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WHY EI MATTERS: THE EFFECTS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, COMMUNICATION AND ADJUSTMENT
IN ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS, AND WORKPLACE FUNCTIONING

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma and to the best of my knowledge contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text of the dissertation.

_________________________________
Andrew Richard Armstrong.

May 9th 2007.
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Abstract

This thesis investigated the relative importance of six emotional intelligence (EI) abilities comprising the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT) in the prediction of (1) psychological resilience to negative life events, (2) romantic relationship adjustment and communication behaviour, and (3) employability skills.

In Study 1, the strength of relationship between negative life events and distress varied across three latent classes, reflecting vulnerable, average, and resilient profiles. Graduated EI scores, in terms of emotional self-awareness, ability to express, and self-manage emotions, predicted membership to each class. Across the 414 survey respondents, these three EI abilities appeared to augment psychological resilience in the aftermath of negative life events.

In Study 2, all six EI abilities were found to be weakly associated with dyadic adjustment, and moderately associated with eight relationship enhancing communication behaviours. The eight behaviours were themselves moderately to very strongly associated with adjustment. Mediation analyses revealed that each EI ability influenced dyadic adjustment through the communication behaviours it best predicted. Across the 116 romantic partners surveyed, those better able to express and self-manage emotion communicated in the most relationship enhancing ways.

In Study 3, four of the six EI abilities were found to be differentially important in the prediction of seven Adaptive Performance dimensions, five Conflict Management strategies, three forms of Organizational Commitment, and seven Achievement Motivations. The abilities to think clearly under pressure, identify others’ emotions, self-manage emotions, and manage others’ emotions made valuable contributions, while emotional self-awareness, and the ability to express emotion, did
not. Across the 105 workers surveyed, those with these four EI abilities appeared to have decidedly stronger employability skills, skills that distinguish between more and less successful workers of similar education and vocational experience, across all job families.

These findings are largely consistent with EI theory, and with the small body of research to have examined similar effects in similar domains. Importantly however, the current findings offer much more specific insights into the relative importance of each EI ability in each context, and thus, the means by which emotional intelligence contributes to a psychologically healthy, intimately connected, and vocationally valuable life.
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CHAPTER 1 - EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PSYCHOMETRICS

Introduction and Aims

Emotions provide a unique source of information to individuals about their environment, which informs and shapes their thoughts, actions, and subsequent feelings (Ekman, 1999). There is an emerging view that emotional information of this kind can be processed and managed more or less intelligently. A notion central to emotional intelligence theory is that individuals differ in their abilities to perceive, understand and use emotional information, and that these abilities contribute significantly to various forms of life success (Bar-On, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). It has been claimed, for instance, that these as well as a range of other related abilities clustered under the banner of emotional intelligence, underlie psychological resilience, romantic relationship success, and career success (Ciarrochi,Forgas, & Mayer, 2001).

Such claims have naturally generated considerable interest in EI, in the research community and general public alike. A large number of studies have lent various degrees of support to these claims, and have contributed all the more to EIs popularity. To date, however, most researchers have examined the effects of EI as a global construct, or the effects of one or two EI abilities, on psychological resilience, romantic relationship success, or career success. And, in cases where the effects of a broader range of EI abilities have been considered, researchers have rarely accounted for the relations amongst the EI abilities themselves, or partialled out their unique influence. Their effects on criteria have thus been confounded by their own interconnectdness. Consequently, little is known about the unique or relative importance of each EI ability in each context, and importantly, the means by which
emotional intelligence contributes to a psychologically healthier, intimately connected, and vocationally valuable life.

It is to this understanding that the present dissertation sought to contribute. Specifically, three studies were conducted to explore whether emotional intelligence, as measured by the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT), predicts (1) psychological resilience to stressful life events, (2) communication behaviour and adjustment in romantic relationships, and (3) employability skills that enhance workplace functioning: and, whether particular EI abilities are more important for some domains rather than others. Before turning to these studies, though, the philosophical and psychological roots of emotional intelligence are examined, and the most popular EI models, and the SUEIT, critiqued.

The Zeitgeist that is Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence as a concept has prospered in recent times, in part, because of the increasing importance placed on individuals’ emotion-related skills in modern society. Encapsulating this view, one of the earliest emotional intelligence theorists, Wayne Payne, argued in his doctoral dissertation that many of the problems facing contemporary society are the direct result of emotional ignorance rather than a deficit in analytic intelligence, citing depression, addiction, illness, violence, and even religious conflict and war as evidence of this (Payne, 1986). Although he did not empirically examine this thesis, subsequent research has lent weight to the more measurable tenets of his position. For instance, poor emotion management skills correlate with societal problems such as violence, crime, drug abuse, family breakdown, and some forms of mental illness (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Likewise, emotional perspective-taking and empathy are significantly related to the development and regulation of interpersonal relationships, whether they be with
intimates, work associates, or new acquaintances (Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Goleman, 1998; Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002; Schutte et al., 2001).

Further still, some research suggests that competencies attributed to emotional intelligence predict important educational and occupational success criteria not typically associated with general mental ability, including creativity (Guastello, Guastello, & Hanson, 2004), stress resilience (Slaski & Cartwright, 2002, 2003), performance under pressure (Lam & Kirby, 2002), teamwork and conflict management skills (Jordan & Troth, 2004), and leadership (L. Gardner & Stough, 2002). And, unlike the traditional conceptualization of intelligence, most prominent EI theorists contend that it can be learned and developed over one’s lifetime (Bar-On, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).

While proponents of emotional intelligence claim to have made strides towards understanding its nature, components, determinants, effect, developmental track, and modes of modification, there has been much criticism, particularly from proponents of traditional notions of intelligence, as to the validity and relevance of emotional intelligence (Matthews et al., 2002). Indeed for some, the notion of an “emotional intelligence” is considered an oxymoron. Throughout much of psychology’s short history, emotions have been viewed as irrational, their influence on thought and behaviour potentially maladaptive, while intelligence has been considered rational and its influence predominantly adaptive (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Payne, 1986; Solomon, 2000). This is not a new view by any means, however. Modern interest in emotional intelligence stems from a dialectic in the field of human abilities research that resonates with the same tones as that of the centuries-long reason versus emotion debate.
In the following section, a selective history of philosophical and psychological ideas is used to illustrate the long-standing tension between perspectives of the role and value of reason (or intellect) and emotion, to social and psychological adjustment, and to the pursuit of a happy and successful life. The zeitgeist of emotional intelligence is positioned as the most recent rapprochement to this tension, encapsulating new views and evidence as to their commingling. This discussion sets the scene for a critique and review of popular models of emotional intelligence, as well as the model used in the present thesis.

**The Conflict between Reason and Emotion**

According to Payne (1986), Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000), and Solomon (2000), the tension in Western culture between exclusively cognitive views of what it means to be intelligent and broader ones that include a positive role for the emotions can be traced back for millennia. For most of this history, though, emotion has been afforded a role inferior to reason, and while contemporary psychology now envisions them as complimentary, this is an unfamiliar view in prevailing Western culture. The inferiority of emotion, and negative evaluations of those who are emotional, remains almost as heavily embedded in cultural values today as they did 2500 years ago.

One of the earliest documented views of this kind appeared in Plato’s (c. 428-347 B.C.) *The Republic* (1994). In this dialogue, Plato outlined a hierarchical tripartite theory of soul (or self) in which emotion was positioned as the defining element of not the highest self nor middle self but rather the lowest and most primal form of self, the “appetite”. Plato defined the “appetitive” soul as the portion of self that wants and feels, that is powerful and unruly, the demands of which must be delayed to achieve rational goals and self-control. The “spirited” soul, on the other hand, concerned will or volition, the active, disciplined and obedient portion of the self which functioned to
carry out dictates of the rational soul while tempted by appetite. The “rational” soul, he described, as the thinking or intellectual portion of self, discerning what is real, judging truth and falsity, and wisely making decisions by which to live a meaningful life. Thus, while appetite embodied life-sustaining functions such as hunger, its impulsive and desirous nature also posed a significant challenge to what he considered higher forms of self. In Plato’s view, human well-being occurred when the three selves functioned harmoniously, desires moderate, actions disciplined, and decisions wise. Human well-being, in a eudaimonic sense, was for him the highest outcome of reasoning and moral conduct. Plato’s vision of the pursuit of well-being is well exemplified in his dialogue, *Symposium* (1999), by his description of “Eros” (or love) as an inner force of reason that draws one toward everything true, good and beautiful. One can thus infer that while emotion played an important role in Plato’s theory of self, its contributions to well-being and life success were only realized when subordinated to reason.

While Plato’s position on emotion is inferred from these writings, Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.) provided an explicit definition and distinctive view of the function of emotion. In his *Rhetoric* (cited in Solomon, 2000), he defined emotion in terms of a powerful force involving pleasure and/or pain that could transform judgment or reason, for better or worse. As discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* (cited in Solomon, 2000), certain emotions in Aristotle’s view were essential to leading the good life, an ethical life which for him equated with a reasoned life. He considered emotions such as anger, humility, fear and forgiveness to be virtuous, albeit in moderation and in the correct ethical circumstances, while he considered the absence of such emotions in the correct ethical circumstances to be a vice. As well, irrespective of circumstance, he considered emotions such as jealousy, envy and spite to be vices. He argued that one
must acquire through disciplined pursuit of reason, emotional and social skills that enable one to put their general understanding of ethics into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion. In his view, reason or human intellect was “the highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest things that can be known” (cited in Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000, p. 505). The importance given to analytic intelligence up to the present day is testament to the enduring popularity of this notion.

Sellars (2006) writes that the Stoic movement of ancient Greece and Rome (circa 300 B.C.) also revered reason, while positioning “passion” at the heart of analytic error. Notably in ancient times, “passion” was defined in terms synonymous with modern definitions of “anguish” and “suffering” (Merriam-Webster, 1996). To Stoics such as Cato the younger (c. 95-46 B.C.), Seneca the younger (4 B.C.– 65 A.D.), and Zeno (c. 333-264 B.C.), passion resulted from irrational self-centered expectations of the world and one’s place in it. Such expectations, which by their nature went unfulfilled, led to misery and frustration. Moreover, they argued that the idiosyncratic nature of unchallenged passion rendered one incapable of insight and wisdom. Stoic philosophy advocated challenging the passions through the practice of logic, reflection, and concentration, meditation, and dialectic conversation with others and with one’s self, in order to achieve a state of “apathy”- which in ancient times referred to clear judgment and inner calm (Merriam-Webster, 1996). Living according to reason they held, was to live in harmony with the universe, in recognition of common reason and the essential value of all people. To live otherwise, was to invite unhappiness and potentially, evil.

Solomon (2000) writes that the Christian philosophy of the Middle-Ages was also influenced by such views. Emotions such as anger, lust, envy, pride, gluttony,
and greed were labeled sins by influential figures such as St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), while the experience of love, hope and faith were not labeled as emotions, but rather as virtues associated with reason. Similar views dominated academic thinking in the Renaissance period of 16th and 17th centuries of Europe. Descartes for instance (1595-1650) argued in On the Passions of the Soul (1649; as cited in Solomon, 2000, p. 3), that an emotion is a type of “passion”, where the passions are distinguished from “clear cognition”, and render judgment “confused and obscure”. He also acceded however, that certain emotions were beneficial in that they preserved links to important memories, and that emotion could be influenced through reason. One for instance may be disturbed by the memory of an experience in which fear evoked unreasoned flight, which in retrospect, may have been better resolved at the time if fear had been confronted with logic. Reason and memory may thus excite a new emotion, courage, to overcome fear and act differently in a similar future situation.

Like Descartes, philosophers belonging to the Enlightenment movement of the 17th and 18th century espoused the virtues of reason as well. Hobbes (1588-1679), an early figure often linked to this movement, advocated materialistic rationalism as a means to establish an authoritative system of ethics and knowledge. He saw human beings as essentially mechanistic, with even their thoughts and emotions operating according to physical laws and chains of cause and effect, action and reaction (Thomson, 1996). Later figures of this movement however began to question reason’s limits. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) made a strong distinction between the practice of “reason” on the one hand, and emotions, moods and desires, which he termed “the inclinations”, on the other. In his seminal work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781/2003), Kant described the inclinations as either useless at best or disruptive at worst to the process of analytic reasoning. In a later work however, The
Critique of Judgment (cited in Solomon, 2000, p. 8), Kant argued that “nothing great is ever done without passion”. In this work he also espoused the importance of shared emotional fervor to fully appreciate God and his creation. In doing so, he suggested that while emotion may disturb the process of analytic reasoning, it provided the motivation to achieve greatness, and the means to recognize and appreciate greatness.

David Hume (1711-1776) was far more outspoken in his skepticism of reason, contending that it alone could not yield knowledge. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1793), Hume argued that all human knowledge was derived from “perceptions”, which he classified into “impressions” (sensation & emotion) and “ideas” (thoughts & reflections). Hume defined emotion as an impression, stimulated by “animal spirits” within the blood, which could be experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. He theorized that the pleasantness or unpleasantness of an emotional impression was not a consequence of physiology however, but rather, a consequence of one’s ideas, which he defined as conscious reflections on an impression. In his view, virtuous thoughts or behaviour are always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, and vice by a feeling of pain. Thus, one performs a virtuous action because it arouses a pleasant feeling, and one avoids committing an invirtuous action because it arouses an unpleasant feeling. As such, Hume believed that one’s feelings provide a natural guide for moral conduct. Happiness and any sense of enduring personal success were derived from such behaviour. The function of reason he relegated to interpreting the world in terms of facts, from which one formed inferences useful in achieving the agendas set by emotion. Hume thus provided emotion with a status no less significant to living a successful and purposeful human life than reason (Russell, 1995; Solomon, 2000).

Following in the wake of Hume, artists and writers belonging to the Romantic movement of Europe’s late 18th and early 19th century such as Goethe (1749-1832)
and Woodsworth (1770-1850), argued that logic alone could not deliver the breadth of insights and innovations that were possible when empathy and emotion-guided intuition were incorporated into their thinking. Intense emotion and individual imagination were positioned as the critical authorities, a revolt against aristocratic and religious social and political norms, and the rationalism of human nature by the Enlightenment (Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000). Nietzsche (1844-1900), a philosopher often associated with the more radical views of this movement, declared in his *Twilight of the Idols* (1889), that Western philosophy since Socrates represented a degeneration of humanity’s natural strengths. For him, any understanding of what it is to be human had been corrupted and undermined by debates of dialectic reason bent on denying or covering up native human desires. Indeed, in his *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887; as cited in Wicks, 2004), he described instincts and some emotions as more reasonable than reason. Like his admirer, Freud, Nietzsche viewed emotion as completely natural - its repression or suppression, psychologically disastrous. From Nietzsche’s perspective, happiness or well-being was not criterial of being a better or more successful person, nor did he consider it an intrinsically valuable end, thus something a superior person aims for. On the contrary, he saw great suffering as prerequisite for any great human achievement, particularly in the arts.

As this selective review illustrates, at various points in Western philosophical history, the emotions have been dismissed as unintelligent, animalistic, vices, and sins. On the other hand, they have been ascribed a life-defining role, have been defined as virtues, as empowering, as complimentary or as important, or even sovereign to reason as well. It is the former negative position however, which has resonated most strongly (Payne, 1986; Solomon, 2000). In summing up the reason versus emotion debate, Payne (1986) forcefully argued that for much of Western
history, persons with strong reason had prevailed while persons with strong emotion had been branded mentally ill, institutionalised, and tortured to suppress emotionality. He wrote that Stoic, then Jewish, then Christian philosophies had carried such values forward, and that these values remained so deeply embedded in Western cultures that “many of us fear uncontrolled emotional expression, such as weeping, with an intensity that rivals our fear of death” (cited in Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000, p. 94). He mused that humans had perhaps tried too hard to “civilize” themselves, while denying their emotional nature along the way.

**Emotion: An Intelligent Response**

In direct contradiction to a Western history often disdainful of emotion, empirical evidence as to the functional purpose of emotion was established with the publication of Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1899). Darwin’s research revealed that emotion gives rise to adaptive behaviours that most species on the planet depend upon for their continued survival, such as when fear generates flight, or when lust or love generates procreation. As well, Darwin revealed that amongst social species, emotion and its overt expression confers a further survival advantage. It gives rise to a communication system whereby emotions can inform others of one’s perceptions, alerting others to a potential threat which they may not have seen for instance. Importantly, his work suggested that during the process of evolution, emotion had encouraged most successful species in directions which had been better than other solutions in recurring circumstances that were relevant to individual and species-related survival and proliferation. Emotion it seemed had played a key role in individual and group survival, development of social bonds, and environmental adaptation (Ekman, 1999).
Damasio (1999) writes that William James (1842-1910), 19th century philosopher, physiologist, and founder of the first experimental psychology laboratory, was much inspired by Darwin’s emotion research. But while Darwin respected and attributed much import to emotion, he saw emotion in humans as a residual phenomenon from previous stages of evolution. James, on the other hand, believed in the continued importance of emotion to human adaptation through its profound influence on the brain, wellbeing, and reason. He defined an emotion in terms of a sequence of events that begins with the presence of an arousing stimulus and finishes with a passionate feeling, a conscious emotional experience. In explaining this sequence, he theorized that when one perceives a given stimulus, such as a dangerous animal, the brain immediately triggers a physiological change (e.g., heart begins to race, stomach tightens, palms sweat, muscles tense), and it is in the moments following this change, in which the brain receives physiological feedback from the body, that the brain forms a mental interpretation which he defined as an emotion. Thus, from James’ perspective, one is afraid because one trembles, and one is sad because one cries. Moreover, he accorded each emotion a distinct physiological signature, a unique pattern of sensory information.

While James, like Darwin, emphasized the importance of emotion to species survival, he also ascribed it a crucial role in the achievement of wellbeing, even the will to live. Of this, he wrote in Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence (1878/1978a):

The social affections, all the various forms of play, the thrilling intimations of art, the delights of philosophic contemplation, the rest of religious emotion, the joy of moral self-approbation, the charm of fancy and of wit — some or all
of these are absolutely required to make the notion of mere existence
tolerable... (p. 13)

On the topic of emotion and its relation to reason, James wrote amongst other
works, *The Sentiment of Rationality* (1897/1978b). In this rather candid essay, he
held that sentiment or a set of sentiments was a “mark” of rationality. He wrote that
even the most disciplined of thinkers recognize the rationality of a conception "as he
recognizes everything else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him.
When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality." He described
the “marks” in terms of a "strong feeling of ease, peace, rest" (p. 57), and a "feeling of
the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness" (p. 58). As such, he
argued that without emotion, one is not motivated to reason, nor can one discern the
reasonableness of an idea.

Nonetheless, Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, and Mayer (2000) write that many
psychologists of the early and mid 20th century held to the view that intellect and
emotion had opposing purposes (e.g., Schaffer, Gilmer, & Schoen, 1940; Woodworth,
1940). Logical decision-making and accurate information interpretation were deemed
to result from intellect, while impulsive decision-making and misinterpretation of
information were deemed to result from emotion. Young for instance, influential
researcher in psychophysiology, motivation, behaviour, and inventor of the
pseudophone, attributed no conscious purpose to emotion in 1936, which in his view
caused “a complete loss of cerebral control” (cited in Salovey et al., 2000, p. 505).
Lewis Terman, who collaborated with Alfred Binet to develop the first highly popular
intelligence test, the Stanford-Binet IQ test, espoused a similarly rational view,
claiming in 1921 that “an individual is intelligent in proportion as he is able to carry
on abstract thinking” (cited in Salovey et al., 2000, p. 505). Likewise, David
Wechsler, original designer of two of the most well-known modern intelligence tests, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) defined intelligence as "... the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment" (Weschler, 1958, p. 7). Intelligence research was thus heavily oriented towards an analytic conception, where a rational response to a given situation was judged as intelligent, and an emotional response ignored, dismissed or deemed unintelligent.

In psychology, the earliest notion that an emotional response can be an intelligent response is frequently attributed to E. L. Thorndike’s (1920) social intelligence construct (Bar-On, 2000; H. Gardner, 1983; Goleman, 1995; Salovey et al., 2000). Thorndike proposed a theory of intelligence that divided an individual’s mental capacities into three parts: *abstract-scholastic intelligence* – the ability to understand and manage ideas; *mechanical-visuospatial intelligence* – the ability to understand and manipulate concrete objects, and; *social intelligence* – the ability to understand and manage people, and act wisely in social contexts. Standardized measures of social intelligence were developed from this definition in the 1930s, where the manner and accuracy with which people identify emotional and mental states and make social judgments was the focus.

Although much interest and effort was applied to conceptualizing and measuring social intelligence, the construct proved extremely elusive. Researchers found it particularly difficult to select or develop criteria that discriminated between general and social intelligence, and consequently validate experimental scales (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). Indeed, following seventeen years of social intelligence research, his son R.L. Thorndike concluded that the social intelligence measures of
the time were simply poor measures of general mental ability (R. L. Thorndike & Stein, 1937). This and Cronbach’s (1960) frequently cited conclusion that social intelligence was unlikely to be defined or able to be measured continued to fuel the pursuit of a singular analytic intelligence until the 1980s.

Around this time, Sternberg (1985) contested the absence of creative and practical aspects of intelligence in mental ability research, arguing that traditional definitions of intelligence were far too narrow. In a like mind, Gardner (1983) proposed a theory of multiple intelligences which included an intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence. Intrapersonal intelligence emphasized one’s access to inner feelings, the ability to identify and understand them, to express them, and to use them as a guide for behaviour. Interpersonal intelligence, on the other hand, emphasized the capacity to understand the intentions, motivations and desires of other people. Such perspectives however, while begrudgingly acknowledged for their insight by traditional intelligence researchers, never gained the popularity or empirical attention of analytic intelligence (L. G. Smith & Smith, 1994).

A decade later, Herrnstein and Murray’s (1994) book, The Bell Curve, was published with the intention of cementing the central position of analytic intelligence to life success, revealing evidence of its genetically transmitted properties. Their book emphasised the notion that the population was normally distributed in intelligence, and that intelligence was hard to change. Some people fell into the low and high ranges of intelligence, while most people fell in the middle. Intellectual differences between gender, religious, ethnic and racial groups were reported. The authors contended that low intelligence accounted for the poverty and joblessness of some groups in society, and that high intelligence accounted for the wealth and career success of others.
However, Hernstein and Murray’s interpretation of data was considered elitist by many, and prompted a proliferation of scathing criticisms concerning their methodology. In *Bell Curve Wars* (Fraser, 1995) for instance, Nisbett convincingly demonstrated in a critique of Hernstein and Murray’s and related work that Hernstein and Murray had omitted, distorted or misdescribed evidence concerning the existence or otherwise of: a genetic element to racial IQ differences, the extent to which interventions can improve cognitive skills, and whether differences are widening or narrowing. In Nisbett’s view, Hernstein and Murray’s “treatment of none of these three issues…could be published in any respectable peer-reviewed journal” (cited in Tucker, 1998, p. 3). In the same book, Gardner referred to *The Bell Curve* as “scholarly brinkmanship”, a work in which the authors came “dangerously close to embracing the most extreme positions, yet in the end shy away from doing so”, but nevertheless persuade the reader to “draw the strongest conclusions, while allowing the authors to disavow this intention” (cited in Tucker, 1998, p. 3).

In the wake of such criticisms, and contrary to Hernstein and Murray’s intentions, the book revived debate about the degree to which environmental circumstances affect intelligence and whether traditional conceptions of intelligence were defined too narrowly. Publications exhorting ways of being intelligent and successful other than those stipulated by traditional intelligence theory abounded.

*Emotional Intelligence: The Rapprochement of Reason and Emotion*

The first empirical model of emotional intelligence emerged in this climate, formulated and revised by Salovey and Mayer in two highly influential papers (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Extending on the works of Gardner (1983) and Thorndike (1920), their model described emotional intelligence as an intelligence in the traditional sense. That is, as a set of conceptually related abilities
pertaining to emotions and the processing of emotional information that are part of and contribute to logical thought and general intelligence. Their primary intention was to draw attention to the interactive relationship between emotion and reason, often historically ignored, denied, or distained in psychology and within its philosophical roots. In stating their position on this issue, they claimed that “human beings are not, in any practical sense, predominantly rational beings, nor are they predominantly emotional beings. They are both.” (Salovey et al., 2000, p. 504).

Salovey and Mayer posited that successful adaptation to the environment, an outcome traditionally attributed to analytic intelligence, depends on a functional integration of both emotional and rational abilities.

Notably, their position was given much weight by emerging neuroscientific research. Features of cognition were identified in each region of the brain in which features of emotion were found (Davidson & Irwin, in Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, & Wallace, 2005). Indeed, not only was the circuitry supporting emotion and cognition found to be more highly integrated than previously thought, they were found to be inseparably intertwined (Ekman et al., 2005). In short, emotional responses were shown conclusively to be a crucial component of rational decision making (Damasio, 1995; LeDoux, 1996). In summing up 30 years of research on such relations, renowned neuroscientist and author, Antonio Damasio, concluded that the absence of emotion is “at least as prejudicial for rationality as excessive emotion”, and that “well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a support system without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly.” (Damasio, 1999, p. 42).

Emotion, he described, as cognitive as any other percept, delivering cognitive information directly, and via feelings. And reason, he described, as an evolutionary extension of the automatic emotional system.
In conclusion, evidence as to the synergetic relationship between emotion and reason has brought the long-standing academic debate concerning their separateness and respective value, for the time being at least, to an end. The notion of an “emotional intelligence” is one attempt to integrate and operationalize this knowledge. It captures the benefits historically attributed to emotion and to intellect, and positions them as supportive rather than detrimental to each other, as complimentary, even dependent. However, as addressed in the following section, the extent to which current models accurately reflect and reliably measure emotional intelligence, and the extent to which current models predict adaptation-related criteria, remain issues of key concern.

Definitions and Models of Emotional Intelligence

With the historically pejorative view of emotion in mind, it is perhaps ironic that some critics of EI argue that its recent popularity might amount to a replacement for general IQ, which would surmount to a future for intelligence theory where reason and critical thinking matter little (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). Somewhat less dramatic and of considerably more substance, are concerns raised regarding the variety of definitions of emotional intelligence, the limited theoretical basis underlying some of the most popular EI models, and perhaps most pertinently, the abundant psychometric issues relating to measures designed to assess EI (Conte, 2005; Livingstone & Day, 2005; Matthews et al., 2002; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).

In this section, seven of the most influential and widely cited EI models and accompanying measures are reviewed and critiqued. It is these models and the research concerning them which for the most part informed the current thesis: (1) The Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999),
and (2) Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002); (3) the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI; Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000); (4) the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i; Bar-On, 1997, 2000); (5) the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994); (6) the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995); and (7) the Schutte Self-Report Inventory (SSRI; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998). More comprehensive reviews of these EI models can be found in Bar-On (2000), Conte (2005), Livingstone and Day (2005), Matthews et al. (2002), Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios (2003), and Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004). Following this, the model used in the present thesis, the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT; Gignac, 2005; Palmer & Stough, 2002; Stough & Palmer, 2002), is similarly reviewed.

**The Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) and Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT)**

Mayer and Salovey (1997) describe emotional intelligence as an interaction between cognition and emotion, defining EI as the “ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth.” (p. 5). They propose a theory of emotional intelligence in which four hierarchical dimensions or branches of cognitive emotional ability build upon and contribute to one another. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, they describe a progression of skills within each branch from the more basic to the more sophisticated. They take the view that these abilities, like those inherent to other forms of intelligence, should be relatively independent of personality traits.
### Figure 1.1. Mayer and Salovey's (1997) theoretical model of emotional intelligence.

The first and lowest branch, *Perception, Appraisal, and Expression of Emotion*, or Emotion Perception, concerns the ability to accurately detect and differentiate between one’s emotional states, as well as those expressed by others, and those that present in the environment such as within pictures, literature, or music. It also concerns the ability to accurately express feelings and the needs related to one’s feelings (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).

The second branch, *Emotional Facilitation of Thinking*, or Emotion Assimilation, concerns the ability to use one’s emotions to assist thinking and decision-making. It involves weighing emotions against each other and other thoughts and sensations, and allowing each emotion time to direct attention. Multiple
points of view on a particular situation are elicited from this process as the cognitive system shifts focus, between, for instance, negative and positive interpretations of information perceived. It also concerns the ability to generate emotions “on demand” so as to anticipate and understand how potential experiences may feel (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Empathizing with another’s position, or imagining the different ways one might feel on the first day of new job, are examples of the use of this ability. Such shifts are thought to be advantageous, in that information pondered from the various emotional positions can encourage one to think about things more deeply, widen one’s point of view (Mayer & Hanson, 1995), and to problem-solve more effectively (Izard, 2001).

Branch three, *Understanding and Analyzing Emotions; Employing Emotional Knowledge*, or Understanding Emotion, concerns the ability to analyze emotions, appreciate their probable trends and progressive effects over time, and understand their outcomes. It involves understanding the deeper consequences, implications and meanings of emotional signals and symbols, and their interactions with each other (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001). Persons with highly developed ability, for example, are likely to understand that frustration may intensify into anger, and that anger is frequently an emotional consequence of a perceived injustice (Matthews et al., 2002). They are also likely to understand that feelings of excitement and lust may combine to form another emotion, passion (Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2000).

Branch four, *Reflective Regulation of Emotions to Promote Emotional and Intellectual Growth*, or Emotion Management, focuses on the regulation of emotion in oneself and others, in ways concomitant with personal goals. Mayer and Salovey (1997) contend that this branch reflects the highest level of EI ability. It incorporates emotional problem-solving on both a personal and social level. It involves the ability
to stay open to emotions, whether pleasant or otherwise, to detach or engage with particular emotions, and to reframe appraisals so as to generate beneficial emotions in oneself and others. The extent to which one can self-sooth and relax during or following a stressful event, and to alleviate the stress experienced by others, are examples of this ability.

Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) originally developed the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) to measure the four-branch model of EI. However, the MEIS suffered from poor reliability and scoring problems on a number of subscales. Such problems precipitated substantial revisions to item and factor content. This re-conceptualization took the form of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, presently in its second version (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). Both the MEIS and MSCEIT were developed in accordance with intelligence test development methods, and are the only published and peer-reviewed performance-based tests of EI in common circulation. Although the MSCEIT has improved on some of problems with the MEIS, the MSCEIT is very recent. Studies examining its psychometric properties are thus much fewer in number (Conte, 2005). For this reason, research pertaining to both the MEIS and MSCEIT is reviewed.

The MEIS comprises 12 tests formed from 402 multi-choice items. Two or more tests combine to form each of the four branches. MEIS items are scored in degrees of right or wrong using a target, consensual or expert scoring system, the latter two methods being the most widely used. A much shorter measure, the MSCEIT comprises 8 tests formed from 141 items, where two tests combine to form each branch. MSCEIT items are scored using consensus or expert scoring. The target scoring method involves a test-taker rating the degree to which a target is for instance
experiencing a particular emotion, and contrasting their rating with the target’s experience. Consensus scoring involves determining the correctness of a respondent’s answer by matching it to the majority opinion of hundreds of other persons from the same culture. Expert scoring involves determining the correctness of an answer by comparing it to the majority opinion of experts in emotion. Notably, the consensus scoring method runs in direct contrast to traditional measurement of intelligence where test items of graded difficulty discriminate between levels of intelligence. It has been criticized on the grounds that high and low score ranges are not adequately represented. The scale authors acknowledge this, and argue that for the time being consensual scoring by an individual’s social and cultural peers is at best close approximation of a correct answer. On the other hand, the expert scoring method is more similar to the system of measurement used in cognitive ability assessment, where an attempt is made to define objective scoring criteria (Matthews et al., 2002).

In terms of the MEIS’s psychometric properties, four large-sample studies reported internal consistency reliability alphas across the consensus and expert scoring systems ranging from .90 to .96 for the full scale, and .74 to .96 for the four subscale branches (Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 2002; Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000; Mayer, Caruso et al., 1999; Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). Not so impressive were test-retest reliability estimates, which Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (2000) reported to range between .75 for the full scale and .60 to .68 for the four branch subscales following a two-week intermission. Moreover, in some studies, the average internal consistencies for the branch subscales have estimated to be as low as .77 for the consensus scoring method, and .62 for the expert scoring method (Caruso et al., 2002; Matthews et al., 2002). Worse, some studies have reported internal consistency reliabilities as low as .46 (Ciarrochi et al., 2000), .35 (Mayer, Caruso et
al., 1999), and .26 (Roberts et al., 2001) for some of the twelve tests comprising the four subscales. Thus, while the full scale reliability estimates are quite good when compared to well-established cognitive ability tests, which typically demonstrate reliabilities ranging from .85 to .95 (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994), the test-retest reliability estimates, average subscale estimates, and individual test estimates are quite poor.

These reliability issues notwithstanding, the MEIS appears to have a robust factor structure. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2004) cite three studies in which exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses have replicated the four branch model (Day & Carroll, 2004; Mayer et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2001). With respect to convergent validity evidence, the MEIS has been found to correlate at .36 with Bar-On’s (1997) measure of emotional intelligence, the EQ-i (Mayer, Caruso et al., 2000). This indicates that the two measures share around 13% of their variance, which is quite low considering they both purport to measure EI. However, as will become evident from the later critique of the EQ-i, content and measurement differences likely account for limitations in their shared variance. Better evidence of convergent validity has been reported in studies by Roberts et al. (2001), and Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004), where correlations between the MEIS and cognition-related ability measures ranged between .30 and .40. Of note however, a study by Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found no relationship between the MEIS and cognitive ability when assessed by Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices.

Evidence of the MEIS’s discriminant validity has also been forthcoming, as has that of its criterion validity. In a large sample study, Roberts et al. (2001) reported correlations between the MEIS and Big Five personality dimensions ranging from .13 and .24, clearly indicating their distinctiveness. In terms of criterion validity, various
studies have found the MEIS to be associated with a range of theoretically predicted outcomes, including life satisfaction, relationship success, and parental warmth, albeit with correlations of around .20 (see Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Mayer, Caruso et al., 2000).

Research examining the MSCEIT’s psychometric properties is much more limited given its recent development. Mayer et al. (2003) have reported internal consistency reliabilities across scoring methods for the full scale that range from a high .91 to .93 for the full scale, and a moderate .76 to high .91 for the four branches. However, when coefficient alphas for the eight tests comprising the four branches were averaged, the expert scoring system exhibited a low reliability of .68, while the consensus method exhibited a low to moderate reliability of .71. The internal reliability of these subtests, therefore, appears far from optimal, particularly considering that a primary reason for the MSCEIT’s development was to surmount such issues with the MEIS.

Two recent studies have also raised questions regarding the MSCEIT’s factor structure. Reanalysis of Mayer et al.’s (2003) subscale intercorrelation matrix by Gignac (2005b) revealed a best-fitting model comprising three rather than four interpretable EI branches, for both the consensus and expert-based scoring systems. In this model, no support for the second Emotion Assimilation branch was found. In a further sample, confirmatory factor analyses by Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough (2005) led to the same conclusion.

In terms of discriminant validity evidence, studies by Livingstone and Day (2005) and O’Conner and Little (2003) found correlations of less than .24 between the MSCEIT and Big Five personality dimensions, which suggests that like the MEIS, the MSCEIT is quite distinct from personality. In terms of convergent validity, Barchard
and Hakstian’s research (2001) found low to moderate correlations between some of the MSCEIT branches and cognitive tests of verbal ability, verbal disclosure, and inductive reasoning. A more recent study by Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, and Roberts (2005) reported similar correlations between verbal ability, the Understanding Emotion \( (r = .54) \) and Emotion Management \( (r = .28) \) branches, and the full scale MSCEIT \( (r = .32) \). Of concern however, low correlations between the MSCEIT and other measures of EI were reported by Brackett and Mayer (2003), and Zeidner et al. (2005), who found that the full scale MSCEIT correlated at .21 with the EQ-i, and .29 with the SSRI respectively. The former correlation is of particular concern given that the MSCEIT’s predecessor, the MEIS, shared 14% of variance with the EQ-i, while Brackett and Mayer’s (2003) results suggest that the MSCEIT shares only 4% of variance with the EQ-i. Again, variation in content and measurement may account for these differences. With this apparent change of relations in mind however, Conte (2005) and Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts (2002) note with surprise that correlations between the MEIS and MSCEIT have not yet been published, which they remind is a standard procedure in test development, particularly in establishing the psychometric soundness of a revised measure.

Such issues not withstanding, EI as measured by the MSCEIT has been found to correlate to various degrees with a number of validating criterion, including self-detection of autonomic arousal \( (r = .23; \) Schneider, Lyons, & Williams, 2005), secure attachment style \( (r = .28; \) Kafetsios, 2004), and socially deviant behaviour \( (r = -.45) \) and alcohol use \( (r = -.32) \) amongst males (Brackett et al., 2004). The MSCEIT has also been linked to academic performance in studies by Barchard (2003) and O’Conner and Little (2003). In Barchard’s study however, its predictive power was nullified by cognitive and personality variables, while in O’Connor and Little’s study,
the Understanding Emotions branch but not the MSCEIT full scale correlated with academic performance, and the correlation was quite weak ($r = .23$).

In sum, the MSCEIT has demonstrated an adequate level of full scale reliability and discriminant validity thus far. However, more work appears necessary to improve the subscale internal reliabilities, factorially substantiate the Emotion Assimilation branch, and expand evidence as to its convergent and criterion validity. Nevertheless, and perhaps more importantly at this stage, Salovey and Mayer (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) have contributed the most influential theory of EI to date, and have made their data and the tests themselves readily available for peer review. Their theoretical contribution and public attempts to empirically establish their respective tests stand in stark contrast to the next EI model reviewed, the ECI.

**The Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI)**

Goleman’s (1995) best-seller, *Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ*, is attributed with the popularization of the EI concept. At the heart of his theory of emotional intelligence is a basic neurophysiological explanation. He claims that when humans experience emotional arousal in the form of bodily sensations, they experience a “neural hijack”, in which the brain reacts automatically to sensory information, rather than consciously processing and attempting to better understand the information in order to make efficacious decisions. He suggests that although the control one can exert over this hijack has a genetic component, one can learn how to improve and hone this control in order to perceive, process and manage emotional information more effectively.

Less well known however, is that much of his 1995 treatise of EI was a journalistic account of Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) earliest theory of emotional
intelligence, an account which also altered their meaning of EI and added claims which the original theory never made. Furthermore, and rather surprisingly, some scholars attributed Goleman’s work with scientific credibility at a time when the originators of the theory had only recently embarked on empirical investigation of their own theoretical model (Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000). To his credit, Goleman (1998) acknowledged these issues and attempted to distinguish his own perspective in a later book, *Working with Emotional Intelligence*, in which he stated, “I’ve also gone back to my professional roots as an academic psychologist, conducting an exhaustive review of the research….And I’ve performed or commissioned several new scientific analyses of data” (p. 5).

In this work, Goleman (1998) defined emotional intelligence as “the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships” (p. 317).

Operationalized in the form of the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI), his model of EI continued to borrow loosely from the early works of Salovey and Mayer (1990), incorporating cognitive abilities synonymous with their theoretical model along with a galaxy of constructs common to personality, motivation, interpersonal skills, and leadership theory. Developed by Goleman, Boyatzis, and colleagues (Boyatzis et al., 2000; Boyatzis & Sala, 2004; Goleman, 1995, 1998), the latest version of the ECI consists of 110 multiple choice items that assess twenty competencies. In terms of scoring, the ECI incorporates 360-degree assessment possibilities involving self, peer, and supervisor ratings. The twenty competencies are organized hierarchically into four dimensions or clusters which build upon one another: Self-Awareness, Self-Management, Social Awareness, and Social Skills.
The first dimension, Self-Awareness, refers to knowledge of one’s preferences and feelings at any given moment and the ability to use that knowledge to guide decision making. It also refers to self-confidence, and having a realistic perspective of one’s abilities. The second dimension, Self-Management, comprises the ability to handle emotions in such a way that they facilitate rather than interfere with task performance, the ability to work conscientiously and delay gratification to pursue goals, and the ability to self-heal emotional distress. It also incorporates motivation, referring to the ability to preferentially stimulate and direct one’s efforts towards personally relevant goals, and to persevere when faced with setbacks and frustration. Social Awareness, the third dimension, involves the ability to sense what people are feeling, being able to take their perspective, and cultivating rapport and attunement with a diverse range of people. The fourth and final dimension, Social Skills, is measured in terms of one’s competence in handling emotions in relationships, interacting effectively, accurately reading social situations and networks, and using these competencies to persuade and lead, negotiate and settle disputes, and facilitate cooperation and teamwork.

In summarizing his theory and model of EI, Goleman (1995) explains, “there is an old-fashioned word for the body of skills that emotional intelligence represents: character” (p. 285). From a cynical perspective, this statement implies that his theory of EI contributes both nothing new and nothing beyond personology. As well, this statement seemingly contradicts the varied content of the ECI, which extends significantly beyond the boundaries of personality (Matthews et al., 2002; Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000).

Turning to the ECI’s psychometric properties, internal consistency reliability for the ECI scales have been reported to range between .62 and .87 for the self-
assessment method, and .80 to .95 for peer and supervisor ratings (Boyatzis et al., 2000). No other sources of reliability information are available. Validity information is even sparser. Boyatzis et al. (2000) claim that the validity of the ECI is supported by strong correlations with its predecessor, the Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ), which was developed from hundreds of studies of business leader performance. Independent evaluation of this and other forms of validity is difficult however, since the empirical studies which Boyatzis et al. cite are located primarily within in-house working papers, unpublished manuscripts or technical reports. Similarly, there are no peer-reviewed or commercially published factor or cluster analyses to substantiate the factorial structure of the ECI, nor have correlations between the ECI and measures of personality dimensions, cognitive ability or criterion-related variables been publicly disseminated.

This situation is primarily due to propriety constraints that have restricted public access to both in-house research, and to the ECI items themselves. As a result, few independent studies of its psychometric properties have been performed. Independent researchers have instead resorted to examining the conceptual content of the ECI. In such cases, evidence of its uniqueness is reportedly very poor since numerous ECI competencies appear to overlap heavily with the Big Five personality dimensions (Matthews et al., 2002; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). For example, Boyatzis et al. (2000) claim conscientiousness to be an EI competency, located within the Self-Management cluster. Not only is it named identically to the better known Big Five dimension, it is defined almost identically. Another self-management competency, emotional self-control, which at high levels reflects an absence of distress and disruptive feelings, bears much resemblance to the Emotional Stability personality dimension. A further competency, trustworthiness, is again seemingly
identical to the same-named facet of the Agreeableness personality dimension. Similar parallels can be drawn between many of the other 18 ECI competencies and other well-established constructs within psychological literature, including self-esteem, achievement motivation, conflict management and leadership styles.

Having examined the limited research available, reviewers including Conte (2005), Matthews et al. (2002), and Mayer et al. (2000) concur that the ECI currently lacks the necessary published evidence to be considered a useful measure of emotional intelligence. Furthermore, they share the opinion that even if the ECI items and their psychometric properties were to be disclosed, the ECI would likely reflect a clustering of constructs which have already been widely studied in psychological literature, and offer nothing new to our understanding of human behaviour.

**The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)**

While Goleman’s (1995) work is frequently attributed with the popularization of EI, Bar-On’s (1997) Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i) is perhaps the most well known self-report EI measure, and was the first EI instrument made commercially available. It shares the strongest similarities with Goleman and colleagues’ ECI, in that it comprises clusters of competencies which seem to resemble established personality traits. Bar-On (2000) claims to have coined the term “emotional quotient”, and defines EQ as a “noncognitive intelligence [comprising] an array of emotional, personal, and social abilities and skills that influence an individual’s ability to cope effectively with environmental demands and pressures” (Bar-On, Brown, Kirkcaldy, & Thome, 2000, p. 1108). The most recent version of the EQ-i comprises 133 items that render a global EQ score and scores for five clusters of competency: Intrapersonal EQ, Interpersonal EQ, Adaptability, General Mood, and Stress Management (Bar-On, 2000). Fifteen subscales contribute to the five clusters.
The first cluster, Intrapersonal EQ, comprises a Self-Regard, Emotional Self-Awareness, Assertiveness, Independence, and Self-Actualization subscale. Self-Regard refers to awareness, understanding, and acceptance of one’s self; Emotional Self-Awareness concerns the ability to recognize and understand one’s feelings; Assertiveness reflects the ability to express feelings, beliefs, and thoughts, and to stand up for personal rights in an effective but non-damaging manner; Independence refers to self-direction and control over personal thought and action, and freedom from emotional dependence; Self-Actualization concerns the ability to fulfill personal potential, and pursuit of personally meaningful or enjoyable goals.

The second cluster, Interpersonal EQ, comprises an Empathy, Social Responsibility, and Interpersonal Relationship subscale. Empathy refers to awareness, understanding and appreciation of others feelings; Social Responsibility refers to cooperativeness and constructive contributions to one’s social group; while Interpersonal Relationship refers to the ability to develop mutually satisfying relationships characterized by emotional closeness, intimacy, and affection.

The third cluster, Stress Management, comprises a Stress Tolerance and Impulse Control subscale. Stress Tolerance purportedly measures ability to withstand the emotional pressure of distressing situations, and actively and positively cope with stress; while Impulse Control concerns resistance or delay in the gratification of impulses, drives or temptations.

The fourth cluster, Adaptability, comprises Reality Testing, Flexibility, and Problem Solving subscales. Reality Testing refers to the ability to critically assess the match between subjective perception and objective information; Flexibility concerns adjustment of personal feelings, thoughts, and behaviours to changing situations or circumstance; and Problem Solving reflects the ability to identify and implement
solutions to personal and social problems. The fifth and final cluster, General Mood, is composed of an Optimism, and Happiness subscale. Optimism refers to maintenance of a positive attitude and perspective; while Happiness refers to the ability to maintain a sense of life satisfaction, and to express positive emotion.

At the theoretical level, Bar-On’s (1997) model has been criticized on the grounds that hierarchical relations between the fifteen factors, the five clusters and the overarching EI factor are unclear and unsubstantiated (Conte, 2005). Others have gone further, criticizing his non-cognitive model as a “catch-all” paradigm for any unclassified non-cognitive ability, one that fails to provide or specify any real form of binding or underlying theory at all (Matthews et al., 2002). As well, one of the primary criticisms leveled at Goleman and colleagues’ ECI, that it measures already established personality traits, is also leveled at the EQ-i (Livingstone & Day, 2005; Matthews et al., 2002; Mayer, Salovey et al., 2000). Mayer, Salovey et al. (2000) draw similarities, for instance, between a number of EQ-i competencies, and traits comprising the well-established and highly regarded California Personality Inventory (CPI), which like the EQ-i, includes measures of Self-Assurance, Interpersonal Effectiveness, Self-Acceptance, Self-Control, Flexibility, and Empathy. In their view, such conceptual similarities suggest that many of the EQ-i competencies are not appreciably different from the CPI or other like forms of personality measurement. They suggest that irrespective of the EQ-i’s psychometric properties, to which discussion turns next, Bar-On’s model of emotional intelligence offers little or no clarification to our understanding of human behaviour beyond that previously established by decades of personality research, and may even be considered a distraction from this substantial work. His critics acknowledge however, that unlike many other EI test developers, Bar-On has used samples numbering in the thousands
at each stage of the EQ-i’s development, and has made his research and the EQ-i available for peer review (Matthews et al., 2002).

In terms of psychometric properties, Bar-On reports an adequate though less than optimal internal consistency reliability of .76 for the full scale EQ-i and .69 to .86 for the the subscales (Bar-On, 2000), and a four month test-retest reliability of .75 (Bar-On, 1997). Similar levels of reliability have also been replicated by independent researchers (e.g., Dawda & Hart, 2000). However, Bar-On’s (2000) most recent exploratory and confirmatory factorial analyses of the EQ-i revealed evidence for ten rather than his stipulated fifteen factors. Curiously, he advocated retaining the five unsubstantiated factors as EQ-i subscales (Optimism, Self-Actualization, Happiness, Independence, and Social Responsibility), referring to them as facilitators rather than aspects of emotional intelligence. Independent researchers, on the other hand, have not been able to satisfactorily replicate even the ten factor model, let alone the fifteen factor model or its hierarchy (Palmer, Manocha, Gignac, & Stough, 2003). Indeed, analyses from three independent studies strongly suggest a single factor rather than multi-factorial model (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Livingstone & Day, 2005; Petrides & Furnham, 2001).

Turning to construct validity, independent research by Gowing (2001) reported an average subscale intercorrelation of .50, which is comparable to the convergence amongst traditional intelligence subtests. Mayer, Salovey et al. (2000) also reported correlations between the EQ-i and the MEIS of .36, indicating that the content is moderately similar. Yet, unlike the MEIS, which in some studies correlated at .30 to .40 with cognitive ability (Roberts et al., 2001; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), Bar-On (2000) only found a correlation of .12 between the EQ-i and the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, while Livingstone and Day (2005) found no
relationship at all between the EQ-i and three cognitive ability tests. These findings suggest a much weaker relationship than one might expect between theoretically complimentary constructs.

In regard to discriminant validity, Livingstone and Day (2005) reported an acceptable mean correlation of .39 between the EQ-i clusters and Big Five personality measures. Yet, Dawda and Hart (2000) reported an unacceptably high mean correlation of .50 between the full scale EQ-i and the Big Five personality measures. Worse, Newsome, Day, and Catano (2000) reported a correlation of -.77 between Cattell, Cattell, and Cattell’s (1993)16PF trait Anxiety scale and the full scale EQ-i, and correlations of .60 or higher with four of the five EQ-i clusters. Likewise, O’Conner and Little (2003) reported a correlation of -.76 between the 16PF Anxiety and the full scale EQ-i. These results indicate that Bar-On’s measure overlaps uncomfortably with long-studied and well-established personality constructs.

With respect to criterion validity, independent research by Slaski and Cartwright (2002) found that the EQ-i correlated positively with self-ratings of morale $(r = .55)$, and supervisory ratings of performance $(r = .22)$, and negatively with health problems $(r = -.50)$, and stress $(r = -.41)$, in a sample of retail managers. In another study, Day, Therrien, and Carroll (2005) found that the EQ-i explained incremental variance in wellbeing, but not stress, after the effects of daily hassles and personality were controlled. Likewise, Livingstone and Day (2005) found that the EQ-i cluster scores predicted life satisfaction $(r = .42)$ and continued to do so after the effect of personality was controlled.

Bar-On (1997) has also cited unpublished studies in which his measure predicts academic success. Moreover, peer-reviewed research by O’Conner and Day (2003) supports this link. The research of Newsome et al. (2000), however, does not.
Specifically, O’Conner and Day found that the EQ-i Intrapersonal and Stress Management clusters correlated weakly with university students’ grade point average (GPA; $r = .21$ and $r = .29$ respectively), as did the full scale EQ-i ($r = .23$). On the other hand, Newsome et al. found no significant correlations between university students’ GPA scores and their scores on the five EQ-i clusters, nor their full scale EQ-i score.

Overall, the findings cited here suggest that the EQ-i demonstrates adequate though not optimal reliability, shares a small amount of variance with another EI measure, and predicts some theoretically consistent criteria. However, the theory behind the EQ-i is vague at best, the factorial structure is empirically unsubstantiated, and measure has little to no relationship with cognitive ability. Moreover, the close relationship between the EQ-i and personality suggests that it does not constitute a new concept, but rather, represents constructs for which there are more sophisticated measures supported by decades of research. Indeed, Matthews et al. (2002) cynically conclude that like Goleman and colleagues’ ECI, the EQ-i covers so much ground that it is likely to have some utility in any circumstance.

Although the MEIS, MSCEIT and EQ-i are the most popular measures of emotional intelligence, and the ECI the most notorious for its psychometric secrecy, EI research predating the popularity of these measures was most commonly performed using one of three self-report measures: the TAS-20, TMMS, or the SSRI. And while their public popularity has been eclipsed by the former models, these three latter measures remain popular tools in academic EI research given their time and cost efficiency.
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20)

One of the earliest instruments used to measure constructs inherent to emotional intelligence was the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994) which has become one of, if not the most widely used measure of alexithymia (Taylor & Taylor, 1997). A 20-item self-report instrument, the TAS-20 was designed to measure three psycho-pathological dimensions of alexithymia, each of which reflect deficits rather than a surplus of abilities inherent to emotional intelligence. The three dimensions measured by the TAS-20 are labeled Difficulty Identifying Feelings, Difficulty Describing Feelings, both of which are self-evident; and Externally Oriented Thinking, which mirrors a conscious preference for avoiding self-reflection.

The scale authors found evidence supporting the factorial structure and reliability of the TAS-20 in both their early (Bagby et al., 1994; Parker, Bagby, Taylor, & Endler, 1993) and later works (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003; Simonsson-Sarnecki et al., 2000). In samples from America, Canada, Germany (Parker et al., 1993) and Sweden (Simonsson-Sarnecki et al., 2000), coefficient alphas for the full scale ranged between .74 and .84, while subscale alphas for the replicated factor structure ranged between .60 and .83. Bagby et al. (1994) also found evidence of its convergent and discriminant validity, whereby the three TAS-20 subscales correlated moderately and negatively with psychological mindedness, and weakly with the Big Five personality dimensions. Furthermore, Bagby et al. (1994) demonstrated the TAS-20’s concurrent validity in terms of positive correlations with observers’ ratings of alexithymia in a target sample of behavioural medicine outpatients clinically identified as such.
Like the scale’s authors, independent researchers have also found empirical support for the TAS-20’s construct validity. They have reported convergent correlations of up to -.61 with Salovey and Mayer’s earliest EI measure, the Trait Meta Mood Scale (Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003; Davies et al., 1998; Palmer, Donaldson, & Stough, 2002; Salovey et al., 1995), strong correlations with performance criterion on emotion-labeling ($r = -.71$) and emotion-monitoring stroop tasks ($r = -.53$; Coffey et al., 2003), moderate correlations with negative affect ($r = .31$), weak correlations with satisfaction with life ($r = -.26$; Palmer et al., 2002) and discriminant correlations with personality dimensions averaging around .18 (Davies et al., 1998).

The Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS)

The Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995) was an exploratory measure designed to reflect Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) earliest version of their cognitive theory of emotional intelligence. Thirty self-report items assess three constructs: Attention, which measures perceived ability to attend to moods; Clarity, reflecting perceived ability to discriminate between feelings; and Repair, which concerns the ability to regulate moods.

Adequate internal reliability has been repeatedly demonstrated for Attention and Clarity, although reliability for Repair has been found to fluctuate between a poor .64 and an acceptable .85 (Salovey et al., 2002). Independent confirmatory factor analyses have confirmed its 3-factor structure (Palmer, Gignac, Bates, & Stough, 2003), while correlations of around .30 with the MEIS (Gohm & Clore, 2002) and .40 with the TAS-20 (Palmer et al., 2002) have demonstrated some convergent validity. The three subscales also appear relatively distinct from three of the five personality dimensions with correlations of .32 or lower. However, Clarity and Repair have been
found to correlate at up to .47 with Agreeableness, and .50 with Neuroticism (Salovey et al., 1995).

In terms of criterion validity, each dimension has been associated with theoretically expected outcomes. Attention to feelings has been correlated moderately with private and public self-consciousness. Clarity has been weakly correlated with emotional expressivity and fewer depressive symptoms. Repair has been correlated moderately with less depression, greater optimism, and belief in the changeability of negative moods (Salovey et al., 1995). Clarity and Repair have also been associated with life satisfaction to modest degrees, and the Clarity subscale appears to predict incremental variance in life satisfaction beyond that of well-known mood and state constructs and personality traits (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2005).

While the TMMS reflects a conception of EI that has progressed beyond its originating theory, and shares overlap with some personality dimensions, many researchers have found it a useful time-efficient self-report measure of some emotional abilities inherent to Mayer et al.’s (2004) MSCEIT (Coffey et al., 2003; Fernandez-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & Pizarro, 2006; Ghorbani, Bing, Watson, Davison, & Mack, 2002; Palmer et al., 2002).

**Schutte Self-Report Inventory (SSRI)**

Another EI measure widely used in academic research is the Schutte Self-Report Inventory (SSRI; Schutte et al., 1998). Schutte et al. (1998) used Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) original three dimensional model, that which underlies the TMMS, as the foundations for its development. Composed of 33 freely published items, the SSRI provides a full scale EI score, and scores on four sub-factors: (1) Emotion Perception, which measures appraisal, understanding and expression of emotions in the self and others; (2) Utilizing Emotions, which centers on using experienced
emotions and changes in emotions to develop new ideas; (3) Managing Self-Relevant Emotions; and (4) Managing Other’s Emotions, which concern abilities to repair negative mood states and generate positive ones in self and other respectively.

Schutte et al. (1998) reported a high internal consistency reliability of .90 for the full scale, and two-week test-retest reliability of .78. However, poor to moderate subscale reliabilities have been reported in studies by Ciarrochi and colleagues (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001; Ciarrochi, Dean, & Anderson, 2002), ranging from .55 to .76.

In terms of factorial validity, confirmatory factor analyses by both Petrides and Furnham (2000) and Saklofske, Austin, and Minski (2003) extracted a higher order general EI factor, and four nested factors reflecting optimism/mood regulation, appraisal of emotions, social skills, and utilization of emotions when thinking. While the factor content is very similar in both of these independent studies, it differs enough from Schutte et al.’s (1998) original factor content to cast doubt on the replicability of her proposed sub-scales. Casting further doubt, CFA analyses by Gignac, Palmer, Manocha, and Stough (2005) failed to find factors pertaining to emotional expression or managing others’ emotions, reflecting the first and fourth factors of Schutte’s proposed model.

With regard to construct validity, independent analyses by Ciarrochi et al. (2002) found acceptable internal subscale convergence, with correlations ranging from .28 to .48. Furthermore, the scale authors demonstrated validating convergence between the SSRI and the TAS ($r = -.65$), and TMMS ($r = .61$; Schutte et al., 1998). On the other hand, Zeidner et al. (2005) found a rather low correlation of .25 between the full scale SSRI and MSCEIT, which indicates that they share only 6% of their
variance. Also of concern, Schutte et al. (1998) found no relationship between the SSRI and cognitive ability.

In terms of discriminant validity, the scale authors found that the SSRI was unrelated to four of the Big Five personality dimensions, the exception being a .54 correlation between the full scale SSRI and Openness (Schutte et al. 1998). Dawda and Hart (2000) also reported discriminant correlations with personality, ranging from .18 to .38. Further testing by Ciarochi et al. (2002) reported a desirably low correlation of .21 with self-esteem, but a much less desirable correlation of .51 with trait anxiety.

With regard to criterion validity, Schutte et al. (1998) found that the full scale SSRI predicted greater life optimism ($r = .52$) and lower levels of depression ($r = - .37$). Furthermore, research by Saklofske et al. (2003) found that the SSRI predicted incremental variance in well-being beyond that explained by the five personality dimensions, though the magnitude of partial correlations with well-being were less than .20. In the originating study, Schutte et al. (1998) also found that the SSRI predicted university students’ grade point average with a correlation of .32. In direct contrast however, Zeidner et al. (2005) found lower SSRI scores but higher MSCEIT scores amongst academically gifted Israeli high school students when compared to non-gifted students.

Overall, the SSRI is more distinct from personality traits than the EQ-i or ECI self-report measures, and there is some evidence of construct and criterion validity. Its predictive power appears fairly small however, and there are concerns regarding subscale reliability and replicability of the factor structure.

Beyond the measures reviewed here, there are a plethora of additional EI measures which are yet to receive the same empirical attention. Some have been
published in peer-reviewed journals, psychometric evidence for which is still 
Emotional Intelligence Profile (WEIP), Petrides and Furnham’s (2003) Trait 
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQ), and Tett, Wang, Greibler, and 
Linkovich’s (1997) TETT EI scale are some examples. Many others have proliferated 
in commercial contexts for use as selection devices or aids in individual development, 
team-building and personal coaching. Even less is known and little will likely ever be 
known about the psychometric properties of most of these in-house tests.

As has been shown, theorists and test developers have defined and 
operationalized emotional intelligence in different ways. This has resulted in a wide 
range of different dimensions and respective measures. As will be demonstrated 
throughout the current thesis, such differences make comparative evaluations of the 
various models and resulting research difficult, as does the lack of theory 
underpinning some models - particularly those which stray from Mayer and Salovey’s 
(1997) conception of EI.

Compounding these difficulties are psychometric issues with the measures 
themselves. For the most part, the full-scale EI measures demonstrate acceptable 
internal consistency. However, many of the subscales demonstrate less than 
acceptable consistency. Moreover, the factorial structure of most of the EI models 
reviewed is also questionable, with significant differences in factor number and 
composition emerging across different studies. As well, a number of the more reliable 
self-report measures strongly correlate with well-established personality traits, but 
ironically, barely correlate with intelligence or cognitive ability measures, or with 
other measures of EI. Most, however, do correlate with some validating criterion.
In short, important theoretical and psychometric issues remain to be resolved. Such issues continue to hamper acceptance of EI as a potentially valuable construct in wider academic psychology research: most particularly its acceptance as a construct reflecting the synergetic relationship between emotion and reasoning ability.

The Current Model: The Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT)

It is with such concerns in mind that Palmer and Stough (2002) conceived of the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT), of which Gignac’s (2005a) revision is used in the present thesis. Palmer and Stough sought to identify the most definitive dimensions of EI, and create a psychometrically sound self-report scale that measured these dimensions. The first stage of their investigation involved a factor analytic study of six emotional intelligence tests, chosen to represent the various types of models and measures available: the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Scale (MSCEIT 1.1 Research Version; Mayer, Salovey et al., 1999b); the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i, Bar-On, 1997); the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995); the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-II (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994); the Schutte Self-Report Inventory (SSRI; Schutte et al., 1998) and Tett et al.’s (1997) Emotional Intelligence Scale (TETT).

Each of the six measures was factor analyzed separately using principle components analyses, as described in Palmer and Stough (2002). Factor-based scores for each of the dimensions identified in each test were formed from the component score coefficients. The dimensions identified for each test then served as items in a larger exploratory component analysis. This analysis revealed the number and composition of dimensions common to the six EI measures. Five components emerged, which were labeled Emotional Recognition and Expression; Emotions
Direct Cognition; Understanding of Emotions External; Emotional Management; and Emotional Control. Factor content loading on the Emotional Recognition and Expression dimension reflected the ability to identify one’s own feelings and emotional states, and the ability to express those inner feelings to others. Content comprising the Emotions Direct Cognition dimension concerned the extent to which emotions and emotional knowledge were incorporated into decision-making and problem solving. Content loading on the Understanding Emotions External dimension related to the ability to identify and understand the emotions of others and those inherent in the environment. Content weighing on the Emotional Management dimension related to the management of positive and negative emotions both in oneself and others; while the Emotional Control dimension comprised content which concerned the extent to which strong emotional states such as anger, anxiety and frustration affect concentration and performance.

The emergent model thus bore considerable similarity to Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) four-branch model, and was interpreted as such. A notable difference was the presence of the fifth dimension, Emotional Control, which would theoretically be subsumed by Mayer and Salovey’s Emotion Management dimension. The authors and a team of colleagues subsequently generated a large pool of self-report items to represent each of the five factors, and successfully tested these items on 690 working adults. The resulting measure, the SUEIT, comprised 64 items. Psychometric analyses of scale properties found evidence of adequate internal consistency, and some evidence of construct and criterion validity. Coefficient alpha for the full scale was found to be .90, while the subscales ranged from .91 for Emotional Recognition and Expression, to .70 for Emotions Direct Cognition, .89 for Understanding Emotions External, .83 for Emotional Management, and .77 for Emotional Control.
Test-retest reliability for the subscales following a one month interval was reported to range between .82 and .92 in an additional albeit very small sample of 36 persons.

Data pertaining to the construct validity of the SUEIT was also promising. Internal subscale correlations averaged .32, which the authors interpreted as evidence that the subscales measured distinct yet related constructs. They also found a mean correlation of .30 between the SUEIT subscales and Emotional Stability, Extraversion, and Openness personality dimensions, which is comparable to some of the lowest correlations reported between self-report EI measures and personality. In terms of criterion validity, Palmer, Gardner, and Stough (2003) found that senior business executives (N = 110) had a higher mean level of SUEIT EI than both a general sample of 210 persons and a sample of 555 nurses: A finding that was theoretically consistent with the expected combination of people and personal management skills inherent to senior leadership roles. In a further study, Gardner and Stough (2002) found that the SUEIT predicted transformational but not transactional leadership behaviours, the former being most strongly emotion-focused (Yammarino & Dubinsky, 1994) and most strongly associated with better organizational performance and success (K.B., K.G., & N., 1996).

In short, Stough and colleagues’ research revealed evidence favoring SUEIT’s psychometric soundness. The SUEIT subscales exhibited higher reliability than a number of other self-report measures, and appeared more distinct from well-established personality dimensions. The SUEIT also demonstrated some initial evidence of criterion validity. Stough and colleagues of course considered their SUEIT research preliminary rather than substantive, and their measure, experimental.

Much effort was recently invested to improve the psychometric properties of the SUEIT, by Gignac (2005a), author and contributor to a collection of papers
examining the factor structure of general intelligence (e.g., Gignac, 2005c, 2005d, 2006; Gignac, Stough, & Loukomitis, 2004; Gignac & Vernon, 2003) and emotional intelligence (e.g., Palmer, Gignac et al., 2003; Palmer et al., 2005; Palmer, Manocha et al., 2003). In short, Gignac performed a comprehensive series of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on the 64-item SUEIT, using data from 1405 adults provided by Stough and colleagues, the results of which formed part of his doctoral thesis. In contrast to Stough and colleagues’ principle components factor analyses (Palmer, Gardner et al., 2003; Palmer & Stough, 2002), Gignac identified a best-fitting model comprising nine rather than five substantive factors within the SUEIT. However, Gignac recommended the omission of two factors which he opined to be theoretically and empirically inconsistent with predominant conceptions of EI, as well as a number of items which he deemed to be factorially invalid.

The final model of acceptable fit comprised a first order general EI factor, a further first order factor consisting of positively keyed items, and seven nested orthogonal group level factors reflecting seven EI subscales. Gignac (2005a) affirmed the soundness of this model by splitting the sample and replicating the factor structure within both groups. Of import, in his concluding comments, Gignac further questioned the theoretical relevance of one of the seven factors, “Emotions Direct Cognition”, the contents of which concerned personal affirmations as to the value of emotions rather than any form of emotion-related information processing ability. Rather than omit this factor from the analyses, he left the relevance and value of this factor for the original scale authors to decide. Consequently, his findings and recommendations suggested that the most theoretically and empirically sound model of the SUEIT was one comprised from 44 of the 64 original items, measuring global EI and six EI sub-factors: Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression,
Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Control, Emotional Management of Self, and Emotional Management of Others. Figure 1.2 depicts this model.

![Diagram showing the six-factor model of the SUEIT](image)

**Emotional Recognition in Self**
The ability to identify and understand one's own emotions, and to accurately distinguish between them.

**Personal Expression**
The ability to clearly express one's own emotions to others.

**Understanding Emotions External**
The ability to perceive and understand the emotions expressed and experienced by others, and to perceive and understand the emotional climate of different environments.

**Emotional Control**
The ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotion.

**Emotional Management of Self**
The ability to manage both positive and negative moods and emotions within oneself, and to generate emotions commensurate with one's goals.

**Emotional Management of Others**
The ability to manage both positive and negative moods and emotions within others, and to generate emotions within others commensurate with one’s goals.

*Figure 1.2.* Gignac’s (2005a) revised model of the SUEIT.

The six-factor model suggested by Gignac (2005a) bears much similarity to the original SUEIT model. There are three important differences however. First, Gignac’s model of best fit split the original Emotional Management factor into two factors: Emotional Management of Self and Emotional Management of Others. Second, the original Emotional Recognition and Expression factor was also split into
two factors: Emotional Recognition in Self, and Personal Expression of emotion.

Third, he considered the content validity of items construing the Emotions Direct Cognition factor highly debatable. For this reason it was not considered further in the present thesis.

Estimated levels of internal consistency reliability for the six newly extracted factors were generally moderate to high, with coefficient alphas of .76 for Personal Expression, .89 for Understanding Emotions External, .84 for Emotional Control, .86 for Emotional Management of Self, and .74 for Emotional Management of Others. However, a very low coefficient alpha of .30 was estimated for Emotional Recognition in Self, which comprised only two items following Gignac’s revision. When stepped-up by the Spearman-Brown formula (Krus & Helmstadter, 1987), which estimates coefficient alphas for experimental tests comprising low item numbers (the formula being $\alpha = 2(\alpha)/1+1(\alpha)$), it rose to .46. Gignac suggested that this might be considered adequate for such a small scale, and as will be seen in later sections, it did achieve much better levels of reliability across the three studies performed in the present thesis.

Intercorrelations between the subscales were also of a desirable level, ranging from .21 to .68, and in concert with the CFA fit statistics, suggested that the six factors were distinct yet related constructs contributing to a uni-factorial EI construct. The six SUEIT factors demonstrated discriminant validity as well, with a mean positive correlation of .28 with four of the Big Five personality dimensions, and .10 with the remaining Agreeableness dimension. Furthermore, using a combination of multiple regression and CFA analyses, Gignac demonstrated that each of the SUEIT subscales retained a degree of statistically significant true score variance, independent of the true score variance of the Big Five.
As such, Gignac’s (2005a) revised model of the SUEIT demonstrated a more differentiated factor structure than the original: a structure strongly validated by the persistence of the newly extracted factors and model fit statistics across the large split-sample. Moreover, with one exception, internal consistency reliability estimates for the emergent subscales remained moderate to high. There was also an improvement in convergent validity amongst the subscales, and an improvement in the SUEIT’s already strong discriminant validity in relation to the Big Five personality dimensions.

When one compares Gignac’s SUEIT data to the seven models reviewed earlier, it can be seen that the robustness of the revised SUEIT factor structure is on par with the high performing MEIS, TAS-20, and TMMS, and appears more robust than that of the MSCEIT, EQ-i and SSRI. Moreover, with the exception of the Emotional Recognition in Self subscale, the SUEIT subscale internal reliability estimates (αs .74 to .89) are comparable with those for the MEIS (αs .62 to .96) and MSCEIT (αs .76 to .91), and are generally higher than those reported for four of the five remaining five models (TAS-20 αs .60 to .83; TMMS αs .64 to .85; SSRI αs .55 to .76; EQ-i αs .69 to .86): the fifth for which no such data is available (the ECI). Convergence amongst the SUEIT subscales, reinforced by EFA and CFA fit statistics, is also on par with the best of these models. Finally, while not as distinct from personality traits as the MEIS, MSCEIT, or TAS-20, it is quite close (SUEIT rs .28 or less; MSCEIT rs .24 or less; MEIS rs .24 or less, and TAS-20 rs around .18), and compares similarly to the SSRI (rs .18 to .54). It also outperforms the TMMS (rs up to .50) and EQ-i (rs up to .77). On the basis of content analyses, it outperforms the ECI in this regard as well.

Gignac’s revised model of the SUEIT thus appears to be a very good all-round model. Its psychometric performance either equals or comes close to that of the best
measures in terms of each of the foregoing criteria. Indeed, with the exception of the consistently highly performing TAS-20, one can see that none of the foregoing measures have performed so well, so consistently. And, the TAS-20, which is concerned with deficiency rather than ability, covers only three aspects of EI. Moreover, these aspects mirror only the lowest abilities in Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) hierarchical EI theory. The six SUEIT aspects on the other hand encompass a breath of abilities ranging from the low to high end.

A further important point to note is that Gignac’s (2000a) version of the SUEIT distinguishes between a number of abilities which are curiously subsumed by singular constructs in Mayer et al.’s (2002) MSCEIT. Consider first the MSCEIT Emotion Management subscale. As illustrated in the critique, research and psychometric data reported for this subscale do not distinguish between the ability to manage one’s own emotions and the ability to manage others’ emotions. Instead they are treated statistically as a single ability; capacity to self-soothe is thus confounded by capacity to manipulate others. Likewise, the MSCEIT Emotion Perception subscale does not distinguish between emotional self-awareness, awareness of others’ emotions, and the ability to articulate emotions. One could argue that these abilities are as different as Neuroticism, Openness, and Extraversion respectively. The SUEIT subcales, on the other hand, do distinguish between these abilities.

Such points provide a compelling case for use of this version of the SUEIT. Critically however, data concerning its criterion validity remains to be established. Such evidence is obviously crucial to establishing its competitive value. While it was not an overt intention of the present thesis to do so, the three studies that follow can naturally be seen to contribute to such an end.
Summary

In summary, the theory of emotional intelligence is an attempt to integrate and operationalize the now well-established synergetic relationship between emotion and intellect. However, the extent to which popular EI models accurately reflect and reliably measure this relationship, and relatedly, the extent to which these models predict adaptation-related criteria, remain issues of key concern. On the strength of its psychometric properties, the SUEIT rather than a more popular measure was chosen to approximate emotional intelligence in the three investigations that follow. These investigations seek to provide new evidence as to the role of emotional intelligence and its composite abilities in three major domains of life functioning: coping with negative life events, developing and maintaining a romantic relationship, and serving as an effective member of the workforce.
CHAPTER 2 - STUDY 1:
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCE:
ADAPTATION TO STRESSFUL LIFE EVENTS

Clinical research has identified a wide range of life events that frequently precede the onset of mental health symptoms. The Social Readjustment Ratings Scale (SRRS), originally devised by Holmes and Ray (1967), revised in numerous later studies (e.g., Hobson et al., 1998; McGrath & Burkhart, 1983; Scully, Tosi, & Banning, 2000), and cited in over 4000 publications (Hobson et al. 1998), lists 43 of the most common. The death of one’s romantic partner, family member or friend, divorce or separation, incarceration, serious personal injury or illness, accident exposure, and loss of job rank amongst the most severe, whereby events such as these have been found to precede almost all types of mood disorder (Stueve, Dohrenwend, & Skodol, 1998).

In this literature, stressful or negative life events have typically been construed as change events that precipitate movement from one set of living conditions to another. The life transitions resulting from such events, for example the loss of a loved one, or the loss of one’s job, pose significant adaptational challenges that can strain people’s ability to cope to the point of clinical distress, manifest for instance in symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. Moreover, the experience of multiple such events in a relatively short period can compound this distress (Brown & Harris, 1986, 1989; Monroe & Simons, 1991; Scully et al., 2000). Indeed, one stressful event can impede coping efficacy for additional events that occur during the transition, increasing vulnerability to and even the likelihood of further negative events (Cole, Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Paul, 2006; Kessler & Magee, 1993).
Of course, while such events are potentially traumatic, exposure does not necessarily lead to the development of clinical symptoms, as not every person experiences or copes with these events in the same way. For instance, while some people experience acute distress from which they are unable to recover, others suffer less intensely and for shorter duration. As well, while some people appear to recover quickly, they experience difficulties living life with the same enjoyment as they were previously used to. Furthermore, and of particular interest, many people appear to endure the temporary upheaval of potentially traumatic events with little disruption to their ability to function, and seem to adapt to the emotional demands of additional life challenges with similar ease (Bonanno, 2004). Bonanno (2004) describes the latter persons as resilient, defining resilience as:

…the ability of adults in otherwise normal circumstances who are exposed to an isolated and potentially highly disruptive event such as the death of a close relation or a violent or life-threatening situation to maintain relatively stable, healthy levels of psychological and physical functioning [as well as] the capacity for generative experiences and positive emotions. (p. 20)

Bonanno contends that resilience is far more common than currently credited in clinical theory and research. He draws on a number of studies of highly aversive events, including automobile accidents, physical assault, urban riots and violence, widowhood, and exposure to the September 11 terrorist attack, to illustrate his point (Mancini & Bonanno, 2006). In terms of the two latter events for example, which are considered particularly severe, Bonanno and colleagues found that more than a third of gay men who cared for and lost a partner to AIDS showed a stable and very low level of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in the period following the loss. The same low level of symptoms characterised more than half of the
heterosexual sample who lost a partner to other circumstances (Bonanno, Moskowitz, Papa, & Folkman, 2005). Similarly, six months following the September 11 terrorist attack, Bonanno and colleagues found that only a third of 2,700 Manhattan residents sampled exhibited two or more symptoms of PTSD. Furthermore, half of those who personally witnessed the attack or who were in the World Trade Center at the time exhibited either one or no symptoms, as did one third of those who were actually injured in the attack (Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, & Vlahov, 2006).

Bonanno (2004) explains that our clinical understanding of trauma and coping has been derived primarily from individuals who have presented for treatment with significant psychological problems. He subsequently argues that theorists and researchers in this field have often underestimated or misunderstood resilience, perceiving it as either a pathological state in itself (e.g., post-traumatic repression) or phenomena observed in exceptionally well-adjusted individuals.

**Emotional Intelligence and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

EI theory suggests that emotional intelligence may well be directly connected to resilience, such that emotionally intelligent behaviour in stressful circumstances could be considered adaptive behaviour. In fact, Bar-On (1997) directly incorporates competencies synonymous with resilience into his EQ-i model, in terms of Stress Management and Adaptability. Yet, most EI theorists and model developers would take the view that emotional intelligence is antecedent to resilience, such that EI functions through its composite abilities to promote adaptation to stressful encounters. Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, and Mayer (1999) claim for instance that persons with higher EI cope better with the emotional demands of stressful encounters because they are able to “accurately perceive and appraise their emotions, know how and when to express their feelings, and can effectively regulate their mood states” (cited in
Matthews et al., 2002, p. 161). EI is thus considered to assuage or buffer the affects of aversive events, and may consequently, manifest in resilience.

Evidence favoring this position is mounting. EI and its composite abilities have generally been associated with better mental health, effective coping strategies, as well as a range of behaviours which promote better health (see Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 2005; Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Day et al., 2005; Dulewicz, Higgs, & Slaski, 2003; L. Gardner & Stough, 2003; Matthews et al., 2002; Riley & Schutte, 2003; Slaski & Cartwright, 2002, 2003; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005). However, only two of these studies have specifically examined the extent to which emotional intelligence buffers the effects of stressful life events on mental health: that of Ciarrochi et al. (2002), and Day et al. (2005). Furthermore, only Ciarrochi et al. (2002) included events from the Social Readjustment Ratings Scale. Day et al. (2005) focused instead on daily events or “hassles”. The unique roles of the specific EI abilities in this process have received little attention as well.

While this is so, research in other fields has explored or inferred the value of constructs synonymous or similar to the EI abilities in ameliorating the effects of stressful experiences on mental health. This research is reviewed in the remainder of the introduction. It informs the method, analyses, and subsequent discussion of Study 1, in which the primary goals were (1) to examine the relationship holding between negative life events, and depression, anxiety and stress, referred to hereon as life event distress, and (2) to examine the extent to which life event distress varied as a function of the six SUEIT EI abilities.

**Emotional Recognition in Self and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

Emotional Recognition in Self, or emotional self-awareness, concerns the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions (Gignac, 2005a). Only one
study, performed by Ciarrochi et al. (2002), has examined the effect of this aspect of EI on life event distress. And, in this study, the ability to self-monitor emotions, measured using the SSRI Emotion Perception subscale, failed to moderate the deleterious effects of both daily hassles and life events on depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. Indeed, the only variable Emotion Perception correlated with was hopelessness, and while this correlation was negative, it was weak.

This single study notwithstanding, theory and research concerning alexithymia, itself characterized by very poor emotional self-awareness and vocabulary, strongly suggests that Emotional Recognition in Self plays a role in ameliorating life event distress. Beginning with Martin and Pihl (1985; 1986), their alexithymia research led them to theorize that low emotional self-awareness results in inaccurate self-perceptions of stress level, which can in turn obstruct appropriate self-regulatory actions when stressful events occur. They drew on extant stress theory to explain more fully why this might be so. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and Seyle (1976), a commonly accepted function of stress is to activate psychological and physiological resources to deal with internal and external demands. A state of stress can thus be viewed as supplying important information concerning the condition of these resources during the arousing experience. For instance, a situation that provokes a low stress state may indicate the presence of a concern requiring action, to which appropriate resources can be marshalled. On the other hand, a situation that provokes a high stress state may serve as a warning to immediately change or leave the situation. Consequently, persons who can accurately appraise their emotions are presumably in a better position to respond to the demands of the environment.

Naatanen, Ryynanen, and Keltikangas-Jarvinen (1999) support and extend on
this premise. They reason that if one is unable to accurately assess their emotional state, the likelihood of engaging in maladaptive behaviours in stressful situations will increase. They cite a number of alexithymia studies in which researchers have drawn similar conclusions. In one study, Papciak, Feuerstein, and Spiegel (1985) found that people who had great difficulty identifying their feelings significantly underestimated their physiological stress levels when exposed to arousing stimuli. Papeiak et al. speculated that experiential warning signals were ignored or downplayed, and that this would likely lead to continued engagement in situations that exceed personal resources. This in turn would lead to frequent or prolonged experiences of intense physiological arousal that would have a detrimental impact on mental and physical health.

In another study, Newton and Contrada (1994) found that people with low emotional self-awareness overestimated rather than underestimated their stress levels when exposed to arousing stimuli. They speculated that overestimation of stress levels would promote a greater frequency of situations in which dangers were overestimated, leading to emotional drain, inefficient use of emotional resources and difficulty coping with additional stressors. Adding a further dimension, Martin and Pihl (1985) found that persons with low emotional self-awareness biased their perception of stress towards overestimation following removal of the stressor stimuli, suggesting that such persons experience a prolonged subjective recovery period following a stressful event.

With these findings in mind, Naatanen et al. (1999) attempted to clarify the circumstances in which persons with alexithymia, measured in this case with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, underestimated and overestimated their stress levels. They found that underestimation most often occurred during the period immediately
following initial exposure to a stressor, whilst overestimation most often occurred during the recovery period when the stressor had been removed. Between these two intervals, when the stressor was at its peak, they found that inaccuracy of stress estimation was at its lowest. They subsequently concluded that persons with low emotional self-awareness begin to subjectively respond to their stress levels as the impact of the event approaches its peak, at which point the symptoms become too obvious to misinterpret or ignore.

They also drew similarities between their finding that stress overestimation occurred during the recovery period, with previous research in which individuals who did not seek help or engage in effective coping activities following stressful events were typically those prone not to self-monitor emotion (Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). From this they surmised that persons with reduced capacity to monitor and identify their emotions often fail to respond to their distress until symptoms are fully blown, and are thus likely to experience longer periods of recovery from stressful events and heightened risk of mental ill health.

In sum, despite Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) findings to the contrary, alexithymia theory and research suggests that Emotional Recognition in Self may well play a significant role in ameliorating the effects of life event distress.

**Personal Expression and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

Personal Expression concerns the ability to express one’s feelings clearly and accurately to others (Gignac, 2005a). No previous studies have specifically examined relations between EI measures of this ability and life event distress. There are nevertheless numerous studies which have linked other measures of emotional expression to wellbeing outcomes under stressful conditions.
Through the mediums of talking and writing, emotional expression has been linked to increased positive affect (Mendolia & Kleck, 1993), fewer intrusive thoughts (Klein, 2002), decreased autonomic arousal (Pennebaker, Hughes, & O’Heeron, 1987), enhanced immune system functioning (Esterling, Antoni, Fletcher, & Margulies, 1994), decreased distress (Lepore, 1997), fewer reports of illness and clinician visits (Lepore, Greenberg, Bruno, & Smyth, 2002), and better role and physical functioning (Kelley, Lumley, & Leisen, 1997). Moreover, similar findings have been replicated across dozens of studies within populations as diverse as maximum security prisoners, recently unemployed professionals, and university students (for a review see Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999).

Some of the most compelling evidence concerning the benefits of emotional expression has been observed in cancer research. In one such study, by Spiegel, Kraemer, Bloom, and Gottheil (1989), women with meta-static breast cancer were divided into two treatment groups. The first group received standard medical care only, while participants in the second group were additionally enrolled in a weekly program in which they were taught to express their feelings about having cancer, to extract meaning from their experience, and to develop a social support network. The women who received standard medical care lived an average of 19 months from the time of study participation, while remarkably, those who participated in the support program lived an average of 37 months from time of study participation.

Similarly, in studies by Bahnson (1981) and Gross (1989), participants who suppressed rather than expressed negative emotions exhibited increased part susceptibility to cancer, and faster cancer progression. In other such studies, by Cooper and Faragher, women who exhibited high distress symptoms to clinicians, yet denied their existence, were more likely to be diagnosed with breast cancer. On the
other hand, women who indicated that they were comfortable expressing their frustration or anger were less likely to receive a cancer diagnosis (Cooper & Faragher, 1993; Faragher & Cooper, 1990).

Examples from trauma research provide further evidence of the benefits of emotional expression, or more particularly, the detrimental effects of emotional suppression. In one such study, Wastell (2002) examined the impact of accident exposure on emergency service personnel, and found the use of emotion suppression as a way of coping to be significantly linked to physical and psychological stress symptoms, particularly amongst those of longer service. In another, Boca, Rime, and Arcuri (cited in Christophe & Rime, 1997) found that poorer health outcomes and longer periods of rumination were more prevalent amongst people who did not share their feelings following a car accident. Similarly, Amir, Stafford, Freshman, and Foa (1998) found that victims of rape who developed more complex and articulate narratives of the experience suffered less symptoms of post-traumatic stress.

The most commonly proffered explanation for such findings derives from emotional discharge theory, which itself can be traced back to the dynamic theories of Freud. The main tenet of this theory is that emotional energy or arousal is discharged either directly through external expression, or indirectly through internal pathways. Expression through overt channels, such as the voice and facial musculature, results in attenuation of physiological reactivity and associated psychological symptoms, whereas inhibition results in retention of physiological arousal and psychological agitation, which in the longer term is associated with somatic illness (Franz, Schaefer, & Schneider, 2003). When examined in depth, such links have been found to be very complex, and may differ not only individually, but also in terms of individual organ
responses. The primary tenet is nevertheless well-supported (Consedine, Magai, & Bonanno, 2002).

Another popular explanation derives from narrative theory, which emphasises the relationship between emotional expression, the development of a coherent narrative of a traumatic experience, and psychological wellbeing. Research has shown that traumatic memories are not commonly integrated into one’s personal life story or narrative (Christianson, in Consedine et al., 2002). Furthermore, deliberate inhibition of thoughts and feelings concerning a traumatic event has been found to result in frequent intrusions of painful and seemingly uncontrollable thoughts (Janoff-Bulman, in Consedine et al., 2002), which interfere with normal information processing (Pennebaker, in Consedine et al., 2002), and can manifest in pathological symptoms down the road (Smyth, 1998).

In the view of narrative theorists, the manner in which a traumatic event is represented in memory can be changed through expression of related feelings and thoughts. Expression facilitates a deeper understanding of the event, as well as one’s personal reactions to it. Dislocated or floating facts, thoughts and feelings concerning the event begin to become organized into a more articulate and stable structure. Emotions associated with the memory are assimilated and connected to particular aspects of the event. The act of constructing a coherent and well-structured narrative facilitates a sense of control over the event, and emotions can seem more manageable. Finally, story completion facilitates a sense of resolution, and intrusive thoughts and feelings associated with the memory reduce in intensity and frequency (Pennebaker & Stone, 2004).

Another very common explanation concerns the link between emotional expression and social support. Expressions of emotion operate as important
communication channels which enhance the quality of social interactions and relationships (Gottman, 1994). Expressive persons frequently have greater social resources and support as a result, and the health benefits of having supportive people to lean on, particularly in distressing circumstances, are widely documented (Kessler, 1997).

In sum, there is much evidence to suggest that expression of emotion can be beneficial to one’s mental health in a wide variety of adverse circumstances. And, there are a number of sound explanations as to why, as well. It seems highly probable therefore that persons’ better able to express their emotions are more resilient to life event distress.

*Understanding Emotions External and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress*

Understanding Emotions External concerns the ability to detect and distinguish between emotions in others, and more broadly, to detect the emotional climate of a given environment (Gignac, 2005a). Both Day et al. (2005), and Ciarrochi et al. (2002) have examined the effects of similar EI constructs on life event distress. In the case of Day et al., no evidence of a relationship was found between Bar-On’s (1997) Interpersonal EQ-i subscale, which concerns self-reported empathy, social responsibility and interpersonal closeness, and the frequency of daily hassles. Nor did it moderate the deleterious effects of such on mental health. On the other hand, in Ciarrochi et al.’s study, the ability to detect specific emotions in a series of short stories moderated the severity of daily hassles, but not the impact of less frequent major life events on mental health. There was a twist, however. Higher ability *exacerbated* rather than buffered the effects of hassle severity. Persons’ better
at identifying others’ emotions reported higher levels of depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation, when hassles were more severe.

Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) findings could plausibly be explained by the construct convergence between interpersonal perceptiveness and empathy, and empirical links between empathy, emotional sensitivity and mood contagion. With regard to the foremost, Flurry and Ickes state that the “ability to accurately infer the specific content of other people’s thoughts and feelings represents the fullest expression of a perceiver’s empathic skills.” (cited in Ciarrochi, Forgas et al., 2001, p. 114). Interpersonal perception and empathy thus go hand in hand. However, empathic persons have also been found to be more sensitive, and thus affected, by their own emotions, as well as those of others (Batson, 1991). Ciarrochi et al. (2002) infer that the same might thus be true of interpersonally perceptive individuals. It logically follows therefore that perceptive, empathic individuals would experience greater subjective distress in response to negative events. Moreover, according to the emotional contagion paradigm (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), when an individual experiences distress, they carry it with them into their interactions and infect others to some extent. Thus, the emotionally perceptive individual might not only have to deal with their own negative emotions following stressful events, but also be burdened by the distress of family, friends, colleagues and so on that they themselves have caused.

This explanation presumes of course that the disadvantages of empathy outweigh the psychological advantages, and there is evidence to suggest that this may not be so. Empathy is generally assumed to be the source of most altruistic behaviour (Batson, 1991; Hoffman, 1981), and many researchers have found that performing helping behaviours results in psychological benefits for the helper such as improved well-being, enhanced self-esteem, and happiness (Post, 2005; Vaillant, 2000).
Furthermore, altruistic people typically possess a more integrative view of self-and-others in society, are more mature, and possess greater personal efficacy (Rushton, 1991), and such characteristics are believed to contribute to psychological resilience (Vaillant, 2000).

Moving from empathy to the final argument, another way in which Understanding Others External might contribute to dealing with life event distress, is through its effect on vicarious learning and experience. Bandura's (1977) major premise concerning such was that we can learn by observing others. Indeed, he considered vicarious experience to be the most common way that human beings learn to change their behaviour. He used the term “modeling” to describe the processes of response acquisition, and he claimed that modeling can have as much impact as direct experience. From this perspective, the ability to identify and understand people’s emotional reactions to events, hence observe and learn from their experience, could plausibly form the basis for personal future coping.

In sum, the evidence and arguments presented here do not indicate a clear direction of influence. It appears that Understanding Emotions External may exacerbate life event distress, or buffer such effects. Another possibility of course is that such effects balance out.

**Emotional Control and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

While Emotional Management of Self concerns the ability to repair negative moods and generate and maintain positive moods, Emotional Control concerns the ability to think clearly and resist impulsive urges when life circumstances elicit immediately unmanageable emotions such as intense anger, sadness, or anxiety (Gignac, 2005a; Palmer & Stough, 2002).
This construct is unique to the SUEIT measure of EI, and its proponents have not previously examined its value as a distress buffer. A number of studies have however reported positive associations between criteria that affect well-being and other conceptions of emotional control which closely resemble Palmer and Stough’s construct. In one such study, when persons were placed under pressure in a group laboratory task, those less able maintain emotional control were more likely to respond to others aggressively, with verbal or physical hostility (Roger & Najarian, 1989). Likewise, in studies by McDougall, Venables, and Roger, and Salovey (cited in Ciarrochi, Forgas et al., 2001), persons with poorer emotional control were more verbally aggressive and behaviourally antagonistic overall. Not surprisingly, such behaviour is associated with significantly difficulties in developing and maintaining friendships (Benotsch, Christensen, & McKelvey, 1997). Access to the benefits of social support is thus much more limited. Compounding this, research by Lepore (1995) found that such persons were less able to realise the benefits of social support even when it was available. Worse still, in both Benotsch et al.’s and Lepore’s research, they found substantial associations between hostility, cynicism and excessive cardiovascular reactivity - a predictor of future myocardial infarction.

Salovey (2001), and Roger and Najarian (1989) have also linked emotional control to impulsive consumption. In their research, persons lacking in control were more likely to increase their consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, sweet and fatty foods in response to aversive feelings, thereby precipitating long-term physical and psychological health problems. In lieu of these findings, it is also not surprising that poor emotional control has been linked to poor life satisfaction (Ciarrochi, Scott, Deane, & Heaven, 2003).
As such, it appears that persons with poor emotional control are more likely to express distress through behaviours that are associated with interpersonal and health problems. Fuelling these potential problems, they appear to experience heightened levels of distress when faced with stressful situations, have less social support to draw on, are less able to realise the benefits of social support when they do, and are more at risk of potentially fatal stress-related illness in the long term. For such reasons, Emotional Control may well ameliorate life event distress.

**Emotional Management of Self and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

Emotional Management of Self concerns the ability to repair negative emotions and generate and maintain positive ones (Gignac, 2005a). Common to all EI models, this aspect of emotional intelligence in particular is considered important to coping successfully with distress. Proponents of EI assert that self-regulation of emotion contributes to coping with stressful life circumstances in a way that minimizes the resulting effects of distress on both physical and psychological health (Matthews & Zeidner, 2000).

Epstein (1998) describes persons with highly developed regulatory ability as calm, centred, and peaceful of mind. He asserts that such persons tend to worry less about things that are beyond their control, are more likely to interpret criticism and failure constructively, interpret negative outcomes less sensitively, and generally take things less personally. Furthermore, Matthews et al. (2002) propose that when such persons are faced with stress, they should be more likely to engage in active coping behaviours such as self-pep talks and physical exercise, rather than passive behaviours such as avoidance, or drug or alcohol use. Moreover, Matthews and Zeidner (2000) suggest that when stressful events occur, persons skilled in this regard are unlikely to rely on one coping style, but rather, flexibly fit their coping responses to the
constraints and affordances of the situation. Similarly, Salovey, Hsee, and Mayer (1993) claim that such persons are able to maintain a balance between enjoyable distractions from stressful events and coming to terms with their emotions. They are able to engage or detach themselves from their emotions, depending on their resources.

A number of studies lend support to these contentions. In one study, Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found that MEIS Emotion Management ability was associated with capacity to maintain an experimentally induced positive mood. Individuals with higher ability held onto the positive mood for a significantly longer period after the laboratory component of the experiment had ended. In a follow up study, Ciarrochi, Chan et al. (2001) found that adolescents who scored higher on the SSRI Managing Self-Relevant Emotions subscale generated a greater number of positive stories under both positive and negative experimental mood conditions, when compared to their less able counterparts. Persons skilled in emotion management thus appear able to maintain positive moods for longer periods, and generate positive moods even in negative situations. For such reasons, wellbeing is generally higher amongst such persons.

The ability to generate and maintain positive emotions also has clear health ramifications. Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found that persons who were frequently happy reported fewer illnesses, were significantly more willing to engage in health-promoting behaviours when they became ill, and were more confident that such behaviours would alleviate their symptoms than their less happy counterparts. On the other hand, persons who frequently found it difficult to shake their negative moods seemed to experience a quandary. While they reported more illnesses, and experienced their illnesses as more intense and discomforting, they also believed there
was little they could do improve the way they felt. Relatedly, Goldman, Kraemer, and Salovey (1996) found that in times of high stress, persons with better emotion regulation ability as measured by the TMMS Mood Repair subscale frequented health centers less often for treatment of illness. But, in times of low stress, emotion regulation ability did not predict health center visits. Such findings suggest that such persons experience less stress-related illness due to their effective, preventative and responsive behaviour.

Research by Salovey et al. (2002) illustrates further examples of such behaviour. Using the TMMS, they found that persons’ better at mood repair responded to circumstances of high stress with a greater proportion of active coping behaviours (active steps to change a stressful situation), less passive coping behaviours (giving up, avoiding or inhibiting active responses to stressful situations), less rumination, and tended to perceive stressors as less threatening than their less-able counterparts. Moreover, researchers have previously evidenced the functionality of active coping behaviours when compared to passive behaviours (for a review see Thayer, 1996). Active strategies appear to be much stronger predictors of psychologically healthy adaptation to the demands of stressful life events, particularly in the long term. Of note however, while such persons in Salovey et al.’s (2002) study coped primarily through an array of active strategies, they also tended to use one passive coping strategy, distraction. This fits with Matthews and Zeidner’s (2000), and Salovey et al.’s (1993) speculation that emotional self-managers are able to flexibly fit their coping responses and resources to the circumstances at hand.

Adding further general weight in support of such arguments, Extremera and Fernandez-Berrocal (2002) have found strong positive associations between perceived skill at mood repair as measured by the TMMS, and a range of physical and
psychological health-related quality of life measures amongst middle-aged women. Similarly, using two different sample populations, Tsaousis and Nikolaou (2005) found positive associations between constructs akin to emotion regulation, and physical health, psychological health, frequency of planned exercise, and time dedicated to relaxation.

In summary, research indicates that persons with better emotional self-management skills are more proficient at generating and maintaining positive moods, are more physically and mentally healthy, engage in preventative health behaviours, and when they do experience ill health or distress, turn to effective coping strategies. However, in spite of this, and the theoretical consensus as to its importance, emotion management ability has not been shown to buffer the effects of life events: whether the events be minor (Day et al., 2005) or major (Ciarrochi et al., 2002).

*Emotional Management of Others and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress*

Emotional Management of Others concerns the ability to influence and regulate others’ emotions (Gignac, 2005a). Epstein (1998) and Salovey et al. (1999) claim that persons better able to manage others’ emotions generally have greater access to social coping resources, since this ability encompasses the social skills necessary to assemble a reliable and supportive social network. The influence of social support on physical and psychological health is well-established, such that individuals who have minimal social coping resources have been found to be more prone to illness and mood disturbance when faced with stressful life circumstances (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988). Accordingly, persons with the ability to positively influence others’ emotions should assess and experience negative life events as less disturbing.
Evidence favouring this contention has recently emerged from research by Ciarrochi and his colleagues. Ciarrochi, Chan et al. (2001) found that persons scoring higher on the SSRI Managing Others’ Emotions subscale had a wider, more supportive social network, embracing peers and family, and were more satisfied with the support received than persons who reported less ability. Consistent with these findings, help-seeking research by Ciarrochi and Deane (2001) indicated that persons’ better able to manage others’ emotions were more willing to seek help from friends and family when confronted with emotional problems than their less able counterparts. They were also much more willing to seek help from mental health professionals when the stress of daily hassles provoked suicidal ideations. With respect to the latter finding, it was further revealed that persons with low ability were less willing to seek help from mental health professionals because of poorer past experiences with such persons, while the opposite was true of those with high ability. This suggests that in the absence of effective peer or family support, higher functioning persons successfully access available community resources to meet their needs.

In a follow up study, Ciarrochi et al. (2002) also found direct evidence to suggest that the ability to manage others’ emotions buffers the effects of stressful events on mental health. Specifically, people who were better at managing others’ emotions responded to the stress caused by daily hassles with less suicidal ideation. Such persons also reported less depression and hopelessness. However these latter effects were directly related to the ability to manage others’ emotions, and were not related to stress level. Furthermore, such persons were no less affected by more major life events corresponding with those listed in the SRRS.
In summary, Ciarrochi and his colleagues’ research suggests that the persons who are less able to influence others’ emotions have less access to supportive resources, are less willing to seek help, and if they do seek it, are less likely to benefit from it. They are also more likely to experience depression and hopelessness, and are more vulnerable to the impact of daily stressors. On the other hand, the converse appears true for those better able.

**Summary and Aims of Study 1**

In summary, there appear to be a variety of unique and complimentary ways in which the six SUEIT abilities can potentially influence the life event-distress relationship. The ability to detect and distinguish between personal emotions may promote efficient monitoring and deployment of emotional resources in stressful situations. Accurate and clear expression of personal emotion may provide a cathartic outlet for emotional distress, through emotion discharge or narrative development, and may generate social support. The ability to identify others’ emotions may result in benefits similar to those of empathy, including buffering effects attributed to resulting altruistic behaviour. There may also be costs, however, such as those associated with empathic sensitivity and mood contagion. The ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotion may contribute through its links to social functioning and healthy decision-making under pressure. The ability to self-soothe and generate positive emotions is widely linked to psychological and physical wellness, and adaptive and preventative coping behaviours. Finally, the ability to manage others’ emotions appears central to the development, maintenance and utilization of supportive social networks.

Yet, before research can proceed with exploring and affirming the particular mechanisms by which each ability ameliorates life event distress, the relative value of
each EI ability in actually performing the latter needs to be empirically established. One reason Ciarrochi, Dean, and Anderson (2002), and Day, Therrien, and Carroll (2005) may have been unable to empirically substantiate theorized effects, particularly in the cases of emotional self-awareness, expression, and self regulation where theory and research is so convincing, could be because, as Bonanno (2004) argues, people are indeed resilient in most cases. Correlations between life events and mental health symptoms, while strong in most studies, may give the false impression of a homogenous effect, which actually represents a minority suffering terribly, and a majority hardly affected. If so, buffering effects may well have been obscured by the resilience of the majority. Indeed, this may account for why amelioration has only emerged on extreme measures, such as suicidal ideation in Ciarrochi, Deane, and Anderson’s (2002) study. The aims of Study 1 were thus two-fold:

1. The first aim was to determine whether the effect of negative life events on distress are homogenous, or, whether the strength of this effect differs across latent classes of participants.

2. The second aim was to determine the extent to which individual differences in life event distress vary as a function of the respective EI abilities.

Method

Procedure

Members from fifty-six online discussion forums were invited to complete an online survey constructed for the purposes of Study 1. In circumstances where a moderator presided over a forum, written permission was obtained prior to posting the invitation. A copy of the invitational post is included in Appendix A.1. The invitation provided a direct link to the online survey information page, which outlined the study, provided the researcher’s contact details, those of the presiding supervisor,
and ethics committee. The groups approached were those that had an active and open
discussion of what Holmes and Rahe (1967) describe as life events (e.g.
healingwell.com; widownet.org; joblayoffsupport.com). The online survey was
programmed in such a way that prospective participants could participate once only,
could not miss a question, or mistakenly rate a question multiple times. Missing data
were only present in cases where persons did not complete the survey.

Participants

Of 1,156 persons who answered the first survey question, 444 completed the
survey. Thirty respondents were below the age of adult consent (18 years of age).
Their contributions were deleted. Consequently, 414 (48.5%) of the 1,156 people
who began the survey comprised the final sample. The average age of the sample was
36.7 (SD = 12.4), the youngest being 18 and the oldest being 75. Seventy six percent
of the participants were female while 24% were male. Almost half of the sample
(45%) resided in the USA, while 24% lived in Australia, 15% lived in the UK, and
9% lived in Canada. A small number of participants resided in Europe (3%), New
Zealand (2%), Asia (1%), and Africa (1%). In terms of relationship status, 42% were
single, 13% were dating, 10% were in a defacto relationship, while 34% were
married. In terms of education, most participants had earned an undergraduate (30%)
or post-graduate (30%) university qualification. The highest qualification which 12%
of the sample had completed was a technical qualification, while 22% had completed
secondary school only, and 5% had completed eleven years of schooling or less. 19% of
the sample was engaged in continuing study.

In terms of employment status, 42% were employed full-time, while 17%
worked part-time. A further 19% were fulltime students, approximately 10%
performed fulltime household duties, 7% were unemployed, 3% were retired, while
2% were disabled. Participant occupations were classified into eight classes using the ANU4 system (Jones & McMillan, 2001), derived from the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations second edition (ASCO2; McLennan, 1997). The ANU4 was developed for the Australian Department of Education, Science and Training to classify and distinguish between professions in terms of social status, ranging the most prestigious in class 1 to the least in class 8. Figure 2.1 depicts the occupational stratification of employed participants in Study 1.

![Figure 2.1 Percentage of Study 1 participants employed in each occupational class.](image)

As depicted in Figure 2.1, of the 59% employed participants, 14% were employed in occupations classified within the first class, comprising health,
education, legal, science, building and engineering qualified professionals. Thirty one percent were in the second class comprising nurses and therapists; and social, business, computing, media and air/sea transport qualified professionals. Four percent were in the third class of elected and appointed officials; and senior management of public sector and large organizations. Sixteen percent were in the fourth class comprising artists; associates/technicians; police/defence force officers (non-commissioned); sportspeople; and business specialists. Ten percent were in the fifth class of farm, shop, office and hospitality managers; specialized clerks, sales and service workers; mechanical engineering, electrical and communications tradespeople. Sixteen percent were in the sixth occupational class of building, auto, arts, and miscellaneous tradespeople; secretaries; clerks; and care workers. Six percent were in the seventh class of transport and service workers; metal, textile, glass, wood, agriculture tradespeople; stationary plant operators; skilled forestry, waterside, mining, construction workers; and defence force personnel (lower ranks). Finally, 3% were employed in the eighth occupational class comprising other service workers, other machine operators; factory/farm hands; and laborers.

**Measures**

Three inventories contributed data to the present study, measuring emotional intelligence, negative aspects of mental health, and frequency and valence of life events. The survey required around 30 minutes to complete. A copy of the survey questions is included in Appendix A.2. Due to propriety constraints, only example items from the emotional intelligence instrument are included. Permission may be sought for the complete measure from Professor Con Stough, Swinburne University.

*Emotional intelligence.* Emotional intelligence was measured using the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT), an experimental self-
The SUEIT was originally devised by Palmer and Stough (2002), the properties of which were subjected to additional revision in further studies (Gignac, 2005a; Palmer, Gardner, & Stough, 2003). As detailed in Chapter 2, Gignac’s (2005a) most recent revision, performed on an Australian sample of 1,503 persons, recommends that the SUEIT be construed in terms of six factors or subscales: Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Control, Emotional Management of Self, and Emotional Management of Others. The Emotional Recognition in Self subscale measures the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions. The Personal Expression subscale measures the ability to express emotions clearly and accurately to others. Understanding Emotions External measures ability to identify and understand emotions in others, and more broadly, the emotional climate of a given environment. Emotional Control measures the ability to think clearly and function effectively while experiencing strong emotion. Emotional Management of Self measures ability to repair negative mood states and generate and maintain positive ones. Finally, the Emotional Management of Others subscale attempts to measure ability to repair negative mood states and generate and maintain positive emotions in others.

In Study 1, the 44 items comprising Gignac’s (2005a) revised SUEIT were scored on a five-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating ‘virtually never’ and 5 indicating ‘virtually always’. Twenty two items were reverse scored. Scores were calculated separately for each subscale. The Emotional Recognition in Self subscale was represented by two items, where possible total scores ranged between 2 and 10. In the present study, it demonstrated a low coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .59$), though this level of reliability should probably be considered good given the small number of items. The
correlation between the two items was stepped-up via the Spearman-Brown formula, where $a = \frac{2(a)}{1+1(a)}$. This formula is commonly used to estimate the reliability of a small test if the number of items were to be increased (Krus & Helmstadter, 1987).

The subscale subsequently demonstrated a moderate coefficient alpha of .74. The Personal Expression subscale was represented by five items, with total possible scores ranging between 5 and 25. It exhibited a moderate coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .82$).

Seventeen items represented the Understanding Emotions External subscale, where possible scores ranged from 17 to 85. This scale had a high coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .89$). Emotional Control was represented by four items, with possible scores ranging from 4 to 20. It exhibited a moderate coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .77$). Emotional Management of Self was represented by ten times, where possible scores ranged between 10 and 50. It demonstrated a moderate to high coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .86$).

Six items represented the Emotional Management of Others subscale, where possible scores ranged between 6 and 30. This final subscale demonstrated a moderate coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .74$). Finally, the SUEIT as a global measure of EI exhibited a high coefficient alpha of .93. Wider data pertaining to the psychometric properties of the SUEIT have been outlined in Chapter one.

**Distress.** Distress was assessed using the short version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The Depression subscale measures inertia, anhedonia, lack of interest/involvement, self-depreciation, devaluation of life, hopelessness, and dysphoria. The Anxiety subscale measures subjective experience of anxious affect, situational anxiety, skeletal muscle effects, and autonomic arousal. The Stress subscale measures chronic non-specific arousal
reflected in impatience, irritability/over-reactivity, upset/agitation, nervous arousal, and difficulty relaxing.

The DASS-21 contains 21 items, where 7 items comprise each of the three subscales. Participants rate the extent to which they have experienced each of the items over the past month on a 4-point severity/frequency scale ranging from 0 = did not apply to me at all to 3 = applied to me very much. Totals for each scale are doubled so that they are comparable to those for the full 42-item DASS. Possible scores for each subscale range from 0 to 42, and the total scale ranges from 0 to 126. Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) present cut-off scores for interpretation of the DASS, with severity ratings from ‘normal’ to ‘extremely severe’. Ratings are allocated on the basis of converted percentile scores, where 0-78 = ‘normal’, 78-87 as ‘mild’, 87-95 as ‘moderate’, 95-98 as ‘severe’, and 98-100 as ‘extremely severe’.

The reliability and validity of the DASS has been demonstrated in a diverse range of clinical and non-clinical settings. Coefficient alphas for the full scale and three primary subscales are typically above .87, and internal subscale correlations hover between .60 and .70 (Crawford & Henry, 2003). The DASS Depression subscale correlates highly with the well-established Beck Depression Inventory \( r = .74 \), as does the DASS Anxiety subscale with the Beck Anxiety Inventory \( r = .81 \) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). In the present sample, internal consistency reliabilities for the Depression \( \alpha = .93 \), Anxiety \( \alpha = .89 \), Stress \( \alpha = .88 \) subscales and DASS full scale \( \alpha = .95 \) were comparably high. Likewise, subscale correlations ranged from .65 to .75. In the present study, full scale rather than subscale scores were used.

**Negative life events.** Life events were sampled from the revised Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS; Scully, Tosi, & Banning, 2000), originally
developed by Holmes and Rahe (1967). The revised SRRS consists of 43 life events, commonly reported as stressful, identified from clinical psychological experiences. Each event is said to require personal adjustment. The items are considered change events which precipitate movement from one circumstance to another. The events concern family, marriage, occupation, economics, residence, group and peer relationships, education, religion, recreation and health (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). In recent research, Scully, Tosi, and Banning (2000) reviewed the contemporary utility of the SRRS as a predictor of stress-related pathology as measured by the well-regarded Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, Lipman, Covi, & Rickels, 1971). Their data revealed that the SRRS remains a robust instrument for predicting stress-related pathogenic symptoms.

For the purposes of Study 1, a number of changes were made to the SRRS item content and participant instructions. First, original items that appeared to encompass more than one event were revised into an appropriate number of events. For instance, events referring to a change in circumstances were itemized to reflect improvement or worsening of the situation, the result being that single items such as, “Change in sleeping habits”, became two items, i.e., “Sleeping habits worsened”, and, “Sleeping habits improved”. Likewise, the item, “Gain new family member”, was re-itemized into five events, which reflected birth or adoption of a child, becoming a grandparent, birth of a sibling, marriage of a parent, and marriage of a child. Furthermore, references to “spouse” were changed to “partner” to encompass other forms of committed romantic relationships, including defacto and same-sex partnerships. While these changes did not interfere with the thematic content of the SRRS, the number of events expanded from 43 to 59.
Second, in the original (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) and revised (Scully, Tosi, & Banning, 2000) SRRS, respondents indicated which events occurred to them in the past year, and rated the relative degree of readjustment necessary for each life event. Marriage was assigned an arbitrary value of 500. Respondents then rated the degree to which each event required more or less readjustment than marriage. In the present study, participants were required to make a different set of judgments for each event. First, participants recalled whether each event had occurred over the past two years rather than one year, since research has shown that significant life events often retain their impact over this period or can take this long to fully manifest their psychological impact (Monroe & Simons, 1991). Second, participants indicated the extent to which each event continued to affect them in the present, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “Very negative affect now”, to 4 = “No affect now”, to 7 = “Very positive affect now”. If participants experienced a particular event more than once in the past two years, they were asked to rate the most impactful occurrence. The frequency of events continuing to have a negative affect was summed for each participant. Possible scores for number of negative life events ranged from 0 to 59.

Results

Analyses performed for Study 1 examined the relationship holding between accumulated negative life events and distress, and the extent to which this relationship varied as a function of the six emotional intelligence abilities. It was generally expected that higher numbers of negative life events would predict higher levels of distress, but that the effect of negative life events on distress would be weaker for participants with higher levels of emotional intelligence. Three sets of analyses were performed to this end. First, a series of latent class regression analyses were performed to determine whether the effect of Negative Life Events on Distress was...
homogenous across all participants in the study, or, whether the strength of this effect differed across participants to the extent that latent classes (or clusters) of participants better represented the data. Three classes with different Life Event Distress profiles were identified. Second, a discriminant function analysis was performed to determine whether membership to the classes varied as a function of scores on the six EI abilities. Third, the significant EI abilities identified in the second analysis were regressed on the discriminant function to determine whether their contributions were unique, their predictive strength, and hence their relative importance in predicting membership to the latent classes.

**Latent Class Regression Analysis: Negative Life Events and Distress**

Latent class (LC) regression analysis, also referred to as clusterwise regression modelling or latent class segmentation analysis, belongs to a more general class of statistical modelling called finite mixture modelling (S. H. Cohen & Ramaswamy, 1998). Unlike traditional regression techniques, which assume that a similar regression coefficient holds true for all cases in a given sample, LC regression detects and extracts distinct latent classes of participants who share similar regression coefficients on a set of predictor-outcome variables (Magidson & Vermunt, 2004). In terms of variables in this study for example, an accumulation of negative life events may be found to exhibit a stronger impact on the distress levels of one part of the sample than another. Two latent classes, distinguished in terms of their unique pattern of association between negative life events and distress, may therefore be detected and extracted.

Similar to traditional clustering techniques, the presence of latent classes is detected by iteratively allocating participants into a range of classes until the overall fit for each class, in terms of within-class coefficients, is maximized. Unlike
traditional clustering techniques, however, each participant is assigned a percentage probability of belonging to each latent class. Probability scores are derived from the pattern of observed scores for each case and from the estimated model parameters. This results in fuzzy class assignments whereby each participant’s probability of belonging sums to 100% across the latent classes (Vermunt & Magidson, 2003). A good model is one in which participants are correctly assigned to respective latent classes with 80% probability (Cohen & Ramaswamy, 1998). Magidson and Vermunt (2002) have demonstrated the superiority of latent class analysis over traditional K-means clustering techniques. Furthermore, they and other researchers have also demonstrated that it can be used with mixed data modes (i.e., nominal, continuous, ordinal data), and can incorporate covariates to predict class membership (Kamakura, Wedel, & Agrawal, 1994; Vermunt, 1997). As well, they have demonstrated that it does not rely on traditional assumptions of linearity, skewness, homogeneity, or normal distribution of error (Magidson & Vermunt, 2004).

With the latter in mind, multivariate outliers were not omitted during data screening. Data were transformed, however, to reduce the number and effect of univariate outliers. In eight cases, where standardized $z$ scores for events or distress exceeded $\pm 3.29$ ($p < .001$), variable scores were changed to one unit smaller or larger respectively, than the next most extreme score.

In the present study, LC regression analyses were performed using Latent Gold version 3.01 (Vermunt & Magidson, 2003) to detect whether latent classes with distinct Life Event Distress profiles were present within the data. Distress was entered as the dependent variable and number of Negative Life Events entered as the independent variable. A 1-class model was initially estimated, followed by additional models which successively incremented the number of classes by one. Model
estimation, hence inclusion of additional classes, ceased once the smallest Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) value was found, BIC being the same goodness of fit measure used in structural equation modelling. Model fit statistics are shown in Table 2.1

Table 2.1

*Latent Class Regression Model Fit Statistics: Negative Life Events Regressed on Distress*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>LL</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Class. Error</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Class</td>
<td>-1926.53</td>
<td>3871.14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Class</td>
<td>-1873.62</td>
<td>3789.43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>3-Class</em></td>
<td>-1855.97</td>
<td>3778.23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Class</td>
<td>-1844.22</td>
<td>3778.84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in Table 2.1, the smallest BIC value occurred for the three class model, indicating that this model best represented the data. The effect of Negative Life Events on Distress was clearly not homogenous across all participants in the study. In the 1-class model, only 21% of variance in Distress scores was accounted for by Negative Life Events, while the inclusion of three classes improved the explained variation by an additional 59%. Calculation of classification error revealed that a respectable 76% of participants were correctly classified into the three classes identified in this model. Summary statistics for Negative Life Events and Distress in
the 3-class model are shown in Table 2.2, and regression statistics are shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.2

*Summary Statistics for Negative Life Events and Distress in the 3-Class Model*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class 1 (n = 184)</th>
<th>Class 2 (n = 120)</th>
<th>Class 3 (n = 110)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range</strong></td>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>Max.</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Life Events</td>
<td>0-58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress</td>
<td>0-126</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 414. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score; NA = Not Applicable.*
Table 2.3

*Latent class regression statistics for the best fitting 3-Class model for Negative Life Events regressed on Distress*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3-Class Model</th>
<th>Wald Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 ( (n = 184) )</td>
<td>Class 2 ( (n = 120) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress Intercept</td>
<td>15.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Life Events B</td>
<td>2.78**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 414. * \( p < .05 \). ** \( p < .01 \).*

The significance of the unstandardized beta values in Table 2.3 indicates that for each class, higher numbers of Negative Life Events predicted higher Distress levels. However, Wald statistics for number of Negative Life Events indicated that the strength of this relationship was significantly different between classes.

Regression lines depicting the relationship between aggregated Negative Life Events and Distress for each latent class are plotted in Figure 2.2. Anchors for the horizontal axis comprise the sample mean number of Negative Life Events, and one standard deviation above and below this mean. Anchors for the vertical axis comprise DAS scale range labels, percentile ranks, and raw scores.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a pattern of graduated differences between the classes in terms of their Life Event Distress profiles. Class 3 Distress levels were the lowest when Negative Life Events were low in number. Furthermore, their Distress levels exhibited the weakest increase in the presence of higher numbers of Negative Life Events. Participants classified into class 3 were therefore considered psychologically “Resilient”, at least in the context of this sample. Conversely, class 2 Distress levels were the highest of all three classes when Negative Life Events were low in number, and exhibited the greatest increase in the presence of higher numbers of Negative Life Events. Participants classified into class 2 were thus labelled psychologically
“Vulnerable”. Class 1 fell in between class 2 and 3 in terms of Distress Intercept and effect of Negative Life Events on Distress. It also contained the largest participant grouping. As such, participants classified into this class were labelled “Average”.

**Discriminant Function Analysis: Class Membership and Emotional Intelligence**

Having established the presence of three latent classes within the data, graded in terms of their Life Event Distress profiles, a discriminant function analysis (DFA) was modelled to test whether membership to the three classes varied as a function of the six emotional intelligence variables. EI data were first screened and transformed where necessary to reduce the number and effect of univariate outliers, reduce skewness, and improve normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of residuals. In five cases, where standardized $z$ scores exceeded +/- 3.29 ($p < .001$), EI scores were changed to one unit smaller or larger respectively, than the next most extreme score. Summary statistics following transformation are presented in Table 2.4. Class membership (Vulnerable, Average, and Resilient) was then entered as a categorical dependent variable, while the six EI variables were entered as predictors into the DFA.
Table 2.4

Summary Statistics for Emotional Intelligence in the 3-Class Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vulnerable Class (n=120)</th>
<th>Average Class (n=184)</th>
<th>Resilient Class (n=110)</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>17.35</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>17-85</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.38</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>63.41</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>65.37</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.02</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>29.71</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>34.39</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>6-30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.68</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** N = 414. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.

The analysis indicated that the three classes were reliably distinguished by one discriminant function, which predicted 35% of variation in class membership, Wilks = .65, $\chi^2 (12) = 174.27, p < .001$. The structure matrix indicated that the function was extremely strongly correlated with Emotional Management of Self, $r = .90, p < .001$, strongly correlated with Emotional Control, $r = .51, p < .001$, and moderately correlated with Personal Expression, $r = .44, p < .001$, and Emotional Recognition in
Self, $r = .39$, $p < .001$. On the other hand, Emotional Management of Others and Understanding Emotions External did not significantly relate to the discriminant function. Thus, the discriminant function was interpreted to reflect higher emotional intelligence in terms of the four former EI abilities.

Centroids for the discriminant function revealed that the Resilient class (.96) had significantly higher EI scores than both other classes, that the Vulnerable class (-.94) had the lowest EI scores, and that the Average class (.04) fell almost precisely in between. The extent to which the discriminant function correctly classified cases into their respective classes is shown in Table 2.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vulnerable Class</th>
<th>Average Class</th>
<th>Resilient Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Class</td>
<td>$N$ 66</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 55</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Class</td>
<td>$N$ 33</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 17.9</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilient Class</td>
<td>$N$ 6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 5.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The classification results revealed that the discriminant function correctly classified an acceptable though less than optimal 59.4% of cases overall. As shown in Table 2.5, while 69.6% of cases were correctly classified into the Average and largest...
class, only 55.0% were correctly classified into the Vulnerable class, and only 47.3% were correctly classified into the Resilient class.

While the latter misclassification levels are less than ideal, similar levels of misclassification are very common in discriminant function analyses conducted on unequal class sizes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In such circumstances, cases tend to be overclassified into the largest class or the class with greatest dispersion, and as can be seen in Table 2.5, this was the case here. While 42.5% of Vulnerable cases were misclassified into the Average class, only 2.5% were misclassified into the Resilient class. Likewise, while 47.3% of Resilient cases were misclassified into the Average class, only 5.5% were misclassified into the Vulnerable class. As recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), canonical discriminant functions for class centroids and cases were plotted in Figure 2.3 to further examine case classification.
Figure 2.3. Canonical Discriminant Function scores for class centroids and individual cases.

The data in Figure 2.3 illustrate that the distribution of within-class function scores was quite homogenous. Furthermore, incremental gradations in function score from Vulnerable to Resilient cases are clearly observable. Moreover, it can be seen that most misclassifications reported in Table 2.5 are accounted for by cases from Resilient or Vulnerable class that shared close proximity to the Average class centroid. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the data in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.3 are complimentary in affirming the validity of the discriminant function.
**Standard Regression Analyses: Class Membership and Emotional Intelligence**

Having established that four of the six EI variables, Emotional Management of Self, Emotional Control, Personal Expression, and Emotional Recognition in Self, represented the discriminant function, they were regressed together on this function, using standard method, to determine the uniqueness of their contributions, their predictive strength, and thus their relative importance in predicting membership to the latent classes.

The regression revealed that all but Emotional Control uniquely predicted the discriminant function, \( F (4, 409) = 946.76, p < .01 \), and together explained 90% of its variance. Emotional Management of Self was found to be the strongest of the three significant EI variables, and a very strong predictor at that, \( \beta = .84, t (413) = 40.58, p < .01 \), while Personal Expression was a weak predictor, \( \beta = .18, t (413) = 10.03, p < .01 \), and Emotional Recognition in Self weaker still, \( \beta = .09, t (413) = 5.09, p < .01 \).

A further exploratory standard regression was conducted to ascertain the fate of Emotional Control. It revealed that Emotional Control was a unique and indeed the strongest predictor of the discriminant function, \( \beta = .44, t (413) = 12.05, p < .01 \), but only in the presence of the two weaker EI predictors from the first regression, Emotional Recognition in Self, \( \beta = .23, t (413) = 6.0, p < .01 \), and Personal Expression, \( \beta = .28, t (413) = 7.18, p < .01 \). Furthermore, these three EI variables explained only 51% of variance in the discriminant function, \( F (3, 410) = 142.28, p < .01 \), which was almost half that explained by the first model. Together, this and the previous regression indicated that the variance explained by Emotional Control, and thus its importance, was subsumed by Emotional Management of Self.
Figure 2.4 clearly illustrates the extent of latent class differences in the three unique EI predictors of membership, using z-scores standardized across the sample for each EI variable.

![Figure 2.4. Z scores for the three unique EI predictors of latent class membership by class.](image)

In summary, latent class regression analysis revealed that the strength of relationship between Negative Life Events and Distress, while pervasive, was not homogenous across participants. Rather, it differed significantly across three latent classes. The three classes were retrospectively labelled Average, Vulnerable, and Resilient to reflect their Life Event Distress profiles. A discriminant function analysis
suggested that membership to each of these classes varied as a function of four emotional intelligence variables. However, a further set of standard regression analyses revealed that variation in class membership was uniquely explained by three rather than four EI variables, Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and Emotional Management of Self, while the variance explained by the fourth EI variable, Emotional Control, was subsumed by the latter. High scores on these EI variables predicted membership to the Resilient class, low EI scores predicted membership to the Vulnerable class, and EI scores in between predicted membership to the Average class. As such, the relationship between aggregate Negative Life Events and Distress was markedly weaker for participants with high Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, or Emotional Management of Self scores.

**Discussion**

**Overview**

In broad terms, Study 1 sought to identify which participants were more and less successful at adapting to the emotional demands of stressful events, and to identify the extent to which individual differences in adaptation could be attributed to the respective aspects of emotional intelligence. Consistent with theory and previous research, higher numbers of negative life events predicted higher levels of distress, while the effect of negative life events on distress was weaker for participants with higher levels of Emotion Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and Emotional Management of Self ability.

**The Nature of Relations between Stressful Life Events and Distress**

In the present study, around ninety five percent of participants reported that one or more stressful events continued to exert a negative influence on their wellbeing up to two years later. On average, participants remained negatively affected by
around five events, while event distribution data indicated that the number of such events ranged from a low one or two, to a high eight events, at one standard deviation below and above the mean respectively. And, as expected, across the sample, a greater accumulation of such events in the preceding two years predicted heightened symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress, or “distress”, in the preceding month.

This finding accords with decades of research that has related exposure to one or more stressful life events to the onset of depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms, and to the duration of such symptoms (Monroe & Simons, 1991; Stueve et al., 1998).

Yet, while pervasive, the relative strength of this relationship was not uniform across the sample. Instead, three latent classes or groups with different Life Event Distress profiles were identified, which when compared revealed clear gradations in effect. The most resilient group, comprising 27% of the sample, exhibited the weakest relationship between accumulated life events and distress, and, although their reported distress symptoms did worsen as events increased, their symptoms remained within the range of normal psychological functioning irrespective of whether they remained negatively affected by a low or high number of events.

On the other hand, participants in the largest class, comprising 44% of the sample, and what was labelled the Average group, exhibited a stronger life event distress relationship. For them, the ongoing negative affect of one or two events in the past two years corresponded with normal present functioning, while five events corresponded with symptoms bordering on normal to mild distress, at around the 76th percentile. Symptoms bordering on the moderate range emerged in the Average group for those who remained affected by a high eight events, with distress levels around the 85th percentile.
Participants latently classified into the most vulnerable group, comprising 29% of participants, exhibited the strongest relationship between accumulated events and distress. For these participants, the ongoing negative affect of just one or two past events corresponded with current distress levels around the 88th percentile, well within the moderate clinical symptom range. Worse, those who continued to be affected by the sample average of five events, reported distress symptoms bordering on severe, at around the 94th percentile, while those who remained affected by a high eight events reported symptoms well within the severe clinical range, at around the 97th percentile of distress.

As such, while life event and trauma research indicates that each life event on its own can result in significant distress when it first occurs, and that additional events can compound distress, in the present study, most participants in the Resilient and Average groups, hence around 71% of the sample, appeared to have adapted sufficiently to the ongoing fallout of not just one or two but typically five events in most cases, with depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms remaining within the normal functioning range. On the other hand, findings pertaining to the Vulnerable group highlighted the plight of a sizable minority, who’s difficulties in meeting the emotional demands of stressful life events were reflected in moderate clinical symptoms, even when their lives were relatively uneventful compared to the rest of the sample, and in symptoms bordering on clinical disorder when their lives were as eventful as most participants.

Broadly speaking, the latent class differences in Life Event Distress profiles revealed here are consistent with the findings of previous life events research, in which some individuals have been found to vary greatly in the duration and severity of their symptoms. Some have exhibited relatively few symptoms following a
traumatic event, while others have continued to experience profound distress, many years later (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Kessler, 1997; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2003). More specifically, however, these distinct Life Event Distress profiles support preliminary research in the area of adaptive resilience conducted by Bonanno and colleagues (Bonanno, 2004, 2005; Bonanno et al., 2006; Bonanno et al., 2005; Bonanno et al., 2002). Their research strongly suggests that most people are resilient to the emotional impact of one potentially traumatic event, and even when greatly affected initially, tend to return to baseline levels of emotional well-being relatively soon after even the most extreme event. Furthermore, Bonanno and colleague’s research suggests, like the present findings, that persons most distressed prior to an event experience the greatest increase in distress following an event (Boerner, Wortman, & Bonanno, 2005). Importantly, the present findings also extend this seemingly common capacity for resilience, and the vulnerability characteristic of a minority, to circumstances involving not just one but numerous stressful life events, within a retrospective two year time-frame. Such results underscore the extent to which resilience has often been underestimated by trauma theorists and clinical researchers, who have often viewed resilience as a rare form of exceptional strength (e.g., Casella & Motta, 1990), reflective of denial, (e.g., McFarlance & Yehuda, 1996), or in the context of relationship loss, reflective of poor attachment (e.g., Bowlby, 1980).

The interpretation of findings presented here does not seek to diminish or discount the suffering that individuals in the present sample may have experienced either during or immediately following a particularly stressful life event. However, it does give rise to the possibility that given time, most people, when exposed to up to five life events, cope adequately with the resources they have at their disposal. They
thus do not require psychological intervention. This conclusion is particularly
relevant in light of recent mounting evidence which suggests that the indiscriminate
application of psychological intervention to affected individuals is ineffective in many
cases, and worse, is harmful in others (Rose, Bisson, & Wessely, 2003; Wessely &
Deahl, 2003). Indeed, findings like the latter suggest that for some, psychological
intervention may impede what is otherwise a well-functioning process of adaptation.
Such findings necessitate more cautious interpretation of Smith and Glass’s (1977) oft
drawn upon meta-analytic conclusion, that, “On the average, the typical therapy client
is better off than 75% of untreated individuals…” (p. 752), whatever the issue,
whatever the intervention. Certainly there is cause for intervention. In terms of the
present study, for instance, those in the Average group who continued to be negatively
affected by a high number of events, and those in the Vulnerable group more
generally, may very well benefit. But, the prevailing presumption of people’s
vulnerability, and, homogeneous analysis of participant samples to identify those at
risk, needs to change.

**Emotional Intelligence and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

Such findings of course raise the question as to why some participants were
more successful than others at adapting to the emotional demands of stressful life
events. The present study examined the extent to which the six SUEIT EI abilities
explained such differences, in terms of their relative importance in predicting
membership to the Resilient, Average and Vulnerable groups.

Preliminary analysis revealed that four of the six EI abilities, Emotional
Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, Emotional Control, and Emotional
Management of Self, discriminated between membership to the three Life Event
Distress groups, while Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management
of Others did not. The Resilient group had the highest scores on these four EI abilities, the Vulnerable group had the lowest, while those of the Average group fell in-between. As such, gradations in these EI ability scores corresponded with gradations in life event distress, whereby the effect of accumulated negative life events on distress was much weaker for participants with higher scores on these four aspects of emotional intelligence.

However, when these four EI abilities were regressed together on the discriminant function, Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and Emotional Management of Self, were found to uniquely predict group membership, while Emotional Control did not. Higher scores on any of these three EI abilities predicted greater resilience, while Emotional Management of Self was found to account for the variance explained by Emotional Control. Relatively speaking, Emotional Management of Self was revealed to be the strongest EI predictor, and uniquely, a very strong predictor of membership to the three, while Personal Expression was found to be a weak predictor, and Emotional Recognition in Self weaker still. These findings suggest that the component abilities subsumed by Emotional Management of Self relating to the ability to repair negative emotions, generate positive ones, to think clearly and concentrate in highly stressful circumstances, together with the ability to express emotions and do so clearly and accurately, and the ability to detect and distinguish between emotions as they are experienced, buffered the ongoing negative impact of life events which occurred in the preceding two years, on levels of depression, anxiety and stress in the preceding month. On the other hand, the ability to accurately detect others’ emotions, and the ability to repair others’ negative emotions and help them generate new ones, did not.
These results support the position of many EI theorists and proponents, who have viewed adaptive coping as central to emotional intelligence. They have claimed that the extent to which one can identify, express and manage emotion shapes the way one copes with the emotional demands of stressful encounters, and thus predicts the extent to which one is negatively affected (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). The beginnings of support for such claims arose from a body of research linking EI to psychological and physical health (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Dawda & Hart, 2000; Dulewicz et al., 2003; Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002; Salovey et al., 2002; Slaski & Cartwright, 2002; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005), as well as a body of other related psychological research which linked many of the same characteristics that promote healthy functioning in normal circumstances to resilience in times of potential trauma (for reviews of these various characteristics, see Bonanno, 2004; 2005, Kessler, 1997).

Yet, prior to the present study, only a handful of studies had specifically examined the extent to which emotional intelligence predicted mental health outcomes in the context of stressful life events, and their findings lent little or no support to the buffering hypothesis (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Day et al., 2005). Thus, while EI had directly predicted health in numerous circumstances, it had yet to be distinguished as an aptitude that predicted success in handling the emotional demands of stressful situations. The current study appears to be the first to report unequivocal support, such that symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress, indicative of poor mental health, were kept at a manageable level by persons with higher intrapersonal emotional intelligence, under very challenging circumstances.

The ramifications of these findings are now discussed in relation to each EI ability. Note however, that given the absence of elaborated theory or research body
relating the specific EI abilities to adaptive coping, it was necessary to extend from the theories and research introduced in literature review that have examined similar constructs in this context, to suggest the respective means by which they contributed to psychological resilience.

**Emotional Recognition in Self and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

As mentioned, the effect of higher numbers of negative life events on distress levels was significantly weaker for participants with higher Emotional Recognition in Self scores. That is, the ongoing negative affect of accumulated negative life events in the preceding two years, on levels of distress in the preceding month, was weaker for participants who were better able to detect and distinguish between their emotions.

This particular finding is inconsistent with the only other study, conducted by Ciarrochi et al. (2002), that has examined this aspect of EI in the context of life event distress. In Ciarrochi et al.’s study, self-reported ability to self-monitor emotions, measured using Schutte et al.’s (1998) SSRI EI scale, did not moderate the stressful impact of daily hassles (i.e., minor negative events) on depression, hopelessness, or suicidal ideation. They attributed their null finding to the self-report methodology, arguing that personal judgements of EI ability may have been quite inaccurate, and thus may have obscured any possible moderation effect. However, Ciarrochi et al.’s null finding is itself inconsistent with other related research which focuses on alexithymia, research with which the present finding accords.

Similar to the present finding, alexithymia research has linked significant difficulties in identifying one’s own subjective feelings to greater ongoing stress in the period following removal of stressful stimuli (Martin & Pihl, 1985; Naatanen et al., 1999). In explaining this, alexithymia researchers have argued that persons with such difficulties experience longer periods of recovery and poorer mental health
following stressful events, because they are much slower to translate biological phenomena signalling psychological strain into consciousness, and thus marshal appropriate resources to lessen the strain. Their efforts to cope begin significantly later than emotionally self-aware individuals, allowing the emotional impact of events to develop into symptoms which are much more difficult to deal with. Furthermore, their delayed reactivity can lead to continued engagement in situations that exceed personal resources, which again can lead to development of greater psychological symptoms.

The present finding and proffered explanation is also consistent with research that has linked proneness to avoid self-monitoring stress levels with the absence of both help-seeking behaviours and effective coping activities, and consequently, poorer mental health outcomes, in the period following stressful events (Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990). Likewise, research has identified difficulty identifying emotions as one mechanism underlying proneness to drug and alcohol addiction (Taylor, 2001), a disposition reflecting dependence on artificial means by which to escape from normally occurring emotion, and to achieve a known and preferred emotional state, which is itself predictive and reciprocally linked to stressful events such as financial problems, relationship breakdown, job loss, and poorer mental health (Garrity et al., 2006).

As such, it is inferred from the present finding and those of previous research, that persons better able to detect and distinguish between their emotions are in a better position to anticipate the effects of emotions as they occur, seek and apply their coping resources opportunistically, and lessen their exposure to the more painful aspects of the situation before excessive strain results. This of course presupposes forms of
effective regulatory behaviour to result from emotional self-awareness, and judging by the salutary effects observed here and in other studies, this may well be so.

However, persons skilled in Emotional Recognition in Self may also be unsure of how to best use this information all of the time. Some may also be overwhelmed by awareness of subjective emotions for which they have yet to develop appropriate ways of responding, for instance, those more inclined to neurotic traits. Further complicating the issue, research by Aronson, Barrett, and Quigley (2006) suggests that people’s ability to differentiate between their emotions is much poorer on days that are subjectively stressful compared to days that are not, while research reviewed by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs (2001) strongly suggests that people focus on extant negative emotions at the expense of others.

This suggests that the negative emotions arising from a stressful event can dominate one’s awareness and coping focus, obscuring awareness for other emotions related to the experience, or those arising from further stressors, or even positive events. It follows therefore that the psychological health benefits of Emotional Recognition in Self may be quite limited in the context of multiple life events. One or more of these reasons may account for why its contribution to predicting membership to Life Event Distress groups, though uniquely important, was very weak relative to the other two more actively-oriented EI abilities, Personal Expression and Emotional Management of Self.

**Personal Expression and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

As mentioned, the effect of higher numbers of negative life events on distress levels was significantly weaker for participants with higher Personal Expression scores. That is, the ongoing negative affect of life events accumulated in the
preceding two years, on levels of distress in the preceding month, was weaker for those better able to express their emotions to others.

No previous empirical studies of emotional intelligence have isolated and examined the relative contribution of emotional expression to psychological resilience in the context of life event distress. As such, the present is the first EI study to find that emotional expression discriminates between those who are more and less resilient, and does so independently of other aspects of emotional intelligence. While this finding is unique in this respect, it nevertheless accords with a large body of research linking emotional expression to better psychological and physical health outcomes, and emotional inhibition to poorer outcomes, in a wide variety of experimental and natural stress conditions, and populations (Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). The present finding extends on such studies, by suggesting that emotional expression has as much relevance to coping with the emotional demands of accumulated life events, as it does to coping with the demands of the single stressful conditions typically examined in previous research.

Although the specific mechanisms by which Personal Expression exerted a salutary influence were not examined in the present study, the research reviewed earlier relating expression to wellbeing identified three commonly accepted explanations. The most widely accepted explanation applied to findings like the present is that emotional expression facilitates a psychophysiological transformation of the inner experience of stressful life events which reduces their capacity to distress (Purves & Erwin, 2004). This explanation has been supported in numerous studies, in which emotional expression has been found to attenuate the physiological agitation associated with stressful experiences (e.g., Cooper & Faragher, 1993; Francis & Pennebaker, 1992; J. J. Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997), and consequently,
attenuation in the psychological symptoms associated with this agitation (Franz, Schaefer, & Schneider, 2003). For example, emotional expression, particularly that of anger, has proved a particularly robust and powerful predictor of the psychological wellbeing of cancer sufferers, as well as physiological resistance to cancer and thus longevity (for a review see J. J. Gross, 1989). This explanation suggests that in the present study, Personal Expression may have provided a means by which to release the physiological strain arising from the negative events participants’ experienced, and in doing so, reduced the extent to which this strain later manifested in clinical symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress.

Yet, another body of research has reported outcomes that favour expressive inhibition in certain circumstances, which has led to a growing number of caveats concerning the benefits of emotional expression. For instance, in a study by Adler and Matthews (1994), chronic expression of negative emotion, particularly anger, predicted cardiovascular disease, while in two studies by Bonanno and colleagues, greater expression of negative emotion (Bonanno et al., 1995), and again anger in particular (Bonanno et al., 1999), predicted a longer course of psychological symptoms following conjugal loss. It is notable that these anger findings contrast not only with those of cancer research, but with a popular tenet of bereavement theory, which posits anger expression as one of the steps towards recovery (Cerney & Buskirk, 1991).

Such findings resonate with Lazarus’ (1985) view that in some circumstances there are likely to be physiological and psychological benefits associated with defensive strategies such as emotional repression or denial. As such, in the present study, the expression or inhibition of certain emotions may have been beneficial in dealing with particular events or aspects of these events, whilst ineffective or harmful
in dealing with others. Indeed, as Izard (1991) suggests, the health-related benefits associated with expression may well vary at the level of discreet emotions.

A second explanation for the finding that Personal Expression positively discriminated between more and less adaptive participants, is suggested by links between emotional expression and social support. The benefits of a supportive social network when coping with distressing circumstances are widely documented (Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005; Kessler, 1997). It is also widely accepted that expressions of emotion operate as important communication channels which enhance the quality of social interactions and facilitate the development of supportive social relationships (Gottman, 1994). Indeed, individuals who express emotional states tend to be liked better, even if these states are negative. Expressions of sadness evoke sympathy and support from others, and dissuade them from aggressive behaviour, while expressions of embarrassment evoke forgiveness for social transgressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). It is not surprising, therefore, that those who rarely express their emotions or are unable to express them accurately, typically have fewer social resources at their disposal, and do not utilize their social resources efficiently in the wake of stressful life events (Bonanno, 2001).

This explanation suggests that the more emotionally expressive participants in the present study were very likely to have had greater social support to draw upon, and drew on these more efficiently. This would bolster their ability to cope with the negative events they experienced. Even so, as with the previous explanation, there are important caveats to the beneficial relationships among emotional expression, social support, and mental health. Amongst others, Gottman and Levenson (1992) have found that high levels of emotional disclosure can also have negative consequences on social relationships, depending on the subject and circumstances of conversation, as
can expressions of intense negative emotion, which when frequent or protracted can drive supportive persons away. Therefore, in certain circumstances, inhibition of expression serves to mitigate the negative social consequences of distressing emotions. This suggests that in the present study, the extent to which Personal Expression facilitated social and thus psychological support, likely depended in part on what was experienced, and what of these experiences was expressed, how and to whom.

A final explanation of the beneficial effects of Personal Expression comes from the Narrative theory, which amongst other things emphasises the relationship between emotional expression, the development of a coherent narrative of a traumatic experience, and psychological wellbeing (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). Research in this field has shown that memories for traumatic events are typically not processed very deeply, and are thus not integrated into one’s personal “narrative” or life story. When such memories are left unprocessed, it is not uncommon for painful and seemingly uncontrollable thoughts and feelings associated with the experience to intrude into consciousness at frequent intervals, which can later manifest in psychological symptoms (Pennebaker, 1993). When processed more deeply, however, the frequency of intrusive thoughts and feelings often diminishes (Amir et al., 1998). Furthermore, in related research, these intrusions have been found to be significantly more frequent and intense when thoughts and feelings are deliberately inhibited (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). This has led to the view that expression of event-related thoughts and feelings facilitates deeper emotional processing, integration of this information into one’s personal narrative, and ultimately, transformation of the way in which a traumatic event is represented in
memory for betterment of long-term mental health (Amir et al., 1998; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999).

Although the mental health benefits associated with emotional expression have often been interpreted from this position in recent years (for reviews see Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Pennebaker & Stone, 2004), clinical researchers have found that emotional expression is not synonymous with the emotional processing required to build a cathartic narrative, which the research of Stiles (1995) and Purves and Erwin (2004) strongly suggest determines the severity and longevity of psychological symptoms. Consequently, Purves and Erwin (2004) argue that the health benefits of emotional expression derived from narrative development and integration are only realized to the extent that the depth of emotional processing facilitates access to core personal assumptions concerning the self, the world, and how these assumptions have been affected by the traumatic event. As such, while some participants in the present study may very well have processed their negative events more deeply as a result of their emotional expressions, the leap from expressing simple details of subjective emotional experience to the development of an enlightening cathartic narrative leaves much room for individual differences in the benefits of emotional expression.

These mechanisms and their caveats offer possible explanations for the unique yet weak contribution of Personal Expression to the prediction of life event distress. Such caveats do not seek to downplay the salutary effects of Personal Expression, nor Emotional Recognition in Self, revealed in the present study. Clearly, emotionally expressive or self-aware participants were better able to weather the ongoing negative effects of accumulated life events. What this discussion does illustrate, however, is that there are multiple and complex paths through which these EI abilities may exert an impact on well-being. A better understanding of these paths will inform us as to
which are the most beneficial, and consequently, how to better focus emotional expression and self-awareness to buffer the impact of stressful life events.

**Emotional Management of Self, Emotional Control and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress**

Turning to Emotional Management of Self, Study 1 revealed that as theorized, participants better able to repair their negative moods and generate positive ones, suffered less distress following multiple negative events than those less able. Furthermore, the strength with which Emotional Management of Self discriminated between the most and least distressed participants was almost five times that of Personal Expression and nine times that of Emotional Recognition in Self, after accounting for both, clearly making this the most important EI predictor. As well, the ability to self-manage emotions subsumed the role played by Emotional Control, indicating that it incorporated the extent to which participants’ ability to think clearly and concentrate in highly stressful circumstances discriminated between the Life Event Distress profiles. Through their ability to self-manage emotions, participants appear to have been able to snap out of feeling down, maintain a more positive state of mind, and think clearly so that their ability to function was not overwhelmed by the negative emotional experience of multiple life events.

In broad terms, this finding is consistent with research directly linking various measures of ability to self-manage emotions to a range of positive mental and physical health outcomes, in different populations and under different circumstances (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002; Goldman et al., 1996; Salovey et al., 2002; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005). Notably however, the present finding is the first to support the contention of many EI theorists that emotional self-management is particularly relevant to adaptive coping (Matthews et al., 2002), which is
conceptualised in this study as psychological resilience to the cumulative affect of a wide range of negative life events.

Indeed, in the two previous studies to examine this contention, no such support was found. In Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) study, the corresponding SSRI EI subscale (Managing Self-Relevant Emotions) did not moderate the aggregate severity of Daily Hassle or Negative Life Events on mental health. Nor did any of the corresponding EQ-i subscales (Adaptability, Stress Management) moderate the aggregate impact of Daily Hassle frequency on mental health in Day et al.’s (2005) study. Yet, as reviewed in Chapter 1, both the SSRI and EQ-i measures have known factorial replicability and subscale redundancy issues, which raises the possibility that the relevant subscales were not distinct enough measures of emotional self-management to observe a finding similar to the present.

A further explanation which might account for their null findings comes from a body of research suggesting that subjective Hassles and Life Event severity totals, as used by Ciarrochi et al. (2002), and as well as Hassles frequency totals, as used by Day et al. (2005), are much more likely to be contaminated by respondent’s mood at time of participation, than the frequency totals of life changing events used in the present study (Kessler, 1997; Turner & Wheaton, 1995; Zimmerman, 1983). As such, the events measures used in these two previous studies may have been more indicative than predictive of participants’ mental health, than the event measure used in the present study.

A final possible explanation concerns the use of latent class regression analyses in the present study, and the use of traditional moderation regression analyses in Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) and Day et al.’s (2005) studies. It may have been the case that treatment of their samples as homogenous entities from the first, in terms
of relations between life events and symptoms, obscured latent class differences in such relations, which subsequently blurred or obscured potential moderation effects. Had they accounted for initial latent differences, buffering effects might have been observed.

The balance of direct evidence notwithstanding, limited as it is, other studies have explored the mechanisms by which emotional self-management contributes to psychological health, and their findings suggest reasons as to why the present EI ability discriminated so strongly between those who were more and less resilient. As reviewed earlier, EI research has found that persons better able to manage their emotions not only experience better mental health in general (e.g., Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005), but also experience more positive affect, and are able to sustain positive moods for longer periods (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). Furthermore, when feeling down, they appear to generate positive thoughts in attempts to repair negative mood (Ciarrochi, Chan et al., 2001), appraise their distress in terms of a personal challenge to overcome rather than a threat to be avoided, and reflecting this appraisal, engage in active behaviours to cope with their distress rather than give up, deny their feelings, or attempt to disengage from the situation through drugs, alcohol or comfort eating (Salovey et al., 2002).

Interpreted in the context of the present finding, this previous research suggests, first, that participants with better emotional self-management skills were in better psychological health prior to negative life events they experienced: which the research of Boerner, Wortman, and Bonanno (2005) has identified as a predictor of psychological resilience to future life events. Second, this research suggests that they responded to the negative thoughts and emotions arising from stressful events with a greater frequency of positive thoughts and consequent affect: which in Bonanno et
al.’s (2005) research predicted resilience, and for those significantly distressed, speed of psychological recovery. Third, this research suggests that they engaged in active behaviours to deal with the situation, such as accessing social and instrumental support, and concentrating, planning, and testing ways to ameliorate their distress: behaviours which Thayer’s (1996) review of coping research has also linked to resilience. Fourth, these three suppositions, coupled with the subsumption of Emotional Control, further suggests that participants with better emotional self-management skills were much less disposed to ruminate about their negative experiences: itself characterised by repetitious and excessive focus on distress symptoms, inability to concentrate, and a lack of action to reduce distress: behaviours which Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues’ research have linked to higher levels of depression and anxiety in the aftermath of potentially traumatic events (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).

In summary, the findings of previous research offer a number of likely explanations as to why Emotional Management of Self was not only a unique EI predictor of membership to Life Event Distress groups, but the strongest of all the EI variables. Research concerning the efficacy of Emotional Recognition in Self, and Personal Expression, while generally favourable, raised clear caveats concerning the means by and circumstances in which their benefits were likely to have been realised. However, there are few dissenting findings as to the psychological benefits of constructs synonymous with Emotional Management of Self. Indeed, when weighed together, the balance of evidence relating each of these three EI abilities to psychological resilience factors, appears to reflect the differences in discriminatory strength observed in the present study.
Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Management of Others and Psychological Resilience to Life Event Distress

While the former three EI abilities distinguished between those more and less distressed by accumulated negative events, and Emotional Management of Self additionally subsumed the contribution of Emotional Control in making this distinction, Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management of Others made no such contribution. In other words, the ability to accurately detect others’ emotions, and the ability to repair others’ negative emotions and induce positive ones, did not discriminate between participants who were more and less distressed by the ongoing negative affects of accumulated life events.

The null findings concerning these two EI abilities are consistent with Day et al.’s (2005) research, in which the Interpersonal EQ-i scale did not moderate the impact of Daily Hassle frequency on wellbeing, physical and psychological strain, or symptoms of burnout. Yet, neither did the four other EQ-i scales moderate this impact in their study, two of which, have much in common with Emotional Management of Self.

Conversely, in Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) study, participants’ ability to identify the presence of emotions in a series of other people’s short stories did indeed moderate the impact of Daily Hassle severity on depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. However, higher ability exacerbated rather than buffered the effect of Hassle severity. In other words, those who were better at identifying other’s emotions appeared to have poorer mental health when stressed, than those with lower ability.

In attempting to explain these findings, Ciarrochi et al. (2002) speculated that the ability to detect emotions in other’s stories is reflective of interpersonal emotional
perceptiveness more broadly (Mayer & Geher, 1996), and may also go hand in hand with intrapersonal perceptiveness. Persons’ poor at identifying others’ emotions, being similarly poor at identifying their own emotions, may thus have been unaware of the symptoms resulting from their daily hassles and under-rated their symptoms.

Support for Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) speculation was of course not found in the present study. Instead, the opposite was observed. First, both intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion perception ability, construed here in terms of Emotional Recognition in Self and Understanding Emotions External respectively, exhibited independent relations with life event distress. And second, poor intrapersonal rather than interpersonal perceptiveness predicted vulnerability. These findings underscore the importance of distinguishing between these two constructs, and the arguments that concern them.

The literature reviewed within the introduction raised three arguments as to why Understanding Emotions External might help or hinder adaptation to the emotional demands of accumulated negative life events. Two arguments were inferred from empathy research. They were both developed from the premise that the ability to detect and understand others emotions is conceptually similar to the construct of empathy (Flurry & Ickes, cited in Ciarrochi, Forgas et al., 2001). The first argument was a favourable one, developed from the general assumption that empathy is a primary source of altruism (Batson, 1991), that the underlying characteristics of altruism include amongst others, maturity, an integrative view of self-and others in society, and self-efficacy (Rushton, 1991), and that these particular characteristics have themselves been empirically linked to health and wellbeing (Post, 2005; Vaillant, 2000), and theoretically linked to resilience (Vaillant, 2000). The second argument was an unfavourable one, developed from well-established links
between two further characteristics of empathic individuals: emotional sensitivity to intrapersonal and interpersonal problems (Batson, 1991), and over-arousal resulting from the vicarious experience of others’ emotions (Hoffman, 1981; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), both of which have been linked to psychological vulnerability (Eisenberg, 2000). It appears however that neither direction suggested by these arguments was emphasized.

This may be explained by the fact that unlike empathy, the ability to detect and understand others emotions does not specify the extent to which accurate observations translate into sympathetic or unselfish behaviour. Indeed, accurate observations may be equally used for selfish or evil purposes, or no purpose at all. Consequently, this EI ability, while irrefutably relevant to the development and accurate demonstration of empathy, may very well not manifest in empathy, and thus in the formation of altruistic characteristics believed to enhance resilience, nor in the sensitivities characteristic of psychological vulnerability.

The third argument, also favourable, was derived from Bandura’s (1977) social learning paradigm. It was suggested that persons skilled in detecting and understanding others’ emotions may have learned how to adapt to the emotional demands of negative life events by observing and imitating the way others have successfully coped with distressing events. Again however, the null finding suggests that that the present conception of Understanding Emotions External generally offers no such benefit. Perhaps accurate observation of others emotions did not translate into behaviour, or if it did, the behaviour mimicked may not have achieved the expected result, since particular coping strategies have been linked to successful adaptation for people of particular personality, but not for others (see Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996).
Turning to Emotional Management of Others, the present null finding is consistent with Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) research, in which the ability to manage others’ emotions did not moderate the effects of aggregate Daily Hassle severity on depression, or hopelessness. However, in their study, it did assuage the effect of Daily Hassle severity on suicidal ideation, such that people better able to manage others’ emotions responded to greater stress with fewer thoughts of suicide. Perhaps the present study may have observed a similar result if an equally extreme measure of mental health had been included.

Other studies by Ciarrochi and colleagues have repeatedly linked Emotional Management of Others to greater social support, suggesting that through this mechanism this EI aspect may have buffered the stress-suicidal ideation relationship. As reviewed earlier, Ciarrochi and colleagues found that persons better able manage others’ emotions had a broader, more supportive social network (Ciarrochi, Chan et al., 2001), were more willing to access this network when confronted with emotional problems, were more willing to seek professional help when emotional problems manifested in suicidal ideation (Ciarrochi & Deane, 2001), and in each case, were more satisfied with the support they received. Ciarrochi et al. (2002) inferred from these findings that the ability to generate positive moods in others generally led to closer friendships of greater number, thus greater social support, which in turn resulted in psychological benefits in times of personal crisis.

While this may be so, it is surprising that the extensive social support Ciarrochi and colleagues associated with this ability did not also implicitly manifest in less symptoms in times of greater stress, in both in their study and the present, since social support is one of the most consistent attenuators in the relationship between stressful life events and mental health, particularly in the case of depression (Kessler,
A satisfactory explanation notwithstanding, Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002) findings and the present suggest that Emotional Management of Others is generally not helpful in ameliorating the depression, anxiety, and stress which follows multiple negative life events.

**Methodological Considerations and Directions for Future Research**

The findings of Study 1 clearly highlight the importance of examining the relationship between aggregated life events and psychological symptoms in a latent class rather than homogenous fashion. The resilience of the majority is otherwise likely to be blurred with the vulnerability of a sizable minority. This issue, in addition to the issues raised with other EI scales, may account for the divergence between Ciarrochi et al.’s (2002), and Day et al.’s (2005) findings, and those of both the present study and EI theory.

Furthermore, the importance of distinguishing between the respective contributions of EI abilities in the prediction of psychological resilience, rather than treating EI as unitary construct, is emphasized. The current results and literature reviewed and discussed here suggests that the connections between each EI ability and psychological resilience are complex, are unique yet complementary, and are potentially open to a range of moderation and mediation effects, suggesting numerous avenues for future research.

However, while the findings of the present study were generally consistent with expectations derived from EI theory and research in similar contexts, there are three sets of methodological considerations that should be considered in the interpretation of data presented here. The first set of considerations are the broadest, most commonly applied to research designs like the present, and concern the participant recruitment method, and the use of self-report scales to measure EI and
depression, anxiety, and stress. As documented in depth in numerous social research
design texts, the use of self-selection and self-report methodology limit the
interpretive breadth and caution the wider applicability of research findings to the
general population (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001). While particular internet self-help
and support groups were targeted for participation, respective forum moderators, and
then members, chose whether or not to engage with the study. The study results were
thus influenced by both moderators’ and members’ personal interest or view of the
worth of the project, resulting in exclusion or selection bias. Furthermore, oft hidden
issues which commonly bias self-report information in the case of those who choose
to participate, and thus limit the generalizability of the present findings, include
socially desirable responding, reluctance to provide highly personal information, and
response styles or “sets” such as acquiescence, which not only artificially reduce the
complexity of findings but confound the use of reverse-keyed items common to self-
report scales.

It would therefore be interesting to observe the extent to which findings like
the present are replicated in future research, using performance-based measures like
the MSCEIT, and using different research methods, including life event interviews or
observational studies, naturalistic or laboratory experimental studies in which
stressors are manipulated, and the consistency of results across both cross-sectional
and longitudinal designs. Of course, each of these methods have their own costs and
benefits.

The second and much more specific set of considerations concern the use of
the Social Readjustment Rating Scale to retrospectively estimate the effects of
aggregated life events on distress. A critique of Life Events research methodology by
Kessler (1997) identifies two primary issues with this design. Firstly, accuracy in
reporting life events is associated with psychological symptoms, and the present study did not adjust for this bias. While not as problematic as with Daily Hassles scales, negative feelings often lead to exaggerations of event occurrence and severity, such as endorsement of ‘Serious personal illness’, in the case of a bad flu. They also lead to significantly higher retrospective recall for negative events (L. H. Cohen, Towbes, & Flocco, 1988), which in the present study may have created the appearance that the events themselves led to the symptoms.

Inherent to this problem is the second and related issue, causality. It is unknown whether participants’ events occurred before the symptoms measured here, or vice versa. While much research indicates that stressful life events precede the onset of psychological symptoms, research also indicates that events can be caused by the symptoms themselves (Hammen, 1991), and that events are more frequent for people with a history of symptoms, even when they are free of symptoms (Kessler & Magee, 1993). For example, a partner who decides they no longer wish to continue coping with their spouse’s depression may decide to end the marriage, but wait till their spouse’s symptoms have receded to a more manageable level. Depending on depth of attachment, availability of alternative partners, supportive friends, and associated financial strain, the previously depressed spouse may or may not subsequently relapse. Such contextual complexities are missed in studies like the present, and the two issues raised here are themselves linked to additional concerns and imperfect solutions, many of which are well-documented in Kessler’s (1997) critique.

The third and final point concerns the correlational design of Study 1, which allows no causal inferences to be made regarding the relationship between EI and life event distress. On the one hand, it may be that the capacities to identify, express and
regulate emotion do indeed assuage the effects of life stressors on psychological health, and in doing so, heighten resilience to further events. On the other hand, however, as life stressors compound, it may also be that emotional intelligence is itself temporarily diminished. The capacity to identify, express and regulate emotion may be disrupted, and psychological vulnerability to further events heightened. Longitudinal research is clearly needed to ascertain whether these relationships are uni-directional or bi-directional, and thus address the question of causality.

Summary

In summary, as with much previous research, Study 1 revealed that accumulated stressful life events predicted symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. However, unlike much of this research, the strength of this relationship differed markedly across three distinct latent groups identified within the present sample. The Life Event Distress profiles of these groups bore considerable resemblance to the patterns of pervasive resilience and minority vulnerability observed in recent time-series studies of the psychological effects of single traumatic experiences, conducted by Bonanno and his colleagues. The findings of Study 1 therefore suggest that similar patterns of resilience and vulnerability may prevail in circumstances involving not just one but numerous stressful life events within a relatively short time frame. Furthermore, membership to these groups was uniquely predicted by three emotional intelligence abilities, such that the effect of life events on psychological symptoms was markedly weaker for participants’ better skilled in detecting, expressing, and most particularly, managing their own emotions: the latter of which also experienced the benefits of emotional control. On the other hand, the ability to detect and manage others’ emotions did not predict psychological resilience. The present study is the first to observe such findings, which while consistent with EI
theory, are inconsistent with the two previous studies to specifically explore this
d paradigm. Possible explanations as to means by which these EI abilities achieved a
salutary effect or otherwise were considered, as were limits to the present study
design, offering numerous paths for future researchers to consider.
CHAPTER 3 - STUDY 2:
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOUR AND ADJUSTMENT IN ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Most people desire to be in a happy, personally satisfying romantic relationship, and attempt to realise this desire through commitment to a life-long relationship such as marriage (Markman & Halford, 2005). This desire is so pervasive across cultures that many psychologists consider it to be a central and fundamental human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), or even an evolutionary imperative (Buss, 2000). While this is so, divorce statistics indicate that a satisfying life-long relationship is not easily achieved. The most conservative estimates suggest that around 43% of first marriages in the United States will end in divorce (Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006). And although around 80% of those who divorce are likely to remarry within five years, the divorce rate amongst second marriages is estimated to be ten percent higher than first marriages (Mackey, 1995). Moreover, official divorce statistics are believed to underestimate the prevalence of marriage dissolution, since many marriages end in permanent separation rather than divorce (Hewitt, Baxter, & Western, 2005). Indeed, some estimates of separation suggest than somewhere between one half and two thirds of first marriages dissolve (Brubaker & Kimberly, 1993; T. C. Martin & Bumpass, 1989).

Somewhat lower rates are predicted for other Western countries, for example Australia, where 32% of first marriages are expected to end in divorce, but such rates are nonetheless high when one considers that at the beginning of the 20th century, divorce was almost non-inexistent (Hewitt et al., 2005). Of course, such statistics also indicate that many relationships do endure, and research indicates that these
relationships often convey substantive benefits to those involved. For instance, partners within enduring relationships tend to be more satisfied with their lives, report greater economic security (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994; Seefeldt & Smock, 2004), often have a deeper sense of personal meaning and identity (Aldous, 1996), are generally happier and healthier, and live longer than persons without such relationships (Gottman, 1994; Orbuch & Custer, 1995).

The harmful consequences of relationship dissolution are similarly marked. Divorced or separated partners are at increased risk of physical and psychological ill-health, of becoming victims of violent crime, including homicide. Incidences of suicide are higher, as are automobile accidents, including fatalities. Loneliness, loss of friends and supportive social network are common outcomes, as is downward economic and social mobility (Amato & Booth, 1997; Fincham, 2003; Gottman, 1994).

The desire for a lasting romantic union, the benefits associated with its attainment, and the costs associated with its deterioration, have stimulated much interest in identifying the features of those relationships that do endure (e.g., Fenell, 1993; Glenn, 1990; Lauer, Lauer, & Kerr, 1990; Robinson & Blanton, 1993). Many and varied features have arisen from this body of research, and while they differ in number and name, they nevertheless tend to share much similarity in content (Rosen-Grandon, Myers, & Hattie, 2004). One measure that encapsulates many of these features is the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS; Spanier, 1976), which despite its age, remains one of the most widely used measures (Glenn, 1990), and one of the most well regarded (Sabourin, Valois, & Lussier, 2005). The DAS is based on the assumption that relationship adjustment is an ongoing process, determined by partner behaviour and couple interactions, and that adjustment at a given point in time can be
measured in terms of four factors: Dyadic Consensus, Dyadic Satisfaction, Dyadic Cohesion, and Affectional Expression. Consensus refers to a high frequency of agreement between partners on issues as diverse as handling finances, religion, and ways of dealing with parents and family. Satisfaction refers to a low frequency of separation discussions, regrets about forming the relationship, getting on each others nerves, and a high frequency of shared confidences and positive thoughts about the relationship. Cohesion refers to the sense of connectedness between partners as well as the frequency of shared activities including outside interests, exchange of ideas, and working on projects together. Finally, Affectional Expression refers to fewer problems regarding sex and a higher frequency of displays of love (Spanier, 1976).

Almost all of the studies to which the DAS has been applied over the past thirty years have shown that these four features distinguish between relationships that endure and those that do not (Sabourin, Valois, & Lussier, 2005). But while this is so, Robinson and Blanton (1993), and Rosen-Grandon, Myers, and Hattie (2004) point out that much of the variance in dyadic adjustment itself remains unexplained. They attribute this to the use of simple linear models in most adjustment studies. They argue that more complex models are needed, models which account for the relative influence of partner characteristics and specific relationship processes, if we are to better understand the means by which well-adjusted relationships are achieved.

The primary goal of Study 2 was to contribute to this understanding. In broad terms, Study 2 sought to explore the contribution of emotional intelligence and communication behaviour to romantic relationship adjustment. More particularly, the study sought to explore whether emotional intelligence acts through communication behaviour to facilitate adjustment. Ideally, such an investigation would incorporate couples’ EI abilities, behaviours, and sense of adjustment. However, resource
limitations, time constraints, and the overall breadth of the dissertation necessitated that Study 2 be limited to examination of data from one partner rather than both.

The present section is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, research linking EI to romantic adjustment and to interpersonal adjustment more broadly is reviewed. In the second subsection, communication and behavioural patterns that consistently distinguish between poorly adjusted and well-adjusted couples are identified, and eight specific communication behaviours of relevance to the current study defined. The third subsection reviews research linking EI aspects and similar constructs to those resembling the eight communication behaviours.

**Emotional Intelligence and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

EI theorists have proposed that emotional intelligence or aspects of emotional intelligence contribute to the development and maintenance of interpersonal relationship adjustment, whether in general, or in specific contexts such as romantic relationships (Bar-On, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Salovey, Caruso, & Mayer, 2004). General support for the latter premise can be seen in the wider romantic relationship literature, in which personal qualities resembling aspects of EI have been cited as particularly important to negotiating the ups and downs of romantic relationships. For example, difficulties identifying and expressing emotion have been linked to avoidance or premature withdrawal from discussions of difficult relationship issues (Noller & Ruzzene, 1991). Low empathy has been linked to negative affect reciprocity (Noller & Ruzzene, 1991), which is itself linked to frequent marital conflict, and conflict escalation (Gottman, 1994). Lack of emotional control has been linked to aggression (McDougall, Venables, & Roger, 1991); while the capacity to self-regulate emotion has been linked to success in negotiating marital problems
(Gottman & Levenson, 1992). In each case, the latter behaviours have been found to influence adjustment.

To date, however, only four published studies have specifically explored relations between EI and romantic relationship adjustment criteria. Two of these, performed by Schutte et al. (2001), and Brackett, Warner, and Bosco (2005), examined the effects of EI as a global construct, while the remaining two, performed by Fitness (2000, further detailed in 2001b), and Cordova, Gee, and Warren (2005), examined the effects of EI at the level of component abilities. A number of other studies have however explored relations between EI and broader interpersonal adjustment criteria. Taken together, these studies provide a framework within which to compare the soundness and generality of findings arising from the current study.

Beginning with the broader interpersonal domain, EI as measured by the SSRI has been associated with moderately higher levels of inclusiveness and affection within close social relationships (Schutte et al., 2001). EI as measured by the performance-based MSCEIT has been associated with a moderately warmer, more cooperative, and trusting approach to interpersonal relationships (Brackett & Mayer, 2003), and less conflict with close friends (Lopes et al., 2003). Higher MSCEIT scores have also been weakly associated with self-perceptions of interpersonal competence (Brackett & Mayer, 2003), and very weakly associated with more positive interactions with friends (Brackett et al., 2004).

Interestingly, this pattern of weak to moderate associations sits between the strengths of association observed in the two studies to investigate the effects of global EI on romantic relationship adjustment. In the first of these studies, Schutte et al. (2001) found a strong correlation between SSRI EI and the marital satisfaction of thirty-six health care workers’ in their mid-thirties. Thus, married persons with higher
emotional intelligence were much more satisfied with their relationships than those with lower emotional intelligence. Schutte et al. also found that couples with higher combined emotional intelligence were much happier with their marriages than couples with lower combined emotional intelligence. Furthermore, unmarried participants in Schutte et al.’s study indicated a preference for future partners who were more adept at recognizing and managing their own and others’ emotions.

Surprisingly, the second of these studies, performed by Brackett et al. (2005), yielded quite different results. In their study of eighty-six college couples, and contrary to their expectations, Brackett et al. found no significant association whatsoever between participants’ EI, as measured by the MSCEIT, and their relationship satisfaction. Likewise, participants’ emotional intelligence was not associated in any meaningfully consistent way with six other qualities of their relationships, qualities which bore much similarity to Spanier’s (1976) Affection, Cohesion and Consensus constructs. On the other hand, when partners’ relationship ratings were combined, Brackett et al. did find that couples comprising two low EI partners were significantly less satisfied with their relationship, and were engaged in poorer quality relationships, than couples in which one or both partners were high in EI. The variation in satisfaction and quality between these couples was quite small, however, averaging around eight percent across the seven criteria.

Although the findings of Schutte et al. (2001) and Bracket et al. (2005) clearly differ, they broadly concur with the pattern of positive associations observed between EI and interpersonal adjustment, and suggest that EI plays a direct role in facilitating romantic adjustment. However, when attention has been given to the issue of which EI aspects matter most, interpersonal and romantic adjustment research have emphasised the importance of different abilities. For instance, in four studies led by
Lopes, Emotion Management was the only MSCEIT EI ability to be consistently associated with interpersonal adjustment criteria. Specifically, participants’ ability to manage their own and others’ emotions was weakly associated with interpersonal relationship satisfaction (Lopes et al., 2003), moderately associated with the quality of interactions with friends (Lopes et al., 2004; Study 1), and weakly associated with satisfaction with daily interactions with the opposite sex (Lopes et al., 2004; Study 2). It was also weakly to moderately associated with favourable ratings from peers, in terms of the degree to which persons with this ability were liked, were thought to be interpersonally sensitive, and the extent to which their peers felt that efforts to maintain a friendship were reciprocated (Lopes, Salovey, Cote, Beers, & Petty, 2005).

Lopes and colleagues’ findings suggest that the only EI ability directly relevant to interpersonal adjustment is the ability to manage emotion, since the ability to perceive emotions in others, to understand the effects of emotions and their blended interplay, and the ability to use the experience of different emotional states to facilitate different situational perspectives, were not associated with this criterion at all. But research by Salovey et al. (2002) emphasised the benefits of a further EI ability. In their study, participants’ general satisfaction with their interpersonal relationships was moderately associated with two TMMS subscales, Mood Repair and Emotion Clarity. Like Lopes and colleagues’ four studies, this suggests that the ability to manage one’s emotions contributes to the development of better relationships. It also suggests, though, that the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions plays a similarly important role.

The two studies to examine romantic adjustment also emphasised the benefits of the latter ability. In the first of these, Fitness (2000) found a weak association between marital happiness and the TMMS Emotion Clarity subscale, but not the
Mood Repair subscale. As such, like Salovey et al.’s study (2002), Fitness’ findings emphasised the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions. Unlike Salovey et al. and Lopes and colleagues’ four studies, though, Fitness’ findings did not emphasise the importance of managing one’s emotions.

In the second of these studies, in which the TAS was used, Cordova et al. (2005) observed moderate associations between husbands’ and wives’ ability to accurately detect their own emotions, as well as their ability to accurately express them, and higher levels of marital consensus, cohesion, satisfaction, and affection. As such, Cordova et al.’s study not only emphasized the importance of emotional self-awareness, but also highlighted the equal importance of emotional expression.

Thus, these EI aspect studies, like those to examine global EI, support the premise that EI contributes to romantic adjustment. With regard to which EI abilities matter most, however, interpersonal adjustment research has for the most part emphasised the importance of managing emotion, while romantic adjustment research has emphasised emotional self-awareness and expression. At face value, this suggests that particular aspects of emotional intelligence may be more important in particular relational contexts. But the real answer to the different emphases seems to lie in the different EI measures used in these studies.

For instance, none of the MSCEIT subscales specifically measure the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions, or clearly express them. The TAS, on the other hand, measures both of these abilities, but no other. The MSCEIT and TAS thus measure completely different aspects of emotional intelligence. Further complicating the issue, the TMMS incorporates some aspects of both the TAS and MSCEIT, but not all. It measures the ability to detect and distinguish between emotions, like the TAS, but not the ability to express them. It also measures the
ability to manage one’s own emotions, like the MSCEIT, but not the ability to manage others’ emotions. The MSCEIT, on the other hand, subsumes both emotion management abilities into one subscale. It is therefore little wonder that different abilities have been emphasised by the foregoing studies.

Another point to note is that none of the foregoing studies controlled for the effects of the EI aspects they did measure, when examining their respective associations with adjustment. The relative value of the EI aspects to adjustment has therefore not been properly examined. Notably, the SUEIT EI subscales to be used in the current study independently measure each of the abilities that the foregoing studies have linked to adjustment. The current study was thus able to consider the relative value of the foregoing abilities to the prediction of romantic relationship adjustment, and in doing so, suggest an answer the question of which EI aspects matter most.

Communication Behaviour and Romantic Relationship Adjustment

A further point about the foregoing romantic relationship studies is that they did not attempt to identify the specific communication behaviours through which EI or its composite abilities influence romantic adjustment: this despite the fact that the patterns of behaviour which distinguish between poorly adjusted and well-adjusted relationships are well-established.

As reviewed by Gottman (1998), laboratory studies have identified seven communication or behavioural patterns that consistently characterise poorly adjusted couples. Poorly adjusted couples: (1) engage in greater negative affect reciprocity; (2) have a higher ratio of negative to positive interactions; (3) report more negative and fewer positive expectations of their partner; (4) lasting negative attributions and elaborate negative narratives about the relationship are more prevalent; (5) a pattern
where husbands’ withdraw from wives’ demands for attention is often evident; (6) during couple interactions, partners’ stress levels are typically greater, and finally; (7) partners frequently communicate their complaints through personal criticisms, contemptuous remarks, respond to each other defensively, and “stonewall” or disengage from each other when complaints are expressed. Although each of these patterns is important in its own right, Gottman’s (1994) research suggests that the four latter behaviours characterising the seventh pattern (i.e., criticism, contempt, defensiveness, and stonewalling behaviour), have the most corrosive effects on romantic adjustment.

Much of this knowledge has been derived from the use of observational behavioural coding systems such as the Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS-III, MICS-G; Weiss & Tolman, cited in Arellano & Markman, 1995), the Couples Interaction Scoring System (CISS; Gottman, cited in Arellano & Markman, 1995), and the Rapid Couples Interaction Scoring System (RCISS; Kroff, Gottman, & Haas, cited in Gottman, 1998). However, time and cost effectiveness, and interference with couple authenticity, are frequently cited as disadvantages of such systems. Another disadvantage concerns the inability of observational systems to identify the cognitive processes underlying the foregoing behavioural patterns. For instance, observers are unable to assess the extent to which partners attempt to censor their reactions to provocative behaviour. Moreover, as the foregoing patterns illustrate, observational studies have been more successful at identifying destructive communication or behavioural patterns than constructive ones (Arellano & Markman, 1995).

In an attempt to consolidate these findings into a comprehensive, time and cost efficient self-report instrument, and to expand on the constructive elements of couple
behaviour, Arellano and Markman (1995) constructed the Managing Affect and Differences Scale (MADS). They drew on research which had informed the foregoing patterns, as well as number of relationship enhancement therapies and programs, to identify very concrete, specific communication behaviours which they believed underlay the reported patterns and therapies. Their final MADS inventory comprised twelve subscales on which partners rate their own behaviour, their partner’s behaviour, or their behaviour as a couple, in terms of Leveling, Expressivity, Negativity, Negative Escalation, Love and Affection, Editing, Validation, Feedback, Stop Actions, Focusing, Communication Over Time, and Withdrawal.

In their first and only published investigation of the MADS, in which preliminary evidence as to its psychometric soundness was also established, Arellano and Markman (1995) observed moderate to very strong associations ($r_s = .34$ to .77) between the communication behaviours, their participants’ relationship satisfaction, and their confidence in resolving relational conflicts. They observed these strengths of association within both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, and found that most of the communication behaviours distinguished between satisfied and dissatisfied couples. However, they did not examine the combined or relative contribution of each of these behaviours to satisfaction levels.

Eight of Arellano and Markman’s (1995) communication behaviours were examined in the current study: Leveling, Expressivity, Negativity, Editing, Validation, Feedback, and Focusing. **Leveling** behaviour concerns communicating thoughts and feelings clearly, constructively and simply to one’s partner. **Expressivity** concerns the expression or disclosure of emotion to one’s partner. **Negativity** concerns communication behaviour in which one partner criticizes or seeks to antagonise the other. **Editing** behaviour concerns positively reframing negative personal thoughts
and feelings, and partner messages. **Validation** is reflected in listening attentively to partners and expressing value in their points of view. **Feedback** concerns paraphrasing partner messages and asking questions to clarify these messages; the aim being to better understand their points of view. **Focusing** concerns attempts to keep discussions of difficult issues on track, and avoiding urges to raise new issues during such discussions. Finally, **Withdrawal** reflects physical or emotional disengagement during difficult or heated discussions.

The Love and Affection subscale was excluded from the current investigation given its strong similarity to the DAS Affectional Expression subscale. The Negative Escalation, Stop Actions, and Communication Over Time subscales were also excluded on the basis that the items measuring these constructs concerned couple behaviours rather than behaviours unique to one partner, the latter being the focus of the current study.

Of further interest to the current study, the variation in strengths of association reported by Arellano and Markman (1995) suggested that deeper analysis of these links might offer more complex insights into the relative value of the eight behaviours in predicting romantic relationship adjustment. The current study thus examined the relative importance of Leveling, Expressivity, Negativity, Editing, Validation, Feedback, and Focusing behaviour to adjustment.

**Emotional Intelligence, Communication Behaviour and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

While the studies reviewed earlier suggest that EI contributes to romantic adjustment, few have examined how or why. Yet, as touched on earlier, EI aspects or constructs resembling EI aspects have been associated with certain relationship behaviours, which are themselves known to influence adjustment. For example,
emotional self-awareness has been linked to the propensity to forgive (Fitness, 2000, 2001a); emotional disclosure has been linked to intimacy-enhancing behaviour (Cordova et al., 2005); low empathy has been linked to negative affect reciprocity (Gottman, 1994); poor emotional control has been linked to aggression (McDougall et al., 1991); while the capacity to self-regulate behaviour has been linked to success in negotiating marital problems (Gottman & Levenson, 1992). These and other behaviours, discussed in the remainder of this chapter, suggest a number of possible explanations for the positive association between EI and romantic adjustment.

Furthermore, as will be shown, there are many similarities between these behaviours and those comprising the MADS. For instance, similarities can be drawn between the propensity to forgive and Editing behaviour (i.e., the propensity to cognitively reframe negative thoughts and feelings about one’s partner); intimacy-enhancing behaviour and Validation behaviour (i.e., listening attentively and validating partners’ points of view); negative affect reciprocity, aggression, and Negativity (i.e., the propensity to provoke or verbally attack one’s partner). The MADS, therefore, provides a framework within which to investigate the means by which the various EI aspects influence adjustment, and at the same time, facilitates comparative links with the wider relationship literature.

**Emotional Recognition in Self, Communication Behaviour and Adjustment**

As mentioned, direct links between the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions and romantic relationship adjustment have previously been observed in the research of Fitness (2000), in which Emotion Clarity was weakly associated with greater marital happiness, and in the research of Cordova et al. (2005), in which Difficulty in Identifying Emotions was moderately associated with poorer marital adjustment.
These associations suggest that emotional self-awareness contributes to adjustment, but offer little in the way of explanation as to how or why this might be so. The extended findings of the foregoing authors, as well as the works of a number of other researchers, suggest three explanations. Specifically, it can be inferred from their research that this EI ability, relative to the other EI aspects, may be an important predictor of Editing, Validation, and Withdrawal behaviour, and that through these behaviours, it may influence adjustment for the better.

Beginning with Fitness’ (2000) research, she observed that persons with higher Emotion Clarity not only reported happier relationships, but found it significantly easier to forgive their partners for a marital transgression: this despite the seriousness of the transgression, the pain caused, or their level of marital happiness. In Gordon and Baucom’s (2003; see also 1998) synthesis of forgiveness models, persons who achieved forgiveness were typically theorised to be those who (a) positively reframed their thoughts and feelings to regain a more balanced view of transgressor and event; (b) decreased their negative affect towards the transgressor, and; (c) gave up the “right” to punish the transgressor. Such behaviours are clearly similar in many respects to the positive reframing of negative personal thoughts, feelings and partner messages inherent to the MADS Editing construct. With this in mind, a more detailed explanation for Fitness’ (2000) findings emerges. Her emotionally self-aware participants may well have found it easier to forgive their partners for relationship transgressions, because they were able to identify and then actively edit or reframe the negative thoughts and feelings associated with their partners’ behaviour. And as Arellano and Markman (1995) have shown, this behaviour has a direct positive impact on relationship adjustment. Editing behaviour
may thus be one means through which Emotional Recognition in Self influences adjustment.

Cordova et al.’s (2005) research similarly implicates Editing behaviour, as well as Validation behaviour, as possible means by which Emotional Recognition in Self may influence romantic adjustment. Cordova et al. found that spouses’ ability to identify their own emotions was not only associated with dyadic adjustment, but also with the generation of intimate safety within the relationship. Moreover, they found that intimate safety fully mediated the influence of this EI ability on adjustment. In other words, emotionally self-aware participants appeared to create a safer, intimate environment for their partners, which in turn led to greater cohesion, consensus, satisfaction, and affection within their relationships.

Cordova et al. (2005) theorised intimate safety to be generated by each partner’s propensity to encourage or “reinforce” vulnerable disclosures or behaviours on the part of the other, behaviours for which the other had previously been punished, either directly or indirectly, in earlier interpersonal encounters. Reinforcement primarily involved comforting and expressing value in partners’ vulnerable behaviours. Such behaviours reflect Validation as construed by the MADS. Moreover, the absence of criticism or punishment for partners’ vulnerable behaviours, which others had previously found antagonising, suggests that the observing partners may have been editing negative thoughts and feelings associated with this behaviour. This suggests that Validation and Editing behaviours may be two means through which Emotional Recognition in Self, in particular, influences adjustment.

Marital research performed by Noller and Ruzzene (1991) suggests that Emotional Recognition in Self or emotional self-awareness might also be an important EI predictor of Withdrawal behaviour, or emotional and physical disengagement,
which suggests another means by which this EI aspect can influence adjustment.
Noller and Ruzzene observed that men who were poorer at identifying and expressing their emotions, more often withdrew from conflicted interactions, and did so in a state of heightened physiological arousal. These men were also frequently involved in unhappier marriages. Difficulties with emotional expression notwithstanding, these findings suggest that poor emotional self-awareness might underlie men’s Withdrawal behaviour.

The possible primacy of emotional self-awareness over gender in explaining Withdrawal behaviour also seems consistent with research linking difficulties identifying one’s emotions to greater personal confusion and uncertainty during stressful marital interactions (Gottman, 1994), delayed awareness of and thus reaction to personal physiological stress (Martin & Phil, 1986; Naatanen et al., 1999), a consequent absence of effective coping behaviour during stressful episodes (Suls & Rittenhouse, 1990), and moreover, proneness to avoidant or escapist coping behaviour when stress levels are realised, including turning to drugs and alcohol (Taylor, 2001).
For the man or woman seeking to alleviate seemingly sudden high levels of stress, and for those who are more prone to avoidant coping, emotional withdrawal or physical flight from an arousing argument would seem a likely behaviour.

In summary, previous research suggests that Emotional Recognition in Self positively influences romantic relationship adjustment, that it may be an important EI predictor of Editing, Validation, and Withdrawal behaviour, and that it may influence adjustment through these behaviours. It might also be that this EI aspect is important to the prediction of one or more of the remaining five MADS behaviours. Research, however, appears yet to explore such links.
Only Cordova et al. (2005) have examined direct links between the EI ability to clearly express emotion and romantic adjustment, and as mentioned, they found a moderate association between the two. Their extended findings, and those of other researchers, suggest that Personal Expression might be particularly important to the prediction of six of the eight MADS communication behaviours, and that its influence on adjustment might be explained through these behaviours: Expressivity, Validation, Editing, Feedback, Leveling, and Withdrawal. If so, such a breadth of influence would indicate that this EI aspect is one of the most important to romantic adjustment.

In terms of the first behaviour, the link between the ability to clearly express one’s emotions and the propensity to express emotion to one’s partner is suggested by theories of expertise. Common to such theories is the premise that a given ability is developed from a native aptitude to which practice and persistence contribute (Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006). In the current study, it was presumed that most participants’ ability to clearly express emotion was developed, at least in some part, by the practice and propensity to express emotion to others, which would presumably include their romantic partners. Indeed, in the case of the latter, research suggests that romantic partners typically express more emotions to each other, than persons external to their relationship (Jourard, 1971). Moreover, the value of emotional expressivity to romantic relationship adjustment is widely documented. The disclosure of personal feelings to relationship partners has been linked to greater adjustment across different populations and relationship types, using various assessment measures of both expression and adjustment, across decades of research (e.g., Arellano & Markman, 1995; Gottman, 1994; Waring, Holden, & Wesley, 1998).
The research of Laurenceau, Rovine, and Barrett (2005) suggests Validation and Feedback behaviour as further means through which Personal Expression, in particular, might influence adjustment. In their daily diary study of married couples’ interactions, Laurenceau et al. found that more intimate, satisfying marriages were had by emotionally expressive spouses. It also emerged that their communication behaviour partially mediated this link. When emotionally expressive spouses listened attentively to their partners, expressed value in their partners’ disclosures, and made efforts to clarify and better understand partners’ messages, intimacy was enhanced. Such behaviours characterise the MADS Validation and Feedback constructs, which suggests two further means through which Personal Expression may influence adjustment.

The extended findings of Cordova et al. (2005) similarly implicate Validation behaviour, as well as Editing behaviour, as possible mediators of the link between Personal Expression and romantic adjustment. They found that intimate safety, which theoretically, is generated by behaviours similar to Editing and Validation, mediated the link between dyadic adjustment and participants’ ability to identify their emotions, and to communicate their emotions. In other words, participants’ who were better able to communicate their emotions, or identify them, appeared to generate a safer, intimate environment, by reframing negative thoughts and feelings about partners’ vulnerable disclosures, and listening attentively and expressing value in partners’ disclosures. This in turn influenced their relationship adjustment for the better.

Finally, research by Noller and Ruzzene (1991) suggests that Personal Expression might also be important to the prediction of Leveling and Withdrawal behaviour, and that its influence on adjustment might be mediated by these behaviours. With regards to Leveling behaviour, Noller and Ruzzene observed that
men were much less accurate in communicating their emotions than women. That is, what men said they were feeling frequently did not match their bodily expressions of said feelings. Moreover, men who were less accurate in this regard were involved in unhappier relationships. Such inaccuracies suggest a lack of Leveling behaviour on the part of men in unhappier relationships; that is, efforts to communicate their emotions constructively and simply. And presumably, such efforts reflect the behaviour of persons poorly skilled in clearly expressing their emotions. As such, differences in Personal Expression ability may well explain the propensity to engage in leveling behaviour, and through this behaviour, this EI aspect may influence adjustment.

With regards to Withdrawal behaviour, Noller and Ruzzene (1991) observed that men who had difficulty identifying and expressing their emotions, withdrew more often from heated discussions with their partners, and that such men were involved in unhappier relationships. Their findings suggest that poor emotional expression ability, like poor emotional self-awareness, may underlie men's Withdrawal behaviour. Like sufferers of alexithymia, heated discussions may well lead inexpressive persons to feel confused, threatened or overwhelmed by their built-up emotions (Naatanen et al., 1999), precipitating their emotional or physical disengagement from the situation. Important issues would thus remain unresolved, partners’ frustrated, and adjustment may well be damaged (Gottman, 1994).

In summary, research suggests that Personal Expression positively influences romantic relationship adjustment, that it may be an important EI predictor of Expressivity, Validation, Editing, Feedback, Leveling, and Withdrawal behaviour, and that its influence on adjustment may be mediated by these behaviours.
A number of studies have linked constructs similar to Understanding Emotions External to romantic relationship adjustment. For instance, early research by Kahn (1970) found greater marital satisfaction within couples who were more accurate in interpreting each other’s nonverbal communications. In later research, Gottman (1979) found higher levels of distress within couples who reported poorer empathic understanding of each other. Similar studies by Noller (1980) and Noller and Venardos (1986) reported positive correlations between accurate understanding of spousal verbal and non-verbal communications and relationship quality and functioning. Likewise, Hansson, Jones, and Carpenter (1984) and Hansson (in Davis & Oathout, 1987) identified empathy as one characteristic important to relationship adjustment. As well, more recent research by Noller and Ruzzene (1991) demonstrated that partners’ better able to identify each other’s emotions were involved in much happier relationships. On the other hand however, as mentioned earlier, Lopes’ four MSCEIT studies revealed no link between participants’ ability to identify others’ emotions and their sense of interpersonal adjustment (Lopes et al., 2004; Studies 1 & 2; Lopes et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003).

While evidence suggesting a direct link between Understanding Emotions External and romantic adjustment is mixed, evidence suggesting an indirect link is more consistent. Indeed, the wider relationship literature suggests four communication behaviours through which Understanding Emotions External, in particular, might influence adjustment: Validation, Feedback Negativity, and Editing.

In regard to the first three, Davis and Oathout (1987) found that high perspective-taking ability predicted clusters of constructive relationship behaviours, and that these were associated with greater relationship satisfaction. Constructive
behaviours included listening attentively to partners, expressing value in their views, and making efforts to better understand their points of view. On the other hand, poor perspective-taking ability predicted clusters of destructive behaviour which were associated with lower relationship satisfaction, including rudeness, nagging, and self-centred behaviour. Such behaviours reflect the MADS Validation, Feedback, and Negativity constructs. Thus, Davis and Oathout’s findings suggest that Understanding Emotions External may act through these communication behaviours to influence adjustment.

Marital research by Noller and Ruzzene (1991), and Gottman (1994) similarly suggests that Negativity may play a mediating role. Noller and Ruzzene found that less empathically aware spouses more often misidentified their partners’ emotions and misunderstood their partners’ intentions, which in Gottman’s research predicted more frequent and intense spousal conflicts and the escalation of such conflicts. Such behaviour, in turn, predicted marital unhappiness.

Regarding the fourth behaviour, research by Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus (1991) suggests that Editing might perform a similar mediating function. In their study, participants’ with better perspective-taking ability were more likely to react constructively rather destructively to their partners’ bad behaviour, for example, by shrugging off personal slights or transgressions, or by responding affectionately. Such reactions, similar to those in Fitness’ (2000) forgiveness research, suggest that positive reframing of negative thoughts and feelings was involved.

In summary, previous research suggests that Understanding Emotions External positively influences romantic relationship adjustment; that it may be an important EI
Emotional Control, Communication Behaviour and Adjustment

As with the other EI abilities, there is some evidence to suggest that the ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions can influence interpersonal and romantic relationship adjustment for the better. For instance, emotionally impulsive persons have been found to be more verbally aggressive and behaviourally antagonistic when interacting with others (McDougall et al., 1991), particularly when faced with stressful situations (Roger & Najarian, 1989). Furthermore, persons who struggle to control their hostility and cynicism often find it difficult to develop and maintain friendships (Benotsch et al., 1997), and maintain their marriages (Caspi, Elder & Bem, 1987).

In terms of the latter in particular, a longitudinal study by Caspi et al. (1987) revealed that almost half of a sample of male participants with a history of temper tantrums stretching back to their childhoods were divorced by around 40 years of age. In comparison, a quarter of the men without such a history were divorced by this age. With respect to women, around a quarter of those with a history of tantrums were divorced by around 40 years of age, whereas only a tenth of those without such a history were divorced. Moreover, in cases where marriage remained intact at midlife, husbands of historically ill-tempered women reported greater marriage dissatisfaction and more relationship conflicts than husbands of wives without this history.

This research suggests persons with better Emotional Control might be involved in better-adjusted relationships because they are better able to inhibit their hostility and cynicism, thus less often antagonise or verbally attack their partners, behaviours which characterise the Negativity construct.
Emotional Management of Self, Communication Behaviour and Adjustment

The research pertaining to Personal Expression emphasised the important role emotional expression plays in the development of a well-adjusted romantic relationship. An important caveat to such conclusions is raised by Gottman and his colleagues (Carstensen, Gottman, & Levenson, 1995; Gottman, 1994; Gottman & Levenson, 1992), whose research indicates that unhappy marriages involve a greater exchange of negative emotional expressions than positive ones. This is not to say that the expression or presence of negative emotion is to be avoided, but rather, that marital happiness is enhanced when emotional exchange is balanced in favor of positive emotions. In fact, Gottman and colleagues’ research suggests that the likelihood of a marriage remaining stable over time is greatly increased in cases where the ratio of positive versus negative emotional exchanges is around five to one.

Such findings suggest that the construct of Emotional Management of Self might be particularly important to relationship adjustment, since it embodies not only the ability to repair negative mood states, but also the ability to generate positive ones. Presumably, therefore, persons with this ability would be more likely to instigate positive exchanges, and do so more frequently.

This position, however, is not supported by the only study known to have explored the link between this EI aspect and romantic adjustment. As mentioned earlier, Fitness (2000) found no association between ninety married persons’ Mood Repair ability and their level of marital happiness. On the other hand, its value to romantic adjustment is suggested by Lopes and colleagues’ four interpersonal relationship studies, in which participants’ ability to manage their own and others’ emotions was the only MSCEIT EI ability significantly associated with adjustment across a range of different relationships (Lopes et al., 2004; Studies 1 & 2; Lopes et
al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003). Its value to romantic adjustment is also suggested by the findings of Salovey et al.’s (2002) study, in which participants’ Mood Repair ability was moderately associated with interpersonal relationship satisfaction.

Gottman and Levenson’s (1992) research suggests four communication behaviours through which Emotional Management of Self in particular might influence adjustment for the better: Negativity, Withdrawal, Focusing, and Editing. Gottman and Levenson observed that some married couples regulated their behaviour during discussion of marital problems, that is, increased their use of positive communications and decreased negative ones, while others did not. Moreover, during these discussions, the spouses comprising regulated couples were less critical of their partners, withdrew less often, and were less likely to counter-blame or respond to partner messages with other defensive behaviours, when compared to spouses comprising unregulated couples. Furthermore, when examined at two time intervals, regulated couples were found to be more satisfied with their relationships, and were less likely to have separated or considered separation than unregulated couples.

In terms of the current study, the capacity of Gottman and Levenson’s (2002) regulated spouses to increase positive and decrease negative communications suggests that they might have had better emotional self-management skills, while the specifics of their communication behaviour suggests the absence of Negativity and Withdrawal, and the presence of Focusing, and Editing behaviour.

In summary, the foregoing research suggests that Emotional Management of Self positively influences romantic relationship adjustment, that it may be an important EI predictor of Negativity, Withdrawal, Focusing, and Editing behaviour, and that it may influence adjustment through these behaviours.
**Emotional Management of Others, Communication Behaviour and Adjustment**

To date, no research has specifically examined the effects of the EI ability to manage others’ emotions on romantic relationship adjustment. However, as previously mentioned, the MSCEIT Emotion Management subscale, which incorporates regulation of both self and others’ emotions, has been positively linked to interpersonal functioning (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003). It therefore seems reasonable to expect that Emotional Management of Others might be similarly linked to romantic adjustment.

There is also no research to suggest the particular MADS communication behaviours through which this EI ability might influence adjustment. Nevertheless, it was reasoned here that it might act through five behaviours: Validation, Feedback, Expressivity, Withdrawal, and Negativity. In order to identify which partner emotions to repair, persons skilled in this regard would presumably need to listen attentively and ask questions to clarify their understanding of partner worries. Having established such knowledge, skilled persons would presumably express value in their partners’ positions and their feelings and use emotional expressions of their own, such as love, praise, and humour, to positively influence their partner’s emotional state. Such behaviours characterise the Validation, Feedback, and Expressivity constructs.

It was also thought that persons’ better able to manage others’ emotions might be less likely to withdraw from heated discussions: firstly, because engagement with a negative partner would seem necessary to repair their emotions, and secondly, because the positive influence of this ability would presumably result in more moderate discussion. Finally, it was thought that verbal provocations and criticisms would be counterproductive to the process of repairing negative emotions and
generating positive feeling in partners. Such behaviours, which characterise the Negativity construct, would thus seem less likely of persons skilled in this regard.

To conclude, the findings of interpersonal adjustment research suggest that Emotional Management of Others may positively influence romantic relationship adjustment. It also may be that Emotional Management of Others is an important EI predictor of Validation, Feedback, Expressivity, Withdrawal, and Negativity, and that it influences adjustment through these behaviours.

**Summary and Aims of Study 2**

In summary, a small body of research supports the premise that emotional intelligence contributes to the development and maintenance of romantic relationship adjustment. Weak to moderate associations have generally been observed, though both strong and non-existent associations have also been reported. In terms of which EI aspects matter most, the findings have been mixed, since few studies have used the same EI measures, and few EI measures address the same EI aspects. Across such studies, the value of emotional self-awareness, emotional expression, and emotional management has been differentially emphasised. However, their effects have never been assessed together in the same study, nor have their contributions, relative to each other or other EI aspects, been examined.

Even fewer studies have attempted to identify the factors that mediate the relationship between EI and adjustment. And none have examined the effects of relationship communication behaviour in a mediating role: this despite the fact that the communication and behavioural patterns which distinguish poorly adjusted from well-adjusted couples are well-established. Eight communication behaviours, derived from the MADS, appear to tap specific behaviours underlying these patterns. Their respective associations with adjustment have ranged from moderate to very strong,
suggesting that some behaviours are more important than others. It is the case, however, that research in the wider relationship literature has linked constructs resembling the EI aspects to communication behaviours resembling those measured by the MADS. And, in a number of studies, these behaviours have mediated the influence of such constructs on adjustment. Such findings suggest that the respective EI aspects may act through different communication behaviours to influence adjustment.

Thus, in short, research has established positive connections between EI aspects or similar constructs, constructs resembling the MADS communication behaviours, and romantic adjustment. But it is unclear (a) which EI aspects matter most to adjustment; (b) which MADS behaviours matter most; (c) which behaviours each EI aspect best predicts, and; (d) whether the respective EI aspects act through these behaviours to influence adjustment. The aims of Study 2 were thus fourfold.

1. The first aim was to explore the relative importance of the six SUEIT EI aspects in the prediction of romantic relationship adjustment.

2. The second aim was to explore the relative importance of the eight MADS communication behaviours in the prediction of romantic relationship adjustment.

3. The third aim was to explore the relative importance of the six SUEIT EI aspects in the prediction of each of the eight MADS communication behaviours.

4. The fourth aim was to test whether each EI aspect acts through the communication behaviours they best predict to influence adjustment. That is, the aim was to test whether the relationship between each EI aspect and romantic relationship adjustment is mediated by the communication behaviours that each EI aspect best predicts.
Method

Procedure

Members from forty-five online relationship discussion forums (e.g. womenshealthabout.com; menshealthabout.com) who were involved in a romantic relationship were invited to complete the online survey detailed below. As with Study 1, written permission was obtained prior to posting the invitation in circumstances where a moderator presided over a forum or group. A copy of the invitational post is included in Appendix B.1. The invitation provided a direct link to the online survey information page, which outlined the study, provided the researcher’s contact details, those of the presiding supervisor, and ethics committee. The online survey was programmed in such a way that prospective participants could participate once only, could not miss a question, or mistakenly rate a question multiple times. Missing data were only present in cases where persons did not complete the survey.

Participants

Three hundred and sixty-four persons answered the first survey question, while 129 completed the survey. Thirteen prospective participants who completed the survey were below the age of adult consent (18 years of age). Their contributions were not included in the analyses. As such, 116 (31.8%) of the 364 people who began the survey comprised the final sample. The majority of participants were married (60%), while 18% were in a defacto relationship, and 22% were in a dating relationship. The average length of relationship was 10.4 (SD = 10.11) years, the shortest being less than one year and the longest being 70 years. The average age of the sample was 36.02 (SD = 12.28), the youngest being 18 and the oldest being 94. 75% of the participants were female while 25% were male. Almost half of the sample (44%) resided in the USA. Twenty three percent lived in Australia, while 14% lived
in the UK, and 11% lived in Canada. A small number of participants resided in Europe (6%), and Asia (2%). In regards to education, most participants had earned an undergraduate (34%) or post-graduate (26%) university qualification. The highest qualification that 15% of the sample had completed was a technical qualification, while 22% had completed secondary school only, and 3% had completed eleven years of schooling or less.

With regards to employment status, 50% were employed full-time and 10% worked part-time. Nineteen percent were full-time students, approximately 13% performed full-time household duties, 4% were unemployed, 2% were retired, and 2% were disabled. As with Study 1, participant occupations were classified into eight classes based on occupational social status, using the ANU4 system (Jones & McMillan, 2001), derived from the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations second edition (ASCO2; McLennan, 1997). Figure 3.1 depicts the occupational stratification of participants in Study 2, ranging from the most prestigiously employed in class 1 to the least prestigious in class 8.
Figure 3.1 Percentage of Study 2 participants employed in each occupational class

As depicted in Figure 3.1, of the 60% employed participants, 19% were employed in occupations classified within the first class, comprising health, education, legal, science, building and engineering qualified professionals. Thirteen percent were in the second class comprising nurses and therapists; and social, business, computing, media and air/sea transport qualified professionals. Nine percent were in the third class of elected and appointed officials; and senior management of public sector and large organizations. Twenty four percent were in the fourth class comprising artists; associates/technicians; police/defence force officers (non-commissioned); sportspeople; and business specialists. Eleven percent
were in the fifth class of farm, shop, office and hospitality managers; specialized
clerks, sales and service workers; mechanical engineering, electrical and
communications tradespeople. Nine percent were in the sixth occupational class of
building, auto, arts, and miscellaneous tradespeople; secretaries; clerks; and care
workers. Ten percent were in the seventh class of transport and service workers;
metal, textile, glass, wood, agriculture tradespeople; stationary plant operators; skilled
forestry, waterside, mining, construction workers; and defence force personnel (lower
ranks). Finally, 6% were employed in the eighth occupational class comprising other
service workers, other machine operators; factory/farm hands; and labourers.

Measures

Three inventories contributed data to the present study, measuring emotional
intelligence, eight relationship communication behaviours, and relationship
adjustment. The survey required between 30 and 45 minutes to complete. A copy of
the survey questions is included in Appendix B.2.

Emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence was measured using Gignac’s
(2005a) revised version of the SUEIT, as detailed in Chapter 1. In the present study,
the two-item Emotional Recognition in Self subscale exhibited moderate internal
reliability with a coefficient alpha of .82, and a high .90 when stepped-up via the
Spearman-Brown formula. The Personal Expression subscale also demonstrated a
moderate coefficient alpha of .72. The Understanding Emotions External subscale
had a high coefficient alpha of .91. The Emotional Control subscale exhibited a
moderate coefficient alpha of .77. The Emotional Management of Self subscale
demonstrated a moderate to high coefficient alpha of .87. The Emotional
Management of Others subscale had a moderate coefficient alpha of .79. Finally, the
SUEIT full scale coefficient alpha was a high .94.
Communication behaviours. Relationship communication behaviours were assessed using Arellano and Markman’s (1995) Managing Affect and Differences Scale (MADS). The MADS was designed to assess twelve concrete and specific communication and conflict management behaviours which affect relationship quality: Leveling, Expressivity, Negativity, Negative Escalation, Love and Affection, Editing, Validation, Feedback, Stop Actions, Focusing, Communication Over Time, and Withdrawal. The Leveling subscale measures the extent to which partners’ tell each other what they are feeling by discussing thoughts or feelings clearly, constructively, and simply. The Expressivity subscale measures partners’ degree of comfort with emotional expression, which includes praising, comforting or expressing disappointment in one’s partner. The Negativity subscale measures the degree to which partners hassle and nag the other, verbally attack their partner, and quarrel. The Negative Escalation subscale measures the extent to which negativity is reciprocated by either partner, leading to an upward spiral of hostility. The Love and Affection subscale measures the extent to which partners love each other, engage in and are comforted by affectionate behaviours. The Editing subscale attempts to measure communication behaviours whereby partners listen to each other before providing a response, rephrase negative thoughts into positive statements, and keep defensive responses to partner messages in check. The Validation subscale measures communication behaviours that express value and understanding of partner perspectives and points of view. The Feedback subscale measures the extent to which partners paraphrase each others messages, and ask questions to clarify these messages to ensure accurate interpretation. The Stop Actions subscale involves stopping discussion because conflict has escalated and agreeing to discuss the issue at another time when partners have had time to cool down. The Focusing subscale
concerns communication behaviours which keep discussions focused on one heated issue at a time. The *Communication Over Time* subscale attempts to measure the extent to which partner communication has improved, whether partners confide more, and whether partners understand each other better than in the past. Finally, the *Withdrawal* subscale measures the extent to which partners physically or emotionally disengage from discussion of relationship issues.

The complete MADS requires participants to answer 109 questions pertaining to their own behaviour, their partner’s behaviour, or their behaviour as a couple on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 = Strongly Agree and 5 = Strongly Disagree.

Arellano and Markman’s (1995) preliminary investigation of the MADS psychometric properties revealed acceptable internal consistency levels, where coefficient alphas for the 11 subscales ranged from .64 to .90. Furthermore, the various subscales correlated significantly in expected directions and strength with respected self-report measures of relationship adjustment, including relationship satisfaction ($r = .24$ to $.68$) as measured by the Marital Adjustment Test (Markman, Floyd, Stanley, & Storaasli, 1988), two areas of couple functioning ($r = .25$ to $.67$) measured by the Marital Agendas Protocol (MAP; Notarius & Vanzetti, 1983), and couples’ use of reasoning and aggression ($r = .26$ to $.50$) as measured by the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS; Straus, 1979).

In the present study, a number of changes were made to the MADS composition. Firstly, because the present study was concerned with participants own behaviour, items from each scale which referred to their partner’s behaviour or their behaviour as a couple were omitted. This process resulted in the exclusion of the Negative Escalation and Communication Over Time subscales due to its complete focus on couple rather than individual behaviour. As well, the Stop Actions subscale
consisted of a single item following this process, thus was similarly omitted.

Secondly, the Love and Affection subscale was omitted due to strong similarities with the Affectional Expression subscale, which is one of the factors comprising the Dyadic Adjustment scale.

The result of these changes was that eight of the eleven subscales and 47 of the original 109 items were retained. None of the remaining items required reverse scoring. Scores were calculated separately for each subscale. The Leveling Subscale was represented by eight items, where possible total scores ranged between 8 and 40. It demonstrated a moderately high coefficient alpha of .89. The Validation subscale was represented by ten items, with total possible scores ranging between 10 and 50, and exhibited a high coefficient alpha of .90. The Expressivity subscale was represented by five items, with possible scores ranging between 5 and 25. It demonstrated a high coefficient alpha of .90. The Negativity subscale comprised six items. Possible scores ranged between 6 and 30. A moderately high coefficient alpha of .85 was demonstrated by this scale. Four items represented the Withdrawal subscale, with possible scores ranging between 4 and 20. It demonstrated a moderate coefficient alpha of .75. Feedback was represented by three items, where possible scores ranged between 3 and 15, and exhibited a low to moderate coefficient alpha of .67. Focusing comprised three items, with possible scores ranging between 3 and 15, and exhibited a moderate coefficient alpha of .72. Finally, the Editing subscale comprised eight items, where total possible scores ranged between 8 and 40. A moderate coefficient alpha of .79 was exhibited by this subscale.

ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP ADJUSTMENT. Relationship adjustment was measured using the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS; Spanier, 1976). The DAS is one of the most widely used measures of intimate relationship adjustment (Glenn, 1990). The
DAS was developed on the assumption that relationship adjustment is an ongoing process, determined by partner behaviour and couple interactions, and that adjustment at a given point in time can be measured in terms of four factors: Dyadic Consensus, Dyadic Satisfaction, Dyadic Cohesion, and Affectional Expression. The Dyadic Consensus subscale measures the frequency of agreement between partners on issues such as handling finances, religion, and interacting with family. The Dyadic Satisfaction subscale measures the frequency of shared confidences, quarrels, negative interactions, and discussion of separation. The Dyadic Cohesion subscale measures time spent together and the frequency of shared activities including hobbies, idea discussion, and projects. The Affectional Expression subscale measures satisfaction with sex relations and frequency of displays of love.

The psychometric properties of the DAS have been studied extensively. Factor loadings typically range from .78 to .98, while coefficient alphas are typically higher than .90. Validity evidence is similarly strong, such that adjustment scores have been related to attachment styles, communication, conflict and problem-solving behaviours, coping styles, personality, sex roles, and self-determination in large samples from a range of developed countries (Sabourin et al., 2005).

The DAS contains 32 items for which a range of Likert scales are used. For fifteen items, respondents rate their extent of agreement to statements on a six-point scale, where 1 = always disagree and 6 = always agree. Nine items require respondents to rate the frequency of relationship events, behaviours or thoughts on a six-point scale, where 1 = never and 6 = all of the time. Four items require respondents to indicate how often particular relationship events occur, where 1 = never and 6 = more often than once a day. A single item requires respondents to indicate their frequency of hugs and kisses on a five-point scale, where 1 = never and
5 = every day. Another single item requires respondents to indicate the frequency of shared outside interests on a five-point scale, where 1 = none of them and 5 = all of them. A further single item asks respondents to indicate the degree of happiness in their relationship on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = extremely unhappy to 7 = perfectly happy. A final item asks respondents to choose one of six statements that best reflects how they feel about the future of their relationship.

Eight of the 32 items are reverse scored. The Dyadic Consensus subscale comprises 13 items, with possible scores ranging from 13 to 78. In the present study, this subscale exhibited a high coefficient alpha of .93. The Dyadic Satisfaction subscale contains 10 items, where scores can range from 10 to 60. It demonstrated a similarly high coefficient alpha of .92. The Dyadic Cohesion subscale has 5 items, with possible scores ranging from 5 to 29. In this study it had a moderate to high coefficient alpha of .87. The Affectional Expression subscale contains 4 items, where possible scores range from 4 to 24. This scale also had a moderately high coefficient alpha of .89. The global DAS scale contains all 32 items, and possible scores range from 32 to 191. In the present study, the global DAS demonstrated a very high coefficient alpha of .96. This rather than the subscales were used to approximate adjustment.

**Results**

Analyses performed for Study 2 examined the relationships holding between emotional intelligence, communication behaviour, and romantic relationship adjustment. Four sets of analyses were performed to examine these relations. For the first three sets, correlations and multivariate stepwise regression analyses were performed to determine the relative importance of (1) each of the six EI abilities in the prediction of romantic relationship adjustment; (2) each of the eight communication
behaviours in the prediction of romantic relationship adjustment; and (3) each of the six EI abilities in the prediction of each of the eight communication behaviours. For the fourth set of analyses, a series of mediation models were tested to examine whether the relationship between each EI ability and romantic relationship adjustment was mediated by the communication behaviours that each EI ability was retained to predict in the third set of stepwise analyses. The choice of stepwise regression procedures over other regression alternatives reflected the exploratory nature of Study 2, and the emphasis on model-building rather than model-testing.

Prior to each analysis, data was screened and transformed where necessary to reduce the number and effect of outliers. In two cases, where standardized z scores for outliers exceeded +/- 3.29 ($p < .001$), variable scores were changed to one unit smaller or larger respectively, than the next most extreme score. Summary statistics for the six EI abilities following transformation are shown in Tables 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>17-85</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63.51</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.56</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>6-30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19.97</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 116. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.*
Summary statistics for the eight communication behaviours and romantic relationship adjustment are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

*Summary Statistics for Communication Behavior and Romantic Relationship Adjustment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leveling</td>
<td>8-40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.09</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40.99</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressivity</td>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativity</td>
<td>6-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17.02</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>3-15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.58</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing</td>
<td>3-15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing</td>
<td>8-40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31.29</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic Relationship</td>
<td>32-191</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>142.69</td>
<td>26.74</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* N = 116. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.

*Emotional Intelligence and Romantic Relationship Adjustment*

Correlations between the six EI abilities and romantic relationship adjustment are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Romantic Relationship Adjustment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>.23*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 116. *p < .05. **p < .01.

As shown in Table 3.3, there were significant weak positive correlations between all six EI abilities and romantic relationship adjustment. A multivariate stepwise regression analysis was subsequently employed to identify the most important EI predictors of adjustment. All six EI abilities were entered as independent variables, while adjustment was entered as the dependent variable. The resulting model was significant, $F(1, 114) = 9.48, p < .01$, but retained only Emotional Management of Self, which explained 8% of variation in Relationship Adjustment, $\beta = .28, t(115) = 3.09, p < .01$. In sum, higher scores on the six EI abilities, particularly Emotional Management of Self, predicted better romantic relationship adjustment.

**Communication Behaviour and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

Correlations between the eight communication behaviours and Relationship Adjustment, as well as statistics for subsequent stepwise regressions, are reported in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4

*Romantic Relationship Adjustment correlated and regressed on Communication Behaviour*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relationship Adjustment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveling</td>
<td>.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation</td>
<td>.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressivity</td>
<td>.74**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativity</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing</td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing</td>
<td>.63**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 116. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Dashes inserted for variables not retained by the stepwise models.*

As shown in Table 3.4, there were significant moderate to very strong correlations between the eight communication behaviours and Relationship Adjustment. Relationship Adjustment was subsequently regressed on all eight communication behaviours using multivariate stepwise procedure. The resulting model was highly significant, $F(4, 111) = 50.99, p < .001$. Validation, $t(115) = 3.42, p < .01$, Expressivity, $t(115) = 3.11, p < .01$, Negativity, $t(115) = -2.35, p < .05$, and Focusing, $t(115) = 2.27, p < .05$, were retained as the most important predictors,
together explaining 64.8% of variation in adjustment. In sum, the six positive communication behaviours, particularly Validation, Expressivity, and Focusing, predicted better romantic relationship adjustment, while the two negative behaviours, particularly Negativity, predicted poorer adjustment.

**Emotional Intelligence and Communication Behaviour**

Correlations between the six EI abilities and the eight communication behaviours are reported in Table 3.5. As can be seen in Table 3.5, there were significant weak to strong correlations between each EI ability and seven or eight communication behaviours. Higher EI scores were associated with greater use of positive behaviours and less use of negative behaviours. Eight multivariate stepwise regressions were subsequently performed whereby each communication behaviour was regressed on the combination of significantly associated EI abilities. Regression statistics are reported in Table 3.6.
Table 3.5

*Correlations between Emotional Intelligence and Communication Behaviours*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leveling</th>
<th>Validation</th>
<th>Expressivity</th>
<th>Negativity</th>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>Feedback</th>
<th>Focusing</th>
<th>Editing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.45**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>-.45**</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 116. * p < .05. ** p < .01.*
Table 3.6

*Communication Behaviours regressed on Emotional Intelligence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication Behaviours</th>
<th>Stepwise $\beta s$</th>
<th>Leveling</th>
<th>Validation</th>
<th>Expressivity</th>
<th>Negativity</th>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>Feedback</th>
<th>Focusing</th>
<th>Editing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-26*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-30**</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-45**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ | .28 | .14 | .22 | .21 | .25 | .21 | .12 | .17 |

df | (1, 114) | (2, 113) | (2, 113) | (1, 114) | (2, 113) | (2, 113) | (1, 114) | (2, 113) |

$F$ | 44.40** | 9.51** | 16.20** | 29.58** | 18.43** | 15.02** | 14.93** | 11.90** |

*Note. $N = 116$.  * $p < .05$.  ** $p < .01$.  Dashes inserted for variables not retained by the stepwise models.*
As shown in Table 3.6, all eight regression models were significant. The stepwise models retained either one or two EI abilities to explain between 12% and 28% of variance in each communication behaviour. Of all the EI abilities, Personal Expression was the most pervasive predictor. It was retained as the sole best predictor of Leveling behaviour, $t (115) = 6.66, p < .001$, was the most important predictor of Expressivity, $t (115) = 3.64, p < .001$, and made important contributions to the prediction of Withdrawal, $t (115) = -2.99, p < .01$, Validation, $t (115) = 2.17, p < .05$, and Feedback behaviour, $t (115) = 2.27, p < .05$. Emotional Management of Self was the second most pervasive predictor. It was retained as the sole best predictor of Negativity, $t (115) = -5.44, p < .001$, and Focusing behaviour, $t (115) = 3.86, p < .001$, and made an important contribution to the prediction of Editing behaviour, $t (115) = 2.41, p < .05$. Emotional Recognition in Self also made important contributions to the prediction of Withdrawal, $t (115) = 2.61, p < .01$, and Editing behaviour, $t (115) = 2.41, p < .05$, as did Emotional Management of Others to the prediction of Feedback, $t (115) = 3.28, p < .001$, and Expressivity, $t (115) = 2.08, p < .05$. Understanding Emotions External made a single contribution as one of the best predictors of Validation, $t (115) = 2.36, p < .05$. Lastly, Emotional Control was revealed to be the least important predictor of communication behaviour, such that was not retained by any of the stepwise models.

The overall picture was one where higher EI scores were associated with greater use of positive communication behaviours and less use of negative behaviours. The differential importance of each EI ability was emphasized in the prediction of each communication behaviour, and largely reflected the possibilities suggested within the introduction. Personal Expression and Emotional Management of Self
were revealed to be the most pervasive predictors of communication behaviour, and Emotional Control the least.

**Mediation Analyses: Emotional Intelligence, Communication Behaviour and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

The fourth set of analyses examined the extent to which the effect of emotional intelligence on romantic relationship adjustment was mediated by communication behaviour. Having established that all six EI abilities and all eight communication behaviours were associated with adjustment, and that either five or six EI abilities were associated with all eight communication behaviours, thirty-eight potential mediation paths were feasible, when EI abilities, communication behaviours, and Relationship Adjustment were positioned as predictors, mediators, and outcome respectively. However, Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004) strongly recommend that choice of predictor variables reflect those which seem most likely to cause both the mediator and outcome variables. The choice as to which paths to examine was thus informed by the third set of stepwise analyses, in which one or two EI abilities were identified as the best predictors of each communication behaviour. This method of model choice also strengthens the quality of interpretive links between the four sets of analyses. Thirteen mediation models were subsequently tested, given that there were thirteen instances of EI abilities best predicting the eight behaviours in the third set of stepwise analyses. No mediation analyses were performed for Emotional Control since it was not retained by any of the stepwise models to predict the respective communication behaviours. Consequently, the mediation models tested the extent to which each EI ability influenced Relationship Adjustment (a) directly, after controlling for the communication behaviours it best predicted, and (b) indirectly, through the specific communication behaviours it best predicted.
Kenny (2006) and colleagues (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981) consider structural equation modelling (SEM) the superior means by which to conduct mediation analysis, since measurement error can be controlled, model fit statistics can be obtained and compared, and multiple variables can be included at each stage of the model. However, the present sample size of 116 is well below the minimum 200 recommended for SEM (Quintana & Maxwell, cited in Frazier et al., 2004). In these circumstances, Kenny and colleagues, and many others, (see Holmbeck, cited in Frazier et al., 2004) recommend using a four-step standard regression procedure to estimate the path coefficients within each model, to determine the significance of direct effects, and a test such as Sobel’s (1982), to determine the significance of indirect effects (for a comparison of similar tests see Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The four-step approach to establishing whether the respective communication behaviours mediated relations between the respective EI abilities and Relationship Adjustment is explained in context of the paths illustrated in Figures 3.2. A and B.

![Diagram A](image1)

*Figure A.*

![Diagram B](image2)

*Figure B.*

*Figure 3.2. Illustration of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-step approach to Mediation*
The first step required that the EI ability in question significantly predict Relationship Adjustment (see Path c in Figure A). The second step required that the EI ability predict the communication behaviour in question (see Path a in Figure B). The third step required that the communication behaviour predict Relationship Adjustment (see Path b in Figure B). The fourth and final step required that the strength of relation between the EI ability and Relationship Adjustment reduce significantly when the communication behaviour was added to the model (compare Path c in Figure A with Path c’ in Figure B).

According to Kenny (2006), a reduction in beta weight to non-significance in the fourth step, in conjunction with a significant Sobel’s indirect effect test, is evidence of full or complete mediation. If the beta weight reduces yet is still significant, and Sobel’s test is also significant, this is evidence of partial mediation. In either case, if Sobel’s test is not significant, this is evidence of no mediation. Furthermore, the percentage of the total effect mediated can be calculated by submitting the path coefficients to the formula $ab/c$ (Shrout & Bolger, cited in Frazier et al., 2004). However, a sample size of 500 or more is required to accurately determine this percentage (MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, cited in Frazier et al., 2004). Therefore, while these percentages were calculated in the present study, they should be considered exploratory estimates for future research to consider. Results for the thirteen mediation analyses are displayed in Figures 3.3 to 3.15, from Emotional Recognition in Self to Emotional Management of Others. The data indicate that full or complete mediation occurred in every case.
Emotional Recognition in Self \[ \rightarrow \quad 0.21^* \quad (0.05) \rightarrow \quad \text{Withdrawal} \rightarrow \quad -0.43^{**} \]

Emotional Recognition in Self \[ \rightarrow \quad 0.34^{**} \quad (0.63)^{**} \rightarrow \quad \text{Editing} \rightarrow \quad 0.63^{**} \quad (0.63)^{**} \]

Direct $B$: \[ 0.05 \]
Indirect $B$: \[ 0.16^{**} \]
% Mediation: \[ 79.86\% \]
Mediation type: Full

Note. \( N = 116. \quad * p < .05. \quad ** p < .01. \)

Figure 3.3. Mediation Model 1: Emotional Recognition in Self, Withdrawal, and Relationship Adjustment.

Direct $B$: \[ 0.00 \]
Indirect $B$: \[ 0.21^{**} \]
% Mediation: \[ 100\% \]
Mediation type: Full

Note. \( N = 116. \quad * p < .05. \quad ** p < .01. \)

Figure 3.4. Mediation Model 2: Emotional Recognition in Self, Editing, and Relationship Adjustment.
**Figure 3.5.** Mediation Model 3: Personal Expression, Leveling, and Relationship Adjustment.

**Figure 3.6.** Mediation Model 4: Personal Expression, Expressivity, and Relationship Adjustment.
**Figure 3.7.** Mediation Model 5: Personal Expression, Withdrawal, and Relationship Adjustment.

- Personal Expression → Withdrawal: -0.45**
- Withdrawal → Relationship Adjustment: -0.39** (-0.35)**

| Direct B: | 0.09 |
| Indirect B: | 0.16** |
| % Mediation: | 70.20% |
| Mediation type: | Full |

*Note. N = 116. * p < .05. ** p < .01.*

**Figure 3.8.** Mediation Model 6: Personal Expression, Validation, and Relationship Adjustment.

- Personal Expression → Validation: 0.32**
- Validation → Relationship Adjustment: 0.76** (0.75)**

| Direct B: | 0.01 |
| Indirect B: | 0.24** |
| % Mediation: | 97.28% |
| Mediation type: | Full |

*Note. N = 116. * p < .05. ** p < .01.*
**Figure 3.9.** Mediation Model 7: Personal Expression, Feedback, and Relationship Adjustment.

**Figure 3.10.** Mediation Model 8: Understanding Emotions External, Validation, and Relationship Adjustment.
Figure 3.11. Mediation Model 9: Emotional Management of Self, Editing, and Relationship Adjustment.

Figure 3.12. Mediation Model 10: Emotional Management of Self, Negativity, and Relationship Adjustment.
Figure 3.13. Mediation Model 11: Emotional Management of Self, Focusing, and Relationship Adjustment.

Figure 3.14. Mediation Model 12: Emotional Management of Others, Feedback, and Relationship Adjustment.
As can be seen in Figures 3.3 through 3.15, the pattern of results was uniform across all models. Requirements for the four steps were met in every case. Higher scores on the EI ability in question significantly predicted better Relationship Adjustment (Step 1), greater use of the positive communication behaviour or less use of the negative communication behaviour in question (Step 2). Likewise, greater use of the positive communication behaviour in question or less use of the negative communication behaviour in question significantly predicted better Relationship Adjustment (Step 3). Furthermore, no EI ability exhibited a significant direct effect on relationship adjustment after the communication behaviour was added to the model. Instead, each EI ability exhibited a significant indirect effect on Relationship Adjustment through the communication behaviour in question (Step 4). As such, full mediation occurred in every model.
In sum, communication behaviour fully mediated the relationship between EI and romantic relationship adjustment that was initially established in the first set of analyses. The respective EI Abilities were found to positively influence romantic relationship adjustment through greater use of the positive communication behaviours and less use of the negative communication behaviours they best predicted in the third set of analyses.

**Discussion**

**Overview**

Study 2 sought to determine (1) which EI aspects mattered most to romantic relationship adjustment; (2) which communication behaviours mattered most; (3) which behaviours each EI aspect best predicted, and; (4) whether the respective EI aspects acted through the behaviours they best predicted to influence adjustment. In terms of the first aim, Emotional Management of Self stood out as the most important EI predictor of adjustment. In terms of the second aim, Validation, Expressivity, Negativity, and Focusing, were identified as the most important communication behaviours. In terms of aim three, each EI aspect differed markedly with regards to the behaviours they best predicted. In terms of aim four, the direct effect of each EI aspect on adjustment was fully mediated by every one of the communication behaviours they best predicted. These findings offer insight into the means by which emotional intelligence contributes to the development and maintenance of successful romantic relationships.

**Emotional Intelligence and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

At the broadest level, the findings of Study 2 reveal that participants with higher EI scores in terms of any of the six EI abilities were generally involved in better adjusted romantic relationships. That is, the better participants were at
identifying, expressing, or managing emotions, or maintaining emotional control, the better their reports of relationship consensus, satisfaction, cohesion, and affection. More specifically, they perceived greater attunement between their own and their partners’ opinions and beliefs. They shared intimate thoughts more often, and thought more positively about their relationships. They felt more connected to their partners, and shared more ideas and activities with their partners. And, they reported fewer sexual problems, and overtly displayed their love more often to their partners, than those who self-reported lower emotional intelligence. The strengths of association between EI aspects and adjustment were, however, consistently weak, with Emotional Management of Self exhibiting the strongest of these.

This pattern of weak associations is consistent with the findings of previous EI research, as reviewed earlier, in which weak to moderate associations were observed between various EI aspects and adjustment in both interpersonal and romantic relationship contexts. Like the current study for instance, the findings of Fitness (2000), and Salovey et al. (2002) emphasised the value of the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions, while Cordova et al.’s (2005) findings emphasised the ability to express emotion. The findings of Salovey et al. emphasised the ability to manage one’s own emotions as well, while Lopes and colleagues’ four studies (Lopes et al., 2004; Studies 1 & 2; Lopes et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003), emphasised the value of both this and the ability to manage others’ emotions, since they aggregated the two abilities into one emotion management scale.

Of course, the correspondence between the foregoing findings and the present is dependent upon consideration of the foregoing findings as a whole, since each of these previous studies emphasised different EI abilities. It is necessary to consider their findings in this way, though, since few of these studies used the same EI
measures, and few of the EI measures assessed the same range of abilities. The SUEIT, on the other hand, measures each of the previously associated EI abilities. From this perspective, the current pattern of associations is supported by the foregoing studies. The current further suggest that had these previous studies measured the same range of EI abilities, similarly uniform patterns might have been found.

One EI aspect that the foregoing studies did not attempt to link with adjustment was Emotional Control, or the ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions, since this ability is unique to the SUEIT. Its weak association with adjustment is thus a finding unique to the current study. The weak association between Understanding Emotions External and romantic adjustment is similarly unique to the current study, since no previous EI studies of romantic relations have investigated such links. Lopes’ four interpersonal adjustment studies did however include a similar EI measure, but found no association. This raises the possibility that the effects of the ability to identify others’ emotions on adjustment may be more pronounced in romantic relationships than interpersonal relationships more generally.

A further point of difference between the current and foregoing studies is that they did not examine the relative value of the EI aspects they did measure, in the prediction of adjustment. The current study, in doing so, identified Emotional Management of Self as the most important EI aspect, since it accounted for all the unique variance in adjustment explained by the other EI aspects. This finding suggests that partners’ ability to repair their own negative emotions and generate positive ones is more important to the success of their relationships than any other EI ability. It is important to note, however, that Emotional Management of Self explained a small eight percent of variation in adjustment. Its value to the direct
prediction of adjustment is thus quite limited, and the value of other EI aspects, even less so.

The relative importance of Emotional Management of Self aside, the uniformity of current associations is also consistent with the weak to moderate associations observed in all previous studies to examine relations between global EI and interpersonal adjustment criteria (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Lopes et al., 2003; Schutte et al., 2001). Such correspondence offers further support to the soundness of the present findings.

Interestingly however, the present associations, like those in interpersonal adjustment research, sit between the strengths observed in the two previous studies to examine relations between global EI and romantic adjustment criteria. Recall that in the first of these, Schutte et al. (2001) observed a strong correlation \( r = .51 \) between SSRI EI and the marital satisfaction of thirty six health care workers’ in their mid-thirties, while much weaker relations were observed between EI and three broad interpersonal adjustment criteria \( r_s = .29-.33 \). As such, Schutte et al.’s research suggested that EI is more strongly associated with romantic relationship adjustment than interpersonal adjustment.

Schutte et al.’s (2001) findings, if upheld by the present findings, would have made both theoretical and practical sense. The assessment of interpersonal adjustment, as measured in the foregoing studies, embraces a range of relationships, such as those with “close friends” or “peers”. Therefore, adjustment ratings are likely to be diluted by the relative importance and consequent efforts made in developing and maintaining the relationships comprising these groupings. Assessment of romantic relationship adjustment on the other hand, isolates success in developing and maintaining a single relationship, which for most represents the most important, the
greatest emotional investment, and given the range of commensurate benefits attached, equates with an adaptive life outcome when achieved. It would seem quite logical therefore for EI to be more strongly associated with romantic relationship adjustment than interpersonal adjustment more broadly. Indeed, this distinction would reflect a subtle and valuable degree of discriminant predictive validity on the part of EI.

However, the weak present associations and their correspondence with interpersonal adjustment research offer no support for this position, nor do the findings of the second romantic adjustment study, performed by Brackett et al. (2005). Recall that in their study of eighty six college couples, they found no association between MSCEIT EI and relationship satisfaction or six other relationship qualities that bore much similarity to Spanier’s (1976) Affection, Cohesion and Consensus constructs. They did find a small group difference however, whereby couples comprising two low EI partners were less satisfied with their relationships, and were engaged in poorer quality relationships, than couples in which one or both partners were high in EI.

The divergence in strengths of effect between Schutte et al. (2001), Brackett et al. (2005), and the present study is curious indeed, considering that SSRI was developed from the same theoretical model as the MSCEIT, while the SUEIT incorporated both the SSRI and MSCEIT into its development. The divergence in findings thus raises an important criterion validity concern. Practically, one would expect relatively uniform associations between these EI measures and romantic adjustment, like those observed in interpersonal adjustment research. And, theoretically, one would expect persistent application of EI to a singular relationship of great personal importance to manifest in higher adjustment levels when compared
to the aggregate adjustment of other less important interpersonal relations within which one invests less effort.

One possible explanation for the divergent findings concerns the romantic adjustment measures used. For instance, the Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (LWAT; Locke & Wallace, 1959) used by Schutte et al. (2001), and the DAS used in the current study are both well-established measures, and share numerous items. Brackett et al. (2005), on the other hand, developed their own romantic adjustment and quality measures. The temporal reliability and predictive validity of Brackett et al.’s measures are yet to be established, and in their present form are likely to be much less valuable in the prediction of adjustment when compared to the LWAT or DAS, the content of which has been refined over the past thirty to forty years. However, the robust pattern of associations previously observed between the SSRI and MSCEIT, and a wide range of well-established and experimental interpersonal adjustment measures, suggests that the value of this explanation is limited.

A more promising explanation concerns differences in the samples used. In the case of Schutte et al. (2001), their sample size of thirty seven married healthcare workers in their thirties is particularly small. As is well known, a small sample size increases the likelihood that chance variation in the data will affect correlations, the most common result being artificial inflation of coefficients (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001). As such, although the present findings and those of interpersonal adjustment research suggest that the direction of association observed by Schutte et al. is likely to be replicated in a larger sample, the strength may well be significantly lower.

In the case of Brackett et al. (2005), their sample size of eighty six couples was not so much an issue. What does seem to have been an issue however, as they themselves recognised, was their sample composition. Their couples mostly
comprised twenty-year old undergraduate university students in their first or second year of study. Moreover, most of the couples had been together for less than a year, and were not living together. This of course reflects an entirely different subset of the coupling population than that examined in both Schutte et al.’s (2001) study and the present. Recall that in the present sample, most participants were in a cohabiting relationship of around ten years in length, and most were around thirty-six years of age. As such, the present findings, like Schutte et al.’s, reflect the direct effects of EI on longer term, committed, mature adult relationships within the wider population. Brackett et al.’s findings, on the other hand, reflect the effects of EI on recently formed, less committed relationships within a young adult population.

It may be therefore that EI has a different impact on relationships of different commitment type or length. Indeed, such differences would concur with the views of many relationship theorists who assert that cultural and sociological display rules dominate behaviour in the early stages of romantic relationship development, while idiocentric behaviours play a much stronger role in later stages (e.g., Altman & Taylor, 1973; Aune & Comstock, 1997; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Knapp & Vangelisti, 1992; Miller & Steinberg, 1975). More specifically, display rules heavily prescribe positive behaviour, and the expression of positive, harmony-producing emotions in new relationships, in efforts to appear desirable as a long-term partner (Matsumoto, cited in Aune & Comstock, 1997). But as a relationship progresses, and both partners become relatively assured of the others’ interest, such rules progressively give way to individualised behaviours of much greater breadth, depth and spontaneity (Knapp & Vangelisti, 1992). These behaviours give rise to personal differences and issues that are often the source of tension, conflict, and relationship dissolution in later stages (Aune & Comstock, 1997), which as Schutte et al.’s (2001)
and the present findings suggest, EI may assuage. As such, EI may have greater impact on the adjustment of longer-term relationships, in which the partners’ individualised behaviours rather than socially prescribed behaviours dominate adjustment.

This explanation does not seek to discount the possible utility of EI in attracting a partner in the first place, or securing a relationship in its early stages, since positive emotion generation and expression are central to many conceptions of EI. But whether such a relationship develops into a satisfying, cohesive, consensual and affectionate one in the longer term appears to be associated with EI, while adjustment in the short term, at least amongst young couples, appears not to be. With this in mind, future EI research would do well to consider whether EI is more or less relevant to particular stages of romantic relationship development, and whether its value to the development of interpersonal relationships follows a similar course.

In short, the weak positive associations between four of the six EI aspects and romantic adjustment reflect those observed in similar interpersonal and romantic adjustment studies, when their findings are considered as a whole. The general uniformity of associations is also consistent with links observed between global EI and interpersonal adjustment, as well as romantic adjustment, in direction if not strength. Such correspondence offers much support to the soundness of the present findings. EI, as measured by the SUEIT, appears to play a small but significant role in the process of developing and maintaining a well-adjusted romantic relationship.

Findings unique to the current study include the weak links between romantic adjustment, and Emotional Control and Understanding Emotions External. The identification of Emotional Management of Self as the most important EI predictor of romantic adjustment is also unique to the current study. It appears that this ability
supersedes the value of the other EI abilities in directly predicting relationship success. Such findings suggest that it makes sense to continue to conceptualise and examine emotional intelligence as a set of separate yet interrelated competencies, rather than a global construct, if we are to better understand how EI directly impacts romantic adjustment.

A more detailed discussion of the present findings as they pertain to each EI aspect, and their correspondence with findings in the wider relationship literature, is presented in the final sections of this chapter in which their effects on communication behaviour are also discussed.

**Communication Behaviour and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

Turning to consideration of Arellano and Markman’s (1995) MADS behaviours, just like their preliminary findings, moderate to very strong associations were observed in the current study among the eight behaviours and adjustment. Participants who performed either of the two negative communication behaviours less often, or any of the six positive communication behaviours more often, reported higher levels of romantic relationship adjustment. More specifically, in terms of the negative communication behaviours, adjustment was moderately associated with both Negativity and Withdrawal, indicating that participants in better adjusted relationships precipitated fewer arguments and verbally attacked their partners less often, and that they emotionally disengaged or physically withdrew less often from heated discussions.

In terms of the positive behaviours, adjustment was strongly associated with Focusing, Feedback, Leveling, and Editing behaviour, and very strongly associated with Expressivity and Validation behaviour. This indicated that much better relationships were had by participants who, when communicating with their partners,
kept discussion of difficult issues on track and avoided raising new issues during such
discussion, paraphrased their partner’s messages and clarified the meaning of their
partners’ messages before responding, discussed their own thoughts and feelings with
their partners in a simple and constructive manner, and took the time to positively
reframe negative thoughts, feelings and negative partner messages. Moreover, even
better relationships were had by participants who freely expressed their feelings to
their partners, and who listened attentively to their partners’ messages and
acknowledged the value of their partners’ points of view.

Having thus affirmed the soundness of the links between the eight self-
reported communication behaviours and adjustment, as Arellano and Markman’s
(1995) preliminary investigation had suggested, the present study investigated which
of these behaviours, relatively speaking, were most important to adjustment. The
subsequent stepwise regression analysis retained Validation and Expressivity as the
strongest predictors, followed by Negativity and Focusing. Together, these four
behaviours explained a sizable sixty five percent of variation in romantic adjustment,
while the four remaining behaviours, Leveling, Editing, Feedback, and Withdrawal,
made no additional contribution. As such, knowing the extent to which participants’
attended to and validated their partners’ points of view, expressed their feelings to
their partners, how often they provoked or verbally attacked them, and the extent to
which they attempted to keep discussions of difficult issues on track, explained the
majority of variation in participants’ sense of connectedness to their partners, the
extent to which they shared activities and opinions, the level of affection in their
relationship, and their level of satisfaction with their relationship.

What is perhaps most notable about these findings is that they concur in many
respects with the findings of Gottman’s (1994) extensive research into the predictors
of divorce, in which Contempt, Criticism, Defensiveness, and Stonewalling distinguished themselves from a wide range of other factors as the four strongest predictors of marital dissolution. More specifically, Validation as assessed here appears antonymous to Gottman’s Contempt construct, characterized by often subtle, psychologically abusive comments that intentionally mock the partner, devalue their views, and undermine their sense of competence, or worse, their sense of self. Likewise, Negativity bears much similarity to Criticism, which is characterized by generalized attributions of blame or attacks on partner’s personality, communicated, for example, through criticisms such as “you always think about yourself”, or “you never take me anywhere”, rather than facilitative complaints such as “we don’t go out as much as I’d like to.” (Gottman & Silver, 1994, p. 41-42). Moreover, the value of Focusing observed here reflects the importance Gottman’s research gives to one of the worst behaviours characterizing Criticism, colloquially termed “kitchen sinking”, wherein during heated discussion, rather than focus on a single issue, one partner raises every criticism and point of contention they can grasp.

Furthermore, Negativity and Focusing respectively embrace and counter “cross-complaining”, a common example of Defensiveness in which one partner’s complaint is immediately met with a new complaint that completely ignores the original issue, which if not regulated, can quickly lead to conflict escalation. Validation is also inversely related to Defensiveness, such that attending to and clarifying hostile partner messages facilitates insight and closeness, while defensive reactions, such as when one responds in a victimized manner by making excuses or denying responsibility, or when one responds in a defiant manner through repetitious reiteration of one’s opposing opinion, perpetuates interpersonal differences and creates distance. A final point of interest regarding MADS behaviours antithetical to
Defensiveness, is that the lesser importance of Editing behaviour observed in the current study, coupled with the greater importance of Negativity, Focusing, and Validation, suggests that during difficult discussions, positive reframing of negative personal thoughts, feelings and partner messages is not nearly as important to adjustment as inhibiting urges to verbally attack partners, keeping discussions focused on one issue at a time, and validating partners’ feelings and points of view.

With regard to Gottman’s (1994) fourth divorce predictor, the present findings did not, on the surface, place such great emphasis on Stonewalling as did his research. This behaviour is most similar to Arellano and Markman’s (1995) Withdrawal communication behaviour, and describes conversational circumstances in which communications signalling engagement are abandoned in place of stony disinterest or physical exit. Stonewalling most typically occurs during heated discussions between partners. It conveys disapproval, distance, and superiority, and has the effect of leaving partners frustrated, and important relationship issues unresolved and simmering. While highly important in Gottman’s research, its lesser relative importance here may very well have been a product of the present sample composition, of which three-quarters were women. Emotional and physical disengagement during heated discussion is much more characteristic of men’s behaviour (Gottman & Levenson, 1988), and typically antagonises women much more so than men (Gottman, 1994). With this in mind, Withdrawal may have been a more important predictor of adjustment here if the present predominantly female sample had been rating their male partners’ propensity to withdraw, rather than their own. As such, the use of Withdrawal behaviour and its effects on adjustment in the wider coupling population may have been under-represented in the present sample.
This last point also speaks to the greater relative importance of Expressivity observed here, or propensity to disclose personal feelings to partners, which in addition to being regarded as one of the primary means by which romantic intimacy is developed and maintained (Cordova et al., 2005; Laurenceau et al., 2005), is much more characteristic of women’s relationship communication behaviour than men’s (Noller & Ruzzene, 1991). Furthermore, Expressivity has been construed in some studies as one anchor on a continuum for which Stonewalling or disengagement might be considered the opposite (Christensen & Heavey, 1999). From this perspective, given the strong representation of women here, the importance of Gottman’s (1994) Stonewalling construct may well have been better represented by the present participants’ Expressivity, or lack thereof, rather than their Withdrawal behaviour.

Overall, similarly to Arellano and Markman’s (1995) research, the present findings emphasized connections between each of the eight communication behaviours and relationship adjustment. Furthermore, the relative importance of Validation, Expressivity, Negativity, and Focusing observed here concurs in many respects with Gottman’s four strongest predictors of divorce. As Arellano and Markman (1995) intended, variation in the use of these self-report behaviours appears to explain much of the reason why levels of adjustment differ between relationships.

*Emotional Intelligence, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment*

The findings discussed thus far suggest that emotional intelligence is not nearly as important to romantic relationship adjustment as communication behaviour. This is perhaps not so surprising, given that the MADS behaviours were extracted from a large body of research conducted with the specific purpose of determining the predictors of adjustment. EI, on the other hand, comprises a set of higher order
abilities, which the stepwise and mediation analyses performed in the current study suggest may be tied to adjustment indirectly, through their more direct influence on these behaviours. Indeed, the various EI abilities appeared to act through different communication behaviours to influence adjustment. The specifics of these findings are discussed in the context of each EI aspect. The notions of causality implied in this section, based on cross-sectional correlational data as they are, are considered purely hypothetical.

**Emotional Recognition in Self, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

As mentioned, romantic relationship adjustment was significantly higher for participants with higher Emotional Recognition in Self scores. That is, a more consensual, satisfying, cohesive and affectionate relationship was reported by participants’ better able to detect and distinguish between their emotions. This finding is consistent with the research of Salovey et al. (2002), which linked Emotion Clarity to higher interpersonal relationship satisfaction; with the research of Fitness (2000), which positively linked Emotion Clarity to greater marital happiness, and; with the research of Cordova et al. (2005), which linked Difficulty in Identifying Emotions to poorer marital adjustment. The present finding thus further strengthens the evidence supporting the beneficial relationship between this EI ability and romantic adjustment.

This finding, like those supporting it, however, does not explain the means by which this EI ability influences adjustment. Weak to moderate correlations between Emotional Recognition in Self and seven of the eight communication behaviours suggested a wide range of such means, many more indeed than detailed in the literature review. However, a very similar pattern of associations was observed across
the other five EI aspects. This and the interrelatedness amongst EI aspects emphasises the importance of distinguishing the communication behaviours through which Emotional Recognition in Self influenced adjustment from the behaviours which best explained the influence of the other EI aspects. Consideration of these factors allowed the present study to build a picture of the relative importance of Emotional Recognition in Self, and indeed every EI aspect, to the prediction of the eight communication behaviours, and their influence on adjustment through these behaviours.

Analyses performed to this effect revealed that of all six EI aspects, Emotional Recognition in Self was one of the two best predictors of Editing and Withdrawal behaviour. Together with Emotional Management of Self, it explained seventeen percent of variation in Editing, and together with Personal Expression, it explained twenty five percent of variation Withdrawal behaviour. Furthermore, both behaviours fully mediated its direct effect on adjustment. Two means by which this particular EI aspect influences adjustment were thus revealed. It appears that emotionally self-aware persons prefer to edit or cognitively reframe negative thoughts and feelings about their partners when they arise, and prefer to engage rather than withdraw from their partners during heated discussions. They thus make more efforts to control defensive reactions to partner messages, invest more effort in maintaining a positive internal representation of their partner, are less likely to stonewall, and are more likely to discuss important or contentious relationship issues to a conclusion. Through such behaviours, the present results suggest that emotional self-awareness, in particular, plays a role in facilitating romantic relationship adjustment.

While unique to the present study, the findings pertaining to Editing behaviour are supported by Fitness’ (2000) research, in which forgiveness, an outcome
facilitated by cognitive reframing, was much more easily achieved by emotionally self-aware persons. The process of forgiveness is a clear example of Editing behaviour in action, in which defensive reactions to an offense are controlled, and in which negative feelings and thoughts caused by a partner’s offense, or negative partner messages inherent to an offense, are positively reframed.

These findings are also supported by Cordova et al.’s (2005) research, in which intimate safety, an outcome also thought to be facilitated by cognitive reframing, was more easily generated by emotionally self-aware persons. Editing behaviour exemplifies a means by which negative impressions of partners’ intimate yet sometimes aggravating disclosures or behaviours can be assuaged. A safer, intimate environment is thus likely to be experienced by the partners of emotionally self-aware persons, particularly when compared to the environments of previous relationships, in which these disclosures or behaviours have elicited punishment of some sort.

Of note, Cordova et al.’s (2005) study also suggested that emotionally self-aware persons create a safer, intimate environment though Validation behaviour, as well as Editing behaviour. However, the current study, having considered the relative importance of other EI aspects in the prediction these behaviours, found that Validation behaviour was better explained by other aspects of emotional intelligence. Thus while emotional self-awareness appears to play a role in the generation of intimate safety, its role appears more distinct than Cordova et al.’s study suggested.

Turning to Withdrawal, the findings pertaining to this behaviour most closely equate with marital research by Noller and Ruzzene (1991). They observed that men were poorer at identifying their emotions than women, more often withdrew from conflicted interactions with their partners, and did so in a state of heightened
physiological arousal. Such men were also involved in unhappier marriages. The current findings, however, better reflect the effects of women’s Withdrawal behaviour on romantic adjustment. It seems that women with poor emotional self-awareness are more likely to withdraw from emotionally evocative discussions as well, leaving important issues unresolved and simmering, and in this way, damage their relationships.

This possibility is further supported by Gottman’s (1994) research, in which men and women with poor emotional self-awareness became particularly confused and unsure of themselves during heated interactions with their partners. This confusion might explain why similar persons withdrew from such situations here and in Noller and Ruzzene’s (1991) research. This explanation also concurs with Martin and Phil’s (1986), and Naatanen et al.’s (1999) studies of alexithymia, in which persons with poor emotional self-awareness did not acknowledge thus respond to their stress until it reached a point where their symptoms, reflecting the situation, were very difficult to cope with. Withdrawal, it would thus seem, is a preferred coping option for such persons, in such situations.

In summary, the present findings suggest that Emotional Recognition in Self influences relationship adjustment through Editing and Withdrawal behaviour. Awareness of personal feelings appears to facilitate opportunities to positively reframe negative thoughts, feelings and partner messages, before they damage relationship adjustment. Likewise, awareness of personal feelings appears to promote engagement with partners during heated discussions, and in doing so prevents the harmful consequences associated with stonewalling or withdrawal from such discussions. While Editing and Withdrawal behaviours were not generally as important to adjustment as Validation, Expressivity, Focusing, and Negativity, the
previous research cited suggests that emotional self-awareness, through these two
behaviours, serves important positive adjustment functions in more particular
circumstances, such as when partners’ transgress, when they behave in emotionally
vulnerable ways, or when contentious issues require sustained discussion.

**Personal Expression, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship
Adjustment**

Like those with higher Emotional Recognition in Self scores, a more
consensual, satisfying, cohesive and affectionate relationship was reported by
participants better able to clearly express their emotions to others. As mentioned, this
finding is consistent with work of Cordova et al. (2005), theirs being the only
published study to specifically examine links between this EI ability and romantic
relationship adjustment.

The extended findings of Cordova et al. (2005) as well the works of a number
of other researchers, suggested that Personal Expression might be an important EI
predictor of six communication behaviours, and that its influence on adjustment might
be explained through these behaviours. Expertise theory suggested that Expressivity
might be one such behaviour (Ericsson et al., 2006). Laurenceau et al.’s (2005) work
on intimacy processes suggested that Editing and Feedback might be two further
behaviours. Cordova et al. (2005)’s study of intimate safety suggested Editing
behaviour as well, and suggested Validation as a fourth possible behaviour. Finally,
Noller & Ruzzene’s (1991) study of marital communication patterns suggested
Leveling and Withdrawal as a fifth and sixth behaviour. These possibilities were
examined, as was the potential importance of Personal Expression in the prediction of
the two remaining MADS behaviours.
Stepwise and mediation models revealed its importance in the prediction of Expressivity, Validation, Feedback, Leveling, and Withdrawal behaviour, which concurs for the most part with the possibilities raised by the foregoing research. In terms of the first behaviour, Personal Expression was found to be the strongest predictor of Expressivity, followed by Emotional Management of Others. Together, these two EI aspects explained twenty two percent of variation in this behaviour. Moreover, Expressivity was found to fully mediate the direct effect of Personal Expression on adjustment. As such, consistent with expertise theory (Ericsson et al., 2006), it appears that persons better able to express their emotions do so more regularly to their partners. And consistent with the value of expressivity observed across decades of relationship research (e.g., Arellano & Markman, 1995; Jourard, 1971), these expressions facilitated a greater sense of connectedness, cohesiveness, affection, and satisfaction within their relationships.

Personal Expression was also found to be one of the best EI predictors of both Validation and Feedback, explaining fourteen percent and twenty one percent of variation in these behaviours, the first in conjunction with Understanding Emotions External, and the second with Emotional Management of Others. In addition, the direct effect of Personal Expression on adjustment was fully mediated by both behaviours. It appears that persons better able to express their own emotions also listen to and express value in their partners’ disclosures more often, and ask questions of, paraphrase and clarify their understanding partners’ points of view, which in turn promotes similarity in opinion, sense of connectedness, affection, and relationship satisfaction.

The validity of these particular findings is supported by their correspondence with those of Laurenceau et al.’s (2005) study, in which behaviours similar to
Validation and Feedback partially mediated the link between emotional expression and intimacy. Moreover, the current findings suggest concrete names and conceptual boundaries to the behaviours Laurenceau et al. identified in their participants’ daily diary narratives: behaviours which emotional expression precipitated in many cases, and enhanced intimacy when performed.

The findings pertaining to Validation are also supported by Cordova et al.’s (2005) research, in which intimate safety, an outcome thought to be facilitated by attentive listening and reassurance, was generated to a greater extent by persons’ better able to express their emotions. Validation appears to exemplify a means by which emotionally expressive persons encourage free and safe expression of intimate thoughts, feelings, or behaviours on the part of partners, particularly when they are reluctant to do so, having been punished for such in previous interpersonal encounters.

Of note, Cordova et al.’s (2005) study also suggested that persons better able to express their emotions create a safer, intimate environment though Editing behaviour, as well as Validation behaviour. However, the current study, having considered the relative importance of other EI aspects to the prediction these behaviours, found that Editing behaviour is better explained by other aspects of emotional intelligence. The present findings thus illustrate the importance of distinguishing between the specific behaviours by which the various EI abilities influence adjustment. Doing so enables a better understanding of the respective contributions of EI abilities to adjustment, and avoids misattributing the means by which they do so.

Finally, research by Noller and Ruzzene (1991) suggested that Personal Expression might be particularly important to the prediction of Leveling and
Withdrawal behaviour, and that the influence of this EI aspect on adjustment might be mediated by these behaviours. Stepwise regression and mediation analyses supported each of these positions. Personal Expression was found to be a strong predictor and indeed the only EI predictor of Leveling behaviour, for which it explained twenty eight percent of variation. And, together with Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression explained twenty five percent of variance in Withdrawal behaviour. Moreover, both communication behaviours fully mediated the direct effect of Personal Expression on adjustment. It appears that persons better able to express their emotions are much more inclined to explain their thoughts and feelings clearly, constructively, and simply to their partners, and are much less inclined to emotionally and physically withdraw from heated discussions with their partners. Such behaviours, in turn, have a positive influence on their relationships.

The findings pertaining to Leveling behaviour suggest a reason as to why, in Noller and Ruzzene’s (1991) research, men were much less accurate in communicating their emotions than women, and why their relationships were unhappier ones. The present findings suggest that individuals who lack the EI ability to express their emotions clearly, often do not recognise or do not value the beneficial adjustment effects of explaining their feelings in a constructive, simple manner to their partners, since they appear much less likely to attempt do so. One might also presume that they fail to recognise the detrimental effects that their frequent miscommunications can have on their relationships. Moreover, given the strong representation of women here, the current findings could also be taken to suggest that this issue is not gender specific. It appears that women who lack this EI ability are also less likely to take the time to explain their feelings simply to their partners, and that they too miss out on the adjustment benefits of this communication.
The present findings also suggest that poor emotional expression ability might account for why, in Noller and Ruzzene’s (1991) study, inexpressive men were more likely emotionally or physically disengage from heated discussions. Like persons with alexithymia (Naatanen et al., 1999), heated discussions may well cause persons who struggle to express their emotions to feel confused, threatened or overwhelmed by the build up of unexpressed emotions. Such confusion would explain their abandonment of communications signaling engagement, and explain why they frequently choose to exit such discussions. Moreover, such behaviour would explain why their relationships are often unhappy ones. Their partners would regularly be left feeling frustrated at being unheard, and important issues would regularly be left unresolved (Gottman, 1994).

In summary, the present results suggest that Personal Expression is particularly important to the prediction of five communication behaviours, and that it influences adjustment through these behaviours. This EI ability predicted participants’ propensity to disclose their feelings to their partners, and their attempts to do so clearly, constructively, and simply. This ability also predicted participants’ propensity to encourage partners’ similar contributions, whereby those better able to express their emotions engaged rather than withdrew from heated discussions with their partners, attended to and expressed value in their partners’ disclosures, and actively sought to clarify and better understand their partners’ points of view. In each case, these behaviours facilitated the link between Personal Expression and adjustment. Relative to the other five EI aspects, these findings speak to the greater importance of Personal Expression to adjustment, since it explained more variance in relationship enhancing communication behaviour than any other aspect, and predicted
Validation and Expressivity, two of the four best behavioural predictors of adjustment observed in Study 2.

**Understanding Emotions External, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment**

Like the two previous EI aspects, Understanding Emotions External was positively associated with romantic relationship adjustment. Participants who believed themselves better able to accurately detect others’ emotions reported engagement in relationships that were more consensual, cohesive, satisfying, and affectionate. This finding is consistent with the research of Kahn (1970), in which accuracy in interpreting partners’ nonverbal messages was associated with marital satisfaction, and with the research of Gottman (1979), Noller (1980), Noller and Venardos (1986), Hansson et al. (1984), and Hansson (1985), in which empathic understanding, or accuracy in identifying partner emotions or communication cues were associated with relationship harmony, quality, functioning, or relational competence.

The research reviewed earlier suggested that Understanding Emotions External might be important to the prediction of four communication behaviours, through which it might influence adjustment. A study by Davis and Oathout (1987) suggested the possibility of three such behaviours: Validation, Feedback and Negativity, whereby perspective-taking ability predicted the performance of like behaviours, which in turn predicted relationship satisfaction. Links between low empathic awareness and marital misunderstandings, observed by Noller and Ruzzene (1991), and links between such misunderstandings and marital conflict in Gottman’s (1994) research, added further weight to the suspected link between Understanding Emotions External, Negativity, and adjustment. A fourth behaviour was suggested by
the work of Rusbult et al. (1991), in which perspective-taking ability predicted a number of relationship behaviours resembling the Editing construct. These possibilities, and its importance to the prediction of the remaining four behaviours, were examined.

Contrary to almost all of the foregoing possibilities, stepwise regression and mediation analyses revealed that Understanding Emotions External was an important EI predictor of just one behaviour: this despite its significant associations with all eight communication behaviours. Specifically, Understanding Emotions External was found to be one of the best predictors of Validation behaviour, for which it explained fourteen percent of variation, in conjunction with Personal Expression. Moreover, Validation behaviour fully mediated the direct effect of this EI aspect on adjustment. Thus it appears that emotionally perceptive persons are more likely to listen attentively to their partners, and acknowledge the value of partners’ points of view, and that this attention in turn, has a positive impact on their relationships.

The importance of Validation notwithstanding, this singular prediction, and the limited variance that Understanding Emotions External explained in this behaviour, suggests that accurate identification of others’ emotions does not positively impact adjustment in a number of the ways suggested by previous research. Instead, the present findings support an argument raised by Simpson, Orina, and Ickes (2003), that the importance of perspective-taking and empathic accuracy to adjustment has tended to be exaggerated in past research. Indeed, the results here suggest that the conclusions reached by Davis and Oathout (1987), Noller and Ruzzene (1991), and Rusbult et al. (1991), may have been quite different had they accounted for the influence of other emotion-related abilities.
Emotional Control, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment

Turning to Emotional Control, participants who believed themselves better able to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions also reported higher levels of relationship adjustment. This finding is unique to the present study, since no previous relationship studies appear to have examined such relations. Other studies have however linked constructs similar to Emotional Control to verbal hostility and cynicism (e.g., McDougall et al., 1991), particularly in stressful situations (Roger & Najaran, 1989): behaviour which itself has been associated with difficulties in developing and maintaining friendships (Benotsch et al., 1997), and maintaining a marriage (Caspi et al., 1987; Gottman, 1994). Considered together, this research suggested that persons with better Emotional Control might less often provoke or verbally attack their partners, which would in turn influence their relationships for the better.

The present analyses revealed no support for this possibility, nor raised any other. While Emotional Control was significantly associated with Negativity, and indeed six of the seven other behaviours, all were better explained by combinations of other EI aspects. As such, the ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions did not act through any of the communication behaviours to influence adjustment, when the contributions of the other EI aspects were accounted for. Emotional Control thus appears to be the least impactful EI aspect as far as romantic adjustment is concerned. As with Understanding Emotions External, this finding speaks to the value of accounting for other emotion-related abilities when examining the means by which constructs like Emotional Control impact romantic relationship adjustment.
Emotional Management of Self, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment

Like the four preceding EI aspects, higher Emotional Management of Self scores were weakly associated with higher romantic relationship adjustment. Participants who believed themselves better able to generate positive emotions and repair negative ones reported being involved in a more consensual, cohesive, satisfying and affectionate relationship. Moreover, stepwise regression analysis revealed Emotional Management of Self to be the most important EI aspect in the direct prediction of adjustment, since no other EI aspect was able to explain significant variation beyond its eight percent.

Interestingly, the relative importance of Emotional Management of Self observed here is inconsistent with the only other study known to have specifically explored such relations. Indeed, Fitness (2000) observed no significant association whatsoever between her participants’ ability to repair their negative moods and their level of marital happiness. On the other hand, its importance here is broadly supported by Lopes and colleagues’ four interpersonal adjustment studies, in which participants’ ability to manage their own and others emotions was the only MSCEIT EI ability significantly associated with adjustment across a range of other forms of relationship (Lopes et al., 2004, Studies 1 & 2; Lopes et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003). Its association with romantic adjustment is also broadly supported by Salovey et al.’s (2002) study, in which Mood Repair was moderately associated with interpersonal relationship satisfaction. Fitness’ (2000) study notwithstanding, these and the present findings suggest that this EI aspect may be the most important to adjustment, irrespective of relational context.
Gottman and Levenson’s (1992) marital research suggested that Emotional Management in Self might be an important EI predictor of four communication behaviours, Negativity, Withdrawal, Focusing, and Editing, and that it might act through these behaviours to influence adjustment. These possibilities, and its potential importance in the prediction of the remaining four communication behaviours, were examined.

Stepwise regression and mediation analyses revealed support for three of the four possibilities raised by Gottman and Levenson’s (1992) research, but no others. Specifically, it was found to be the best and only EI predictor of Negativity as well as Focusing. It explained twenty five percent and twelve percent of variation in these respective behaviours. Moreover, these were two of the four strongest behavioural predictors of adjustment in the current study. It was also found to be one of the best EI predictors of Editing behaviour, accounting for seventeen percent of variance, in conjunction with Emotional Recognition in Self. In each case, the behaviours fully mediated the influence of Emotional Management of Self on adjustment. It thus appears that persons better able to self-soothe and generate positive emotions, provoke and verbally attack their partners much less often, make more attempts to keep discussions of difficult issues on track, and make more attempts to cognitively reframe negative thoughts and feelings about their partners. Through such behaviours, emotional self-management skills appear to influence romantic relationship adjustment for the better.

The similarities between these and Gottman and Levenson’s (1992) findings suggest that differences in ability to self-soothe and generate positive emotions may well explain why some of Gottman and Levenson’s participants were able to communicate positively with their spouses during discussion of marital problems, and
why others struggled to do so, or worse, regularly blamed and criticised their partners during such discussions. In particular, the correspondence between the ways in which self-regulating spouses communicated with each other in Gottman and Levenson’s research, and the ways in which emotional self-managers communicated here, supports this position.

That said, Emotional Management in Self did not strongly predict Withdrawal behaviour in the current study. Instead, Withdrawal was best explained by Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression: two factors which Gottman and Levenson’s (1992) studies were not concerned with. This suggests that persons able to regulate their emotions have the same tolerance for heated discussions as the next person. Note however, that given their penchant for Editing and Focusing behaviour, and their avoidance of Negativity, discussions of difficult issues would presumably be less intense, and thus more often reach an amicable conclusion. These findings broadly fit with research by Salovey et al. (2002), in which emotional self-managers were found to cope with stressful situations using an array of active coping behaviours, but used self-distraction, thus emotional and physical disengagement, to cope when they felt their resources were overstretched.

In summary, Emotional Management of Self was found to be the most important direct EI predictor of adjustment, the most important predictor of Focusing and Negativity, and one of the most important predictors of Editing behaviour. Participants’ better able to generate positive emotions within themselves and repair negative ones were much more inclined to keep discussions of heated issues on track, to reframe negative thoughts and feelings about their partners, and to refrain from verbally attacking or responding hostilely to their partners. In each case, these behaviours fully mediated the link between Emotional Management of Self and
adjustment. The value of this EI aspect to romantic adjustment, relative to the other EI aspects, might thus be best characterised by its influence on relational conflict regulation and negotiation. The current findings also speak to the greater relative importance of Emotional Management of Self to adjustment, not only because of its direct prediction of adjustment, but because it was the strongest predictor of Focusing and Negativity, two of the four most important relationship communication behaviours.

*Emotional Management of Others, Communication Behaviour, and Romantic Relationship Adjustment*

As with the foregoing EI aspects, participants with higher Emotional Management of Others scores reported higher romantic relationship adjustment. A more consensual, cohesive, satisfying, and affectionate relationship appeared to be had by participants’ better able to generate positive emotions in others and repair negative ones. This finding is unique to the present study, since no previous EI studies have attempted to link this ability to romantic relationship adjustment. This finding is broadly consistent, however, with related research by Lopes and colleagues, in which Emotion Management was positively linked to adjustment across a range of other relationship types (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes, et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003).

An important difference between Lopes’ studies and the present, as noted earlier, is that both the ability to manage one’s own emotions and manage others’ emotions were treated as a single Emotion Management construct in Lopes’ work, while their relative importance was considered here. In doing so, the present results revealed that although the association between adjustment and both abilities was similar at face value, emotional self-management was the more important of the two.
It subsumed all the direct variance in adjustment explained by Emotional Management of Others, as well as that explained by the remaining EI aspects. Just like most of the other EI aspects, though, the unique value of Emotional Management of Others was revealed during exploration of the communication behaviours through which it influenced adjustment. It was found to be one of the strongest predictors of Feedback and Expressivity, explaining twenty two and twenty one percent of variation in these respective behaviours, in conjunction with Personal Expression. Moreover, both behaviours fully mediated its direct effect on adjustment. As such, it appears that persons better able to manage others’ emotions make more frequent efforts to understand their partners’ thoughts and feelings by asking clarifying questions and paraphrasing partner responses. They also share their own feelings with their partners more often. It appears that through this sequence of give and take, they influence their partners’ feelings, and their relationships for the better. Note as well, that the latter behaviour was one of the most effective means by which participants’ influenced relationship adjustment in the present study.

These findings suggest that the means by which Emotional Management of Others influences romantic relationship adjustment are different yet complimentary to means by which Emotional Management of Self influences adjustment. The former revolves around building emotional engagement, by exploring one’s partners’ thoughts and feelings and expressing one’s own, while the latter revolves around conflict management, that is, keeping heated discussions focused one issue at a time, reframing negative thoughts and feelings, and keeping personal attacks to a minimum. This therefore speaks to the distinct value of Emotional Management of Others to adjustment, and thus, the importance of distinguishing between the two management
abilities when considering how and why they impact adjustment, a consideration not
given in other studies of this kind.

**Methodological Considerations and Directions for Future Research**

Much more could be speculated as to why some EI aspects and combinations
of EI aspects predicted particular behaviours and not others, and how through the
combinations of behaviour they predicted, the EI aspects influenced adjustment.

However, the unique and exploratory nature of this study necessitates that the present
findings be replicated in future studies, with larger samples of greater statistical
power, before the generalizability of present findings and the conclusions to which
they lead can be considered sound. Specifically, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
caution that a cases-to-IV ratio of 40:1 be used when seeking to generalize the results
of stepwise regression to the wider population.

Ideally, such studies would observe couple communication behaviour as well,
rather than rely on the self-reported behaviour of one partner, and do so
longitudinally. Likewise, they would test for the effects of emotional intelligence
using other EI measures, and examine the relative effects of each partners’ EI abilities
on adjustment, and behaviour, rather than interpolate such things from one partner’s
opinions. They would also do well to examine adjustment and communication
differences between relationships of different length, commitment type, and account
for partners’ maturity and gender. Moreover, the potential effects of a well-adjusted,
long-term relationship on the development of EI should be considered, given that the
communication styles shown to promote adjustment appear analogous to EI in action.

Finally, future research might employ latent class modelling techniques to
identify different types of happy, long-term relationships which defy the adjustment
assumptions inherent to Spanier’s (1976) model. For instance, research by Raush,
Barry, Hertel, and Swain (1974) and Gottman (1994) suggests that there are other relationship types which are equally successful, ones in which full blown fights are a regular occurrence, and others, where conflict is avoided and in which partners never challenge each other. Such research could then examine the extent to which EI influences adjustment within these latent relationship types, explore which behaviours are most important to their success, and explore whether these behaviours also mediate the influence of EI.

**Summary**

In summary, as with much previous research, the direct associations observed in Study 2 indicated a relatively uniform, simple and weak relationship between the EI aspects and adjustment. However, stepwise and mediation analyses of their connections to the eight communication behaviours revealed a highly differentiated and complex set of processes underlying the relationship between each EI aspect and adjustment. These analyses revealed clues as to how and why each particular EI ability influences romantic relationship adjustment.

Specifically, the present findings suggested that Emotional Recognition in Self influences adjustment through Editing and Withdrawal behaviour. Personal Expression had a more widespread influence on adjustment through Expressivity, Leveling, Withdrawal, Validation, and Feedback behaviour, while Understanding Emotions External acted through Validation only. Emotional Management in Self, the most important direct EI predictor of adjustment, acted through Editing, Focusing, and Negativity, while its counterpart ability, Emotional Management of Others, appeared to act through Expressivity and Leveling. Furthermore, given the importance of Validation, Expressivity, Negativity, and Focusing behaviour observed here, Personal Expression and Emotional Management of Self, through their value in
predicting these behaviours, stood out as the most important EI predictors of romantic relationship adjustment. Emotional Control, on the other hand, appeared altogether unimportant to the prediction of behaviour and adjustment, its influence accounted for by other EI aspects in every respect. These indirect effects, even more so than the direct effects, speak to the importance of considering emotional intelligence as a set of separate yet interrelated competencies, rather than a global construct, if we are to better understand how EI contributes to romantic relationship adjustment.

While unique to this study, these findings are in many ways consistent with those reported in the wider relationship literature, in which similar associations have been observed between constructs akin to the EI aspects, the MADS behaviours, and adjustment. What few of these studies have done, however, was to examine mediating relationships between these constructs. What none have done, was to test for the relative value of EI or related abilities, in the prediction of romantic adjustment, or communication behaviour. Having done so here, the present findings suggest that EI does indeed have the potential to enhance or maintain adjustment, but that EI on its own is not sufficient to secure it. Rather, romantic partners need to communicate in particular ways to facilitate adjustment, and those with higher EI seem more often to recognise this, and do so.
CHAPTER 4 - STUDY 3:  
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND WORKPLACE FUNCTIONALITY:  
THE SKILLS EMPLOYERS’ WANT

Research concerning the role of emotions in the workplace has traditionally focused on issues such as emotional labour and display rules (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Hochschild, 1979), impression management (Flett, Blankstein, Pliner, & Bator, 1988), motivation (George & Brief, 1992), and organizational commitment (Allen & John, 1990). More recently, widespread interest has developed concerning the intelligent use of emotions in the workplace. This interest has arisen primarily as a result of EI theories by Goleman (1998), Bar-On (2000), and Mayer and Salovey (1997), which suggest that emotional intelligence contributes to previously unexplained variance in performance and success in the workplace.

The results of various studies have supported its proposed benefits to different degrees, such that EI has been associated with elements of workplace functioning in meaningful and positive ways. For instance, emotional intelligence or constructs considered to reflect aspects of EI have been linked to stress resilience in the workplace (Slaski & Cartwright, 2002, 2003), job performance (Lam & Kirby, 2002), creative output (Stough & De Guara, 2003), teamwork and conflict management (Jordan & Troth, 2002, 2004), and leadership (L. Gardner & Stough, 2002; Lopes, Cote, & Salovey, 2006) to name a few.

While these and numerous other studies attest to the benefits of EI in a work setting, a number of researchers have strongly criticised the anecdotal nature of some evidence supporting EI (see Landy, 2005; Matthews et al., 2002), and relatedly, the agendas of some EI authors, whose studies were sponsored, performed and published in-house, so that there was little opportunity for peer review or objective replication.
by external parties (see Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Newsome et al., 2000; Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004). A further related issue concerns the importance a number of researchers have attributed to EI. For instance, Zeidner et al. (2004) quote a *Time Magazine* article by Gibbs (1995), known to have contributed to the popularity of EI, in which it was claimed that, “In the corporate world…IQ gets you hired but EQ gets you promoted” (p. 59). Zeidner et al. (2004) also quote statements by Watkin (2000), who without any empirical support claimed that the “Use of EI for recruitment decisions leads to 90-percentile success rates” and that “What distinguishes top performers in every field, in every industry sector, is not high IQ or technical expertise, it is EI” (p. 91). Likewise, Goleman (1995) has claimed without any empirical data that EI rather than IQ accounts for more than 85 per cent of outstanding performance in top leaders (in Zeidner et al. 2004). In contrast, some critics have argued that EI is but one of many sources of influence on workplace performance, and that its influence has been overemphasised by particular authors while more established sources of influence have been artificially deemphasised (see Conte, 2005; Zeidner et al., 2004). Indeed, Matthews et al. (2002) caution that the usefulness of EI is likely to be limited to particular roles, and that EI as a selection criterion, “should be used only where warranted by the job description” (p. 506).

With these concerns in mind, one way to ascertain the relevance of EI to the workplace is to identify commonalities amongst the specific skills that businesses most value in their employees, and to explore the extent to which EI predicts functioning in these areas. Research commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor, and performed by the American Society for Training and Development (ASTD; Carnevale, Gainer, & Meltzer, 1990) has made considerable inroads into determining these commonalities. Over a four year period, Carnevale et al. (1990) extensively
interviewed private and public sector employers, human resource experts and practitioners, and consulted with experts from the fields of economics, adult education, training, public policy, and strategic management, to identify the “base” or “employability skills” that employers require of their employees. Employability skills were defined as “transferable core skill groups that represent essential functional and enabling knowledge, skills, and attitudes required by the 21st century workplace [which are] necessary for career success at all levels of employment and for all levels of education” (Overtoom, 2001, p.1). Carnevale et al’s (1990) resulting publication, “Workplace Basics: The Essential Skills Employers Want”, identified sixteen employability skills across all job families, which Overtoom (2001) classified into six categories:

1. **Basic Competency Skills**: Reading, writing and computation skills.
2. **Communication Skills**: Speaking and listening skills.
3. **Adaptability Skills**: Learning to learn, creative thinking and problem solving skills.
4. **Developmental Skills**: Self-concept management, motivation/goal-setting skills and career orientation.
5. **Group Effectiveness Skills**: Interpersonal, teamwork and negotiation skills.
6. **Influencing Skills**: Understanding organizational culture and leadership sharing skills.

Carnevale et al.’s (1990) research revealed that employers want a new type of worker than was previously sought, one with a broad set of workplace skills that go beyond basic reading, writing and computation skills, academic qualifications or occupational experience. It also revealed that deficiencies in these skills are
increasingly becoming barriers to both entry-level and experienced workers, and workers trying to adapt to economic and technological change within their employing organization. Their report is considered a foundational work in the identification of employability skills, and is often used as a benchmark or starting point for local, regional, state, national and international studies (Overtoom, 2001). To illustrate the relevance of Carnevale et al.’s findings, the U.S. Department of Labor, established the Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCAN) following its publication, one task of which was determine the extent to which U.S. educational institutions taught and were capable of teaching these skills (O’Neil, Allred, & Baker, 1997).

**Employability Skills**

Study 3 sought to explore the extent to which the six emotional intelligence abilities comprising the SUEIT (Gignac, 2005a; Palmer & Stough, 2002) predict self-reported employability skills subsumed by the Adaptability, Developmental, and Group Effectiveness categories. First, an overview of the skills comprising these three categories is given. Following this, a review of research relating the specific skills within these categories to contemporary psychological models is presented. Finally, research relating each of these models to emotional intelligence is reviewed.

**Adaptability skills: Learning to Learn, Creative Thinking and Problem Solving**

According to Carnevale et al. (1990), learning to learn involves learning new ways to perform a job, or learning different skill sets or tasks to upskill for a job or new career. Growth in the importance of learning to learn is a direct result of the rapid pace of technological advancement and a related emphasis on continual learning in organizations. Workers are increasingly required to learn new ways to perform their jobs due to the introduction of new technologies. As well, new technologies
bring an end to various roles and procedures, and generate new ones in their place.
Consequently, workers are increasingly required to engage in the process of planning for and participating in skill development in preparation for anticipated technologies and related workplace changes. As a result, workers are now much less likely to learn one job or set of skills and apply it for the remainder of their career. Carnevale et al.’s (1990) research indicates that employers greatly value workers who are able to anticipate future needs and adapt to changing job requirements by learning new technologies and procedures.

Carnevale et al.’s (1990) research also indicates that employers are increasingly placing a premium on finding workers who are both problem solvers and creative thinkers. Competitive advantage is often linked to businesses’ ability to innovate quickly, and that this ability rests in a large part on their employees’ skill in creative problem solving. Moreover, creative thinking and problem solving skills contribute strongly to an organizations’ capacity to achieve strategic objectives in a timely and resource efficient manner. Problem solving capability is reflected in workers’ ability to recognise and define problems, develop and implement solutions, and monitor and evaluate outcomes; whereas creative problem solving capability is reflected in workers’ ability to understand problem solving techniques, and to transcend logical thinking to the point of innovation. Employers seek creative problem solvers because such workers can identify potential problems earlier, tend to make fewer errors, exhibit higher productivity, develop products with a more desirable image, and where it is a focus, achieve better profit margins.
**Developmental Skills: Self-Concept Management, Motivation/Goal-setting, and Career Development Orientation**

The employers and experts Carnevale et al. (1990) consulted described developmental or personal management skills as the foundations for good morale, a focused work-life, and organizational productivity. In their view, workers with a strong self-concept distinguish themselves from others in terms of their positive view of self, awareness of their strengths and weaknesses and how these relate to their work performance, their capacity to deal with stress, uncertainty, and change, and ability to handle difficult situations in the workplace.

With respect to motivation/goal setting, employers placed a high value on workers who labour for the pleasure of it, who are oriented towards achieving skills mastery, and who challenge themselves to perform at their best. They work with greater autonomy, regularly display personal initiative in setting and achieving goals, seek to perform better than other workers, motivate and lead others to perform similarly, and take satisfaction and pride from their performance.

In terms of career development orientation, employers seek workers who are not simply committed to the organization to further their careers, but are committed to upholding the organizations’ values, interests and goals. Workers’ skilled in matching their agenda to those of the organization are better able to understand and absorb the organizational knowledge, attitudes and values systems necessary for the achievement of both personal career and organizational objectives. Such commitment maximizes employee retention and productivity.

**Group Effectiveness skills: Interpersonal Skills, Teamwork, and Negotiation**

According to Carnevale et al. (1990), employers seek workers who are highly accomplished in developing and sustaining productive working relationships with the
diverse range of persons who contribute to an organization's functioning. These include suppliers, contractors, co-workers, superiors, subordinates, consultants, and customers. Specific interpersonal skills sought include the ability to recognize appropriate behaviour and to adapt or improve one's own behaviour, ability to cope with undesirable behaviour in others, to deal with interpersonal stress and differences, and to flexibly interact with persons of different needs, goals, values, and culture.

Teamwork skills are also highly sought after since the accomplishment of many tasks is achieved more efficiently by supportive and cooperative teams. As well, management decisions are interpreted more accurately, and confusion regarding assignments tends to be resolved more quickly by well-functioning teams. Quality teamwork occurs when team members know how to recognise and work with a wide variety of personalities, and when each team member has a sense of the cultures and approaches that other team members represent. Awareness of other team members' strengths and weaknesses, an understanding of how the different members interact, and an ability to work with this knowledge reflect the teamwork skills that employers want.

Employers also value workers who can extend their interpersonal and teamwork skills to the negotiation of workplace disputes which frequently arise from conflicts of interest between individuals, and work groups. They recognise that the manner in which workplace disputes are settled impacts both productive outcomes and future working relationships. Employers thus place great value on workers who are able to negotiate conflicts to productive conclusions with limited or no damage to interpersonal relations.

In summary, workers skilled in learning to learn, creative problem solving, and self-concept management, who are motivated to achieve, are committed, and who
demonstrate strong interpersonal, teamwork and negotiation skills are highly valued by private and public employment institutions. These skills are sought after in addition to academic qualifications or job-specific experience, as they represent competencies which both employers and employment experts argue are essential to individual and organizational success in the modern business climate.

*Psychological Models of Employability Skills and their relationships to Emotional Intelligence*

As the research reviewed in the following sections will demonstrate, the links Carnevale et al. (1990) draw between the various employability skills and work functioning are well supported by organizational psychology research. Notably however, this research has empirically examined the skills or constructs comprising the Adaptability, Developmental, and Group Effectiveness categories using nomenclature different to that of Carnevale et al. As such, Study 3 examines research pertaining to these skills using the nomenclature of contemporary psychological models. Specifically, learning to learn, creative thinking and problem solving, the coping elements attributed to self-concept management, and interpersonal and teamwork skills are examined in the context of Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, and Plamondon’s (2000) model of Adaptive Performance. Negotiation skills are examined in the context of Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer and Nauta’s (2001) model of Conflict Management. Career development orientation is examined in the context of Meyer, Becker, and Vandenberghe’s (2004) model of Organizational Commitment, while motivation/goal-setting is examined in the context of Cassidy and Lynn’s (1989) model of Achievement Motivation. Research linking each of these models to emotional intelligence is then reviewed.
Adaptive Performance

Pulakos and colleagues suggest that adaptability is perhaps the most important workplace competency of our present time (Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999; Pulakos et al., 2000; Pulakos et al., 2002). They describe adaptable workers as open to new information, able to let go of old assumptions, and able to adjust the way they operate to changing conditions. Their position reflects the works of previous authors who have examined adaptability using different names and definitions. For example, the work of London and Mone (in Pulakos et al., 2000) emphasised the value of workers’ ability to access and process new learning opportunities in the current business climate. Murphy and Jackson’s work (in Pulakos et al., 2000) similarly emphasised the importance of workers’ “role flexibility”, that is, their capacity to adapt to changing role demands. These and other conceptions of adaptability have been positively associated with wide variety of organizationally relevant variables including teamwork, problem solving, and cultural and technological adjustment (Allworth & Hesketh, in Pulakos et al., 2000).

In efforts to draw this research together, Pulakos and her colleagues undertook an extensive review of related literature (Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999), and performed a content analysis of over one thousand critical incidents from 21 different job-types that described actual examples of adaptive performance (see Pulakos et al., 2000). They subsequently developed and validated a taxonomic model of adaptive workplace performance comprising eight dimensions: Creative Problem Solving, New Learning, Interpersonal Adaptability, Cross-Cultural Adaptability, Physical Environment Adaptability, Coping with Uncertainty, Coping with Stress, and Handling Crises (Pulakos et al., 2000). The psychometric soundness of their model was further demonstrated in a subsequent study (Pulakos et al., 2002). Moreover, Pulakos et al.
(2002) found significant correlations between self and supervisor ratings of adaptive performance on the various dimensions, suggesting that their self-assessment reflects observed behaviour to a significant degree.

In a later study, Griffin and Hesketh (2003) independently investigated the theoretical underpinnings of Pulakos et al.’s (2000) taxonomy. Their investigation led them to opine a seven rather than eight dimensional model. On the whole, however, Griffin and Hesketh’s definition of dimensions diverged only slightly from Pukalos et al., whereby Cross-Culture Adaptability was condensed into Work Culture Adaptability, while Physical Environment Adaptability was omitted. They justified both these changes citing the very rare circumstances in which the original dimensions applied to the business incidents sampled.

Noting this, the present study adopted Griffin and Hesketh’s (2000) changes, thus investigated adaptive performance in terms of seven dimensions: Creative Problem Solving, New Learning, Interpersonal Adaptability, Work-culture Adaptability, Coping with Uncertainty, Coping with Stress, and Handling Crises. This model therefore embraces not only Overtoom’s (2001) Adaptability category, but also the coping elements which Carnevale et al. (1990) ascribed to self-concept management, as well as Carnevale et al.’s interpersonal and teamwork skills.

**Creative problem solving.** Pulakos et al. (2000) identified several authors that discussed creative problem solving in the context of adaptive performance (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1986; Holyoak, 1991). This literature revealed that workers in the contemporary business climate are increasingly challenged with unfamiliar, ill-defined or complex problems, to which they are expected to develop creative solutions. In the wider business literature, these problems are most frequently attributed to the dynamic pressures arising from globalization, changes in workforce
structure, increasing competition, better informed customers, changing government regulations, environmental concerns, and privacy and ethical issues (e.g., Reiter-Palmon & Illies, 2004; Santanen, Briggs, & Vreede, 2004; Wang & Horng, 2002). In the business incidents Pulakos et al. (2000) sampled, ability to design new procedures or processes, solve problems for which there are no easy or straightforward answers, and develop innovative ways to improve quality of products, services and systems, distinguished between workers who were more and less capable on Pulakos et al.’s Creative Problem Solving dimension.

**New learning.** In a similar vein, numerous authors have asserted that the rapid pace of technological advancement and resulting changes to organizational processes requires workers to learn new ways to perform their jobs (Kinicki & Latack, 1990; Noe & Ford, 1992; Patrickson, 1986; Thach & Woodman, 1994). Furthermore, workers are often expected to plan and participate in skill development in anticipation of such changes (London & Mone, 1999). As such, ability to learn new ways to perform a job, to adjust to changing work processes, procedures, and equipment, and propensity to search for and participate in work assignments that require one to develop new skills, reflect performance on Pulakos et al.’s (2000) New Learning dimension.

**Interpersonal adaptability.** Technological advancement and related changes to organizational dynamics have also seen a shift from persons working in relative isolation or insular teams to more fluid project-oriented teams in which the membership frequently changes at various stages of project development (Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999; B. Schneider, 1994; Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996). Interpersonal adaptability reflects action to improve understanding of colleagues’ needs and values, ability to listen and consider others’ points of view, and
to adjust interaction style and behaviour to work effectively with persons of different skill orientation, experience, and personality (Pulakos et al. 2000).

**Work-culture adaptability.** Greater fluidity and cooperation is required not only between colleagues within project teams, but also across the departments and organizations which contribute resources or seek to benefit from the various stages of project development. Different departments and organizations often operate with different customs, values, rules and structures (Chao, O'Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein, & Gardner, 1994; Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999; Noe & Ford, 1992). As such, flexibility and open-mindedness when dealing with persons from other work units, ability to adjust to work processes within other units that have different cultures or methods, and to alter behaviour to suit the values of other units, reflect skill in work-culture adaptability (Griffin & Hesketh, 2003).

**Coping with stress.** Workers frequently confront stressful situations such as highly demanding workloads or schedules, or unexpected news or situations, in which their functional effectiveness is determined by their ability to remain composed and cool, to avoid overreaction, and to manage their frustration (Lopez, Kesselman, & Lopez, 1981; Pulakos et al., 2000). Behaviour under this kind of pressure is reflected in Pulakos et al.’s (2000) Coping with Stress dimension.

**Coping with uncertainty.** Organizational restructuring, shifting business priorities, and reductions or changes to available resources create unpredictable and uncertain work situations, and are far more common to contemporary businesses than past enterprises (Ashford, 1986; Dix & Savickas, 1995; Edwards & Morrison, 1994). Workers’ ability to adjust and deal with the ambiguity these situations create, to function without knowing the total picture, to shift their orientation and respond
flexibly when necessary, distinguishes between those who are more and less successful at coping with uncertainty (Pulakos et al., 2000).

**Handling crises.** From time to time, workers also confront crises or emergency situations in which their functional effectiveness is determined by their ability to maintain emotional control and objectivity while performing quick analyses of options and implications, and making split second decisions (Lopez et al., 1981; Pulakos et al., 2000). Ability to think and act effectively during crises reflects this dimension.

**Emotional Intelligence and Adaptive Performance**

Emotional intelligence is yet to be examined in the context of adaptive workplace performance. However, numerous studies have investigated relations between EI and a variety of performance outcomes across a diverse range of occupations including debt collectors (Bachman, Stein, Campbell, & Sitarenios, 2000), salespersons (Deeter-Schmelz & Sojka, 2003), and middle and upper level executives (Slaski & Cartwright, 2002, 2003). Various studies have also examined links between EI and cognitive and academic performance (e.g., Lyons & Schneider, 2005). Where significant links have been found, positive results have generally been reported. This suggests that EI enhances performance in a variety of contexts, or is at least characteristic of higher performers across a variety of contexts, and as such, may well be related to the various dimensions of adaptive performance.

**EI and creative problem solving.** Evidence for a relationship between EI and creative problem solving comes primarily from research on student populations. For instance, in her doctoral dissertation, Batastini (2001) reported a strong relationship between emotional intelligence and creativity amongst college student leaders, whereby higher EI scorers performed better on divergent thinking tasks involving the
creation of novel ideas and solutions. Similarly, in a study of university students, Guastello, Guastello, and Hanson (2004) found that emotional intelligence as measured by the SSRI positively predicted a wide range of divergent thinking and creative production measures.

Specific aspects of EI, rather than EI in general, have also been related to originality of creative problem solving. However, there is little correspondence concerning which EI aspects are most important. For instance, in a sample of college students, Wolfradt, Felfe, and Koster (2001) found a positive relationship between performance on a creative task and SSRI abilities reflecting Emotional Recognition in Self and Emotional Management of Self. In another study, Chan (2005) found that particular SSRI abilities predicted self-ratings of creative ability in gifted Chinese primary and college students. Creative ability was defined in terms of development and articulation of original ideas, and viewing ideas and problems from multiple perspectives. Unlike Wolfradt et al.’s study however, EI aspects reflecting the SUEIT Understanding Emotions External factor, but not Emotional Recognition in Self or Emotional Management of Self, predicted creativity scores. Similarly, in a study of relations between an early version of the SUEIT and workplace performance, Stough and De Guara (2003) found that supervisors of a group of young office workers rated subordinates with better understanding of others’ emotions as more innovative, both in terms of creative contributions relating directly to their jobs and within the broader context of the organization as a whole. However, subordinates’ ability to understand others’ emotions did not distinguish between better and poorer performance, when their work was rated more generally. While the most influential EI factors are difficult to determine from this research, these findings suggest that emotional intelligence may well be related to creative problem solving ability in the workplace.
There appear to be no peer-reviewed empirical studies that have explored relations between EI and ability to learn new ways to perform one’s job, to adjust to new work processes, procedures, and equipment, or the propensity to search for and participate in work assignments that require one to develop new skills. Potentially, one may be able to infer such relations from studies that have examined EI in the context of academic performance at university. Success at university is heavily dependent on student’s ability to independently seek and master new knowledge and conceptual understandings, to learn profession-specific skills including the use of modern technologies, and to understand relations between theory, research and practice, which together foster future self-learning ability (Elander, Harrington, Norton, Robinson, & Reddy, 2006). One could thus argue that success at university resembles skill in the ‘new learning’ component of adaptive workplace performance.

Although some studies have reported little or no relationship between EI and academic performance (e.g., Barchard, 2003; Newsome et al., 2000), those which have reported substantial relationships have emphasised the positive influence of EI as a whole, or various EI aspects. For instance, two studies by Schutte and colleagues found that students’ overall scores on the SSRI were positively associated with Grade Point Average (GPA) scores (Schutte, Lopez, & Malouff, 2000), and predicted GPA performance in their first year of university (Schutte et al., 1998). In a similar study, Wong, Day, Maxwell, and Meara (1995) found that social perceptiveness, an aspect of social intelligence reflecting the ability to understand the emotional states of others, also predicted academic performance as measured by Grade Point Average (GPA). In another related study, Parker, Summerfeldt, Hogan, and Majeski (2004) found that EQ-i aspects reflecting Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and
Emotional Management of Self predicted GPA scores. In two further studies, GPA scores were related to students’ MSCEIT Understanding Emotions ability (O'Connor & Little, 2003), and MSCEIT Emotion Perception and Emotion Management abilities (Drago, 2005). Through their relationship with academic success, these findings suggest that various aspects of emotional intelligence may be predictive of adaptive learning in the workplace.

**EI and interpersonal adaptability.** Emotion theorists and researchers have long agreed that emotions perform important communicative functions (Keltner & Haidt, 2001). Influential emotion theorists, Buck (1984), Izard (1991), and Ekman (1999) emphasise their importance in the social context, and concur that a primary function of emotion is to guide adaptation to the social environment. Emotions deliver dense information about what transpires in one’s own and others’ minds during social interaction, which in turn facilitates social coordination. Consequently, intelligent perception, expression, and management of emotional information are theorised to be important predictors of interpersonal adjustment. Intelligent individuals are thought better able to extrapolate knowledge from their past interpersonal relationships, and observations of others’ relationships, and apply it to new and unfamiliar social situations (Bar-On, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).

A number of studies have empirically examined and supported this proposition. Emotional intelligence has been associated with better peer relationships amongst schoolchildren (Rubin, 1999), university students (Brackett et al., 2004), and adults (Mehrabian, 2000). As well, quality and satisfaction in relationships with close friends and parents (Lopes et al., 2003), and within romantic relationships (Schutte et al., 2001), have been linked to EI. Developmental studies by researchers such as
Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, and Reiser (2000) and Halberstadt, Denham, and Dunmore (2001) have associated abilities subsumed by emotional intelligence, such as emotional regulation and the abilities to understand one’s own and others’ emotions, with social adaptation in children. As well, EI has been strongly and inversely related to social interaction anxiety, whereby Summerfeldt, Kloosterman, Antony, and Parker (2006) found that emotional self-awareness and expression were the strongest facilitators of social confidence, followed by ability to comprehend and manage social interactions. Furthermore, Jordan and Troth (2002, 2004) have linked emotional intelligence to team performance amongst university students, which suggests that EI facilitates better interpersonal negotiation and coordination skills. In a similar vein, Martin, Knopoff, and Beckham (1998) have argued that emotion regulation skills are a prerequisite for maintaining workplace relationships. It seems likely therefore that EI contributes to interpersonal adaptability in the workplace.

**EI and work-culture adaptability.** While the above studies suggest that emotional intelligence promotes interpersonal adaptation within culture-centric populations, two research papers suggest that EI also promotes cross-cultural adaptation from which one might infer relations with work-culture adaptation. Doctoral studies by Tang (2002) and Wells (2004) both reported significant positive relations between EI and EI-related constructs, and the Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory (CCAI; Meyers & Kelley, 1992). Specifically, in a sample of service workers, Tang found positive associations between cross-cultural adaptability and a measure of emotional expression, of mood repair (as measured by the TMMS), and empathy. Likewise, Wells found that total EI as measured by the MSCEIT positively discriminated between university students who were more and less culturally adaptable in terms of flexibility and receptivity to cultural differences. Tang’s and
Wells’ findings suggest that abilities captured by the EI construct may be valuable in explaining adaptation to the various customs, values, rules and structures of different work departments and organizations.

**EI and coping with stress.** While Study 1 extensively examined relations between emotional intelligence aspects and capacity to cope with the stress, uncertainty, and crises inherent to negative events, the current study sought to further understand such relations in the workplace context. Research suggests that because opportunities to discharge emotions in the workplace are generally more restricted, different forms of work stressors may require different coping strategies (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996), thus different emotional competencies. To this end, the current study explored whether EI aspects contribute similarly or distinctively to adaptive workplace performance in terms of coping with stress, uncertainty, and handling crises. Both laboratory and workplace research offers insight into these potential links. As will be seen however, their findings leave open the question of the most influential EI aspects.

Lam and Kirby (2002) investigated relationships between EI as measured by the MEIS, general intelligence, and individual performance on a set of complex timed logical reasoning tasks chosen to emulate the stressful demands of the modern workplace. They found that Emotion Perception and Emotion Management explained variance in performance above and beyond general intelligence, whereby higher EI scorers performed better than lower scorers. Similar research by Schutte, Schuettpelz et al. (2000) explored relations between the SSRI EI measure and performance on a series of cognitive tasks that were graded in terms of difficulty. They found that participants scoring higher on the SSRI performed better on more difficult tasks than those who obtained lower scores. Schutte et al. interpreted this to mean that higher EI
scores predisposed participants to better tolerance of frustration. Schutte et al.’s tasks were not chosen to emulate work-specific conditions. However, their results lend weight to Lam and Kirby’s findings, suggesting that EI facilitates problem solving performance under stressful conditions, and thus adaptive performance in terms of coping with stress in the workplace.

In further related work, Gardner and Stough (2003) examined EI in the context of workers’ ability to deal with various occupational role demands, in terms of role overload, role inadequacy, role ambiguity, and role balance: demands which Osipow and Spokane (1984; 1998) identified as significant sources of workplace stress in formulation and review of their Occupational Stress Inventory (OSI-R). Using an early version of the SUIET, Gardner and Stough found that Emotional Recognition in Self and Expression, and Emotional Control, but not Emotional Management, predicted role inadequacy. Higher scorers on these EI aspects reported a better fit between their skills and the job they were performing. As well, they found that these EI aspects, with the addition of Understanding Emotions External, predicted role ambiguity. Workers scoring higher on these EI abilities reported having a better sense of what they were expected to do in their jobs, how they should be spending their time, and how they were evaluated. Gardner and Stough concluded that workers with these EI abilities were much less stressed by the various demands and expectations of their jobs when compared to those who had lower EI scores in these areas.

In a similar study, Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002) examined the relationship between their own self-report measure of emotional intelligence (the EIQ), which they theoretically based on the MSCEIT (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), and sources of occupational stress as measured by the Organizational Stress Screening Tool (ASSET; Cartwright & Cooper, 2002), in a sample of mental health institution workers. They
found that total EI correlated negatively with most of the ASSET work stress indicators. Workers with higher EI scores reported significantly less stress associated with workload, work relationships, resource availability, communication, control over work processes, and pay and benefits. Like the results of Gardner and Stough (2003), their findings suggest that EI facilitates adaptation to various workplace conditions which many workers find stressful.

**EI and coping with uncertainty.** Qualitative research by Hummelvoll and Severinsson (2001) implies that some of the stressors measured by the OSI-R and ASSET can be also construed in terms of coping with uncertainty. Hummelvoll and Severinsson conducted a series of interviews with mental health professionals to identify the most salient issues contributing to workplace stress in a psychiatric hospital. They identified three core themes, one of which was ‘coping with uncertainty’. Coping with uncertainty subsumed a range of stressors, including: feelings of inadequacy, which concerned discrepancies between job requirements and workers’ skills and personal resources; diffuse work responsibility, which concerned confusion regarding what workers were expected to do in their jobs, and how they were to evaluate their performance; communication problems resulting from frequent staff redeployment, and; resource problems which affected the ability to carry out planned treatments. These uncertainty issues are clearly very similar to a number of the stressors studied by Gardner and Stough (2003) and Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002), adaptation to which was facilitated by EI.

**EI and handling crises.** Research suggesting links between EI and coping with workplace stress has been forthcoming, and relations between EI and coping with uncertainty are suggested or can be inferred from related work. Yet, the ‘handling crises’ construct as conceived by Pulakos et al. (2000) appears not to have
been addressed in psychological literature in the context of EI as an element distinct from methods of coping with stress. The literature concerning crises typically refers to coping with the outcomes of various traumatic situations (e.g., Parry, 1990; Rosenthal, Charles, & Hart, 1989), rather than the process whereby efforts are made to avert or control such situations, and the extent to which such efforts are efficacious. It is therefore difficult to draw on even inferential research to distinguish between the relationship concerning EI and handling crises, and coping with stress. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that workers’ ability to deal with crisis situations may be augmented by emotional intelligence in a manner similar to coping with stress and uncertainty so that one, a constellation, or all of the EI aspects may contribute.

In a stressful, uncertain, or crisis situation, the ability to clearly express emotions may offer workers a cathartic outlet, and may enable them to find and receive help or support from others. The ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions may enable workers to distinguish performance-disruptive from performance-enhancing emotions, and thus engage with the latter and allocate coping resources to the former. The ability to identify others’ emotions may enable workers to identify performance-disruptive and performance-enhancing emotions in others, and thus engage with the latter. The ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotion may enable workers to function more effectively when under the influence of performance-disruptive emotions. The ability to repair negative emotions and generate new ones may enable workers to reduce or distance themselves from disruptive emotions while generating and engaging with enhancing emotions. Finally, the ability to manage others’ emotions may enable workers to help others’ reduce or distance themselves from disruptive emotions while generating and engaging with enhancing emotions.
As can be seen, research linking EI to the seven adaptive performance dimensions is rather limited. Moreover, in many of the studies cited to illustrate potential links, different measures of EI or related constructs have been used. As well, when EI has been a focus, such studies have examined global EI, one, or some EI-related aspects, rather than isolate the relative contributions of the various EI aspects to the criteria investigated. It is therefore unclear which aspect or combination of aspects best predicts each of the adaptive performance dimensions. The present study thus sought to explore the relative importance of the six SUEIT EI abilities in the prediction of these dimensions.

Conflict Management

The pervasiveness of workplace conflict is well exemplified by the research of Thomas (1976), in which a large sample of managers from a diverse range of organizations reported spending around twenty percent of their time managing workplace conflicts. Moreover, the costs of poorly managed conflict in the workplace are well documented. It has been linked to frequency of reported health problems, absenteeism, and visits to medical practitioners (De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; Spector & Jex, 1998), job dissatisfaction, low morale, and employee turnover (Kirkman, Jones, & Shapiro, 2000), as well as poorer individual and team performance (Tjosvold, 1998): each of which impact organizational efficiency and productivity. For such reasons, workers’ who capably handle conflict are highly valued (Carnevale et al., 1990).

Although numerous conflict management models and strategies have been conceived, theory and research tends to converge on Duel Concern Theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), for which Blake and Mouton (1964) and Deutsch (1973) provided the foundational research. Carnevale et al. (1990) draw on this theory and supporting
research to illustrate the differences in negotiation styles observed by employers and consultants in their study. According to Duel Concern Theory, conflict occurs when an individual perceives that their own and another party’s current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. In such situations, individuals tend to turn to a particular conflict management strategy, one which reflects their level of self-concern, and level of concern for the other party (M. A. Gross & Guerrero, 2000; Sternberg & Soriano, 1984). Reflecting this, five conflict management strategies are described by Blake and Mouton (1970), and modelled by De Dreu et al. (2001), preferences for which reflect various combinations of high, low and intermediate concern for self and other: Force, Collaboration, Compromise, Accommodation, and Avoidance.

Past research has consistently supported Dual Concern Theory, such that its operationalization in terms of these five strategies has distinguished between various conflict outcomes in social psychological experimentation (P. J. Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000) and in organizational field research (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Thomas & Schmidt, 1976; Van de Vliert, 1997). Euwema, Van de Vliert, and Bakker (2003) classified these outcomes into two categories: (1) Substantive outcomes, where parties reached productive agreement, compromise, or made specific concessions or promises, and (2) relational outcomes, where affective social bonds were strengthened, mutual trust and understanding was established, and willingness to engage in future cooperative efforts was enhanced. Euwema et al.’s (2003) classification, as well as their own study, illustrated clear differences in the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy.

**Force.** Force as a conflict management strategy refers to the imposition of ones will upon another, and attempts to prevail at an opponent’s expense. Behaviours such as threats, bluffs, and persuasive arguments reflect the use of force. In terms of
Duel Concern theory, a preference for force results from high self-concern and low concern for others. Mixed outcomes have been linked to the use of force. While most researchers have observed that the use of force has a negative impact on what Euwema et al. (2003) describe as relational outcomes (e.g., M. A. Gross & Guerrero, 2000; Sorenson, Morse, & Savage, 1999; Van de Vliert, 1997), researchers have also observed that individuals who use force as a strategy achieve stronger substantive outcomes (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; Rahim, 1992; Thomas, 1992). However, one study also reported decreases in the achievement of substantive outcomes (Van de Vliert, Euwema, & Huismans, 1995). These findings suggest that the use of force results in productive conflict outcomes in most cases, but often at the expense of relationship bonds whether the strategy is successful or not.

**Collaboration.** Collaboration, on the other hand, is a conflict management strategy in which the goal is to reach an agreement that satisfies both one’s own and others’ primary priorities. It thus reflects a high concern for self and other. Information exchange about priorities and preferences, and making trade-offs between more and less important issues are characteristic of collaborative strategies. Notably, the use of collaboration is associated with the simultaneous achievement of substantive outcomes and relational outcomes (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; Euwema et al., 2003). Moreover, Gross and Guerrero’s (2000) research suggests that this is the most respected and effective of all five strategies.

**Compromise.** Compromise as a conflict management strategy involves a search for intermediate positions, whereby only some of both parties’ primary goals are satisfied. Behaviours such as matching another’s concessions, making conditional promises, or an active search for middle ground, reflect the use of compromise. Intermediate concern for self and others thus characterize this strategy. While
Euwema et al. (2003) found compromise to be unrelated to substantive outcomes, Gross and Guerrero (2000) found it to be related to positive relational outcomes.

**Accommodation.** The fourth strategy, Accommodation, involves giving in to another’s needs, accepting, prioritising and incorporating another’s will. Unilateral concessions and unconditional promises exemplify accommodation. Preference for this conflict management strategy reflects low self-concern and high concern for others. No links have been found between accommodation and substantive or relational outcomes (Euwema et al., 2003), which suggests that the resolutions reached usually do very little to enhance outcomes on the part of the accommodator.

**Avoidance.** The final strategy, Avoidance, involves deemphasising the importance of conflicted issues, suppression of thought about such issues, and interacting with conflicted parties in a cold and withdrawn fashion. A preference for avoidance typically reflects a low concern for self and others. It has been associated with negative substantive outcomes as well as negative relational outcomes in various studies, and is considered the poorest conflict management strategy (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; M. A. Gross & Guerrero, 2000; Hocker & Wilmot, 1998). Euwema et al. (2003) suggest that the poor resulting outcomes may be due to the issues remaining unresolved and becoming more serious over time.

The research reported here illustrates that these five conflict management strategies support or undermine workplace functioning to various degrees, and that the more successful strategies reflect the negotiation skills which employers’ most value in their employees.

**Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management**

EI theorists, Goleman (1998) and Mayer and Salovey (1997), have proposed that emotionally intelligent individuals may be more effective in resolving
interpersonal conflict. That is, their heightened awareness, understanding and ability to manage own and others’ emotions may contribute to the negotiation of resolutions that better satisfy the involved parties’ needs and thus lead to better outcomes.

Jordan and Troth (2002, 2004) take a similar view, and extend Goleman (1998) and Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) theory to the context of workplace conflict. They argue that all workplace conflict is inherently emotional in that it involves dealing with perceptions of threat to personal or group goals, and that emotional intelligence influences the manner in which workers attempt to resolve emergent conflicts. Jordan and Troth (2002, 2004) draw on research which parallels the findings discussed above (e.g., Kuhn & Poole, 2000; Tannen, 1994) to emphasise the point that workers generally report poorer conflict outcomes in situations where conflict management is dominated by lack of concern for one or both parties needs, as is the case for strategies involving use of force, avoidance, or accommodation. They subsequently propose that emotionally intelligent workers recognise the value each party places in their position, and are thus more likely to manage conflict through compromise or collaboration: strategies which reflect equal concern for the affected parties and generally lead to better outcomes.

Jordan and Troth (2002) found initial evidence in support of their position from an examination of university students’ conflict resolution preferences. Using their own measure of EI (WEIP; Workplace Emotional Intelligence Profile) which is conceptually similar to the SUEIT, Jordan and Troth found significant positive relations between global EI and a preference for the collaborative strategy. In further analysis, Jordan and Troth found that the most salient EI predictor of collaboration was the Ability to Deal with Own Emotions, which in their model subsumed the abilities to identify, express, and manage one’s emotions. As well, they found
significant negative relations between participants’ ability to deal with their emotions and preferences for Force and Avoidance strategies. Unexpectedly however, they also found a positive relationship between preference for the use of Force and “Ability to Deal with Others’ Emotions”, which comprises the abilities to identify and manage others’ emotions.

In a follow-up study, Jordan and Troth (2004) found further evidence linking emotional intelligence to preferred conflict management strategies. During a problem-solving survival task, university students with higher scores on either WEIP EI ability reported a preference for the use of collaborative and forceful conflict management strategies. On the other hand, students with poorer ability to deal with their own emotions reported a preference for the Avoidance strategy.

As can be seen, some findings are consistent across Jordan and Troth’s (2002, 2004) studies while others are not. For instance, in both studies, persons skilled in dealing with their own emotions favoured the Collaboration strategy, which is related to the achievement of both substantive and relational outcomes. They also disfavoured the Avoidance strategy, which tends to damage both substantive and relational outcomes. As well, in both studies, persons skilled in dealing with others’ emotions favoured the use of Force, a strategy which typically promotes substantive outcomes at the expense of relational outcomes. Conversely however, the ability to deal with one’s own emotions was related to the use of Force in the second study but not the first. Likewise, the ability to deal with others’ emotions was related to Collaboration in the second study but not the first. Furthermore, the Compromise and Accommodation scales were dropped in the second study due to poor internal reliability.
These discrepancies leave open the question of whether emotionally intelligent persons do indeed use the most effective conflict management strategies, and whether strengths in particular aspects of EI result in preferences for one or more of these strategies. The present study thus sought to elucidate such relations, and most particularly, explore the extent to which the six SUEIT EI abilities differentially predict the negotiation skills that employers’ most value.

**Organizational Commitment**

Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, and Topolnytsky (2002) trace the conceptual origins of Organizational Commitment back to theoretical works in sociology (e.g., Becker, 1960; Kanter, 1968), and social psychology (e.g., Kiesler, 1971). Theoretical interest in this construct stemmed from the belief that there were benefits to having a committed workforce. In subsequent decades, this belief was born out. Organizational commitment gained empirical prominence in organizational behaviour literature as a robust predictor of employee turnover and job performance (for a meta-analytic review see Meyer et al., 2002).

While many studies tended to treat organizational commitment as a singular construct, extensive reviews of this literature, performed by Meyer and colleagues (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Meyer & Allen, 1997; Meyer, Bobocel, & Allen, 1991; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001), identified distinctly different reasons underlying employees’ commitment. From these they derived three commitment types: Affective, Normative, and Continuance commitment. Employees considered to be affectively committed were those who stayed with an organization because they wanted to. They described themselves as emotionally attached to the organization. Personal meaning and a sense of belonging were found within the organization, reflecting harmony between their own and organizational goals, values, and interests. Those who were
normatively committed stayed because they believed they ought to. They felt obliged to stay due to a generalised belief in the appropriateness of remaining loyal to an employer, or due to the receipt of rewards or benefits such as tuition payments or skills training. Those who were continuance committed stayed because they needed to. They were committed due to limited alternative employment opportunities, or concerns about the life disruption that a change of employer would create.

Meyer and Allen (1991) argued that the primary reason for differentiating between these commitment types was that each had distinct implications for employee behaviour. This argument was supported in numerous later studies, upon which a meta-analysis was conducted some ten years hence (Meyer et al., 2002). The meta-analysis drew on data from 155 independent samples, and involved 50,146 employees. All three commitment types were negatively associated with turnover. Furthermore, Affective commitment was most strongly and favourably associated with job performance, organizational citizenship behaviour, attendance, and work-family harmony. Normative commitment was also favourably associated with these desirable outcomes, though less strongly. Continuance commitment on the other hand, was unrelated or even negatively related to these outcomes. Clearly, affective commitment most strongly reflects Carnevale et al.’s (1990) career development orientation construct, whereby the personal meaning and belonging inherent to this type of commitment, and workplace outcomes which result, are derived from congruence between personal and organizational interests, values, and goals.

**Emotional Intelligence and Organizational Commitment**

The small number of studies that have examined links between EI and organizational commitment have found positive connections. However, few have
explored such relations at the level of particular EI abilities, and fewer still have accounted for the three forms of commitment.

In one of the first studies in this area, Abraham (2000) found that healthcare, insurance, and telecommunications professionals who scored higher on the SSRI EI measure were more committed, in an overall sense, to their employing organization. Moreover, level of job autonomy moderated the relationship, such that emotionally intelligent participants with less supervision and greater decision-making latitude in their jobs were even more committed than those with less latitude. That their commitment was higher in the absence of controls suggests a stronger, internalized form, which may well manifest in the affective type.

Of note, Abraham (2000) further speculated that the social skills components of EI may exert a strong influence on commitment, such that the development of strong working relationships with colleagues may enhance emotionally intelligent workers’ emotional attachment to their organization. This again suggests that EI may be more strongly associated with affective commitment, the form employers most value. Abraham did not, however, quantitatively distinguish between commitment types or EI abilities, nor pursue the latter avenue of enquiry.

A study by Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002) revealed similar relations, and found, as Abraham (2000) suggested, that some EI aspects were more strongly associated with Organizational Commitment than others. At the global level, mental health workers who scored higher on Tsaousis’ (2003) EIQ (a self-report EI measure based on the MSCEIT) reported stronger organizational commitment. At the level of EI abilities, their “Use of Emotions” in problem-solving scores were strongly associated with commitment, while their “Control of Emotions” and emotional “Understanding and Reasoning” scores were moderately and weakly associated
respectively. As with Abraham (2000), however, Nikolaou and Tsaousis did not quantitatively distinguish between the three commitment types.

In a further study, Carmeli (2003) found that amongst senior financial managers in local Israeli government, those who scored higher on the SSRI EI measure were marginally more committed to their employing organization, and moderately more committed to their careers. In addition, as Abraham’s (2000) research suggested, their commitment manifested in the affective type. Carmeli reasoned that the ability of emotionally intelligent managers to place themselves in a positive emotional state contributed to their sense of attachment to the organization, identification with the job and employer, and congruence between their personal and organizational values. He similarly speculated that when difficulties arose in the course of daily work, emotionally intelligent managers were less likely to focus on identifying who was at fault or blaming the organization, and instead focus on maintaining or generating a positive attitude. This, he believed, minimized the adverse effects of stress on personal commitment to the organization. Carmeli’s conjecture clearly favours emotional self-management over other EI aspects in the prediction of Affective Organizational Commitment. As with Abraham’s study however, Carmeli did not examine links at the level of EI abilities. Nor did he investigate links between EI and the normative commitment type.

In another study, Sinha and Jain (2004) found that amongst mid-level Indian manufacturing executives, those who scored higher on Reality Awareness, an EI construct extracted from factor analysis of Bar-On’s (2000) EQ-i scale, also scored marginally higher on the affective and normative components of organizational commitment. Reality awareness, as Sinha and Jain explained it, is similar to the SUEIT Understanding Emotions External construct, in that it encompasses awareness
of emotions in others and in the environment. The remaining four factors they
extracted, which had no bearing on the three commitment types, concerned emotional
expression ability, emotional self-regulation, optimism, and use of emotion in
problem-solving. Having thus accounted for links between all three forms of
commitment and a broad range of EI abilities, Sinha and Jain’s findings suggest that
Understanding Emotions External may be the most important predictor.

Although the quantity of research linking EI to the three forms of
organizational commitment is clearly limited, and while examination of such links at
the level of EI abilities is limited to one study, all findings suggest a positive
relationship. The present study thus sought to explore the relative importance of the
six SUEIT EI aspects in the prediction of the three forms of organizational
commitment. The primary goal was to determine whether workers with particular EI
strengths were committed in the ways most attractive to employers.

**Achievement Motivation**

Achievement motivation has its roots in the works of James (1890) and
theories of Murray (1938), while its development and refinement is primarily
accredited to McClelland and Atkinson (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, Atkinson,
Clark, & Lowell, 1953), Vroom (1964), Porter and Lawler (1968) and Jackson
(Jackson, Ahmed, & Heapy, 1976; for reviews see Fineman, 1977; Gagne & Deci,
2005; Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Although definitions vary across contemporary
motivation models, mirroring variations in the original theories, it is generally
accepted that achievement motivation reflects the extent to which an individual sets
and strives to attain personally relevant goals (Pinder, 1998).

Most contemporary models also distinguish between achievement motivations
that are self-initiated and those that are derived from external inducements. Most
often, individuals who are motivated to perform an activity because they find it interesting, and derive personal satisfaction from the activity itself are described as intrinsically motivated. On the other hand, individuals who are motivated and find their satisfaction in the tangible rewards that result from the activity are described as extrinsically motivated (Gagne & Deci, 2005).

The importance of this distinction is reinforced by two decades of research showing that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations lead to different levels of achievement on different types of tasks. These motivations have been found to be differentially associated with a range of other criteria relating to workplace functioning as well. Specifically, numerous studies associated intrinsic motivation with superior performance on tasks that are more complex and require disciplined engagement. Intrinsic motivation has also been associated with organizational citizenship behaviour, trust and commitment to employer, job satisfaction, and wellbeing (Gagne & Deci, 2005), critical self-assessment and development, personal initiative, and constructive contributions to workgroups beyond role expectations (Eisenberger, Jones, Stinglhamber, Shanock, & Randall, 2005). Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, has been associated with poorer performance on complex or challenging tasks (Lepper, Corpus, & Iyengar, 2005), and superior performance on simple and unengaging or boring and repetitive tasks (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987), though often at the expense of job satisfaction, wellbeing and adjustment (Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan, 1993).

Like many other theorists and researchers, Cassidy and Lynn (1989) have taken the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation a step further. They proposed seven types of work motivation which reflect more specific achievement motivations underlying the original forms. In their model, which draws heavily on
early theoretical roots, intrinsic motivation is seen as encompassing Work Ethic, Pursuit of Excellence, and Mastery, while extrinsic motivation encompasses Status Aspiration, Competitiveness, Acquisitiveness, and Dominance.

**Work ethic.** Work ethic reflects the notion of “Protestant work ethic”, or the intrinsic motivation to work hard for the simple sake of it (Spence & Helmreich, 1983). It was originally termed thus by Weber (1905/1992) and studied in the field of sociology, prior to being adopted by psychology to describe achievement motivated by finding satisfaction in working hard. Various researchers have found work ethic to influence behaviour, values, and attitudes that promote hard work (e.g., Furnham, 1984; Mirels & Garrett, 1971).

**Pursuit of excellence.** Pursuit of excellence originated in the work of Murray (1938) which formed the basis for later intrinsic motivation theory. McClelland et al. (1953) described the pursuit of excellence in terms of motivation to find reward in performing to the best of one’s ability, and in bettering one’s previous performance.

**Mastery.** Mastery is described as the intrinsic motivation to succeed on novel or difficult tasks in recurring circumstances. It reflects a motivation reinforced by the satisfaction found in understanding, developing, and mastering problem solving techniques to overcome such tasks. Prior to Cassidy and Lynn (1989), mastery had only been identified and measured as a source of motivation by Spence and Helmreich (1983).

**Status aspiration.** Status aspiration originates from sociological and ethological observations of human organization, in which much of the motivation for human action has been attributed to the evaluative comparisons individuals make between themselves and significant others (Giddens, 2001; Goffman, 1967). In psychological discourse, status aspiration traditionally reflects the extrinsic motivation
to climb the social status hierarchy, to receive attention, admiration, and respect of others (Cassidy & Lynn, 1989; Jackson et al., 1976).

**Competitiveness.** Competitiveness also has its roots in sociological and ethological disciplines, and is commonly associated with the “American way of life”. It is described by Cassidy and Lynn (1989) as the extrinsic motivation to compete with others, reinforced by the satisfaction found in winning. They contrast it with McCelland et al.’s (1953) description of the pursuit of excellence, in which competition is with one’s own standard of excellence rather than the standards set by others.

**Acquisitiveness.** Acquisitiveness reflects the first step in Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, and is described by Cassidy and Lynn (1989) as the extrinsic motivation to achieve reinforced by material rewards. It is the most common extrinsic inducement to work, and reflects the pursuit of safety and opportunity access, and upward socio-economic mobility, through personal material gain.

**Dominance.** Dominance, as defined by Jackson et al. (1976), refers to the motivation to achieve authority and control over others, and to plan and decide their actions. While similar to status aspiration, it is distinguishable in that it is primarily concerned with achieving power and leadership roles, rather than the admiration and respect of others (Cassidy & Lynn, 1989).

As can be seen, Cassidy and Lyn’s model of Achievement Motivation embodies the motivation/goal-setting attitudes that employers most value (Carnevale et al., 1990). Employers desire workers who are motivated to labour hard, who seek to master their vocation, who challenge themselves to perform their best, who regularly display personal initiative in setting and achieving goals for themselves, and motivate others to do the same. Their model also encompasses the reward principles
by which such motivations are typically reinforced. Organizational rewards, in the form of public recognition, material reward, promotion to higher status positions, and leadership roles are the most common incentives offered, and competition for such is strongly encouraged (Farrell & Rusbult, 1981; Oliver, 1990).

**Emotional Intelligence and Achievement Motivation**

With theoretical and empirical links between emotion, motivation, and behaviour stretching back into the philosophical origins of psychology (for examples see Chapter 1), and with the importance of motivation to workplace achievement cemented in recent decades, it is somewhat surprising that empirical links between emotional intelligence and achievement motivation remain unexplored. In the present thesis, Csikszentmihalyi’s (1982) theory of flow, and Goleman’s (1998) later adoption of flow as a theoretical component of EI, were used as starting points to ground the current investigation of such links.

Csikszentmihalyi (1982) theorised that when the process of performing a task is experienced as inherently pleasurable, the accumulation of positive emotion results in a state of “flow” whereby immersion in the task temporarily blurs the distinction between self and the work role, and creates a situation in which time and context loose their salience. In later work, Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) positively linked the experience of flow to achievement motivation. When workers in their sample were freely doing what interested them, their behaviours were characterized by spontaneous concentration and engagement, and they became wholly absorbed in succeeding in the activity. Moreover, approximately half of the sampled workers expressed a greater motivation for work in which they had high skill and faced greater challenge.
Drawing on Csikszentmihalyi’s work, Ashforth and Humphrey (1995) argued that the *sine qua non* of work motivation was the experience of joy, excitement, and passion, or in other words, emotional engagement. Goleman (1998) and Abraham (2004) took a similar view, whereby Goleman (1998) claimed that emotions are the “ultimate motivator” (p. 106), while Abraham (2004) suggested that emotions “fuel a passion for work such that the work becomes enjoyable, effortless, and physically and cognitively rewarding” (p. 121). Indeed, Goleman (1995, 1998) went as far as to directly incorporate Csikszentmihalyi’s construct of flow, redefined in terms of an achievement drive, into his model of emotional intelligence. He described the ability to enter flow, through stimulation of the achievement drive, as EI at its best.

More specifically, Goleman (1998) theorised that emotionally intelligent people generate positive emotions to stimulate their achievement drive, and when emotions such as frustration or anxiety interfere with their motivation, they suppress or compartmentalise them, and attempt to substitute them with positive emotions. He further specified that the achievement drive of emotionally intelligent workers is expressed in four ways: they are driven to achieve results in terms of meeting objectives and expected work standards; they set challenging goals for themselves and take calculated risks; they actively pursue task information and find ways to perform tasks better, and are motivated to learn how to improve their performance overall.

these motivations, theoretically suggests that emotional self-management is at the heart of these motivations. Furthermore, Goleman’s theory, coupled with Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre’s (1989) findings, suggest that persons highly skilled in influencing others’ emotions may be more motivated by the extrinsic challenges inherent to attaining positions of greater social status, and dominance or leadership over others: pursuits which are theoretically congruent with the development of this EI ability.

As plausible as the foregoing positions are, EI research is yet to empirically examine the nature of relations between achievement motivation and emotional intelligence. And while possible relations between intrinsic motivations and Emotional Management of Self, and extrinsic motivations and Emotional Management of Others can be inferred, it is difficult to infer similar possible relations between the various motivations and the remaining four SUEIT EI abilities. The present study thus sought to shed light on such relations through examination of the relative importance of the six SUEIT EI abilities in the prediction of each of Cassidy and Lynn’s (1989) seven achievement motivations.

**Summary and Aims of Study 3**

This chapter has reviewed the manner in which Carnevale et al.’s (1990) Adaptability, Developmental and Group Effectiveness skills have been defined and operationalized in organizational psychological models of Adaptive Performance, Conflict Management, Organizational Commitment, and Achievement Motivation. It has also examined the means by which emotional intelligence may influence the constructs comprising these models, and in doing so, contribute to workplace functioning. The research reviewed has illustrated the limitations to our current understanding of the relationship between emotional intelligence and these constructs.
In many cases, relations between EI and these skills that employers consider so essential to contemporary business functioning have received limited or no attention in psychological research. And where they have received attention, many different measures of EI or related constructs have been used. Furthermore, a number of studies have examined either one or some EI-related aspects, or the EI construct as a whole, rather than isolate the relative contributions of the various EI aspects. It is therefore unclear which aspect or combination of aspects best predict the employability skills reviewed in this chapter. Study 3 is therefore essentially exploratory in nature. No hypotheses were specified. Instead, four broad aims were used to guide the investigation.

Study 3 sought to determine the relative importance of the six SUEIT EI abilities in the prediction of:

1) Seven dimensions of Adaptive Performance: Creative Problem Solving, New Learning, Interpersonal Adaptability, Work-Culture Adaptability, Coping with Stress, Coping with Uncertainty, and Handling Crises;
2) The use of five Conflict Management strategies: Force, Collaboration, Compromise, Accommodation, and Avoidance;
3) Three forms of Organizational Commitment: Affective, Normative, and Continuance commitment;
4) Seven types of Achievement Motivation: Work Ethic, Excellence, Mastery, Status Aspiration, Competitiveness, Acquisitiveness, and Dominance.

**Method**

**Procedure**

Members from forty-five online work-related discussion forums (e.g., monster.prospero.com; wetfeet.com) who were currently employed were invited to
complete an online survey. In cases where a moderator presided over the group or forum, written permission was obtained before posting the invitation. A copy of the invitation is included as Appendix C.1. The invitational post provided a direct link to the online survey information page, which outlined the study, provided the researcher’s contact details, those of the presiding supervisor, and ethics committee. The online survey was programmed in such a way that prospective participants could participate once only, could not miss a question, or mistakenly rate a question multiple times. Missing data were only present in cases where persons did not complete the survey.

**Participants**

Two hundred and ninety persons answered the first survey question, while 105 (36.2%) completed the survey and comprised the final sample. The average age of participants was 34.5 ($SD = 9.32$) years, the youngest being 19 and the oldest being 60. Most were women (69%) while around a third (31%) were men. More than half of the sample resided in the United States (54%), while almost a quarter (22%) lived in Australia. Eight percent lived in the UK, and Canada, while 7% resided in Europe, and 1% in Asia. In regards to relationship status, 40% were married and 9% were in defacto relationships, 18% were dating while 33% were single. In terms of education, a majority of the sample had obtained a university qualification, with 37% having finished an undergraduate course, and 27% a post-graduate course. Fifteen percent had earned a technical qualification, while 20% had completed secondary school only. Only 1% had completed less than 12 years of schooling.

In terms of employment status, 83% of the sample worked full-time, while 17% worked part-time. As with Studies 1 and 2, participant occupations were classified into eight occupational social status classes using the ANU4 system (Jones
Figure 4.1 depicts this stratification, where class 1 comprises the most prestigious occupations, and class 8 the least.

Figure 4.1. Percentage of Study 3 participants employed in each occupational class.

Seventeen percent of Study 3 participants were employed in occupations classified within the first class, comprising health, education, legal, science, building and engineering qualified professionals. Sixteen percent were in the second class comprising nurses and therapists; and social, business, computing, media and air/sea transport qualified professionals. Ten percent were in the third class of elected and appointed officials; and senior management of public sector and large organizations. Twenty-two percent were in the fourth class comprising artists; associates/technicians; police/defence force officers (non-commissioned); sportspeople; and business
specialists. Nine percent were in the fifth class of farm, shop, office and hospitality managers; specialized clerks, sales and service workers; mechanical engineering, electrical and communications tradespeople. Twelve percent were in the sixth occupational class of building, auto, arts, and miscellaneous tradespeople; secretaries; clerks; and care workers. Ten percent were in the seventh class of transport and service workers; metal, textile, glass, wood, agriculture tradespeople; stationary plant operators; skilled forestry, waterside, mining, construction workers; and defence force personnel (lower ranks). Finally, five percent were employed in the eighth occupational class comprising other service workers, other machine operators; factory/farm hands; and labourers.

**Measures**

Five inventories were used in Study 3 to measure emotional intelligence, adaptive performance, conflict management preferences, organizational commitment, and achievement motivation. The survey required around 30 minutes to complete. A copy of the survey questions is included in Appendix C.2.

**Emotional intelligence.** As with Study 1 and 2, emotional intelligence was measured using Gignac’s (2005a) revised SUEIT, described in Chapter 1. In the present study, the two-item Emotional Recognition in Self subscale demonstrated moderate internal reliability with a coefficient alpha of .79, and .88 when stepped-up via the Spearman-Brown formula. The Personal Expression subscale demonstrated a similarly moderate coefficient alpha of .74. On the other hand, the Understanding Emotions External subscale had a high coefficient alpha of .92. The Emotional Control subscale exhibited a moderate coefficient alpha of .77. The Emotional Management of Self subscale demonstrated a moderate to high coefficient alpha of
.89. The Emotional Management of Others subscale had a moderate coefficient alpha of .76. The full scale SUEIT exhibited a high coefficient alpha of .94.

**Adaptive performance.** Twenty-one self-report items were developed to measure seven dimensions of adaptive performance: Creative Problem Solving, New Learning, Interpersonal Adaptability, Work-culture Adaptability, Coping with Stress, Coping with Uncertainty, and Handling Crises. These seven dimensions reflect Griffin and Hesketh’s (2003) minor revisions to Pulakos et al.’s (2000) original eight dimensions of adaptive performance. Pulakos et al. derived the original dimensions from content analysis of more than one thousand critical incidents across 21 different job-types.

The Creative Problem Solving subscale measures participants’ self-perceived competence in designing new procedures or processes, solving problems for which there are no easy or straightforward answers, and innovative contributions to product, services or systems quality. The New Learning subscale measures competence in learning new ways to perform a job, adjustment to changing work processes, procedures, and equipment, and inclination to search for and participate in work assignments that require development of new skills. The Interpersonal Adaptability subscale measures efforts to improve understanding of colleagues’ needs and values, to listen and consider others’ points of view, and to adjust interaction style and behaviour to work effectively with different kinds of people. The Work-culture Adaptability subscale measures participants’ perception of their flexibility and open-mindedness in dealing with workers from different departments or organizations, and ability to adjust behaviour to suit other department or organizational cultures and values. The Coping with Stress subscale measures competence in dealing with highly demanding or stressful work situations. The Coping with Uncertainty subscale
measures competence in adjusting and dealing with the ambiguity that significant workplace changes often create. Finally, the Handling Crises subscale measures competence in thinking and acting effectively during crises.

Pulakos et al. (2002) revised the item number and content of Pulakos et al.’s (2000) original measure, such that the eight dimensions were represented by 80 items instead of 68, with 10 items comprising each subscale. Participants reported their perceived self-effectiveness for each item using a scale ranging from 1 = below average to 5 = exceptional. Coefficient alphas for the eight subscales ranged from .89 to .97 in Pulakos et al.’s initial publication and .75 to .91 in their second. Subscale intercorrelations ranged from .30 to .69 in the initial publication, and .38 to .79 in the second. Furthermore, in the second publication, Pulakos et al. reported significant correlations between self and supervisor ratings of adaptive performance on each of the eight dimensions, suggesting that self-assessment reflects observed behaviour to a significant degree. Griffin and Hesketh (2003) on the other hand did not report psychometric properties for the items they constructed to measure their revised seven dimensions, but did report a very high coefficient alpha of .97 for their full scale.

In the present study, each of the seven dimensions was represented by three items. The items were based closely on definitions and descriptions provided by Pulakos et al. (2000; 2002) and Griffin and Hesketh (2003). Participants rated the extent to which they believed themselves to be competent in each item on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = I’m yet to develop skill at this to 7 = I stand out as an expert at this. Possible subscale scores ranged from 3 to 21. Subscale correlations were comparable to those of Pulakos et al.’s original scale (2000), ranging from .42 to .81, while coefficient alphas were comparable to Pulakos et al.’s (2002) revised scale. Specifically, each of the adaptive performance subscales exhibited moderate
reliability, with coefficient alphas of .75 for the Creative Problem Solving and New Learning subscales, .76 for Interpersonal Adaptability, .83 for the Coping with Stress subscale, .82 for Coping with Uncertainty, and .75 for Handling Crises. Item content analysis revealed that one item for the Work Culture Adaptability subscale was deleterious to internal consistency. Following its deletion, this scale reported a coefficient alpha of .78. The possible score range was subsequently reduced to 2-14. The full scale demonstrated a high coefficient alpha of .94.

**Conflict management strategies.** De Dreu et al.’s (2001) shortened, revised and updated English translation of Van de Vliert’s (1997) Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (DUTCH) was used to measure participants self-reported preferences for five conflict management strategies: Force, Collaboration, Compromise, Accommodation, and Avoidance. The Force subscale measures respondents’ preference for confronting conflicted parties in a direct way, and pushing personal agendas at the expense of others’ goals. The Collaboration subscale measures preference for reconciling the parties’ basic interests. The Compromise subscale measures preference for settling disputes through mutual concessions. The Accommodation subscale measures preferences for giving in to the other party. The Avoidance subscale measures preference for evading the conflicted issue.

The DUTCH contains 20 items, 4 of which contribute to each of the five subscales. Participants rate the extent to which they behave during conflict in the way indicated by each item on a 7-point scale, where 1 = almost never and 7 = almost always. Possible scores for each subscale range from 1 to 28. Dreu et al. (2001) performed three studies to examine the psychometric properties of their revised DUTCH. Internal consistency reliability was found to be sufficient, with Coefficient alpha for the five subscales ranging from .64 to .83. Discriminant validity was
present, such that internal subscale correlations were almost non-existent to very low, the highest being .32. Self-report ratings of conflict management strategy preferences also correlated significantly with observer ratings of conflict management behaviour.

In the present study, the three best performing items from each 4-item subscale as identified by Dreu et al. (2001) were chosen to represent each strategy, for total of fifteen items. The Force subscale exhibited a moderate level of internal reliability comparable to the original scale (α = .72), while Collaboration achieved a higher coefficient alpha of .90. Item content analysis revealed a single poorly performing item within each of the Compromise, Accommodation, and Avoidance subscales. Following deletion of these items, the resultant 2-item subscales demonstrated moderate coefficient alphas of .74, .74, and .84 respectively, and their scale ranges reduced from 3-21 to 2-14.

**Organizational commitment.** Organizational Commitment was assessed using Meyer, Allen, and Smith’s (1993) revision of Meyer and Allen’s (1991) earlier self-report inventory. The inventory measures three forms of organizational commitment, each of which has distinct implications for employee behaviour: Affective, Normative, and Continuance. The Affective commitment subscale attempts to measure respondents’ sense of belonging and meaning, and emotional attachment to their employing organization. The Normative commitment subscale measures the degree to which employee commitment is derived from obligation or receipt of benefits. The Continuance commitment subscale measures the extent to which respondents’ commitment is derived from limited alternative employment prospects, or concerns about the life disruption changing organization would cause.

Meyer et al.’s (1993) Organizational Commitment inventory contains 18 items, where 6 items comprise each of the three subscales. Participants rate the extent
to which they agree or disagree with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Possible scores for each subscale range from 6 to 24. Meyer et al. (1993) reported moderate internal reliability for each of the subscales, with coefficient alphas of .82 for Affective commitment, .83 for Normative commitment, and .74 for Continuance commitment. Subscale intercorrelations revealed no significant connection between Continuance commitment and the other two scales ($r = .06$), while Affective and Normative commitment correlated highly ($r = .74$).

In the present study, the best three items from each of the 6-item scales were chosen to represent the commitment constructs. The Affective and Normative commitment subscales achieved moderate internal consistency, with respective coefficient alphas of .81 and .74. In the case of the Continuance commitment subscale, item content analysis revealed that one item performed poorly and was thus deleted. Coefficient alpha for the resulting 2-item subscale was low to moderate ($\alpha = .66$), and the possible scale range was reduced from 3-21 to 2-14.

**Achievement motivation.** Achievement motivation was measured using a self-report instrument developed by Cassidy and Lynn (1989). Their measure incorporates seven dimensions designed to reflect workplace motivations: Work Ethic, Pursuit of Excellence, Mastery, Status Aspiration, Competitiveness, Acquisitiveness, and Dominance. The former three are considered intrinsic motivations and the latter four extrinsic. The Work Ethic subscale measures respondents’ motivation to achieve based on finding reinforcement in the performance itself, that is, the desire to work hard for the sake of it. The Pursuit of Excellence subscale measures motivation to perform to the best of one’s ability, and to better previous performance. The Mastery subscale measures motivation to tackle and
succeed at difficult or complex tasks. The Status Aspiration subscale measures motivation to climb the social status hierarchy. The Competitiveness subscale measures motivation to compete with others with the ultimate goal of winning. The Acquisitiveness subscale measures the degree to which respondents’ motivation is based on the reinforcing properties of material reward. The Dominance subscale measures motivation to achieve power over, lead and direct the actions of others.

Forty nine items comprise the full inventory, where 7 items comprise each of the seven subscales. Respondents rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each item on a 7-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Possible scores for each subscale range from 7 to 49. Cassidy and Lynn (1989) performed three studies to assess the psychometric properties of their inventory. Coefficient alphas for the seven subscales ranged between .55 and .81, while internal subscale correlations ranged between .01 and .63. The Work Ethic (r = .63) and Status Aspiration (r = .79) subscales correlated highly with very similar scales by Lynn, Hampson, and Magee (1983), while the Competitiveness and Mastery subscales correlated very highly with similar subscales from the Work and Family Orientation Scale (WFO; Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Convergent validity data for the Dominance, Acquisitiveness, and Pursuit of Excellence subscales was not published by Cassidy and Lynn.

For purposes of brevity, in the present study each subscale was shortened from seven to the best three items reported by Cassidy and Lynn (1989). Four of the twenty one items required reverse scoring. Possible scores ranged from 3 to 21. The Dominance subscale achieved the highest coefficient alpha of .88, while the Status Aspiration (α = .81), Pursuit of Excellence (α = .80) Work Ethic (α = .79), and Competitiveness (α = .72) subscales demonstrated moderate coefficient alphas. These
reliability scores are on par with and in some cases higher than those demonstrated by Cassidy and Lynn’s 7-item scales. In the case of Mastery and Acquisitiveness however, item content analysis revealed a single poorly performing item within each scale. These problematic items were removed, reducing the number of items to two for each scale, and the possible score range to 2-14. The Mastery and Acquisitiveness subscales subsequently demonstrated reliabilities of borderline acceptability, exhibiting coefficient alphas of .68 and .63 respectively.

Results

Analyses performed for Study 3 examined the relationships holding between emotional intelligence and (1) seven dimensions of Adaptive Performance; (2) the use of five Conflict Management strategies; (3) three forms of Organizational Commitment; and (4) seven types of Achievement Motivation. Four sets of correlations and multivariate stepwise regression analyses were performed to determine the relative importance of each of the six EI abilities in the prediction of the foregoing criteria. As with Study 2, the choice of stepwise regression procedures over other regression alternatives reflected the exploratory nature of Study 3, and the emphases on model-building rather than model-testing.

Prior to these analyses, the data was screened and where necessary transformed to reduce the number of outliers, reduce skewness, and improve normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of residuals. In six cases, where standardized z scores exceeded +/- 3.29 ($p < .001$), variable scores were changed to one unit smaller or larger respectively, than the next most extreme score. Summary statistics for the six EI abilities are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1

*Study 3 Summary Statistics for Emotional Intelligence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>17-85</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>66.63</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.49</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>10-50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.49</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>6-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19.66</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.*

*Emotional Intelligence and Adaptive Performance*

Summary statistics for the seven dimensions of Adaptive Performance are shown in Table 4.2. Correlations between the EI abilities and Adaptive Performance dimensions are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.2

*Summary Statistics for Adaptive Performance Dimensions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creative Problem Solving</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Learning</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Adaptability</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.46</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-Culture Adaptability</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping with Stress</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.77</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping with Uncertainty</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.15</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling Crises</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.*
Table 4.3

*Correlations between Emotional Intelligence and Adaptive Performance Dimensions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Creative Problem Solving</th>
<th>New Learning</th>
<th>Interpersonal Adaptability</th>
<th>Work Culture Adaptability</th>
<th>Coping with Stress</th>
<th>Coping with Uncertainty</th>
<th>Handling Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. * p < .05. ** p < .01.*
As shown in Table 4.3, there were significant weak to strong positive correlations between three to five EI abilities and each Adaptive Performance dimension. Only Personal Expression did not correlate with Adaptive Performance. Seven multivariate stepwise regressions were subsequently performed, whereby each Adaptive Performance dimension was regressed on the combination of significantly associated EI abilities. Regression statistics are reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4

Adaptive Performance Dimensions regressed on Emotional Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Creative Problem Solving</th>
<th>New Learning</th>
<th>Interpersonal Adaptability</th>
<th>Work Culture Adaptability</th>
<th>Coping with Stress</th>
<th>Coping with Uncertainty</th>
<th>Handling Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>.09</th>
<th>.08</th>
<th>.31</th>
<th>.24</th>
<th>.11</th>
<th>.20</th>
<th>.26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$df$</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(2, 102)</td>
<td>(2, 102)</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(2, 102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>10.38**</td>
<td>8.70**</td>
<td>23.81**</td>
<td>16.50**</td>
<td>12.12**</td>
<td>25.32**</td>
<td>17.56**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N = 105$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. Dashes inserted where variables were not retained by the stepwise models.
The data in Table 4.4 show that all seven regression models were significant. The stepwise models retained either one or two EI abilities to explain between 8% and 31% of variance in each Adaptive Performance indicator. Emotional Control was retained as the sole and therefore most important predictor of two of the performance-under-stress dimensions, Coping with Stress, $t(104) = 3.48, p < .001$, and Coping with Uncertainty, $t(104) = 5.03, p < .001$, and as one of the best predictors of the third, Handling Crises, $t(104) = 2.75, p < .01$. It was also the sole EI ability retained to predict Creative Problem Solving, $t(104) = 3.22, p < .01$.

Understanding Emotions External was revealed to be one of the most important predictors of the two relationship-oriented dimensions, Interpersonal Adaptability, $t(104) = 2.84, p < .01$, and Work Culture Adaptability, $t(104) = 3.89, p < .001$, and was the only EI ability retained to predict New Learning, $t(104) = 2.95, p < .01$. Emotional Management of Self was identified as one of the best predictors of Work Culture Adaptability, $t(104) = 2.15, p < .05$, and Handling Crises, $t(104) = 2.32, p < .05$, as well. Emotional Management of Others made a single unique contribution, having been identified as one of the most important predictors of Interpersonal Adaptability, $t(104) = 2.75, p < .01$. Emotional Recognition in Self, on the other hand, made no unique contributions.

The overall picture was one in which higher EI scores were associated with higher Adaptive Performance. The importance of one or two EI variables, particularly Emotional Control and Understanding Emotions External, was emphasized in the prediction of each performance indicator. Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression, on the other hand, appeared entirely unimportant.
Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management

Summary statistics for the five Conflict Management strategies are shown in Table 4.5. Correlations between EI and the Conflict Management strategies are shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.5

Summary Statistics for the Conflict Management strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.79</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.*
As shown in Table 4.6, there were weak to moderate positive correlations between two or more EI abilities and the Force, Collaboration, and Compromise Conflict Management strategies. However, no relationships of substance were evident between EI abilities and the Accommodation or Avoidance strategies, nor was Personal Expression significantly associated with any particular strategy.

Using stepwise multivariate procedure, Force, Collaboration and Compromise were regressed on significantly associated EI abilities. Regression statistics are shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.6.

*Correlations between Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management strategies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Management Strategies</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Compromise</th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Avoidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 105. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
As shown in Table 4.7, all three regression models were significant. Either one or two EI abilities were retained by the stepwise models to explain between 13% and 17% of variance in each conflict management strategy. Emotional Management of Others was retained as the sole predictor of Compromise, \( t(104) = 3.92, p < .001 \). It was also identified as one of the most important predictors of Force, \( t(104) = 2.37, p < .05 \), in conjunction with Emotional Management of Self, \( t(104) = 2.46, p < .05 \),
and Collaboration, $t(104) = 2.71, p < .01$, in conjunction with Emotional Control, $t(104) = 2.31, p < .05$.

This set of analyses emphasizes the importance of Emotional Management of Self, Emotional Control, and particularly Emotional Management of Others, in the prediction of Conflict Management approach. The analyses also emphasize the unimportance of Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression in predicting preferred Conflict Management approach, and the unimportance of all the EI abilities in predicting the use of Accommodation and Avoidance strategies.

**Emotional Intelligence and Organizational Commitment**

Summary statistics for the three Organizational Commitment types are shown in Table 4.8. Correlations between EI Organizational Commitment are displayed in Table 4.9.

**Table 4.8**

*Summary Statistics for Organizational Commitment types*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective Commitment</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Commitment</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuance Commitment</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.*
As shown in Table 4.9, weak to moderate positive correlations were observed between Affective Commitment and three EI abilities. However, none of the EI abilities correlated with Normative or Continuance Commitment. Affective Commitment was subsequently regressed on the three significantly associated EI abilities using stepwise multivariate procedure. Emotional Management of Self was the sole EI variable retained, $F(1, 103) = 10.69, p < .01$, explaining 9.4% of variation in Affective Commitment, $\beta = .31, t = (104) 3.27, p < .01$.

This set of analyses emphasises the importance of Emotional Management of Self in the prediction of Affective Commitment, and the unimportance of all six EI variables in the prediction of Normative and Continuance Commitment.
Emotional Intelligence and Achievement Motivation

Summary statistics for the seven Achievement Motivations are shown in Table 4.10, and correlations between the EI abilities and Achievement Motivations are displayed in Table 4.11.

Table 4.10

Summary Statistics for Achievement Motivations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Ethic</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellence</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastery</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.34</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Aspiration</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisitiveness</td>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.85</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 105. Range = Scale range; Min. = Observed minimum score; Max. = Observed maximum score.
### Correlations between Emotional Intelligence and Achievement Motivations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Work Ethic</th>
<th>Excellence</th>
<th>Mastery</th>
<th>Status Aspiration</th>
<th>Competitiveness</th>
<th>Acquisitiveness</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td><strong>0.29</strong></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.45</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.38</strong></td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.31</strong></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td><strong>0.25</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td><strong>0.29</strong></td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td><strong>0.36</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.48</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.29</strong></td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. *p < .05. **p < .01.*
As shown in Table 4.11, one or more EI abilities correlated positively with five of the seven Achievement Motivations. There was no relationship between EI and Acquisitiveness and Competitiveness. Stepwise regressions were subsequently performed for Work Ethic, Excellence, Mastery, Status Aspiration and Dominance, whereby each motivation was regressed on the combination of significantly associated EI abilities. Regression statistics are shown in Table 4.12
Table 4.12

*Achievement Motivations regressed on Emotional Intelligence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievement Motivations</th>
<th>Work Ethic</th>
<th>Excellence</th>
<th>Mastery</th>
<th>Status Aspiration</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Recognition in Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Expression</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Emotions External</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Control</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Self</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Management of Others</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.23*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2, 102)</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(1, 103)</td>
<td>(2, 102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>5.79*</td>
<td>18.29**</td>
<td>16.84**</td>
<td>9.77**</td>
<td>10.70**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 105. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.*
As shown in Table 4.7, all five stepwise regression models were significant. The stepwise models retained either one or two EI abilities to explain between 5% and 26% of variance in each of the five Achievement Motivations. Emotional Management of Others was clearly the most pervasive predictor. It was retained as the sole predictor of Work Ethic, \(t(104) = 2.41, p < .05\), and Status Aspiration, \(t(104) = 3.13, p < .01\), and was one of the best predictors of Excellence, \(t(104) = 2.94, p < .01\), and Dominance, \(t(104) = 2.25, p < .05\). Understanding Emotions External was one of the most important predictors of Excellence as well, \(t(104) = 2.07, p < .05\), and was also retained as the sole predictor of Mastery, \(t(104) = 4.10, p < .001\). Finally, Emotional Management of Self made a single unique contribution. It was identified as one of the most important predictors of Dominance, \(t(104) = 2.66, p < .01\). Notably, neither Emotional Recognition in Self nor Personal Expression was retained in any of the five models.

This set of analyses emphasizes the importance of Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Management of Self, and particularly, Emotional Management of Others, in the prediction of Achievement Motivation. The analyses also emphasize the unimportance of Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression in the prediction of work-related Achievement Motivation, and the unimportance of all six EI abilities in the prediction of Acquisitiveness and Competitiveness motivations.

In summary, across the four sets of analyses, one or more EI abilities were positively associated with sixteen of the twenty two workplace constructs examined. EI abilities differentially predicted all seven Adaptive Performance dimensions, preferences for the three of the five Conflict Management strategies, Affective but not Normative or Continuance Organizational Commitment, and five of the seven Achievement Motivations.
Discussion

Overview

Study 3 sought to determine which aspects of emotional intelligence were the best predictors of (1) seven dimensions of Adaptive Performance; (2) the use of five Conflict Management strategies; (3) three forms of Organizational Commitment, and; (4) seven types of Achievement Motivation. These constructs reflect a range of “employability skills” that are highly valued in contemporary organizations: skills which distinguish between more and less successful workers of similar education and vocational experience. The analyses revealed that higher EI scores were broadly associated with Adaptive Performance, a preference for effective Conflict Management strategies, greater Affective Organizational Commitment, and most forms of Achievement Motivation. Moreover, different aspects of emotional intelligence were found to be most important in the prediction of the constructs comprising these domains. The findings thus suggest that workers with a broad range of higher EI abilities are likely to have decidedly stronger employability skills than their less emotionally intelligent counterparts.

EI and Adaptive Performance

A climate of dynamic change currently characterizes many organizations. Business priorities often shift in anticipation or in response to global market forces. Mergers, “rightsizing”, and corporate restructuring are common, reflecting efforts to remain competitive. Technology changes on a frequent basis, resulting in wide-scale changes to workplace processes, procedures, and the skills employees’ need to function effectively. Individuals from different departments and organizations, with different values, orientations and backgrounds are expected to work together, often on a flexible basis, requiring workers to be interpersonally and culturally adaptable.
Workers with the capacity to adapt to such circumstances, and to cope with the associated pressures, are thus highly valued (Carnevale et al., 1990; Griffin & Hesketh, 2003; Pulakos et al., 2000).

In the current study, relations between workers’ EI abilities and seven Adaptive Performance competencies were examined. Generally speaking, workers with higher EI estimated themselves to be more competent than those with lower EI on each of the seven dimensions. However, the variance EI explained across these dimensions was by no means uniform, ranging from a small eight percent in the case of New Learning, to a much larger thirty one percent in the case of Interpersonal Adaptability. And in most cases, the variance in each dimension was best explained by different EI aspects or combinations of aspects.

**EI and creative problem solving.** Perhaps surprisingly, Emotional Control was revealed to be the most important EI predictor of Creative Problem Solving, explaining nine percent of variation in this dimension. It appears that the ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions plays a more important role than other EI abilities, when workers are required to design new workplace procedures and processes, solve problems for which there are no straightforward answers, or find innovative ways to improve the quality of products, services and systems.

This finding is broadly consistent with previous studies that have linked global EI to better performance on a wide range of divergent thinking and creative production measures (e.g., Batasini, 2001; Guastello et al., 2004). The particular importance of Emotional Control, however, stands in contrast with three studies to have explored such relations at the level of EI abilities. Specifically, a study by Wolfradt et al. (2001) emphasized the value of emotional self-awareness and the
ability to manage one’s emotions, while studies by Chan (2005) and Stough and De Guara (2003) emphasized the ability to identify others’ emotions.

While possible, it seems unlikely that these varied findings reflect the different EI measures used. Wolfradt et al. (2001) and Chan (2005) both used the SSRI, while Stough and De Guara (2003) used an earlier version of the SUEIT, which like the current version, incorporated the SSRI into its development. Instead, the divergent emphases likely reflect the different contexts in which creativity was measured. For instance, Wolfradt et al. measured college students’ performance on a single creative task, while Chan measured self-perceived creative ability amongst gifted elementary and secondary students. Stough and De Guara on the other hand examined subordinates’ overall creative output in the workplace as rated by their supervisors. The present finding and those of the foregoing studies might thus be interpreted to suggest that different aspects of emotional intelligence are useful in different creative contexts.

The current finding as it pertains to the business context suggests that the ability to think clearly under pressure augments workers’ capacity to identify, understand, and develop creative solutions to the novel problems facing contemporary organizations, particularly those undergoing significant change. Workers with better Emotional Control are likely to stand out from their colleagues, to a small but significant degree, in this regard. The relative importance of Emotional Control, when compared to the other EI aspects, could also be taken to suggest that the pressure to find creative and efficacious solutions, and do so in a timely manner, often interferes with workers’ capacity to do so, but that the capacity of those with better Emotional Control is less affected.
EI and new learning. In terms of the second Adaptive Performance dimension, Understanding Emotions External was found to be the best EI predictor of New Learning, explaining eight percent of variation in this dimension. This suggests that workers’ ability to identify and understand colleagues’ emotions, and at a broader level, accurately gauge the emotional climate of their workplace, is the most important EI determinant of their capacity to anticipate, learn and adjust to new work processes, procedures, and equipment.

This finding is supported at a broad level by studies which have linked global EI to higher academic performance amongst university students (Schutte, Lopes et al, 2000; Schutte et al., 1998), a performance criterion contingent upon skills resembling the New Learning construct (Elander et al., 2006). Moreover, the particular importance of Understanding Emotions External is consistent with the research of Wong et al. (1995), in which social perceptiveness was linked to academic performance; with the research of O’Connor and Little (2003), in which MSCEIT Understanding Emotions ability was linked to higher Grade Point Average (GPA), and; with the research of Drago (2005), in whose doctoral dissertation MSCEIT Emotion Perception ability was linked to higher Grade Point Average. Of note, Drago also found significant links with students’ MSCEIT abilities to use and manage emotion. The present results therefore emphasize the value of controlling for the relative influence of significantly associated EI aspects, so as to identify which aspect or aspects are in fact responsible for the variance explained.

In the wider business context, the current findings suggest that workers’ better able to identify and understand the emotions of those around them have a small but significant advantage over their colleagues in terms of their capacity to adapt to the rapid pace of current technological advancement, and the resulting changes to
organizational processes. They may well be more prescient and receptive to such changes, and are likely to be more proactive in seeking opportunities to upskill or learn new ways to perform their job.

**EI and interpersonal adaptability.** In regards to the third Adapative Performance dimension, Interpersonal Adaptability, Understanding Emotions External was one of the best EI predictors, as was Emotional Management of Others. Together, they explained a sizable thirty one percent of variation in this criterion. It appears that workers’ skilled in identifying and managing others’ emotions are much more likely to listen and consider colleagues’ points of view, are subsequently more attuned to their various needs and values, and can adjust the way they interact to suit and influence colleagues with different personalities, skill orientations, and experience.

This finding is broadly supported by research which has linked EI to interpersonal adjustment across various age cohorts (e.g., Brackett et al., 2004; Mehrabian, 2000; Rubin, 1999), and relationship types (e.g., Jordan and Troth, 2002, 2004; Lopes et al., 2003; Schutte et al., 2001). The particular importance of Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management of Others is supported by studies in which constructs resembling these abilities have been associated with greater capacity for social adaptation (Eisenberg et al., 2000; Halberstadt et al., 2001), and greater social confidence (Summerfeldt et al., 2006).

Employees with these EI abilities are likely to have a marked advantage in the contemporary workplace, in which changes to organizational dynamics have shifted the emphasis from working in isolation or insular teams, to fluid, project-oriented groups (Kozlowski et al., 1999; Schneider, 1994; Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996). They are likely to stand out in terms of their capacity to develop and sustain effective and
productive relations with the diverse range of people who contribute to projects in which they are involved.

**EI and work-culture adaptability.** As with the previous two dimensions, Understanding Emotions External was an important EI predictor of Work-culture Adaptability. In this case, Emotional Management of Self was also an important predictor, though somewhat less so. Together, they explained twenty four percent of variation. This suggests that workers’ skilled in identifying and understanding the emotions of those around them, and skilled in regulating their own emotions, are much more flexible and open-minded when dealing with persons from other work cultures, and can adjust their behaviour to suit the dominating customs, values, rules and structures of unfamiliar departments or organizations.

This finding is broadly supported by Well’s (2004) doctoral research, in which a strong positive association was observed between global EI as measured by the MSCEIT and cross-cultural adaptability. Moreover, the particular importance of Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management of Self is supported by Tang’s doctoral research (2002), in which positive associations were observed between cross-cultural adaptability, empathy and scores on the TMMS Mood Repair scale.

Of note, Tang (2002) also observed a similar correlation with a measure of emotion expression ability, while no such correlation was observed here, either with interpersonal or work-culture adaptability. This suggests that the benefits of emotional expression to relationship formation do not extend beyond particular contexts, such as romantic unions (e.g., Gottman, 1994; and Study 2 of the present dissertation), or more general contexts of interpersonal (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997) or cross-cultural relations (e.g., Tang, 2002), to the business context. These
null associations are supported by the research of Ashforth and Humphrey (1995), whose review of literature suggests that the rigorous structuring of workplace roles purposefully restrains the development and expression of emotional connections between colleagues. Expressions which transgress a very limited acceptable range, from mild positive displays in the case of subordinates to mild negative displays for supervisors, are viewed pejoratively, since they are believed to impair personal performance and interfere with the performance of others. Workers who regularly transcend such boundaries are often assigned pejorative labels (e.g., “bleeding heart”, “petty tyrant”), which act to stigmatize them and diminish their standing in the workplace (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). The prescriptive nature of emotions in the workplace may thus account for the very limited value of emotional expression observed here.

The present findings suggest that Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management of Self abilities are very likely to distinguish between workers who perform well and workers whose performance is diminished, in contexts where business is negotiated and conducted across different departments and organizations, and across project teams which comprise individuals from different work cultures. Understanding Emotions External presumably assists in the identification and interpretation of culture-centric expectations and display rules, while Emotional Management of Self augments workers’ capacity to meet these expectations.

**EI and coping with stress, uncertainty, and handling crises.** Emotional Control was identified as the best EI predictor of Coping with Stress and Coping with Uncertainty, explaining eleven and twenty percent of variance in these respective Adaptive Performance dimensions. Emotional Control was also one of the best
predictors of Handling Crises, as was Emotional Management of Self. Together they explained twenty six percent of variation in this dimension.

The findings pertaining to Coping with Stress suggest that workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure are to a small but significant degree better able to cope with highly demanding workloads, stay focused while juggling multiple responsibilities, and cope with the strain caused by excessive time constraints. The findings pertaining to Coping with Uncertainty suggest that such workers are much more competent or confident in dealing with unpredictable situations, functioning without knowing the total picture or having all the facts at hand, and coping with unanticipated delays in important information. The findings as they pertain to Handling Crises suggest that workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure, and self-soothe and generate positive emotions within themselves, are much more likely to stay calm and focused in a crisis situation, are often quicker to respond to and adapt to new and important situational information, and are more likely contribute purposefully to regaining control and recovering from the situation.

At a general level, these findings support research by Schutte, Schuettplez et al. (2000), in which higher SSRI EI was linked to problem solving persistence and enhanced performance on a range of tasks graded in terms of difficulty and stress. The findings are also consistent with the research of Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002), in which mental health workers’ with higher EIQ scores reported being less stressed by a range of occupational stressors. Moreover, the particular importance of Emotional Control is supported by the research of Gardner and Stough (2003), in which SUEIT Emotional Control was linked to workers’ confidence in managing occupational pressure. Notably though, no previous research has examined connections between global EI or EI aspects and workers’ capacity to handle workplace crises. That the
benefits of Emotional Control extend to crisis situations, and that Emotional Management in Self also contributes are thus findings unique to the current study.

One might query the lack of importance of Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression, and somewhat more limited importance of Emotional Management of Self in predicting these coping competencies, given their value in predicting resilience to life-event distress in Study 1. It is important to note though that these Adaptive Performance constructs reflect competence in achieving successful outcomes when particular stressful events occur, such as meeting tight deadlines, adapting to unforeseen difficulties, and averting crises. Resilience to life-event distress, on the other hand, reflects competence in coping with the personal psychological aftermath of such events, particularly when such an event could be considered highly traumatic. The adaptive coping competencies are therefore quite different to life event distress resilience, and this is reflected in differences in the EI abilities which best predict them.

Overall, the current findings suggest that EI contributes to Adaptive Performance in a variety of ways. The results thus appear to have significant implications for selecting adaptable workers, since those with higher EI are likely to be so. Understanding Emotions External, and Emotional Management of Others and Self respectively, appear to be particularly valuable in roles where interpersonal and work-culture adaptability is required. Emotional Control appears to be very valuable in roles where uncertainty and ambiguity are commonplace, where stress is high, and where quick analyses of situations and decision-making are required. Emotional Management of Self also appears important to the latter, and given the nature of this ability in Study 1, is likely to augment resilience and thus assuage the psychological impact of very tense and traumatic workplace situations. In roles where workloads
are high, where heavy time constraints prevail, and where responsibilities are numerous, workers with better Emotional Control are also likely to have an advantage over their colleagues.

The benefits of EI in circumstances requiring creative problem solving and adaptive learning skills, while clearly observable, are likely to be less pronounced than in the former contexts. The relatively small variance that Emotional Control and Understanding Emotions External respectively explained in these dimensions presumably reflects the cognitive orientation of these constructs. Cognitive constructs mapping on to “g” or general intelligence would presumably be much more powerful predictors, as indicated by the strong associations between IQ, performance on complex work tasks, and training outcomes (for a review see Gottfredson, 1997). Nevertheless, it may well be that Emotional Control adds incremental variance to the prediction of creative problem solving beyond that explained by cognitive constructs. The ability to think clearly under pressure would obviously benefit attention, comprehension, and performance in high pressure work environments, as demonstrated by its importance in predicting workers’ confidence to cope with stress, uncertainty, and crises. Likewise, the ability to identify and understand the reasons for shifts in colleagues’ emotions and the workplace climate may uniquely benefit workers’ capacity to anticipate impending workplace changes, and thus re-skill in a timely fashion, while their cognitive abilities would presumably better account for the ease or the depth to which such skills are developed.

In short, the results suggest that workers with higher emotional intelligence function at a higher level than their colleagues in climates of dynamic organizational change.
EI and Conflict Management

Conflict is an integral aspect of workplace life. The priorities, aspirations and resourcing needs of individuals and teams frequently clash as they seek, and often compete, to meet organizational goals. Individual, team, and organizational effectiveness are thus significantly affected by the ways in which such conflicts are managed (De Dreu et al., 2001; Jordan & Troth, 2004). Workers able to negotiate conflicts to productive ends are therefore highly valued (Carnevale et al., 1990).

In the current study, relations between workers’ EI and their preferences for five conflict management strategies were examined. The analyses revealed significant relations between EI aspects and the three most effective conflict management strategies: Force, Collaboration, and Compromise, but not the two least effective strategies: Compromise and Avoidance. In each significant case, Emotional Management of Others played a role.

EI and force. With regards to Force specifically, Emotional Management of Others and Emotional Management of Self were found to be the best EI predictors, explaining seventeen percent of variation. It thus appears that workers’ better able to repair negative emotions and generate positive ones, either in themselves, others, or both, often prioritize their own goals over those of others during interpersonal conflict. They are likely to push their own points of view, search for personal gains, fight for a better outcome for themselves, and will do so to the other parties’ detriment.

Research has most often related the use of this strategy to the achievement of “substantive” workplace outcomes, in which productive agreements and resolutions are reached (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997, Rahim, 1992; Thomas, 1992). But given the behaviours characterizing Force, most compromises, concessions, and
promises are made by the other party (Euwema et al., 2003). Consequently, “relational” outcomes are often damaged by the use of Force. Affective bonds are weakened, as is mutual understanding and trust. Willingness to engage in future cooperative efforts is therefore lessened (Gross & Guerrero 2000; Sorenson et al., 1999; Van de Vliert, 1997). Workers’ skilled in managing their own and others’ emotions are thus likely to force workplace conflicts through to substantive conclusions, but at the expense of the other parties’ goals and future working relations.

It may be, however, that the detrimental relational outcomes typically associated with the use of Force are lessened in the case of workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions, given that this ability also predicted substantial variance in the Interpersonal Adaptive Performance dimension. Such workers may be able to present their own priorities and reframe the concessions made by other parties in a more positive light: one that potentially counters the negative relational affects.

EI and collaboration. With regards to Collaboration, Emotional Management of Others and Emotional Control were identified as the best predictors, also explaining seventeen percent of variance. It appears that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions are equally likely to approach interpersonal conflict in a way that reflects a high concern for both their own and the other parties’ priorities. Workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure are also likely to demonstrate this balance of high concern. Reflecting this preference, they often attempt to resolve conflicts by examining the relevant issues from both sides, identifying and making trade-offs between the most and least important priorities and preferences, until a mutually optimal solution is found. Importantly, they are likely to attempt to do so without compromising either parties’ main goals.
Use of the Collaboration strategy has been positively associated with the simultaneous achievement of substantive and relational outcomes (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; Euwema et al., 2003), and is considered to be the most effective conflict management strategy (Gross & Guerrero, 2000). Workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure and influence others’ emotions are thus likely to achieve the best results from workplace conflicts, when circumstances permit this approach.

**EI and compromise.** Turning to Compromise, Emotional Management of Others was revealed to be the best predictor, explaining thirteen percent of variation. It appears that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions may also resort to resolving conflict in a way that reflects intermediate rather than high concern for either parties’ goals. That is, they may attempt to find a middle-of-the-road solution; one in which mutual concessions are made and matched to the extent that some primary goals are achieved but others are compromised.

Use of the Compromise strategy has not been meaningfully associated with substantive outcomes in previous research (Euwema et al., 2003; Gross & Guerrero, 2000). It has however been associated with positive relational outcomes to a small degree in one study (Gross & Guerrero, 2000), although no such associations were observed in another (Euwema et al., 2003).

While substantive outcomes are not more or less likely, the findings pertaining to Interpersonal Adaptability suggest that positive relational outcomes may indeed be more likely to occur for workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions. Compromise may therefore be the strategy of choice for such workers when the primary goals of conflicted parties are irreconcilable, and when future working relations are deemed more important than the attainment of personal goals.
The findings pertaining to each of these strategies are broadly supported by the research of Jordan and Troth (2002, 2004), which similarly associated emotional intelligence, as measured by the WEIP, with participants’ preferences for the five conflict management strategies. It is difficult to directly compare their findings to the present, however, since they merged their five WEIP EI subscales (which with the exception of Emotional Control are analogous to SUEIT EI aspects), into two measures that they labeled the “Ability to Deal with Own Emotions” and “Ability to Deal with Others’ Emotions”. Moreover, the Accommodation and Compromise scales were dropped in their 2004 study, due to poor reliability. Nevertheless, Jordan and Troth (2002, 2004) did observe positive correlations between both their ability measures and Collaboration and Force, reflecting similar associations as found here. The current study, however, having controlled for the relative influence of the six SUEIT EI aspects, provides a more fine-grained account of which EI aspects are the best predictors of the use of the these two strategies, as well as the use of Compromise.

Overall, the current findings emphasize the flexible approach that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions take to conflict management. They are likely to use any of the three foregoing strategies, or perhaps elements of each, to achieve conflict resolution. Notably, these are the most effective of the five (Euwema et al., 2003). One presumes that they tailor their tactics to fit prevailing priorities, and weigh the costs and benefits associated with the use of each strategy against these priorities. It is likely that when such workers find themselves in conflict with colleagues expressing very different goals, with whom they are unable to collaborate to create a solution that will satisfy both parties’ needs, and when they are unsuccessful or deem it inappropriate to force their own agenda, they see compromise
as the best remaining option. With such a flexible approach, and with their Interpersonal Adaptability in mind, they are much more likely than other workers to negotiate conflicts to a successful conclusion, whether in terms of substantive or relational outcomes, or both.

Of course, when these three strategies fail, the null correlations between Emotional Management of Others and the two remaining conflict management strategies suggest they are as likely as the next person to resort to the personally ineffectual Accommodation strategy, in which the goals of the other party are prioritized (Euwema et al., 2003), or the conflict Avoidance strategy, in which neither parties’ goals are addressed, to the detriment of both substantive and relational outcomes (De Dreu, 1997; Gross & Guerrero, 2000; Hocker & Wilmot, 1998).

Not to be discounted, workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure are also more likely to opt for the most effective strategy, Collaboration. Their confidence in their Creative Problem Solving and adaptive coping capacities is consistent with this preference. Their capacity to negotiate is less likely to be affected by the stress, uncertainty and urgency inherent to conflict situations, and they are more likely to develop creative solutions which benefit both parties. On the other hand, workers’ better able to manage their own emotions are most likely to use force to negotiate a resolution that benefits themselves only. Presumably, the latter workers use their ability to manage their emotions to present themselves in an authoritative light, to emphasize the importance of their own priorities, and to steel themselves against persuasive bargaining on the part of the other party. In both cases, such workers are likely to achieve substantive productive outcomes, though in the latter case, at the expense of ongoing working relations. Of course if these singular
strategies fail, these workers are as likely as not to adopt any of the remaining strategies.

In sum, the results of Study 3 suggest that workers with higher emotional intelligence are better at managing workplace conflicts, enhancing individual or team effectiveness to the benefit of their organization through the resolutions they negotiate.

**EI and Organizational Commitment**

Organizational Commitment has been valued primarily for its effects on employee retention, such that those who are more committed to their employing organization are less likely to leave (Meyer et al., 2001). When employee turnover is low, the costs of separation are less, including those arising from exit interviews, administration requirements, separation pay, and unemployment compensation. Likewise, replacement costs are less, including those associated with advertising, interviewing, and testing. Productivity costs are less as well, as are training costs. Moreover, employers can focus on developing the skills of committed employees rather than bringing new recruits up to speed (Tziner & Birati, 1996).

In recent years, Organizational Commitment has been partitioned into three distinct types; Affective, Normative and Continuance Commitment. As described in the introductory chapter, this is because each has been associated with other, equally important aspects of workplace functioning in addition to employee retention (see Meyer et al., 2001). In the current study, relations between EI and these three forms of Organizational Commitment were examined.

The analyses revealed that only Emotional Management of Self was significantly associated with Organizational Commitment, and with only one form, Affective Commitment, in which it explained nine percent of variation. This finding
is consistent with the connection between Emotional Management of Self and work-culture adaptability. It suggests that workers’ better able to repair negative emotions and generate positive ones within themselves are better able to tailor their goals, interests and values to those of their employing organization. In doing so, they develop a stronger emotional connection to their employer, find more personal meaning from their work, and experience a greater sense of belonging to their organization.

Notably, this form of commitment is most valued by employers (Carnevale et al., 1990). Workers with higher Affective Commitment typically exhibit higher performance than those committed for reasons reflecting the Normative type (who, for example, are committed due to a sense of loyalty, or due to the receipt of benefits), and particularly the Continuous type (who, for example, are committed due to the perceived costs of leaving, or a lack of employment alternatives). Their job satisfaction is typically higher as well, as is their attendance rate. They are also more likely to perform organizational citizenship behaviours, such as assuming voluntary responsibility for mentoring new employees, or helping others when their workloads are particularly heavy. Moreover, they are often able to maintain a better balance between work and family commitments (Meyer et al., 2001).

At the empirical level, the current findings are broadly supported by the research of Abraham (2000), in which higher SSRI EI scores were associated with moderately stronger Organizational Commitment within a sample of US healthcare, insurance, and telecommunications professionals. The current findings are similarly supported by the research of Carmeli (2003), in which higher SSRI EI scores were associated with marginally stronger Affective Organizational Commitment amongst senior financial managers in local Israeli government. Moreover, the particular
importance of Emotional Management of Self is supported by the research of Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002), who found moderately stronger Organizational Commitment amongst Greek mental health workers with higher scores on Tsaousis’ (2003) similar EIQ Controlling Emotions subscale.

On the other hand, the current findings are inconsistent with those of Sinha and Jain (2004), who found very weak associations between Indian manufacturing executives’ Affective and Normative Commitment, and their Reality Awareness scores. Extracted from Bar-On’s (1997) EQ-i measure, this EI factor most closely resembles the SUEIT Understanding Emotions External construct, in that it taps the ability to identify emotions in others and those permeating the environment. Of course, Sinha and Jain’s associations contrast with the strength of Abraham’s (2000) findings, and the particular value of Controlling Emotions in Nikolaou and Tsaousis’ (2002) study, as well. The research of Gelade, Dobson, and Gilbert (2006) suggests that cultural and economic factors particular to India may account for Sinha and Jain’s findings.

At the theoretical level, the current findings support the prevailing position that emotionally intelligent workers’ develop greater organizational attachment in the form of an Affective Commitment, rather than a Normative or Continuance Commitment (Abraham, 2000; Carmeli, 2003; Nikolaou & Tsaousis, 2002). As well, the link between Emotional Management of Self and Affective Commitment supports the position of Abraham as well as Carmeli, who argue that workers’ better able to manage their emotions are better equipped to generate the feelings of identification necessary to enhance their sense of connection to the organization, to enhance the personal meaning they derive from their work, and to maintain or buffer their affective commitment during difficult or trying periods. The current findings do not
however support Abraham’s contention that the strong working relationships generated by the interpersonal aspects of EI act to enhance workers’ Affective Commitment. Instead, the present findings suggest that Affective Commitment is independent of such abilities, and is thus independent of such relationships.

In summary, Emotional Management of Self appears to play a small but significant role in the generation of Affective Organizational Commitment, a role more important than other aspects of emotional intelligence. The commitment of workers with this EI ability is thus likely to be more valued by their employers, given the congruency between personal and organizational goals that affective commitment reflects, and higher retention rates and benefits to workplace functioning with which it is associated.

**EI and Achievement Motivation**

High achievers, in almost every context, share a common characteristic of high motivation. Their primary motivations to achieve are, however, frequently quite different. Some are intrinsically motivated by personal interest in an activity, and derive great satisfaction from its performance. Others are extrinsically motivated by the tangible rewards that result from an activity, such as social recognition, higher pay or promotion. Moreover, as detailed in the introduction, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are associated with higher performance in different work settings, as well as a range of other work-related outcomes. Intrinsic motivations for example are associated with higher performance on complex tasks, while extrinsic motivations are associated with higher performance on dull, repetitive tasks (Gagne & Deci, 2005).

Cassidy and Lyn (1989) take the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation a step further. They propose seven types of work-related Achievement Motivation which reflect more specific motivations underlying the original forms.
According to this format, intrinsic motivation is seen as encompassing Work Ethic, Pursuit of Excellence, and Mastery. Extrinsic motivation encompasses Status Aspiration, Competitiveness, Acquisitiveness, and Dominance. In Study 3, relations between emotional intelligence and these seven motivations were investigated. This investigation in particular was highly exploratory as no other study has considered such relations.

Generally speaking, workers with higher EI estimated themselves to be more motivated than those with lower EI. As with Adaptive Performance, however, the pattern of relations between the EI abilities and the seven Achievement Motivations was far from uniform. The analyses revealed that one or two EI abilities explained significant variation in five of the seven motivations, ranging from five percent in the case of Work Ethic to twenty six percent in the case of Pursuit of Excellence. And in most cases, as with the Conflict Management strategies, Emotional Management of Others was an important predictor.

EI and work ethic. With regard to the first Achievement Motivation, Work Ethic, Emotional Management of Others was identified as the best predictor, explaining five percent of variance. Such a small amount of variance, significant to $p < .05$, suggests that this finding may have been fortuitous. Nevertheless, in the present sample, workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions reported being slightly more intrinsically motivated than others to work hard for the simple sake of it, and found slightly greater satisfaction from doing so.

EI and the pursuit of excellence. In terms of the second Achievement Motivation, the Pursuit of Excellence, Emotional Management of Others was the best EI predictor, followed by Understanding Emotions External. Together they explained a substantial twenty six percent of variation. It appears that workers’ better able to
identify and influence others’ emotions are much more motivated than others to work
to the best of their ability. They find considerable satisfaction in exceeding their own
previous performance, even when they do not outperform others. This aspiration,
more closely than any other, reflects traditional notions of intrinsic motivation
(Cassidy & Lynn, 1989). This finding thus suggests, contrary to Goleman’s (1998)
position, that interpersonal EI abilities rather than the intrapersonal ability to self-
manage emotions are most closely related to intrinsic work motivation.

**EI and mastery.** In terms of the third Achievement Motivation, Mastery,
Understanding Emotions External was revealed to be the best predictor, explaining
fourteen percent of variation. It appears that workers’ better able to identify others’
emotions, and those that characterize the workplace climate, are more intrinsically
motivated to understand and master problem solving techniques to overcome difficult
tasks. This resonates with the confidence such workers displayed in their New
Learning competency, reflecting their penchant to seek out and learn new or more
effective ways to perform their jobs.

**EI and status aspiration.** With regard to Status Aspiration, Emotional
Management of Others was the best predictor, explaining a small nine percent of
variance. This suggests that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions are, to
a small but significant degree, more extrinsically motivated than others to achieve
higher social status, and the attention, admiration, and respect of others. This
motivation is consistent with their preferences for the Collaboration and Compromise
Conflict Management strategies, in which concerns for their own and the conflicted
parties’ goals, as well as their future working relationship, are given equal
consideration.
EI, competitiveness and acquisitiveness. In relation to the fifth and sixth Achievement Motivations, Competitiveness and Acquisitiveness, EI made no significant contribution to their prediction. It appears that emotionally intelligent workers are as extrinsically motivated to compete with their colleagues, and find as much satisfaction in winning as the next person. Likewise, they are as motivated to acquire money and material wealth as most workers. While no comparison can be drawn between Competitiveness and other criteria measured, the null association between EI and Acquisitiveness is consistent with the absence of relations between EI and Normative Organizational Commitment, in which the intent to remain with an employer is often based on the receipt or anticipation of tangible rewards.

EI and dominance. With regard to the seventh and final Achievement Motivation, Dominance, Emotional Management of Self and Emotional Management of Others were identified as the best EI predictors, explaining seventeen percent of variance. It appears that workers’ better able to manage their own emotions and influence others’ emotions are more likely to seek authority over their colleagues, and moreover, are motivated by belief in their capacity to be successful leaders. This extrinsic motive is consistent with the personal preference such workers demonstrated for the Force conflict management strategy, in which their own opinions and priorities are pressed on others.

It thus appears that workers with higher EI in terms of Emotional Management of Others, Understanding Emotions External, and Emotional Management of Self are much more motivated to achieve than those with lesser EI abilities, or those with other EI strengths. In the absence of similar previous empirical research, convergence between the motivations of workers with these EI abilities, their Adaptive Performance competencies, Conflict Management skills, and Organizational
Commitment, lends some weight to the validity of the current findings. The motivations expressed by workers with these EI abilities also offer some insight into why they have the employability skills they do.

In the first instance, the status and leadership aspirations held by workers skilled in influencing others’ emotions are consistent with their heightened levels of interpersonal adaptability, and their preferences for the most personally and interpersonally effective conflict management strategies. Using their emotional influence, they appear to develop highly productive working relations which further their status and leadership ambitions.

In the case of Understanding Emotions External, the motivations to better previous personal performance and master new skill sets, held by emotionally perceptive workers, are consistent with their confidence in anticipating and adapting to new work processes, procedures and equipment, as well as their work-culture adaptability. Awareness and interest in colleagues’ emotional fluctuations and the emotional climate of the workplace could thus be seen to reflect a broader, underlying interest and openness to progress-related change, and the challenges associated with adapting to such.

With regard to Emotional Management of Self, the singular motivation to dominate or lead one’s colleagues, held by workers’ skilled in managing their own emotions, is consistent with their forceful, domineering approach to conflict management, and their heightened sense of emotional attachment to the employing organization. They generally believe that their values and goals are more congruent with those of the employing organization when compared to their colleagues, and, lacking the interpersonal skills and subtler persuasion skills of those able to understand and influence others’ emotions, attempt to dominate or force others into
achieving what they are likely to perceive as both personally relevant and organizationally relevant goals.

Viewed in this light, the results are generally consistent with Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre’s (1989) position that workers are motivated to achieve in ways that reflect and challenge their existing skills. However, a number of findings observed here are incongruous with this position as well. The most outstanding relate to the lack of importance of Emotional Management of Self in predicting the intrinsic Work Ethic, Excellence, and Mastery motivations, and the importance of Understanding Emotions External and Emotional Management of Others in predicting such. As Goleman (1998) theorized and Abraham’s (2000) position suggested, one would expect the drive to work hard, to better personal performance, and master occupational skills to be more strongly associated with the ability to emotionally manage oneself so as to self-stimulate the positive attitudes necessary to do so. The lack of importance of Emotional Management of Self in predicting these motivations is all the more curious given the greater personal commitment that workers’ with this EI ability seem to have to achieving organizationally relevant goals.

The fact that interpersonal EI abilities, Emotional Management of Others and Understanding Emotions External, were better predictors of these intrinsic work motivations, and that the influence of the former extended to extrinsic motivations as well, suggests that the interpersonal hierarchical workplace environment may be one in which workers’ with such abilities find their motivations more compatible with the means by which organizational goals are achieved. As Carnevale et al.’s (1990) research indicates, in the contemporary workplace, few significant personal achievements are made without significant input or collaboration with others.
This may explain why workers’ better able to manage their own emotions seem more preoccupied with dominating others than developing their own skills in their pursuit of organizationally relevant goals. Considered in the same light, the intrinsic motivations of workers’ better able to identify and understand others’ emotions could be seen to reflect the desire to be excellent or masterful team contributors. Such an explanation is congruent with a commingled view of their New Learning and Interpersonal Adaptability skills. In the case of workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions, their intrinsic motivations to work hard, and to excel at what they do, also make sense in this context, reflecting interest in gaining the respect of colleagues, and excelling in positions of authority.

While such interpretations are of course quite speculative, some support for these views can be drawn from the fact that the majority of participants in Study 3 were employed in roles where interpersonal tasks dominate, and where success is presumably measured in like terms. That is, close to sixty percent were employed in managerial roles, nursing, teaching, academia, training, sales, or customer service roles. In such positions, persons with stronger interpersonal EI abilities would likely find their work goals much more compatible with their motivations as described above. Further investigation of why workers’ with particular EI abilities are differentially motivated, and whether these differences remain consistent across job types where interpersonal tasks are less of a focus would clearly be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Overall, the current findings suggest that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions are likely to be much more achievement-oriented than their colleagues. They enjoy working slightly harder for the simple sake of it, appear much more motivated than others to work to the best of their ability and to better their
previous performance. As well, they are likely to strive for higher status positions, and to dominate and lead others. Given this balance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, they are likely to find satisfaction and perform well on both complex, challenging tasks, and less interesting, repetitive tasks that require persistence. And, given that most occupations encompass both complex and repetitive tasks, those with this EI ability are likely to function at a higher level overall when compared to equally experienced and educated colleagues.

Workers’ better able to identify and understand others’ emotions are also likely to be more achievement-oriented than others, though in an intrinsic sense. Like those foregoing, they tend to compete with their own standards of excellence rather than those set by others, and are more motivated to perform to their best, and better, on complex, challenging tasks. And unique to workers with this EI ability, they are more likely to distinguish themselves from their colleagues by their drive to master the skills necessary to complete such tasks in the most efficient way.

Workers’ better able to manage their own emotions are likely to distinguish themselves from their colleagues as well, by their drive to dominate and lead others. Leadership opportunities or situations in which such workers may be afforded power over others are thus likely to result in a level of performance that exceeds that of their colleagues. Moreover, given the extrinsic nature of this motivation, their performance may be even stronger when compared to their colleagues, on less complex or repetitive tasks.

In sum, workers with higher EI, in terms of Emotional Management of Others, Understanding Emotions External, and Emotional Management of Self, appear to be much more achievement-oriented than their less emotionally intelligent peers,
reflecting attitudes to work which are highly regarded by employers (Carnevale et al., 1990).

**Methodological Considerations and Directions for Future Research**

The organizational psychology constructs measured in Study 3 have provided self-estimated approximations for half of the sixteen “employability skills” that employers, human resource experts, and experts in the fields of economics, education, training, public policy and strategic management deem necessary for success in the contemporary workplace (Carnevale et al., 1990). Specifically, learning to learn, creative thinking and problem solving skills have been estimated by the similarly named Adaptive Performance competencies. Self-concept management has been estimated by the three Adaptive Performance coping competencies, and more generally by confidence in the Adaptive Performance competencies overall. Motivation/goal-setting has been represented by the Achievement Motivations. Career orientation has been represented by Organizational Commitment. Interpersonal skills, teamwork, and negotiation skills have been estimated by the interpersonal and work-culture Adaptive Performance competencies and Conflict Management strategy preferences.

In each case, particular EI abilities were found to be valuable in their prediction. The odds are thus that workers with a broad range of higher EI abilities are likely to stand out from their less intelligent counterparts in terms of their employability skills. What remains to be established is whether emotionally intelligent workers are, or at least estimate themselves to be, more competent in the remaining eight employability skills, and which of their EI abilities matter most in their prediction. The skills remaining include reading, writing, and computational
skills, speaking and listening skills, and skills in understanding and developing organizational effectiveness, and leadership sharing.

The presumption here has been of course that EI, as self-estimated and construed by the SUEIT, translates into actual ability, and likewise, that self-estimates for the constructs reflecting the employability skills translate into actual competencies, approaches to negotiation, commitment and motivations, on the job. Performance measures for the EI abilities, the use of objective job performance ratings, and observation of employees’ workplace behaviour would clearly add much predictive validity to similar future studies.

Another methodological issue to consider is that the findings of Study 3 and subsequent interpretations have been based on a relatively small sample of 105 self-selected, computer literate workers: the majority of whom were well-educated, fully employed women. Replication of the present study with a larger, heterogeneous sample with a cases-to-IV ratio of at least 40:1 needs to occur before the conclusions to which the current findings lead can be considered sound and generalized with more certainty to the wider working population (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).

A further issue, one which has received little attention in the current study, concerns the well-established value of IQ in predicting job performance: the correlate being around $r = .5$ across all job families. Indeed, it is said to be the single most powerful predictor of performance. Moreover, higher IQ is associated to various degrees with stronger negotiation skills, faster career progression, and higher socio-economic status (Gottfredson, 1997). Such associations clearly suggest the presence of stronger employability skills amongst those with higher IQ. Future research would thus do well to explore the relative concurrent and incremental importance of abilities comprising EI and IQ in predicting the various employability skills. A future project
which accounted for each of the foregoing issues would be influential indeed. It would establish the actual value of EI in the eyes of employers and academics alike, and serve as a benchmark study for future in-depth investigation of its value to particular careers and organizations.

Summary

The current findings go some way to challenging the rather extravagant, black and white claim that, “In the corporate world, IQ gets you hired but EQ gets you promoted” (Gibbs, 1995; p. 59). The current findings similarly challenge the cautionary claim that the usefulness of EI is limited to particular roles, and that EI as a selection criterion, “should be used only where warranted by the job description” (Matthews et al., 2002, p. 506). The benefits of EI may indeed be more obvious in emotionally laborious occupations, such as psychotherapy or social work, and the benefits of IQ more obvious in intellectually rigorous occupations, such as research analysis or computer programming. But the Adaptive Performance competencies, Conflict Management strategy preferences, Affective Organizational Commitment, and Achievement Motivations which EI predicted here, are, according to Carnevale et al.’s (1990) seminal work, important to career success across all job families, “at all levels of employment and with all levels of education” (Overtoom, 2001, p.1).

The current findings do of course suggest that workers with singular EI talents are likely to be better suited to some careers than others. Emotional Management of Others, or the ability to influence others’ emotions, appears particularly useful in roles where interpersonal adaptability is important, and where a highly flexible approach to conflict negotiation is required. Moreover, workers with this EI ability are likely to perform at a higher level than similarly experienced or educated colleagues, in roles
which challenge them to perform to the best of their abilities, or when opportunities to
improve status or achieve leadership positions present themselves.

Emotional Management of Self, or the ability to regulate one’s own emotions,
appears to be most useful in roles where adaptation to different work cultures is
important, where crises need to be managed, where a forceful, unrelenting approach to
conflict negotiation is required, and where a high level of emotional commitment to
the employing organization is desired. Opportunities to dominate or lead others
appear likely to motivate such workers to perform to a higher level than their
colleagues.

Understanding Emotions External, or the ability to identify and understand
others’ emotions, and more broadly, accurately gauge the emotional climate of the
workplace, appears particularly important in roles where interpersonal or work-culture
adaptability is required. This ability also appears to be of benefit in roles where
adaptation to changing technology or work processes is important. Reflecting this,
workers with this EI ability are likely to perform better than similarly experienced or
educated colleagues in roles where complex tasks prevail: tasks which not only
challenge them to perform to the best of their abilities, but afford them the opportunity
to master their skill sets.

Emotional Control, or the ability to think clearly while experiencing strong
emotions, appears to be most valuable in roles where uncertainty, crises, and stress
dominate, and where creative problem solving is a priority. As well, in situations
where the primary goals of different parties come into conflict, yet must be achieved
and relations maintained, this EI ability like Emotional Management of Others
appears to play an important role.
On the other hand, Emotional Recognition in Self, or the ability to detect and distinguish between personal emotions, and Personal Expression, or the ability to clearly express emotions, appear to be of no unique benefit to workplace adaptation, conflict management, commitment, or motivation: their associations with these domains having been accounted for by their relationships to the foregoing four EI aspects. Thus while in themselves characteristic of higher EI, and important to life event distress resilience (Study 1) and romantic relationship enhancing behaviour (Study 2), they are highly unlikely to distinguish between workers with higher and lower employability skills in terms of those examined here.

In conclusion, Study 3 provides much new evidence as to the role of emotional intelligence in the workplace. Relations between the various EI abilities and the constructs reflecting the “employability skills” suggest that emotionally intelligent workers have many of the skills necessary to succeed in the contemporary workplace: skills that distinguish them from less emotionally intelligent workers of similar education and experience. The current findings, while unique in many respects, are largely consistent with EI theory, as well as studies of the role of EI in predicting similar constructs in other related contexts. Study 3 thus speaks to the future promise of EI as a selection tool and a focus of training, in order to improve the fit between workers’ capacities and the skills employers’ want.

**General Discussion**

The person who is resilient in the face of life’s inevitable negative experiences, who can establish a lasting intimate romantic connection with another individual, and who can achieve a high level of occupational value is thought to be well on the way to living a meaningful, satisfying, and ultimately successful life (Ciarrochi et al., 2001). The issues addressed in this dissertation were whether
emotional intelligence, as measured by the Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT), predicts criteria relating to success in each of these life domains, and whether particular EI abilities are more important for some domains rather than others. And in each case, this was so.

In terms of coping with negative life events, Study 1 found that Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and particularly Emotional Management of Self discriminated between those least affected and those most affected. They accounted for more than thirty percent of variance in membership to the vulnerable, average, and resilient latent classes. EI, it appears, in the form of these three abilities, augments psychological resilience to life event distress.

In relation to romantic relationship adjustment, considered in Study 2, again both Personal Expression and Emotional Management of Self, were the most important contributors, with these EI aspects impacting on four highly influential relationship-enhancing communication behaviours: Validation, Expressivity, Focusing, and Negativity – behaviours which themselves explained more than sixty percent of variance in adjustment. With the exception of Emotional Control, the remaining EI abilities made valuable contributions to romantic adjustment as well, through singular effects on these or a smaller range of communication behaviours. Although EI was only weakly directly related to adjustment, emotional intelligent partners nevertheless appear to communicate in the most relationship enhancing ways.

Finally, in relation to workplace functionality, Study 3 indicated that all but Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression made unique and important contributions. The EI abilities explained an average of sixteen percent of variance across sixteen of the twenty-two constructs measured, constructs which approximate half of the skills employers’ most value. Moreover, respective contributions of EI
aspects were generally balanced and complimentary. Emotional Management of Others was important in the prediction of eight workplace constructs, while Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Control, and Emotional Management of Self were each important in the prediction of five. It appears that workers with a broad range of EI abilities have decidedly stronger employability skills than their less emotionally intelligent counterparts, in terms of adaptability, conflict management, commitment, and motivation. Presumably because of these EI abilities, they are likely to perform to higher standards, and make contributions of greater importance during the course of their working lives.

As such, the three studies have demonstrated a variety of ways in which emotional intelligence benefits each of the three life domains. In particular, the studies have provided new insights into the relative impact of the six EI abilities on psychological resilience, romantic relationship adjustment and communication behaviour, and workplace functioning. Their unique effects in each study, summarised in the remainder of this chapter, illustrate some general patterns concerning the benefits of each ability, as well as limitations as to the contexts in which these benefits apply.

**Emotional Recognition in Self**

As shown in Study 1, persons’ better able to detect and distinguish between their emotions appear, to a small but unique extent, to be more resilient to life event distress. This is consistent with the view that emotional self-awareness promotes efficient monitoring and deployment of coping resources. Early awareness of distress provides opportunities to respond before symptoms become more intrusive, and their effects more pervasive (Martin & Pihl, 1985; Naatanen et al., 1999).
The communication behaviours through which Emotional Recognition in Self positively influenced romantic relationship adjustment in Study 2 are congruent with this view as well. Specifically, it had small unique relationships with Editing and Withdrawal behaviours, each of which mediated the connection of Emotional Recognition in Self with adjustment. Emotionally self-aware persons, therefore, prefer to edit or cognitively reframe negative thoughts and feelings about their partners when they arise. They also prefer to engage rather than withdraw from their partners during heated discussions. They thus make more efforts to control defensive reactions to partner messages, invest more effort in maintaining a positive internal representation of their partner, are less likely to stonewall, and are more likely to discuss important or contentious relationship issues to a conclusion. These behaviours provide insights into the kinds of coping resources self-monitoring persons deploy to counter personal tension and augment intimate relationships.

Interestingly though, as shown in Study 3, the benefits of Emotional Recognition in Self do not appear to translate into similar outcomes or behaviours in the workplace. First, heightened self-awareness did not translate into task-focused behaviours to deal with stressful or negative workplace events. Persons with higher emotional self-awareness were as competent as the next person at meeting tight deadlines or juggling heavy workloads, responding to unforeseen difficulties, or averting crises. The findings of Study 1 do suggest, of course, that such persons would be less likely to develop symptoms from exposure to these kinds of events, or recover faster if they did.

Second, the Editing and engagement behaviours reported by such persons in Study 2 did not translate into similar conflict management behaviour in Study 3. During interpersonal conflicts, emotionally self-aware workers pressed their agendas
at the expense of working relations as often as they edited their agendas in attempts to maintain relations. Likewise, they actively sought solutions to conflicts as often as they prematurely withdrew before solutions could be realised. As well, they reported being as successful at developing working relationships as those who were less aware.

It is useful to note that Emotional Recognition in Self did correlate positively with the content of a number of workplace competencies, including Coping with Uncertainty, Handling Crises, and the most effective conflict management approach, Collaboration. Yet, in each case, correlations with emotional self-awareness were rendered insignificant when relationships to the other EI abilities were statistically controlled. It is also important to emphasise that where it did exert an influence, in studies 1 and 2, the effects were weak. Such strengths are consistent with the logic that self-awareness alone does not necessarily lead to deployment of the most appropriate emotional resources. It does not, however, preclude opportunities to do so.

In sum, the ability to detect and distinguish between one’s emotions appears to play a small, unique role in mitigating personal distress in the aftermath of one or more negative life events. Emotional self-awareness also appears to result in more frequent Editing and less frequent Withdrawal behaviours, which in turn influence romantic relations for the better. Yet, its effects do not appear to translate into workplace functionality, in terms of achieving stressful work goals, communicating more effectively, or developing better relationships with colleagues. Nor does this ability appear to exert any influence over the other employability skills investigated.

**Personal Expression**

Personal Expression of emotion, like Emotional Recognition in Self, discriminated to a small extent between those who were more or less resilient in
dealing with negative life events in Study 1. Comparatively though, its unique effect was twice as strong. This difference in effect is consistent with the logic that emotional self-awareness facilitates identification of distress symptoms, but not necessarily deployment of effective coping strategies. Emotional expression, on the other hand, is an explicit act which has been shown to discharge or at least attenuate such symptoms (e.g., J. J. Gross & Levenson, 1997). Furthermore, as research has shown, expressive persons are generally liked much better than less expressive persons. Consequently, they are likely to have wider, more supportive social networks which further contribute to their resilience (Bonanno, 2001).

The findings of Study 2 are consistent with, and compliment the latter research as well. Personal Expression was found to have small to large unique effects on five relationship-enhancing communication behaviours: Feedback, Validation, Withdrawal, Expressivity, and Leveling. Relative to persons with other EI strengths, these findings suggest that those better able to clearly express their emotions communicate with their romantic partners through the widest range of relationship enhancing communication behaviours, including the two most effective. They appear to show greater interest in their partners, asking questions with a view to better understanding their thoughts, feelings, and points of view. They listen more attentively to their partners, and express greater value in their disclosures, as well. On occasions when discussions become difficult or heated, they are more inclined to work through the issues than disengage or withdraw. They also appear to disclose their feelings to partners more often, and make conscious attempts to do so clearly, constructively, and simply. Such findings offer insight into why expressive persons are more well-liked, and the means by which they develop stronger, intimate relationships.
With Personal Expression being clearly connected to resilience, and its breadth of influence over communication behaviour in mind, it might seem strange that similar effects were not found in the workplace. In Study 3, Personal Expression did not correlate with, let alone explain, unique variance in the three adaptive coping competencies, nor interpersonal adaptability, or any of the five conflict management strategies. In fact, the only workplace construct it did correlate with was the intrinsic work ethic motivation, and this relationship was accounted for by other EI abilities. However, these null associations are consistent with the view that the conservative structuring of the traditional workplace environment purposefully restrains emotional expression and the development of emotional connections between colleagues. Emotional expressions which transgress a very limited acceptable range, from mild positive displays in the case of subordinates to mild negative displays for supervisors, are generally viewed pejoratively and implicitly or explicitly punished. This is because they are believed to impair personal performance and interfere with the performance of others (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). As such, opportunities to attenuate debilitating workplace stress through emotional discharge, and to advance and invoke social support through expression are quite restricted. These restrictions might well account for the null effects of Personal Expression in Study 3.

In sum, the ability to clearly articulate one’s feelings appears to play a unique yet small role in ameliorating life event distress, and a much larger role in facilitating romantic relationship adjustment through its broad influence over communication behaviour. But, these effects do not appear to translate to workplace functionality, in terms of achieving stressful work goals, communicating more effectively, or developing better relationships with colleagues. Nor do its effects appear to extend to any of the other employability skills investigated.
**Understanding Emotions External**

Unlike the two previous EI abilities, Understanding Emotions External was found to play no unique role in Study 1. Ability to detect and understand others’ emotions, as well as those within the environment, did not discriminate between persons who were more or less resilient in the aftermath of multiple negative life events. Thus, no evidence was found for the resilience (e.g., Vaillant, 2000) nor the vulnerability (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000) sometimes attributed to heightened perspective-taking ability and empathic ability.

The effects of Understanding Emotions External in Study 2 were very limited as well. Although significantly associated with all eight romantic relationship-enhancing communication behaviours, it had a small unique effect on only one: Validation. Emotionally perceptive persons were more likely to listen attentively to their partners and express value in their partners’ points of view. This attention, in turn, had a positive impact on their relationships.

While validating behaviours are what one would expect of persons’ attuned to their partners’ emotions, and who value their relationships, it appears that this EI ability does not influence adjustment in a number of other ways suggested by previous research. Persons’ more in touch with their partners’ emotions, do not, for instance, appear to invest more time in exploring why their partners feel the way they do. Nor do they appear to edit their thoughts or behaviours when their partners are upset, refrain from criticism, or make more efforts to explain themselves when misunderstood. Instead, such behaviours seem better explained by other EI abilities. This suggests that the conclusions of a number of previous studies (e.g., Davis & Oathout, 1987; Noller & Ruzzene, 1991; Rusbult et al. 1991), which emphasised connections between constructs similar to Understanding Emotions External and these
behaviours, may have been quite different if the influence of other emotion-related abilities had been accounted for.

With these limitations in mind, it is interesting that in Study 3, Understanding Emotions External played a more important role than other EI abilities in predicting Interpersonal and Work-culture Adaptability. In both cases, its unique effects were moderate. This suggests that persons’ better able to detect and understand others’ emotions, and the emotional climate of the work environment, use this information to form productive working relations with colleagues of different personalities, skill orientations, and experience, and to adjust their behaviour to suit the dominating customs, values, rules and structures of unfamiliar departments or organizations.

When its effects in Studies 2 and 3 are considered together, it appears that enhanced emotional perceptiveness has limited value in romantic relationships, within which emotional communication channels are generally open, and considerable value in workplace relationships, within which such channels are restricted. The former makes sense when one considers that failure to implicitly understand a partner’s feelings can be readily rectified through dialogue, as evidenced by the powerful effects of communication behaviour in Study 2. On the other hand, in the traditional workplace setting, explicit dialogues of this kind are deemed inappropriate, discouraged and even punished (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). Ability to perceive and engage with implicit emotional information may thus take the place of such communication. These contextual differences may explain why the ability to identify and understand others’ emotional signals, and thus engage on a covert emotional level, seems more important to the development of workplace relations than romantic relations.
In Study 3, Understanding Emotions External was also found to be the only unique EI predictor of New Learning adaptive competence. Its effect was small, however. This finding suggests that heightened awareness of emotional fluctuations in colleagues and the environment can benefit workers’ capacity to anticipate impending workplace changes, and re-skill in a timely fashion. The small to moderately stronger intrinsic motivations reported by workers with higher ability, specifically to excel at what they do and master new skills sets, compliment and are consistent with this competence as well. Together, these findings suggest that awareness and interest in colleagues’ emotional fluctuations and the emotional climate of the workplace is connected to a broader, underlying interest and openness to progress-related change, and the challenges associated with adapting to such changes.

In sum, heightened awareness of others’ emotions seems to play no unique role in ameliorating life event distress, and only a small role in facilitating romantic relationship adjustment, through more frequent Validation behaviour. In the workplace, however, it appears to play an important role in facilitating Interpersonal and Work-culture Adaptability, and is connected to interest in learning and mastering new skills, and excelling in their application.

Emotional Control

Like Understanding Emotions External, Emotional Control played no unique role in Study 1. The ability to think clearly while experiencing strong emotions did not uniquely discriminate between persons who were more or less resilient to life event distress. Nor did this ability play a unique role in the prediction of any of the eight relationship-enhancing communication behaviours in Study 2, though it correlated with seven. It thus appears that Emotional Control has little to no effect on
resilience or romantic relationships when one accounts for the influence of other EI abilities.

While this is so, Emotional Control made a number of valuable contributions in Study 3. In particular, it was the most dominant predictor of the three adaptive coping competencies: Coping with Stress, Coping with Uncertainty, and Handling Crises. Workers’ better able to think clearly under pressure were more competent at meeting tight deadlines or juggling heavy workloads, responding to unforeseen difficulties, and dealing with crisis situations. These findings might seem curious given its null prediction of resilience in Study 1, but the contrast in findings seems to reflect inherent differences in the constructs measured. Specifically, the workplace coping constructs reflect competence in achieving productive outcomes when stressful workplace events occur. Resilience to life-event distress, on the other hand, reflects competence in coping with the subjective psychological aftermath of events such as these. The findings thus suggest that persons with high Emotional Control are less likely to focus on or become distracted by their emotional response to such events. Instead, they are more likely to remain task-focused, that is, focused on finding solutions and responding productively. This does not, however, translate into coping more effectively with the psychological stress resulting from the events themselves. Instead, as shown in Study 1, the abilities to detect, express, and regulate one’s emotions, better explain the latter. Such findings offer insight into the different means by which emotional intelligence influences adaptation to stress.

Consistent with and complimenting this explanation, Emotional Control was found to be the only unique EI predictor of creative problem solving. Its connection to this construct was moderate. This finding suggests that the ability to think clearly under pressure augments workers’ capacity to design new workplace procedures and
processes, solve problems for which there are no straightforward answers, and find innovative ways to improve the quality of products, services and systems.

Emotional Control was also found to be one of the most important predictors of the use of a collaborative conflict management strategy, though the unique effect was small. When in conflict, rather than prioritize their own concerns, workers with better Emotional Control are more likely to examine the relevant issues from both sides, and negotiate trade-offs between the most and least important priorities, until a mutually optimal solution is found. This suggests that their capacity to manage interpersonal conflicts in the workplace is less affected by the stress, uncertainty and urgency inherent to such situations, as well.

In sum, Emotional Control appears to have no unique impact on resilience to life event distress, romantic relationship communication behaviour or adjustment. In the workplace, however, this ability appears to make important contributions to surmounting stressful, uncertain, and crises situations, to solving problems creatively, and negotiating conflicts to productive, mutually beneficial ends.

Emotional Management of Self

While the foregoing four EI abilities made important contributions to one or two studies, Emotional Management of Self made valuable contributions to all three. In Study 1, persons’ better able to repair their negative moods and generate positive ones, suffered less distress following multiple negative events than those less able. Furthermore, the strength with which Emotional Management of Self discriminated between more and less resilient participants was almost five times that of Personal Expression and nine times that of Emotional Recognition in Self, after accounting for both, clearly making this the most important predictor of resilience. As well, it subsumed the role played by Emotional Control, incorporating the extent to which
participants’ ability to think clearly and concentrate in highly stressful circumstances initially discriminated between the Life Event Distress profiles. Through their ability to self-manage emotions, participants appear to have been able to maintain a more positive state of mind and think clearly so that their ability to function was not overwhelmed by the emotional experience of multiple negative life events.

This finding is consistent with research directly linking various measures of ability to self-manage emotions to a range of positive mental and physical health outcomes, in different populations and under different circumstances (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002; Goldman et al., 1996; Salovey et al., 2002; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005). Notably however, the present finding is the first to support the contention of many EI theorists that emotional self-management is particularly relevant to adaptive coping (Matthews et al., 2002).

Emotional Management of Self played a similarly important role in Study 2. Not only was it found to be the best direct EI predictor of romantic relationship adjustment, it accounted for all the unique variance in adjustment explained by the other EI aspects. This finding suggests that partners’ ability to repair their own negative emotions and generate positive ones is more directly important to romantic relationship success than any other EI ability. Notably, however, the variance it explained was small. Its value to the direct prediction of adjustment is thus quite limited, and the value of other EI aspects, even less so.

Nonetheless, like the other EI aspects, it was found to be a stronger predictor of relationship-enhancing behaviour. Indeed, it was the only EI aspect to explain unique variance in Negativity and Focusing behaviour: two of the four best predictors of adjustment. And, it exerted moderate effects on both. These findings suggest that ability to self-soothe results in less provocation, criticism, and cross-complaining, and
more attempts to keep discussions of difficult issues on track. It also made a small unique contribution to the prediction of a third adjustment-enhancing behaviour: Editing. This EI ability thus also appears to increase propensity to reframe negative thoughts and feelings about partners, and reframe negative partner messages. These behaviours, reflecting efforts to exert intrapersonal control, are clearly what one would expect from persons exercising emotional self-management skills.

Its effects in Study 3 are consistent with such skills, as well. While not more competent at juggling heavy workloads or responding to unforeseen difficulties, workers with stronger emotion regulation ability, appear, to a small extent, to be more competent at dealing with extreme situations, such as crises, where quick analyses of situations and decision-making are required. Moreover, the findings of Study 1 suggest that such workers are likely to rebound much more quickly from the psychological impact of these, as well as less extreme workplace events.

The findings of Study 3 also suggest that workers’ skilled in managing their emotions, are, to a moderate extent, better able to tailor their own goals, interests and values to those of their employing organization. In doing so, they develop a stronger emotional connection to their employer, find more personal meaning from their work, and experience a greater sense of belonging to their organization. Complimenting this, they appear to be more flexible and open-minded when dealing with unfamiliar departments or organizations. Like emotionally perceptive persons, they use their emotional intelligence to adjust their behaviour to suit the customs and values of those with whom they interact. These findings, together, suggest that they may distinguish themselves from their colleagues by their capacity to effectively represent their employers’ values within other organizations.
When their goals or those they represent clash with those of others, however, they are likely to be less than flexible. The findings indicated that they are most likely to adopt a forceful conflict management approach in which they push their own priorities, search for personal gains, and show little concern for the other parties’ goals. Yet, they are likely to do so quite calmly, without resorting to personal attacks, and with their employer’s best interests in mind, if their resilience to distress, competence in handling crises, affective commitment, and relationship communication behaviours are any indication.

Perhaps not so surprisingly then, Emotional Management of Self was also found to have a small unique effect on a single achievement motivation: Dominance. It appears that workers with higher EI ability are more focused on achieving authority over their colleagues than pursuing personal excellence or mastering tasks: their latter drives being as strong as the next worker. They appear to envisage themselves having a greater impact on organizational goals through leading others, than developing their own goal-specific skills.

In sum, the ability to repair negative emotions and generate positive ones appears to play a decisive role in ameliorating life event distress. It also appears to influence romantic relationship adjustment directly, to a small degree, and indirectly to a larger degree, through Editing behaviour, and abstinence from Negativity and Withdrawal. In addition, it effects translate into stronger employability skills, in terms of desire to lead, Handling Crises, Work-culture Adaptability, Affective Organizational Commitment, and negotiating conflicts to personally productive ends.

**Emotional Management of Others**

Turning finally to Emotional Management of Others, it too, like Emotional Control and Understanding Emotions External played no unique role in Study 1. The
ability to influence and regulate others’ emotions did not distinguish between persons who were more or less resilient to life event distress. Although consistent with research to have examined similar effects (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2000), its lack of impact might be considered surprising by some, given past links between this ability and enhanced social support (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan et al., 2001). Nevertheless, this finding, coupled with a similar absence of effect in the case of Understanding Emotions External, speaks to the greater importance of intrapersonal EI abilities that address life event distress directly, and the lesser importance of interpersonal EI abilities that address life event distress indirectly, through mediating mechanisms such as social support.

The unique effects of Emotional Management of Others in Study 2 were also more limited than one might expect. Although significantly associated with all eight romantic relationship-enhancing communication behaviours, it explained unique variance in just two. Specifically, it exerted a moderate effect on Feedback and a small effect on Expressivity. Persons better able to manage others’ emotions reported making more frequent efforts to understand their partners’ thoughts and feelings, by asking clarifying questions and paraphrasing partner responses. They also reported sharing their own feelings with their partners more often. It appears that through this sequence of give and take, such persons are able influence their partners’ feelings, and their relationships, for the better.

In Study 3, the effects of Emotional Management of Others were stronger and more pervasive. Indeed, it explained unique variance in eight of the workplace constructs: three more than any other EI ability. In the first case, it exerted a moderate effect on Interpersonal Adaptability. This suggests that workers’ skilled in influencing others’ emotions listen to and consider colleagues’ points of view more
fully, are able attune themselves to others’ needs and values, and are better able to adjust the way they interact to suit and influence colleagues with different personalities, skill orientations, and experience. In doing so, they influence colleagues’ emotions, and their working relationships, for the better.

Unique connections between Emotional Management of Others and the three most effective conflict management strategies compliment the foregoing finding. Specifically, Emotional Management of Others had a small influence on Force and Collaboration, and was the only EI aspect to explain unique variance in Compromise, over which it had a moderate influence. These findings suggest that workers’ skilled in managing others’ emotions tailor their negotiation tactics to fit prevailing priorities, and weigh the costs and benefits associated with the use of each strategy against these priorities. It seems likely that when such workers find themselves in conflict with colleagues expressing very different goals, with whom they are unable to collaborate to create a solution that will satisfy both parties’ needs, and when they are unsuccessful or deem it inappropriate to force their own agenda, they see compromise as the best option. With such a flexible approach, they are much more likely than workers with other EI strengths to negotiate conflicts to a successful conclusion, whether in terms of substantive or relational outcomes, or both.

Emotional Management of Others also had the broadest and strongest effects on Achievement Motivation. In particular, it was the only unique EI predictor of Work Ethic, though its influence was very small, and was the only unique predictor of Status Aspiration, over which its influence was moderate. It had a moderate influence over Excellence, and a small influence over Dominance, as well. These findings suggest that workers’ better able to influence others’ emotions enjoy working slightly harder for the simple sake of it, and are more motivated than others to work to the best
of their ability, and to better previous performance. They also strive for high status positions and desire to dominate and lead others more so than their colleagues. Together, these motivations suggest that such workers impress by example. They are likely work hard to gain the respect of colleagues, and to excel in positions of authority.

In sum, Emotional Management of Others appears to have no unique impact on resilience to life event distress. And, it only plays a minor role in facilitating romantic relationship adjustment through more frequent Expressivity and Feedback behaviour. In the workplace, on the other hand, its effects are marked. It plays an important role in facilitating Interpersonal Adaptability, and a more important role than any other EI ability in managing workplace conflicts. It is also more strongly connected to Achievement Motivation than any other EI aspect, with higher ability manifesting in a stronger work ethic, pursuit of personal excellence, and pursuit of status and leadership positions.

General Methodological Considerations and Directions for Future Research

The simplest conclusion one can derive from the aggregated findings is that emotional intelligence does indeed contribute to a psychologically healthier if not happier, romantically satisfying, and vocationally successful life. Nevertheless, as illustrated here and throughout, the ways in which it contributes are far from simple. The diverse effects of each EI aspect emphasise the importance of context, latent classes, mediator variables, and the relative influence of other EI abilities, when attempting to determine how exactly emotional intelligence exerts its influence.

The interpretations of findings, their caveats, and their connections to extant theory and research, have indicated numerous avenues for future research. These have been discussed in the body of each study. An array of methodological issues
have also been discussed, and these may inform future research as well. A number of
the issues raised are unique to the particular studies. Some apply equally to all three.
The three which seem most important, are reiterated here.

Perhaps the most important issue concerns the presumption that EI, as self-
estimated and construed by the SUEIT, translates into actual abilities, and likewise,
that self-estimates for the constructs in each study translate into actual mental health
outcomes, dyadic adjustment and behaviours, and workplace functioning. While due
consideration has been given to the nature and properties of the scales used, the use of
performance–based EI measures, behavioural observation, objective outcome criteria,
and longitudinal consideration of bi-directional effects between EI and outcome
criteria would clearly add much weight to the findings of similar future investigations.

The second issue concerns the statistical analyses employed in studies 2 and
3. Although the exploratory stepwise regression analyses offer new insights into the
relative influence of the EI aspects, the sample sizes of around one-hundred are far
less than the 240 recommended given number of EI aspects involved. Replication of
these studies with a cases-to-IV ratio of at least 40:1 needs to occur before the
conclusions can be considered sound and generalized with more certainty.

Thirdly, consideration must be given to the participant recruitment method
employed in all three studies. Although a large number of highly active, study-
specific, internet forums were targeted, in each case the respective forum moderators,
and then members, chose whether or not to engage with the study. The results were
thus influenced by both moderators’ and members’ personal interests and views of the
worth of the project, resulting in exclusion or selection bias. Furthermore, the
question remains as to whether such persons are typical of individuals dealing with
stressful events, individuals involved in romantic relationships, and individuals in
workplaces. Again, this limits the wider applicability of the present findings. The findings best approximate the role of emotional intelligence in the lives of middle-aged, well-educated, computer literate Caucasian women residing in English-speaking countries, and to a lesser extent, men of the same demographic. Future comparable studies that tap either a broader representative population, or specific demographic groups, would offer insight into the generalizability of the effects of the six emotional intelligence aspects studied here.

**General Summary**

In summary, this dissertation has critically reviewed theory, previous research, and provided new evidence as to the role of emotional intelligence and its composite abilities in three major domains of life functioning. In terms of extant findings, in Study 1, Emotional Recognition in Self, Personal Expression, and Emotional Management of Self were found to be central to adaptive coping in the aftermath of negative life events. In Study 2, all but Emotional Control were found to influence romantic relationship adjustment through unique combinations of communication behaviours. In Study 3, all but Emotional Recognition in Self and Personal Expression were found to be uniquely associated with different sets of employability skills: those necessary to succeed in the contemporary workplace. Across all three studies, the findings were largely consistent with the benefits attributed to higher EI by theory, and the small body of research to have examined its effects in similar domains. In most cases, however, the findings were unique, reflecting not only the specific criteria examined, but the statistical approaches adopted. The findings offer much more specific insights into the relative importance of each EI ability in each context, and thus, the means by which emotional intelligence contributes to a psychologically healthy, intimately connected, and vocationally valuable life.
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Appendix A.1 - Study 1 Participant Recruitment Discussion Forum Post

Hello my name is Andrew. I’m a doctoral researcher based at Swinburne University of Technology. Currently I’m investigating the effects of a wide range of life events on people’s lives. I am also interested in the role that emotions play in people’s lives. If you would like to contribute your own experiences and opinions to this research, or would like more information about the research, you can click on the link below.

I would like to emphasize that the research has no political or commercial ties or funding. It is academic in nature. The questions asked reflect those that many psychologists ask of their clients. For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, no individual will be identifiable from their responses. The findings will be published in a scholarly article and in a thesis which will be available internationally.

Kind regards,
Andrew Armstrong
BA (SUT), PgDip App Psy (SUT)
aarmstrong@swin.edu.au

CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION
Appendix A.2 - Study 1 Online Survey Information Sheet and Scale Items

Project Title: Your Life – Life Events

Area of Interest
We are investigating the ways in which different kinds of people are affected by various life events. We are also interested in the role that emotions play in their lives.

Participation
Participation in this research involves the completion of an online survey, which will take 30 minutes to complete. The survey comprises two sections. The first section focuses on your life experiences during the past two years. The second section focuses on your present well-being, and the role that emotions play in your life.

Privacy and Consent
For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, please do not provide your name or contact details with your survey. We require that you remain anonymous. Completion of your online survey will indicate to us that you have freely consented to participate. You are under no obligation to finish the survey once you have commenced. No individual will be identifiable. The results of this study will be published in a scholarly article and in a doctoral thesis.

Further Queries
If you have any further questions about the project, please contact the researchers:

Andrew Armstrong
aarmstrong@swin.edu.au

Roslyn Galligan
rgalligan@swin.edu.au

There are no risks involved in study participation. However, completing surveys of this nature can sometimes raise personal questions that you might like to discuss with a professional advisor. Lifeline International (www.lifeline.web.za) provides counseling services free of charge to people on all continents.

If you have concerns about the project which the researchers were unable to satisfy, please contact: Chair, SBS Ethics Committee, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences. Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia. If you wish to lodge a complaint about the way you have been treated during the study, please contact: Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee, Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia.

This project meets the standards of the Swinburne University Human Research Ethics Committee and Australian Psychological Society Code of Ethics.

CLICK HERE IF YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE
Please answer the following:

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Country of Citizenship

Please choose the option which best describes your level of education:

- Primary or Grade School
- Junior Secondary or High School (Year 7-9)
- Partial Senior Secondary or High School (Year 10-11)
- Complete Senior Secondary or High School (Year 12)
- Technical Qualification (Apprenticeship, TAFE, Technical College)
- Bachelors Degree
- Post-graduate Diploma
- Post-graduate Degree (Masters or Doctoral)

Please choose the option which best describes your current working circumstances:

- Full-time work
- Part-time work
- Student
- Household and family duties
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Disabled

Please state your current job title. Eg, Rehabilitation coordinator


Please indicate your profession if it is different from your current job title. E.g., Registered Nurse


In an average week, how many hours work would you do?

Please estimate your annual household income from the ranges provided:

- 0 - $20,000
- $20,001 - $40,000
- $40,001 - $60,000
- $60,001 - $80,000
- $80,001 - $100,000
- $100,001 - $120,000
- $120,001 - $140,000
- $140,001 +

Please choose the option which best describes your current relationship circumstances:

- Single
- Dating
- Living together
- Married

YOUR USE OF EMOTIONS

People tend to use and experience emotions in very different ways, and we are interested in the role emotions play in your life. For each statement below, please indicate the response that is most indicative of the way you typically think, feel and act.

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<td></td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
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1. I can tell how others are feeling by the tone of their voice
2. I generate positive moods and emotions within myself to get over being frustrated
3. When I'm anxious I can remain focused on what I am doing
4. I find it difficult to talk about my feelings to others
5. I find it easy to influence the moods and emotions of others
6. I can detect my emotions as I experience them
7. (Items 7 – 44 withheld due to propriety constraints)

**FRUSTRATION OR DISTRESS IN THE PAST MONTH**

Please read each statement and indicate how much the statement applied to you over the past 1 month. Do not spend too much time on any one statement.

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<td>Did <strong>not apply</strong> to me at all</td>
<td>Applied to me to <strong>some degree</strong>, or <strong>some of the time</strong></td>
<td>Applied to me to a <strong>considerable degree</strong>, or a <strong>good part of the time</strong></td>
<td>Applied to me very much, or most of the time</td>
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1. I found it hard to wind down
2. I was aware of dryness in my mouth
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all
4. I experienced rapid breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing in the absence of physical exertion)
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
6. I tended to over-react to situations
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
11. I found myself getting agitated
12. I found it difficult to relax
379

13. I felt down-hearted and blue

14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing

15. I felt I was close to panic

16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything

17. I felt I wasn’t a worthwhile person

18. I felt that I was rather touchy

19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)

20. I felt scared without any good reason

21. I felt that life was meaningless

**LIFE EVENTS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS**

**Please read these instructions carefully**

Below is a list of Life Events. During the past two years, some of the events will have occurred in your life. Some may have had a big impact on you when they happened, and some may continue to affect you now. How they affect you now is the focus of interest here.

1. For each listed event that occurred in your life during the past two years, please indicate how the event affects you now. For instance, the event might have “No affect now”, or it might still have a “Slight negative affect now” or it might still have a “Very negative affect now”. If a particular event occurred more than once in the past two years, please rate the most impactful occurrence.

2. SKIP all events that did not occur to you in the past two years.

Here’s an example -
A couple of months ago, Bob’s mobile phone was stolen. When he looked at Event 9, “You were a victim of crime”, he remembered this event, and recalled being very upset at the time. However, he had replaced the phone since then and now felt only slightly upset about the event. He therefore chose “Slight negative affect now”.
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<td>Eating habits worsened</td>
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<td>Experienced a serious personal injury</td>
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<td>Experienced a serious personal illness</td>
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<td>Financial state worsened</td>
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<td>Mortgage or loan more than $100,000</td>
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<td>Foreclosure of mortgage or loan</td>
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<td>Mortgage or loan less than $100,000</td>
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<td>Relationship with partner significantly changed</td>
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<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>Pregnancy (You or partner / date)</td>
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<td>Partner passed away</td>
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<td>Sex difficulties or problems</td>
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<td>Divorce</td>
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<td>Relationship reconciled (got back together)</td>
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<td>Partner seriously ill</td>
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<td>Partner seriously injured</td>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>Child seriously ill</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>Child seriously injured</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>Parent seriously ill</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>Parent seriously injured</td>
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<td>A friend passed away</td>
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<td>Retired</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>Lost job</td>
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<td>48.</td>
<td>Changed to a different line of work</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>Business you work for was restructured or went through merger</td>
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<td>Change in conditions at work</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>Increase in hours worked</td>
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<td>52.</td>
<td>Decrease in hours worked</td>
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<td>53.</td>
<td>More responsibilities at work</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>Less responsibilities at work</td>
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<td>55.</td>
<td>Conflict with a manager / supervisor</td>
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<td>56.</td>
<td>Commenced a new course</td>
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<td>57.</td>
<td>Withdrew from study</td>
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<td>58.</td>
<td>Returned to schooling after prolonged absence</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>Graduated</td>
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Thank you kindly for your participation.
Appendix B.1 - Study 2 Participant Recruitment Discussion Forum Post

Hello my name is Andrew. I'm a doctoral researcher based at Swinburne University of Technology. Currently I'm investigating differences in the ways people communicate with their partners and deal with a wide range of issues in their relationships. I am also investigating the role emotions play in people's lives. If you would like to contribute your own experiences and opinions to this research, or would like more information about the research, you can click on the link below.

I would like to emphasize that the research has no political or commercial ties or funding. It is academic in nature. The questions asked reflect those that many psychologists ask of their clients. For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, no individual will be identifiable from their responses. The findings will be published in a scholarly article and in a thesis which will be available internationally.

Kind regards,
Andrew Armstrong
BA (SUT), PgDip App Psy (SUT)
aarmstrong@swin.edu.au

CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION
Appendix B.2 - Study 2 Online Survey Information Sheet and Scale Items

**Project Title: Your Life – Romantic Relationships**

**Area of Interest**
We are interested in the opinions of people who are involved in a romantic relationship. We are interested in how people communicate with their partners and deal with a wide range of issues in their relationships. We are also interested in the role emotions play in their relationships. If you choose to participate, you will be asked questions that explore: what you like and dislike about your relationship, your preferred ways of interacting with your partner, issues that affect your commitment and interest, and how conflict affects you and how you deal with it.

**Participation**
Participation in this research involves the completion of a 30 minute online survey, where you remain anonymous to the investigators. There is little writing involved as the survey is primarily based on multiple choice questions.

**Privacy and Consent**
For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, please do not provide your name or contact details with your survey. We require that you remain anonymous. Completion of your online survey will indicate to us that you have freely consented to participate. You are under no obligation to finish the survey once you have commenced. No individual will be identifiable. The results of this study will be published in a scholarly article and in a doctoral thesis.

**Further Queries**
If you have any further questions about the project, please contact the researchers:

Andrew Armstrong  
Email aarmstrong@swin.edu.au

Roslyn Galligan  
Email rgalligan@swin.edu.au

There are no risks involved in study participation. However, completing surveys of this nature can sometimes raise personal questions that you might like to discuss with a professional advisor. Lifeline International (www.lifeline.web.za) provides counseling services free of charge to people on all continents.

If you have concerns about the project which the researchers were unable to satisfy, please contact: Chair, SBS Ethics Committee, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences. Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia. If you wish to lodge a complaint about the way you have been treated during the study, please contact: Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee, Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia.

CLICK HERE IF YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE
Please answer the following:

**Age**

**Sex**

**Country of Citizenship**

Please choose the option which best describes your level of education:

- [ ] Primary or Grade School
- [ ] Junior Secondary or High School (Year 7-9)
- [ ] Partial Senior Secondary or High School (Year 10-11)
- [ ] Complete Senior Secondary or High School (Year 12)
- [ ] Technical Qualification (Apprenticeship, TAFE, Technical College)
- [ ] Bachelors Degree
- [ ] Post-graduate Diploma
- [ ] Post-graduate Degree (Masters or Doctoral)

Please choose the option which best describes your current working circumstances:

- [ ] Full-time work
- [ ] Part-time work
- [ ] Student
- [ ] Household and family duties
- [ ] Unemployed
- [ ] Retired
- [ ] Disabled

Please state your current job title. Eg, Rehabilitation coordinator


Please indicate your profession if it is different from your current job title. E.g., Registered Nurse


In an average week, how many hours work would you do?


Please estimate your annual household income from the ranges provided:

- $0 - $20,000
- $20,001 - $40,000
- $40,001 - $60,000
- $60,001 - $80,000
- $80,001 - $100,000
- $100,001 - $120,000
- $120,001 - $140,000
- $140,001 +

Please choose the option which best describes your current relationship circumstances:

- Single
- Dating
- Living together
- Married

How long have you been involved in your current relationship in months and/or years?

[ ]
YOUR USE OF EMOTION

People tend to use and experience emotions in very different ways, and we are interested in the role emotions play in your life. For each statement below, please indicate the response that is most indicative of the way you typically think, feel and act.

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<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. I can tell how others are feeling by the tone of their voice
2. I generate positive moods and emotions within myself to get over being frustrated
3. When I'm anxious I can remain focused on what I am doing
4. I find it difficult to talk about my feelings to others
5. I find it easy to influence the moods and emotions of others
6. I can detect my emotions as I experience them

(Items 7 – 44 withheld due to propriety constraints)

COMMUNICATION WITH YOUR PARTNER

The following set of statements concern how you interact with your partner. Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes the way you and your partner interact in your relationship.

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. When I feel hurt by my partner, I tell him/her
2. I listen attentively to what my partner says
3. Knowing how my partner feels is important to me
4. I help my partner to understand what I am saying
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I'm feeling proud of myself</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>When angry at my partner, I tell him/her</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>I feel comfortable when my partner expresses affection</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>I tell my partner how I feel about things</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>I try to understand how my partner feels by listening to what he/she has to say</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I'm disappointed</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>I summarize what my partner says to make sure that his/her point of view is understood</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I'm proud of him/her</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>I verbally communicate to my partner that I understand and value his/her position</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>I listen to my partner's whole message before responding</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when he/she has done something that bothers me</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>I try to express appreciation rather than complaints</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>I try to interact positively with my partner</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>I will do favors for my partner, even when I'm having a bad day</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>I try to phrase things positively</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I'm having a bad day</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>I say exactly what I think or feel</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>I show interest in my partners activities</td>
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<td>23.</td>
<td>I give my partner my attention</td>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>I try to focus on the positive side of situations</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>When conflicts get out of hand, I usually try to stop them and ask if we can set up another</td>
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<td></td>
<td>time for discussion</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>I express appreciation for my partner's help even when he/she doesn't succeed</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>I often interpret my partner’s messages more negatively than they are intended</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>I try to think about my partners point of view when I find myself thinking only of my own</td>
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<td>point of view</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>When we drift off topic, I try to get back on track</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>When disappointed in my partner, I tell him/her</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>When an issue arises, I ask my partner directly how he/she feels or thinks about it</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>I give my partner emotional support</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>When my partner has a complaint, I try to understand</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>If I do not understand my partner’s point of view, I ask for elaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>When my partner makes complaints, I make complaints too</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I’m happy</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>I try to understand my partner’s complaints</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>I offer constructive alternatives for bothersome behavior</td>
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<td>39.</td>
<td>I often hassle and nag my partner</td>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>I tell my partner when I’m pleased with him/her</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>When discussing a problem, I try to focus on that one problem</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>My partner wishes I was more affectionate</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>Even when my partner has a bad day, he/she tries to be positive when we interact</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>When discussing issues, I usually withdraw for fear of conflict</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>When discussing issues, I remain silent</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>When problems arise, I often leave the room</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>My partner often gets on my nerves</td>
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**A SNAPSHOT OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP**

Most persons have disagreements in their relationships. Please indicate the approximate extent of agreement or disagreement between you and your partner about the following issues.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Always disagree</th>
<th>2 Almost always disagree</th>
<th>3 Occasionally disagree</th>
<th>4 Occasionally agree</th>
<th>5 Almost always agree</th>
<th>6 Always agree</th>
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<td>Handling finances</td>
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<td>Matters of recreation</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Demonstrations of affection</td>
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<td>Friends</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Sex relations</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Conventionality (correct or proper behaviour)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Philosophy of life</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Ways of dealing with parents or family</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Aims, goals, and things believed important</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Amount of time spent together</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Making major decisions</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Household tasks</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Leisure time interests and activities</td>
<td></td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Career decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>More often than not</td>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>All of the time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. How often do you discuss or have you discussed terminating your relationship?

17. How often do you or your partner leave the house after a fight?

18. In general, how often do you think that things between you and your partner are going well?

19. Do you confide in your partner?

20. Do you ever regret that you are together?

21. How often do you and your partner quarrel?

22. How often do you and your partner get on each other’s nerves?

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>Almost every day</td>
<td>Every day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. How often do you kiss or hug your partner?

<table>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None of them</td>
<td>Very few of them</td>
<td>Some of them</td>
<td>Most of them</td>
<td>All of them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Do you and your partner engage in outside interests together?

Please indicate how often the following events occur between you and your partner:

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<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Less than once a month</td>
<td>Once or twice a month</td>
<td>Once or twice a week</td>
<td>Once a day</td>
<td>More often</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Have a stimulating exchange of ideas
26. Laugh together

27. Calmly discuss something

28. Work together on a project

These are things about which couples sometimes agree and sometimes disagree. Indicate if either item below caused differences of opinion or were problems in your relationship during the past few weeks.

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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>More often than not</td>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>All of the time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. Being too tired for sex

30. Not showing love

31. Rate the degree of happiness in your relationship

Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about the future of your relationship?

32. I want desperately for my relationship to function well, and would go to almost any length to see that it does

I want very much for my relationship to function well, and will do all I can to see that it does

I want very much for my relationship to function well, and will do my fair share to see that it does

It would be nice if my relationship functioned well, but I can’t do much more than I am doing now to help it succeed
It would be nice if it functioned well, but I refuse to do more than I am doing now to keep the relationship going

My relationship can never function well, and there is no more that I can do to keep the relationship going

Thank you kindly for your participation.
Appendix C.1 - Study 3 Participant Recruitment Discussion Forum Post

Hello my name is Andrew. I'm a doctoral researcher based at Swinburne University of Technology. Currently I'm investigating the role emotions play in people's work lives, people's level of commitment to their employing organization, what motivates them to work, their self-assessed skill levels, and the ways they manage conflict. If you would like to contribute your own experiences and opinions to this research, or would like more information about the research, you can click on the link below.

I would like to emphasize that the research has no political or commercial ties or funding. It is academic in nature. The questions asked reflect those that many psychologists ask of their clients. For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, no individual will be identifiable from their responses. The findings will be published in a scholarly article and in a thesis which will be available internationally.

Kind regards,
Andrew Armstrong
BA (SUT), PgDip App Psy (SUT)
aarmstrong@swin.edu.au

CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION
Appendix C.2 - Study 3 Online Survey Information Sheet and Scale Items

Project Title: Your life - Work

Area of Interest
We are interested in the opinions of people who are employed in any form of organization. We are interested in the role emotions play in people's work lives, people's level of commitment to their employing organization, what motivates them to work, their self-assessed skill levels, and the ways they manage conflict.

Participation
Participation in this research involves the completion of a 30 minute online survey, where you remain anonymous to the investigators. There is little writing involved as the survey is primarily based on multiple choice questions.

Privacy and Consent
For purposes of privacy and confidentiality, please do not provide your name or contact details with your survey. We require that you remain anonymous. Completion of your online survey will indicate to us that you have freely consented to participate. You are under no obligation to finish the survey once you have commenced. No individual will be identifiable. The results of this study will be published in a scholarly article and in a doctoral thesis.

Further Queries
If you have any further questions about the project, please contact the researchers:

Andrew Armstrong  Roslyn Galligan
Email aarmstrong@swin.edu.au  Email rgalligan@swin.edu.au

There are no risks involved in study participation. However, completing surveys of this nature can sometimes raise personal questions that you might like to discuss with a professional advisor. Lifeline International (www.lifeline.web.za) provides counseling services free of charge to people on all continents.

If you have concerns about the project which the researchers were unable to satisfy, please contact: Chair, SBS Ethics Committee, Faculty of Life and Social Sciences. Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia. If you wish to lodge a complaint about the way you have been treated during the study, please contact: Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee, Swinburne University of Technology. PO Box 218, Hawthorn 3122, VIC, Australia.

CLICK HERE IF YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE
Please answer the following:

Age  
Sex  
Country of Citizenship

Please choose the option which best describes your level of education:

- Primary or Grade School
- Junior Secondary or High School (Year 7-9)
- Partial Senior Secondary or High School (Year 10-11)
- Complete Senior Secondary or High School (Year 12)
- Technical Qualification (Apprenticeship, TAFE, Technical College)
- Bachelors Degree
- Post-graduate Diploma
- Post-graduate Degree (Masters or Doctoral)

Please choose the option which best describes your current working circumstances:

- Full-time work
- Part-time work
- Student
- Household and family duties
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Disabled

Please state your current job title. Eg, Rehabilitation coordinator


Please indicate your profession if it is different from your current job title. E.g., Registered Nurse


In an average week, how many hours work would you do?
Please estimate your annual income from the ranges provided:

- $0 - $20,000
- $20,001 - $40,000
- $40,001 - $60,000
- $60,001 - $80,000
- $80,001 - $100,000
- $100,001 - $120,000
- $120,001 - $140,000
- $140,001 +

Please choose the option which best describes your current relationship circumstances:

- Single
- Dating
- Living together
- Married
People tend to use and experience emotions in very different ways, and we are interested in the role emotions play in your life. For each statement below, please indicate the response that is most indicative of the way you typically think, feel and act.

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I can tell how others are feeling by the tone of their voice
2. I generate positive moods and emotions within myself to get over being frustrated
3. When I'm anxious I can remain focused on what I am doing
4. I find it difficult to talk about my feelings to others
5. I find it easy to influence the moods and emotions of others
6. I can detect my emotions as I experience them

(Items 7 – 44 withheld due to propriety constraints)

**SELF-ASSESSMENT OF SKILLS**

In this section we would like to you to perform a hard-headed assessment of your skill or experience in the following areas. Note that you are not trying to "sell yourself" to us, but rather, demonstrate a critical awareness of your current competencies.

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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I'm yet to develop skill at this</td>
<td>I have a little skill at this</td>
<td>I'm well on my way to developing competence at this</td>
<td>I'm competent at this</td>
<td>I'm slightly better at this than most people who do this competently</td>
<td>I'm considerably better at this than most people who do this competently</td>
<td>I would say I stand out as an expert at this</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Designing new procedures or processes for my work area
2. Solving problems for which there are no easy or straightforward answers
3. Finding innovative ways to improve the quality of products, services, or systems
4. Dropping everything and take an alternative course of action in response to new and important information
5. Staying calm and focused when dealing with a crisis situation at work
6. Getting back on track after things turn out disastrously
7. Adjusting to new work processes, procedures, and equipment
8. Learning new ways to perform your job
9. Searching for and participating in work assignments that require you to develop new skills
10. Adjusting the way you deal with people to suit a wide variety of personalities
11. Taking action to improve your understanding of your colleagues’ needs and values
12. Listening to and considering others’ viewpoints and opinions, and altering your own opinions when it is appropriate to do so
13. Adjusting to working with different work teams that have different cultures or methods
14. Altering the way you do things to suit the preferences of other departments or work units
15. Being flexible and open-minded when dealing with people from other work units
16. Coping with a highly demanding workload
17. Staying focused while juggling multiple responsibilities
18. Coping with having too little time to complete work tasks in the way you think they should be done
19. Dealing with uncertain or unpredictable work situations
20. Functioning well without knowing the total picture or having all the facts at hand
21. Coping with an unanticipated delay in delivery of information/materials that you need to complete an urgent project

CONFLICT AT WORK

When I get involved in an interpersonal conflict at work, I typically do the following:

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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>About 50/50</td>
<td>More often than not</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. I give in to the wishes of the other party
2. I concur with the other party
3. I try to accommodate the other party
4. I try to realize a middle-of-the-road solution
5. I emphasize that we have to find a compromise solution
6. I insist we both give in a little
7. I push my own point of view
8. I search for gains
9. I fight for a good outcome for myself
10. I examine issues until I find a solution that really satisfies me and the other party
11. I examine ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal solution
12. I work out a solution that serves my own as well as the other party's interests as well as possible
13. I avoid a confrontation about our differences
14. I try to make differences loom less severe
15. I try to avoid a confrontation with the other

**YOUR CONNECTION TO YOUR EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

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<th>1</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Moderately disagree</td>
<td>Slightly disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>Slightly agree</td>
<td>Moderately agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career within this organization
2. I do not feel a strong sense of “belonging” to my organization
3. This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me
4. It would be very hard for me to leave my organization right now, even if I wanted to
5. Too much of my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave my organization now
6. I feel that I have too few options to consider leaving this organization
7. I do not feel any obligation to remain with my current employer
8. This organization deserves my loyalty
9. I would not leave my organization right now because I have a sense of obligation to the people in it

**YOUR MOTIVATIONS TO WORK**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Moderately disagree</td>
<td>Slightly disagree</td>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>Slightly agree</td>
<td>Moderately agree</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I must admit I often do as little work as I can get away with
2. I am basically a lazy person
3. I like to work hard
4. If there is an opportunity to earn money, I am usually there
5. I would be willing to work for a salary that was below average if the job was pleasant
6. It is important to me to make lots of money
7. I think I would enjoy having authority over people
8. If given the chance I would make a good leader of people
9. I think I am usually a leader in my group
10. I find satisfaction in working as well as I can
<p>| | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>I find satisfaction in exceeding my previous performance even if I don't outperform others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>There is satisfaction in a job well done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>It annoys me when other people perform better than I do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>I judge my performance on whether I do better than others rather than on just getting a good result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>It is important to me to perform better than others on a task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>I would like an important job where people looked up to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>I want to be an important person in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>I find satisfaction in having influence over others because of my position in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>I would rather do something at which I feel confident and relaxed than something which is challenging and difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>If I'm not good at something I would be inclined to keep struggling to master it, rather than move on to something I may be good at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>I persist at difficult tasks until they're completed to a high standard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your participation is greatly appreciated.