted of eight workshops led by a thematic specialist, with some 20 – 25 participants in each. The exact numbers of participants are not recorded, since the coordinators found that young people would just turn up even if they had not actually been selected to participate. As a result, the target of “more than 80 participants” set in the original Project Document was exceeded. All the selected participants completed the programme.

Coordination between the West Bank and Gaza Strip was organized by the appointment of a project coordinator in each location, and each of these mentioned in the interviews that coordination had been smooth and cooperation easy.

In support of the students’ follow-up actions in their communities 1,000 brochures outlining the project and the concepts of tolerance and human rights were printed in Arabic and distributed, along with posters illustrating tolerance that had been developed as part of an annual exhibition organized by RCHRS on this subject (not funded by UNDEF). Students were encouraged and helped to do research and write articles using their newly acquired knowledge for RCHRS’ regular journal Tasamuh (Tolerance) and 1,000 copies of the edition appearing during the project were printed and distributed. These materials, as well as the training modules, were also posted on the organization’s website. It was not possible to gauge the level of use of these materials, however the on-line versions of some of the materials have been used since the project ended.

Between 2 April and 30 June 2011, 30 meetings were organized with decision
Four final conferences had been planned – one at the end of each year in Gaza and the West Bank. However only two were held, towards the end of the project in October 2011. The presentations made at these events were selected from research papers produced by the student participants following their training. The 20 papers selected (11 in the West Bank, nine in Gaza) covered *inter alia* democratic citizenship, women’s and children’s rights, youth participation in local elections, academic freedom, tolerance and reconciliation, voluntary work and on-line social networking. The West Bank conference was broadcast live on Al Jazeera television and was widely covered in Palestinian media.

While media activities had been identified as a crucial element of the project, they appear to have been limited, with much of the media activity at a level regularly achieved by RCHRS in the course of their daily work. The final conference elicited event-related coverage and journalists interviewed said that their participation in the project provided a “hook” on which they were able to hang features on issues such as tolerance and discrimination – issues they could otherwise rarely cover. However the journalists also noted that coverage of these issues remains piecemeal and, above all, that Palestinian media outlets have no sustained commitment to such debate or house policies on such issues.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (v).

In contrast, the project visits to Europe exceeded expectations. Despite limitations on selection of the participants (see above), two participants were able to travel as well as a project staff member (new staff, also a training participant) and the organization’s director. Although the Europe trip lasted only one week, it covered a broad range of visits designed to illustrate democracy and tolerance at work, including to the BBC, municipal offices in Bolton and Manchester, Durham University, a legal firm, political parties and Palestinian expatriates in the UK. In the Netherlands, the visitors met the Mayor of Leiden, representatives of the Greens, municipal officers in Rotterdam, expatriate Palestinians and the Victims of Racism Defence Association.

### iv. Impact

**Impact on individual participants**

Most of the participants interviewed affirmed that they had gained understanding, or new understanding, of relevant issues through the training and, indeed, from the friendly discussions, welcoming reception at RCHRS offices and meetings the project had provided. The fact that the number of participants at the training courses continued to grow informally after the initial selection, and that the retention rate of the course – and later attendance at the final conference – was almost 100% also attests to the fact that the students saw their participation as worthwhile.

There were a number of student-led initiatives that also demonstrate the impact of the training: some students used the training materials posted on the website in sessions they
organized in their institutions. One student said that, “in the universities, the HAMAS/Fatah divide is too obvious, and it is good to take these messages of tolerance into the university”. In the second year of the project, there were municipal elections in the West Bank, and electoral processes and considerations were added to the training. As a result, the trainees grouped together to promote voting by young people, and monitored the process and youth involvement.

In some universities, the students organized meetings between the Fatah and HAMAS wings of the PLO and used the occasion to stress the fact that young people from all parties are friends and colleagues, and want to “have different views but sit together, not divided, and hoping others will join us”.

Participants from the American University in Jenin organized a meeting with four national decision makers “just to talk” and 150 students attended. In their villages and home communities, a number of participants became active in defending people targeted for their political or religious views. In one example, a participant mobilized a group of villagers to protect a known HAMAS sympathizer because “his human rights were not being respected”.

One of the participants in the project has since become a trainer specializing in democracy and tolerance; a female participant is now teaching human rights. Using social media to organize his campaign, a participant in Gaza began a Facebook lobbying group to push for lower university tuition fees to allow more young people access to tertiary education, and succeeded in getting the Islamic University to lower fees. Another female participant has joined an organization that teaches democracy and tolerance to children.

These findings contribute to Conclusion (vi).

- Impact at societal level

While there were many examples of the impact of the project on individual participants, and in a number of cases of a multiplier effect within the students' families and communities, the broader impact of the project – its ability to plant a seed that might grow at societal or even national level (ie across the West Bank and Gaza Strip) was and is constrained by the political reality of Palestinians' lives, especially young Palestinians.

A number of participants, for example, still questioned how democracy could really work in the OPT “when even the people we elect don’t represent us but the donors who give the money and the Israelis who make all the decisions”. Interviewees of all kinds frequently mentioned a general feeling that elected representatives are seen as “corrupt”, not in the sense that they are fraudulent but that they are non-representative and, again, because there is an overwhelming belief that the lives of Palestinians in the OPT are governed not by elected representatives but by forces outside Palestine.

One student interviewed became so angry talking about himself that he later returned to apologize to the evaluators. A university graduate, he now drives a taxi because he cannot find a suitable job in accountancy. Faced with unemployment, graduates can only accept it or take any work available. They cannot seek work elsewhere because they are unable to leave the OPT. Unemployment additionally means no money for a dowry and so limited options for marriage and no home independent of family – life choices that young people elsewhere largely take for granted.
A decision maker suggested that, although he thought the project had been very successful and had made a significant difference to the young people involved in it, “poverty, unemployment and other social ills are always on top”.

These findings contribute to Conclusion (vii).

When asked what might be done to spread the impact of the project given the seemingly intractable political realities of life in the OPT, the only solution that interviewees offered – and on several separate occasions – was “more of the same”. More teaching and promotion of tolerance and human rights, more classes in schools and universities, more opportunities for young people to bring about change in a way that respects others and protects their rights, they believed, was the only way to build a tolerant society where divisions would disappear. This was true for both the West Bank and Gaza.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (viii).

v. **Sustainability**

- **Realistic aims**
  Reflecting the difficulty of achieving impact and therefore promoting sustainability of the project’s outcomes at a broad societal level, RCHRS focused efforts to assure sustainability at the level of individual participants and their immediate communities. The original project document outlined four principal aims: establishing individual relationships with the facilitators to promote the participants’ personal investment in the project; encouraging leadership and ownership of the project; working towards assimilation of the issues covered into existing networks; and producing replicable materials and models. There are indications that these aims have been met:

- **Continued engagement**
  Many of the participants have continued efforts to carry forward the messages of the project (see above) but additionally many have remained in close contact with RCHRS, dropping into the offices in Ramallah and Gaza (where the RCHRS organizes monthly discussion groups), continuing discussions and having access to the organization’s facilities. Indeed, RCHRS had no trouble bringing together students from a number of towns in the West Bank to meet the evaluators, and participants in Gaza were available for interview by phone.

  Participants stay in regular contact via the “RCHRS Friends” page on Facebook. This is mainly used by the students and those they have recruited, but RCHRS itself also intervenes from time to time to comment or make suggestions or share news. One participant expressed the view that the page “has a life of its own”, independent of the project and those who took part in it originally. The person who coordinated the project in the West Bank, and who is no longer employed by RCHRS, remains engaged with the participants and the issues covered by the project and is currently exploring the potential of using social media and mass media to promote messages of tolerance and human rights, and to share information on violations.

  The RCHRS website (www.tasamuhnet.org/vb) is also used as a repository for the project’s training materials, research papers and conference materials, and as a forum for exchange. There was evidence that a number of students use these resources, including in meetings they organize and courses they teach to others in their communities. Other spin-offs from the project led by individual students are mentioned above (see Impact). Some decision makers and facilitators who participated in the project advised that they now act as mentors to individual participants and speak highly of the continued engagement of the students, even after they have graduated. One spoke highly of the participants’ ongoing commitment: “These young people,” he said, “are the best of the best”.

16 | P a g e
These findings contribute to Conclusion (viii).

- **Next steps**

A number of interviewees, including representatives of UN agencies, said that they hoped such initiatives might continue because they were rare in the OPT and that there was a feeling that “a seed has been planted that has an opportunity to grow”. Several respondents suggested that the participants should be supported to pass messages on now to children in schools (something that one participant had indeed said they wished to do), and that teaching children non-violence and tolerance is vital to the future of the OPT. UN interviewees confirmed that, while UNRWA works with UNICEF and UNESCO to support classroom teaching of children’s rights and non-violence, this is not as effective as peer teachers and young people bringing the message into the school.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (vii and ix).

The UNRWA representative advised that UNRWA’s relationship with universities is weak and so there are no initiatives at that level. UNWOMEN also mentioned the lack of programmes run for or with students at tertiary level, with universities being seen only as potential sources of academics for commissioned research. UN respondents believe that UNDEF is ideally placed to support work at university level, although they suggested that isolated programmes will not be as effective as ongoing programmes and that local UNDEF partners should be encouraged to focus on sustainability and follow-up when designing projects.

This finding contributes to Conclusion (ix).

**vi. UNDEF value-added**

Although there are many agencies, both UN and NGO, working in the OPT, most are involved in providing direct services to their mandated beneficiaries – women, children, refugees. Interviewees mentioned that “no UN agency has the task of protection and promotion of human rights here” and a number of respondents suggested that UNDEF had played a vital and recognized role through support of the RCHRS project.

Although the evaluators were able to speak to a number of UN agencies and NGOs in the course of the evaluation, none could suggest any donor-led or agency-led initiative in the fields of democracy, governance, leadership or human rights (other than local NGO-led monitoring of human rights violations). UNDEF therefore filled a significant gap through its support of this project.

A number of respondents spoke of the privileged status of the UN in the OPT. They suggested that the young people recruited into the project were willing to put themselves forward because it was supported by the UN. “People felt safe,” one respondent said, “because the UN is a neutral party”. In the particular circumstances of the OPT, this was seen as particularly important.

A UN-supported project, respondents also said, has a base of trust among Palestinians. “The relationship between the UN and Palestinians is very special,” one student said. As a result, UNDEF’s support was crucial to the readiness of students and others to participate fully in the project. Additionally, one decision maker believed that the project had had support among a wider public because it was able to display the UNDEF emblem. One decision maker believed that a priority for UNDEF actions in the OPT in the future might be taking an
initiative such as the RCHRS programme and modifying it to work with young people who cannot go into tertiary education, especially in rural areas.

Clearly UNDEF played an important role in the promotion of tolerance and dialogue through this project, and the project’s wide acceptance and perceived value are at least in part attributable to the UN’s unique place in the lives of the Palestinian people. This finding leads to Conclusion (ix).

IV. Conclusions

i. Based on all findings above, but especially those related to impact and sustainability, it is clear that this was a well designed project, effectively implemented. It received significant support from participants and other stakeholders. One minor design flaw was allowing decision makers to control the content and format of their meetings with students – this could have given rise to unmet expectations and disengagement and was therefore a high-risk strategy.

ii. One challenge still largely unmet, however, in relation to the project’s objectives is making strong links between young people in the West Bank and Gaza. It is recognized that the obstacles to this geographically and politically are significant and may at this time be insurmountable.

iii. Restrictions on movement were taken into account in project implementation as far as possible, however they are a significant hurdle to full implementation and effectiveness as well as, ultimately, to impact.

iv. The training focused on improving understanding of theoretical concepts – tolerance, human rights, discrimination – and did not cover practical skills such as project design and management, fundraising and reporting, and evaluation and monitoring, which would have equipped students to put their newly established knowledge into practice in their communities.

v. Although there was media coverage of the project and some events, it was left up to individual (interested) journalists to use these opportunities to cover the issues at the heart of the project. Media outreach was in general a weak point in the project.

vi. The project had significant impact on individuals who participated. Ultimately, however, occupation and the injustice that Palestinians experience on a daily basis limit the impact of the project on a broader developmental scale. This was outside the control and capacity of the implementing agency.

vii. Despite the preceding conclusion, it seems clear from the comments of many interviewees that hope persists that democracy, justice and human rights will prevail, and that the future will be brighter for the coming generation. As a result, a focus on teaching children about tolerance, democracy and human rights, and supporting more school-based programmes was regularly suggested.
V. Recommendations

For RCHRS

i. (Based on Conclusion i): The project could be replicated, taking into account the feedback provided in this report. In particular, consider minimizing the risk of disengagement by providing a neutral facilitator for the meetings with decision makers, who could guide the discussion just enough to ensure that the students do not leave with unrealistic expectations.

ii. (Based on Conclusions ii and iii): Explore alternative tools and means to make links between the West Bank and Gaza; videoconferencing, Skype and other social media should be explored more systematically, perhaps with the input of a specialist in these areas.

iii. (Based on Conclusion iv): In training courses with a largely theoretical content, consider nevertheless what practical skills might be taught to help the trainees to put their theoretical training into practice in the long-term (for example: project design and management, fundraising and reporting, evaluation and monitoring).

iv. (Based on Conclusion v): While RCHRS might be effective in attracting media to cover events, consider taking on short-term media expertise, as necessary, to develop a comprehensive media and communications strategy for projects to ensure full media and communications impact for the issues covered as well as the events organized.

v. (Based on Conclusion vii): Explore the potential of piloting the same (suitably adapted) methodology for school-aged children – or of supporting trainees to do this.

For UNDEF

vi. (Based on Conclusion ix): The value-added of this project for UNDEF was very high, since there is a significant gap in the OPT for UN-led activities in the areas of democracy, governance and leadership, as well as human rights in general, and UNDEF may wish to consider this in focusing future support.
### ANNEXES

**Annex 1: Evaluation questions**

#### General evaluation question categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Related sub-questions</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Relevance** | To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels? | - Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?  
- Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?  
- Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse? |
| **Effectiveness** | To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals? | - To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?  
- To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?  
- Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?  
- What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? |
| **Efficiency** | To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts? | - Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?  
- Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?  
- Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives? |
| **Impact** | To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy? | - To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?  
- Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?  
- To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?  
- Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples? |
| **Sustainability** | To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? | - To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?  
- Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)? |
| **UNDEF value added** | To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors? | - What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).  
- Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF’s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues? |
Annex 2: Documents reviewed

**Background documents**
- CIA World Facts: West Bank
- CIA World Facts: Gaza Strip
- UNDP Human Development Indicators 2011 ([www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org))
- UNRWA website: [www.unrwa.org](http://www.unrwa.org)
- Statistical website: [www.indexmundi.com](http://www.indexmundi.com)

**Project outputs**
- RCHRS project brochures (in Arabic)
- Compte-rendu of the academic forum (in Arabic)

**Project documentation**
- Project Document, UDF-PAL-08-245
- Mid-term Progress Report, UDF-PAL-08-245
- Final Project Narrative Report, UDF-PAL-08-245
- Milestone verification mission report 2 (11-14 March 2010)
- Milestone verification mission report 3 (7 August 2010)
## VI. Annex 3: People Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory phase start</td>
<td>August 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel to/from the OPT</td>
<td>6 September/14 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective mission dates</td>
<td>7 – 12 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8 September 2012
- **International and local experts; New Vision Director** | Briefing
- **Dr Iyyad Barghouti, Director RCHRS** | Interview
- **Ashraf Okeh, Project Coordinator, West Bank** | Interview
- **Talal Abu Rokbeh, Project Coordinator, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Bahi Al-Khateeb, Freelance journalist** | Interview

### 9 September 2012
- **Mohamad Falah Fuad Zakayneh**
  - Jaleel Hakam Atef Zakarneh
  - Rama Mohamad Aqel
  - Hamzaila Shimsaleh Manasra
  - Mohannad Abu Ali
  - Ala’a Daghlless
  - Nonad Al Samell Abu Raya
  - Abed Rahman Jamal Omar Qandeel
  - Basem Ibrahem Ali Bderat | Focus Group

- **Participants, West Bank**
- **Rami Barghouti, Participant West Bank – Europe trip** | Interview
- **Wesim Alabed, Participant West Bank – Europe trip** | Interview
- **Wadieh Al Arabid, Participant, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Ibrahim Al Ghandour, Participant, Gaza** | Phone interview

### 10 September 2012
- **Fadi Abu Shamaleh, Conference facilitator, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Majeda Balbisi, Journalist, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Fatmeh Ashoor, Facilitator training and conference, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Dr Abd Alrahman Al Haj, Facilitator conference, West Bank** | Interview

**Note:** Protests against fuel price increases blocked roads in the West Bank so planned interviews with course trainers were cancelled. Instead, the experts studied the contents of the training courses with RCHRS personnel.

### 11 September 2012
- **Nasir Matar, School Supervisor, Education and Training, UNRWA West Bank** | Interview
- **Dr Hasan Khresheh, 1st Deputy, Palestine Legislative Council, Tulkarem** | Phone interview
- **Salah Abdel Ali, Leader, Jaba Sha‘abiyeh Party, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Nasoh Badran, Head, Municipality of Deir Al-Ghusun** | Phone interview
- **Tayseer Mhaisin, Office Member, Ash-Sharb Party, Gaza** | Phone interview
- **Siham Rashid, Programme Manager for MDG Programmes, UNWOMEN** | Phone interview

### 12 September 2012
- **Khaled Nassif, Planning Manager, UNDP West Bank** | Interview
- **Wala’ Abu Ghanam, Freedom Forum Palestine (NGO)** | Interview
- **Najwa Yaghi, Programme Coordinator, Al Miftah (NGO)** | Interview
- **Riad Khouri, Commentator and analyst, ex-IOM** | Interview in Amman, 14 September
### Annex 4: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCHRS</td>
<td>Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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