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THE GROWTH LOBBY AND ITS ABSENCE:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING INDUSTRIES AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AUSTRALIA AND FRANCE

1945-2000 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050

M.A. by Research, Swinburne University, Victoria, 2002
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[http://www.alphalink.com.au/~smnaesp/population
speculation.htm](http://www.alphalink.com.au/~smnaesp/population_speculation.htm)
[http://www.alphalink.com.au/~smnaesp/population,land,biodiv
ersity.htm](http://www.alphalink.com.au/~smnaesp/population,land,biodiversity.htm)

ABSTRACT

This thesis compares population policy and demographic outcomes in France and Australia from 1945 taking into consideration projections to 2050. These features are analysed using a theoretical approach derived from James Q. Wilson and Gary Freeman, flagging focused benefits/costs and diffuse benefits/costs of population growth, including growth fueled by immigration. This analysis is framed by the New Ecological Paradigm developed by Dunlap and Catton.

The oil shock of 1973 is identified as a major turning point where French and Australian policy directions and demographic trends diverge, notably on immigration.

It is established that in both countries there was a will for population stabilisation and energy conservation, which succeeded in France. In Australia, however, a strong, organised growth lobby over-rode this Malthusian tendency. A major force for growth lay in the speculative property development and housing industries. The specific qualities of the Australian land development planning and housing system facilitated

land speculation. Speculative opportunity and profits were increased by population growth and, with decreasing fertility rates, the industries concerned relied increasingly on high immigration rates. In France, to the contrary, the land development planning and housing industries had no similar dependency on immigration and, since the oil shock, have adapted to a declining population growth rate.

The author concludes that France has a relatively Malthusian economy and that Australia has a relatively Cornucopian one. These observations may be extrapolated respectively to non-English speaking Western European States and to English Speaking Settler States.

Speculative benefits from population growth/immigration are illustrated by demonstrating a relationship between ratcheting property price inflation in high overseas immigration cities in Australia and the near absence of this inflation in low growth areas. In contrast this ratcheting effect is absent in France and French cities where population growth and immigration have little influence on the property market.

The research suggests that speculative benefits of high population growth have been magnified by globalisation of the property market and that these rising stakes are likely to increase the difficulty of population stabilisation and energy conservation under the Australian land development and planning system.

The thesis contains a substantial appendix analysing and comparing French and Australian demographic and energy use statistics.

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PART I

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

In 1945 France and Australia started out with high immigration policies that set out to supply workers for industrial expansion and to build up the populations of their nations for defence purposes. Both also began with strong public housing policies.

France continued to house a large proportion of its lower socio-economic strata through public housing, but in Australia in the 1950s the Menzies Government withdrew support from the public housing program, giving private developers and builders almost exclusive domain over the provision of housing in Australia.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Australia was on course in 1995 to increase its population by about 50% by the year 2050, when it would still be growing. This course has not varied much since then.¹ But France is on a course to stabilise and then decline over the same period, according to the Institut National des Statistiques et Etudes Economiques (INSEE) and Eurostat.²

The UN has suggested that France (and the rest of Western Europe) replace its population loss and maintain its age to youth ratio through a massive immigration program.³ A number of prominent Australians think that Australia should do the same.⁴ But for the French such a proposition has little relevance since population stabilisation and decline are well accepted prospects there.⁵

France and Australia began on a similar path. How is it that they have finished up with such different demographic philosophies? Much of the answer may lie in their different approaches to land development planning and housing.

World Population, International Migration and Economic Policies: Emerging Differences

A situation has arisen where growing inequalities between the 'developing countries' and the 'developed countries' have contributed to strong emigration "push factors" from

poor countries to richer countries. Some "pull factors" also exist in the richer countries and some groups seek to profit from them.

After the Second World War a number of western countries set out to increase their populations and to increase economic development. These objectives were related in a number of ways. In the case of Europe there was a desire to rebuild war depleted populations, to man factories and to produce new soldiers for defence. In the "English speaking settler societies" of the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, there was the additional objective of territorial development, such as the expansion of agriculture and transport infrastructure. In Australia there was also the objective of expanding the local market.

Several of these first world countries continue to have semi-explicit population policies based on population growth and economies which appear to be based on this population growth. However increases in energy consumption and human population since the Second World War call the wisdom of these policies into question as well as the philosophy of economies dependent on demographic growth. In this thesis I will be concentrating on France and Australia.⁶

Between 1960 and 1999 global population doubled for the third time in 72 years, reaching six billion in 1999. Prior to this it had taken 123 years to double just the once, from one billion to two billion, between 1804 and 1927.⁷ It may yet double again. Even if this does not happen, population momentum guarantees continuing rapid increase well into the next century. This is because of gains in life expectancy, despite falling total fertility rates.

Pressure from population growth and economic growth is causing environmental degradation and massive loss of biodiversity and wilderness, as well as degradation of natural economic resources, such as soil and water in the poor countries of the world. These pressures are not, however, confined to the so-called "Third World". As per capita consumption increases and where population continues to expand in the old colonial countries like Australia and the United States, the last of the major wildernesses and major intact biodiverse ecologies are in the line of sight of property developers. They are increasingly downstream from high impact developments, and bounded, criss-crossed or pitted by human infrastructure, such as roads, dams, mines and power grids.

As well as these ecological problems, economic disparities between the “developed” and the “developing” world have dramatically increased since the second world war.⁸ And since a series of oil shocks, beginning in 1973,⁹ the disparities between socio-economic classes have also increased in developed countries where these traditional gaps had previously narrowed with the post war boom and industrialisation in intensively oil based economies.¹⁰

Economic and demographic pressures within the developing countries are causing a growing movement of people seeking better lives by moving to the richer countries in search of work.¹¹ Some attempt to come as formal immigrants; others by other routes. For example, the number of people seeking political asylum is rising. The line between political asylum and economic migration is blurring as social breakdown accompanies economic breakdown and the policies developed by the first world countries for determining and processing asylum claims are being overwhelmed and replaced with new strategies.¹²

At the same time as the poor are pressing against the national borders of the first world, national governments in the first world are actively competing with each other to attract highly skilled workers and potential capital investors to their commercial, research, service and development sectors.

In a sort of parallel economy, employers in the black labour market are also seeking to attract another class of immigrant (low-skilled workers, the very class that the national workers want to keep out) to supply labour to those industries that either cannot get local labour or cannot or will not pay the wages it asks for. (Nationals fear open policy towards these kinds of low skilled immigrants will depress wages).¹³ This group of “illegal immigrant traffickers” is an industry in itself; people-smuggling is a lucrative business.

The legal immigration of refugees selected off-shore, family reunion, and potential workers, has also become a lucrative international enterprise, which does not carry the stigma or the risks of illegal immigrant trafficking, but which attracts money up front and may be at times nearly as financially exploitative of false hopes.

Some humanitarian groups also seek to take in many more refugees than their governments wish to provide for.

In Australia, but not in France, business groups and industries (especially the land development and housing industries) seek greater immigration from any quarter in the belief that a bigger population will mean more consumers, profitable infrastructure expansion, and a bigger economy.¹⁴

Almost all of these pro-immigration groups are in conflict with other groups (which desire to limit the immigrant flow) to various degrees in various first world countries, including France and Australia. For instance, in Australia, the groups which seek to attract skilled immigrants are in conflict with local industry associations, like the Australian Medical Association and Actors Equity, who wish to restrict the entry of such migrants. In France and Australia the groups which seek to attract illegal immigrants are in conflict with the law and the working classes who sense that their jobs and wages are targeted. The industry that profits by encouraging largely unfounded hopes of legal immigration among political asylum-seekers costs government and tax payers the funding required to process applications and appeals, particularly in Australia.¹⁵ In France and Australia, the humanitarian groups that want more refugees are in conflict with government because of the cost of providing support and infrastructure for humanitarian migrants, who are one of the most costly immigrant groups, due to physical and emotional trauma and the difficulty in language and matching skills with local labour markets. In Australia, the business groups which desire demographic expansion in order to have a bigger local market and the land development and housing industries which hope to profit from providing the infrastructure for that expansion are in conflict with environmentalists and ecologists. Government also worries about the costs to the environment and of providing infrastructure for continuing expansion.

First world countries have experienced a tremendous, largely unanticipated rise in migration pressures. This, together with the economic disparity between the first and third worlds and the growing difficulties of the former communist European states, has challenged the premises upon which the post-1945 population and economic policies of the first world were based. As we shall see, the two countries chosen here for analysis provide, in different ways, telling examples of the way in which changing global conditions have challenged the certainties of the early post-war period.

France and Australia : Differences and Similarities before the 1973 Oil Shock

At the end of the Second World War France and Australia both developed policies aimed at population growth for reasons of defence and economic growth. Both relied heavily upon immigration to achieve this population growth. Both began with pronatalist policies, but Australia's pronatalist lobby lost much of its political influence in the mid 1950s.¹⁶

There is some conflict among immigration historians and sociologists as to whether France eventually launched a post-war immigration program that was exclusively economic, based on an intake of short-term immigrant workers, as Gary Freeman argues,¹⁷ or whether the program retained a nation-building (population-building) purpose. However the work of a number of writers supports the case that the French immigration program did retain population building characteristics.¹⁸

France and Australia may have coincided in their desire to build up population for defensive purposes, but unlike Australia, France had never been particularly concerned about the size of her local market. Her post-war policy had been to develop the European Economic Community (EEC)¹⁹ as an area of favoured trade and to develop exports further afield.²⁰ Although early post-war Australian economic policy and practice had included export of food, fibres and some mineral resources, such as pig iron, the preoccupation of the business community had been to develop a big local market by increasing local population. This idea was particularly favoured by Australian manufacturers and the Liberal party. It also came to be favoured by the property development and housing industries. After 1945 the primary idea of governments - Labor and then Liberal - after defence, was economic development within Australia. The idea of a huge local market provided by a huge local population complemented this idea. Exports were a secondary consideration. The immense mineral wealth of Australia was virtually unsuspected in 1945.²¹

Importantly, both countries also began with post-war public housing policies. France kept hers as an important provider of housing to a substantial portion of the working classes. The French government also had extensive authority to direct the planning of land-use development on a national basis. In Australia the Chifley war-time and post-war government had considered doing this but ultimately did not. Nevertheless the

Australian government did go ahead with a federally funded and public housing plan. However, gradually between 1950 and 1955, the Australian government turned almost all home building over to private industry and most land continued to be privately developed on an *ad hoc* and speculative basis, unlimited by any national planning.²²

During these times - 1945 to the first oil shock (*circa* 1973) - energy was cheap, and so were wages. (Marxism and capitalism co-incided in the belief that humans created as much wealth as they needed by extracting it and moulding it, almost like clay.) France refers to the years between 1945 and 1975 as “*les trente glorieuses*” - the thirty glorious years. Australia talks about “the long boom”. In both countries much manpower was required - not necessarily skilled - to build infrastructure for industrial expansion and to work in industry, especially in manufacturing. Very gradually automation decreased the need for manpower here and there. But since business was booming there was plenty of money to start up new businesses for nearly every worker that presented, and automation was more of a choice than a competitive necessity.

This was the period of the “traditional” or “worker” immigrant of humble origins. In France, with the independence of her colonies and with the development of free movement and trade within the EEC, this traditional immigrant worker came to be identified as coming from outside the EEC. The distinction between non-EEC and EEC immigrants was increasingly formalised within the EEC as time went on, particularly after 1973.²³

So, at the beginning of the period from 1945 until the first oil shock, France and Australia had a number of broad commonalities: they both sought high immigration for economic reasons and to build up population for defence purposes and they both began with major housing shortages which they both initially attempted to resolve through important public housing schemes. France continued hers to the present day but Australia's lost much of its importance in the mid-1950s.

Economic fall-out from the oil-shock was to have significance for long-term future policy. Australia and France handled the challenge of much higher oil-prices in different ways, which affected their demographic, social and housing policies differently. The differences in dealing with international changes in oil economics

between France and Australia will be described at the beginning of Chapter Seven and are important to the argument in this thesis.

France and Australia 1974 : The Aftermath of the First Oil Shock

Immigration:

France and Australia's policy similarities were to change between 1973 and 1975, when, after a short-lived but dramatic change of course on Australia's part, the population policies of the two countries - especially on immigration - drastically diverged.

Until 1974 immigration had contributed substantially to population growth in France and Australia.. After 1974, when France brought in a policy of zero net immigration from outside the European Economic Community, the contribution of immigration to population growth in that country fell dramatically. But in Australia, except for a brief interruption, from 1972 to 1976, high immigration continued as before.²⁴ (For statistical documentation see Appendix 4, e.g. Graphs A.4.1 and A.4.8.)

Trends in both countries have led to total fertility rates below the "replacement level" of 2.1 children per woman, in France since 1974 and in Australia since 1976. This means that, apart from the self-limiting contributions of population momentum and increases in life expectancy, immigration is the only factor that will keep either population growing. It is also the major factor on which the two countries diverge after 1974.

My study has two major focuses: immigration numbers as the major variable affecting ultimate population size and land development planning and housing as a major variable affecting immigration.

Land Development Planning and Housing:

After 1974 in France a building boom came to a grinding halt as demand fell off from the private sector and the government greatly reduced its outlays on public housing construction and private housing subsidy. Sociological studies since then record changes to the structure and operation and technology of the French (and Western

European) housing industries, but virtually no change of this kind in Australia. In Australia the same pattern of rapid cycling booms and busts prevailed in the housing industry and immigration numbers, though interrupted under the Whitlam government for a short period in the mid 1970s, went on to rise and continue at a high level as before.

The interruption to 'business as usual' for the property development industry and immigration during the Whitlam era was, however, important. The lack of success in Australia of policy changes similar to those which succeeded in France, highlighted the interdependence of immigration, economic philosophy and the land development and building industries in Australia.

After 1974 lobbying for high immigration ceased in France, although the housing industry there continued to lobby for immigrant labour (but not for immigrant consumers) for one more year.²⁵ In Australia, however, the lobbying never stopped.

A New Subject of Sociological Comparison in Immigration Research

The differences that exist between Western Europe and the English Speaking Settler countries regarding land development planning and housing have, for a long time, been uncommented on by sociological writers on population policies and immigration. They have been written about quite often by sociological writers on urban planning and the housing industry, but these authors do not make a connection to immigration politics.

Writers on urban planning have however observed that: "assumptions and models derived from North American studies are not only simplistic in the European context, but at times quite erroneous. Cities in Western Europe remain distinct, just as their approaches to planning remain distinct."²⁶ This comment was made about writers on urban planning, but could well apply to other sociological studies of Europe if the theory about the influence of land development planning on population growth developed in this thesis is correct.

Biological ecologists writing about human population impact on animal populations also frequently write about problems in land-use management.²⁷ Although they often connect human population growth to destruction of indigenous fauna and flora habitats and farmland, to my knowledge none has looked at the differences in land development planning between the English speaking New World settler societies on the one hand and

Western Europe on the other. Since Western Europe is particularly low in biodiversity, this omission is not surprising.

And so far, to my knowledge, no anglophone population sociologist has yet written of the connection between land development planning and immigration as a factor in population growth politics. The subject of housing and planning comes up from time to time in French writing on immigration but, since these French writers seem unaware of the great difference in land development planning and housing in the English-speaking settler societies (ESSS), no theory has fused these issues to date.²⁸ (Henceforth I will refer to the English-Speaking settler societies using the acronym ESSS.) Jeanette Money has noted how the different emphases on public housing in Australia, France and Britain seemed to correlate with different levels of resentment of immigrants competing for housing with native-born, but her main focus is on localised competition for housing and the opportunity this provides for influencing electoral margins. She also suggests that the property development lobby for high immigration in Australia might be important to the volume of immigration after 1974 (a volume which she sees as quite small), but, since the focus of her argument was elsewhere, she does not go into how differences in land development planning may have produced this difference.²⁹

But attention to the relationship between population growth, immigration and land development planning and housing has wide implications for sociological study. It could, for example, be applied to the third world to see if, for instance, Chinese development planning deters population growth whereas laissez-faire planning in India promotes it. A study of the land development planning traditions in Fiji (bloodline inheritance without the possibility of selling outside the Fijian ethnic community) might help to explain the difficulties in integrating the two disparate communities of Indian and islander Fijian. The relationship between land development, housing, and immigration policy might also be useful for explaining the inaccessibility of home ownership for Australians due to high prices, and the flight to cheaper housing away from the major cities, especially Sydney. (See Chapter 8) Knowledge about alternative ways of planning land use and development might assist Australians and the other ESSS to halt the destruction of native animal and plant habitats.

So, to sum up: From 1945 to 1974 there were a number of similarities between the immigration policies of France and Australia but, since 1974, the immigration policies of the two countries have diverged. Differences in land development planning systems, however, predated the second world war. Public housing policies diverged early in the period being studied. Unlike the Australian Government, the French Government is not trying to increase its population through an active immigration program and, again unlike the situation in Australia, no significant lobby group in France suggests that it should.

Research question and Argument Outline

Why have French policy makers taken a different path on immigration policy from their counterparts in Australia over the last 25 years? Why have they adopted a policy of demographic consolidation while their counterparts in Australia have persisted with a growth policy?

I sought answers to this question by applying a theory adapted by Gary Freeman to analyse concentrated and diffuse benefits and costs of immigration in immigration politics. I describe this theory in detail in Chapter 5.

Freeman hypothesised that immigration has become entrenched in systems where its benefits are narrowly focused but the costs that it imposes are diffuse (and therefore not easily identified by the public that is paying for them). According to Freeman's thesis, we would find the answer to the question about the difference between French and Australian immigration policies by seeing where concentrated benefits and costs and diffuse benefits and costs are located in each society in relation to immigration impacts.

Narrowly focused benefits mean that those benefiting from immigration are consciously aware of this and are able to recognise each other and organise to keep those benefits flowing. Where costs are diffuse and fall upon a disparate population at many different points in many different ways, they are difficult to identify and there are no obvious political rallying points for the public to organise a protest around.

Using Freeman's approach I identified the Australian property development and housing industries as major receivers of concentrated benefits from immigration. Upstream and

downstream many other major industries also benefited from the financial activity and material expansion that property development and associated infrastructure engendered.

The situation was almost the converse in France, however. The property development and housing industries showed no interest in catering to immigrants. There was even a certain hostility to housing immigrants and the lack of housing arguably poses an obstacle to immigration.

Why should there be such marked differences in the relationship between property development, housing, and immigration in each country? Further exploration revealed that there was a marked difference in the *systems* of land development planning and housing in France and Australia.

This led me to theorise that the difference between French and Australian *systems* of land development planning and housing was a major factor in the different outcomes, whereby the Australian property development industries lobby for high immigration because they perceive that their profits rely on it, whereas the French industry seems to be indifferent to immigration, not perceiving profits therein.

I concluded that the role of the property development and housing industries in Australia had almost certainly been of major importance in maintaining high immigration there after the 1973 oil shock, which I identified as a turning point, despite initial attempts to reduce immigration led population growth. In France, however, the absence of reliance by the property development industry meant that there was no strong organised obstacle to a long-term reduction in immigration.

I interpreted these findings within the context of Dunlap and Catton's New Ecological Paradigm. (See Chapter Two.) There is no apparent conflict between this paradigm and Freeman's theory. According to the New Ecological Paradigm, after an abortive Malthusian response in Australia, Australia took a Cornucopian route and France took a Malthusian route after the 1973 international oil-related crisis.

(Cornucopian denotes a philosophy that the world and nature are infinitely abundant and that mankind will always engineer solutions to any problems that develop. Malthusian denotes a philosophy whereby natural resources are presumed to be finite and that humankind, like other species, will encounter certain limiting material situations. Humankind will not be able to overcome these with mechanical solutions

and will need instead to adapt by limiting its demands on the natural world. Both these philosophies have demographic and economic expressions.)³⁰

Australia's cornucopian route was characterised by high population growth (notably through high immigration), infrastructure expansion, and energy use. France's Malthusian route was characterised by a strong reduction in population growth, notably through the reduction of immigration numbers, infrastructure consolidation and oil based energy use reduction, with a shift to other forms of energy supply. These two different development policy routes fitted respectively what Dunlap and Catton call the Human Exemption Paradigm (HEP) (a cornucopian point of view) and the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) (a malthusian point of view).

The system of land planning development and housing in Australia was typical of a general growthist³¹ economic approach in that country and would almost certainly have been a factor impeding a different style of adaptation to the post 1970s oil-shock situation, despite an early attempt in Australia at a complete change of approach to one more similar to France's.

The system of land planning development and housing in France, which did not rely on population growth and an economic approach that looked to national security in essentials like energy resources, meant that in France it was relatively easy to adapt the economy to a declining pace of demographic growth and less oil based energy use.

Another characteristic of the cornucopian Australian approach was a tendency for public and private overseas borrowing to finance continuing expansion. In France, to the contrary, where economic activity and energy use were allowed to contract, overseas borrowing was not a major option.

An important assumption of this thesis is that petroleum based energy is fundamental to our modern industrial economy, although our dependency on this varies from country to country. Because of this fundamental dependence, it is reasonable to suppose that, since the first oil shocks, there have been some important social, industrial, political and economic adjustments.

Outline of Structure and Contents of this Thesis

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part deals with theory, background information, and history. The second part elaborates my argument. There are also five appendices, which provide definitions of terms, more detail of theoretical background, and detailed documentation for some of my assumptions, particularly in the domain of French and Australian statistics.

Part I

Chapter One contains the introduction, which establishes the merit and interest of the research subject. It contains a statement of my research question and argument outline and this outline of the Structure and contents of the thesis.

Chapter Two describes the sociological theory of the New Ecological Paradigm and examines similar theories. It introduces a relationship between theory on ecological limits to growth and actual social reaction to the experience of the 1973 oil shock.

Chapter Three examines different systems of land development and housing and the residential construction industry, with reference to sociological literature. It introduces a relationship between theory on land use planning and housing and demographic and energy consumption policy. It describes the issue of the value of biodiversity preservation as a sociological concern that is more prevalent in Australia than in France. It then introduces a relationship between systems of land development planning and land use planning for biodiversity habitat needs and points to a body of Australian immigration literature that has been written by ecologists.

Chapter Four reviews traditional immigration literature relevant to the research question. It highlights some assumptions that are implicit in French immigration literature and evaluates some different statistical approaches to measuring immigration rates.

Chapter Five describes in detail Gary Freeman's theory of concentrated and diffuse benefits and costs of immigration, discussing its application in my thesis.

Chapter Six provides a relevant history of immigration in Australia and France before 1945 and up to the 1973 oil shock. It establishes the existence of a populationist property development lobby at the turn of the 19th century in Australia and documents a similar lobby in modern times. For France it documents reasons for immigration up to 1974 in the absence of such a lobby. European law has created special legal traditions which make it difficult to limit family reunion and here I introduce the idea that the French system of land development planning and housing may be used to impede immigration to France, especially in the form of family reunion. The impact of the politics associated with the colonisation and decolonisation of Algeria are also described in this chapter

Part II

Part II contains three chapters. Chapters seven and eight are the evidence chapters and chapter nine is the conclusion.

Chapter Seven contains my theory and my argument and evidence for it.

Chapter Eight tests my theory from a different angle, examining the complicating role of globalisation of the property market. I compare the impact of globalisation in France and Australia and conclude that immigration caused a ratchet effect on prices in Australia which is not present in France.

Chapter Nine contains the conclusion to my thesis with some recommendations for further research.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - contains the glossary of terms.

Appendix 2 - contains information about some events and policies discouraging high immigration in Australia, to supplement a brief reference I have made to these in my argument.

Appendix 3 - contains a detailed account of the development of energy and oil economics policies in France and Australia and some other countries. There are some tax policy and statistical comparisons included.

Appendix 4 - is the Statistical Appendix and contains details of different operational definitions in French and Australian statistics, evaluations of reliability and validity, and discussions about comparability. Graphs are provided detailing rates and contributions to population growth in France and Australia since 1945 and population projections to 2050 are also provided for both countries. It also provides statistical information using a variety of units to measure human impact within different economies.

Appendix 5 - on Population theory contains supplementary information on the historical development of population theory, especially that of Malthus and Darwin. It also looks at some of the ideas of cornucopians.

Appendix 6 - contains copies of original documents by André Postel-Vinay, Minister responsible for Immigration policy in France in 1974.

Raw Data for Graphs and Tables - Raw data will be supplied by the candidate on request.

CHAPTER TWO - BACKGROUND THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW - THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM

My explanation for why Australian and French population policies diverged is both environmentally based and economic. I will be arguing that the Oil Shock of the early 1970s,¹ and those that followed, necessitated socio-economic reorganisation for both countries and that their different land planning development and housing systems meant that they re-organised differently from each other and with different immigration outcomes. In this chapter I give the theoretical background for my environmentally based explanation.

Environmental Sociological Theory

I would describe as "environmental" rather than ecological the theories below. They emphasise the use of commercial energy and other resources for human needs and give little attention to ecological issues of biodiversity. Nevertheless they are usually referred to as ecological theories. Their relevance to sociology is discussed below. (Theory of land-use for biodiversity is addressed in Chapter Three.)

New Ecological (Environmental) Paradigms:

Mainstream sociological theory has not been accustomed to giving much prominence to the questions of energy and natural resources. For example, unlike Malthus and Darwin, Durkheim and Marx believed that humans were distinguished from other animals by their ability to escape the limits of growth. Both acknowledged Darwin's contribution to science, but both thought humans were fundamentally different from other animals.² More recently there have been attempts to realign sociology with the basic common ground of biophysical science by, among others, R.E. Dunlap & W.R. Catton Jr., in "A New Ecological Paradigm for a Post-Exhuberant Sociology".³

Dunlap and Catton use the term "human exemptionalism"⁴ to describe the belief that humans can solve all problems through technology, and they link its persistence with the optimism that accompanied the pioneering of new territories (such as America and

Australia) from the 18th to the 20th centuries by Europeans. They identify Europe's discovery of the "new world" with the notion of limitless territory. They call the period of colonialism and the industrial revolution, which also spanned the 18th to the 20th centuries, the "Age of Exhuberance". According to their interpretation the Age of Exhuberance was fuelled by the opening up of the "second hemisphere" (the new world and Oceania) accompanied by the discovery and the exploitation of new techniques which led to increased fossil fuel use. Rees and Wackernagel have more recently popularised Caton's conceptualisation of the exploitation of fossil fuels, particularly oil, as the opening up of another dimension; that of precious energy buried in time. (See further on.)

The Age of Exhuberance began to falter in the second half of the twentieth century. One sign that the exhuberant age was coming to an end was that colonial populations sought sovereignty over their regional wealth.⁵ The formation of OPEC has been cited as an illustrative case that severely impacted upon the first world, giving rise to the 1973 oil shock. The reaction of European and English speaking settler societies, primarily France and Australia, to the first and subsequent oil shocks, is an important part of the argument developed in this thesis.

A second sign that the Age of Exhuberance might be coming to an end was the rise in population in third world colonies and the rise in energy consumption and population in first world colonies and in Europe, a rise which has been accompanied by economic and demographic disparities on a global scale. These disparities have, as we have seen, contributed to international migration pressure and to increasing acrimony⁶ over international trade power blocs - notably North America's dominance over the international market.

Thirdly, many analysts fear that growing problems of pollution of water, soil and atmosphere, with the prospects of global warming and the possibility of qualitative and quantitative oil shortages, (leading to exploitation of increasingly pollutive and inefficient energy sources) will make economic and demographic growth and growth in energy use increasingly problematic.

Possibly because they felt constrained to operate still within the (Marxist originated) materialist economic model that dominates Sociology, Dunlap and Catton's analysis is limited to material wealth alone, and does not explore disruption of biological diversity

and species scarcity. Ecological crisis is implicitly defined as a crisis of material(s)⁷ supply.

Dunlap and Catton cite Garrett Hardin's *Limits to Growth*⁸ for its contribution to the identification of this crisis. They identify several problems they consider will arise from an impending materials shortage/environmental crisis and human population growth. Among these is the phenomenon of resource substitution of one fossil fuel for another, which physical scientists often hold will lead to higher energy costs and growth in pollution. Another problem many scientists have raised is that continuing expansion and intensification of human economic activity will lead to increasing heat production. Dunlap and Catton are among those who believe this will result in dangerous planetary warming, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics.⁹

Dunlap and Catton call the belief, in sociology,¹⁰ that human beings are not subject to the same biophysical laws as other animals, the Human Exemptionalist Paradigm (HEP). Because of this belief they say, initial sociological studies of environmental problems were mostly confined to public attitudes on environmental issues. Presumably this was due to the need to establish these issues as sociological concerns. However studies never got beyond this focus to the point of actually examining human and social interaction with environment and ecology, particularly major biodiversity issues.¹¹ Some sociological work on the relationship of humans with the biodiverse environment began in the 1970s, with studies by Burch and Michelson.¹² By their acceptance of environmental variables, these sociologists implicitly denied the HEP.

Dunlap and Catton's New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) stresses the interdependencies of species including humans, whilst allowing humans some "exceptional" qualities. The NEP asserts that human affairs are often influenced by the biophysical environment, frequently due to environmental reaction to human action. Human affairs are constrained by their biophysical context. The NEP assumes that, as inventive as humans may be, their science and technology cannot repeal physical ecological principles such as the laws of thermodynamics. The NEP assumes that there are limits to growth for human societies and compares the sociological concept of a "sustainable society" to the biological concept of a "climax community".¹³ The term, climax community, refers to the final (stable) stage of a plant/animal community where the numbers and generations are stable as long as the environment remains unchanged. (It

would be interesting to situate French and Australian populations according to this definition.)

The most obvious departure from traditional sociology is the inclusion of non social variables. For sociologists the NEP gives a new basis for examining traditional sociological concerns, such as competition and conflict between different social classes in a context of ecological scarcity and competition between current and future generations, using the concept of intergenerational competition for resources or “diachronic competition and intertemporal equity.”¹⁴ Here is a sociological conception of a dimension in the future that relies on exploitation of fossil reserves accumulated in the past! It also provides a basis for examining resource competition between the first and third worlds.

For the purposes of this thesis, ecological crisis as a crisis of material shortage is an important concept when considering the 1973 Oil Shock and those that followed. Among reactions to the 1973 shock, in Europe we see social reaction to the concept of potential long-term energy shortage. In the English-speaking settler countries, however, energy shortage is dealt with as a short term-problem.¹⁵

In my thesis I use technological and design changes in the construction industries and the decline of new building in the home building sector as an indicator of these different social reactions. The case emerges that suggests that the French (and EEC community) interpreted the 1973 oil crisis as an indicator of limits to growth and set about limiting population growth and energy use for the long term. Their immediate objective, which they achieved, was to reduce the consumption of oil based energy. However the land development planning and housing system in Australia (and other English-speaking settler countries) relied on population growth and high energy consumption and overcame similarly inspired attempts to restrain these there.

Land and the phenomenon of immigration are also important to Dunlap and Catton's thesis. Using the historic context of European expansion into the New World, Dunlap and Catton show how increases in the amount of land available to Europeans through emigration were also responsible for setting the tone of the Age of Exhuberance. According to them, "discovery" of the Americas took the land potentially available to the European population from about 24 acres to 120 acres per capita (an approximate five fold increase).

The perspective developed by the NEP provides one way of visualising the interaction between human culture and its resource base, but the concept of the ecological footprint allows us to bring this new image into a sharper focus.

The Ecological Footprint

William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel examine the concept of land needs in *Our Ecological Footprint* (1998).¹⁶ This book attempts to develop a concept for measuring the per capita impact on the environment of a community. It is another way of counting population by assigning each person an average impact value¹⁷ according to the total impact of their nation's economy on regional and planetary resources.

Instead of just looking at housing and urban planning on a local scale as in Australia, or on a national scale as in France, it looks at planning on a global scale. While population planning is usually addressed on a national or global scale, and family planning on a personal or family level, Rees and Wackernagel's addresses land use on the global scale, although it does look at personal needs.

The book visualises the allocation of space needed by humans and how this space is utilised by an economy. It also explores planning of development in a spatial sense and how building, organisation and design affect energy use. How much biologically productive land¹⁸ will be required to produce the energy required for humans to live in a particular economy and how much pollution will they produce? Furthermore, how much biologically productive land would be required to absorb that pollution? This is another way of exploring carrying capacity. Its methodology is built on theories like Ehrlich's I=PAT.¹⁹

The Rees and Wackernagel theory has been developed with practical formulae and serves sophisticated concepts, but the operational indicators are still primitive so the results are of low validity and reliability. This is due in part to the problem of global scale and national differences in statistical measures and indicators. Nevertheless some practical work has been done already using this theory and has permitted comparisons between different countries.²⁰ See my Statistical Appendix, pp 35-45 regarding methods used to calculate energy use. See Appendix 5 for more about population theories.

This thesis attempts broadly to quantify and relate availability and cost of energy to land-use, housing and population logistics in France and Australia. It identifies differences in energy policies and in land development planning and housing systems as variables producing different demographic outcomes in France and Australia. The Footprint theory helped in providing a conceptual framework, as well as examples of indicators and measures, with which to do this.

Energy and Oil Shocks

What have energy consumption and oil economics got to do with sociology?

Clearly energy consumption and oil economics have an impact on economies and anything which impacts on an economy may cause social constraints and social reactions.

In the area of sociological theory, Dunlap and Catton and Rees and Wackernagel have given sociological significance to energy use and their theories provide us with conceptual frameworks within which to examine relationships between numbers of people, lifestyles and energy consumption. (Some of the statistical concepts for measuring indicators of these will be mentioned at the end of this section. They are discussed in much more detail in Appendix 4, pp.35-45.)

Their theory assumes practical significance for the analysis of socio-economic policy in response to major oil shocks, particularly the first one in 1973.

Conveniently, the major oil shock of 1973 provided a period where economic impact and social reaction was highlighted and substantial records remain at the level of the popular press, specialist magazines and books treating the period. This is because policy formation was widely discussed and reported on internationally. It focused on decisions to do with consumption and energy pricing, potential alternatives to petroleum-based energy, infrastructure expansion or contraction, demographic expansion or stabilisation, public finance strategies such as encouraging saving, buffering unemployment, raising taxes, increasing protectionism, or borrowing externally. Some of these policies were more directly connected to the international crisis as an oil supply crisis and others were

couched in more general terms of an economic crisis. But they were all apparently kicked off by the 1973 oil shock.

The 1973 oil shock marks the period when France broke away from its post war population building policy and when Australia attempted unsuccessfully to do so. From this point the two countries were to develop in quite different ways.

The oil economics literature has little to say on the reason that different countries took different courses in dealing with the oil shock, but two obviously different blocs exist.

In ecological terms, the first block consists of the 'cautious' Western European countries, like France, without local oil supplies and the second, of the 'incautious' ESSS with local oil possessions. It appears that France and other Western European countries took a Colbertiste and Malthusian²¹ course.

Australia and ESSS with local oil possessions were economically and demographically more expansive and cornucopian in their approach - as judged by energy consumption, population growth, and infrastructure expansion.²²

There does seem to persist in some circles a general belief that "new" countries could go on expanding indefinitely, due to their abundant natural resources, which include oil, gas and other energy and mineral reserves.²³

This absence of comparative theory leaves questions that I attempt to answer, at least in part, through my research, which does indeed suggest that France's methods of organisation, with national land planning and strong public housing provision may have assisted the retention of a "Colbertiste" protectionist approach to economics and social welfare, with a "Malthusian" awareness of population carrying capacity.

These differences will be dealt with at the beginning of Chapter Seven and are explored in some detail in Appendix 3.

CHAPTER THREE - BACKGROUND THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW - LAND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS, HOUSING AND THE RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

The previous chapter provides an outline of the theoretical perspective in which the argument of this thesis is set. It shows that, whatever may have been the case in the past, we can no longer analyse social and economic policies without considering environmental constraints. To date there has not been a particularly abundant literature on this, but the case is different when we come to the specifics of particular policies. There has, for example, been a substantial tradition of policy analysis as far as the land development system, housing, and the residential construction industries in France and Australia are concerned.

Systems of Land Development Planning

In this thesis I identify two different systems of land development planning and treat them as variables of population policy formation in France and Australia.

Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*¹ helped me to clarify the differences in land development systems, as part of the structure and implementation of property development in France and Australia. The book was written by a number of authors in the field of urban planning for the express purpose of pointing out how different land development planning of cities and housing and other spaces in Western Europe is compared to statutory planning and housing in America. Their articulation of the characteristics of Western European cities and spaces validated my suspicions that erroneous assumptions about pressures to maintain or increase immigration in France could have occurred due to misunderstandings by writers from English speaking settler countries about land development planning and housing systems there. A major difference that emerged was the relative lack of land speculation.

One of the functions of government in any society is that of directing and controlling housing outcomes through appropriate housing policy. The form of that policy will vary from country to country, depending upon the particular form of society and governance. Terry Burke in his analysis of housing and related planning policy

describes Australia, the United States, and Canada as market liberal federal systems, meaning that their "national political system is built around States with their own autonomy and rights." Their emphasis is on market processes and small government. Another system exists in other countries which have "unitary systems, where the national political system is dominated and controlled by a central or national government." He adds that this difference is "often neglected in an analysis of housing policy", but that it is an important one.²

Nationally co-ordinated Land Development Planning : This is France's system. It is a nationally based and co-ordinated and involves State direction of public land. Uses are planned a long time in advance. The State purchases land specifically for public housing, equips it with infrastructure and releases it to builders. Land is also set aside for forests, roads, agriculture and other social and economic uses.

Statutory or Land Use Planning : This is Australia's system. Australia's planning system reflects that Australia is a market liberal and federal society. There is no national planning system as planning is the responsibility of the states and local government. It is also a non-interventionist system compared to much of Europe, as the objective is to facilitate and direct the market rather than to override it. Although land is initially zoned by state governments and there are forums for the public to raise objections to development initiatives, the system is piecemeal and no-one in one area is aware of what is being done in another area unless they take special steps to find out. This is because administration of the development controls that attach to zones is left to the myriad of local governments, each with their own interpretations and aims and objectives. Despite the fact that land is initially zoned, rezoning is comparatively easy, due to the absence of overall long-term planning framework in most states and territories and a greater desire to accommodate the needs of the private sector than in non-market liberal societies.

Australia

The two systems are clearly very different and the literature on one does not often speak to the conditions of the other. Consequently the two systems will be analysed separately here.

Michael Cannon's *The Land Boomers*,³ and Neville Hicks, *This Sin and Scandal*,⁴ helped me to make connections between land speculation, economic growthism and population boosting. Cannon's work was about land speculation in Melbourne and Sydney in the 1890s and Hicks wrote about the desperate machinations of businessmen of the time to induce a rise in the birth rate and in immigration.

After the long boom associated with the 1860s gold rush, when gold ran out, international immigration dried up, the birth rate fell, and people went interstate, to Queensland and West Australia, following gold discoveries there.⁵ The worst economic depression in Australia's history followed.⁶ Up to the crash, however, more allotments had been subdivided for suburban houses in Melbourne than would have been sufficient for the entire population of London. In 1893 there were 14,000 vacant houses there.⁷

What were the ecological consequences of so much land clearing associated with mining and building? An unpublished doctoral thesis by Sandra Bardwell, *National Parks in Victoria 1866-1956, "For all the people for all time"*, 1974⁸ provides valuable documentation of historical changes to space and amenities, in the form of the reservation of parks, changes to forest cover and increments to urban areas. This detailed thesis, which actually went chronologically well beyond 1956, is an historical document in its own right, since its focus typifies a 1960s and early 1970s renaissance in the preservation of natural spaces in Australia just prior to the post oil shock period when universities and youth became more preoccupied with unemployment and corporate culture.

Bardwell shows that the Gold Rush and its attendant land rush had rapidly devastated much of the Victorian landscape. Land was cleared for housing, for fuel and for agriculture as well as to dig holes to look for gold. The impact on forest cover was so early so devastating that the Land Act (1865) Commissioners recommended investigating the merit of establishing State Forests. They described examples of protective overseas legislation and raised the issue of massive forest clearing and the connection with climate change, drainage problems and water supply.⁹

It seems clear that rapid population growth was a good thing for the property development industry, but a bad thing for ecology and the environment. (In the last part of this chapter I explore land-use planning and ecological theory for biodiversity needs.)

There were obvious differences in the way Australia's population had grown in sudden fits and starts since 1788 and in the more moderate pace of change in the French population over the same period. However it was not until I started to investigate differences in immigration policy in France and Australia after the first oil shock that I began to wonder if there was some difference in the way land development was planned and organised in Australia and France whereby the interests of Australian property developers were more directly served by population growth. Continuing a similar line of research to Cannon's history of land speculation were Leone Sandercock's books, *The Land Racket* (1979) and *Property, Politics and Urban Planning* (1990).¹⁰

Sandercock describes these books as historical studies of the “national hobby of land speculation” beginning in the 19th Century. The first concentrates on corruption in the Victorian property development and housing industries with the institutionalisation of private interests over public interest in land development planning.¹¹

The second book revisits the first and adds chapters on Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, making some comparisons between Australian and American city planning. The author comments on her early method, which she describes as having been written on the “cusp of a waning left-liberal approach to planning issues and a just blossoming neo-marxist paradigm”.¹² She explains that she had been interested in the political, sociological and institutional aspects of city planning and in understanding how planning relates to the political economy of a society. Her books carefully document names and dates and they also establish concepts which do not occur elsewhere in sociological literature on population growth and immigration. For instance, in her second book she establishes the relationship between property speculation and population growth and the fact that it is an issue which gives rise to conflict among planners in Australia.¹³

She also provides a clear definition of “land development planning and statutory planning”. Sandercock actually expressed these two concepts as: “development planning” and “statutory or land-use planning”,¹⁴ but I have changed the first to “land development planning” to avoid confusion with foreign aid 'development' programs and to emphasise the fact that land use of all kinds may be involved in this kind of forward large scale nationally co-ordinated planning. She also establishes very firmly the existence of speculation as an institution in Australia and the role that government's

accommodation of private interests in land development and housing play in facilitating this.

France

Modern French land development planning and public housing traditions and law in France actually had their origins quite early in the 20th century. Jean-Pierre Gaudin documents this in "Urban planning techniques and political legitimacy in France at the beginning of the twentieth century".¹⁵ Ironically, the First World War appears to have had a beneficial effect on planning. Gaudin writes that the "scope of reconstruction work made necessary after the bombing in 1914-18 prevented those defending private property and real-estate speculation from holding up the process any longer." The process was to pass national laws making town planning compulsory, providing powers of compulsory purchase, and increasing the powers of the communes and the government. This process was first discussed in 1909 by the French Chamber of Deputies.¹⁶

After the first world war forward planning of "development, improvement and extension programmes"¹⁷ for the allocation of land-uses became a reality. In a paper for an urban planning conference in 1923 at Strasbourg, France, G. Bechman wrote that "the period of small-scale road maintenance operations, designed with a narrow-minded outlook, prepared and undertaken in isolation, accompanied by a great many endless formalities, to end finally in ruinous expenses, is now definitely over".¹⁸

Gaudin writes that French planners immediately saw that plans for new residential areas would have little chance of success if it was attempted to implement them on land belonging to private owners. Hence laws were made for compulsory acquisition of land by government for the building of public housing and amenities, financed by taxes. The goal was for "land regrouping" where the State would purchase private land to form blocs destined for specific public use. The Cornudet planning Act of 1919 continued on a national basis the principles of planning initiated by the famous statesman and planner, Haussmann, who remodeled Paris between 1853 and 1869 and had a lasting influence on urban design throughout Europe.¹⁹ It had the purpose of dealing "with the question of the future development of the city and built-up area; the general review and

modification of routes of communication, conservation of existing open spaces, formation of wooded reserves, rational distribution of public buildings, creation of health, archaeology and art organizations and major clean-up operations."²⁰

The concept of protecting the heritage of future generations through "plans based on forecasting" was thus introduced and legitimatised in France before 1920. Planning was a communal responsibility according to the principles of "social solidarity", a concept popularised by the Radical Party at the turn of the century. The idea was that those who had become rich in a society owed a debt to the society as a whole, for their wealth had been acquired through many anonymous acts of cooperation over time.²¹ This philosophy provided an important rationale for taxing speculative profits.

These innovations to the structure and implementation of property development seem to have contributed to a situation in France where there were, arguably, fewer obstacles to nationally co-ordinated land planning development than in Australia. Structural limitations and taxation disincentives to land speculation seem to be especially important. For instance, although in 1945 according to their urban planning projections, the French had anticipated a higher growth rate, both by natural replacement and immigration, far into the twentieth century when growth slowed dramatically from 1974 onwards, these plans could be revised without the kinds of revolt and lobbying for renewed population growth that occurs in Australia from the property development and manufacturing sectors. An indication of this flexibility of planning was the capacity by government to reduce funding for public housing and subsidies for private home buying.²² Since government provided much of the funding for housing of all kinds this dramatically reduced the creation of unnecessary new housing stock.

In an international comparison, Barry Simpson provides further information on planning and infrastructure provision in his *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman, 1987. This work gives numerous instances of specific laws authorising public authority land requisitioning and obligations for developers during different periods. The comparative material is useful as well because it demonstrates the broad similarities of Western European planning approaches. Simpson's work also contains a few examples of where private property development had found ways around institutionalised planning obligations. This situation is alluded to by Burtenshaw and Bateman below. It seems that property speculation was just

getting ready to seriously entrench in France, particularly in the commercial sector, when the oil crash came.²³

Another source of international comparisons is the *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*.²⁴ Willem Van Vliet in his introduction to this collection of articles, provided material to situate Australian development and housing policies and practices internationally.²⁵ He evoked the different roles that governments in capitalist systems could take in land development,²⁶ writing that in the US “local growth coalitions dominate” and national government intervention is minimal. Australian policy and practice seem to be closer allied to US practice than European practice, as I suggest often in my thesis. He adds that “political constituencies in many European countries were better positioned to extract government commitment to public concerns such as education, health and housing than was the case in the US, Canada and Australia”.

Van Vliet does not comment on the relationship between population growth and housing, but he does write that “housing has also been an instrument of population-related policies” and gives examples which include the redistribution of population (in Britain, the Netherlands, China ...) which were part of broader strategies to stimulate economic growth, but also to protect agricultural land and curtail adverse effects of urbanisation, and to promote the integration of diverse population groups.

Public and Private Housing Policy

There is in fact quite a lot of comparative work on housing policy internationally.²⁷

A number of key differences exist in the housing systems of France and Australia. One is the greater role of public housing for the lower socio-economic strata in France compared to Australia. Where Australia's in the mid-nineties was five per cent of stock, that of France was 17 per cent.²⁸ The obvious point to make here is that the housing system in France is therefore more amenable to state control than the largely private Australian system. The two other important aspects of the way housing is provided are, firstly, that the Australian system is dominated by the detached dwelling (almost 80 per cent of stock) whereas the French, notably in urban areas, is dominated by flats and

apartments. Secondly and relatedly, the construction of housing in Australia is dominated by small builders, where the French system is controlled more by large builders using industrial techniques. The small scale fragmented nature of the former, along with the more marketised nature of the residential building industry means it is much more prone to booms and busts and therefore to the speculative opportunities that a boom and bust process creates. The role of household growth and migration in relation to the attributes of the housing system including the tendency to market speculation and production is one theme of the research.

Many of these books are primarily concerned with better servicing the housing needs of the lower socio-economic strata. This objective is of obvious social importance, but, in pursuing it they unavoidably provide information on patterns of provision and rates of provision of different kinds of housing in relation to population growth and immigration. Statistical sources help us to establish rates and patterns of population growth through immigration and natural replacement, but historical and sociological studies are necessary to elicit material on interactions between immigration and production and access to housing.²⁹

The Residential Construction Industry

Burke (1999) points out that the methods by which housing is produced, as well as its form, have important implications for housing policy, including low income housing provision.³⁰

The residential construction industry is that part of the property development industry that actually designs and builds residences. His work makes it clear that the structure of the provision of housing and systems of land development, housing policy, and the residential construction industry are interdependent.

For some time I concentrated on material that described actual residence construction industry organisation, technologies and product design. I thus initially zeroed in on differences between the way the residential construction industries in France and Australia had adapted to energy price changes and economic recession, supposing that organisational and technical changes in the French residential building industry after 1973 reflected a drop in demand due to lower population growth, together with a rise in

the cost of building materials and wages. I assumed that this alone must have led to so much contraction in the industry that it had been unable to marshal sufficient forces or funds to lobby for more migrants or to attract international finance.

Although I was right about the depressant effect on the French residential construction industry, what I did not realise is that I would find no evidence of any part of the French property development industry, including the residential construction industry, *ever* having relied upon or lobbied for population growth, especially not from immigration. The time I spent researching characteristics of the residential construction industry that emerged after 1973 proved to be useful however, for establishing industry flexibility. Importantly it also provided indications of relationships between rising energy costs and industry restructure or lack of restructure and change or lack of change in product design and focus in each country during this period.

The main thing to emerge from reading about the course of the residential construction industry in France and Australia was that after the 1973 oil shock, the French industry restructured. This was also the case in the rest of the EEC. In France the industry rationalised resources, utilised new technology and adapted design and production to increased energy costs and to the reduced product demand.³¹ This reduced product demand was related to reduced population growth and reduced government projects and finance.

In contrast, the Australian industry made few if any such adaptations although a number of similar conditions initially prevailed. From the late 1970s however, there was actually infrastructure, residential and office construction *expansion* in Australia. There are many indications that the Australian construction industry came to rely on overseas borrowing, much of it brokered through international Japanese construction companies.³²

Peter Rimmer's article, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", provides material indicating major international financial links to State infrastructure and residential and office construction projects. He describes Australian States competing for international funding in the face of the post oil shock economic fall-out.³³

Sandercock, in her introduction to *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*³⁴ describes very clearly how from the "late 1970s until its defeat in 1983, the Fraser government relied ..." on attracting foreign investment by the provision of cheap power and encouragement of the "provision of infrastructure for private sector resource" which relied heavily on foreign borrowing.

Rimmer also alludes to immigration as a way for foreigners to acquire cheap land in Australia.³⁵ Ernest Healey's thesis, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor during the 1980s and Early 1990s*³⁶ hypothesises global market and finance motivations for a connection between high immigration policy for Australia and the vision of Australia as more imbedded in Asia. These are new ways of looking at the relationship in the Australian property development industry between high immigration and land speculation. *The Bold Riders* by Trevor Sykes, as well as chronicling the activities of the grand Australian speculators of the late 1980s, provided evidence of some relevant links between these speculators and government.³⁷

Fagan writes that after 1975 State governments increased their foreign borrowing firstly to finance infrastructure projects, especially for mining, and later to "offset mounting balance of payments deficits on current account."³⁸

Between 1963 and 1977 capital from Japan increased ten-fold. From less than 10% in 1972-75 under Whitlam, foreign investment in Australia increased to 49% of GDP in 1990-91. By 1986 **more than half** was destined for real-estate investment.³⁹

It appears thus that the Australian economy was able to perpetuate pre 1973 conditions by overseas borrowing, whereas the French economy chose a more conservative path.

Prime Minister Fraser liberalised foreign investment rules under the *Foreign Takeovers Act (1975)*.⁴⁰ Successive amendments have progressively removed barriers for foreigners to purchase land in Australia. Few restrictions remain. A 1987 amendment prohibited foreigners from purchasing established residences, but since 10/9/99 a foreigner married to an Australian citizen may co-purchase an established residence. There is no restriction on purchasing any other land with the exception that foreigners must notify the Foreign Investment Review Board when they intend to purchase developed non residential land for more than \$50 million. I will discuss some ramifications of this issue in Chapter 8.

In France, foreign borrowing and foreign investment were discouraged up to the 1990s. Pompidou changed policy to the extent of facilitating foreign investment in productive industries that created employment, "Greenfield investment", but discouraged the buying out of French enterprises. From the mid 1980s French investment overseas increased. By 1992 French direct investment abroad made up 18% of the world total and 32.1% of investments originating from the EEC. Most of this finance was invested in Europe. From the mid 1980s foreign investment in France increased, but most came from within Europe. Up to 1992 EEC investment was clearly preferred. After 1992 policy was less discriminatory. There has developed over this period a notable symmetry between imports and exports.⁴¹

Van Vliet in *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices* analyses the average size of residential construction firms in different countries in the 1980s as an indicator of efficiency in the building industry. Australia's firms were among the smallest, with about 20,000 firms in 1984-1985 with an average of 3 employees each, including the working proprietors.⁴² This point is important to my argument as the size of construction firms is linked with the ability to adapt new methods and this is a factor in reliance or lack of reliance on accelerated population growth. In *The Australian Housing System*, which refers to the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia,⁴³ Terry Burke comments that developers in Australia frequently employ a strategy of "inviting as many builders as possible to set up display houses. Some have up to 60 different builders working on their estate at any one time. This fragmentation not only limits the degree to which the builders can appropriate development gains, but also further restricts their ability to embark on more industrialised forms of production techniques that might occur on site."⁴⁴

In short, the cases of France and Australia provide many differences in industry restructuring post 1973, differences in energy use practices, differences in infrastructure investment and in overseas borrowing. Added to differences in population growth rates between France and Australia, these variations underpin my argument that Australia took a 'cornucopian' route and that France took a 'Malthusian' route after the 1973 international oil related economic crisis.

The next section deals with a branch of land development planning literature concerned with population policy, immigration, and ecology. This is land planning for biodiversity, a branch of planning which has given rise to major differences between Australian and French immigration literature. These differences may again be extrapolated to differences between the ESSS and Western Europe.

Land-use Planning for Biodiversity Habitat Needs

Biodiversity and Habitat Preservation as a Sociological Concern

Durkheim defined social facts⁴⁵ as detectable social products that form institutionalised constraints. He held that social conventions and institutions constitute concrete manifestations of real societies. He divided social facts into material ones, like roads and buildings, and non material ones, like social norms prescribing acceptable behavior. In human society, land clearing and appropriation is subject to many rules and conventions and frequently encounters opposition. One opposition it encounters are rights of biodiversity, which humans have institutionalised on a variety of levels as conventions and territorial interests. For instance there is the convention of not being cruel to animals, which has a long and distinguished history,⁴⁶ and the desirability of preserving an area of great interest to science. We are also told that to reduce or unbalance biodiversity may ultimately overwhelm our immune systems.⁴⁷ Groups of humans attempt to save natural habitat in order to preserve the populations and cultures of hunter and gatherer tribes which function within these natural areas. There are also many who value natural biodiversity in its unchanged habitat for aesthetic and spiritual reasons.⁴⁸ We may thus justify the inclusion of the concept of biodiversity habitat in sociological terms. Indeed there is a rich body of literature that proposes that threats to biodiversity viability by human population growth and infrastructure expansion are reasons to limit population growth in Australia.

Ecological Theory of Biodiversity Habitat Needs

The ecological theory of biodiversity habitat needs is a scientific and popular concern that has arisen mainly in the ESSS. This is because exploration of the new world not only opened up land, but it brought Europeans in contact with an extraordinary wealth of intact ecologies containing large fauna and flora. This was, in a sense, a second chance at Eden.

Australia was one of the first countries in the world outside the United States in which national parks appeared before 1900 and was a pioneer in the creation of special legislation and organized public promotion of national parks and regional reserves for the conservation of Australian flora and fauna.⁴⁹

The history and role of national parks and regional reserves in France presents a marked contrast to Australia's. Legislation to create national parks in France only exists from the 1960s and is still in its early stages.⁵⁰ At present most or all of these parks are located in alpine or mountainous regions and are too small or too unprotected from resentful farmers to ensure viability of 'super-predators', such as wolves, lynxes and bears.⁵¹ Regional parks in France have the major function of retaining human population in rural areas by preserving traditional regional lifestyles and distinctive local products. The protection and fostering of local fauna and flora is almost an ancillary pursuit. It is largely dominated by the French hunting and shooting lobby's needs and preferences, which favor an attenuated range of traditional prey.⁵²

Such different sociological pressures are reflected in land-use planning and population theory differences in the ESSS and Western Europe. In the ESSS a new branch of Malthusianism called "Eco-Malthusianism" has arisen, which is hardly known in France or Western Europe. This emerging philosophical difference was perhaps first written about in Ronsin, Dubois and Newman in "Ecomalthusians and Pherologists".⁵³

Although in theory one could feed and house a substantially larger human population in Australia, one could not do so and also preserve the natural biodiversity there. This is all the more so because the Australian State based land development planning system, which is population growth dependent, has unnecessarily fragmented natural habitat, rendering what is left extremely fragile.⁵⁴ In essence, corridors which once linked parks and reserves have been broken up and built over by human infrastructure, leaving biodiverse population stranded on islands, buffeted within a sea of increasingly intensive human activity.

Biodiversity habitat needs are the population needs of species including, and in addition to, the human species. Ecological theory of biodiversity habitat is a form of population theory that looks at the problem of land use planning. "Ecological" here is used to distinguish theory about relationships between living organisms and their environment from the narrower term, "environment", which is often used anthropocentrically to designate "the external conditions and surroundings, especially where people live and work"⁵⁵ and which may entirely disregard the issue of biodiversity.

History of Biodiversity and Habitat Theory : Ecological Darwinism

Up until the publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, the general western view on species extinction and changes to landscapes was that God had preordained everything that was going to happen to the world. This perspective is now generally known as "creationism". Many people believed that the species composing an ecology were an unchanging ingredient, although it was also widely held that a great flood had eradicated animals and plants from an earlier epoch. There was however little or no concept of geological time. How people felt about what became of their landscapes and the animals in them varied between a fatalistic belief that destiny prevailed and man had no responsibility or, to the contrary, that man was there to keep order among the lower species, which many felt were only there to serve him.

Whereas Malthus had popularised the concept that food production was limited to available arable land and human population growth was limited by food production, Charles Darwin popularised the notion that humans were only part of a complex web of life. He theorised that species competition over territory could lead to extinction. It is almost certainly to Darwin that we can attribute the wide dissemination of the notion that other species are worthwhile and interesting in their own right. Until Darwin's thesis there had been no principle under which the impact of human activities on other species might be examined.⁵⁶

History of Ecological Darwinism in Australia Leading to Early Formation of National Parks

Many natural scientists had been attracted to Australia by a stream of publications on Australia's extraordinary ecology, beginning with Banks' journal of his voyage with Captain Cook in 1770.⁵⁷ It is probably true to say that, until the gold rush, natural scientists were among the few people who came to Australia voluntarily. This was Australia's golden age of science.⁵⁸

Darwin has a particular place in Australian history because he not only visited Australia, in 1836, but Australia's unique ecology furnished powerful evidence for his

theory of natural selection. A number of "Darwinian scientists" came to Australia because what Darwin had to say about the ecology fascinated them.⁵⁹

Against the feverish property development and infrastructure expansion associated with the gold rush, such scientists led the strong popular native biodiversity conservation movement, which resulted in the creation of natural reserves in the form of "national parks".

Gradually, however, the proportional representation of natural scientists in the Australian population and the importance assigned to their opinion, as evidenced by the number of social events and publications related to scientists, was reduced by the arrival of more commercially oriented waves of immigrants.

The first wave came with the gold rush. This was the beginning of Melbourne's establishment as a financial centre and it was also the beginning of the Australian tradition of property speculation.⁶⁰

The second great wave arrived after the second world war.⁶¹ These immigrant waves formed the foundations of the rise of a bourgeoisie in Australia with little interest in the wonders of biodiversity and which, in the case of the property development sector, was actually in competition with it.

Probably because Australia is a large land that is very hard for humans to settle, and because dense settlement by non-stoneage peoples occurred much later than in Europe, much of its remarkable biodiversity still survives despite the increasingly hostile and intensive economy.⁶² Although there has been a retreat from rural areas, population growth in urban regions and along the coasts is rapid and sprawling, preceded by and accompanied by massive land clearing - much of it speculative.

In France, due in part to the different land development and public housing system, natural habitat has increased since last century and physical conditions are ripe for the return of "super predators" at the head of biodiverse chains, but cultural conditions still support the domination of nature by man, despite a growing movement in support of undomesticated species.⁶³

In Australia, cultural traditions still support the preservation of biodiversity, but physical conditions for its maintenance are rapidly eroding.

Modern Theory : Island Biogeography and Land Planning for Species Diversity

E.O. Wilson and R.H. MacArthur's ecological theory of Island Biogeography (1967)⁶⁴ may be the first that attempted to quantify the destruction of species by relating their habitat needs to loss of habitat through land clearing. Prior to this there was no real system whereby we could measure the erosion of the natural world by human settlement. Wilson and MacArthur's method was to study small islands to see how many individuals of different ages and sexes were necessary to a particular species in order for it to maintain an optimum population. The study also took into account in and out migration and interdependence of species within ecological communities. It began to look at the viability of ecological communities according to scale and complexity. The theory also permitted the definition and study of unnatural islands created by humans, which isolated species and ecological communities away from their counterparts. Figure 3.1. shows how human land-clearing creates such isolated islands.




Fig. 3.1. Maps showing progress of Reduction and Fragmentation of woodland due to land clearing for agriculture, roads, housing etc.

Source: MacArthur, R.H., Wilson, E.O., *Ecological theory of Island Biogeography*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967, p.4, Fig.1, "Reduction and Fragmentation of the woodland in Cadiz township, Wisconsin, 1831-1950." The illustration actually depicts man's impact on Wisconsin woodlands between 1831 and 1950 and originally appeared in J.T. Curtis, "The Modification of mid-latitude grasslands and forests by man. In W.L. Thomas, Jr., ed., *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, University of Chicago Press.

These illustrations lead us to obvious conclusions. At some point in the progress from dense woodland to total fragmentation and then complete clearing there is not going to be enough land for ecological communities, for large species, or, indeed, for almost any species except humans. The species and communities are not going to be able to leave their population centres in order to seek fresh genetic pools because the habitat they eat and shelter in no longer connects the various communities. The process ends with no viable animal and vegetation communities except human ones and those which human enterprise provides for domestic animals.⁶⁵

E.O. Wilson has continued to pursue this problem throughout his life. In *The Diversity of Life*, (1992)⁶⁶ a study of a new volcanic island, he explores the question of just what it takes and how long for a complex biodiverse community to build itself from the ground up.

Wilson's life-long study also led him to examine the problem of the inability of the "human" sciences - notably sociology - to deal with the problem of desertification and loss of biodiversity. One of his most recent books, *Consilience* (1999)⁶⁷ is a book which asks for the different sciences and arts to come together by acknowledging their common basis in molecular and physical science in understanding and nurturing the world we live in. Sociology is particularly taken to task for persisting in treating its subjects - humans - as if they were not real life-forms dependent on a biophysical environment and for its negligence towards other life-forms.

Australian Eco-Malthusian Literature

The cultural importance of native biodiversity and the conflict this engenders in the face of Australia's growing human population and infrastructure expansion within a growthist economy have given rise to a body of Australian population and immigration literature written by natural scientists.⁶⁸

In *The Future Eaters*, 1994,⁶⁹ Australian zoologist, Tim Flannery, in the tradition of Darwin, writes about the competition between humans and other species.⁷⁰

Flannery and other Australian scientists⁷¹ have contributed information on the problem of land use planning for biodiversity preservation by identifying the co-operative

characteristics of Australian indigenous ecology which are different from the competitive characteristics of Europe's. The reasons are biophysical; Europe's receding glaciers created newly mineral enriched soils only 8000 years ago, whereas Australian soils have remained undisturbed by glacial or volcanic activity, or even by fast flowing rivers, for many millions of years, leading to soils which are poor in contrast to those of Europe. Australia's exacting climate and poor soils give rise to much less vigorous, more interdependent ecological communities than Europe's.

Flannery identifies humans as coming from the more competitive ecology. He theorises that Australian Aborigines decimated species in Australia during their early settlement of the continent until the ecological circumstances they had induced caused them to adapt their society to a more co-operative model.

Flannery's thesis propounds the need for an overall population policy in Australia aiming for a more ecologically co-operative model and a much smaller population over time. He assesses this need on the basis that, at current economic lifestyles, the human population, together with other introduced species, is destroying the capacity of the land to sustain it, by devastating the natural biodiversity, which is also of tremendous interest and scientific and aesthetic value. Knowing the contribution of immigration to Australia's population growth, he therefore recommends a reduction in immigration levels.

Australian natural scientists, including paleobotanist Mary White, author of *After the Greening, The Browning*,⁷² show that there is a strong relationship between the destruction of indigenous biodiverse ecology and land and water degradation and desertification.⁷³ Like Flannery, White melds geological theory to fossil evidence, in another Darwinian tradition.

White states that Australia is overpopulated⁷⁴ and has advocated a smaller population in the long-term in her densely written, illustrated work on the interaction of climate and geophysics with the Australian continent and man. White's thesis is similar to Flannery's but, added to her paleobotanical and geological review of Australia's prehistory and history, she identifies likely trends for the future. Even without global warming, Australia is still drifting northwards and this very dry brown land is becoming even drier. Australia's major river basin, the Murray-Darling, is becoming so salty it may turn into a salt desert by about 2020. In the form of irreversible drylands

salinity, salt is rising up in the absence of native vegetation all over the continent. Without ground cover and as the land dries, the top soil, never plentiful anyway, is blowing away into the sea. How will humans and other life-forms in Australia cope?

Because Australia has such extraordinary rich, if fragile, biodiversity, a major issue of land planning and human population expansion is how far can development go without destroying this inheritance? And how far do Australians want it to go, keeping this in mind?

The *Australia, State of the Environment* report examines this question in detail and concludes that the current volume, pace and style of development is unsustainable. This report was published by the Commonwealth Department of the Environment and is a document of highest authority.⁷⁵

In France the situation is different. There biodiversity was drastically reduced and almost completely domesticated long ago, due to human competition and dominance. Encouraging the re-establishment of indigenous animal and plant populations is a distant future ideal for France. Dominant ecological issues in France are reduced to the environmental ones of how to preserve water, soil, atmosphere and quality of life for human beings, whilst keeping the economy going and, the national joke goes, preserving the biodiversity of over 300 cheeses. The issue is much more complex in Australia because of the possibility of preserving and enhancing life for wild populations of flora and fauna. There is even the issue of preserving the possibility of hunter and gatherer lifestyles within these wild ecological communities.

These differences give rise to global responsibilities in land development planning in Australia which go far beyond France's. But as we have seen, Australia's land development planning system is relatively anarchic compared to France's and that it is failing to protect her biodiversity. More and more it accommodates market forces⁷⁶ and market forces seem to be destructive of biodiversity, especially as concerns land clearing. Although most land clearing was initially done for agricultural purposes, including grazing, or for industrial purposes, including mining and provision of firewood, as human population grows, those agricultural lands and the natural habitat that lies between them, are rezoned for housing. Next, more land is cleared for agriculture, and so on.⁷⁷ Between 1961 and 1971 Australian cities used 1,042 square metres of land per person for each unit of population increase. Between 1971 and 1981

this increased to 1,207 square metres. South East Queensland lost 33% of coastal bushland to development between 1974 and 1989.⁷⁸

Fig. 3.2. Map of land clearing and vegetation disturbance in Australia

Source: Mary White, *After the Greening*, Kangaroo Press, 1994, p. 210.



In Fig.3.2 the lighter shaded areas are those which have been affected by thinning and clearing of vegetation. The dark spots are specific areas altered in composition. The main point is that natural habitat has been damaged by thinning and clearing in virtually all fertile areas. Those areas not shown to be affected on the map are more or less inhospitable to human habitation and unable to sustain other large flora and fauna in any density. They are largely desert areas




Fig. 3.3. "Pre-European broad vegetation types".

Source: *Wild Animals of Victoria*, Viridans Biological Databases, a CD purchased from the Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment, viridans@connect.net.au This map shows the variety of vegetation types in Victoria prior to European settlement in around 1850. The entire area is covered in a rich variety of vegetation.

Fig 3.3. is the first of two maps of Victoria, one of Australia's oldest settled States. Much land has been cleared for rural and urban use in only about one hundred and fifty years. This state was originally densely wooded, with well watered and rich soils by Australian standards. It was therefore habitat for a wide variety of flora and fauna, The coastline was once extremely rich in lowland forests and quite large animals, such as

kangaroos, wallabies, wombats, quolls and koalas. Most Victorian quolls have died out and koalas, arguably one of Australia's most emblematic animals, are, among several other species, considered to be under serious threat of extinction. If we look at Fig. 3.4 we can see that much of their habitat has been cleared.




Fig. 3.4. "Present Day Broad Vegetation types".

Source: *Wild Animals of Victoria*, Viridans Biological Databases, a CD purchased from the Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment, viridans@connect.net.au

Land clearing in Victoria, the most intensively settled state in Australia, has been extensive. Most of the relatively uncleared areas are public land, such as parks and reserves - but they tend to be on poor land and are small. Most of the cleared areas are private land. Much of the latter was originally agricultural but is increasingly being rezoned and urbanised, particularly around the biodiverse coastline.




Fig. 3.5 Map of Victoria and Koala sightings.

Source: *Wild Animals of Victoria*, Viridans Biological Databases, a CD purchased from the Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment, viridans@connect.net.au

Each square represents the sighting of at least one koala within ten kilometers squared. Sightings go back to 1900. It is obvious that much koala habitat has been cleared or thinned.

In Fig. 3.5 we can see that there is little food or cover for koalas and that their habitat has been reduced to tiny landed islands. Koalas already nearly died out in Victoria in the 1900s and most of the Victorian population was imported from French and Phillip Islands. In the recent years these animals have been dying of starvation because, having run out of trees in their local areas, they have no other place to go.

Koala specialist, Scott Buckingham, links koala decimation to human population intensity and writes that, in 1996-1998 it was estimated that several thousand koalas and their young died of starvation in the isolated habitat of Framlingham Forest.⁷⁹ Where roads and housing estates are encroaching, such as Tower Hill in Victoria (the first created of Victoria's National Parks)⁸⁰ forests have been stripped bare of leaves and seem to be deserted. Economist Clive Hamilton, has written about the extinction of

koalas in Bandjulong National Park within the last few years and of how another colony is threatened by housing development in Coffs Harbour, New South Wales.⁸¹

Beyond the furry icon of the koala, however, is the overall reduction of diversity in vegetation and fauna, which is reflected microscopically in the impoverishment of soil and water systems in Australia. Aesthetically and spiritually it is reflected in reduction of bushlands and their vandalisation, littering, weed infestation and the growing absence of native fauna.

In this land planning theory and literature chapter I have described major differences in planning and housing systems and their finance in Australia and France. I have documented how Australia's housing and infrastructure development expanded after the oil shocks, whereas France's consolidated. I have also shown that the need to preserve biodiversity and ecological viability in Australia represents special limits to human population growth and infrastructure expansion in this country and has given rise to a unique body of literature on ecology, population and immigration policy. Unlike the situation in France, the influence of ecologists in the Australian population debate is potentially huge. So far, however, it has been dodged by most major and minor political parties, although a political lobby group does exist - Sustainable Population Australia (SPA).⁸² There is no comparable body of literature in France, nor any comparable lobby group.

The implications of this absence of a comparable French lobby group relate both to the absence of significant biodiversity to protect and the absence of rapid population growth in France. The existence of SPA in Australia is an indication that rapid population growth is noticeable and that it is perceived to be adversely affecting valued qualities of biodiversity.

CHAPTER FOUR - APPROACHES TO MIGRATION : A REVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL LITERATURE

Introduction

Here I concentrate my literature review on the more traditional (that is, non-ecological) works about immigration that provided explanations for why large scale immigration programs were undertaken, why they continued or why they ceased after 1973. Issues of relevance to my thesis include the logistics and politics of land use and housing, ideologies promoting or discouraging immigration, the role of elites and the effectiveness of democracy in determining immigration policy and practice.

For a literature review this chapter contains a fair amount of detailed discussion, clarification and argument. This is due to the international nature of the material and its probable unfamiliarity to the reader. A number of facts and issues have come to light that require explanation - such as Algeria's unilateral cessation of migration to France, official policy on housing for immigrants in France, the complex evolution of EEC immigration as distinct from non-EEC immigration in France and the nature of the French visa system. These elements tend to be taken for granted in French literature but need to be articulated here. The context of analysis is also important - whether France was examined in isolation from the EEC or as an increasingly inextricable component of it.

The chapter is organised into: Works on Australia, Works on France, and International Comparative Works involving Australia and/or France.

Population Numbers and Environmental Considerations

Immigration, where it contributes to population growth, also contributes to increasing economic demand on water and land systems, through clearing for agriculture and infrastructure. Chapters two and three on ecology and environment showed these issues

are of concern to environmental and ecological scientists. This theme is not new in Australian immigration literature.

As early as 1770 the botanist Joseph Banks commented on the low density of the Australian Aboriginal population and surmised that it was due to the biophysical limitations of the continent, such as poor soil and an inhospitable climate. With Captain Cook he was engaged in an assessment of the capacity of the land to support the establishment of a penal colony.

There have since been too many other works which made brief or lengthy references to the issue of "carrying capacity" for me to mention more than a few. Possibly the most famous, which dealt with immigration, population and environment was geographer Griffith Taylor's *Environment and Race* (1927). This predicted most accurately the size of Australia's population in 2000 and suggested that Australia should not grow past 20 millions if quality of life was to be maintained.¹

In 1918 E. Brady's *Australia Unlimited*² promoted the idea that Australia should support a (white) population the size of Europe's and, with the post Second World War policy on immigration there was a rash of works promoting the idea of high immigration, such as A. Lodewyckx, *People for Australia, A Study in Population Problems*, 1956,³ which also advocated a vast population for Australia styled on Europe's. In the 1960s and 1970s aborigines gained Australian citizenship,⁴ the White Australia Policy was gradually dismantled,⁵ and the idea of a big European outpost lost favor.

Populationism⁶ became the prevailing tone of immigration literature for a while. In the 1970s, however, concerns about population numbers returned. In 1975 there was a major government enquiry, *The National Population Enquiry (The Borrie Report)*.⁷ After that the Conservation Foundation of Australia and Fontana published a collection of essays, under the title, *Populate and Perish*, in 1984.⁸ Another collection of essays came out in 1991, *Immigration, Population and Sustainable Environments: The Limits to Australia's Growth*.⁹ Between 1992 and 1994, there was another rash of government enquiries and reports, culminating in the *Australian Population "Carrying Capacity" Report*.¹⁰ In recent times population numbers have been central to the major zoological and anthropological history of the Australasian region, including New Caledonia, New

Zealand and New Guinea in Tim Flannery's, *The Future Eaters*, 1994¹¹ and in Mary White's *After the Greening*¹². This was followed by two books by ecologist, Doug Cocks, *People Policy*, 1996, and *Future Makers, Future Takers*, 1999.¹³ In 1998 ecologist and poet, Mark O'Connor, published *This Tired Brown Land*, 1998.¹⁴ In 2001 Tom Morrow published *Growing for Broke*.¹⁵

Of major Australian immigration sociology works, Birrell and Birrell, with *An Issue of People*,¹⁶ (1981 and 1987) and K.Betts with *Immigration Ideology* (1988) and *The Great Divide*, (2000)¹⁷ stand out in nominating environmental considerations as reasons for addressing the question of immigration numbers and lifestyle. To do this they have referred to non-sociological data, such as, in Betts' case, the *State of the Environment Report*, 1996.¹⁸

Immigration and the Question of Total Population Numbers in France and Australia

Comparison of Australia and France reveals that immigration and population policy do not give rise to the same debates in both countries. This seems to be because the population trajectories are so different and also because biodiversity is of minimal local concern in France.¹⁹ France and Australia resemble each other in total fertility rates and longevity, but in the matter of demographic numbers, immigration impacts are quite different. At current rate of legal immigration France's population is destined to stop growing between 2030 and 2050 - which is the period when the baby boomers will expire. Australia's population would also stop growing then if it were not for the high immigration factor. Discussion of immigration in Australia has recently returned more frequently to a discussion of population policy, hinging on the question of whether Australians want their population to stabilise, decline, or keep on growing rapidly. There is however little or no evidence that debating this matter has recently impeded immigration led population growth.

Since the main point of this thesis is that in Australia high immigration continued after the oil shock, I have concentrated on arguments that explain why this is so. Since, in

France, immigration declined after the oil shock, I have concentrated on arguments as to why this is so.

Works on Australia

Works dealing with incentives and disincentives for immigration

In the 1970s analysts began to focus critical attention on the post Second World War contribution of immigration to population growth in Australia. Instead of asking about numerical goals, or helping governments steer their migration programs, some began to ask: Why did we have immigration?

The idea of an economy "conditioned to immigration" was advanced in Australia for the first time in 1971, by R.T. Appleyard, in "Immigration and the Australian Economy" at the conference, *How Many Australians*.²⁰ Appleyard wrote that a great deal of investment had been undertaken in the expectation that immigration would continue and that there were no countervailing measures to bring it to a halt.

In the same publication the idea that interest groups existed in Australia to promote high immigration was explored by Max Walsh.²¹ He identified such groups as the Immigration Department, Qantas, and manufacturing industries which wanted workers and a larger market of consumers, unions seeking more members, and possibly local governments. He suggested that the interests of these pro-immigration groups were assisted by the inertia of an established pattern of high immigration. Such groups did not overtly advertise their own interest in high immigration but tended to present it as being in the national interest, for economic and defence reasons. In theory the poor, who had to compete for jobs with immigrants, might oppose immigration, but they were not powerful and/or organised. Max Walsh also mentioned environmental groups as possible sources of objections to immigration.

These ideas were taken up later by Birrell and Birrell, and by Betts.²²

A European-based marxist thesis that worker immigration in Europe had been encouraged in order to undermine the ability of indigenous labor to bargain was advanced by Australian writers Castles and Kosacks in *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*.²³ J. Collins²⁴ and Paul Wilson²⁵ adapted this theme to the Australian situation, generalising from the tendency of Southern Europeans to man factories in Australia to most Australian migrants.

The essence of this argument is that a "reserve army" of immigrant labor exerts downward pressure on wages during economic booms, when wages would otherwise most probably rise. Indigenous labor is assumed not to oppose this competition because the immigrant labor force is supposed to perform unpleasant kinds of work that local workers refuse to do. Because of immigrants, local workers might then rise to management positions, and prevail as a kind of labor aristocracy. Reserve army theorists argued that insecure temporary imported workers had few democratic rights and were unfamiliar with culture and language. They were easier to bully than native born workers who could express themselves fluently and who had political rights. This 'reserve labor force' also has the theoretical advantage of being easily dispensed with when no longer wanted.

The Birrells argue against the marxist "reserve army" explanation for immigration dependent labor markets, where the capitalist benefits from bringing in cheap labor. They concede that this is true for Europe, and that it may be true to a degree of the United States, especially in the agricultural industry, but say that it is not a dominant motivating force in the Australian labor market.²⁶

The main theory that the Birrells advance is that of the big local market, where manufacturers and non-trade industries, such as the housing industry, seek to increase the number of customers locally, rather than exporting their product overseas. They argue that the business lobby wanted a big population in order to have a big local market and that it was this motive, rather than the desire for cheap workers, that drove the Australian program. (My own thesis also assumes the big local market goal to be the major driver of Australian immigration, although it concentrates on the role of the property development and housing industries in this.)

The Birrells also argue that the Australian manufacturing industry has become dependent on low skilled immigrant labor and has adapted around it, thus avoiding innovation in technology and design.²⁷

The Birrells offer an economic and an environmental and malthusian explanation for the Whitlam government's low immigration policies, but, contrary to my own interpretation, they do not relate their explanations to the oil shock related depression. Accessing different sources, and writing before Whitlam's autobiography, *The Whitlam Government* (1986),²⁸ they interpret Whitlam's policies as having the purpose of reducing demand on the local employment market whilst Australian industry was engaged in restructuring. The restructuring was an adjustment to across the board tariff reductions of 25 per cent, introduced by the Whitlam Government in 1973 to repair an imbalance in foreign trade in the Australian economy. The ALP also viewed the necessary expansion of infrastructure and services demanded by immigration-fed population growth as soaking up scarce capital which might better be invested elsewhere. In addition, population growth was seen as contributing to urban problems and deterioration in the quality of life.²⁹ These interpretations were an extremely helpful basis for my own interpretations which varied mainly in the way I linked them to the global oil shock related recession and to contemporary environmentalist trends.

The Role of Liberal Democracies, Civil Rights and the Intellectual New Class in Institutionalising Immigration (Australia)

The reserve army theorists and the Birrells offer different explanations for why Australia has pursued a policy of high immigration. In *The Great Divide*³⁰ Katharine Betts asks a different question. She asks how is it that political elites have been able to do this? To answer this question she looks at how societies, especially Australian societies, nurture immigration as a social obligation, a little like a form of *noblesse oblige*, even when it appears to be economically and socially very costly. She pioneered the use in Australian immigration sociology of total net immigration statistics, and I have used the same statistical approach. Betts also writes from an ecological perspective which sees immigration as a subset of the larger question of population

policy, and, unlike Money, (see below), has no doubt that immigration numbers have remained high in Australia. Betts asks why immigration has persisted despite a good deal of resentment among the Australian people? Building on the theories that ascribe population building to the desire for big local markets, she observes that government and opposition appeared to develop a bi-partisan agreement to avoid criticising immigration numbers between 1976 and 1981.

After the demise of the Whitlam government the Labor opposition developed a policy of favoring family reunion, which pleased ethnic groups. However it continued for a while to criticise the numbers of immigrants the Liberals were bringing in. Betts suggests that the Liberals would have challenged Labor to show how immigrant relatives did not represent additional numbers. Labor was of course unable to defend its stance. It wished however to keep its family reunion favoring policy because it was important in appealing to immigrant voters. Betts suggests that, because both Liberal and Labor wanted immigration, although for different reasons - they agreed to avoid the topic altogether. Thus, at the elite political level, there was no criticism of high migration.

Why wasn't there more criticism of this beyond the parliamentary arena, she wonders? Her answer is that it became socially dangerous for intellectuals to criticise immigration because, she theorises, a pro-immigration stance became a badge of membership of a status group which considered itself socially and intellectually enlightened.

Katharine Betts' theory is convincing and appears to apply at an international level in a number of countries, as well as in France. According to the conclusions of my own thesis, Betts's "new class"³¹, although it exists in France (where it might be somewhat differently defined in terms of post war and post modern origins) has not had the same impact on immigration policy, debate and numbers in France as it has in Australia.³² In France a similar group has been described thus:

Parisien snobs calling for legalisation of illegal immigrants' status, abolition of national borders and global brotherly love. ... a badge of the Left for rebels without a cause or artists and film-makers who feel guilty because their professions benefit from national protection.³³

The French intellectual 'new class' is less interested in increasing legal immigration than in increasing the rights and welfare of illegal immigrants and refugees. Perhaps also the frank economic rationale for much of immigration policy in France has limited militant promotion of the right to immigrate to family reunion and rights of immigrants to local voting and to housing.

With regards to Betts' theory about the "new class": Both the French and the Australian "new class" groups tend to be tertiary educated, but in my opinion (using the main argument of my thesis) the Australian group has more power because it is boosted by the commercial investment of much Australian industry in immigration led population growth. As such this "new class" would have constituted an important facilitator of high immigration and the influence and status of this group made public disagreement with them socially dangerous for other intellectuals and socially concerned people. In Australia it would seem that the groups that did not fear the new class were the non-intellectual classes - the rural and urban poor and small business and agriculture, however their lesser articulateness served them ill and they also became associated with some crass nationalistic and racist views which severely eroded the moral and social validity of their platform. Le Pen's supporters in France were of similar ilk³⁴ but the French intellectual class had status but little political or financial power since there is little political or financial support for high immigration and certainly almost none for the rights of illegal immigrants.

Betts's thesis is in a sense complementary to my own (which it preceded, of course). Where I suggest that the dependence on immigration-led population growth of the property development industry and other Australian industry groups boosted the power and influence of the "new class", it is perhaps true that, without the "new class" these industry groups might have had a great deal of difficulty maintaining high immigration.

Works on France

Immigration as a response to citizenship

Gerard Noiriel³⁵ believes that immigration in "new" countries like the United States, Canada and Australia was a response to a need to develop sparsely populated regions and that it is basically different from immigration in Europe.³⁶ He hypothesises that immigration in France developed as a "direct consequence of citizenship". In this way he seeks to explain why France became a country of immigration when most of its neighbours did not and why it began so early (in the 18th century) and on such a large scale. He bases his explanation on the "widely accepted" hypothesis that immigration was closely related to industrialisation and the construction of the nation state. As in other countries there was the need for labor to fuel industrialisation. According to Noiriel, other European countries relied on labor provided by a flow of dispossessed peasants who drifted to the cities and formed a disadvantaged proletariat. In France, however, for political reasons, most peasants enjoyed the right to vote from 1848 onward, forming a powerful constituency of citizens. In addition, rural industry was greatly extended in the 19th century, especially in textiles, and this allowed many with very small plots of land to remain on the land.³⁷ They had "the economic and political means of escaping proletarianisation." Therefore they mostly stayed put. Noiriel concludes that immigration presented itself as one of the few options available to assist the process of industrialisation.³⁸

Elite Power Groups (France)

Patrick Weil in *La France et ses Etrangers, l'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938-1991*,³⁹ theorises that the French immigration program was a mixed purpose one, aiming both at procuring workers and increasing the French population. There was, however, a covert selection policy that sought to decrease the number of Algerian Moslems who migrated, by encouraging immigrants from other sources, both European and non-European (e.g. Portuguese and Moroccan). Policy makers hoped that migrants from these sources would out-compete the Algerian Moslems (including those who were French citizens) in obtaining employment in France, thus making France less attractive for the Algerians. The nation-building part of the program was frustrated by the constant housing shortage, which was also a major factor in raising opposition to immigration. Although all residents in France, foreign or French, were in theory supposed to have access to public housing, in practice the French had first claim and

employers and the government fell far short of supplementing the public housing system by providing adequate housing for immigrants.

Patrick Weil, with others, such as Katharine Betts, tend to believe that "power elites" do not succumb so easily to electoral pressure on bi-partisan issues.⁴⁰ They respond to factors which press on them more immediately than do the poorly focused preferences of disorganised electorates.

Like Jeanette Money,⁴¹ Patrick Weil documented growing dissatisfaction among the French on a variety of issues related to immigration numbers, immigrant integration, and housing.⁴² His account, however, is that although this dissatisfaction seemed to give rise to a series of laws and policies designed to improve the situation of immigrants in French society, the changes were ineffective and unenthusiastically applied.⁴³ Thus he implies that these responses amounted to sops; immigration continued. He concludes that, as long as the employers and the State saw benefit in having immigrants, nothing would stop them, short of a major crisis. He says that it was only in 1973 that economic recession, rising unemployment in France and the rise in oil revenues for Algeria (which led in Algeria to higher national expectations and an alliance with other third world oil producing nations) would modify the facts of the situation and lead to a re-examination of immigration policy.⁴⁴

He adds that, although the issue of immigration was raised by Valery Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand, two major candidates in the 1974 election after Pompidou's death, in his opinion it was still not an election campaign issue. He bases this opinion on the fact that Jean Marie Le Pen, President and candidate for the National Front in this election, made absolutely no allusion to the problem of immigration in the four pages and ten points of his platform.⁴⁵

Housing : Immigrant integration and housing as a political or logistical disincentive to immigration.

In France there exists a body of literature from several disciplines that explores issues related to housing, town planning and immigration.

In 1994 the Ministry of Housing in France produced a critical bibliographical work on studies, research and articles dealing with aspects of living space and immigration between 1970 and 1992. This was *Immigration et espaces habité*, by Roselyne de Villanova.⁴⁶

Although immigration is not seen as a population numbers issue, it is certainly seen as a housing issue in France. (In Australia it is seen as a settlement issue, to a degree - as in how do we stop most immigrants going to settle in Sydney⁴⁷ - which is very crowded - but it is not seen as a problem in terms of finding housing. The problem of the cost of housing for all people in Australia - immigrants and citizens alike - is acknowledged but there are few answers and, especially since the bipartisan silence on immigration after 1975, the cost of housing is not generally associated in the minds of the public with the idea of population policy.)

Inappropriate urban planning is blamed for many problems of migrant integration in France, with architecture and zoning preoccupations seen as having taken precedence over thoughtful town planning. Insufficient consideration had been given to the creation of real urban living space.⁴⁸ The problems experienced by immigrants in the poorly serviced new outer suburbs that resulted from thoughtless planning are seen as the same problems as those of other inhabitants of these complexes, which are problems of the poor. The problems of the poor result from cultural marginalisation to which recent urban planning has contributed. The problems of poor migrants are different in principle from those of the poor French only because they result from a double dose of cultural marginalisation, due to the fact that immigrants are from new cultures.

Villanova notes that modern zoning has given rise to a literature on the separation of urban functions and how this separation impacts socially. In previous urban conglomerations most human activities occurred close by each other, with businesses conducted from or nearby homes. Rich and poor lived close to each other, separated only by different buildings or even just floors of buildings. Now the poor live on the fringes in housing complexes separated from commercial and other social sectors.⁴⁹

A constantly recurring theme in the French literature is that housing policies alternate between the accommodation of single workers and the accommodation of workers and

their families.⁵⁰ "Populating and employment control objectives were not reconciled. The first fell away before the second. Immediate concerns took priority over longer views and economic considerations took precedence to the detriment of social considerations."⁵¹ Marxist tradition explains housing scarcity for immigrants as a capitalist strategy to guarantee a mobile immigrant workforce.⁵² One senses, furthermore, an administrative ambiguity : employers were supposed to provide accommodation for immigrants, so why was publicly funded housing being sought for them?⁵³

Part of my own thesis looks at housing shortages combined with French law requiring suitable housing to accommodate family reunion, and suggests that housing logistics and the law combined to frustrate immigration of the traditional worker and family. Villenova, however, shows that French work on immigration and housing is limited to the conclusion that poor town planning, inappropriate housing and housing shortages exacerbated integration difficulties and led to intolerance in the host population. These deficiencies also led to economic and social marginalisation due to the difficulty in linking up with social assistance and other services because such institutions generally rely on persons having a fixed address.⁵⁴

According to her review of the literature, Villenova finds that "housing is more and more seen by different actors as one of the primary conditions for integration of migrants."

Although Villenova's work shows that French immigration literature really boils down to exploring integration issues, rather than analysing incentives and disincentives to immigration, it constantly evokes physical logistical housing shortages: "increasing shortage of urban housing, increasing shortage of large apartments or [even] bed-sits and two room apartments, which are the most sought after by the French."⁵⁵

Towards the end of her review of the bibliographic literature, Villenova exclaims irritably over the lack of systematic research into the normative impact of the concept of the 'average French family' having regard to low French fertility. She asserts that the typically small French family remains the reference point for models and consumer

products [including housing] in industrial societies and thus "marginalises the characteristics of large families" [associated with immigrants].⁵⁶

Villanova thus provides useful corroborative material for my thesis, which is about how the Australian housing system facilitates and encourages immigration whereas the French housing system fails to facilitate immigration and probably even discourages it due to tight logistics. Villanova's comprehensive bibliographic survey also seems to indicate that no-one has yet written on my area of investigation, that is, the role of land development planning and housing as a logistical impediment to immigration, of which intolerance of immigrants due to crowding of public resources is a side effect.

Although this is not his chief theme, Gerard Noiriel, in *The French Melting Pot*, makes a number of comments identifying housing as a mechanism for assisting permanency or reinforcing impermanency among immigrants, although these are not cited by Villanova's study. His remarks derive from practices in private employer provision of housing to immigrant labor, but these practices were present as models for the French State and similarities can be found in public housing policy and practice.

Noiriel states that "the role of housing in the permanent settlement of immigrants was ... very apparent in heavy industry from the beginning of the century through the 1950s." Industrialists financed the majority of working class housing projects in the northern and eastern parts of France. This, writes Noiriel, was intended as a measure to "stabilise the labor force they needed". "In exchange for 'submission' to the law of the company ... the owner, or 'tenant for life' could plan for the future, set concrete goals ...".⁵⁷

He gives the example of the Languedoc mines which sought to retain Spanish and Italian miners by housing them in projects with their families, but comments that the situation was different for Kabyle (North African) "bachelors" who were "parked in barracks" because their primary role was to remain "available" for intermittent work assignments.

He also goes into some detail on the promotion of insecurity in the tradition of camps for migrant labor and refugees, immigration and refugee camps in France from the First World War to the post Second World War period. The camps were

"...the embodiment of precariousness, of the temporary situation that it was hoped that the act of migrating would be. Most immigrants lived in these areas at some point (and some of them remained all their lives) in order to survive. A quick analysis of the types of housing available to single men leads us from the ageless furnished rooms in Paris under the July Monarchy and in the major industrial cities of the post-Second World War period, to the shelters for bachelors made famous by the firm Sonacotra and encampments for seasonal agricultural laborers: shanties and wooden shacks. The situation was no better for foreigners who came as families. Indeed, immigration is characterized by the sudden arrival of large populations in a specific area (a sector or a region of economic expansion) at a given time (the 'boom' creates an immediate demand for workers); hence the permanent mismatch between the demand when all these people arrive and the housing situation."

He cites as examples through history,

"the Flemish neighborhoods of Roubaix in the 1860s, the Italian miners' housing projects in Aboué around 1910, the Jewish neighborhoods of Belleville or the Marais during the Belle Epoque and the Années Folles, and the buildings and shantytowns of Algerian and Portuguese immigrants in the 1970s..."⁵⁸

In the international section of this chapter there is some further discussion of works referring to housing in France, Australia and elsewhere.

Was France's Immigration Policy a Populationist or a Temporary Worker Immigration Policy? (France)

It is important to establish the situation regarding permanent and temporary immigration because a number of writers have argued that France (and other European countries that stopped immigration after the 1973 oil shock, such as Germany and Switzerland) was

more easily able to cut back on immigration because it had little or no formally established program for permanent settlement.

In his first book, *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, the French and British Experience, 1945-1975*,⁵⁹ Freeman argues that immigration was not very far entrenched in France because there had never been a successful program to build population through permanent immigration. He believed that, although the Population Committee formed by De Gaulle in 1945 began with intentions to build population with immigration,⁶⁰ it was quickly overtaken by an economic policy, which preferred temporary workers who could be sent back home when they were no longer wanted. As a result of this, in his opinion, the policy was really for temporary worker immigration only. Those immigrants who sought permanent settlement would have done so despite policies to frustrate this. Freeman does not mention the effect of problems in France with housing and of a bias by employers towards single workers as factors combining to frustrate long-term migration and family reunion.

He argues that, because immigrant visas depended on separately granted work permits, this meant that immigration was tied to the economic and employment situation.⁶¹ His opinion seems to be that a population building policy would have granted permanence and the right to work without regard to unemployment rates.

I would argue however that the French system of graduated residents' cards, which could be used to select out immigrants who did not have work or work permits or who did not find favour with their local prefectures for other reasons, could equally be used to select in immigrants who did find work and work permits and who were thus or otherwise favored. From this we could just as well infer that France had a *self adjusting* population building demographic policy, that varied according to the employment situation, using the mechanism of granting or withholding work permits and renewing, upgrading, or failing to renew the graduated one, three and ten year *cartes de séjour*.

Ralph Schor writes that demographic concerns were not entirely sacrificed to political or economic controls, and he also cites the structure of progressively more permanent residential visas. He says that steps to acquire the more permanent visas were facilitated, and notes that these were accorded to persons under 35 years of age. He

concludes that the desire to allow permanent immigration in France was also evidenced by early measures that favored the immigration of families and which became entrenched.⁶²

These incrementally structured residents' permits were originally conceived by de Gaulle's population committee with the intention of facilitating permanent settlement of desirable individuals of an age to have children and who were less than 35 years old. How the staff of the various prefectures actually selected long-term and permanent immigrants was meant to be influenced by occasional circulars emanating from ministerial offices in Paris, but there was substantial regional variation.⁶³

This is how the French visa system worked: With regard to "Residents' Permits" (*Permis de Séjour*), the general impersonal rule was of residents' visas progressing from one year, to three, and finally to ten years. In reality who came and who stayed could also be influenced by a practice of reissuing short term visas, and application of policy could vary widely between regional *préfectures*.⁶⁴ The "Privileged Residents' Permit" was accorded to foreigners who were able to show that they had resided in France without interruption for at least three years and that they had been less than 35 years of age at the time of entering France. It brought the recipient close to citizenship.⁶⁵ The system was basically still the same in 2001.

The administrative nature of French immigration law meant that, unlike Australian practice, the interpretation and application of policy, in the form of such permits, could be localized and carried out away from the inspection of any central authority. Not only was the intention of the law difficult to disseminate and enforce among the variety of regional police sections empowered to grant permits, but this decentralised administration afforded another avenue of informal policy influence.

The privileged residents' permit had originally been conceived by de Gaulle's population committee as being for preferred European and occupational types. From 1957 this informal policy was often to prevail, due to developments whereby most EC nationals could more easily enter France and access work and work permits than non EC nationals.⁶⁶

As well as the progressive structure of residents' permits, there are a variety of indications that nation building intentions had been retained, but these favored nationals from other countries which were members of the European Economic Community. Such persons entered France freely and found formal long-term residence status and employment permits with ease.

According to the population historian, Dupaquier, the principle of family immigration was established in a decree on 24 December 1945 and later confirmed in a circular by the Minister of Public Health and Population on 20 January 1947 which confirmed the political will to encourage permanent settlement of immigrants. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux adds that this circular gave the National Immigration Office (*Office nationale de l'immigration* - ONI, which became the OMI - *Office des migrations internationales* in 1987)⁶⁷ the role of facilitating family reunion where appropriate lodgings were available. The OMI/ONI role has persisted, with one break, to this day. She points out that this commitment was underscored by the use of a State monopoly, the ONI, to recruit foreign workers and their families.⁶⁸ Moreover an official link between population policy and immigration was established through the creating of the Ministry of Public Health and Population which was advised by the High Committee of Population.⁶⁹

Alec G. Hargreaves writes⁷⁰ that despite the assumption that most immigrants would in the first instance be foreign workers, it was not required that residence in France be conditional on employment. This was largely because residence permits and work permits were and still are granted separately.⁷¹ He adds that although labor recruitment quickly outpaced demographic considerations as a national immigration priority, the regulatory framework facilitated the settlement of families, and this would eventually lead to the domination of residents' rights over economic considerations.

The picture that emerges from most French literature, particularly from Weil and Costa Lascoux, is this: Most European Community nationals were, a few years after the war, allowed to enter France with their families without being counted as immigrants by the ONI. The remainder, that is single immigrants and families from outside the European Economic Community (EEC), were still processed by the ONI. They were predominantly viewed as male short term labor and were subject to controls of various

kinds. This amounts to facilitating permanent, nation-building immigration with family from the European Community and to a short-term economic immigration program for people from elsewhere.

There are also numerous instances where we can see that family immigration was actively facilitated in certain cases, for instance for Italians and Portuguese.⁷²

In the anglophone literature these complexities are less apparent, perhaps due to an over-simplification of the statistical situation. Without careful examination of the definition and collection of demographic statistics it is easy to overlook the existence of two main "sets of books"; EEC and non-EEC. The official ONI statistics relate principally to immigrant workers from outside the EEC, but this is not always stated - in the French statistics and in work by immigration writers. It is quite easy to get the impression that the ONI and OMI statistics represent all official immigration, however immigration from the European Community, of workers and of family, continued subject to a parallel administration conducted by the *préfectures* without reference to the ONI or later to the OMI. Furthermore, once a non EEC immigrant had a work permit they quite easily were able to renew their residents' permit and work permits. These are only some of the intricacies associated with French statistics. There are also the cases of seasonal workers' permits, students, tourists, and other kinds of visas of less than one year. For this reason I have included a "Statistical Appendix" (Appendix Four) that explains French immigration statistics among others referred to in this thesis.

André Lebon in *Immigration et présence étrangère en France 1997/1998*⁷³ clearly documents the effects on immigration statistics of the separation of administration and recording of EEC and non-EEC immigration, although much can be inferred from other French writing.

In 1998 changes to the law officially granted the ten year resident's permit automatically to all EU nationals who applied.⁷⁴ This is an example of the process of the evolution of the European Economic Community, post war, and its consolidation as the European Union, which has tended to unify policies on immigration and to veer towards a working concept of an intra-european population with nation states within a single

border - rather like the United States. Non-French EU nationals may also vote in local elections, a privilege not accorded to non-EU nationals.

To briefly take up the issue of racialism (which is explored in more detail elsewhere in this chapter); this preference for EEC and recently EU nationals could be construed as racist or as convenient. More and more the EU countries share similar population and economic pressures, as well as educational and human rights standards, and a broad ancient history.

James F. Hollifield assumes that the initial nation building character conceived by de Gaulle's High Committee for Population (1945) for the post war French immigration project persisted. Although his work is primarily an examination of economic migration, he does not assert that manpower was the sole aim of the program. He also contrasts the links between immigration policy and nation building in France with the absence of these in Germany, which did not have the same history of concern about population decline.⁷⁵

The Role of Racialism (France)

Racialism is a variable which has been examined by a number of immigration analysts as a factor partially explaining France's cutting down on immigration in 1974. This explanation works better if France is examined in isolation from the rest of the EEC. If we compare policies before and after the oil shock in the EEC we see however that France's policy change conformed to Western Europe wide policy which could arguably be described as economic. These explanations and the question of racialism will be examined in more detail in the international section following. In this, the French section, I include the views of two French writers, Patrick Weil and Gerard Noiriel.

Patrick Weil makes a good case that France practised an immigration policy with elements of racialism until, after 1973, economic factors virtually eliminated the option of bringing in workers from outside the EEC. The "Algerian problem" was similarly

simplified by the discovery of oil in Algeria and the formation of the OPEC cartel, which coincided with a new Algerian policy discouraging immigration to France.⁷⁶

In *La France et ses immigrés*, Weil gives a detailed account of de facto policies to deter Algerian Muslims from coming in large numbers, even when they were of French nationality, from 1946-1962 and then as foreigners.⁷⁷ We also have evidence of the presence of Georges Mauco and others with systematised racial perspectives, on De Gaulle's population committee, and, in the case of Mauco, in the National Institute for Demographic Study, (INED)⁷⁸ until the 1970s.⁷⁹ As well as this we have the circumstances of France's collaboration through deportation of Jews with Germany's "worker immigration" programs during the war, which included enslavement and genocide of Jews and other groups. There is also documentation to show the objection of former *Resistance* members to the formalisation of Mauco-inspired racial immigration policy.⁸⁰

Gerard Noiriel in *The French Melting Pot*,⁸¹ uses his theory of the early established role of the nation-state and citizenship rights to examine the issue of racial prejudice. He argues that it is prejudice against non-republican foreigners that dominates and writes that the French government has sought to define a distinct and more favourable status for refugees as opposed to "economic" immigrants. It is, he states, "as if political persecution was the only 'excuse' native Frenchmen could accept for immigration." (He gives examples).⁸²

His explanation is that tradition and law have come to define what a French citizen is. Although the State in principle welcomes [foreign] individuals, in practice "it seeks to prevent them from becoming political actors outside of the rules established by the nation. Groups defined according to criteria of 'ethnic' or national origin have never been tolerated in France." According to Noiriel this is why immigrants may not vote in local elections and why "obstacles are placed in the way of naturalisation".

He argues that racial prejudice in France is very minor compared to other countries, although he wonders if anti-Semitism was not invented by France as a political technique. He cites the work of Marrus and Paxton on Vichy⁸³ to support his argument

that anti-Semitism was based on political rather than racial reasons, singling out foreign behaving or unassimilated Jews rather than well integrated French Jews.

"From the German point of view, the French did not understand a thing about the race question (there had even been a black minister in the Vichy government). 'The French possess neither racial instincts nor racial consciousness,' Ernst Robert Curtius wrote in his *Essai sur la France* in 1932. The majority of Jews who were deported had foreign origins. Even such an anti-Semite as Xavier Vallat firmly resisted German pressure to include French Jews in the extermination program. This is not to say, of course, that they were spared persecution"

Noiriel notes that Jews in France were stigmatised more for foreignness than for "race". "Ever since the days of Drumont, Jews had been represented with foreigners' traits (in this case German ones, such as rudeness and a disregard for the French language)." He thus argues that anti-semitism had a political rather than a racial basis (that of the fear that the Republic was being undermined by those with another agenda) in France that saw Jews as a foreign group, but which distinguished French Jews from "immigrant" Jews.

International Comparative Works involving Australia and/or France

The role of Racism (International)

Gary Freeman's first book, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975*,⁸⁴ was a ground breaking work in its time and remains a document of considerable theoretical importance. Freeman believes that the French and British immigration programs became problematic largely due to their high content of racially exotic peoples. Because race conflict was a novel issue for both countries there were no conventions in place to deal with it. Dealing with it might entail discriminatory policies. The explanation he develops for what happened is based on the Habermas⁸⁵ theory about elite behaviour in liberal democracies in industrial

societies. Where issues arise that challenge democratic principles, elites will avoid meeting those issues head on and will only deal with them incidentally, when they arise in the context of other issues, or when they assume crisis proportions. They avoid public discussion.

Freeman assumes that the main solution to the problem which immigration came to pose for France and for Britain lay in limiting the exotic content of the immigration program. He felt that because such a resolution would entail meting out inferior treatment for non-white colonials it presented a major challenge to democratic ideals. As such it was harder for the British than the French to face up to their race relations problem because any major changes to immigration law in that country required public parliamentary debate. Hence British politicians avoided dealing with the issue of racial conflict by altering immigration law. Instead they attempted to alter public reaction through public education and laws proscribing anti-discrimination and equal opportunity law. The situation deteriorated with violent confrontations. It was not until it reached crisis proportions in 1968 that the British came up with a de facto racially discriminatory selection process, which had the effect of significantly reducing immigration numbers.⁸⁶

The situation was different in France. There immigration policies could be altered by executive decree and did not need to be debated in the highly visible arena of the legislature. Thus the French, however, were able to avoid much public scrutiny in a system where decisions could be made quietly by public servants. Thus they maintained a contradiction to the democratic ideal, that of exploitation of foreigners and undermining of indigenous workers, away from the public eye. However this situation ultimately became explosive too.

Freeman believes that violence related to the activities of Algerian nationalists (FLN) in France led to initial attempts to decrease Algerian immigration after 1962. French *colons* (colonial repatriates) were particularly bitter towards the Algerians.⁸⁷ With the May 1968 riots, however, there were mass expulsions of immigrants who were believed to have been implicated. Freeman believes that this was a time when the French elites realised the danger of having a large disgruntled group of aliens in their

community.⁸⁸ Then, with the economic crisis following the 1973 oil shock, the economic motivation to import workers for factories evaporated.

Freeman comments however that, in France, the concept of 'race' was not of itself as important or central to controversy as it was in Britain. He never defines 'race' but seems to use this term in the American way that identifies different demographic groups according to visible traits, behaviour and language, of which the contrast between black and white is the most salient.

He notes that both France and Britain have mechanisms for dealing with social class issues, but suggests that they lack experience in the similar issue of 'race'. He comments that British parliamentarians approached or avoided the issue of 'color' with bashfulness.

He goes on to analyse the problem of 'race' conflict in a similar Marxist way to class conflict, where immigrant workers may be grouped as an exploited sub-class.⁸⁹ On the basis of the Marxist reserve labor army theory, he analyses the response of the unions and worker-oriented political parties in France and England to social problems posed by immigration. These problems are, for instance, conflicts of interest between indigenous workers and immigrants where the presence of immigrants keeps wages low, where immigrants dilute the strength of unions through lesser union participation, where they compete for housing, where they contribute to the embourgeoisement of society by artificially boosting indigenous workers up into the management hierarchy, and where they reduce the voting power of the working class in France due to their lacking the right to vote.⁹⁰

Freeman finds that in France labor unions and the socialist and communist parties attempted to come to terms with immigration and class issues and evolved some useful strategies. These strategies combined a policy of controlling immigration numbers and of attempting to obtain the same rights for foreign workers as for indigenous workers, thus eliminating cheap and disenfranchised competition.⁹¹

He believes that, perhaps because France publicly situated immigration within an economic plan, the situation was clearer for a socialist or communist opposition to deal with. And perhaps the relative engagement of these French "worker-oriented parties" in

the conflicts inherent in immigrant labor ultimately assisted a relatively straightforward discontinuation of immigration with the oil-shock in France (and Germany). In contrast, the lack of a similar political engagement in Britain made the process of cutting back immigration much messier, although it was achieved earlier.⁹²

Apart from this he observes several differences between the immigration situations in France and Britain. A major difference that emerges on analysis was that the British did not identify post-war immigration with any national economic benefit at all. Rather than seeking immigrants to build up population and to furnish labor, the British tended to think of their island as overpopulated and had traditionally relied on the Irish for supplementary labor. Furthermore, ex-colonials had full citizenship from the time of the British Nationality Act, 1948. This meant that they had similar rights to housing and other social welfare benefits - in some cases even being taken to the head of long queues for housing - and because of this they were seen as posing a direct cost to the economy and the community and as competition for scarce resources.⁹³

In France, however, the local population was perceived to be too small and, in addition to population building motives, immigration was part of a formal economic plan to assist economic development. Gary Freeman critically examines polls of French opinion on immigration between 1971 and 1974, all of which indicated concern that immigration numbers were poorly controlled.⁹⁴ A poll in 1973, however, showed that concern about immigration was actually quite minor when ranked with other French concerns and Freeman interprets this poll as demonstrating that the demographic and economic rationales for immigration were widely accepted in French society.⁹⁵ Furthermore, citizenship was not easily available to immigrants in France. Even those who had acquired French nationality had to wait several years before having the right to vote, and they still apparently found themselves at the end of the queue for public housing. Freeman writes that their special needs were dealt with by special programs, of which that of the FAS (Immigrant Workers' Social Action Fund - *Fond d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés*) was made to look as if it was self-funded.⁹⁶ Employers also had obligations to house them independent of public housing programs.⁹⁷

Immigrants in France therefore were not seen as posing much competition for rights and benefits to French citizens, according to Freeman.⁹⁸ Freeman also believes that the size of some of the 'coloured' Commonwealth colonies, such as Pakistan, coupled with initially virtually unrestricted rights to enter and live in Britain, was a cause of alarm in itself, as the English feared being swamped. Unlike France, Britain never developed successful bi-partisan agreements whereby sending countries' governments agreed to restrain emigration.

In his later work, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States",⁹⁹ Freeman concluded that, in the absence of many focused benefits, the focused costs of immigration were expressed by an emerging racialism in France. He argues, however, that initially most post war immigrants to France "tended to be familiar Europeans with white skins."¹⁰⁰ Because of this, he suggests, immigration control could be pragmatic, oriented to population building or economics, without fear that those advocating less immigration might be accused of racialism, since race did not really seem to come into the matter. Freeman suggests in *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict* that "Only with the marked alteration in the nature of immigration did race become an important aspect of the question".¹⁰¹

As we saw in the section preceding this description of Freeman's thesis, both Weil and Noiriel, who wrote considerably later than Freeman, interpret the question of history and attitudes to racialism in France differently from Freeman. Weil suggests that the French attempted to "racially" select from early after the second world war and Noiriel, to the contrary, suggests that the French were little preoccupied by notions of race and that anti-Semitism, which was quite a strong theme in French society, was politically rather than racially based.

An Economic Explanation for both promoting and discouraging Immigration

Tapinos is a French demographer who attempts to explain the phenomenon of immigration in France in "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War

Europe."¹⁰² He asks: Why did immigration take place? Because employers wanted temporary immigrants. Why was immigration stopped in 1974? It was discovered that immigrants wanted to stay and bring their families: "It is clear that the idea of temporary immigration simply did not hold." However he gives an additional economic explanation for Germany, France and Belgium all closing their borders after the oil shock. "Clearly all these countries did not sit around a table one day and decide what to do: all tried to adjust in a similar way to a changed economic environment."¹⁰³

But he does not attribute changes in the employment situation solely to immigration and the oil shock either. There was a contribution from the influx of large numbers of baby boomers and women into the labor market. "So conditions were changed on the supply side of the labor market."¹⁰⁴ Tapinos' argument is strengthened by its attention to demographic factors aside from immigration.

Tapinos also talks about the well known changes on the demand side of the labor equation that accompanied restructuring in the wake of the oil shock. He mentions the car industry and the construction industry in particular.¹⁰⁵

Other explanations for the cessation of immigration have been offered, he writes, but they were constructions after the fact. As researchers and politicians wanted to make a case for closing the border, they reinterpreted the facts and developed new theories.

One such theory was that the high turnover that characterised immigrant labor was ultimately costly for industry to manage. It was therefore better to employ nationals because their low turnover entailed fewer management costs.¹⁰⁶

Another such theory was that German industry had become reliant on an abundant supply of cheap labor to the detriment of more intelligently deployed labor or capital intensive industry.¹⁰⁷ This is a theory mentioned by Birrell and Birrell with regard to Australia's reliance on cheap labour as well.¹⁰⁸

Tapinos is evidently one of those French writers who believes that the main purpose of the French post-war immigration program was to provide temporary labor. As regards the question of why immigration continued after such concerted attempts were made to

rein it in from 1974, he attributes this to a massive rise in asylum seekers, family reunion and illegal immigration as alternative means of entry now that non-EEC immigrant workers were no longer sought.¹⁰⁹ In his view, unwanted flows of immigrants represent a real problem because democratic societies are unable to send immigrants back home *en masse*. James Hollifield develops this theme in *Immigrants, Markets, and States*.¹¹⁰ (See below)

Writing in 1991 Tapinos suggested that the European Union would have to maintain much tighter borders. He thought that formal policies for a slight increase in immigration might occur a few years hence. He explored two reasons for this. The first depended on the "weak argument" for compensating for the decline in the fertility rate. The second was a somewhat stronger argument that the workforce might require some modest supplementation in the future.¹¹¹

The Role of Liberal Democracies, Civil Rights and the Intellectual New Class in Institutionalising Immigration

It seems clear that immigration cannot be explained purely through economics, logistics and electoral politics.

James Hollifield, in *Immigrants, Markets and States: The political economy of Postwar Europe*, writes about immigration policy in Germany, France and, to a lesser degree, Switzerland. His examination situates these countries within the wider framework of an EEC working towards a European Union and this adds to the sophistication and usefulness of his analysis. He asks the question, "Do interdependence and the constraints of global markets mean that immigration is predominantly an economic phenomenon, driven by international systemic conditions?"¹¹² He argues that, although you can perhaps import immigrants rather like commodities, once they enter a liberal democracy they can no longer be treated as pure commodities; they have become human beings with rights. They are integrated socially as well as economically and, to the citizens of liberal democracies, who expect freedom of movement, it seems barbaric to profit from the labor of immigrant workers without awarding them civil rights.

These rights made it hard to send them home "in hopes of exporting unemployment".¹¹³ From a Marxist point of view, to give immigrant workers equal rights was a form of self-defense for local workers, so that they would not lose work to lower paid immigrants who had been brought in as a "reserve army". In Freeman's 1979 book he suggested that this policy of giving immigrant workers equal rights was an objective of unions and worker-oriented political parties in France. Hollifield perceives that this policy has been implemented to a degree.

Hollifield's work also very clearly establishes differences in post war policies in Germany and France, particularly. In Germany immigrant labor was not linked to a colonial past.¹¹⁴ Unlike the low population growth rate in France, the German birthrate and population growth were not considered problematic, so there was no reason to seek immigrants for population building.¹¹⁵ Immediately after the war the number of ethnic German refugees arriving from the USSR meant that Germany did not initially have to actively seek immigrant labor. But this refugee source of labor began to slow by the end of the 1950s and had dried up with the completion of the Berlin Wall in 1961.¹¹⁶ From the beginning of organised importation of immigrant workers, at the end of the 1950s in Germany, the explicit policy was to bring in temporary workers, on a closely supervised contractual basis, for specific periods of time.¹¹⁷ (The rate of unionisation of foreign workers in Germany has been higher than in France.)¹¹⁸

James Hollifield's argument about migrants' acquisition of rights in liberal democracies is very persuasive. The persistence of family reunion in France (and the rest of Europe) which I treat rather mechanically, as a phenomenon of European law, can also be explained as a particular manifestation of liberal democracy in Europe that arose from the traumas of the iron-curtain: freedom of movement, freedom to marry, and freedom to reunite with your family. In France family reunion is a right at European law;¹¹⁹ in Australia no concrete law defends family reunion as a right. However it is a tradition with some status and an object of party political dispute for rights based reasons

The *institution* of immigration as an international right presents slightly different philosophical problems. While Hollifield discusses the difficulty in sending people home, in Australia the discussion is more about the obligation to invite people to visit and stay. The issues are often debated as if they were independent of economic motive,

although government departments and ecologists cost them, and industries assess them for economic profit.

Hollifield assigns the rising cost of energy after the first oil shock and the associated economic depression and unemployment primary importance for the drastic reductions in worker immigration in France, Germany, Switzerland and Western Europe generally. (Switzerland was the first European state to cease immigration.)¹²⁰

In November 1973, when Germany officially ceased importing foreign labor, the execution of this policy was "more categorical and severe than in France", according to Hollifield.¹²¹ No work permits were renewed for foreign workers. Hollifield attributes this severity to the clear policy of the Germans on the purposes of immigration. He also points to the close structural involvement with the state of the interest groups in Germany, who were "linked to the state through a variety of neocorporatist arrangements, making them more likely to support a change in policy."¹²² He sees France as slightly different. This is because it accorded industry some exceptions to the rule of zero net immigration [of immigrant workers], on the grounds that immigrants were necessary to some industries - notably agriculture, construction and mining.¹²³ Both Germany and France were, however, to use suitable accommodation as a barrier to family reunion. (See my Chapters Six and Seven).

How is it that politicians and the political process become influenced to change immigration policy after 1973? Electoral process contrasted with Elite Power Group theory

Hollifield's approach takes into account the background of progress towards the consolidation of the EEC and the growing commonality of immigration and economic policy in the countries he studies. For instance he notes that Germany, Switzerland and France all had similar problems with family reunion and housing, and that they all took the oil crisis and the effects of the rise in energy costs on their domestic economies seriously.

But Hollifield's position is not universal. Other commentators do not consider the growing unification of Europe to be an important part of their analysis. For example, Jeanette Money states near the outset that she is not going to go into European Union

issues because the Union was not yet complete.¹²⁴ By the same token she does not address the pre-Union EEC context, and her results, based on an examination of different countries as if they were in relative isolation, and only affected by third world immigration, seem rather two dimensional in comparison with Hollifield's. (See Appendix 1 of this thesis for definitions of EU and EEC)

Using Gary Freeman's approach in "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States"¹²⁵ (see further detail in Chapter Five) Jeanette Money compares England, France and Australia in *Fences and Neighbors*,¹²⁶ (The Australian part of her book was co-authored by Kimberly Cole.)¹²⁷ She hypothesises that, during periods of economic recession, competition for scarce resources causes intolerance of immigrants competing for those resources. She focuses on local areas rather than national economies and identifies this competition as a potential cost to the indigenous population : "Where immigrants replace a departing host population, they create little competition and can even revive declining neighborhoods. Where they compete with the host population, for public services, for employment, and for cultural dominance, they create costs for the local community. Economic recession aggravates competition and generates the rise of political pressures against immigration."¹²⁸

She hypothesises that, because immigrants tend to be concentrated in limited geographical areas, and therefore the costs are locally focused, it may be hard to get local problems of resource competition noticed at the national level, where immigration policy is formulated. The exception to this would be where the occurrence of a marginal national electoral situation permits local concerns to be highlighted.

She argues that high immigrant French departments (local government regions) with high unemployment seem likely to be anti-immigrant. Similarly, in Australia, high immigrant electorates with crowded infrastructure and rising real estate prices seem likely to be anti-immigrant. Where governments were vulnerable at election time, they or their opposition might try to capture votes from marginal electorates with these characteristics by catering to anti-immigrant sentiment.

Money thinks that, in the early seventies, in both France and Australia, swing electorates in areas of high anti-immigrant sentiment were able to get through to politicians that they wanted immigration cut back, due to the presence of unusually

favorable electoral situations. Politicians seeking to influence narrow margins became willing to listen.

Money's explanation of the political system and process in France whereby this was possible relies on the opportunities that might have been provided by an unusual confluence of political events in France over the period preceding the oil shock. She provides a similar explanation for the Whitlam cut-back in immigration.

Money theorises that Whitlam had a number of strategies for attracting the swing vote in some marginal urban electorates at the time of the 1972 Federal elections. One of these, according to Money, was "to resolve urban problems, in part by reduced immigration intakes."¹²⁹ She cites references to changes to the immigration program in Whitlam's speeches on policy and states that these policy changes had been "debated and adopted at the ALP's 1971 policy conference"¹³⁰, and that Whitlam had referred to this change in a policy speech opening the 1972 campaign. Tom Uren is also cited for a similar reference on 13 October 1972,¹³¹ to do with the pressure of population growth on the cities due to immigration.

She suggests that, as with France, the 1972 Whitlam election campaign was designed to appeal to swing voters in marginal electorates where there were concerns about immigration. This is quite possible but it would be difficult to prove that immigration was a decisive factor among many others.

She gives little or no importance to economic explanations. Money's conclusion¹³² is that "the reduction in immigration was not a temporary response to poor economic conditions but rather a response to the electoral significance of constituencies where immigration pressures were concentrated." She means that Whitlam's objective was to appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment.

Money advances a similar explanation to the one she uses for the French to account for the brief hiatus in immigration in Australia in the early 1970s. Unlike Betts, Birrell, or myself, however, she interprets the immigration statistics from this time as indicative of an enduring wind-down of immigration numbers in Australia. This is because she examines migration statistics as a percentage of total population, rather than using the absolute figures. This means that from her perspective immigration in Australia and immigration in France since 1974 have shared a similar downward trend.

She attributes this "downward" trend to electoral pressure from geographical areas with high rates of overseas immigration. Her major analysis for Australia concentrates on Whitlam's 1972 election campaign. Since, from her point of view, immigration has been greatly reduced since then, her next task is to explain the persistence of this phenomenon. She and Kimberly Cole do not, however, really give much further evidence or argument of their own on this. They mention some other suggested explanations, including economic ones, but rather inconclusively. Instead they address what they perceive as the puzzle of the "half open door" by which Australia, whilst cutting down, according to Money's statistical position, maintained a higher percentage of immigration as a percentage of annual population growth than France. This they attribute partly to the role of the Australian housing industry.

Housing : Immigrant integration and housing as a political or logistical disincentive to immigration (International)

International literature on immigration in Europe indicates that immigrant housing was a typically European issue, not just a French one.

Jeanette Money, in *Fences and Neighbours* says that German guest workers during the 1960s were single men, housed at the worksite in company housing and thus represented "much less of a strain on the German public infrastructure [than on the French infrastructure]." ¹³³

James Hollifield in *Immigrants, Markets and States*, includes Germany with France in his statement that governments in both these countries responded to resentment against immigration well before the oil shock by, among other measures, attempting to improve housing for immigrants. He observes that, "Both France and Germany adopted measures to force employers to contribute to the development of the infrastructure that would be needed to maintain a foreign workforce. In Germany, the government increased the recruitment fees ... that were to be paid by firms employing foreigners." Germany was more successful at this than France. ¹³⁴

After the oil shock attempts were made to restrict family reunion by requiring sponsors to have suitable accommodation, as in France. Hollifield reports that "in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the problems of housing ... for the second and third generation of immigrants became more acute" and the state tried to get churches and other "parapublic institutions" to care for immigrants and their families. Immigrant "enclaves" developed in large cities and gave rise to a "deterioration in ethnic relations".¹³⁵

In Hans van Amersfoort, "Migration control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands", Holland and Norway are also described as having rules about suitable accommodation as a criteria for family reunion.¹³⁶

Co-authors Jeanette Money and Kimberly Cole are the only immigration researchers who appear to have taken some account of the different roles of the building and property developing industries in France and Australia.

As mentioned above, Money has built her thesis on the hypothesis that the costs of immigration are *geographically* localised to quite small areas, like suburbs, municipalities and federal electorates (as differentiated from focused in some other way, such as within a certain social class) rather than widely spread and widely felt. Money and Cole attempt to demonstrate that the commercial benefits of immigration for the development and construction industry are also geographically localised.

Their analysis of the way the housing industry might benefit is expressed mostly as an opinion, without independent supportive research.¹³⁷ This source of support for immigration is not of great importance to Money's principal argument, and she has not attempted to define the concepts involved. For instance she has made no clear distinction between different branches of the property development industry, such as land development, construction and housing. Nor has she attempted to define and identify the different systems in different countries. It is therefore difficult to know what aspects of the property development and housing industries she may be thinking of when she makes general use of the terms "housing", "developers" and "construction industry".

She describes developers and the construction industry as dealing in "non-traded goods",¹³⁸ meaning that those goods are not traded internationally, so that such industries rely on the local market. Hence these industries are motivated to lobby for immigration, which will lead to a bigger local market.

Although most readers would expect the term 'local' here to mean 'national' (as opposed to 'overseas'), Money and Cole seem to want to make local here mean local at an electoral or municipal level.¹³⁹ They restrict the focus of their argument to claiming that the property development and housing [and manufacturing] industries would have benefited locally (not nationally) from immigration. Strangely, without compensating for the fact that nearly 90% of the Australian population is located in state capital cities, especially the southern ones, they infer that "manufacturers and developers" were localising their operations in order to seek geographically focused benefits by locating mainly in the southern state capitals.¹⁴⁰

Money observes that housing competition in Australia is not as intense as in France and England and attributes this to the lesser role of public housing in Australia and the free market character of the private housing industry in Australia.¹⁴¹ She does not however attempt to explain why the public housing factor made a difference in France and England.

Money's research does throw light on the geographically localised costs of immigrant presence and demand on public services, particularly public housing. In a sense her thesis looks primarily for such costs so as to be able to demonstrate the political impact of local dissatisfaction in swing electorates on national immigration policy. Money implicitly assumes that those affected by competition for housing form fairly narrow geographic constituencies in both France and Australia

Problems with statistics in analysing trends in immigration and housing

Money's choice and use of statistics, for both France and Australia, leads her to fundamentally different conclusions from my own. Here I discuss three major differences.

The first major difference is that she assesses immigration as remaining low post-1974 in both France and Australia, whereas more conventional use of the statistics shows that it remained high in Australia.

Money's approach to migration statistics has an inherent downward bias. For example, the second person to step off the first boat in the European settlement of Australia in 1788 would represent a migration increase of 100 per cent, the third one of 50 per cent, the fourth one of 33 per cent, and so on. Her approach is based on a false analogy with other demographic rates (such as the crude birth rate and death rate) where births are expressed as a proportion of the national population "at risk" of experiencing these events. But the national population is not "at risk" of migration to the nation: here the "at risk" population is the vast pool of people who are not members of the nation. (As it is not useful to devise a rate based on such a population, almost all immigration figures use the actual figures.) For these two reasons Money's approach to migration statistics does not provide a useful basis for analysis. The fundamental flaw in the measurement of her dependent variable means that the explanations for the alleged "decline" in immigration in France and Australia which she presents are not helpful. However, despite this serious shortcoming, Money does present useful background information on a number of aspects of immigration politics in the two countries.

Her idiosyncratic approach to the data affects her ability to perceive or comment on the post-Whitlam recovery in the migrant intake in Australia and the expansion of the property development and housing industries.

Money gives evidence that housing prices in Australia were linked to immigration in the press and therefore in the minds of the public in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁴² She seems to imply that this perception remained a factor in keeping immigration 'down' (as she perceives it) presumably through feedback via the democratic process. She fails to acknowledge that the link between housing prices and immigration soon ceased to be highlighted in the press or by politicians. It is true that in the early 1970s Whitlam behaved as if government had a responsibility to provide a system to ensure housing at reasonable prices and that this was a mission of his government. The contemporaneous *Henderson Poverty Report*,¹⁴³ completed in 1975, reflected such an attitude, but its recommendations were to be almost immediately eclipsed by changes in economic philosophy post oil-shock. Since Whitlam, there has been little evidence that

governments in Australia, Liberal or Labor, consider that they have a responsibility in this area. In fact there is evidence of housing policy being reworked to fit economic rationalism.

Although Money does attribute importance to the Australian property development lobby as a driver of immigration, she fails to see, or does not want to see, how that industry was able to dominate anew after the fall of the Whitlam government. Her conclusion that Australian governments from Whitlam on have listened to the electorate and reacted by lowering immigration rests solely on the manner in which she has chosen to transform the data on immigration.

In fact, after Whitlam's fall from power, despite popular resentment about immigration and despite the oil shock, the Australian property development industry was able to forge ahead and even to expand with the return of high immigration. It accomplished this by borrowing heavily and by gaining support from the Fraser government and all those governments that followed.

Towards the end of her book Money tries to have it both ways; immigration was drastically reduced but "the door remained half-open"; meaning that the Government had listened to the voters but the desires of the property developers and the non-trading manufacturers continued to hold sway to a degree. My own analysis is that the property developers and the other growthist lobbyists quickly prevailed. The figures do not support a win by the voters against immigration in the long term.

Although Money does suggest that Australia may have maintained a slightly higher rate of immigration than Europe post oil shock due to the distinctive property development lobby in Australia,¹⁴⁴ she gives no hard evidence for this and leaves the road open for research in the area. On the issue of housing and property development, Money's thesis intentionally confines its application to a local level and does not examine the economic structuring strategies (as opposed for instance to organisational and technical restructuring in France) of the industries involved or the implications of national land development planning or the lack of it. In my thesis I look at both these areas.

My thesis looks at some strategies by which the building and property development industry in Australia survived to lobby another day, but shows how in Europe these industries, which had never established a dependency or even a relationship with

immigration, adapted to a slower pace of growth post oil shock and restructured organisationally and innovated technologically to accommodate new conditions, with little external borrowing.

A second major difference between Money's view and mine is that she does not perceive the housing, construction and property development industries and lobby in Australia as operating on a national and even international level.

A third major difference between Money's thesis and my own is that Money does not look at changes in the rates of population growth and household formation due to other factors apart from third world or overseas immigration in France and Australia.

If her statistical evidence were valid I would choose to accept her conclusions or argue against them in my evidence chapter. It is, however, so flawed in my opinion, that there seems little point in debating it formally. I have nevertheless detailed some of these problems in my endnote here for the reader's information.¹⁴⁵

Apart from her practice of expressing the immigration statistics as percentages, Money uses quite different statistics on French immigration from the ones I have based my argument upon. I use net immigration from Insee, but I supplement this with Lebon's statistics¹⁴⁶ and I comment on the qualities of these sources. Bearing their deficiencies in mind, I have tried to estimate the real likely rate of legal immigration. (See Appendix 4, pp 4-22, for a detailed discussion of the statistics I have used.)

For France, Money uses OMI entry statistics only. This means that she is only counting the traditional "immigrant workers" and some family reunion immigration. She is not counting immigrants from the European Union nor is she capturing numbers for refugees. She is not counting temporary immigrants; she is only counting "resident aliens", that is, those who have permission to stay for a year or more. Unfortunately the discussion and definition of her statistical sources and definitions is limited in her book. She notes some of the pros and cons of not using net immigration, drawing on the low validity of statistics for emigration in many countries, including France.¹⁴⁷ Money is, of course, entitled to choose a particular set of indicators and to stick to it. In the case of France, however, she thereby misses some notable sources of population growth which could have made a difference to her conclusions about competition for scarce resources.

Although she begins her statistical comparison in 1962 she does not incorporate into her argument the extraordinary contribution to population growth of French repatriates from Algeria. She does mention in passing that repatriation from Algeria to France did occur¹⁴⁸, but not the specific information that over 800,000¹⁴⁹ repatriates came onto the French mainland in **one year**, a fact which surely merits a mention in an examination of factors leading to resentment of immigration pressure in creating "competition over ... state resources".¹⁵⁰ She does mention numbers of repatriates who settled in Marseilles and Rhone-Alpes area between 1946 and 1975 but does not give the readily available information about annual intake nationally, and so does not co-ordinate this information about repatriates with her discussion of numbers of other OMI immigrants, which she cites on a national annual basis. For instance, without any special commentary to explain such discrepancies, she reproduces an OMI table¹⁵¹ which gives the permanent immigration numbers for 1962 as 160,097. If she had used INSEE permanent immigration data, the *net* figure would have been 860,200.

Money does not comment on birth rates and the impact of baby boomers on the workforce either, presumably because she is not so interested in the issue of population numbers and pressure per se.

As evidence that the French State was making an effort to meet the demands of an anti-immigration lobby prior to 1974, Money asserts that immigration of workers was substantially cut back from 1972, that is, two years before 1974, but she is only referring to the OMI entry statistics. The OMI statistics do not give the full picture, and the category "immigrant workers" leaves out wives and children. Even without this qualification, Money does not account for the quite high OMI intake for 1973.

Money also does not account for the ongoing impact of repatriates from Algeria, the accumulation of overstaying tourists, refugees and immigrants from Algeria under the post-Algerian independence immigration accords (until Algeria unilaterally ceased immigration in 1973), and the growing population of Portuguese draft dodgers *and their families*, whose passage into France was still being secretly facilitated by the French customs and border police, under instructions.¹⁵² Nor, as I have already mentioned, does she place immigration and housing problems against the background of the changing characteristics of the local population, such as the entry of baby-boomers into the workforce, or the increasing trend towards independent household formation

amongst baby-boomers.¹⁵³ These latter factors also exerted pressure on the supply of public housing.

For the above reasons, unless I specifically cite Money in the argument part of my thesis, I have not utilised her theory of geographically localised costs of immigration when explaining changes to national French immigration policy.

Conclusion

I have been particularly critical of Jeanette Money's statistical assumptions and choices. This is because of the important place she assigns to statistics in her theory. I have been less critical of Weil, Freeman (1979) and Hollifield because their arguments were much less dependent on statistics. Nevertheless their statistics were cited with little critical commentary and were frequently inadequate. However, other documentation and evidence easily carried their arguments despite this problem.

The French statistical system carries some ambiguities in distinguishing internal and international immigration and confusion appears to exist among some foreign authors in their own definitions of foreign and local immigration especially as concerns Algerians. Algerians, as will be repeated from time to time in this thesis, were French nationals from 1946 - 1962. Until about 1968 some Algerians enjoyed privileged status in France.

Confusion also exists between French Expatriates migrating from independent Algeria to France and Algerian moslem non-colonial stock migrating to France, often as political refugees. One gets the impression that there was a huge volume of Algerian moslems flooding into France in the year of Algeria's independence, but the majority of the 1962 flow was French expatriate colonial stock.¹⁵⁴

The difficulties in absorbing the return of 800,000 repatriates from Algeria contributed severely to economic and housing problems in France, but commentators rarely mentioned this. Perhaps the lack of attention to the impact of this in the literature arises because of the difficulty of expressing the different statuses of Algerians and repatriates and because of the problem whereby return from Algeria of repatriates was apparently counted as overseas immigration rather than as internal immigration?¹⁵⁵

It is also possible that focus on ethnic integration problems as implicit explanations for immigration flow policies make it difficult to discuss the return of colonists, since their

ethnic culture was basically French. This is a deficiency of immigration discussions that do not take into account all population movements, including natural increase.¹⁵⁶

Comments from unsophisticated French people suggest further confusion perceived about the nationality of people from overseas French territories, such as Guyana.¹⁵⁷ These people, although many are not classically European in appearance, are French nevertheless. As French citizens they enjoy the same rights to live and work and travel within the European Union and Economic Community. However, because many are of non-white skin colour it may often be assumed that they are foreigners on French soil.

As we have seen, a number of authors draw on racialism as an explanation for the shift in French migration policy in 1974. But, to be accurate the immigration writer concerned about racialism would need to talk about internal migration as well as overseas immigration in order to elucidate the density per capita of non-mainland born population. This would be an almost impossible task since French immigration statistics, with rare historical exceptions (for instance where names of apparently Muslim origin were tallied up from time to time) only permit the recording of nationality of origin, and not "racial" or "ethnic" origin, which is such an integral part of United States of America demographic statistics. The problem of illegal immigration further complicates discussion, but this is not an issue for this thesis.

Note that this is a statistical problem as well as an ethnic and logistical problem. For more on statistical issues see Appendix Four.

Money explains the Whitlam government's reduction in immigration targets as an appeal to the anti-immigrant sentiment of marginal electorates which were experiencing high competition for local services. In contrast, my own explanation draws on Whitlam's biography and other material which strongly indicate that immigration was reduced due to the international economic crisis, and that policy had been prepared with this in mind. The oil shock related economic crisis, although generally dated around 1973, had begun to create international havoc well before the Launceston ALP conference in 1971 that Money refers to as a date preceding the period of international economic strife. By June 1971 there had already been a cumulative series of strikes by the oil producing states (OPEC) against the old order.¹⁵⁸

For the sociologist, whether one gives much weight to Jeanette Money's hypothesis about popular opinion influencing entrenched government policy, would depend partly on how much one thinks democracy or voting on any popular level works in such situations.

The presence or absence of popular discontent might have co-incided with major policy changes in population policy, but did it influence them all that much, if at all?

If one believes in the Elite Power group theory that explains bipartisan government and opposition policy agreements on difficult issues like immigration as strategic alliances to protect the vested interests of the powerful,¹⁵⁹ then fundamental changes in rewards for maintaining a particular position must occur before there is a true shift in bipartisan position. The 'people' are easily taken care of by promises and propaganda, and such a strategy might provide as sops what Money takes for real policy changes.

Weil's thesis that shifts in French power-elites' bipartisan positions were based on fundamental economic changes finds support in contemporary documents and interviews with Postel-Vinay in France and I found corroboration of these in opinions later expressed by Postel-Vinay to myself.¹⁶⁰ In the case of Australia I found comparable support for this perspective in my re-examination of contemporary Australian documents including the minutes associated with the Khemlani loan, which highlight Rex Connor's leadership of the Whitlam government's energy policies. Whitlam gives a different account from Money's of his views on unemployment and the global recession and immigration in his autobiography. Contemporary ecological theory and ideology on energy resources also backs a different line from hers.

Tapinos believes that ceasing immigration was a logical economic decision arrived at independently by Germany, France and Belgium.¹⁶¹ André Postel-Vinay, who recommended France's decision to stop immigration from outside the European Union, told me that it was his own idea, but that persuading the government was helped considerably by the fact that Germany had already made the decision.¹⁶²

My own opinion is that the French political system and situation may well have helped, as Money suggests, but the question still arises as to why, for instance, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland ceased immigration and why Australia cut back as well around the same time. Money does not treat the cases of Germany, Belgium and

Switzerland. Obviously I give great importance to the impact of the oil shock, the subsequent economic depression and to unemployment. That other countries arrived at similar decisions to cut back immigration argues that the world economic crisis was the over-riding factor. In fact, like Australia, the United States attempted to cut down on population growth subsequent to the oil crisis, but industry pressure and possibly religious pressure overwhelmed these attempts.¹⁶³

Money does not examine events with the "population policies" in mind, so she fails to consider the idea of a "full house" in France and total population as an economic and energy cost to the State. One assumes this is because of a belief in the ideology of economic growth and limitless resources. Certainly, although she mentions that ecological and environmental arguments against population growth have been raised (and cites some from Whitlam's campaign), she does not appear to take them seriously and gives them no space in her review of the literature. One wonders if she really thought they were only rhetoric with which to present a subtle promise of reducing immigration to anti-immigrant electorates. Since a major part of her work on Australia revolves around the electoral campaign run by the ALP that got Whitlam into government, she might have paid more attention to the role of ecology and energy in the policies of the time. The same goes for her reports on French policy around the oil shock; although she cites Weil, she does not cite the rationale that Postel-Vinay attached to his recommendations that immigration be halted and which Weil reported in his book.

The main theory that has influenced the formation of my own thesis argument was the one Gary Freeman wrote about in his paper, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States" (1995)¹⁶⁴ This theory will be addressed in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE - MAIN THEORY AND METHOD

My research question is: Why have French policy makers taken a different path on immigration policy from their counterparts in Australia over the last 25 years? (The basis for my comparison between France and Australia is described in Chapter One, page 5.) I have modeled my theoretical approach largely on that of Gary Freeman, which I discuss below. The tradition of comparing policies in different countries is very well established in both land planning development literature and immigration literature, as I showed in chapters three and four.

Although I concentrate on France and Australia, French policy on population and development is more or less typical of recent policy and development in most other member countries of the European Economic Community, and Australian policy and development resembles that of the United States, Canada and New Zealand. I allude to these wider similarities in various parts of this thesis. Overall, the conclusions drawn about France and Australia's demographic, development planning, housing and energy policies in this thesis are also likely to be true respectively for other EEC countries and for other English-speaking settler countries. Gary Freeman's approach flags similarities among the same categories, i.e. English speaking settler states and a group of mainly Western European states which experienced mass migration after the Second World War.

Gary Freeman's Theory of Concentrated and Diffuse Benefits and Concentrated and Diffuse Costs of Immigration

How do we go about explaining why immigration policies in France and Australia (and the countries that resembled them) diverged so radically? Gary Freeman sought reasons for differences between France and Britain in *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies* (1979) and for those between European and other Western countries, including Australia and France in his much later article, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States" (1995).¹ Freeman describes a

situation he perceives in countries where high immigration has become institutionalised despite evidence that most people in these countries want less immigration. He uses a method derived from James Q Wilson² that classified four types of politics depending on whether the benefits and costs of policies were concentrated or diffuse, and he attempts to apply this model to immigration politics. In this way, Freeman comes to the conclusion that immigration has become entrenched in systems where its benefits are narrowly focused but the costs that it imposes are diffuse (and therefore not easily identified by the public that is paying for them).

According to Freeman's thesis, we would find the answer to the question about the difference between French and Australian immigration policies by seeing where concentrated benefits and costs and diffuse benefits and costs are located in each society in relation to immigration impacts. Narrowly focused benefits mean that those benefiting from immigration are consciously aware of this and are able to recognise each other and organise to keep those benefits flowing. Where costs are diffuse and fall upon a disparate population at many different points in many different ways, they are difficult to identify and there are no obvious political rallying points for the public to organise a protest around. In such situations the only such protests with focus tend to be nationalistically xenophobic. Mainstream politicians, serious media commentators, and other analysts, therefore tend to discount such protests as morally invalid, for obvious reasons.

In the context of the economic changes surrounding the oil-shock, Freeman (1979) explains the ability of France to abruptly and drastically reduce immigration in 1974 as due largely to organised French racist pressure groups triumphing over a weak and loosely organised defence of immigrants by "liberalist sympathisers" in the absence of an ethnic lobby.³ But the importance of economic motives to cease immigration during the economic crisis that followed the 1973 Oil Shock, in the context of an overall European Economic Community policy for consolidation, should not be overlooked. Economic philosophies may be more important than any racial philosophies.

The 1973 oil shock provides a crucial period for comparing France with Australia, for, although Australia was to continue on with its high immigration strategy for population growth after 1975, evidence is abundant to demonstrate that for a brief period there was a concerted organised political will and plan for Australia to restrain population growth

by cutting down on immigration, and to develop energy self-sufficiency, like the European plan. For a short period there was also an Australian program of land development reform and protection for employment. How is it that Europe seemed able to carry out these plans whereas Australia could not?

I have identified differences in the construction and implementation of land development and housing policies and the structuring and organisation of these industries in France and Australia as major variables in the different evolutions of the immigration policies in these countries, particularly since the oil shock of 1973. Differences in construction and implementation of land development date back to the 19th and early 20th centuries. Housing policies began to diverge during the 1950s. But it was not until after 1973 that the structure, organisation and building techniques of the building industries that make dwellings really began to diverge in the two countries. That is, these factors within the French building industry only really became prominent after the 1973 oil shock, and it was then that improvements in the industry in France made it progressively more unlike the Australian building industry, which made only minimal and patchy changes to modes of production and design. The task here is to explain how these differences impacted on immigration policy.

Freeman writes that the politics of immigration in systems characterised by concentrated benefits and diffuse costs can be analysed at the level of individual voters, organised groups, and State actors. He also says that governments in liberal democracies arrive at their immigration policies through interaction, between elections, with organised groups of the public. Generally these are groups that receive “concentrated benefits” and therefore the immigration policies they give rise to are expansive.⁴ He was thinking of North America, Canada and Australia, and contrasted these “English speaking settler societies” with selected European countries. The process is similar in the European group, except that there appears to be a lack of organised groups of beneficiaries of immigration.

Freeman separates his area of analysis into three groups of liberal democratic States: The “English speaking settler societies” (the United States, New Zealand, Canada and Australia); a group of mainly Western European States that had experienced mass migration⁵ after the Second World War (France, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden); and a group of “European States which had until recently been

sending countries” (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece). He summarised the English-speaking group by saying that their “institutionalised politics favours expansionary policies and is relatively immune to sharp swings in direction.” By this he meant that, in general, it was difficult to make arguments heard on the subject of immigration except where those arguments were for more immigration or for the status quo. Of the second group of countries, which included France, he described their politics as being shaped by “what most see as the unfortunate consequences of those episodes [of post war mass migration]” and as being “partially institutionalised and highly volatile and conflictual”.⁶ For our purposes here we do not need to deal with the third group of countries. Freeman’s analysis covered the period 1945 to the early 1990s. (As mentioned above, in his 1979 analysis of French immigration problems, he assigns less importance than I do to the part played by population-building in the French post-war immigration program.⁷ But specific empirical reservations that I may have about his earlier work are not relevant to the general theory that he developed in 1995.)

According to his method of identifying concentrated (or focused) costs and benefits, Freeman in 1995 identified organised opposition to immigration in France in both mainstream politics and populist politics. He believed the concentrated costs had come mostly from friction related to ethnic minority issues in the context of high unemployment. The xenophobic rhetoric of the extreme Right fanned this opposition. Freeman concluded that immigration policy and politics were not sufficiently institutionalised to withstand these pressures because the benefits of immigration were relatively diffuse and the beneficiaries disorganised in France.⁸ He described the opposite case as applying in the English speaking settler States, where immigration policy and politics were institutionalised around highly focused benefits from immigration and very diffuse costs. Moreover, where those costs were focused, their brunt fell on the poor and inarticulate who lacked organisations to represent them on these issues. Those relatively powerless people who bear these “principal immediate costs of immigration” he identified as the minorities competing with immigrants for scarce jobs, housing, schools, and government services. Other writers have given the example of African Americans as typical of these groups, especially in the context of losing advantage to new waves of “Hispanic” immigrants.⁹

As well as “the family and ethnic relations of those making up the immigrant streams, employers in labour intensive industries and those dependent on an unskilled

workforce”, Freeman identifies the “principal beneficiaries of immigration” in the English speaking settler societies broadly, as “businesses like real-estate and construction that profit from population growth.”¹⁰

Therein lies our clue to the difference between France and Australia. In France businesses like real estate and construction¹¹ do not see themselves as profiting from immigration-fed population growth and, since most land development is State planned, there is no significant development lobby either that identifies profits in immigration. These industries have in fact been especially sluggish in responding to immigrants’ needs for housing in France. But this difference has for a long time been invisible (or at least, uncommented upon) by sociological writers on population policies and immigration.¹² Differences between European and other Western States in planning land development and financing housing have been written about quite often by sociological writers on urban planning and the housing industry, but these scholars do not make a connection to immigration politics. Writers on urban planning have however observed that “assumptions and models derived from North American studies are not only simplistic in the European context, but at times quite erroneous. Cities in West Europe remain distinct, just as their approaches to planning remain distinct.”¹³ Ecological writers on population also frequently write about problems in land-use management.¹⁴ Although they often connect population growth to destruction of indigenous fauna and flora habitats and farmland, to my knowledge none has looked at the differences in land development planning in the English speaking settler societies and in Western Europe. Since Western Europe is particularly low in biodiversity, this is not surprising.¹⁵ It is true that the subject of housing and planning often comes up in French writing on immigration but, since these French writers seem unaware of the great difference in land development planning and housing between their society and that of the English speaking settler societies, no theory has fused these issues to date.¹⁶ Finally, writers on land development planning and housing do not seem to seriously concern themselves with the problem of conserving biodiversity; there seems to be no current theory that actually explores the relationship between human settlement patterns and biodiversity, nor international comparisons pointing out the differences in national priorities regarding biodiversity and land development planning.¹⁷

The important structural and economic difference between France and Australia lies in the construction and implementation of land development planning and housing in

France as compared with Australia. The system in France can be described as “development planning” with priority given to public housing, while the system in Australia can be described as “statutory or land-use planning” with priority given to the private development and housing industries.

In “development planning” the government assumes responsibility for supplying land for development by the private sector. First the government must purchase the land, preferably well in advance of its release to builders, when the cost is low. Having serviced the land, it rents or sells it at a price that covers the outlays it has made. The costs incurred at this point are generally much lower than those incurred by private developers and builders who generally borrow at high interest to purchase, develop and build on land and seek as high a profit as they are able to obtain. So the government helps to keep the price of privately developed land down as well, since it is providing cheap competition. It can further lower the price of land by releasing a lot at a time, thus diminishing any price rises that might have occurred through land shortages at a time of high demand, which speculators rely on. Governments may either develop the land they have purchased or they may lease or sell it on condition that it is developed in a certain way, thus minimising opportunistic and socially incongruous or undesirable land uses.¹⁸ In France, for instance, private developers have been required to provide transport and various amenities to new housing estates.¹⁹

Similar development planning systems to France’s prevail in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland.²⁰ In fact these are particularly pronounced in Germany and Sweden.²¹ I am inclined to treat Britain as a hybrid, sharing some characteristics with the English speaking settler societies that it seeded with both politics and people,²² and others with the more socially oriented land management and public housing systems of European societies.²³ In fact Freeman’s initial work on immigration examined the differences between immigration politics in France and the United Kingdom and I believe these and the differences in “development planning” are well enough established, despite Britain’s membership of the EEC and later the EU, to permit me to leave Britain out of my study.²⁴ I have not had much to say about Sweden in my work on the relationship between immigration and the construction and implementation of land development and the housing industries, because Sweden is not part of the European Union²⁵ and therefore is not formally party to EU immigration

laws. Nevertheless it could be classed with France, according to its immigration and land development planning policies.

It is important for the reader to understand that the major differences between France and Australia which we are dealing with here lie in France's retention of a strong public housing program²⁶ and a nationally planned land development system.²⁷ In contrast, in Australia, there is no central planning of land development and most land development is carried out by the private sector on land it has purchased, often speculatively.²⁸ Furthermore, in Australia, public housing has been greatly overshadowed by the private housing industry which supplies the vast majority of households. After the oil shock of 1973 France drastically reduced immigration and shortly after this both public and private housing industries there began to adapt to the emerging energy conservative economy by a number of organisational and design innovations. In Australia, despite a short-lived policy to cut down immigration after the oil shock, immigration remained high and the housing industry made few adaptations to the post oil-shock economy.²⁹ The Whitlam government's attempts to bring about some centralised planning of land development were mostly frustrated and, after a short period of crises and crashes, the speculative private development industry thrived in a deregulated market, with increasingly high land prices.³⁰

From the comparison in this thesis with France and Australia as examples typifying these differences in immigration policies and politics and approaches to land development planning I hope to show that the French system identifies immigration with focused costs in a variety of ways, whereas the Australian system identifies many of these very same costs as focused benefits. However the most important difference between the two countries is not the presence of focused costs in France, but the absence of focused benefits, especially in the land development and residential construction industries.

From these different perspectives, which amount to population-growth-costing systems, emerge quite different immigration policies in the two countries. In Australia, where immigration remains high, despite quite substantial public disapproval about this, the costs seem too diffuse to mobilise and focus any wide-based and influential section of society,³¹ whereas the benefits have given rise to an active, well financed, highly organised lobbying business sector – notably the private land development and housing

industries - seeking a bigger local market. During the era of massive industrialisation in France, employers in manufacturing eagerly courted mass immigration, but changes to industry requirements, plus free movement within the EEC, were to eliminate the benefits focused in this area. With the Oil Shock of 1973, after which “worker immigration” was stopped throughout the European Economic Community no such organised group rose to defend high immigration, with the short-lived exception of the Confédération nationale du patronat français (National Federation of French Employers) (CNPf).³² Patrick Weil attributes France keeping her borders open for one year longer than Germany to CNPF lobbying. But as the recession bit, the CNPF also became silent. In fact there is evidence that advice from the then head of the CNPF influenced the man who initiated the immigration policy changes in France.³³ This failure to protest at the closing of the borders to immigration is almost certainly because no organised group in receipt of narrowly focused benefits from high immigration existed any more in France. Narrowly focused costs can be demonstrated to occur in a number of areas where there are narrowly focused benefits in Australia, for instance in tertiary education. While there is a limit on the number of foreign students who may attend any French university, Australia universities court these foreign students because they can charge them high fees.³⁴ I shall, however, be concentrating on land development and housing.

In conclusion, Freeman’s theoretical model allows us to hypothesize that the benefits of immigration-fed population growth are concentrated in Australia but diffuse and largely absent in France. Because of this there is an active growth lobby in Australia which is used to reaping immigration related benefits and which exerts pressure on Government to make sure these benefits keep coming. This lobby is centered in firms speculating in land and in developing land, and in the construction and home-building industries. In contrast the costs of immigration-fed population growth are born by the general public and are diffuse and not easily perceived. Because of this pattern of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, Australian Governments tend to respond to the growth lobby, which wants immigration, rather than to the general public which does not want it, but which does not feel or express this preference very forcefully.

CHAPTER SIX - HISTORY CHAPTER

Purpose of this Chapter

This chapter aims to give a brief history of immigration in Australia and France in order to illustrate some major differences in traditions associated with immigration in these countries. Primarily it attempts to demonstrate the longstanding existence of a populationist property development and housing lobby in Australia and the virtual absence of such a lobby in France. It also gives a contrasting outline of the motivations for and history of immigration in France in the absence of a property development lobby. In both cases some of the characteristics of immigration policy and motives in each country turn out to date from well before the second world war. Associated differences emerge, such as the importance of the gold rush in Australia and of France's integration into the European Economic Community and, later, the European Union.

History of the Populationist Property Development and Housing Lobby in Australia

The Gold Rush and the Land Boom 1860-1890

In Australia a population growth lobby with substantial interests in the area of property development and residential construction and construction materials flourishes to this day in the business community. This economic quality or pattern seems to have its origins in the 1860s Victorian gold rush, which also affected Sydney and New South Wales.

Due to very rapid population growth, plus the economic stimulant of gold, there was intense land speculation. Individuals, banks, building societies, insurance companies

and any large institution with funds invested in land, and paid increasingly inflated prices on the expectation that prices would rise even higher.

The crash came in the early 1890s, but, up until the crash, more allotments had been subdivided for suburban houses in Melbourne than would have been sufficient for the entire population of London. At the time of the crash there were 14,000 vacant houses there. Mortgagors held thousands of title deeds, for the land and houses were hardly worth the expense of advertising them for sale. Because Melbourne was the financial capital of the then unfederated colonies and because most financial institutions had investments in both States as well as other territories, New South Wales and Sydney did not escape. In Sydney land banks offered interest rates of between 7% and 10% for deposits. These deposits had been used to purchase land in Melbourne and Sydney for subdivision. Forty Sydney land companies went into liquidation during the crash. In the following five years 464 bank branches in NSW were closed down. In 1891 the banks of issue had let their reserves fall to 12.8% of their liabilities.¹

Inevitably gold discoveries in Australia dwindled and gold-seekers left. During the 1890s there was also a bad drought. Population growth, which had been extremely rapid, dropped like a stone (see Table 6.1) and the property market lost its momentum. At the same time, foreign investors, under economic pressures of their own, called in their loans. Since so much of the money was invested in land, but the land boom was over, the banks and building societies were unable to sell the land to repay their loans. Thus this remarkable period of prosperity came to an end in the 1890s with a series of massive bank and building society crashes, which plunged Melbourne and Sydney into chaos and land owners into desperate schemes to attract customers.² Among these schemers were members of the Royal Commission into the Decline in the Birth Rate in New South Wales (RCDBR), who sought to increase births and immigration.

The Land Crash and the rise of the Population Boosters

The business community had become convinced that a return to rapid population increase would provide a solution to all its problems from 1890 to 1945. It strove unsuccessfully to restore the demographics of the boom, and thus the boom itself, through two depressions and two wars.

An article in the New South Wales bankers' *Journal* of 1893, by WH Eldred, blamed the financial crisis on "the cessation of immigration caused by the withdrawal of government aid, whereas the true policy of the country lies in encouraging population."³

Other writers to the same journal made similar points. In 1898 an unidentified correspondent linked the approximately 40% population increase in the 1880s with six-fold increases in public and private borrowing. He said how much might have been reaped from this if the borrowed money had been put into 'productive works'. He felt that the consequent demand for labour would have attracted emigrants from as far away as Europe.⁴ The same year the editor bemoaned the departure from Victoria of 50,000 adults in three years, which had badly affected the State's population numbers. He hoped that a liberal government, a good season or two and some opening up of the backcountry would make people stay.⁵

Table 6.1. Australia and her States: Rate of Population Growth (Per Cent) 1861-1950 (Annual Averages)

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Commonwealth Yearbook to period 1968, Table 12, page 13.

| Time Period | NSW | Vic | QL | SA | WA | Tas | NT | ACT | Australia |
|-----------------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| Annual Averages | | | | | | | | | |
| 1861-1870 | 3.63 | 3.01 | 15.18 | 3.92 | 5.06 | 1.17 | - | - | 3.70 |
| 1871-1880 | 4.06 | 1.72 | 6.23 | 4.12 | 1.64 | 1.30 | - | - | 3.08 |
| 1881-1890 | 4.15 | 2.82 | 6.39 | 1.44 | 5.08 | 2.35 | - | - | 3.51 |
| 1891-1900 | 2.02 | 0.54 | 2.33 | 1.14 | 14.01 | 1.79 | ⁶ | - | 1.80 |
| 1901-1910 | 1.91 | 0.85 | 1.95 | 1.31 | 4.40 | 1.15 | -3.79 | ⁷ | 1.63 |
| 1911-1920 | 2.44 | 1.62 | 2.28 | 1.90 | 1.81 | 0.94 | 1.91 | 1.83 | 2.03 |
| 1921-1930 | 1.99 | 1.61 | 2.02 | 1.58 | 2.68 | 0.57 | 2.21 | 16.03 | 1.85 |
| 1930-1940 | 0.92 | 0.66 | 1.19 | 0.42 | 0.94 | 0.80 | 6.10 | 4.97 | 0.85 |
| 1941-1950 | 1.51 | 1.57 | 1.57 | 1.90 | 1.91 | 1.75 | 4.86 | 5.23 | 1.62 |

This table gives us the rate of population growth from all sources for all States and Territories, as well as totals for Australia. From this we can see that in the decades 1891-1900 and 1901-1910 Victoria and NSW did indeed suffer substantial drops in overall population growth, of which Victoria's growth rate decline was quite spectacular. If we look at Western Australia's population growth, however, we can see that it has become spectacularly fast in a year where decline or slowness was evident in all other States. The discovery of gold in 1884 in West Australia⁸ had affected the situation there. Furthermore, if we look further back in West Australia's history in the table we can see the effects of the introduction of convicts in 1850 in transports carrying an equal number of free immigrants up to 1868.⁹

During the 1890s The economic situation worsened and, after 1900, the business community became desperate about increasing the population. In 1903 the President of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce announced that it was necessary to have a population "which steadily increases as commerce itself does."¹⁰ In 1905 the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures supported Prime Minister Deakin's immigration proposals because

"Desirable immigration means more people, and more people means more capital, and the utilization of millions of acres of unused territory, and thus increasing our national wealth".¹¹

Connections between the Land Crash and Members of the Royal Commission into the Decline in the Birth Rate in New South Wales (RCDBR) 1904

In 1904 the constant discussion about the relationship between demographics and hard times in New South Wales gave rise to the Royal Commission into the Decline of the Birth Rate in New South Wales. This was composed of thirteen commissioners.¹² A number of writers have suggested that manufacturing employers were poorly organised and had few links to politics during this period.¹³ Perhaps the Royal Commission was exceptional, but, despite the quainter aspects of its agenda and some of its more peculiar publications,¹⁴ it does seem to have been a surprisingly well connected and politically motivated body.

Octavius Beale, a piano manufacturer, became one of several prominent businessmen appointed to the Commission. Beale was the Founder of the Federated Chambers of Manufactures, President of the Chamber of Commerce, President of the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures from 1902-1904,¹⁵ State President of the National Protection League, and an "old ally" of Liberal leader, Deakin, who became the first Prime Minister of Australia.¹⁶ Deakin is thought to have been quite closely involved in land speculation himself.¹⁷ Five of the Commission were members of the New South Wales Legislative Council, which was known as a den of land speculators.¹⁸

Dr Charles K. Mackellar, a member of the Legislative Council, nominated all but one of the Commission's members. His close business allies dominated the Commission.¹⁹ Mackellar, Maclaurin, and Hughes were clearly associated with some of the most notorious land speculation disasters of the time. They were board directors of failed or struggling banks, building societies, insurance companies, or companies and institutions like hospitals and universities with assets locked into unsaleable land and building stock. As responsible members of company boards where shareholders' funds had

disappeared in wildly speculative land-deals that had subsequently crashed, these men were prepared to take desperate measures to protect their own assets and reputations. As well as recommending laws to prevent contraception, abortion and infanticide, the Commission recommended high immigration. Two of the Committee members were also represented on the Immigration Board. See Table 6.2 below.

| BUSINESS CONNECTIONS | BOARD MEMBERS INVOLVED |
|---|---|
| Medical Practice | Mackellar, MacLaurin, Foreman, Nash, Paton |
| NSW Board of Health | Mackellar, MacLaurin, Hughes (as Lord Mayor of Sydney), Littlejohn, Paton (First Director-General and President from 1913) |
| Colonial Sugar Refining Company | Mackellar (Director), MacLaurin (Director 1896-1914), Edward Knox (General Manager and son of the founder; eventually became Managing Director) |
| Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co. (MLC) Immigration Board | Mackellar (Director & Chairman; Trustee 1911-14), MacLaurin (Director & Chairman), Hughes (Director) |
| University of Sydney | MacLaurin, (Vice Chancellor, Examiner in Medicine, Chancellor), Mackellar (Examiner in Medicine), Knox, (Fellow of the university senate). |
| Gloucester Estate Ltd | MacLaurin (Founder 1903) Mackellar (Chairman) |
| Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd | Mackellar (Director) |
| United Insurance Co. Ltd | Mackellar (Director) |
| Australian Widows' Fund | Mackellar (Director) |
| Equitable Life Insurance Co Ltd | Mackellar (Medical Director) |
| Royal Insurance Co Ltd | Mackellar (Director) |
| Pastoral Interests (considerable) | Mackellar |
| Bank of New South Wales | Mackellar (Director) (President 1901-23 except for overseas absences, when MacLaurin was President, 1904-5 & 1912-13) (Director 1900-1914) |
| Legislative Council | Mackellar, Brady, Nash, Fosbery, Holman |
| Commercial Union Insurance | MacLaurin (Director) |
| Emigration Officer for Port Jackson | Mackellar (Ex officio) |
| Immigration Board | MacLaurin (Chairman 1885-89), MacKellar (Chairman) |
| Lord Mayor of Sydney | Hughes (1902, 1903, 1907, 1908) |
| Tooheys Brewery | Hughes (Chairman) |
| Pattison & Co. Ltd, S Bennett Ltd, (Publishers of the <i>Evening News</i>) | Hughes (Chairman) |
| London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company | Hughes (Sydney Board Chairman) |
| WH Soul & Co (Pharmaceuticals) | Hughes (Chairman) |
| Commercial Banking Co | Hughes (Director) |
| Australasia Hotel Co. Ltd | Hughes (Director) |
| Amalgamated Wireless | Hughes (Director) |
| Federated Chambers of Manufactures | Beale (Founding President) |
| NSW Chamber of Manufactures | Beale (President from October 1902) |
| Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Australia | Beale (President) |
| National Protection League | Beale (State President) |
| Chamber of Commerce | Beale (President), Littlejohn |
| Beale & Co. sewing machine and piano importers | Beale (Managing Director 1884-1930) |

Table 6.2. Some Business Connections of the members of the Royal Commission into the Decline in the New South Wales Birth Rate (1904)²⁰

Organisational Affiliations of members of the RCDBR

Mackellar was a director of the Union Trustee Company of Australia Ltd. The Union Trustee Company was a major creditor of the insolvent Modern Permanent Building Society (£4000) and so was the Commercial Bank (of which Hughes was a director) (£8,500). Creditors from these companies agreed to accept a secret settlement of one penny to the pound. The implication is that the directors of these companies did not want the details of their own involvement exposed.²¹

Mackellar was also a director of the Australian Widows' Fund. In the events leading up to the 1890s crash the Australian Widows' Fund lent its depositors' savings on the 'security' of *leasehold* properties. One huge debt due to land speculation was settled in a secret compact (to protect others involved) at 2s. 6d. in the Pound. Debtor Theophilus Kitchen paid a penny in the pound in a secret composition for another debt to the Widows' Fund of £116,000. In 1896 the Widows Fund wrote off £125,000 capital to help cover its losses from the boom period. By 1910 it had still not recovered its position.²² The Directors proposed an amalgamation with the Mutual Life Association of Australasia, which had recently absorbed the Citizens' Life Company. The weakness of the Widow's fund and its subsequent amalgamation, which gave rise to the giant MLC organisation of today, was undertaken with very little public explanation.²³

As well, Mackellar was a director of Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Company and Hughes was Chairman of the National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd.

Mackellar was also a director of the Equitable Life Insurance Company, which, just prior to the crash, paid Munro's Real Estate Bank (which went under) £363,000 for a site at the corner of Elizabeth and Collins Streets in Melbourne. The property was immediately to lose massively in value.

Hughes was the Director of the Sydney Commercial Banking Company, which was one of five of Sydney's major banks to succumb to the bust. The Commercial Bank was the

colony's largest bank and it was one of the first to go under in the land boom crash, in April 1893, due to engagement in massive land speculation.²⁴

Mackellar, MacLaurin and Edward Knox were all deeply involved with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, which featured strongly in the politics of protectionism. The company had been a source of major pressure on Deakin to grant protectionist policies in return for Queensland joining the Federation of the States.

These protectionist favors were partially in exchange for Colonial giving up its practice of importing Kanakas as cheap indentured labour for its cane fields, thus facilitating the formation of the white Australia policy. The Australian Dictionary of Biography²⁵ records that Knox, General Manager and eventually Managing Director of The Colonial Sugar Company, "supported MacLaurin's vigorous anti-Federation campaign of 1899-1900, when one observer judged MacLaurin to be 'far and away the ablest, as he is the most trusted' of Protectionists opposed to the Bill." MacLaurin and Knox also supported each other in refusing to give evidence in a Royal Commission into the sugar industry in 1912.²⁶

In light of the important role of non European imported labour in the successful establishment of the Queensland sugar industry, and the role of population growth to stimulate housing demand, it is perhaps not surprising that MacLaurin and Mackellar were both also on the Immigration Board.

Recommendations of the RCDBR

The RCDBR report condemned the practises of abortion and contraception, effectively blaming the 1890s depression on the practice of birth control and the selfishness and depravity of women who practised it. Doubt was expressed about the ability of Australians to densely populate large areas of the continent by natural increase alone and the report recommended either "restoring and maintaining a high rate of natural increase or by immigration on a large scale, or by both these means..."²⁷

In response to the Commission's findings the NSW government passed the *Poisons Act 1905*. This made the abortifacient ergot of rye available on prescription only. A *Private Hospitals Act 1908* was passed, requiring private hospitals to register and keep records of births, deaths and patients. A *Police Offences (Amendment) Act 1908* aimed at preventing contraception or abortion advertising was passed. The birth rate, however, remained relatively stable until it plummeted in the 1930s Depression.

In 1905 Beale left Sydney on a world tour,²⁸ during which he met American President, Theodore Roosevelt, who had been impressed with Beale's writings on the birthrate. Beale requested permission to cable the following remarks by Roosevelt to the Australian Press:

Next to my own country I am interested in the progress, success and safety of Australia, that great democratic island continent. Open your doors to immigration. Beware of keeping your Far North empty. Encourage an influx there of southern Europeans. They will cultivate the rich country and make good Australians.²⁹

In 1906 the acting President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce declared that, "an increase in population means an increase of wealth not only of the few but of the many."³⁰ In 1908 the President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce pushed for immigration on the grounds that suitable immigrants would be consumers as well as producers and should therefore be welcomed by all classes".³¹ In 1907 the General Council of Chambers of Commerce asked the government for a steady stream of immigration to provide for the "growth in industrial manufactures which will shortly exceed the volume of consumption of the present population".³² In 1908 the President of the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures stated that:

...to get any benefits from increased protection they must get increased payment and that could not come from their own limited populations. A wisely managed scheme of immigration would be as much the saviour of the manufacturers as anything could be.³³

Colonialism at variance with a big local market

The big local market idea, however, was not popular with England or the Australian government because of the traditional concept of the role of a colony being uniquely to supply the motherland, not to flourish for its own sake. There were also concerns about population distribution at the time, especially as regards opening up further territory for farming, which was perceived as a colonial duty.³⁴

The desire for independent economic survival and the perception that this depended on a more varied and larger local market with a protectionist policy was one of several forces which culminated in 1901 with Australian Federation, which was in some ways an attempt by Australian manufacturers to gain economic independence from Britain. (There were however other social reasons as well.)³⁵

The First World War (1914-1918), Returned Soldier Farmers and the Great Depression

The First World War kick-started the economy, stimulating technology and organisation. In 1918 Edward James Brady wrote the popular book, *Australia Unlimited*³⁶ which the Australian Dictionary of Biography describes as “a comprehensive survey of Australia’s industries”³⁷, whereas William J Lines, in *False Economy* (1998),³⁸ describes the book as a “paean to Australian development ...”

In 1919 Prime Minister Hughes went to an election on the big local market platform:

If Australia is to become a great nation its greatness must rest upon the basis of land settlement ... This great Commonwealth, which could easily support in comfort 100,000,000 people - with its illimitable resources, its rich soil, its great mineral wealth - has now but 5,000,000.³⁹

After the war there were several large scale immigration schemes, mostly financed by Great Britain, for the resettlement on the land of returned British soldiers. Much of this land was unsuitable for agriculture and the settlers had little or no farming experience, especially none of Australian conditions. More of this land was rendered unviable due

to extensive clearing of vegetation, which was required of the landholder by the government.⁴⁰ This was a time of aggravation of salinisation that had already begun in the Murray Darling Basin and in the West Australian Mallee.⁴¹

The First World War had interrupted the flow of migration, but between 1921 and 1930 there was a net migration gain of 312,800 and migration was responsible for an annual rate of growth of 0.32 per cent.⁴² The "roaring twenties" were, however, followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Drought and pests, plus falling grain prices at the time of the Great Depression led many of these poor settlers to walk off their land to seek employment in the cities. There was of course little hope there. Australia had sunk into a long period of depression, like much of the western world, and this period was characterised by very little residential construction.⁴³ Population growth, household formation and available funds were at a minimum. Land speculators and home builders had reached their darkest hour.

After the Second World War

After the Second World War the massive immigration program started up population growth again. Initially Chifflery's public housing program kept a lid on land speculation.

Those few developers and home builders who had survived must have been delighted when Prime Minister Menzies redirected the land development and home building system to the private sector in the mid 1950s. Then, with the baby boom and mass immigration, it was full steam ahead.

But Whitlam's reformist agenda for population and land development planning would have been inimical to the interests of property developers and the residential construction industry. It certainly caused political conflict as well as philosophical conflict in economic and development circles.⁴⁴

Although the early 1970s stand out as a time in recent Australian history when population stabilisation came to be seen as a reasonable goal by mainstream intellectuals, this was not the case with Australian property development lobbies. When the Whitlam government instituted a National Population Inquiry in 1973, a major land and property development business made a submission which indicates how dependent the industry was on immigration supplemented growth.:

A large number of industries, including the building industry could not have developed to their present size without the immigration policy....Population growth promotes expansion in building activity. This is the mainstay of our economy, which as opposed to that of Japan, is substantially concentrated on national infrastructure rather than purely on export industries.⁴⁵

The Populationist Property Development and Housing Lobby in Australia Today

Composition and characteristics

The current populationist lobby in Australia is still largely composed of business associations, businessmen, industries and their spokespersons. The property-development and housing-industry-related subset is still strongly present among these. Then there are populationist politicians who speak up for population growth as a necessity for economic growth, thereby finding support from populationist industries. These politicians also seem to find favorable coverage in the press. Finally, there are writers, both journalistic and academic who put forward arguments in favor of population growth and some of these have also attracted support from industry.

The Property development and housing industries are important to major financial sectors, which profit from lending money to home buyers and others which utilise mortgage funds to finance other investments.

Phil Ruthven of Ibis International lists the "downstream industries" to the housing construction industry as, among others, "Banks, Building Societies and other Mortgage providers, and Residential property operators..." (<http://www.ibisworld.com.au/>). The "upstream providers" are manufacturers and suppliers of every conceivable building material, and they too rely heavily on housing and infrastructure development.⁴⁶ If we think about it, we can see how intimately the housing industry is linked to the rest of the Australian economy - particularly through mortgages. Mortgages not only permit those who lend to them to profit from interest or to acquire cheap assets from defaulters, but mortgages create a huge, dependable fund for other investments. Furthermore, the housing industry attracts foreign investment. As long as our population and household formation continues to grow, international residential construction industries and developers will start projects jointly with local developers in Australia, incidentally providing some employment downstream.⁴⁷

Australian unions, like French ones, fight for immigrant workers to have rights like native born workers and seek members among immigrants so do not present opposition to imported labor. Not since the days of the defunct Builders' Laborers' Union and the days of Jack Mundy's green bans,⁴⁸ it seems, has the union movement shown much interest in the natural environment. The Australian press is almost unanimously sympathetic to high immigration and of course, property sales advertising is a major source of revenue for the press barons.⁴⁹ The press is therefore unlikely to become a source of disinterested information on the long-term costs of growth, and so opinion pages and letters to the editor probably do not typify intellectual or public opinion.⁵⁰

The role of international finance seems to have increased in the 1980s with the arrival of Japanese construction companies floating schemes with foreign loans accessed via Japanese banks.⁵¹ Development and real estate brokerage have adapted increasingly to acting as agents to international investment funds.⁵² However this is apparently not the case in France.⁵³

In March 2001, the following Australian firms of Developers and Contractors or specialising in Building Materials had market capital of over \$100 million and returns on assets of more than 8%. This means that they are among the top companies in Australia.

Table 6.3 Top Australian Companies in Developing and Contracting or in Building Materials by Sector, Market Capitalisation and Return on Assets.

| Company Name | Sector | Market Capitalisation, \$Millions AUD | Return on Assets % |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Bristle Limited | Building Materials | 234 | 10.79 |
| James Hardie Industries Ltd | Building Materials | 1588 | 10.15 |
| Auspine Ltd | Building Materials | 126 | 8.93 |
| Reece Australia Ltd | Building Materials | 408 | 13.69 |
| CSR Limited | Building Materials | 4867 | 10.48 |
| Brickworks Limited | Building Materials | 705 | 16.45 |
| Westfield Holdings Ltd | Developers & Contractors | 7066 | 9.92 |
| Leighton Holdings Ltd | Developers & Contractors | 1846 | 8.76 |
| Central Equity Limited | Developers & Contractors | 174 | 14.16 |
| AV Jennings Homes Limited | Developers & Contractors | 114 | 10.75 |
| Primelife Corporation Limited | Developers & Contractors | 103 | 18.57 |

Source: Lincoln Industries, *Stockfilter* Software Program, 19 March 2001.

Table 6.4 Commercial Property Lending by the Banking Sector in Australia 2000

| Commercial Property Lending by the banking sector in Australia 2000 | | | | |
|--|-------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Banking Sector | Major Banks | Other Domestic Banks | Locally Incorporated foreign banks | Foreign bank branches |
| Total Exposure | \$53.8bn | \$7.7bn | \$1.20bn | \$11.5bn |
| Proportion of Global Assets % | 6.9 | 6.8 | 8.8 | n.a. |
| Impaired Assets % (of total commercial property exposures) | 0.6 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 |

Source: *APRA Insight*, cited in an article by Robert Harley in the *Australian Financial Review*, 20/3/2001, p.38, "Big four dominate commercial real estate lending". This table is closely based on a table in the article.

The Australian banking sector, in March 2001, was reported to have a "total exposure" of \$74.2 billion to commercial property - office, retail, industrial, tourism, land development and other residential property, both in Australia and overseas. The NAB, CBA, Westpac and ANZ dominate with 75 per cent of total exposure, with NAB having more than any other. Their "total exposure" to commercial property lending, in September 2000, was \$53.8 billion. The "total book" was worth about \$320 million.⁵⁴ (For an idea of what this represents in terms of the Australian economy, the ABS estimated Australia's GDP at \$632 billion in 1999.⁵⁵) (All sums expressed in Australian dollars).

The other Australian banks together have about 10 per cent of the rest of commercial property exposure by banks, and locally incorporated branches of foreign banks have

7.3 per cent. Locally incorporated foreign banks have recently increased their property involvement from less than 4% of total assets in 1997 to close to 9 per cent.⁵⁶

Some Modern Australian Population Boosters

The following people, who have high profiles for political or business reasons, or have published books on the subject, are well known for supporting a much larger population for Australia in public forums. It is difficult to say how many they really are: in the end they seem to resolve to a small circle of people who nevertheless get maximum media coverage.

Phil Ruthven, self-styled "futureologist" of IBIS business association, which provides data to industry, has talked of the inevitability of an Australian population of around 150 million in various forums, including *Australia Talks Back*, ABC National radio, August 1997.⁵⁷ In October 1997 *The Age*⁵⁸ reported Malcolm Fraser, ex-prime minister, who headed a return to high immigration and dismantled land development reform structures after the fall of the Whitlam government, as saying "Australia must drastically increase its population, chiefly through immigration, if it is to protect its interests and maintain any influence ..." . Fraser, once widely seen to be a bumbling and unpopular figure, is increasingly lionised by the business and media populationist lobby.⁵⁹

In *The Age* in March 1998,⁶⁰ the following businessmen and politician argued that population growth was desirable and inevitable: Tony Berg, then Chief Executive Officer of Boral Industries (building materials and components) and still, in 2001, director of numerous banking, insurance and property trust related groups and holdings, and the Midland Brick Company; Jeff Kennett, populationist Premier of Victoria (who presided over a developmentalist Ministry for Planning and Infrastructure which decreased housing lot sizes under a code and administration largely unresponsive to public outrage),⁶¹ and Phil Ruthven, who again claimed that by the end of the 21st century Australia's population would be 150 million.

On Geraldine Doogue's ABC National radio programme, *Life Matters*, June 1998,⁶² Phil Ruthven, Ron Silberberg of the Australian Housing Industry Association, and Stephan Kerkashyrian, of the New South Wales Ethnic Affairs Commission, all spoke in favour of big populations.

The Ex-Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, Tony Berg, Ron Silberberg and Western Mining Chief, Hugh Morgan, were among a solid cast of immigrationists at the April 1998 Australia Unlimited Conference, which was co-hosted by the Australian newspaper along with other populationist manufacturing and business concerns.⁶³

In 1998, the Housing Industry Association co-published with Allen and Unwin, Australia, a book called *Immigration and Australia, Myths and Realities*, written by academics well known for their immigrationist viewpoints: Prof. Glen Withers, Head of the Australian Public Policy Program at the Australian National University, Stephen Castles, William Foster and Robyn Iredale.

An article in *Civil Engineers Australia* – December 1998, entitled, “Big Population Growth Needed, Forum Told – enVision '98 Conference”, reported speakers for high immigration and a big population. Among them were Tony Berg, Jeff Kennett, Alan Stockdale, Treasurer of the Kennett Victorian Liberal Government, Dr Jack Wynhoven, chairman of the enVision 98 organising committee and chief executive officer of Connell Wagner (Engineering and major infrastructure projects) and John White, chief executive officer of Richard Pratt's Visy [Paper and Packaging but also manufacturers of Visy board, a building material] Industries. (Pratt was Vice President of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures and has extensive involvement in business.)⁶⁴

In February 1999 *The Australian*⁶⁵ published an article by Prof. Glenn Withers, entitled, "Migration fits our true ideals: The new Australia needs more new Australians." In this Withers argued for a gross immigration intake of 190,000 per year (what he referred to as '1% of population' - 1% of 19 m = 190,000) then and rising each & every year so as to remain at the level of 1% of population. That is, when Australia's population reached 20 million, the intake would be 200,000; at 30 million, the intake would be 300,000 and so forth." In the same year Federal Labor MP Lindsay Tanner's new book *Open Australia* in which he argued for higher immigration for a big population, was published and received wide coverage.

John Nieuwenhuysen (Director of the Australian Bureau of Immigration from 1989-96) is another fiercely pro-immigration writer, see for instance, "There's room for more", *Herald Sun*, 12/2/1999,⁶⁶ subtitled : 'We can't shut ourselves off from the world, says John Nieuwenhuysen.'

The theme of needing a big population in order to repel invaders remains popular. In "More Migrants, Pleads Kennett", by Christine Jackman in the Melbourne *Herald Sun*, 12/2/1999,⁶⁷ Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett was quoted telling "a New York business lunch" that "Australia's population was so low it would not even be able to defend Tasmania", attacking immigration levels as "almost negligible".... and underestimating them at "about 60,000 a year."

Lord Alistair McAlpine wrote an article for *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 20/7/2000, entitled, "Populate the north before the decision is forced on us" : ... "The population and the preservation and the development of northern Australia are just not a possibility. It is an imperative." Lord Alistair McAlpine is a British developer and businessman who first invested in Australia 40 years ago. The article was an extract of a speech he delivered to the Brisbane Institute on 18/7/2000.

The CEDA Conference, November 1999, inaugurated the Australian Population Institute (Apop), a group with the sole purpose of promoting a big Australian population. Apop seems to be mainly composed of business people involved in the property development industries.⁶⁸ Altogether nine papers were delivered in favour of, or neutral about, population increase, including that of the key speaker, Professor Withers.⁶⁹ Without in any way impugning the sincerity and disinterest of the academics involved, Tom Morrow points out in *Growing for Broke*, that Apop - composed of businessmen with a vested interest in maintaining high population growth - thus benefited from the cachet of academic disinterest, whilst only airing one point of view.⁷⁰ Morrow also criticises the lack of an ecological perspective.

In a Financial Review article on 23 January 2001, p.32, "Australians all, let us get the numbers right", Mark Paterson, Chief Executive of Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry came out strongly in support of population growth through increased immigration, stating critically that "Current immigration levels are placing us in a holding pattern." Raja Junankar, Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Western Australia wrote that, "Migrants increase the supply of labour and bring with them skills, entrepreneurship and capital. They help improve the methods of production in our economy, increase a network of contacts for possible exports and imports and increase the demand for domestic products (especially housing and household goods), not to mention increasing our cultural diversity. All the evidence suggests that

immigration increases the growth of the economy and possibly also the growth per capita of GDP."

In February 2001 *The Australian* published "Our Shrinking Nation",⁷¹ by Alan Wood, who cites David Buckingham, Business Council of Australia, stating that "Australia is facing a population crisis in the next 30 years". On the same page there is an article by Vanessa Walker, "One Big Happy Investment", about a family with ten children, described as a demographic and economic blessing" [for Australia].

In the US and Australia there seems to be a greater tendency than in France to perceive and to portray the aging of the population as a dramatic economic threat.⁷² This is particularly true of the property development and housing industries.⁷³

In fact, the United States total fertility rate is very close to replacement and is rising, but the longevity of the US baby-boom cohort is proving a problem for the continued provision of social security. The US political system appears powerless to change the social security system, which, like the French ones, is not capitalised. The situation with the aging cohort in Australia is, however, different. To begin with, Australia began to capitalise its social security system - through a system of pensions and superannuation - quite early by international standards.⁷⁴ The aging cohort in Australia is also not nearly as large as Europe's or the USA's. And the problem is self limiting through death. Immigration - except in absurdly huge quantities - makes virtually no difference to the aging of the population, but aging is still used aggressively to promote high immigration by the Australian populationist lobbies.

In "Our Shrinking Nation"⁷⁵ Wood states that "The dramatic change [sic] in attitudes is most evident in the business community, where groups such as the business Council of Australia, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Australian Industry Group and the Housing Industry Association have all started to agitate for higher immigration and a new focus on population policy"...[Changes in Australia's population age composition] will affect income distribution and could have a severe impact on the price of assets such as the national housing stock, as demand for houses falls."

In February, in "People number-crunching",⁷⁶ Alan Wood wrote again. "There are sectors such as retailing and housing where population numbers matter, so it is no surprise that shopping centre developer Frank Lowy, the housing industry and some manufacturers dependent on the domestic market are keen on higher immigration. But for the Australian economy as a whole it is not the domestic market but the world market that matters."

In the *Business Review Weekly*, November 26, 1999, Robert Gottliebsen wrote in "Warning: prepare your finances for a slowdown": "Migration a must. Although most areas of the media are still ignoring it, Kim Beazley's decision to commit the Australian Labor Party to revising Australia's population assumptions is encouraging people to begin to discuss the issue." What he meant was that Beazley was trying to sell higher fertility and higher immigration to the masses.

From around that time on it seemed that Kim Beazley, who had up until then been a lackadaisical leader of a decimated Labor Party and the butt of journalistic jokes, began to get serious press.

All that was missing before serious pressure could be applied to the Prime Minister, who was perceived as anti-immigration, was a serious economic downturn, which the recession accompanying the 1999-2001 oil crisis provided. By 9 March 2001 Prime Minister Howard was portrayed on page one of the *Australian* as desperately trying to bolster a faltering residential construction industry, because Australia's financial position was perceived to depend on it.⁷⁷ Howard talked of doubling financial incentives for first home buyers to purchase new properties in response to demands from the Housing Industry Association.⁷⁸ According to the article, of 82,344 grants awarded to individuals up to January, only 7 per cent had been for new houses. Before the scheme had been introduced, 20 per cent of first home buyers had bought new properties.⁷⁹ Whereas the French system has tended to cut down on housing construction during recessions, the opposite applies in Australia. The difficult situation of the building industry was also linked to international investment and the falling Australian dollar in the above article.

For further evidence of a business and development based populationist lobby, one could do no better than to cite the Australian Population Institute Inc. (Apop). The Apop netsite announces in an unsigned statement that Apop has, "no political or other mission objective" other than to "represent the views of the many Australians that support responsible population growth". The statement describes Apop as "a group of non-political businessmen", and names its early core supporters as including "Tony Berg [identified as a member of the Business Council of Australia's population committee in the Australian],⁸⁰ Lindsay Cattermole [Member of the Committee for Melbourne], Ivan Deveson [director of Crane Group Ltd and United Group Ltd, groups with very wide interests, including construction and asset management; and Chairman of the Business Skills Assessment Panel for the Immigration Department from 1992-1996; and Lord Mayor of Melbourne from 1996-1999], Malcolm Fraser, Hugh Morgan, Richard Pratt, John Ralph [Director of BHP Ltd., Commonwealth Bank, Pacific Dunlop, and Telstra Corporation], Phil Ruthven, Ron Silberberg, Jack Smorgon and many others". Most of these names are in fact recognisable from their frequent appearance in the media arguing for population growth. (I have added the information in the square brackets.) Less recognisable are the names of the office bearers, however some net searching yields the information that Apop president, Albert Dennis, is Chairman of the Dennis Family Corporation, which is reputed to be Victoria's largest private land developer, with considerable land holdings in Melbourne and Brisbane;⁸¹ Secretary, Geoffrey Underwood is Director of Underwood and Hume P/L, which is a group of Town Planning Consultants,⁸² and Vice President, David Coomes is the Managing Director of the Coomes Consulting Group, which is concerned with development and engineering of major residential and industrial estates as well as roads, bridges and assorted infrastructure. The Coomes Group is also a member of the Australia-Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry.⁸³ To further bear out my theory, Apop declares that it began with "initial support and seed funding of the peak body, the Urban Development Institute of Australia", which is of course an association of property development organisations.⁸⁴

The Sydney Institute is another active immigrationist organisation. Although most of its publicity comes from journalist Gerard Henderson and his wife, the Chairman is Rob Ferguson of the Bankers Trust and, among its board of governors is Frank Conroy of Saint George Bank.⁸⁵ As I argued at the beginning of this section on modern

population boosters, banks and building societies have significant stocks in property investment and use mortgages as a regular source of funding for other investments.

As well as material on the Apop website, there is also plenty of overt populationist material on the websites of the Housing Industry Association (HIA), www.buildingonline.com.au and the Business Council of Australia (BCA), www.bca.com.au)

In 2000 the Business Council of Australia launched a report called *Population Futures*,⁸⁶ which was prepared for them by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE). The report came out strongly supporting the view that Australia can support a much larger population and dismissed the relationship between population growth and environmental stress as tenuous. Alan Jones, of the Division of Earth and Environmental Sciences at the Australian Museum strongly criticised this work for a marked failure to review the literature in the area.⁸⁷

The Absence of a Populationist Property Development and Housing Lobby in France

There seems to be no populationist property development and building lobby in France. Furthermore, the French public housing program has retained an important place in total housing provision. In France 15.7% of total housing is provided by HLMs⁸⁸ (public housing estates) and 10.7 million persons are lodged therein. This represents 18% of the population. About 48% of the French population falls below the threshold at which tax on income is obligatory.⁸⁹ Many receive assistance in paying their rent. Those who have a little more money have low income tax and may obtain housing loans at little or no interest. For those who have more money and who own property, tax reductions are available where they agree to rent their property to others at a low rent.⁹⁰

The French invest in residential properties primarily in order to gain income tax relief, to obtain a rental income, and in order to pass the asset on in the family inheritance. No companies dealing in residential property investment exist in the big league in France.⁹¹ So, where we read in the Australian newspaper property supplement that "Real estate whiz kids are leading the charge on the world's property stage" and that Lend Lease is "now the largest real estate investment operation in the world with a \$US1.6 billion war chest which should eventually find its way into European ... markets" we should take this with more than a grain of salt.

The system is different in Europe.

In the absence of a property development lobby for immigration, what drove immigration in France until 1974?

France, of course, did not experience a gold-rush and it was peopled well before it became a nation and before nations were really thought about. Modern France had its seeds in the French revolution of 1789, which is conveniently close for purposes of comparison to the date of British settlement of Australia, in 1788. Formal immigration, both forced and voluntary, was the motor force of the New South Wales colony that was eventually to give rise to Australia. Although the territory which is now France had been peopled by drifting or invading populations since the time of Cro-Magnon man, the idea of France is much more recent than most of these demographic movements and the idea of formal immigration as an important factor in French demography or the economy is more recent still. This difference may in part explain why the French economy has developed largely independently of immigration led population growth.

Immigration to France was driven primarily by two motives: One was the need for alternative or supplementary sources of labour from time to time (Mainly from the 18th century).⁹² The second was to build up the size of the population for defence. (The 19th and 20th centuries.).⁹³ The first seems to have evolved as a practical ad hoc solution to sporadic and evolving shortages of labor or certain skills, especially with the

development of modern industry. In the post 1945 era, the second motive was more ideologically based and nationalistic. However this motive has faded away as military technology and European alliances have replaced the need for many French soldiers. The real ideologues were the pro-natalists of the 19th and 20th centuries, who were often against immigration since, according to their concept of a nation, it diluted the nation. For those among them who tolerated immigration, it was not the preferred option. For the rest of the nation immigration has not been a matter of great preoccupation, although human rights, and consequently the rights of immigrants in France have at times caught the public imagination especially after the Second World War. If the desire for a bigger local market was a motive after 1945, then it was not a prominent one and I have found no evidence of it. The European Economic Community (EEC) quickly came to be the aimed for market, since it was conveniently situated and large.

Immigration Before 1945

France was, however, for a long time the most populous nation of the Western world. At the time of the reign of Louis XV (1715-1774), of the countries in Europe, only Russia had a greater population. At the time of the revolution in 1789, France had a population of approximately 29 millions, twice as much as the second largest European country, Great Britain (England and Wales).⁹⁴

But by 1871, at the time of the founding of the Second Reich, this relative situation had changed markedly with Germany's population outstripping France's. By 1900 France's population (without Alsace Lorraine, which had become a German possession in 1871) was 38 million and Germany's population was 57 million.⁹⁵

Defeat by the Prussians in 1871 was an event that crystallised France's conception of the relationship between her demography and her decline in importance as a European power, especially relative to Germany.⁹⁶ At a time when military strength was still equated with manpower Germany's youthful, highly fertile population represented a growing threat.

The reason for France's low fertility is generally held to be due to early successful contraceptive practice, initially combined with high infant mortality, and, among the rural populations of the 19th century, late marriage.⁹⁷ In fact France can be described as having undergone the "demographic transition" one century ahead of its neighbours.

France did not feature much in the 19th century European emigration to the new world, in part because of her low population growth. Complementary to this was the situation whereby she began to be a country that received immigrants a century earlier than her neighbours. France is often described as having been a country of immigration from the 18th Century, when industry and commerce sought specialist artisans, such as mechanics from England and craftsmen from Italy.⁹⁸

Even in these early times numbers were occasionally limited by the State. After the Revolution and up to the end of the 19th century, foreigners met little material disadvantage. But there were some exceptions: A law of 1850 forbade foreigners to found a school; a decree in 1852 forbade them to manage newspapers. Up to the end of the 19th century - apart from political rights of voting and being elected - (which were anyway only accorded to French people themselves from the time of the Revolution in an intermittent fashion), and of access to certain public offices and occupations, foreigners did not incur special attention apart from the fact that they could be expelled from the country.⁹⁹

Not until the 19th C would the "immigration problem" be heard as an expression. According to Patrick Weil this coincided with a phenomenon of mass migration in the second half of the 19th century.¹⁰⁰

The reasons for this early migration were economic and populationist: big companies wanted migrants to fill positions and fear of looming Germany had led to nationalist inspired nation-building. Towards the end of the 1860s and much more markedly after the 1871 Prussian defeat, Malthusianism gave way to fears of harmful consequences which might result from the rapid and early fall in the birth rate. In 1873 a Jesuit, Pierre Toulemon, and in 1881, an economist, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, put together a pronatalist argument based essentially on military logic. In 1896 a statistician, Jacques Bertillon, with around a hundred other personalities, including the writer, Emile Zola, founded the

French National Alliance for Population Growth (L'Alliance nationale pour l'accroissement de la population française - ANAPF), which defined and equated defense of one's country and contribution to its population growth as a man's duty. The ANAPF policy was that unmarried men should fund tax deductions for large families by paying higher taxes themselves.¹⁰¹

Weil suggests, furthermore, that some of this importation of people was also encouraged in order to engineer political equilibrium; to assist the process of the social construction of France whereby local class and language differences were to be subsumed in movements for a nation wide school syllabus and common language.¹⁰²

The distinction of French from immigrant on a citizenship basis became established and the State intervened more confidently in immigration. Towards the end of the 19th C more and more workers were imported from Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland and Germany, which provided a kind of neighbourhood immigration, principally to factories and mines.¹⁰³

A wave of immigration preceded the First World War and figures from 1920 to 1930 show a net migration for the period of 1,150,000. By 1930 France was the country with the highest count of foreigners: 515 per 100,000 inhabitants, in comparison with 492 per 100,000 in the United States.¹⁰⁴

By the beginning of the twentieth century immigration arrangements had been institutionalised by international conventions between France and the source countries concerned. Demographic policy in France, as regards immigration, began to take on its characteristic European¹⁰⁵ context. In the late 20th century all of its near neighbours have gone through the same transition.¹⁰⁶

Immigration Policy : 1945-1954:

The populationist policy that developed after the Second World War is perfectly illustrated by this statement by Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy, in *French People for France (Des Français pour la France)* (1946) :

Our current plan is as follows. Death rate : save 30,000 young lives.
Immigration : Admit 130 000 foreigners. Birth rate: Make 160,000
more children. Total : 320,000 people more required.¹⁰⁷

In 1945 De Gaulle formed a High Committee for Population. This contained economists as well as pronatalist demographers like Sauvy and the populationist and racist demographer, Georges Mauco.¹⁰⁸ The economists on the Committee were mainly interested in maximising the labor supply in order to maximise economic growth in the post war industrial economy. They were not as concerned as pronatalist demographers were with issues of "nation building". The High Committee recommended the goal of 1,450,000 immigrants for the next five years.¹⁰⁹

From the recommendations of this committee emerged recommendations for an important system of Residents' visas (*Cartes de séjour*) and Work Permits (*Cartes de travail*).¹¹⁰ These were one year, three year and ten year visas. The ten year Resident's visa brought its holder close to real permanent residence. These permits were administered by regional authorities and continue to be so.

France is also bound by European legislation and European Union courts regarding family reunion and asylum. Unlike Australia, France has never had a quota system or annual immigration targets and post-war national policy precluded overt selection on grounds of ethnic appearance, customs and origins.

After the second world war and the period of reconstruction, high immigration continued principally for economic reasons and was linked to a period of intensive development known as "the thirty glorious years" in France.¹¹¹

Although there was a nation building policy, there was nevertheless a desire to control numbers and the qualities of the migrant flow. The French were not simply looking for as many immigrants as possible. There were to be numerous attempts to restrict entries and duration of stay for immigrants from some origins whilst encouraging immigrants of other origins, however these attempts were not confined to this short period of 1945 to 1954.

In addition to manpower needs to fulfil economic objectives, the principle of family immigration was established in a decree on 24 December 1945 and later confirmed in a circular by the Minister of Public Health and Population on 20 January 1947. This confirmed the political will to encourage permanent settlement of immigrants.¹¹²

On 2 November 1945 the National Immigration Office (*Office nationale de l'immigration* - ONI)¹¹³ was appointed by law to be the exclusive recruiting agency for immigrant workers of all nationalities, whatever their occupations or other characteristics.¹¹⁴ It is important to realize that, after 1957 the ONI, which became the OMI in 1987, was progressively to be excluded from the processing of Economic Community (EC) immigrants. (EC immigrants include those from the DOM-TOM and other overseas possessions.¹¹⁵) The ONI/OMI was eventually only to deal with non-EC immigrant processing. It was also assigned the role of facilitating family reunion “*where appropriate lodgings are available*” as set out in a circular dated 20 January 1947.¹¹⁶ Up until 1975 the ONI still processed and kept statistics on EC family reunion. Together with the French refugee agency, OFPRA,¹¹⁷ it has for many years provided the main official statistics for net immigration. This has meant that intra-European immigration was not counted in those statistics after 1975.

According to the hierarchical system of residents' permits created from 1946, the longer the residence permitted, the greater the social and civil rights. The original intention had been to facilitate permanent settlement for the most "desirable" immigrants, which meant that they were also of an age to have children.

Officially there was a general impersonal rule that assumed progression from a one year resident's permit, to a permit for three years and then, finally, to a ten year resident's permit. This last was known as the Privileged Residents' Permit. It was accorded to foreigners who were able to show that they had resided in France without interruption for at least three years and that they had been less than 35 years of age at the time of entering France. It brought the recipient close to citizenship.¹¹⁸

In reality who came and who stayed could also be influenced by a practice of reissuing short term visas, and application of policy could vary widely between regional *préfectures*.¹¹⁹ The privileged residents' permit had originally been conceived by the

population committee as being for preferred European and occupational types and this policy was often to prevail at a de facto level.

From the 4th of November, 1953, issues related to immigration and the status of immigrants were also affected by international agreements. Among the most important to which France was a signatory were the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1945, the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, and the Treaty of Rome on 27 March 1957. The Treaty of Rome will be discussed a little further on here.

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties was signed by participants in November 4, 1950, and was effective on signatories from 3 September 1953. It was however *not signed by France until 1973* and the importance of this delay will be discussed later in this chapter with reference to family reunion obligations.

At the time of their signing, with the exception of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, where the signing was delayed, the above conventions and laws had little impact on French immigration policy which was still favorable to high immigration.

Long-term outcomes of early policies

The decentralised immigration system in France permits flexible and relatively independent regional administration of immigration law and policy. The centralised memos, circulars and laws affecting immigration, issued by ministries in Paris - principally the ministries of the Interior and Employment - are subject to this decentralized administration. Between 1945 and 1973 there was a tendency to grant the longer visas, especially the ten year ones, to persons from European countries. This is especially obvious where Algerians were concerned. (See further down this section.) After 1974 it became very hard for persons from outside the EEC to enter France on any kind of permanent visa or to gain work permits. It became even easier however for EEC members to enter France and find work. They need only seek visas after they found work and the granting of them was a formality. After 1998 immigrants from all EEC countries were granted 10 year visas automatically.¹²⁰

Housing Issues and Immigration: 1945-1955:

The huge problem of housing after the war presented special problems for immigration. France wanted to import families in order to build up the population, but the housing shortage - as well as the shortage of labor, which it exacerbated and was exacerbated by¹²¹ - often led to policy-makers settling for the expeditious option of single male immigrants in the early years. At least this is the kind of immigrant that accommodation design reflected in boarding houses and hostels at the time.¹²² The housing situation was so competitive that many (non European Community) immigrants lived in slums and shanty towns, unfortunately adding to the negative perception some French had of the more obviously foreign immigrants.¹²³

Immigration policy: 1955-1974:

This was largely a period of laissez faire, where industry sought to attract the immigrant workers it wanted. Government policy had little influence on immigration flows, which were largely beyond its control: foreigners entered as tourists, found work without formal permits, and regularised their situations later.

There were however a number of legislative changes affecting immigration and the issue of housing and immigrants became politically charged after 1968.

The signing of the Treaty of Rome on 27 March 1957 by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany laid down the principle of free circulation of monies and workers between the six member States.¹²⁴ Intra-European migration was gradually to become excepted from the control of the French authorities. Also from 1957, French employers were allowed to hire international immigrants from any source directly instead of their having to apply through International Migration Offices (OMI) offices in their own countries.¹²⁵ Weil argued persuasively that one reason international immigration was so greatly liberalized during this period was to facilitate entry of other nationals to compete for French jobs with Algerians. Apparently there was hope that employers would prefer to employ

non-Algerians and that difficulty in finding employment would deter Algerians from coming to France¹²⁶.

From 1947 until 1962 Algerians were French citizens and it was not legally possible to restrict travel for French citizens within French territory.¹²⁷ They were also entitled to public housing, although they had difficulty accessing it, as the accumulation of *bidonvilles*¹²⁸ with large numbers of Algerian residents attests. Despite the official Frenchness of Algerians, numerous unofficial attempts were made to discourage movement by Muslims from Algeria to France, before and after 1962. The war with Algeria became particularly intense between 1958 and 1962.

On 3 July 1962 French recognition of Algerian independence brought about the end of the war with Algerian nationalists. This led to a vast movement of population, mostly of colonial repatriates, from Algeria to metropolitan France in the same year.

For the first time since 1946 movement from Algeria to France was recorded as international immigration, although much of it concerned repatriate French colonials. Of the 862,000 repatriates from Algeria that came in that one year, the bulk were Europeans.¹²⁹ A smaller proportion were Muslims, although many more wanted to escape Algeria. According to the archives of the Minister for Foreign Affairs,¹³⁰ at the end of October 1962 net Muslim arrivals reached 70,000 in one week, although they did not all stay. The fact that more did not succeed in coming or were unable to remain for long in France was probably due to the success of the policies and strategies to limit Algerian immigration, which I have described below.

Obviously this flood was not the result of demographic policy, but the result of the failure of colonial policy. The motives for discouraging large numbers of Algerians appear to have been fear of being swamped by a third world population of relatively unskilled persons with a different religion and culture.¹³¹ Arguably, perceived "racial" characteristics were another motive - a hangover from the colonial era and possibly as a latter day ideology.¹³² Another reason was that for part of the time that Algeria was a French colony,¹³³ France was at war (1954-1962) with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, which was seeking independence. The FLN carried out acts of terrorism in continental France. It is therefore unsurprising if some French

are frightened of Algerians. French *colons* (colonial repatriates) were particularly bitter towards the Algerians.¹³⁴

Although after 3 July 1962 Algeria was no longer French, the Evian Accords of 18 March 1962 had successfully negotiated for free circulation between France and Algeria to continue after Algeria's independence. In October 1968 changes to the Evian Accords brought this free circulation to an end.¹³⁵

Between 1962 and 1968 a number of strategies were however devised to impede the entry of Algerians into France. Most importantly, De Gaulle had issued secret military orders to keep Muslim refugees down to a minimum.¹³⁶ Against the backdrop of this secret policy, deportations and police harassment occurred. Health inspections by French doctors at the border, which had initially been used in 1936, were reintroduced in 1962 to impede the entry of Muslims. The Nekkache-Grandval Accords with Algeria fixed a trimestrial quota of workers and restricted Algerians from coming into France as tourists. Restrictions on length of stay for Algerians seeking work were introduced.¹³⁷

1963 was another big year for immigration in France, with 214,599 new immigrants¹³⁸, only exceeded by the intakes of 1957 and 1962. Weil argues that the French, whilst discouraging Algerian immigrants, encouraged non-Algerian immigrant workers because they hoped the non-Algerians would out-compete the Algerians in the labor market. Difficulty in finding work would make it very difficult for Algerians to gain a foothold in France even if they managed to enter the country.

There were numerous instances over this period where France specifically encouraged other international immigrants to enter the workforce and, especially in the case of the Portuguese, to bring their families.¹³⁹ France encouraged immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia, via migrant worker agreements with those countries.¹⁴⁰ French enterprises went so far as to select people directly from villages rather than to seek them in the cities where the Moroccan government wanted to relieve unemployment. Morocco perceived this as poaching its best trained workers and held up passport deliveries.¹⁴¹ On 25 January 1965 migrant worker agreements were signed with Yugoslavia, and on 18 April 1965 similar agreements were signed with Turkey.

The Algerian head of Government protested at the obvious discrimination against Algerian workers that was implied by these many encouragements to non-Algerian immigrant workers.¹⁴²

In October 1968 a new agreement was annexed to the Evian Agreements whereby Algerians lost their right to free circulation in France. The French would be able to monitor and regulate the length of Algerian residence in France. Special visas were created for this purpose.¹⁴³

In February 1971 Algeria nationalised 51% of French oil concessions, an act which could not have been welcomed by France. Several other oil producing countries then followed Algeria's lead and nationalised French and other foreign oil possessions on their soils. (See Appendix 3, p.2.)

In September 1973 Algeria suspended emigration to France unilaterally. The official reason was France's racism towards Algerians,¹⁴⁴ however Algeria's alliance with OPEC and OPEC's increasingly hard economic line against first world customers must have played a part in this decision.

In December 1973, after 23 years of procrastination, France ratified (with some exceptions) the 4 November 1950, European Convention Safeguarding Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.¹⁴⁵ This convention affected international rights to family reunion, based on fundamental and enforceable principles including: the right to marry and found a family, the right to circulate freely and to choose one's residence and to leave one's country, and the right of foreigners facing deportation to procedural guarantees. However it was not until 1981 that France accorded individuals access to the European Court of Human Rights which enforces the terms of the convention. It seems likely that these delays had been affected, at least in part, by the desire to limit immigration from Algeria.¹⁴⁶

In 1973 the global Oil Crisis erupted and was followed by an international economic crisis, marked by high unemployment. This was the first experience of high unemployment since the war for Western Europe and for other western economies.

Housing Issues and Immigration 1955-1974:

From 1947 until 1962 Algerians were French citizens and, as such, they were entitled to public housing, although they had difficulty accessing it, as the accumulation of *bidonvilles* with large numbers of Algerian muslim residents attests.

After the massive influxes of 1962 the suburb of Sarcelles on the outskirts of Paris was transformed by many huge blocks of flats built to accommodate the many immigrants, refugees and repatriates from Algeria. These included European French colonists, whose number far exceeded Muslim Algerians entering France at the time, and who were resented almost as much.¹⁴⁷

"*Bidonvilles*" was the term used to describe the slums inhabited mainly by immigrants that arose at city outskirts in France, especially in the north-east of Paris. Such a *bidonville* was in the Parisien outer-suburb of Nanterre. The 1968 student revolt began in Nanterre and was accompanied by manifestations of student solidarity with the immigrants living there. Thus it was that the situation of immigrants and housing received important media coverage. Out of this crucible came the policies for the destruction of the *bidonvilles* and the relocation of their immigrant inhabitants to better dwellings.

Between 1967 and 1970 familial immigration had risen to 25,000 families per annum. By 1970 the intake was 38,000 families and 650,000 foreigners were still living in Bidonvilles. However the annual program for public housing for French and foreigners was fixed at 125,000 new dwellings.¹⁴⁸

Immigration policy : 1974 to the close of the 20th Century

In the European Economic Community the economic crisis, precipitated by the oil shock, occasioned a policy of total suspension of worker immigration from outside Europe. This suspension began in Switzerland, then was initiated in Germany in 1973; France and then Belgium followed, in 1974.¹⁴⁹ (Note that the ban on worker

immigration to France excepted refugees, investors and other special cases and, ultimately, family reunion.)

Among measures to secure and stabilise the situation of those immigrants already in France, there were mass amnesties for illegal immigrants from 1974, culminating in the regularization of status of tens of thousands of immigrants. The principal years these occurred were 1975-76, 1981-82 and 1997-98.¹⁵⁰

Under the stresses that emerged as the post oil-shock economic problems deepened and lengthened, the usual resentments at immigrants in the context of unemployment surfaced.¹⁵¹ With this the mainstream rhetoric and policy and practice towards illegal immigrants became harder.¹⁵²

Family Reunion immigration had been on the rise from the late 1960s. The decision to suspend immigration in 1974 did not just concern new workers. It also initially concerned the families of workers where the worker was already resident in France but whose family was still living outside France. This is an important point to make because family reunion was to remain a major issue in immigration politics and law throughout the 1974-2000 period.

Many families entered France during the mid 1970s as "bogus tourists", but this was impossible to combat because intervention would have involved preventing families from visiting heads of families in France. The 1974 suspension order was apparently never taken seriously by families who felt their presence followed automatically on entry of their "head of family". It has been said that nine out of ten families joined a spouse in France by entering as tourists.¹⁵³

Foreign Aid is another immigration related policy that developed over this period. In Europe "Foreign Aid", or "International co-operation and economic development" is a recognised strategy for reducing emigration pressures in poorer countries.¹⁵⁴ (In Australia no overt association between immigration policy and foreign aid policy is usually made in public policy, perhaps because any such relationship is entirely overshadowed by promotion of immigration as a national benefit.)

French Foreign Aid policy is here noted where it was designed to affect immigration. This it attempted to do by a number of means. These included compensating the [immigrant] "sending" States for loss of foreign income through the repatriation of immigrants who habitually sent money back to their countries of origin. This compensation was made in return for the sending states agreement to limit emigration.¹⁵⁵ Foreign Aid was also promoted as a long-term measure to combat conditions giving rise to demographic and economic problems leading to immigration pressures. Such aid included family planning aid and economic development aid. In fact these means are often used in combination, in the form of international agreements.¹⁵⁶

Legal Interventions on behalf of specific immigrants

Court interventions in individual immigrant cases in France were not nearly such a frequent point of recourse as in Australia until recently. Illegal immigrants are deported by the police within about three days. They may be held in secret detention centers (for instance, occupying several floors in hotels near airports). They may also be restrained in aeroplanes if they resist departure. Many languish in the revolting conditions of French prisons simply because they have been caught without papers. In 1996 there were 6000 such cases.¹⁵⁷

CIMADE¹⁵⁸ is an organisation financed through donations and receiving some government funding. It has locations at French international airports and employs a team of lawyers specially to help illegal immigrants and unsuccessful applicants for visa renewal or asylum to avoid deportation.

Unlike the situation in Australia and the US, legal defense of immigrants is not yet big business in France. Illegals theoretically have the right to free legal aid, but don't often use this, perhaps because the legal profession tends to be quite conservative on these issues.

In June 1998, the "Chevenement law" on Immigration was passed. This required that a motive be supplied for visa refusals for certain categories of applicants. These

categories were spouses and parents of French citizens, beneficiaries of family reunion, foreigners with working permits, and students in higher education. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2000, this change in the law gave rise to a strong increase in appeals against visa refusals. The number rose from 10 appeals in 1997 to 1000 in 1999.¹⁵⁹

Housing Issues and Immigration: 1974 to the Close of the 20th Century:

Most West European countries relied on cheap imported labor to keep the cost of housing construction down during periods of high output between 1946 and 1973.¹⁶⁰ When the housing boom, like many other industries, did a nose dive in the mid seventies it meant that much immigrant labor became redundant in France. This coincided with the 1974 reduction in worker immigration and a policy of non-renewal of residence and work permits. However these reductions were off-set by policies to secure the situation of entrenched immigrants, both legal and illegal, and there was a rise in family reunions.

As public housing construction slowed from the late 1970s and into the 1980s and as competition for affordable housing again became more acute among the growing lower socio-economic classes, immigrants became more unpopular.

Two Parisian suburbs, the thirteenth *arrondissement* and Belleville, were transformed to accommodate refugees from south-east Asia, both winning the reputation of having become virtual "chinatowns".

De facto quotas for immigrants in public housing were introduced in an effort to avoid ghettoization. Local politicians and companies managing HLMs attempted to control the entry and distribution of prospective immigrant tenants, citing increased risks of racial intolerance and acts of protest.¹⁶¹ The National Front (Front National - FN) became involved in the management of public housing through local elections. In 1997 laws were passed to make the FN's continuing involvement in such affairs very difficult.¹⁶²

A rent strike began in 1975 in two buildings in Saint-Denis then spread rapidly to other buildings in Paris. Culminating in the deportation of 370 foreign residents in 1978, it lasted for about five years.¹⁶³

Why did immigration continue in the form of family reunion and asylum seekers in France after 1974?

The main reasons that immigration continued in France at a rate above zero net was due to European Law regarding family reunion, duties with regard to Asylum laws, and because of Amnesties and regularisations of illegal immigrants. Below I give some details of the legislative history of the management of family reunion and refugee/asylum in order to assist understanding of immigration patterns in France.

History of Family Reunion legislative issues post oil shock:

When France suspended immigration from outside Europe in 1974, the suspension also applied to family reunion. The government's right to do this was, however, soon challenged by, among others, GISTI,¹⁶⁴ with the result that on 29 April 1976 a government decree established family reunion as "a right that could not be opposed by the State."¹⁶⁵ The government then overruled the 1976 decree with another on 10 November 1977, which attempted, once again, to limit family migration to France. But on 6 December 1978, the 1977 decree was annulled by the Council of State (an administrative court),¹⁶⁶ thus reinstating the 1976 decree. The reason the Council of State gave was that international [European] law, which declared family reunion to be a human right, over-rode French law. [See endnote for details].¹⁶⁷ This is an example of the growing importance of European law in determining immigration policies in France.

The legislation which had prevailed (the 1976 decree) was not qualified with conditions or limits, and allowed any foreigner, legally 'permanently' resident in France, to bring his family over. These family members would then also be entitled to all the rights of foreigners who are legally resident, including the right to work.

A way was found around this law through regulations that exploited the shortage of housing by limiting family reunion where there was no "suitable accommodation". The family reunion right was thus administered with the following restriction: the foreign worker must guarantee that his lodgings are suitable for his family. (In compensation for the rent he pays whilst awaiting the arrival of his family, he receives a premium of 1000 francs.)¹⁶⁸

There had been a longstanding requirement that non-EC families must make their application to reside in France from their country of origin, via the ONI. A circular dated 10 June 1981 abolished this requirement. The incidence of persons entering France on a Tourist visa, but with the intention of making the application for residence from within France was then observed to increase, with the result that a growing number of unsuccessful applicants remained illegally in France. So from 4 December

1984 applications for family reunion (from non-EC nationals) were again required to be made from outside France and to be processed via the OMI.

The ONI also had the power to make inspections of the conditions awaiting the prospective family, notably the conditions of housing.¹⁶⁹

In another strategy to monitor family reunion, temporary cards were issued to family members visiting temporary migrants (stamped "member of family") from 1984.¹⁷⁰

At the close of the 20th century there were only five reasons that partners and minor children might be denied a French residents' permit:

1. If joining an illegal or temporary (less than one year) migrant
2. If the person they are joining did not have the [stable and sufficient] means to support their family
3. If housing was inappropriate
4. If the presence of a member or members of the family would present a threat to public order
5. If there was illness or sickness which could place public health, public order, or public safety at risk¹⁷¹

The requirement of suitable housing for family reunion is an important concept for the main argument in this thesis.

Asylum Policy legislative issues:

France is, like Australia, a signatory to the Geneva Convention on Refugees. As economic immigration opportunities were reduced in Europe after 1974, two other legal modes of entry remained more accessible. The first, family reunion, I have just dealt with. The second was via refugee law. As in the case of family reunion, the EEC states have since attempted to restrict the numbers of persons accepted as refugees.¹⁷²

In the 1990s new, short term, asylum policies came to be used much more frequently than the old Geneva Convention ones, which had tended to lead to permanent residence. Two major new asylum laws in France are the 1998 Constitutional Asylum for foreigners fleeing "non-State" persecution, and Territorial Asylum for those whose lives are in danger if they return to their country.¹⁷³

In 1995 the Schengen Convention¹⁷⁴ became effective, permitting free circulation of tourists from selected countries within the seven States of Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Luxemburg, Holland and Portugal. The only requirement is that the traveller have a tourist visa from one of those countries. This convention is designed in part to prevent visitors from utilising tourist visas from each country sequentially, thus potentially staying in the EEC much longer than the usual three months accorded per visa.

Although formal EEC policy¹⁷⁵ was to reduce immigration and asylum numbers, in 1997 a number of other countries, as well as France, had what were intended to be only once off increases, caused by amnesties and regularising of status of illegal immigrants.¹⁷⁶ Most of these regularizations of status were only for one year in France and it remains to be seen what proportion will manage to acquire lengthier status.

Conclusion

This chapter gave a brief outline of the history of immigration in Australia and France and established some important facts and concepts, upon which I will base my argument in the following chapters. The main points are: the presence of a immigrationist populationist manufacturing and housing lobby from the 1890s in Australia and its absence in France. In France the requirement of suitable accommodation for family reunions, a decentralised visa and work permit structure and administration permitting a more or less self-adjusting immigration policy, and the progressive concordance of French and European immigration policy.

PART II - EVIDENCE

Introduction to Part II:

As Chapter one pointed out, differences emerged in the post-war economic policies of France and Australia after the time of the first oil shock. In 1945 both countries started off with economic policies reliant on population growth for manpower and defence reasons, but, after the oil shock of 1973, France appears to have adapted her economic policy to the likelihood of population stabilisation and decline. Australia, however, maintained an economic policy based on continuing population growth. The Australian Government's strategy was in part related to the ideological goal of achieving an ever greater local market.

The major factor creating these differences in projected population outcome was the rate of net immigration. (See Appendix 4, pp.21-33 and p.43.)

In Chapter Six I demonstrated the existence of a property development and building lobby in Australia from early times and gave evidence that the industry perceives abundant focused benefits in immigration and is in fact deeply reliant on immigration.

I also showed that the association between property development and populationism had come about during the gold rush in Australia but that it had been in abeyance from the 1890s depression to the 1930s depression when birth rates and immigration were very low. With the post 1945 wave of immigration and a government that favoured private property development and housing, the speculative industry took off again. In the post Second World War period, whenever there were signs that immigration was going to slow down again, this lobby became very active. In the following chapters I argue that these patterns in Australia were nearly changed at the time of the first oil shock and that Australia might then have begun an era leading to population stabilisation, like France. However, with the assistance of an unforeseeable change of government, the Australian property development and housing populationnist lobby was able to satisfy its demand

for immigrants again. I will also show how different national energy policies made a difference to the shape of housing systems in France and Australia.

Chapters Two and Three described sociological approaches on issues of population and land use planning and identified the value of biodiversity retention as a sociological value. I suggested there that Australia's system of land use planning, which promotes expansion, adversely affects the ability to conserve biodiversity in Australia, where it is a unique asset. The Australian planning system also impacts on more general environmental qualities, such as soil and water availability, resulting in economic disruption - for instance of agriculture and the industries that rely on agriculture. I suggested that France's system of land planning development and housing, to the contrary, discourages further expansion. It has protected agricultural land, but has also resulted in the liberation of land from human settlement and cultivation, potentially for biodiversity. Ironically, biodiversity is traditionally less of a consideration in France, due to long standing species impoverishment there.

In this chapter and the next, using Freeman's theory of focused benefits and focused costs and diffuse benefits and diffuse costs, I give detailed evidence for my explanation of why it is that French and Australian policy makers have taken different paths on immigration policy in the last 25 years.

My explanation begins by relating immigration policy differences to different socio-economic responses to the first oil shock.

My argument is that Australia and France initially responded to the first oil shock-related economic crisis of 1973 with similar Malthusian policies on immigration, energy use, land development planning, and housing policies. That is, they sought to restrain population growth and expansion whilst attempting to ensure adequate domestic supplies of energy, employment, and social security.¹

After an abortive but radical Malthusian detour under the Whitlam Government, Australia took a cornucopian route and France took a Malthusian route. Specifically, after 1975, Australia altered course to an expansionary one in energy use, infrastructure

and population growth. France, however, continued to pursue policies to consolidate energy expenditure and infrastructure and to reduce population growth.

Australia's expansionary policies were accompanied by a supportive politico-economic ideology, which came in with the Fraser Liberal Government that replaced the sacked Whitlam Labor government.

The different outcomes of the different approaches to energy consumption and immigration numbers after 1973 will be illustrated by comparing rates of commercial energy consumption, housing production, and annual population growth in France and Australia.

According to my argument, differences between French and Australian land development planning and housing systems were an important factor in mediating these outcomes. A major related difference was the presence of an immigrationist property development and housing lobby in Australia and the lack of such an immigrationist lobby in France.

I will show how the presence of an immigrationist property development lobby geared to infrastructure (especially housing) expansion in Australia would have run counter to the Malthusian policies that the short-lived Whitlam Government attempted to introduce in Australia. In contrast, the Fraser Government that replaced the Whitlam Government was ideologically growthist and immigrationist² and facilitated population increase and infrastructure expansion. Moreover, none of the governments that followed Fraser's seriously challenged the growthist, immigrationist lobby. The lack of a similar immigrationist lobby in France, however, meant that Malthusian policies to reduce immigration and to consolidate energy expenditure and infrastructure expansion could proceed.

As mentioned at the end of Chapter One, a major assumption of this thesis is that petroleum based energy is fundamental to our modern industrial economy, although our dependency on this varies from country to country. Because of this fundamental dependence it is reasonable to suppose that since the first oil shocks there have been some important social, industrial, political and economic adjustments.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Role of Energy Policy in Producing Economic Expansion or Consolidation

The phenomena of oil shocks and France and Australia's different approaches to oil economics are treated in greater detail in Appendix 3.

Different Economic Approaches

Australia and France had different economic approaches to the problems that arose after the first oil shock. France sought to minimise its dependency on oil for national fuel needs, but sought to maximise the profit it could make from selling oil to other countries. My interpretation, within the conceptual framework of the New Ecological Paradigm, is that that France's was a social reaction to the experience of "cheap" oil becoming unavailable and to the prospect of oil based energy itself (cheap or otherwise) becoming rare at some point in the future. After an initial response that was similar to France's, Australia, to the contrary, borrowed externally and continued policies of expansion and population growth which contributed to high national and per capita energy consumption. Few alternative sources of energy were explored. The concept of limits to growth due to eventual depletion of cheap oil supplies was cast aside from the planning process.

Comparative Oil Economics

Finding and developing oil reserves is high risk and very expensive.

After 1973, often in return for equity, those countries without oil reserves of their own offered finance to those oil bearing countries unable to self-finance exploration of their own reserves. Rich countries like the USA were able to finance their own petroleum exploration and development and a number of Arab countries nationalised their reserves, with varying results. France initially developed oil reserves in her old colonies

and, when these colonies became independent, continued to finance exploration in foreign territories, including Australia.

The 1973 oil shock marks the first major divergence in demographic and economic policies between France and Australia since 1945. It is therefore reasonable to ask what, if anything, did the oil shock have to do with the end of populationist and low skill labour supply policies in France and why, to the contrary, did Australia resume populationist and expansionist policies so quickly after the oil shock?

France's Approach to Oil Economics

At the beginning of the 20th century, French oil economics were strongly modelled by government intervention, which sought to compensate for and cushion French industry from many of the effects of international competition in order to ensure its independence. This style was underpinned by national legislation between 1925 and 1928 to encourage oil exploration. France derived numerous tax benefits from its petrol companies.¹

France's conservative oil policies have been described as "Colbertiste" after Louis XIV's famous Minister for Finance.² Their primary objective was to serve the national goal of economic independence. This was to be achieved by gathering wealth through commerce and conserving and enhancing it. French exports should always outnumber imports.³

The first oil shock caused France to lose control of a number of her Middle Eastern oil companies (including those in Algeria), especially Total SA, to OPEC-led nationalisation of assets.⁴ The remainder of the Total Group explored further afield, finding oil in Indonesia, the North Sea, South East Asia and Columbia.

After the 1973 oil shock, despite the income from these companies and the strong national relationship, France sought to maximise her industry and domestic independence from oil based energy, whilst at the same time maximizing the success of her international oil and gas exploration companies. Between 1976 and 1994 Elf-Aquitaine was a strong public association. In the year 2000 the Belgian-French company, TotalFina, merged with Elf Aquitaine, becoming the fourth-largest oil company in the world. In the year two thousand the company was also completely privatised.⁵

Virtually all sources stress France's desire for energy independence and to decrease her reliance on oil. This seems a little odd when France has accumulated so many oil assets, albeit recently privatised.⁶ In fact there are monetary benefits in this seemingly contradictory strategy, due to the exchange value of US petro-dollars.

Because oil is bought and sold in US dollars, any changes to the value of the dollar will affect purchasers using other currencies. If the dollar has a low value then oil will be comparatively cheap; however, if the value is high, then the cost of oil will be high. With a strong dollar, petroleum exporting countries reap bigger financial profits. Governments of importing countries outside the USA may combat these costs by imposing taxes nationally on petroleum imports. If these taxes are based on percentages of prices then State revenue will increase with dollar value. Nevertheless, the overall cost to the importer and user of petrol will be increased, and therefore also the cost of production. This is another reason it makes sense for the European countries to enhance technological advantage in production in order to maximize GDP dollars per kilogram oil equivalent. It also makes sense for them to reduce local use of oil as a fuel. It is profitable however for the French to invest in overseas oil reserves for export to other countries, because that brings petro-dollars to the French economy.

Perhaps, however, the most important consideration for France is less economic than *defence*.⁷ Such a motive would also explain the similarity of approach in most European states without local oil reserves. Europeans dread having supply cut off by international conflict and it seems very likely that they have evolved economic, supply and infrastructure planning strategies to combat this.⁸ The 1956 closure of the Suez Canal and associated hostilities created a fuel crisis in France as well as fears of nuclear conflict and served to reinforce the politics of energy self-sufficiency, which were to De Gaulle's nationalistic taste anyway.⁹ The 1973 crisis reinforced this process and France has been evolving an increasingly sophisticated energy policy since then.

Australia's Approach to Oil Economics

Australia has explored three main strategies to finance oil exploration. The first one, before the first oil shock, was nationalisation and protectionism with high prices and regulated markets. Another involved attempting to access a huge, unsecured loan. The

third one involved inviting foreign companies to explore for oil in return for royalties and other taxes on the oil they extracted. This one is also known as allowing foreign ownership of assets, or, more vulgarly, "selling off the farm."

Unlike France, Australia is an energy resources rich country with important reserves of oil and other fossil fuels. From 1964 to 1973 domestic crude oil prices in Australia were substantially higher than international prices, which meant that oil extraction in Australia was highly profitable. Furthermore, from around 1965, what was known as the "absorption policy" required Australian refineries to buy all the crude oil produced in Australia. This situation provided strong incentives for oil prospecting. Companies extracting oil in Australia were also, however, prohibited from exporting any of their product, which meant that they could not profit from any international price advantages that occurred from time to time. Naturally the Commonwealth government also taxed crude oil sales.¹⁰

At the time of the first oil shock the Whitlam Government developed a policy to protect and develop energy resources in Australia without selling any equity. A huge unsecured loan was sought to finance massive projects associated with this in December 1974. (This incident will be further discussed later in this chapter). The projects and the method of finance were subsequently judged to be scandalous and grandiose and they contributed to the government's downfall. This method of financing oil exploration in Australia therefore did not go ahead.¹¹

Under the Fraser (from 1975) and successive governments, foreign finance was sought in return for equity. The domestic price did not go up in 1973, when the OPEC-induced rise in international prices occurred. Until 1978 it stayed substantially below international levels. These low prices were used to attract foreign industry and infrastructure development to Australia. In 1988 the market was entirely deregulated and government sought to derive income from Australia's oil reserves through a variety of new taxes.¹²

Making money out of oil is not just a matter of selling barrels. Oil explorers must purchase licences, stake claims, pay forms of rent and surrender a proportion of their product as well as a proportion of their profits in many cases. Barrels may be taxed as

they come out of the ground, and as they cross internal and national borders, and royalties and various other levies exist in many forms.¹³

Non oil-producing States may also profit from taxes at many levels. Retailing of petrol to the general public and commercial enterprises is further taxed: In France and Italy up to around 80% of petrol bowser prices are government taxes. Taxes are also applied when bulk oil is brought into countries.¹⁴ All monies derived from oil are affected by international pricing and the value of the dollar.

International statistical comparisons lead to a conclusion that the ESSS with local oil reserves have tended to be less careful of energy and of their energy reserves and to practise less long term conservative economic policies than the European states without local oil reserves.¹⁵ Taxing policies on domestic consumption are also revealing. They tend to be much higher in Europe and much lower in the ESSS and other states that have local oil reserves.¹⁶

For more detail and for graphs of oil taxes in different countries see my expanded version of this part in Appendix 3, p.8.

It seems likely that it was these different systems of dealing with the changes in international petroleum economics that resulted in domestic policies to conserve or not to conserve energy in France and Australia respectively. In turn, the decision to conserve energy led to policies to rein in population growth and infrastructure expansion. Such a conservationist policy was initiated under the Whitlam government but, according to my argument, this policy would have encountered the resistance of the property development and big market lobbies in Australia, which would have supported the overturning of the Whitlam Government. In France, however, no such lobbies existed, so the French oil economics policy which favoured maximising export of energy and minimising domestic energy use and which affected infrastructure, housing and immigration policies by discouraging growth in these was able to be implemented.

Social Impacts

The different economic strategies above had different social policy impacts. The Malthusian strategy was protectionist,¹⁷ conservative of energy, and oriented to

maintaining basic conditions for the employed and providing generous assistance to the unemployed. Immigration was drastically cut. Government policy, inflation and increases in energy and materials costs encouraged technological efficiency and penalised high consumption. This policy was prevalent in France and the rest of continental Europe and affected the nature and production of the residential construction industry there.

The other strategy had the social policy impact of providing the minimum of comfort to the unemployed and the bankrupt with the idea that the economy and the population would adapt more quickly and more realistically to the new situation and work harder and produce more for less. Policies encouraging technological improvement and energy conservation tended to lose priority or to be exploited for profit rather than for energy conservation. Cutting back on human resources was preferred to cutting down production, or money to expand production was obtained through borrowing. The market was prioritised over social welfare traditions and a philosophy of survival of the fittest developed. This kind of policy became prevalent in the English speaking settler societies, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Britain also tended more towards these policies, which epitomised the Thatcher government (1979-1990).

Using the New Ecological Paradigm, these kinds of policies can be interpreted sociologically as different methods of wealth redistribution¹⁸ in a world economy where available wealth had suddenly diminished. The first prioritises equity and the second allows market values to prevail despite widening social divisions based on wealth and access to power.

Reasons for Connections made to Housing and Demographics

What was the impact of France's conservative energy policies since 1973 and Australia's growthist ones via connections between population growth and infrastructure expansion - mainly housing? To continue on the New Ecological Paradigm analysis of these events, in addition to the overt social policy development described above, changes in materials supplies ultimately affected these societies demographically and in terms of infrastructure expansion.

The connection here is this: Housing is particularly susceptible to changes in materials and energy prices and demand for housing is affected by economic and demographic growth contraction. It seems likely that where material and financial constraints operate on housing production, constraints to population growth and to household formation will also be experienced.¹⁹

Where there is economic contraction, and finance for public and private sector housing depends importantly on public subsidies, then unless the government is prepared to borrow to finance expansion, there will be very little expansion. I will argue that this is France's case since 1973.

In countries where a highly profitable property development and residential construction industry dominates, individual firms may be more inclined than taxpayer funded government housing to access international loans, in order to finance continuing expansion.²⁰ (A deregulated financial environment will assist this tendency.) Sales will depend on demand. I will argue that this is the case for Australia.

Because immigrants and native born all require housing, housing demand is particularly sensitive to population growth and household formation. By the same token housing shortages make it difficult to form new households and make founding a new family or reuniting a family from overseas difficult. Similarly where population growth contracts, housing production will contract, due to reduction in demand.

The sensitivity of the housing industry and housing production to changes in demographic growth rates as well as to economic and energy supply changes provides useful data for analysis. In France, on the one hand we see a reduction in demand and, on the other hand, we see the industry responding to energy costs by increasing energy efficiency and restructuring. My conclusion is that the French economic and political system was more sensitised than Australia's to variations in the cost of housing as related to changes in population growth and energy prices. The reasons for this conclusion will be developed further in this thesis.

The Role of Land Production, the Housing Construction Industry, and Public Housing in Immigration Policy

Land Ownership and Development: France

The rebuilding of Europe, and of France, after the second world war was considered and carefully planned on a national basis.²¹ Little was left to the *ad hoc* activities of local governments. Public transport was planned for as an integral part of land development planning. Public funding did not only depend on income tax; a substantial proportion was linked to payroll related taxes and employers had certain tax responsibilities to assist in funding infrastructure for employees and townships where they operated.²² So a number of costs seem to have been formally associated with development, housing and population growth.

Land production is the process by which land is acquired and developed. It makes a difference if the land that is developed and built on is privately or State owned. In France before the first world war and after the second world war, especially from 1953, the State compulsorily purchased urban land and then went ahead and developed it.²³ It then usually resold the land to builders. In the same way that Australian governments may compulsorily acquire land for the purposes of building airports or roads, in France the State still compulsorily acquires land for public housing purposes where it deems that this is necessary. If the prices asked by the owners are too high, there is a system whereby a price is awarded according to an objective valuation of the property. Land taxes may also be charged on unearned increases in land value. In France rural land is also tightly controlled by law and may only be resold for agricultural purposes. It is practically impossible to rezone it for housing or other uses.²⁴

Land Ownership and Development: Australia:

The situation is different in Australia (which resembles the United States, Canada and New Zealand). In Australia the industry that purchases and develops land is also usually different from the one that builds the dwellings on it, but usually both are non-

government. In Australia most urban land is privately owned and developed.²⁵ However the total cost for development is never entirely borne by developers - State and local governments assume nearly all responsibility for the provision of schools, most roads, hospitals, and associated infrastructure and services.²⁶ Australian State governments and politicians, with rare exceptions, tend to voice the belief that any population growth will ultimately produce economic growth of some kind.²⁷ Local governments hope to rationalise costs through economies of scale financed by more rate payers.²⁸ None of this development seems to be publicly admitted as a net cost, except by those who resent increasing density. Such critics associate increasing density with the erosion of value, both monetary and spiritual, due to loss of positional advantages, such as views. They are alarmed at the loss of natural amenities, like adjacent forests and undeveloped coastal areas, and they deplore the degradation and depletion of farmland and its alienation due to the imposition of urban rates. Such views, however, find few official echoes.

In Australia land speculating companies buy large pieces of undeveloped land at low prices in areas where they anticipate that population growth will occur later. Much of this land is rural. There is little protection for rural land in Australia and it is easy to rezone. In Queensland, particularly, which is the major frontier of development at the moment,²⁹ farmers and other landowners may legally sue for compensation if their ability to clear land in order to attract a potentially high development price is frustrated by local councils.³⁰ Councils cannot afford to sustain such legal challenges. The development of land also attracts population growth.

When the population grows and roads and other infrastructure start to multiply around these areas, the developers divide these pieces of land into smaller pieces and then into single blocks, having provided them with basic infrastructure like water and electricity. They then offer these portions to building companies that construct dwellings. In Australia these building companies are among the smallest in the developed world, dwarfed by the land purchase and development companies.³¹ These speculative developers choose their moment to release the land to builders and they try to wait until population pressure due to growth has created a high demand for housing.³² Under these optimum conditions they then sell the land for as high a price as they can get from the builders. The little housing construction companies are obliged to wait until the land

developers choose to release the land and they do not usually have many capital assets behind them. They generally borrow quite heavily from banks and other lending sources in order to buy these bits of land. They too depend on population pressure to raise demand and prices, for the more finance they borrow the less time they can afford to wait to sell the houses, since the amount of interest they pay is affected by the time they take to pay.

Home-building companies usually operate on a very slim profit margin.³³ Their profits depend on the cost of the land they buy, the cost of construction, the price they can sell the house for, the amount of interest they must pay and the length of time they borrow for. The Australian system of private land ownership and development has resulted in unusually high prices for urban land.³⁴ It has also kept the building industry poor and dependent on the private land development industry.³⁵

If we compare the development planning approach and the statutory or land-use planning approach, the literature suggests that the main way to avoid the land speculation that fuels rising land costs, apart from stabilising and reducing population and thereby reducing demand, is for a government to purchase land at low prices and to resell it to builders for low prices.³⁶

In Australia the Chifley government had taken this direction after the second world war, in purchasing land and building public housing. However from 1950 the Menzies government began to withdraw support from the public housing program, giving private developers and builders almost exclusive domain over housing and land supply throughout Australia. In 1972 the Whitlam Government attempted to subsidise the States to purchase large quantities of land for low-price resale to builders, and succeeded in South Australia and some other territories and States to a limited degree.³⁷ However Whitlam's government was sacked in 1975 and these innovations were some of the first measures the succeeding Fraser Government got rid of.³⁸

Public Housing:

Most housing in France is either public housing or at least publicly subsidised.³⁹ This presents a major contrast to most housing in Australia (and the United States, New

Zealand and Canada), where the private market dominates almost but not quite to the point of exclusivity. Thus in France the role of government and public revenue in providing housing is significant, and the role of public housing is especially important for people of lower socio-economic status - a group which includes the traditional migrant.

Much public housing in France is rental and, although the rate of home ownership is rising, the public do not expect to own their own dwellings as a matter of right or tradition.

In France housing policy is made both nationally and at the local Government level. Moreover, at the local level, managers of public housing bodies are elected.⁴⁰ It has therefore been possible for political parties to have their members elected as officers to such public housing bodies and thus to play influential roles in local politics. This situation has permitted the development of one of the spearheads of anti-immigration policy and practice by the National Front (FN), which aimed at winning management of public housing estates known as HLMs⁴¹ and prioritising access to them to the French born.⁴² In Australia, funding for public housing is federal, but since 1956 it has contributed to an ever smaller proportion of total housing. Most housing is privately funded through private mortgages with no mortgage guarantee or tax deductibility.⁴³ State governments, not local governments, are responsible for urban planning, and public housing and management is conducted by unelected bureaucrats. There is no platform for popular activism similar to that provided by the elected public housing bodies in France.

In France there are two special taxes which also constitute a major structural difference between France on the one hand and Australia (and the US, Canada and New Zealand) on the other. They are known respectively as the "1%" and the "0.2 per cent" taxes. These two taxes are levied on employers specifically for the provision of public housing. From 1953 public rental housing taxes of 1% of total salaries and then from 1978, 0.9% have been levied on non-agricultural companies with more than ten employees. In 1975 a 0.2% portion of the original 1% was allocated specifically to housing for immigrants. This portion was reduced to 0.1% when the first tax was reduced to 0.9% in 1978.⁴⁴ Some consequences of this taxation system are that

employers are aware of housing as a cost to themselves and they are aware of immigrants specifically as a component of this cost. These employer public housing taxes are rights the wage earning public has acquired from employers in the post war "dirigiste" or semi-nationalised French State. Diversion of a portion of these funds to immigrant housing represents a structural erosion of these rights.⁴⁵ The taxes are well known to the French public. The situation has been exploited by the National Front, which has included in its electoral platform the proposition that the 1% (now 0.9%) be raised back to 1% for the exclusive benefit of French families.⁴⁶ No similar situation where some housing costs are footed by employers via taxes exists in Australia (or the US, Canada and New Zealand, that I am aware of).

The Role of Property Development and Housing in Immigration Policy

In Australia the property development industry and housing industry are major lobbyists for immigration-accelerated population growth. In France this is not the case. This difference is crucial for my hypothesis suggesting why France was able to drastically reduce non-EEC immigration on an indefinite basis from 1974, but Australia was not. There was no focused pressure from within France to perpetuate high immigration or indeed high population growth of any kind. And there appears to have been a collection of focused pressure points which discouraged immigration. Costs either were more focused or at least appeared to be. In Australia the reverse seems to have been true.

In France, the activities of the private housing development industry are circumscribed due to public development planning and the private housing industry caters mainly to people who are reasonably well off and well established. Therefore the private housing industry in that country would not appear to depend on the few traditional "worker" immigrants who continue to arrive, nor upon the larger stream of families of established "worker" immigrants who are generally of very humble means. This would explain why the industry did not lobby for "worker immigration" after 1974.⁴⁷ The public housing industry did not lobby for it either, since it was government financed and all such housing was perceived to be a cost rather than an opportunity for profit. French housing policy was pronatalist up to the early 1970s⁴⁸ in favouring the poorest families

with the most children, but companies providing housing (publicly funded and other) seem not to have lobbied for population growth of any kind, before or after 1975, and appear to have been particularly sluggish in providing housing for immigrants. This was despite the fact that the need for immigrant housing seems constantly to have been at crisis level both before and after 1975.

This situation represents a crucial difference between France (and Europe) and Australia (and the US, Canada and New Zealand). In Australia the private development and housing industries have flourished in the virtual absence of public housing competition and any growth in population represents an opportunity to make a profit. These industries have become enthusiastic promoters and lobbyists for high immigration and could be described as dependent on immigration-accelerated population growth. Although the Australian immigration system drives private home-buying prices up, and therefore represents a cost to the Australian population, this cost has no observable direct relationship with government spending on infrastructure or on taxes levied on the people. Because of this there seems to be no strong national perception that population growth is costly - except environmentally and ecologically (especially as concerns native biodiversity.) This latter perception is quite widely held amongst some politicians, ecological scientists and those who read their work. However this environmental view seems not to be popular within the financial and business community and would not appear to have mobilised widespread opposition to immigration among the general public. The environmental costs of population growth seem to be a diffuse cost in Australia.

But in France, due to the prominent role of public housing and public subsidies for purchasing houses in all sectors, perceptions of the cost of providing housing for a growing population (whether fuelled by immigration or natural increase) seem to have been a major factor in the minds of Government.⁴⁹

For instance, André Postel-Vinay, the Minister responsible for ceasing non-EEC worker immigration to France in 1974, had for years previously been in charge of an organisation that funded immigrant housing.⁵⁰ His 1974 "Immigration Policy" paper went into great detail about the cost of providing the necessary housing for the French

and for immigrants, with recommendations as to how to fund this through taxing employers.⁵¹

At government level immigration was seen to add to the cost of housing and this perception appears to have been reinforced by one among the general public that public housing was scarce and that immigration intensified this scarcity.⁵² Thus groups among the public — especially those of lower socio-economic status — seem to have come to associate immigrants with competition for the scarce resource of public housing. This perception seems to have made them resentful of any rises in immigration and was, as I have already mentioned, exploited by the National Front at the level of elected management of public housing (HLMs). The situation also seems to have been exploited by the Left, who may have seen the violence and degradation of the *bidonvilles* as a way to shame the government. Although, as discussed in Chapter Six, there may have been other motives for Algeria's decision to stop emigration to France in 1973, the explicit grounds were violence and racialism towards Algerians. So immigrant housing seems to have become a political flashpoint by 1968 and, by 1974, the political and financial costs seem clearly to have outweighed the benefits,⁵³ in the eyes of the government, the lower socio-economic sector that wanted priority in housing, and the government of Algeria.

The left were not actually anti-immigrant⁵⁴ but their drawing attention to the plight of immigrants may have increased the political costliness of the immigrants. The left were calling for more housing for immigrants and that was a financially costly project, as well as being difficult to achieve logistically since most councils seem not to have wanted to take on immigrant housing. Apparently immigrants had become concentrated in Communist local government areas and the Communist mayors were asking for greater distribution of immigrants to other neighbourhoods.⁵⁵ When the oil crunch came it seems that immigrant housing was also a good place to cut expenses, despite Postel-Vinay's good intentions.

It is also important to realise that non-naturalised immigrants from outside the EEC may not vote in local elections in France, so in this sense they would have been political dead-weights to the local governments that attempted to house them. There is some evidence that attempts were made to induce inhabitants of *bidonvilles* to apply for

citizenship in return for housing, but that many were reluctant to apply.⁵⁶ In the State of Victoria, in Australia, since 1974, it has been possible for landholders who are not citizens to vote in local elections.⁵⁷

Immigrant housing in France continues to be associated with violence and conflict so local councils and housing bodies avoid allowing it to be built or allocated in their areas. Immigrants thus form a large part of those living in substandard housing.⁵⁸ This must make it difficult for them to meet the requirements of suitable accommodation (see below) for organising family reunion, and thus would form a barrier to chain migration.

In Australia the situation was, once again, quite different. In the 1950s and 1960s immigrants were a long way down the public housing queue and most relied on the private market, both rental and purchase, as did increasingly the ordinary Australian. Immigrants are, in fact, relatively close to the national average in private purchase. Even directly after the war when there was a more comprehensive public housing program in place, it seems that the government avoided placing immigrants in competition for housing with the locally born population. It has been suggested that a way in which they avoided this was through the creation of "work camps" which provided very basic temporary accommodation specifically for immigrant workers and their families.⁵⁹ In France such a strategy seems to have been ruled out due to identification of work camps with Nazi concentration camps and camps in France that had abused refugees.⁶⁰ Instead they looked the other way and allowed *bidonvilles* to proliferate. The post 1945 French government was a pronatalist one committed to prioritising public housing for the poorest French families with the greatest number of children. With a sluggish housing industry and with the additional problem of clearing bomb damage and reconstructing damaged sites to deal with, the government appears to have left immigrants almost entirely to fend for themselves as far as housing was concerned for much of the period between 1945 and 1974. Much of the urban French population was also living in slums due to the chronic housing shortage which the war had exacerbated, but the immigrants lived in the worst conditions of all.

These practical obstacles notwithstanding, there was, from 1946, a requirement of "suitable accommodation" before immigrant family reunion could legally⁶¹ or practically be satisfied. According to French immigration historians, in the absence of

suitable accommodation, the reunion of families which the populationist demographers on De Gaulle's population planning committee had hoped for, was delayed and staggered due to the housing situation. Largely because of this immigrants during the early post war years tended to be short-staying single, male workers and many commuted periodically between their home countries and France.⁶² Nevertheless an immigrant population with a substantial family component built up in the slums that became known as *bidonvilles*. The codified requirement of suitable accommodation⁶³ was used to counter family reunion especially after 1974, when the policy of zero net immigration meant that almost all worker immigration from outside the European Economic Community was ceased indefinitely.⁶⁴ Between 1974 and 1977 there were attempts to arrest family reunion outright as well, which were overturned according to European law. European law makes family reunion a right.⁶⁵ This right could however be controlled by recourse to the suitable accommodation requirement and the OMI had the right to physical inspection.⁶⁶ As recent articles by immigrant aid organisation, GISTI, indicate, this requirement remains a persistent obstacle to family reunion.⁶⁷ In Australia, to my knowledge, accommodation has never been used as a major argument to deny entry.⁶⁸ Family reunion in Australia is not a legal right in the codified sense that exists in France and European law, although tradition has created strong legal precedents, and so it is legally easier to refuse immigrants simply by imposing categories and numerical limits.

Relationships Between Energy, Economy, Housing and Immigration Post 1974 in France and Australia

Importation of Construction Industry Workers : France and Australia

The provision of housing is the domain of the building industry. There are important differences between the building industries in France and Australia. In Australia the industry has a high reliance on *skilled* immigrant labor. This seems not to be the case in France. In France the industry is strongly associated with the employment of *illegal* and *unskilled* labor,⁶⁹ but legitimate needs for skilled labor seem generally to be considered to be quite adequately met from the resident French workforce or the EEC, with some difficulties in exceptional circumstances or where rare and disappearing trades are

required.⁷⁰ In fact industry reluctance to take trainees of apparently foreign stock has become the subject of a French government campaign against discrimination.⁷¹

An efficient, skilled labor force is a basic condition for keeping housing costs down, E. Jay Howenstein argues as he describes measures taken in Europe to reduce housing costs.⁷² He also suggests that the focus of the Fifth Plan in France (1976-1980) on the value of manual labor was an attempt to address the issue of inefficient use of immigrant labor in the housing construction industries. Seventy apprenticeship centers for workers in the housing industry were established in 1980. Cooperative training programs involving government, contractors and trade unions were instituted and have become commonplace.⁷³

In Australia, the reason given for the reliance of employers on imported skilled labor is that employers and the State combine to offer very few apprenticeships, apparently preferring the cheaper option of imported fully trained skilled labor. This is a very long standing practice.⁷⁴ The low profit margin and the boom and bust cycle that characterises the Australian building industry to this day has apparently also meant that the industry has been able to invest little in training and this is likely to have reinforced the need for immigrants, since work available depends on the boom and bust cycle as well. The effect of this is that building workers have tended to seek other kinds of employment and become unavailable to the industry.⁷⁵

The Boom and Bust Character of the Australian Housing Industry Contrasted with France's and the importation of skilled and unskilled labour

The Australian building industry's importation of skilled labour is significant for the arguments advanced in this thesis because the practice of relying on importing skilled tradespersons whenever a building boom was underway, rather than investing in a stable, educated and sophisticated pool of local skilled labour, would have contributed to the industry being poorly equipped to reorganise and modernise.

In France, as we have seen, the industry was never reliant on the boom and bust of immigration induced population growth. However, up until 1974, it had been able to rely on quite a steady demand for housing in all sectors, and this had been buoyed up by the State through a range of low interest loans and subsidies for a variety of housing options, including renovations, rentals and middle class home purchase. Immediately after the war public housing had been a strong middle class option, but as the economy and housing availability improved for the French, the upwardly mobile began to seek alternatives. This increased opportunities for the building industry to cater for a growing private sector.⁷⁶

Through the late 1960s to the early 1970s, household formation accelerated in France.⁷⁷ This was to do with the increasing independence of young adults from families, higher incomes, high immigration and the recent baby-boom. However after 1973 the rate of new household formation dropped. In France 1974 and 1975 had the lowest total population growth (natural increase and net immigration combined) since the second world war. Similar demographic situations prevailed throughout Western Europe. The absence of interventionist populationist policies, either pronatalist or immigrationist, proved enduring and indicates a massive revision of the growthist post war population policy.⁷⁸ In the long term this revision seems to have amounted to a demographic policy to stabilise population growth and it also had the impact of reducing rate of growth in national energy consumption. Today Western Europe has a substantially slower rate of household formation than Australia.⁷⁹

Reaction to the First Oil Shock in France

Following the first oil-shock in 1973, the French building industry adapted to the slowing pace of local demand, rather than trying to artificially generate it. Specialist literature indicates that residential construction costs were cut down through organisational restructuring and technological change. This led to a greater need of skilled workers but left more money to finance research and training. These structural and organisational changes to the French (and other western European) building methods and practices are important differences between Australia and France.

In France the housing industry adapted by greater energy efficiency of housing design, by refurbishing old buildings and, most of all, by adapting to customer demand and factory construction with major pre-payments, rather than borrowing to build speculative estates. The Government also reduced its annual commitments to public housing construction. Inflation, which affected the public's ability to purchase houses, caused many in the building industry to go broke.⁸⁰

In contrast, Australia's development and housing policies changed very little. Developers in Australia merely slowed their release of land until population growth picked up again. They continued to promote the fragmentation of the building industry by inviting numerous builders to compete with each other on the building estates. This practice presents a severe limitation to the ability of the building industry to fund, and organise to implement, more industrialised and educated production and design techniques.⁸¹

Combined with different demographic, economic and energy consumption policies in France and Australia, my argument is that these different characteristics of the building industries in the respective countries would have either assisted adaptation to slower population growth or have given rise to renewed lobbying for immigration.⁸² Here I will briefly establish what I think may have happened.

During the first oil shock⁸³ there was a concerted organised political will and plan for Australia to restrain population growth and to better plan and manage land development and housing. This would have brought Australian policy more in line with policies in France (and Europe) at that time. Whereas these demographic and planning policies were enduring in France, they did not survive the Australian system of focused costs and benefits attached to population growth, because the latter system highlighted the benefits from growth. This conclusion is suggested by differences in outcome in population growth and housing production. The building industry in France adapted to decreasing household formation, but the Australian industry avoided this and continued to use old fashioned methods of housing production and to rely on high population growth.

The Western European reaction to the 1973-74 oil shock was in many ways very different and more sustained than Australia's or the United States'. This was particularly so for developed European economies which had no local oil of their own, like France.⁸⁴ Historical consumption figures for oil and other documents indicate that France aimed for energy self-sufficiency and to accumulate oil assets, as well as to develop nuclear energy and cut down on energy use overall through better technology and innovation.⁸⁵ Although France lost a lot of her petrol concessions when Algeria nationalised them, French companies successfully accumulated new ones. The strategy was to sell petrol to other countries, thus gaining petro-dollars, whilst minimising domestic use.⁸⁶

As we know, in the European Economic Community the economic crisis occasioned a policy of total suspension of worker immigration from outside Europe,⁸⁷ led by Switzerland and Germany in 1973. France, then Belgium, followed in 1974.⁸⁸

Why did France Drastically Reduce Immigration in 1974?

In Chapter Four, I reviewed a number of explanations advanced for this drastic change to France's immigration policy.⁸⁹ Although my thesis is largely about how France was *able* to decrease immigration, whereas Australia was *not able to*, there is still a need to establish motives for wishing to do so in the first place.

My explanation for the reduction in immigration to France in 1974 is that it was motivated more by national economic planning and elite economic interests⁹⁰ than by democratically expressed⁹¹ resentment or racism.⁹² National security with relation to commercial energy resources must also have been a motive for prioritising energy self-sufficiency. Colbertiste tradition and post-war experience, notably of the Suez Canal crisis, reinforced such preoccupations.⁹³

The EEC context of the reduction should also not be overlooked; France was following Swiss and German policy as did Belgium and other EEC states, including the Netherlands and Norway. It would have been very difficult for any of the EEC states to have acted alone, since they shared borders and increasingly identified as an

economic community. The motives of the other States in the EEC were probably similar to France's with regard to the importance of commercial energy resources for national security, given that most pursued similar conservationist policies.

There were short and long-term economic reasons for the decision by France to reduce immigration. The short term ones were the immediate recession and the contraction of the labor market as a result of high fuel prices and inflation. The long-term reasons were almost certainly predicated on the idea that reliance predominantly on petroleum based fuels could not go on, and that quite drastic social and industrial changes for the long-term were necessary.

The long-term orientation of French energy policy post 1974 is indicated by its inclusion at the level of the "five year plans"⁹⁴ and the persistence of strategies to maximise energy self-sufficiency. These policies and strategies were based on a perception that, if the world was not actually running out of oil in 1974, it would sooner or later run out of *cheap* oil, or supply would be interrupted by war, and it was best to be prepared.⁹⁵

The decision to reduce immigration from the third world reflected, in the short term, immediate changes in labor market demand, due to company failures and organisational rationalisations. In the long term it reflected planning for revolutionary changes in labor deployment and location, (to overseas, for instance) the nature of French industries, and the French economy.

France had emerged from the Second World War as a colonial power with a number of important oil possessions. By the time of the oil shock, France no longer had colonies and had lost many major oil possessions, notably in Algeria. Due to her colonial past and proximity to North Africa, France was very aware of the demographic, economic, cultural and security problems of the third world, especially the Moslem world (which contains the majority of oil possessions.) With the rise of OPEC, the independence of numerous colonies, and the nationalisation by OPEC countries of oil assets, world politics and economics between the first and the third world had changed for the long term as well.

Due to the change in world political economy, France, once apparently so generous with employment for all comers, now stepped back from the world to look after herself. French social welfare philosophy, based on the rights of the citizen,⁹⁶ prioritised employment for the French. Stopping immigration can be seen as a Malthusian solution to prospective long-term high unemployment. And it was a Malthusian reaction to the perception that the overpopulated, underdeveloped third world was pressing in on the First world. Arguably it was also a Malthusian reaction to the reduction in cheaply available energy with which to supply the economy; by seeking national efficiency over growth in local economic activity and infrastructure, France was adapting to restrictions on growth, rather than seeking to overcome them by borrowing overseas, for instance.

France was not alone in the EEC with these Malthusian demographic and energy strategies. It did distinguish itself, however, by its development of nuclear power for export and its pursuit of overseas oil in new territories,⁹⁷ which strategies could both be described as Colbertiste.

In fact, the rationale which accompanied the ministerial recommendation to reduce immigration to France was clearly based on the perception that economic hardship would be long lasting, blow out of population in the Third World would be inevitable, and that France could not save the world's poor by taking them all in.

André Postel-Vinay was the Minister responsible for immigration at the time. He had also previously been the main person responsible for administering foreign aid funds⁹⁸ for 27 years and was well aware of the burgeoning populations and economic and political problems in the third world. As well as this familiarity with external events, from 1963 to 1974 he had overseen the administration of an organisation for immigrant housing in France. His knowledge of the situation which had created the *bidonvilles* was extensive. His "Immigration Policy" recommendations were copiously studded with statistics about the gravity of immigrant housing problems. Whilst urging diversion of funding to improve housing for those immigrants already in France, he also advocated publicising the appalling housing situation and poor economic outlook overseas to the traditional sending countries in order to discourage both prospective immigrant workers and their families.⁹⁹

Postel-Vinay said that three factors made ceasing immigration a preventative necessity: the doubling of third world population by late in the 20th Century; the likelihood of profound and lengthy economic crisis; and the problem of the public housing shortage for both French and foreigners.¹⁰⁰

“The doubling of third world population that we are led to expect by the end of the century, gives rise, in my opinion, to considerable danger. [...] Unless development skills and technology were to improve at an astonishing rate, unless the spirit of human solidarity were to spread in a quite novel way, the proliferation of the human species will increase poverty and malnourishment over vast territories...

To reject, on principle, the idea of stopping or limiting the entry of new immigrants, would mean that we must allow immigration to increase, even if it adds to unemployment and the peopling of slums. This is indefensible. [...] I am aware of the shocking character of any kind of interruption to or limitation of arrivals, the inhumane quality of sending people back to poverty; but that poverty, alas, is likely to constantly increase and to reach geographical regions ever further away: we cannot take in an unlimited amount. We would perish without relieving it.” (André Postel-Vinay in an interview with *Le Monde*, 29/9/74, translated by myself.)¹⁰¹

This was to become long-term policy in France and the EEC.

Weil theorised that shifts in French power-elites' bipartisan positions were based on fundamental economic changes, rather than on democratically expressed resentment of immigrants. (Money maintained the latter.)¹⁰² Weil's theory finds support in contemporary documents and interviews with Postel-Vinay in France and I found corroboration of these in opinions later expressed by Postel-Vinay to myself.¹⁰³ Postel-Vinay said that the situation with immigrants was reaching crisis proportions of homelessness and unemployment. I asked him if anything in particular had influenced him to believe that the oil shock related recession would be especially long and serious. He replied that he had been particularly influenced by the head of the CNPF

(Confederation nationale du patronat français)¹⁰⁴ at the time who had told Postel-Vinay that the recession was likely to be long and hard, with materials shortages, and that, since industry would be unable to employ immigrants it would be advisable to stop immigration.¹⁰⁵ Postel-Vinay then recommended the reduction in immigration. He also gave me a copy of the original document, "Immigration Policy" which alluded to advice from the CNPF.¹⁰⁶ See Appendix 6, "Copies of Original Documents from André Postel-Vinay.

Was ceasing immigration a logical economic decision arrived at independently by Germany, France and Belgium?¹⁰⁷ André Postel-Vinay told me that it had been his own idea to suggest it, but that persuading the government was helped considerably by the fact that Germany had already made the decision.

What is frequently not realised is that Australia temporarily developed very similar policies to France's. Since my argument is that Australia *was not able* to reduce immigration over the long-term, it is necessary to establish, first, that the will was there to do so. Secondly, I need to show that some greater force overrode this will.

Initial Reaction in Australia to the First Oil-Shock

The will was at the level of party politics and at a popular level as well.¹⁰⁸

ALP policy was heading towards one of population stabilisation before the Whitlam government was elected.¹⁰⁹ The strategy of reducing immigration in order to alleviate the pressure of population growth in the cities was debated and adopted at the ALP's June 1971 policy conference in Launceston.¹¹⁰ On 13 October 1972, Tom Uren, who was to become the Minister for urban and regional development, referred to the role of immigration in affecting urban population pressures.¹¹¹ In a policy speech opening the 1973 election campaign Whitlam also referred to the changes to immigration policy.

Contrary to suggestions that ALP policy to reduce immigration was not in response to international economic considerations,¹¹² I would argue that the beginnings of the oil-shock¹¹³ may be dated to well before the time of the ALP conference in Launceston, in mid 1970.¹¹⁴ In fact, the evidence suggests that ALP energy policy was formed as the situation that culminated in what is known as the 1973 oil-shock evolved.¹¹⁵ This was

due mainly to the influence on ALP energy policy of the extraordinary Rex Connor, who was to become Whitlam's minister for Minerals and Energy. Connor was unusually attuned to global and local mining and energy economics and is said to have anticipated the oil-shock.¹¹⁶ In fact Connor claimed this feat himself on behalf of the ALP:

The national policy on minerals and energy approved at the 1971 Launceston Conference of our party has proved to be not only singularly relevant but even historically visionary in the light of subsequent events. We anticipated the world energy crisis (1973), have dealt with international currency turmoil, established a sound export pricing policy, checked the inroads into Australia of the multinational corporations, and secured the respect and understanding of our trading partners.¹¹⁷

There was to follow an extraordinary sequence of events, as the Whitlam Labor Government emerged gloriously from many years in the wilderness only to sink, almost without a trace, like the lost city of Atlantis, along with all its brilliant policies and plans, in a series of devastating international and national events.

On 7 December 1971 Whitlam moved to recommence suspended debate on the need for Australia to establish sovereign control over the mineral resources of the sea bed off the Australian coast.¹¹⁸ In December 1972 the Whitlam Labor government took office.¹¹⁹ In May 1973 Cabinet authorised Rex Connor to confer with State Mines Ministers on the construction and operation of a national pipeline system.¹²⁰

The Australian government seemed to be boldly seizing the initiative to defend Australia's energy resources against a background of worsening international events. Across the sea other old colonies rose up and nationalised their oil reserves.¹²¹ In September 1973 Algeria suspended immigration to France. In October OPEC oil ministers used oil as a weapon in the Arab-Israeli war and Saudi Arabia, Libya and other Arab states announced an embargo on oil exports to the United States and the Netherlands. In November the Arab oil-producing states proclaimed a 25 % cut in oil production, and threatened worse; Germany officially suspended immigration from outside the European Economic Community (EEC)¹²² and President Nixon signed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA). In February 1974 Libya nationalised

three US oil companies and Nixon and Kissinger announced a seven point plan to make the US energy independent. In June the IMF created a special fund to lend money to nations that had become indebted due to the high oil prices. In July France suspended immigration from outside the EEC.¹²³ In Australia the government implemented progressive reduction of the new settler program between December 1972 and late 1975, from 140,000 to 50,000.¹²⁴

On December 13, 1974 the executive council of the Commonwealth of Australia, made up of Prime Minister Whitlam, Attorney-General Murphy, Treasurer Cairns, and the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor,¹²⁵ met to seek four billion US dollars to finance national energy self sufficiency and to fund unemployment reduction.¹²⁶ For this they sought \$US 4,000,000,000 (four billion US dollars). The minute of the meeting stated,

"The Australian government needs immediate access to substantial sums of non-equity capital from abroad for temporary purposes, amongst other things *to deal with exigencies arising out of the current world situation and the international energy crisis*, to strengthen Australia's external financial position, to provide immediate protection for Australia in regard to supplies of minerals and energy and *to deal with current and immediately foreseeable unemployment in Australia.*"¹²⁷ (My emphasis)

At this point Australia was momentarily poised on a similar policy path of self-sufficiency to France and the EEC's. But this was not to be. The Whitlam Government was brought to an abrupt and ignominious end by the associated Khemlani loan scandal.¹²⁸

On 16 October 1975 Governor General Kerr dismissed Whitlam from office.¹²⁹

The Khemlani loan objectives (stated in the above minute) had not been conceived overnight. The kind of loan was itself a method of avoiding surrendering ownership of Australian oil assets to foreign oil companies and the objectives it sought to finance were ideologically based on the premise that population and energy consumption stabilisation, plus national self-sufficiency were the way to go for the long term

future.¹³⁰ (Would national exploitation of petroleum and gas reserves have assisted paying back such a this loan?)

The Whitlam government was a government by intellectuals at a time of heightened ecological and environmental concern. This concern manifested in many contemporary conservationist activities and documents in the Australian and international community.¹³¹ It is often forgotten that the United States attempted to introduce a formal population policy under President Nixon, as well as energy conservation, as a result of a National Security Study undertaken in 1974.¹³² At the same time, the Australian Government undertook a national population enquiry, resulting in the *Borrie Report*, 1975.¹³³ This conservationist and global outlook seems to have disappeared from ESSS - and to have been revised and forgotten in Australia under Fraser and subsequent economic rationalist governments.¹³⁴

There is no doubt that Whitlam was a sophisticated electoral player and he would probably have used anti-immigrant preoccupations in marginal seats to his advantage.¹³⁵ International comparisons, however, testify to an over-riding motive for reining in immigration-led population growth, that of energy conservation and infrastructure consolidation. These motives dominated in France, where energy conservation efforts were considerably assisted by massive industry restructure and increased efficiency.

The evidence is thus strong that Australia's policies to lower immigration at this time reflected a similar Malthusian basis to France's. This seems even more likely when they are considered in conjunction with other Whitlam government contributions to demographic policy, in the realms of increased foreign aid for population control, subsidised abortions, subsidised access to contraception, grants to State and Federal family planning clinics, and promotion of women's rights.¹³⁶ In addition, urban planning initiatives under the Whitlam government were complimentary to population stabilisation. These planning initiatives focused on consolidation, redistribution of metropolitan coastal growth to inland rural areas, financial support for State purchase and development of land for resale at low prices for home building, and funding and support for public housing.

Finally, the Whitlam government abolished the Department of Immigration and replaced it with the Australian Population and Immigration Council. Of the decision to cut down on immigration, Whitlam himself writes,

"The Government, due to the advent of the world recession, was forced to constantly reduce its annual targets for migrant intake. The size of the new settler program was reduced from 140,000 to 110,000 in December 1972, to 80,000 in late 1974 and to 50,000 in late 1975. On 2 February 1975, the Australian Population and Immigration council was established to assist the Government in the accurate assessment of Australia's immigration and population needs."¹³⁷

Clearly Whitlam was contemplating the review of population goals for the long term. His government was, however, suddenly dismissed from office and replaced by a government with very different objectives. Had the growthist lobby groups actually managed to engineer a situation favourable to their interests or did this come about entirely fortuitously?

There is room here for an ideologically related political explanation.

The threat of the possibility of long term Malthusian policies was only averted because the Whitlam Government was sacked. A traditional reason given for the sacking is that the government showed itself to be so financially incompetent and procedurally unorthodox with regard to procuring finances, that the opposition had virtually no alternative but to block supply and the Governor General had virtually no option but to dismiss the government.

A political opportunity was thus created for a caretaker opposition government to step in. This caretaker government was subsequently elected to office amidst the disarray of the ALP.

Another interpretation, (reserving judgement on the quality of the Whitlam Government's policies and practices) might be that the political fortunes of this government suffered due to the impact of the global economic crisis on the Australian

economy. The 25% across the board tariff reductions that Whitlam introduced¹³⁸ had alienated manufacturing and farmers. Changes to land planning development and housing and cuts to immigration had alienated property development, building materials suppliers, and banks and building societies. There were therefore many important and influential dissatisfied voices supporting the opposition and the Governor General. And so a way had been left open whereby the Fraser opposition might exploit any vulnerability in the Whitlam Government.

If the Whitlam Government had not run so counter to entrenched growthist interests, would the opposition have been able to mobilise such support?

The new Fraser government was a vehicle for a new ideology which not only favored the old guard that had a vested interest in high population growth, but which took their interests much further. This was the beginning of important changes liberalising Foreign Takeovers and Acquisitions law, and of greatly increased foreign borrowing for development, in exchange for equity.¹³⁹ I will be expanding on these post-Whitlam themes at the end of this chapter and in Chapter Eight.

Policy Implementation and Outcomes in France and Australia

France's response to the massive price rises in oil based energy that accompanied the oil shock was drastic; oil imports were sharply reduced as the French State, in conjunction with business, set about a strategy of maximising energy self-sufficiency. Between 1960 and 1973, 78-79 kg oil equivalent¹⁴⁰ were required to produce 1000 francs of GNP. By 1980 this had gone down to 72 kg oil equivalent. This was mainly due to the falling away of secondary industries which were big energy consumers. Objectives were next set for 1985 at 68 kg oil equivalent and for 63 kg oil equivalent in 1990.¹⁴¹

Some strategies for diminishing petroleum based energy consumption were the further development of nuclear energy to replace oil generated electricity, improvement of technological efficiency, and organisational restructuring. Many energy sparing technological adaptations or changes of energy sources were assisted by government targets, standards and financial incentives. A department for Energy Saving was created

and this lent its expertise to working out possible economies and substitutions for current energy use. It instituted incentives of 200 francs for every tonne of oil equivalent energy replaced by coal and 400 francs for "freely sourced energies" (solar, geothermic). Subsidies were given for innovation (to finance research and development) and, upon demonstration that they worked, up to 50% of the investment finance was provided. Car design was improved.¹⁴² Some specific changes to building design and energy use are described further on.

Importantly, the French State also sought to cushion the effects of the unemployment that followed by maintaining generous social welfare policies, including unemployment benefits and enhanced opportunities for education and training.¹⁴³

Popular economic theory of the time points to a confluence of interest between local labor on the matter of employment protection and business on the matter of energy conservation.¹⁴⁴

Whereas such policies have endured in France, where it seems that more focused costs than focused benefits were attached to immigration, they did not survive the Australian system with its many focused benefits and few focused costs attached to immigration.

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, increases in energy consumption and human population since World War Two challenge economic policies based on consumption and population growth. Although there are limited alternatives to oil based energy, including nuclear, Australia appears to have failed to explore these.¹⁴⁵ Apart from the Whitlam Government's aborted attempt at implementing the quite radical policies alluded to above, Australia was to continue and to increase its reliance on oil-based energy. Even in the short-term, it had little success in diminishing oil energy consumption, and continued a population building policy entailing high immigration. In the absence of dramatic cuts in per capita oil consumption, it was inevitable that high immigration would increase overall oil-based consumption merely by increasing the Australian population. The outcome may be seen below in a comparison of national oil-based energy consumption and population curves for both countries.




Fig. 7.1 France : Total Oil Consumption and Total Population, 1965-1997.

Source: Petroleum based energy consumption: BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/

French Population numbers: French Population Data, from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institution nationale des études économiques (INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990." Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine. Indicateurs démographiques 1987 à 1997" (As at 1 January).

Note that France made more dramatic reductions from 1980, after the second oil shock.

If we compare Graph 1 with Graph 2, of Australia, we can see that France's population growth is relatively slow and that this has perhaps assisted its ability to reduce total oil consumption, which has remained well below record high levels in 1973. (Per capita oil consumption has only recently begun to rise slightly since 1980.) It is likely that this increase in use will be sharply reined in after the oil shock that began in 1999.




Fig. 7.2 Australia: Total Oil Consumption and Total Population Growth.

Source: Petroleum based energy consumption: BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/

Population numbers: Total Annual Population figures for Australia data source for all tables were, from 1978 to 1997, from Demographic Statistics, ABS, Cat no 3101.0. Figures for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994. Figures for 1945 to 1951 are from Demography 1954, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. (Total population at 31st of December of the year named)

Although Australia's total consumption of oil is less than France's (see Fig. 7.2), on a per capita basis it is about one third higher, according to calculations based on the same source. Australia's population is about one third the size of France's. If we compare Fig. 7.2 with Fig. 7.1, we can see that Australia's population growth is relatively fast.

If we compare Fig. 7.2 with Fig. 7.1, we can also observe two small dips in energy use in 1972 and 1973-74. Although Australia did manage to make some small reductions in total oil use between 1980 and 1987, after the oil shock, nevertheless, use has risen quite steeply in comparison with France's. Australia has never managed to keep its oil use below 1973 levels and the general trend has been far above this. The rapid population growth has probably contributed to this pattern.

This concludes my brief overview of the different outcomes of post oil shock policies in France and Australia.

There had, of course, been a complete change of policies in Australia after 1975. Replacing the sacked Whitlam Government, the liberal government, headed by Malcolm Fraser, had returned Australia to its traditional nation-building population policy course and away from nation consolidation.¹⁴⁶ However, before I treat the matter of the return to populationist and expansionist policies, I will talk about the role and impact of changes to the residential construction industry in France. I will also look at the institutional changes that Whitlam attempted to bring about in land development planning in Australia and to education. These changes might have led, respectively, had they succeeded, to less land speculation amongst property developers and to more efficiency in the Australian building industry.

Changes to the Residential Construction Industry in France after 1973

Energy rationalisation, economic strictures and decline in population growth forced changes in the French housing construction industry. The industry adapted to the decline in demand by promoting renovation of old properties, much of which was also energy conserving due to the stimulation afforded to the industry by the oil crisis.¹⁴⁷

Some examples of changes to building design and use were as follows. In houses, offices, government and shops, temperatures were limited to 19 degrees Celsius; there were tax deductions for the use of insulation; and insulation standards were stricter for new buildings than old ones. There was a program to insulate 500,000 existing dwellings at 20-30,000 franc subsidy per dwelling. In 1973 a new home of 100 metres squared consumed 3.2 tons of fuel per annum. The goal was for this to be reduced to 2.6 per annum by 1980 and then to 1.3 by 1985.¹⁴⁸

As construction of new dwellings in France fell by 3.7% per annum between 1974 and 1985, renovations increased by 0.9% over the same period.¹⁴⁹ What this means is that the French were spending some money upgrading their homes, for instance with insulation and other innovations to reduce domestic fuel consumption, but there was little formation of new households in new homes (which involves a much greater outlay).

The French government also reduced its annual commitments to public housing construction and to subsidised loans for the purchase of both public and privately constructed dwellings. André Postel-Vinay's requirement that money be ploughed into increasing the immigrant housing stock to compensate for the harshness of 'ceasing' worker immigration was flouted and he resigned in protest.¹⁵⁰ As well as this, inflation affected the public's ability to purchase houses as it did everything else. These factors combined to produce a very severe recession in the housing industry and many companies failed. On a graph total production of housing in all sectors in France falls away dramatically from 1974, although the private sector struggled on a little longer than the public, until about 1975.¹⁵¹




Fig.7.3 France and Australia, Total New Dwellings Commenced, 1964-1997

Source for Australia: ABS Timelines series, 875001_wks, Table 1, "Number of Dwelling Units Commenced: Seasonally Adjusted and Trend."

Sources for France: The original source for all my secondary sources was the Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la Mer. My actual sources were: *Insee Annuaire Rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988*, Tableau 1, "Situation de la construction", for the years 1948-1988 and *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, INSEE 1999, for the years 1992-1997. The figures for the years in between (1989-1991) came from Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, *Housing Policy in Europe*, Routledge, 1996, p.127, for the years 1980-1991.

Fig. 7.3 shows how abruptly the construction of new dwellings fell in France and how different the pattern was in Australia, where no long term change in demand or production occurred.

This was a time of major reorganisation of how the housing, building and private developer industries operated in France. After a rash of (largely British inspired) investment in speculative office blocks and housing estates,¹⁵² which, in the absence of high population growth and high economic growth do not pay, the private industry adapted to customer demand and factory construction and introduced a requirement for major prepayments. Factory construction meant that less building was done on sites. The major components of dwellings could be built in factories and assembled later on sites. In effect, rather than purchasing a site and erecting dwellings, then awaiting buyers, the builder waited instead for orders for houses from home buyers who already had a site. Materials could then be ordered as necessary, components of the house could be constructed in the factory and later transported and assembled on site. Up front and total costs to the builder were minimised.¹⁵³

"Through better trained workers, long term planning and methods that overcome seasonal and climate problems and other factors which had plagued the building industry with a stop-go character, in France the number of person-hours required for an average size dwelling decreased from 3,600 in the early post war period to around 1,000 hours in 1980. This was primarily due to industrialisation of the building process."¹⁵⁴

This section on changes to the residential construction industry in France after 1973 illustrates my argument that where there is economic contraction, and finance for public and private sector housing depends importantly on public subsidies, then there will be very little expansion if government is not prepared to borrow finance.

The building industry in France adapted to decreasing household formation, but the Australian industry had no need to and continues to use very inefficient methods of production.

Resistance to Change in the Residential Construction Industry in Australia after 1973

As discussed, Australia had been unable or unwilling to educate and train enough skilled tradesmen.¹⁵⁵ Greater funding and access to education and training were particularly important if the building industry was to change its boom and bust approach to business. The Whitlam Government's policies to improve access to training, combined with urban planning innovation, might have improved this situation, by producing skilled building workers for Australia. Like the French, Australians now had access to free tertiary education and technical and further education and training. This was a revolutionary policy, for, with the Whitlam government's plans for reducing immigration and the Commonwealth funding the States to buy up land cheaply, there would not have been the same opportunities for private speculation. This would have created pressure on the industry to change. With better skilled workers, however, the building industry would have had a greater chance of achieving modern restructuring, which would have assisted its adaptation to new conditions.

Anti-speculation Innovations attempted under the Whitlam Government : the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD)

Whitlam writes at some length on these issues in his autobiography and in this, as in immigration, he favoured consolidation over growth.¹⁵⁶ The Department of Urban and Rural Development (DURD) was created under Whitlam and was the first federal department of its kind. It was meant to be virtually co-equal with treasury, dealing with the urban budget and co-ordinating departments with urban responsibilities, but competition and tradition within the public service hampered its function.¹⁵⁷

Whitlam believed that consolidation of urban development through better planning and services required more Federal intervention, since the Commonwealth Government had

more tax funds at its disposal. He believed that part of the problem of high land prices and inappropriate developments had come about through urban planning being a responsibility of State governments.¹⁵⁸ He also observed that "Government programs for housing renewals swim against the tide of private urban development. In the private housing market the greatest profits are made on the urban fringe".

In his opinion, urban redevelopment of depressed inner city areas would be greatly facilitated by Commonwealth grants for this purpose. He deemed that public acquisition of development land is necessary not only to reduce land prices and provide competition for private developers, but to ensure the orderly and comprehensive development of large areas of land. He was concerned at the sacrifice of previously designated green belts and the environmental and social costs this entailed. It was debatable, he wrote, whether the land should thence be returned to private ownership, but good initial development relied on public participation.¹⁵⁹

He commented that land speculation had been allowed to run unchecked as private developers held the supply of land constant so that its price would increase. He wrote that during the 1960s the average price of land in Australia had increased by 182 per cent. He attributed these characteristics of the Australian housing industry and market to the ideology of previous right wing governments.¹⁶⁰ He also commented that planning was fragmented at State level between various isolated concerns such as education, electricity supply and water supply etc., which used Commonwealth loan money for State and Local Works, with little reference to State and local planning agencies, which were often staffed by innappropriately qualified persons.¹⁶¹ He also attempted to introduce a capital gains tax on profits made through land rezoning.¹⁶²

He deplored the premature development of suburbs like Blacktown and Green Valley in New South Wales, attributing to them later severe social problems, including unemployment (through simple inability due to distance and transport problems of employer to access employee and vice-versa), delinquency and criminality. Blacktown, he explained, had been developed by private developers on the fringes of the city because costs of development were lower there than in land available and zoned for future development closer to the city. Blacktown lacked adequate sewerage, paving, drainage, public transport, shopping amenities and schools and jobs. Green Valley was

a public housing estate that had also been built on the fringes of Liverpool. Although this estate contained 20 per cent more blue-collar workers, 50 per cent less white-collar workers, and 15 per cent more children below the age of 16, and lower ownership of private transport than the national average, it was five kilometers from the nearest railway station, had no proper bus service, and was a long way from the location of jobs.¹⁶³

There had been almost continuous high immigration from 1949-1970. In his book, Whitlam constantly relates population growth statistics to high land prices and the need for more appropriate management of development. In 1973 land prices increased by up to 46 per cent in Melbourne and Adelaide and 34 per cent in Sydney.¹⁶⁴ The highest increases were in outer-metropolitan areas where rapid population growth exceeded the supply of serviced blocks. The Whitlam government attempted to establish Federally funded public land development agencies in each State which would "establish a presence in the market sufficient to influence the general level of land prices and the rate of development of particular areas". This was intended to "create direct competition with private developers" "with a vested interest in the escalation of land prices" by "selling to home builders at the cost of production of the block."¹⁶⁵

This was of course the long-standing policy of the French government.

The success of these policies was patchy,¹⁶⁶ mostly due to opposition from institutionalised vested interests. A South Australian land commission was created in 1973. In New South Wales (March 1975), Victoria (May 1975), and West Australia (May 1975) Urban Land Councils, with inadequate statutory authority and which were obliged to go through other State authorities were created. Queensland was in the process of confirming an agreement to establish one when the Whitlam Government fell. Tasmania reluctantly established an Interim State Land Co-ordination Council in October 1975, which never met.¹⁶⁷

Whitlam compares the impact of the powerful land commission in South Australia with the relatively impotent urban land council in Victoria. The South Australian commission received a total of \$28.8 million from the Whitlam Government and \$4 million from the Dunstan State Government and acquired 1920 ha of urban land, 1094

ha of rural land and 654 ha of non-urban land between 1973 and 1976. By 1977 it was providing 70% of new residential allotments. According to Whitlam this kept land prices down and guaranteed better land development and planning.¹⁶⁸

The situation in Victoria was much different. The Urban Land Council there only marginally affected land prices, according to Whitlam. He also writes that the Council only purchased land when demand was low, which helped out developers who could not otherwise have capitalised on this land and therefore maintained high land prices. Furthermore, the Land Council resold the land to builders at close to market prices. (We need to remember that in the Australian system developers and builders are usually separate concerns, with the former generally much better financed than builders and the latter working on very small profit margins, due to the initial cost of land bought from developers.) Whitlam's observation is that the Victorian Liberal Government (and the New South Wales and Western Australian governments) acted in accordance with the private land market and against the public interest. He provides evidence that, using public money, the Victorian Housing Commission purchased land at well above market price in 1973 under the Minister for Housing in Victoria, Vince Dickie.¹⁶⁹

The Hamer Government in Victoria achieved another remarkable feat, which has not received any critical comment, to my knowledge, although it has been recently documented in Australian immigration literature. This was the successful passing of an amendment to the Local Government Act whereby non-citizens became eligible to vote on council elections and to run for local government election.¹⁷⁰

Leonie Sandercock was moved to write a book about the corrupt Victorian Housing Commission, which engaged in land speculation under the Hamer Government in Victoria :

"... the VHC [Victorian Housing Commission], as much as any private speculator, assisted in the maintenance of the land boom in Victoria by paying to other speculators urban prices for land which was at the time of purchase zoned as farming land, thereby contributing to land price inflation and making it more and more difficult for low income workers to enter the land market, and thereby adding clients to its own waiting list. And this

amazingly counter-productive policy was pursued because the State Government, at a Cabinet meeting on 16 July 1973 (after six months' concern at the likely consequences of the establishment of a land commission on the Victorian land market), decided to try to pre-empt this Federal program by allotting to the VHC the role of land banking and development."¹⁷¹

These and other speculative activities under the Victorian government resulted in an Inquiry and criminal proceedings, and such was the extent of this land speculation that it impacted on the Federal Liberal government that followed on from Whitlam's and resulted in the removal of Treasurer Lynch in December 1977.¹⁷² This is ironic because it was Lynch, whilst in opposition, who had instigated the events that led to Whitlam's fall from government. One cannot help but wonder if this was pure coincidence or if Whitlam's strategies to frustrate land speculation, combined with his policies reducing migration, had not significantly added to the number and dedication of his enemies in the Victorian Liberal Party. This would be a very interesting and difficult object of future study but is not within the purview of this thesis.

If Whitlam's land development and housing reform strategies had succeeded, in combination with much reduced net immigration and, arguably, policies for lower energy use, it seems likely the housing industry in Australia might have adapted to a much lower rate of population growth and household formation. However these measures were doomed, along with the Whitlam government.

Leonie Sandercock, in her close analysis of the subject in the Transaction edition of *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*¹⁷³ with hindsight almost concludes that the Australian State based political system may make it impossible to reform land speculation traditions. She nevertheless concedes that Whitlam did succeed in influencing State Labor governments, although he failed with State Liberal governments. She also allows the possibility that Whitlam might have succeeded in establishing greater long term changes if the economic problems of rising unemployment and inflation had not undermined the government's ability to finance these changes and if the government had not been brought down. Her introduction to the Transaction edition is of documentary interest in its own right, if you depart from

the premise that she is revising a book that was written on the cusp of an era of great social and environmental optimism and confidence, just as the global effects of the oil shock related world recession had taken hold of Australia.¹⁷⁴ Her concluding paragraph is poignant:

"If the left is to put its energy behind practical reforms of this kind, it will need to redirect its thinking away from grand schemes based on the premise that capitalism is about to collapse ... *Now that the prospect of a continued, unlimited increase in material wealth has faded*, we need more than ever a worked out conception of the good society - that is, an ideological stand - if we are to discuss policies intelligently.¹⁷⁵ [My emphasis.]

In this section we saw how Labor, under Whitlam, attempted to curb land and housing speculation. The success of these innovations was limited by external events, the short life of the government, and institutional resistance by those with focused benefits in speculation. If Whitlam's innovations had succeeded, along with the maintenance of low net overseas immigration, according to my argument, then we might have seen a similar picture in Australia to the one in France in Figure 7.3. That is, there might have been a similar huge drop in the number of property development and building companies, to the extent that their ultimate regrouping would have been as a much smaller and more efficient sector, with substantially modified technologies, modes of production and organisational forms. According to this argument, the industry would thereby have lost its dependence on high immigration and a major immigrationist force in Australia would thus have become spent. Without the traditional recourse to population pressure and population competition to drive up land and house prices, property inflation and prices would have become substantially lower. Money might have been invested in new industries. The long-term demographic outlook of Australia might have been stabilisation at a smaller population.

In fact, the property development and building industries did go through a doldrums between 1974 and 1986¹⁷⁶ and these doldrums did coincide with a net fall in overseas immigration between 1972 and 1979.

In the end, however, Fraser reversed Whitlam's innovations and there was ultimately a return to high immigration. This, plus progressively more liberal access to foreign capital, progressively more banking deregulation, and progressively more globalisation of the property market, under successive governments, seem to have restored the old speculative system in good health. I will introduce these changes in the next section and then go into more detail about their nature and impacts in Chapter Eight.

Australia's return to a populationist development and housing policy under the Fraser Government.

After the Whitlam government was sacked, and during high unemployment, the Fraser Liberal/National Party government (November 1975- March 1983) reinstituted economic policies that were dependent on rapid population growth - through high immigration - and high energy consumption.¹⁷⁷

Whitlam's concept and attempts to create a system of feedback loops from population to housing were dismantled or under-financed. Prime Minister Fraser abolished DURD very early in his government, under which Federal funding for urban and regional development declined by 86 per cent.¹⁷⁸ He also began to liberalise the foreign investment rules, with the *Foreign Takeovers Act (1975)*.¹⁷⁹

In Whitlam's time foreign investment had been less than 10%, but it increased steadily after 1975. Between 1980 and 1981 there was the "highest capital inflow on record." Much of this was for loans to State governments for infrastructure projects, but after 1980 more and more was borrowed by private firms with an ever greater part going to property development. By 1985-86 services, tourism, real-estate and property development were responsible for over fifty per cent of incoming capital and real-estate was the biggest borrower.¹⁸⁰

The Australian housing industry continued speculative land development and reliance on high immigration to feed population growth and thus demand, with little central planning. As the economy was opened up to the ideology of free market forces, speculation and housing price inflation increased. However, from 1974-1986 economic recession affected the housing industry.¹⁸¹

Government policies assisting home ownership were identified as an impediment to economic growth by, among others, a group that included the Australian Treasury,¹⁸² over which Federal Treasurer Philip Lynch had presided until 1977, when he was

sacked for involvement in Victorian land speculation scandals. Land scandals were not confined to Victoria, however. An example of political corruption and land speculation, with the demise of DURD and the Whitlam Government, occurred when the Liberal West Australian Minister for Industrial Development, Sir Charles Court, bailed out property developer, Alan Bond¹⁸³ by purchasing a property that Bond had been trying for years to get rezoned but which had been destined, with the co-operation of the previous WA Labor Government, under the Federal department, DURD, to remain a green corridor. Instead of leaving Bond with his unrezoned rural property, Court used DURD funds to purchase the property from Bond. Bond subsequently donated \$20,000 to the Liberals' 1977 election campaign. Soon after Sir Charles Court raised \$250,000 in a syndicate to finance Bond's America's Cup venture.¹⁸⁴

The ALP West Australian Government that followed on from the Liberal one was no better. It formed a corrupt network with WA land speculators which was subsequently to be known as "WA Inc." The Premier involved in this was Brian Burke and he was later imprisoned for corruption.¹⁸⁵

The members of the Australian Treasury group wanted a reduction in all forms of housing assistance. They also called for the freeing up of the housing market to market forces, without interference from subsidies or regulated industry rates. They blamed government regulation for keeping the cost of home ownership unrealistically low, inflating ownership expectations and leading to people owning too many houses.¹⁸⁶

In response to lobbying,¹⁸⁷ immigration began to climb again from 1979 and remained high until 1982.

As well as dismantling Whitlam's urban and rural development system, the Fraser Government commenced the first of a long series of steps to dismantle the free tertiary education system. It thereby reduced that avenue for Australia to increase its skilled and tertiary educated workforce, leaving industry few options but to import new skilled workers. The structure and finance of the industry meant that support for developing a local system to provide skilled tradesmen remained weak and unorganised. Thus the industry continued its strong reliance on imported skilled labour. As the economy was

opened up to the ideology of free market forces, speculation and housing price inflation increased, with strong encouragement from the Australian Treasury.

This section on Australia's return to a populationist development and housing policy under the Fraser government illustrates my argument that in countries where a highly profitable property development and residential construction industry dominates, individual firms may be more inclined than government assisted housing systems to access international loans in order to finance continued expansion. Furthermore a deregulated financial environment will assist the strategy of borrowing to finance expansion.

This chapter has examined evidence for the hypothesis that Australia had followed a cornucopian route and France a Malthusian one after the oil crash. My evidence consisted largely of indicators of policy and practice related to per capita and industrial energy consumption, principally in the building industry and the production of dwellings. I situated these indicators within the context of the different land development and housing systems in Australia and France and showed how the first relied on immigration but the latter did not. I gave evidence that both countries had temporarily reduced immigration at the time of the first oil shock for energy saving and economic reasons, but that the fall of the Whitlam government had brought an end to these politics in Australia and ushered in a high conventional energy using expansionist period with fast population growth. I attributed this growthist course in Australia largely to a populationist lobby in which property developers and residential construction companies were important actors. I explained the ability of France to consolidate its population and energy use to the absence of such a lobby.

There are, however, other possible explanations for the difference between immigration policies in France and Australia that have resulted in a higher migration intake in Australia. For example there is, arguably, a stronger ethnic lobby in Australia than in France and this lobby is able to press for extended family reunion. Because Australia has an active immigrant recruitment intake, it is difficult to justify a small humanitarian intake. A multiculturalist approach to new settlers, rather than an integrationist approach may favour the development of ethnic lobbies and the establishment of distinct communities with a variety of motives for expansion. These explanations have not

been explored here but that is not to say that they and others I have not mentioned, have no value. Nevertheless, the evidence pointing to a very important role for the property development lobby in driving immigration is strong.

The next chapter looks at how the immigrationist policies I have described continued in Australia and argues that the focused gains for the property development and housing industries from high immigration may have been enhanced by increasing recourse to foreign finance and globalisation of the property market. It then looks at the impacts on housing prices and the increasing profits at stake in the growthist economy for property developers and builders and compares these outcomes with those in France, in the absence of an immigration dependent property industry.

CHAPTER EIGHT - EVIDENCE CHAPTER : GLOBALISING THE PROPERTY MARKET : FOREIGN FINANCE AND IMMIGRATION FROM THE 1980S

Introduction

In Chapter Six I showed that there is a property development lobby for population growth in Australia. In Chapter Seven I argued that this lobby affected Australia's mode of adaptation to economic changes after the 1973 oil shock.

In this part of Chapter Eight I describe the recovery of immigrationist policy and the evolution of a legislative and economic policy environment that facilitated rather than discouraged speculative property development after the fall of the Whitlam Government.

Some changes indicative of this policy environment will be described in the following pages. Among them were the loss of a clear ALP public housing policy and a continuing reduction in Commonwealth funding for public housing. Other changes were the facilitation of deregulation of the banking and finance industries by government and changes in legislation facilitating foreign ownership and investment in property. A sign of these changes in finance and foreign ownership law was a rise in foreign finance of both public and private property development projects and a consequent rise in foreign debt. During this time a number of property speculators rose to comparative glory and more than one government was tainted through the association of ministers with the "corporate cowboys". The rate of overseas migration increased after Whitlam, most notably under the Hawke government, where it reached all time high levels. A bipartisan policy evolved to support high immigration. Government economic policy seems to have become increasingly dominated by housing loan rates and policies to support the housing industry. That the period was marked by the rise of political movements opposing immigration and/or opposing rampant property development is an indication of development and immigration pressures.

In sum, the overturning of the Whitlam government permitted the rise of an economic rationalist philosophy which favored enhancement of economic over social interests and thus aided and abetted private property development and land speculation over social housing policies and measures to control land costs. Arguably it focused the benefits to property development more sharply and spread more costs diffusely to the wider community.

The situation that evolved has been criticised by numerous social commentators who have warned that the erosion of home ownership in Australia threatens to bring about "serious long term inequities between a property-owning class with inheritance rights and the growing numbers of non-owners..."¹

But perhaps the pressure of "new class" has led some social commentators to become complicit with the population boosters. In 2001 the Saint Vincent de Paul society published a report about housing and poverty, entitled *Roofs Over Heads*. In the same year the Victorian Department of Infrastructure brought out a report² commenting on the same thing; the shortage of affordable housing and the growing social divide. Oddly, neither mentioned the role of population pressure and how property developers and the construction industry lobby for it. This may be because the Catholic Church,³ to which Saint Vincent de Paul belongs, and the Victorian State government are both major lobbyists for immigration. The Catholic church has humanitarian and ideological reasons and the State government appears to be under the influence of the land development and housing industries.

After I have shown how high migration, globalisation of the property market, and foreign borrowing promoted a climate conducive to property speculation and development, I will argue that these conditions probably facilitated speculative gains and would therefore have justified the efforts of developers and builders to lobby for them.

Property Development and Foreign Finance from the 1980s

Successive amendments of the Australian *Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act* (1975) increasingly facilitated foreign investment in property development and real estate after 1975.⁴

One of the ways the property development and housing industry overcame finance difficulties was to seek foreign finance. Japanese construction firms turned out to be a ready source of such finance. From 1980 in Japan there had been a policy of zero public sector growth, a preference for regional contractors, and sluggish private sector activity. New construction companies especially began looking outside Japan for development and construction opportunities for their Japanese investors. Australia proved to be an ideal customer. Australian State Governments, developers and builders scrambled to enter into agreements with these firms, which offered "the most favorable fixed price" and "to take equity in the project if necessary, arranging loans at low interest rates from financial institutions in Japan or Australia" and guaranteeing "any money required if the project [went] over cost."⁵

There were many advantages to such schemes. First of all they gave the Australian property development and housing industry access to a lot of money and brought in foreign currency. Secondly there were guarantees for investors against going over budget. Thirdly, the State governments could boast about bringing in big scale international projects. Fourthly, the scale of these projects - shopping centres, housing developments, resorts - "The prototypical urban development based on tourism - hotels, condominiums and canal estates ..." ⁶ - meant short-term employment for those in the building trade, but also many downstream associated infrastructure projects, like golf courses, roads, shops, schools and more houses. Fifthly, upstream building materials suppliers, including extractive and timber industries, and downstream industries, like banks and building societies, increased sales and financial transactions. Between 1982 and 1987 there were 58 major property development projects undertaken by Japanese companies. These were located in every State,⁷ but particularly in New South Wales and Queensland.

Of particular significance in this rash of foreign loans, was the ease with which Australian developers could access money if they could show they had a site worthy of a large project, but no finance. Kumagai Gumi, which was the major Japanese construction firm, would obtain a letter of credit from a Tokyo bank. The Australian developer then would negotiate a loan from an Australian finance agent and the project would be co-financed.⁸

A declining dollar and trade outlook made Australia vulnerable to some more dubious project opportunities and led to less stringent foreign investment guidelines⁹ and to neglect of environmental and ecological considerations.¹⁰

This sudden injection of large amounts of foreign capital pushed up real estate prices, especially in Sydney. There was a fear that Sydney would become like Hawaii, where real-estate prices are notoriously high and are related to the presence of a high volume of foreign investment capital. Responding to the out-cry, the Australian government barred foreigners from purchasing established dwellings in September 1987. Peter Rimmer observes, however, that this did not prevent "Australians living abroad, immigrants with permission to settle permanently in Australia, and foreign companies seeking accommodation for executives from purchasing residences."¹¹ Subsequent amendments have considerably watered down even these weak protections.¹²

This style of financing property development with foreign money continues mainly in the ESSS and in Asia¹³. It is not big in France, of course, especially not in the area of housing, because the French housing system does not lend itself to speculation.¹⁴ Furthermore, France's tendency was to tamp down finance and demand for housing during recessions, beginning with the one in 1974.¹⁵ France has tended to lend money overseas, rather than to borrow it, and finds adequate domestic finance for most development. In the 1990s however, more foreign investment was tolerated as the French economy reluctantly opened somewhat to this aspect of globalisation.¹⁶ Despite this, French trade balances and foreign investment have so far remained very balanced, unlike Australia's.

The easy exchange of equity for foreign finance from foreign construction firms in Australia seems to have further weakened the Australian construction industry through a

loss of control over the sites and development of Australian cities and major infrastructure.

Why didn't Australian construction companies pursue the alternative option of playing a greater part in the exploitation of the Asian frontier? Japan was not the only construction country to take its entrepreneurship overseas.¹⁷ Many other foreign construction companies were undertaking projects in the Asian construction and development boom. By 1996 the leading foreign construction firms in that area were the US, Japan, UK, France, West Germany and Italy, but Australia's presence was statistically insignificant.¹⁸ One reason put forward for Australian construction's lack of profile in the region is that Australian construction projects were not tied to foreign aid, whereas many other foreign projects were.¹⁹

A better explanation might be that Australian entrepreneurs and developers had been encouraged to see Australia as merely another exploitable frontier, and did not see the need to venture further afield. Australia's encouragement of "corporate cowboys" seems to indicate that Australian governments, like many South East Asian governments, were not too fussy about who they went into business with, as long as business went ahead.

It was during the period of the late 1980s that the "corporate cowboys" - Connell, Bond, *et. al.* blazed most brightly. Although all of the cowboys had previously engaged more or less heavily in land speculation, after the stockmarket crash of October 20 1987, they transferred the majority of their efforts to this area. Their subsequent dealings in property development and land speculation, until about 1989, are now notorious. Many of the cowboys were based in West Australia and West Australian Labor and Liberal governments became involved in their dealings. Government involvement was not just limited to State governments, but apparently included the Federal Labor government and Prime Minister Hawke.²⁰

The following donations were made to the West Australian Labor Party between 1983 and 1989 by persons with strong interests in speculative property development, several of whom became notorious. The West Australian Labor Premier, Brian Burke, went to jail eventually over his involvements with these entrepreneurs.²¹

Table 8.1 Donations to the WA Labor Party by Property Developer Investors 1983-89

Source: Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, 1996 edition, printed 2000, pp135.

| | \$. |
|-----------------------|-----------|
| Warren Anderson | 366,000 |
| Alan Bond | 2,038,000 |
| Laurie Connell | 860,000 |
| Dallas Dempster | 512,000 |
| Yosse Goldberg | 425,000 |
| Robert Holmes à Court | 30,000 |

Why did Labor, and then the Coalition, continue high immigration after Fraser? Politics and Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s

The immigrationist Fraser government lasted from November 1975 to March 1983.

After the Fraser Liberal government, there was a long-reigning Labor government, under two prime ministers, Hawke, from March 1983 to December 1991, and Keating, to March 1996. Although both had begun their careers as politicians in a party that was very cautious about immigration, they were to preside over highly immigrationist policies. There was one exception. The Minister for Immigration between 1990 and 1993, Gerry Hand, cut immigration back to the lowest figures since 1975. He was to be replaced by the highly immigrationist Senator Bolkus.²²

Before its election in 1983 the Labor government had a clear cut public housing policy.²³ Afterwards this was largely subsumed by broad economic policies targeting inequities in other sectors.

What had happened?

When we last looked at the ALP, during Whitlam's era, it was all for population stabilisation, environmentally sensitive energy policy, a socially just and modestly priced housing system, a strong public housing program, and the preservation of nature.

But the Whitlam Government had been made to look foolish by the Khemlani affair and Labor was ashamed. The USA and the Thatcher Government in Britain turned their backs on the 1970s ideals of the interventionist welfare state and Keynesianism, and Australia followed suit.²⁴

Habermas²⁵ argues that elites avoid debate where their interests are in conflict with democracy in liberal democracies in industrial societies. This theory could explain this situation where Labor elites now drew back from addressing the democratic conflict inherent in foreign financing of property development and the stimulation of population

growth through high immigration. The conflict is that, whereas high immigration and foreign financing of property development carry increased focused benefits for property developers and investors and speculators, they almost certainly raise the cost of housing and increase foreign debt. These higher costs tend to be diffused to the rest of the community, with low income earners bearing the greatest disadvantage. The absence of a strong public housing program aggravates the situation.

At any rate immigration was now increasingly treated outside the broader issue of population policy. Debate was directed away from environmental and ecological impact. Diffuse social benefits, like the advantages of space and personal security in Australian society were overwhelmed by negative evocations of boring suburbs and monoculture.²⁶ Multiculturalism - and incidentally high immigration - were proposed as a solution to a perceived national existential ennui.

Beliefs also arose that Australia's dismal colonial record of massacres and dispossession²⁷ subsequent to British settlement/invasion²⁸ could somehow apparently be compensated by an even greater injection of settlers/invaders. How this was supposed to help Aborigines reclaim their land was never clarified.

Because high immigration - primarily a matter of numbers - became instead identified with diversity of cultures, almost any criticism of immigration was easily interpreted as ethnically or 'racially' motivated. Ironically this was also the way that Aboriginal rejection of further immigration was treated.²⁹

Immigration came also to be dealt with as a technical issue, focusing on economic goals, like increasing business immigration versus increasing family immigration and as a means of developing new trade ties with new countries.³⁰ Immigration was also seen as an important way of increasing cultural choice for consumers, for instance in restaurants and kinds of food available.³¹ In the 1990s it was also proposed as a means of gaining an edge in the global economy.³²

Freeman introduced Habermas's theory of elite avoidance of difficult issues as a way of discussing the avoidance of the issue of racial conflict, which Freeman felt was a major issue at stake in Britain and France leading up to the oil shock. My own judgement is

that "race" or ethnicity were far from the main issue in Australia, although some xenophobic nationalism has arisen in areas of social stress where people feel disadvantaged by change and where they possibly associate change and disadvantage with the increasing presence of ethnically identifiable new immigrants. But this is a side issue. However, by appearing to address racial conflict, Australian political parties were able to avoid the issue of the impact of numbers and the problems involved in land speculation.

Betts' theory about why the Labor Party went soft on population growth is that the ALP began by criticising the Liberals' high immigration on the grounds that it was economically and environmentally costly. That is to say that post-Whitlam they remained anti-immigrationism.³³ However they also said that the Liberals should allow more family reunion. Somehow Labor had got into the position where endorsement of family reunion had become a badge of party solidarity with the ethnic community.³⁴

Then, in April 1981, the Liberal government reached a tacit agreement with Labor. They would increase the family reunion intake and, in return, Labor would stop criticising the overall size of the program.³⁵

Labor came into government in March 1983 in the wake of the second oil shock related economic recession, which was characterised by extremely high interest rates (the highest since before the war, but which were to go higher later in the decade) and a sharp rise in unemployment. The Minister for Immigration, Stewart West, kept immigration low during 1983 and 1984. This seems to have been the first time since 1976 that unemployment was taken into consideration when planning immigration numbers. In an effort to facilitate family reunion for relatives of non-English speaking immigrants, however, West removed all advantages to English speaking applicants in the immigrant selection system. According to Birrell the resulting acceleration in chain immigration (mostly Asian) was unplanned.³⁶ It was to give rise to anti-immigration sentiment, particularly on the Right, and would contribute to the erosion of bipartisanship. The unpopular policy for population increase through high immigration went ahead again after 1984 due to the lack of an organised political movement to oppose the growth lobby and increasingly restrictive social norms that identified as racist any and all objections to immigration.³⁷

Of the Hawke Labor government period Betts writes³⁸ that Labor relaxed its "traditional caution" on immigration, despite the economic and unemployment challenges of the mid 1980s. She ascribes this change in policy to pressure from growthist business lobbyists and also to an ethnic lobby, together with the lack of focused opposition. The policy of low immigrant intake oriented to family reunion had produced an increase in the number of immigrants from Asia³⁹ for the first time since the 1860s,⁴⁰ since immigrants from these countries tended more than others at the time to use the family reunion option. Betts adds that the rise in Asian immigration strongly contributed to a brief breakdown of bi-partisan policy on immigration in 1984 from the more conservative Liberal/National opposition. The issue of race overtook that of numbers in a hostile community debate. But soon policy adjustment for a small increase in skilled and independent immigration apparently sufficed to pacify the opposition's policy requirement for an [ethnically] 'balanced' increase.

West was succeeded by Chris Hurford, (December 1984 to February 1987), an immigrationist who apparently believed in creating a big local market and thought that demographic aging could be effectively combatted by immigration.⁴¹ This was also the time that State governments were vying with each other to attract foreign money to property and infrastructure development projects and high immigration stimulated confidence in property development.⁴²

In 1986 world prices for Australian commodities fell and on October 20, 1987, there was a massive stockmarket crash. Economic policy focused on facilitating Japanese investment in Australia and greater participation in the Asia Pacific region.⁴³

This was also the time of the wild property deals of West Australians, Bond, Connell and their mates. Prime Minister Hawke was apparently one of their mates. He was associated with them in such compromising circumstances that he was obliged to apologise twice in Parliament. There are strong indications that political donations were exchanged for a delay in a gold tax, which would have affected the West Australian entrepreneurs' investments⁴⁴

Immigration policy was publicised with an increasingly internationalised stage in mind, as a foreign economic policy tool. Publically encouraging Asian immigration was deemed to be an important part of the cultivation of a new public image for an Australia with a friendly attitude to Asia, Asians and Asian money.⁴⁵

Although this government had begun with low immigration targets, Hawke's pro-immigration stance, pressure from the building lobbies, ethnic vote seeking, and business schemes relying on tens of thousands of temporary fee-paying students, prevailed over any contrary views, to see the highest immigration since the war. In 1989 the Beijing Massacre led to over 40,000 Chinese students on temporary visas being able to change over to permanent residence on humanitarian grounds due mostly to a prime ministerial decision by Hawke.⁴⁶

In Figures 8.4 and 8.5 in the following section on Housing Affordability we will see that the big wave in immigration under Hawke seems to have coincided with a permanent steep rise in housing prices in States that receive large quantities of immigrants. This was despite dwelling construction activity being greater than ever before and extremely high interest rates, which, in the years 1989, 1990 and 1991 reached their highest level ever post war at 17% and more. A continuous rise in asset values meant that property speculators were willing to borrow money even at very high interest.⁴⁷ But high immigration minimised this risk by enhancing the property market.

In the States and regions that did not receive high immigration the same steep rise in 1988 and 1999 did not occur and, when adjusted for inflation, price rises after this were negligible (Fig. 8.7) Dwelling prices in the high overseas immigration cities of Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, however, never returned to previous levels. (See Figure 8.4)

From April 1990, Minister for Immigration, Gerry Hand continued the preceding Minister Ray's economically geared tighter program, placing emphasis on English language proficiency and requiring placement of security bonds by those wishing to sponsor their parent. These measures coincided with a substantial drop in immigration and the financial recession is also thought to have caused a drop in New Zealand arrivals.⁴⁸ (See Fig. 8.1)

Between 1990 and 1993, although dwelling prices did not return to pre-1998 levels, some price stability returned in the high immigration cities.

Despite the 1993 recession and rises in interest rates, home building production reached an all time high in 1993 and 1994, but dropped like a stone in 1995 and 1996. In 1993 Prime Minister Paul Keating replaced the cautious immigration minister, Gerry Hand, with the immigrationist, Nick Bolkus and immigration then climbed steadily.⁴⁹

Years later Keating came out with some remarkable comments which would lead one to infer that he had experienced irresistible pressure from property developers whilst in government. In a speech to an architecture forum in Sydney in 2001 he stated that that he thought [Australians] would be better off if developers were forbidden from donating election funds to municipal candidates and to political parties.⁵⁰

Immigrationist policy had become explicitly entwined with foreign economic policy, with rhetoric encouraging Asian immigration used as a signifier of a friendly attitude to Asian business. Under Bolkus and Keating the pro-Asia body of economic ideology burgeoned in support of schemes involving boosting the size of the local market and encouraging export industry channels through immigration from the nearby South East Asian region.⁵¹ It seems to have amounted to a call for more people and more foreign money.

Immigrationism and the promotion of the view that Australia was a part of Asia were concepts taken up enthusiastically by business and some intellectuals, but there were discontented rumblings from the public, underestimated by Keating.

The Labor Keating government lost the March 1996 election and there are indications that the high immigration policy it had pursued had alienated many voters.

The Liberals came back into power under Prime Minister John Howard after 13 years in opposition. Howard's cautious attitude towards immigration was well known to the community. Other signs that immigrationism was unpopular were to be found in the popularity of certain politicians for whom it had become an important electoral issue, Graeme Campbell and Pauline Hanson. Paul Sheehan's *Among the Barbarians*,⁵²

achieved national best-seller status because it lambasted the immigrationism of the period. Two new groups had formed during this time, around 1988. The first, Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population, objected to population growth and hence to immigrationism on ecological grounds. The second, Australians Against Further immigration, was a political party which was later subsumed to Pauline Hanson's party. See Appendix 2, "Events and Policies discouraging high immigration from 1975" for more detail.

At State level, there were also signs that sections of the urban community are beginning to perceive population growth as a focused cost in Australia, and to organise at local level. In the 1970s groups defending local environment and property values first appeared. They had a municipally located focus and lacked a national perspective.⁵³ In the late 1990s similar groups - this time with a State based focus - arose under the banner of Save Our Suburbs (SOS).⁵⁴ Melbourne SOS seems mainly concerned with suburban housing values and street appearances, whereas the Sydney based SOS has also participated in broader forums on population growth and its effects on the natural environment.⁵⁵ The Sydney movement would thus appear to have some overlap with ecological organisations.

Under the Howard government the immigration program was again restyled to emphasise skills, personal wealth and English proficiency. The focus was weighted more towards short term rather than long term intake. Initially concerted attempts were made to restrict the family reunion program. New immigrant access to welfare payments was limited in an attempt to discourage opportunistic immigration and to appease a lobby that was critical of immigration because of the higher welfare dependency of immigrants.

A new focus on short term intake developed, however, with strong options of permanency for some applicants once onshore.⁵⁶ There were also changes in policy regarding definition of family reunion in rural areas.⁵⁷

In 1999 Australia adopted a European style model (with UNHCR approval) of short term asylum provision, as an alternative to the traditional Geneva convention model of refugee asylum, which has usually assumed the granting of permanent residence to the person granted a "protection visa".⁵⁸ This was in contrast to Canada and the United States, which continued to operate permanent asylum policies only.

For the first time since Whitlam, a minister made some attempt to rein in property development excesses. The Liberal Minister for Science and Resources, Nick Minchin, 1996- made several statements over the years regarding the environmental impact of population growth. He attempted to push back against the Housing and Construction and Property Development industries immigration lobbies.

In October 1999, Minchin urged these industries to embrace exports and innovation rather than rely on high Australian population growth. He identified export growth as a key opportunity for Australia's Building Industry. He said that, although Australia has the "fastest population growth in the developed world", due to immigration, this paled next to the global market of six billion people.⁵⁹ His attempts to persuade the industry to stop relying on local population growth obtained little support from any other quarter, and certainly not the Labor Party.

Public housing provision in the 1990s continued to deteriorate. Where there was a need for between 20,000 to 30,000 new dwellings every year, by 1995 new construction of public housing was no more than about 5000 buildings per annum.⁶⁰ Commonwealth budgeting for Housing and Urban Development has greatly decreased since 1975-1976.⁶¹

| Commonwealth Housing and Urban Development Expenditure | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1970-1971 | 1972-1973 | 1975-1976 | 1982-1983 | 1987-1988 | 1995-1996 |
| 2.8 | 2.8 | 4.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.9 |

Table 8.2 Evolution of Commonwealth Housing and Urban Development Expenditure: 1970-1996

Source: Ian Manning , "**Policies: Past and Present**", Chapter 2, pp10-32, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, Table 1.1, p.14. "Main Heads of Expenditure as a percentage of Commonwealth Budget Outlays."

A new Goods and Service Tax (GST) was introduced in the midst of intense political controversy at the end of December 2000. Just prior to the introduction of this tax, house sales had accelerated, as people rushed to buy houses before the tax was introduced. Immediately after the introduction of the GST, sales of houses slumped. Under enormous pressure, Prime Minister Howard doubled first home buyer grants at the end of March 2001. The effect of this was dramatically evident in stock market trends, where Developer and Contractor shares had steadily trended upwards since April 1995, until the short free fall at end of December in 2000, which ended smartly when the first home grants were doubled and the upward trend continued. Two weeks after the new grants, sales were recovering⁶². Building material manufacturers had also reaped the benefits before and after GST.⁶³

But it wasn't enough. At the end of April 2001, in response to continuous lobbying by pressure groups and a switch of support by the major press to Labor, Prime Minister Howard gave in and increased business and family reunion immigration by several thousands. This was an election year and, in opposition, Labor was indicating a preference for a major population building program. As had happened in April 1981, the Liberal government adopted a policy that effectively facilitated family reunion,⁶⁴ simultaneously removing the ALP's post 1975 grounds for objection to the Lib policies and a reason for big business and the media to support Labor.

Above I have chronicled the rise of immigrationist policy and promotion and property development industry lobby group pressures since the fall of the Whitlam government. I have also mentioned the resurgence or rise of political movements and arguments against immigrationism and/or rampant development.⁶⁵ More evidence for this is in my appendix, "Events and Policies Discouraging High Immigration".

I introduced the previous chapter, Chapter Seven, by pointing out that the removal of the Whitlam Government created an avenue for a government which, not only favoured a populationist agenda, but which further facilitated the interests of the property development and construction industry by removing impediments to foreign investment in property.

My chronicle here of post Whitlam immigration policies reveals a persistent tension on the issue of immigration numbers. A high rate of immigration arouses resistance in one form or another and leads to attempts to rein in numbers. As we can see, from Figure 8.1, this resulted in a see-saw pattern, but the average numbers, however, increased - See Table 8.3. The number of dwellings constructed in the high immigration cities also increased. And, in the cities with high influxes of overseas immigrants, so did the price of land and housing.

| AUSTRALIA : Average Total Net Migration at different periods | |
|---|---------|
| 1950-1999 | 89,597 |
| 1970-1999 | 89,590 |
| 1980-1999 | 102,195 |
| 1950-1959 | 88,121 |
| 1960-1969 | 91,096 |
| 1970-1979 | 65,640 |
| 1980-1989 | 111,650 |
| 1980-1984 | 85,720 |
| 1985-1989 | 137,580 |
| 1990-1999 | 82,522 |
| 1990-1995 | 59,020 |
| 1995-1999 | 106,024 |

Table 8.3. Australia: Average Total Net Migration at Different Periods

Source: Australian Commonwealth Year Books and ABS 3101.0 for various years.

Housing Production, Immigration and Foreign Investment

Introduction

The existence of the immigrationist property development lobby implies that there was profit to be made through speculation on population growth and through property price inflation related to population competition. To consolidate my argument, however, I would need to demonstrate that developers and builders had good reason to believe that high population growth meant higher property and housing prices.

The next section attempts to address this need by demonstrating a likely relationship between high land and housing prices⁶⁶ and high overseas immigration in some Australian cities, looking at the variable of rate of population growth. I will suggest that such a relationship strongly indicates a profit related motive for immigrationism in the Australian property development industries. In addition, the increasing globalisation of the property market has increased the number and variety of potential buyers. This wider and deeper market⁶⁷ provides greater competition for property in Australia, driving prices up, and it gives developers easier access to overseas funding. In order to maintain the interest of overseas investors and buyers and to win the confidence of banks and other organisations that provide loans, here and overseas, a strong selling point would appear to lie in the growth and expansion of the Australian population and consequently the need and the market for housing and related infrastructure development. This quality of population growth and expansion⁶⁸ and the opportunity they afford for speculation in Australia (and other ESSS states) compares favourably with the lower property speculation prospects in Western Europe where planning and zoning are more restrictive, taxation on speculative gains is more punitive, and population growth and household formation are relatively slow.

The contents of this section could be described as reporting on an impact of immigration, but this impact must also be seen as a reinforcement of focused gain to the housing/property development industry in Australia and their downstream beneficiaries

- for instance the banks. Considerable diffuse and rising costs to the Australian community in land and housing price inflation appear to be entailed. Comparing the Australian case with France shows that the system there, in the absence of migration impacting on the housing market, has managed inflation much better, despite the entry of foreign buyers into the market.

My research and some other Australian work (details further on) indicates a statistical relationship between immigration and housing production in Australia. There are also indications of links between high dwelling prices and a combination of high immigration and foreign investment in property. This is further evidence of why the property development and housing industries should find immigration worth lobbying for in Australia. In order to attract foreign investment there is a need to convince the potential investor that the population is growing and expanding and so is the need and the market for infrastructure and housing. Obviously nothing like the rate of expansion in Australia exists in France or the rest of Western Europe, where building zones are strict and population growth is slowing towards a likely decline.

In the late 1980s there was an international bubble of property speculation, following on from the US stock market crash of October 1987. For the first time there was large scale property speculation in France, although mostly confined to Paris.⁶⁹ In Australia property speculation also occurred in the big cities, although not for the first time. In both countries local speculation was supplemented by foreign buyers and investors. The major differences were in the different land planning development and housing systems and in the fact that France lacked immigration related population growth.

Housing Production and Overseas Immigration in Australia




Fig. 8.1 Australia: Total Net Overseas Immigration (year ending December 31) from 1945-1998 and Total New Houses Commenced from 1955-1998.

The purpose of this graph is to show broad statistical relationships between immigration and property development, which are fairly clear between 1955 and 1971. We can see that after the first oil shock there was an initial overshoot of building and then the relationship is much more irregular.

Source: ABS Timelines series, 875001_wks, Table 1, "Number of Dwelling Units Commenced: Seasonally Adjusted and Trend." Source for Total Net Migration was ABS 3101, various years, and Commonwealth Year Books, Various years. This is a graph on two axes and has been displayed on two axes in order to highlight the movements of the respective units (net immigrants and new houses commenced) in relation to themselves. (Since numbers of dwellings commenced varies within a smaller scale than numbers of immigrants, if numbers of dwellings were placed on the same scale as numbers of immigrants the apparent scope of variations would have been diminished.) Note that this graph deals only with private sector houses. A later statistical series counts, as well as detached houses, which is the earliest in the series, other kinds of new residences, including apartments - "Total Private Dwellings". In the year 2000, total private dwellings was on an upturn in production, whereas detached houses were showing as a slight decline. All data for housing was "original data", that is, not smoothed for trends. This choice was because of a desire to use comparable data sets, and the earliest sets were "original data".

Figure 8.1 chronicles the negative immigration due to the Second World War and then the return of soldiers and the arrival of new immigrants in 1948 and 1949, years of immigration that were never to be exceeded until 1987 and 1988, when Prime Minister Hawke gave amnesty to Chinese students in Australia following the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989, after which many Chinese became permanent immigrants, with substantial subsequent chain immigration.

We can see that around the time Menzies introduced policies (notably in 1950 and 1956)⁷⁰ to encourage private home building to overtake public housing, housing construction went from less than 40,000 dwellings per annum in 1955 to nearly 70,000 in the space of one year. After this, dwelling construction clearly appears to closely follow the general trend in immigration between 1967 and 1972. 1973 is the first year of five years - 1973 to 1979 - when the trend of net immigration to continuously rise, taking into account relatively small troughs, was suddenly reversed, with relatively small peaks and enormous troughs.

Over this very period, however, we can see that housing construction proceeded at higher levels than ever before and prices rose (see more on prices later). Certainly there are valleys in between the peaks, but they are very high valleys if we compare them to the peaks preceding 1973. In fact housing construction remained at an all time high average over this period. It was not until 1983 that the optimistic waves of new dwelling construction succumbed to a year of greatly diminished production, falling to around 1963/64 levels at about 75,000 dwellings - a number which had once seemed quite reasonable for the industry.

Between 1973-1982 the Australian situation resembles the contemporaneous French one, with the production of dwellings in a state of comparative overshoot, relative to population growth, both from immigration and in relation to total population growth. However after 1983 the situation no longer resembles the French one. (See Fig. 7.3)

In France, we will recall, the housing industry began collapsing between 1974 and 1975. Production declined until 1984, and, after survivors had consolidated, its course remained much more modest than prior to the crash. What is interesting is the way the Australian housing industry not only recovered, but went on to ever greater production, with peaks in 1985, 1989 and 1994 (the highest peak ever). Prices rose and this churning out of dwellings occurred despite the fact that affordability was at all time lows according to the CBA/HIA index,⁷¹ due to the highest ever interest rates. Furthermore, from 1987 on, prices in the major capital cities of Perth, Sydney and Melbourne began perhaps the steepest ascension since the 1890s.

We know that this phoenix-like activity had something to do with foreign investment.⁷² Following the October 1987 US stock market crash, there was in fact a world wide boom in property speculation.⁷³ In Australia, however, it is possible that the rise in housing prices had a lot to do with a return to high immigration, particularly in 1980 and 1981 and especially in 1988 and 1989. (See Figures 8.1, 8.3, 8.4 for all States and, for Melbourne only, Figure 8.2). Price rises began with the sudden peaks of immigration in 1988, (See Figure 8.4 which shows peaks for several States⁷⁴) rather than at the beginning of the international property boom in 1987, when they first show in Paris. (See Figure 8.8). Although immigration numbers fell in 1992 and 1993, following Immigration Minister Hand's recession-related immigration cut-back, housing production increased. The international speculative cycle was still going. It ended around 1996, when there was another big trough in housing production in Australia.

The rest of this chapter compares the evolution of dwelling prices in high population growth, high overseas immigration Australian cities against the evolution of dwelling prices in low population growth, low overseas immigration cities. There will also be a comparison between patterns in dwelling price inflation over a long period of time in France and Australia, taking into account the globalisation of the property market, as well as rates of overseas immigration. The conclusion for this chapter will suggest that high or low immigration numbers represent a major variable accompanying the presence or lack of presence of a ratchet effect on dwelling prices, distinct from market cycles.

Dwelling Prices and Affordability in Australia

Figure 8.1: Required Annual Income to Purchase Median-priced House (real threshold income), 1972 to 1995




Figure 8.2. Required Annual Income to Purchase Median-priced House in Melbourne (real threshold income), 1972 to 1995 in 1990 Australian Dollars

Source: Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174. (Scanned from source article.)

Fig. 8.2 gives us a picture of dwelling affordability *in Melbourne only* between 1970 and 1995.⁷⁵ (Note that I have used different index sources for my own graphs, which cover several cities, in Figures 8.2-8.7 below.) This Melbourne study was the longest Australian based study I could find and I have included it, in part, for comparison with Fig 8.8 on French prices from 1955-1998. (Please note that all the other Australian

graphs in this chapter use different data, refer to shorter time frames and apply to several Australian cities and/or regions).

Note that, since the data I have accessed for Australian cities and regions only starts in 1985, I have been obliged to use secondary sources for descriptions of housing price trends in Australia prior to 1985.⁷⁶

From 1975-1986 economic recession affected the housing industry. Another bout of inflation of house prices occurred just after the recession of the early 1980s. After a brief dip in the middle of the 1980s, prices rose enormously. Hayward⁷⁷ relates that throughout Australia the price of homes increased by almost 20% per annum. Housing loan interest rates went up and down a great deal as well, although usually the trend was upwards, until the beginning of a recession in 1991/2. Going from 4% at the beginning of the 1980s, long term interest rates reached an average 8-10% during the 1980s. Home mortgage interest rates showed similar patterns and reached a post war record of 17% during the late 1980s.⁷⁸

Burke largely attributes an "erosion in affordability after 1972", to interest rate changes over much of the period, especially towards the end of the 1980s when they reached heights of 17%. However, he says, the picture is also much affected by creeping house price inflation. Although interest rates in 1995 were similar to those of 1975, affordability, according to Burke, "was worse than in the earlier era because of the cumulative effects of housing price inflation."⁷⁹ (Note that "inflation" refers to "a progressive increase on the level of prices brought about by an expansion in demand or the money supply.")⁸⁰

Burke writes that the cause of "this inflation and why it has been more severe in Australia than in most other OECD countries is unclear, but embraces such factors as high levels of demand relative to supply: The Australian tendency to speculate on property; and the particular system of housing provision in Australia, including the fragmented nature of the building industry and the separation of the land development and building sectors."⁸¹

The Labor government presided over a situation of home ownership and public housing in the 1990s which has been described as beleaguered by a "combination of economic forces and public policies that resulted in lower incomes and higher housing costs."⁸²

Fig. 8.2 only gives us information about Melbourne. Australian prices, however, vary substantially from State to State and from rural to urban locations. These days we will find that Sydney has the highest land prices,⁸³ with Melbourne and Perth following, whereas Tasmania and South Australia are comparatively affordable. (See Figure 8.4)

A major difference is, of course, the rate of population growth, which is affected chiefly by net immigration. Sydney is the receiver of the highest number of overseas immigrants in Australia. (See Figure 8.3).

Dwelling Affordability in Australia and Population Pressure

To recapitulate some of the points made by Terry Burke above: when lending interest rate effects are accounted for,⁸⁴ the price of housing in Australia continues to show huge increases and levels of demand relative to supply are cited among reasons for this "house inflation".

What are the causes of high demand relative to supply, apart from affluence and family breakups?⁸⁵

I was curious to test the truism that high population growth leads to high demand for housing and thus higher home prices and that variations in price might be related to high immigration. The Australian Bureau of Statistics⁸⁶ leave no doubt that in Australia high population growth is related to high net immigration but can the same be said for high house prices?

Whitlam attributed high home ownership prices to population pressure fuelled by high immigration, combined with land speculation.⁸⁷ Shayne Nugent suspected the same

thing.⁸⁸ Some other studies done were by Junankar, Pope and Kapuscinski, Ma and Mudd⁸⁹ and Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy.⁹⁰ According to Burnley and Murphy, Junankar found that immigration had a minimal effect on prices, but that study was done before the end of the baby boom, which may have overwhelmed immigration factors. Burnley and Murphy also used a different affordability measure from the one used by Junankar et al.⁹¹ Burnley and Murphy thought that immigration had a big effect on land and housing prices but were puzzled to find that West Australian results showed less migration related effect on prices in the late 1980s than they had expected.⁹² My own results (which used a simple measure of disposable income to house price)⁹³ however clearly show a strong correlation between high immigration and West Australian prices in 1988 - 89. (See Graphs 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5.) Why the intensity is less would be a good subject for future study but does not detract from the impact that immigration apparently did have. Burnley and Murphy⁹⁴ compared populations between censuses and may have missed impacts related to flow patterns. (See my figures 8.3, 8.4, and especially 8.5.)

Conveniently Australia's population is concentrated in eight major capital cities and these cities may be differentiated by characteristics of high overseas immigration and low overseas immigration. Furthermore, other areas outside the cities, including rural areas, receive almost no overseas immigration. New South Wales has the highest overseas immigration and Tasmania has the lowest, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory, which has had occasional net losses. Using high and low net overseas immigration in different States as variables, I compared the evolution of house prices. Although the immigration statistics I rely on are for each State, the great bulk of overseas immigration goes to the cities and thus it is reasonable to compare city dwelling prices with State immigration figures.




Fig. 8.3 Net Overseas Migration (Adjusted for Category Jumping) for Australian States and Territories 1979-2000.

Source: ABS Demographic Statistics, 3101, Population changes, Rates and Causes at June for various States. This graph shows that New South Wales receives the highest number of migrants, followed respectively by Victoria, West Australia, and Queensland. South Australia receives the most migrants of the low immigration States, followed by the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the Northern Territory (NT) and Tasmania. The high immigration States and the low immigration States also have different patterns of immigration, with much lower or absent peaks. The curves for the ACT and Tasmania are very similar and are too small to distinguish from each other on the graph. Note that in this graph and in the next two, both immigration and prices peak slightly later in West Australia and the peak is shorter.

The results of this research indicate that house prices are higher in the high net overseas immigration capitals of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth than in the lower immigration cities of Hobart, Adelaide, and Canberra. These observations are true of all other areas outside the high population growth Capitals. Not only are house prices higher, but there has been a different pattern of dwelling price inflation.

Note that I have not used the same dwelling price measures here as were used by the author of Fig. 8.2. I have chosen measures more comparable with material from France, which used the apparently more simple indicators of house prices corrected for inflation expressed as a percentage in relation to disposable income, according to the French Notaries property price index and INSEE measures of disposable income. (See Fig. 8.8.) For Australia I have used CBA/HIA Index sources for Median House Prices (based on Commonwealth Bank home loans) and Disposable Income (based on ABS statistics) and I have expressed the house prices as a percentage of the disposable income. I controlled for inflation by expressing as 1984/5 Australian dollars the actual house prices and the disposable income dollars.




Fig. 8.4 Median Dwelling Prices as a Percentage of Disposable Income \$1984-5 for Australian Cities with High Population Growth and High Overseas Migration.

Source for Median Dwelling Prices was the Housing Industry Association, "HIA/CBA Housing Affordability Index". The median prices are taken from Commonwealth Bank loans for home purchases. The original data was not adjusted for inflation. I controlled for inflation by expressing the actual prices at \$1984/5 using the ABS CPI. Note that the ABS CPI has, since 1998, ceased to take mortgage payments into account, but this change would have a minimal effect on these graphs. Note also that my graphs using HIA/CBA Affordability data show quarterly variation, whereas my graphs on immigration only show annual variations. Source for disposable income was HIA Affordability "Disposable Income".

In Fig. 8.4 we can see that in all these high population growth cities there was a steep rise in median dwelling prices as a percentage of disposable income in early 1988. This rise is not affected by adjustment for CPI, although all other house price rise indicators in the series I have used are.⁹⁵

After 1990 Queensland also received high net interstate immigration and this has probably kept the curve rising. From 1994-1998 West Australia also experienced positive net interstate migration. In 1992-1996 Melbourne experienced strong negative interstate migration, much of it going to Queensland. This has probably been a factor in stemming price rises there over that period.⁹⁶

In Sydney dwelling prices to disposable income rose from 220 % in the last quarter of 1987 to 307 % in the first quarter of 1988. By the fourth quarter of 1988 they had climbed to 338%, then in the first and second quarters of 1989 they were 368 % and 346 %. They never returned below 303 % and, by the first quarter of 2001 median dwelling prices to disposable income in Sydney had reached 550 %.⁹⁷

Similar drops in the value of disposable income to price rises are observable in the other high growth capitals, Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane, in the graph above.




Fig. 8.5 Net Overseas Migration (adjusted for category jumping) as a Percentage of Total Population Growth in different States, Year ending June.

Source: ABS Demographic Statistics 3101, "Percentage rates of resident population growth".

Note that the measure used by the ABS for State migration movements is adjusted for category jumping and this manifests as a delay in curves when compared with Total Net Migration, which I have used in graphs for Australian movements. Total Net Migration shows a much more marked rise between 1998 and 2000. See Appendix 4, Figure 5, for a graphic comparison. For detailed graphs of the contribution of Overseas Migration to Total Population Growth see Appendix 4, "Australia: Australian States and Territories: Overseas Migration and Total Population Growth Rates, 1986-1999: Graphs A.4.17-A.4.25.

If we look at immigration as a percentage of total annual population growth for the States, in Fig. 8.5 the picture is reinforced, however there is an interesting variation, with West Australia's growth by overseas migration at a higher rate even than NSW in

1988-1989, but occurring later and over a shorter period than the other high immigration States.

Fig. 8.6 presents a more detailed picture of factors affecting population growth rates in New South Wales over much of the period. The greatest factor in population growth variation was overseas migration. We can see that Net Migration of all kinds, both overseas and interstate, decreased after 1989, mainly due to outward interstate migration. How could this have caused housing prices to increase?

Shane Nugent has written an article about this phenomenon⁹⁸ wherein he suggests interstate emigration from Sydney rose at this time due to some people seeking to escape congestion and others seeking to capitalise on their assets by selling their homes for high prices. He assumed that the demand created by new immigrants would have led to these high prices. I agree with him but believe that the influence of overseas speculators must also have contributed to this property boom. Burnley and Murphy also suggest this.⁹⁹




Fig 8.6 New South Wales Components of Population Growth as a Percentage of Total Population Growth

Source: ABS Demographic Statistics 3101, "Percentage rates of resident population growth".

Economic circumstances immediately preceding the sustained period of dwelling price inflation which began in 1988-1990 were notable for the Wall street crash of October 16-19th 1987. Despite this world scale economic event, a bubble of buoyancy followed in Australia in the form of the remarkable property boom already alluded to. This also appears to have been a global event. As we will see, Paris also went through its first

major speculative period at this time, although theirs began slightly earlier than in Australia. In Australia the property boom lasted from about early 1988 to late 1990, when, among other financial disasters, Pyramid Bank went broke. The boom had little foundation beyond property speculation, with banks and building societies paying up to 20% to small depositors. High dwelling prices coincided with very high interest rates, which tend to discourage ordinary home buyers but which speculators relying on a continuous rise in asset value tend to take in their stride, since they hope to get rid of the property before paying much interest at a price that will cover interest.¹⁰⁰

Some of these similarities in dwelling price rises in high net immigration cities may be related to high immigration. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the unusually high net overseas immigration - the highest since the war - that accompanied Hawke's amnesty for Chinese immigrants on the occasion of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and which shows up in 1988-1989 as such an obvious statistical bump in the median housing prices of high population growth cities in Figure 8.4.

The continuing influence of foreign buying must, however be taken into consideration. In effect, if we are reckoning on an effect on house prices from overseas migration, we should also include the effect of overseas buyers. This is a way that the property development and housing system have been able to increase their market and keep asset prices rising. A continuously enlarging house market kept buoyant by immigration increases the attractiveness of Australian property for professional investors and developers overseas as much as for individual overseas buyers.

Although the Australian land boom appeared to crash in 1989, when some of the biggest property speculating companies came to grief,¹⁰¹ dwelling prices have remained very high (Figure 8.4) and there is a crisis of affordability for many Australians. In Melbourne the maintenance of relative price stability for some time after the rises in 1988-89 (Figure 8.4) has been put down to major economic casualties in Victoria, such as the failure of Pyramid Building Society.¹⁰² These economic problems were also accompanied by high outward interstate migration, which has now stopped. The maintenance of continually rising prices may mean that the Australian boom is long lasting, or else the prices may be the result of a major structural change in how the

industry defines its market. Since Australian incomes are shrinking relative to the high dwelling prices in the high growth capital cities, especially Sydney, it is likely that overseas investors' money is contributing to this long land boom. Over the past 10 years stocks in the Development and Contracting sector have trended continually upwards.¹⁰³

In early 2001, up to 30% of revenue from Australian dwelling sales was attributed to sales to expatriates and foreign buyers. Prices were described as "strong, often extraordinary" and the industry was reported to be renewing ties in the Asian region and targeting "Australian expatriates hunting for investments of, typically, \$1 million or more." Whereas foreign buyers may now invest in planned residential properties, and virtually without restraint in non-residential properties, there are still some lingering restrictions on their purchasing established residential properties.¹⁰⁴

To test the hypothesis about the possible effect on dwelling prices of high overseas immigration to the big cities, I looked at dwelling price inflation in the cities that were not affected by high overseas immigration in 1988-89. If the hypothesis was correct, these low growth cities would lack the jolt in prices that shows up in the high growth cities in 1988 and 1989.




Fig. 8.7 Median Dwelling Prices as a Percentage of Disposable Income \$1984 in Selected Areas with Low Population Growth and Low Overseas Migration 1984-1999 (Net Overseas Migration adjusted for category jumping.)

Source: ABS Demographic Statistics 3101, "Percentage rates of resident population growth" and HIA/CBA Housing Affordability Index for Disposable Income. I have adjusted prices to \$1984-5 AUD.

The results in Figure 8.7 support the hypothesis. In contrast to the pattern of disposable income as a percentage of median dwelling prices in the high population growth cities, the low population growth cities of Adelaide, Hobart, and Canberra and Other Areas (mostly rural) show no similar fall in affordability in 1988 and 1989. Canberra, which is the Federal capital and three hours drive from Sydney, has the lowest affordability of the areas studied, but this has varied relatively little over the period, in comparison with Sydney.

Some other factors that may have a bearing on housing and land prices would include rural to city drift and interstate population movements. Interest rates on loans also appear to be a big factor influencing individual local buyers. Interest rates, however, do not vary a great deal by location, and so are not a very important consideration when comparing cities and regions. Some other factors that would need to be taken into account in a more detailed study are median income differences between States, since there are variations;¹⁰⁵ and relative demand and supply of land, including scope for the city to expand. Sydney is far more "hemmed in" than Melbourne or Brisbane, for instance. Sydney's "international gateway" status creates income and capital flow effects as well as immigration flow effects. There is also the complicating factor that thirty years ago a wife's income was less likely to be counted towards a mortgage. This has changed and combined incomes raise purchase capacity and therefore affect prices. This would disadvantage single income home buyers.

Dwelling Prices and Affordability in France

As I have already argued at length, the French property development and housing industries do not rely on immigration and the possibilities of speculating on property are much less than in Australia. Investment in the housing market has failed as a major share-market option.¹⁰⁶

French laws taxing speculative profits may, however, be overcome in the short term by obtaining higher prices. In the absence of changes to the market, higher prices will ultimately have the effect of dampening down demand, due to market correction. If my hypothesis that overseas immigration artificially widens and stimulates the market is correct then the presence of overseas immigrants able to purchase dwellings in Australian cities and their absence in France would respectively facilitate and prolong rising dwelling prices in Australian cities and show up in very short cycles of speculation in France with little or no long term impact on prices. This hypothesis is borne out between 1965 and 1985 (Figure 8.8) From 1986 the variable of foreign investment widened both markets but the impact of immigration as a variable on the housing market did not alter in France.

Dwelling prices in France are difficult to pinpoint due to the great variety and number of small, medium and larger urban centres, apart from Paris. Paris prices are comparable to Sydney and Melbourne prices, but depend more on quality of the building, space available, and social class associations than on demand due to population pressure. Prices in other cities and towns are often modest compared to those in Australian cities. Below is a graph of French dwelling prices from 1955 to 2000, expressed in 1965 francs and with prices as a proportion of disposable income, expressed as an index of affordability. This measure is comparable to the one I have employed for Australian affordability.




Fig. 8.8 Index of price of dwelling in ratio to disposable Income, using 1965 francs.

This graph was photocopied in black and white so the colour distinctions have disappeared. The top line, indicating higher prices, is always for Paris. The second line is for other French urban centres, and the lowest line, "Province" is for Other Areas, including non-urban.

The graph shows the ratio of disposable income to domestic property prices per square meter from 1979 to the year 2000. Affordability was highest in 1981. Between 1987 and 1996, however, France, mainly Paris, was affected by the same period of global property speculation that affected Australia. This was the first time France had undergone such a phenomenon. In contrast to Australia, however, the prices returned to the level preceding the speculation bubble.¹⁰⁷

Source: *L'Observateur de l'Immobilier*, No. 43, paris, 1999. The original data source is "Marché immobilier des notaires" (Notaries' property market) and INSEE *Annuaire statistique de la France*, ed. 2001

We can observe here that dwelling prices in France, according to this measure of affordability, have risen and fallen quite steeply, but there appears to have been an overall stability, since 1965, when they stopped rising in real terms.¹⁰⁸

The financing of property development with foreign money would be unusual in France, which finances most of its own development and tends to be a financier of overseas construction projects as well as heading construction companies overseas,¹⁰⁹ but, between 1987 and 1996, Paris experienced a new level of real-estate speculation which was in part due to foreign money, Japanese in particular.¹¹⁰ The foreign investment concentrated in redevelopment of space for offices, but there was also redevelopment for housing. There are rumours that overseas buyers were attracted to the lower prices for French dwellings compared to others in Europe (presumably not realising how high the property taxes are, especially on transactions).¹¹¹ This unprecedented¹¹² period of strong speculation occurred mainly in Paris, although a shorter one affected some other major population centres. The boom was followed by a real-estate sector crisis, with real-estate agency employees reducing from 25,000 persons in 1990 to 12,000 in 1996.¹¹³ The French construction industry went through more hard times.¹¹⁴ With the Gulf War oil-shock of August 1992 banks ceased to make new loans, but individual buyers continued to speculate for some time, hoping that the situation would improve.¹¹⁵ Even in this time of higher disposable income, however, when prices rose due to speculation they quickly reached a point where people ceased to buy and prices fell, due to their unaffordability.

Looking at Figure 8.8 overall, we can see that, since about 1967, there has been no climb in domestic property prices, in relation to disposable income, in any way comparable to the pattern in Australia. (Compare Figure 8.8 with Figure 8.4.) The graph curve ultimately always goes up in Australia. In France it has always gone down again over a period now of 21 years. Although this recent period of inflation was the first of its kind in modern France, there seems to have been an eventual market correction. This was not the case in Australia, where prices have, with some periods of relative stability intervening, continued to rise, well after the global boom ended for France. This is especially the case for Sydney, the Australian city most comparable with Paris.

What can we conclude from this? Part of the difference in dwelling price inflation cycles may lie in the fact that in France there is no equivalent immigrant housing market; bringing in many migrants was not an option after 1973 and, even had it been

one, it would not have stimulated the French housing market, which does not cater to immigrant workers and their families.

Speculators cannot rely on constant human expansion in France but this is what trends promise them in Australia. In Australia, however, my research indicates that foreign buyers and high immigration, combined with the Australian land development and housing system, which relies on speculation, may be a major variable that initially boosted dwelling prices and then assisted in maintaining this increase until the next speculative cycle. If this is true then it represents a self-perpetuating focused benefit of overseas immigration for the property development and housing industries in Australia. This benefit would appear to be greatly enhanced by the relaxation of foreign investment law.

In France, although foreign investment apparently played an influential part in Paris from 1986 to 1996 for the first time, there were no spurts of growth in the local population of potential home buyers to keep the market bubbling. It may be that the inclusion of overseas buyers and speculators has produced a prolongation and deepening of the housing market cycle and this may be a sign of what is to come. The ratchet effect which appears to occur with each cycle in Australia is not present, however, since prices have continued to return to base, even in the case of this last amplified cycle.

More work needs to be done in this area in order to arrive at firmer conclusions as to why a ratchet effect is present in Australia but absent in France. Further study might explore these differences in the light of continuing trends of global property investment and different land development planning and housing systems and, of course, population trends.

CHAPTER NINE - CONCLUSION

So, what is the answer to the question of How is it that France was able to put a plan of low immigration into action, apparently so easily, but Australia was not?

Comparing France and Australia and other polities using a method of analysis based on Gary Freeman's theory of focused/diffuse benefits/costs, yielded useful new results.

Using the same theoretical framework as Freeman, I believe that my thesis identifies, for the first time, a major structural and economic difference between France (and the countries of the European Union with the exception of Britain and including the non-EU member, Sweden) and Australia (and the other English speaking liberal democratic settler societies, the United States, Canada and New Zealand.¹) The difference lies in their respective systems of land planning and housing and the relationships these systems have or do not have with immigration.

I also dealt with other possible or partial explanations for the differences in France's and Australia's immigration policies.

For instance, Katharine Betts's thesis on the role of high immigration as a badge of new class membership cannot be discounted. Without the unconscious support of "new class", which castigated any critics of high immigration, industry groups that profit from speculative opportunities reliant on high population growth might have encountered more learned and popular social opposition to their immigrationist lobbying. After all, although housing unaffordability is a major social issue and is known by government and the industries to be related to population growth, there has been little social education or criticism of this, and virtually no exploration of alternatives in many years.

Castles and Kosacks' reserve labor force theory worked better for Europe, where workers did not have to travel so far and where temporary labor was an official part, if not the whole part, of the immigration program. In Australia, however, if largely due to distance, most immigrants were potentially long stayers and only a proportion of these Australian immigrants remained in low wage unskilled jobs, whereas non EEC

immigrants in France tended to be concentrated in low wage areas. The Birrells' identification of this difference assisted the formation of the basis of my establishing a relationship between marginalisation, insecurity, immigration and difficulties in accessing housing in France that did not exist in Australia.

The explicit economic context of elements of labor importation in French immigration policy probably facilitated a Marxist approach to resolving conflict between local and imported labor, permitting worker organisations and political parties to argue for immigrants' rights at the same time as they agreed to limit numbers of non-EEC immigrants. (Weil and Hollifield) Nevertheless the inherent conflict between populationist and manpower supply policies and structures, combined with democratic and human rights principles, guaranteed exceptions to zero net immigration in France. (Hollifield)

Oil shock related economic explanations as the main reason for the cut-back in immigration in France in 1974 predominated amongst French authors (Tapinos, Weil) and those who analysed France at least partially within the context of the EEC (Hollifield, Brochman and Hammar : Hans van Amersfoort².) Economic explanations were treated as more or less secondary to social ones by Freeman (1977) and Money who, comparing France with countries outside the EEC, seemed to assume that the French state would not have cut back immigration for economic reasons if there had not also been longstanding social ones. I believe it was important to analyse France in its European economic community context

The Birrells' argument that Australia's immigration program was largely driven by a desire for a big local manufacturing market was also my major assumption. My thesis concentrated on an aspect of this, namely the role of the property development and housing industries in lobbying for and profiting from rapid population growth and related housing demand.

The Birrells' argument that Australian manufacturing industry became dependent on low skilled labor and adapted around it, rather than changing to a more skilled and technologically innovative society, represents a motivation for continuing immigration, even if it is not an economically efficient one. My thesis, especially when it discusses

energy, makes a case to support this argument, at least as regards the building industry. My argument is that the building industry, as well as profiting from immigration stimulated population growth, acted as a conduit for foreign money at the invitation of the Australian government, which also promoted low cost energy. In accessing foreign funding for speculative infrastructure, home-building, and other property development projects, in conjunction with a steady supply of new customers, compliments of the state, local industry was able to keep on with inefficient practices, outmoded technology and high energy consumption practices and product designs. Although the following is not a central part of my thesis, it could be added that the Australian property development industry is a high importer of immigrant labor³ - both skilled and unskilled - and to some degree exemplifies the Birrell's thesis.

The Freeman-Habermas crisis theory could be applied to the way France and Australia severely cut immigration at the time of the oil shock, if you consider that only a massive economic threat permeating to the interests of the elites could effect a change to, in France's case, manpower import and, in the Australian case, customer import.

Villanova's bibliographic study of immigration and housing in France demonstrated the recurrence in immigration literature of the issue of housing and immigration in France. Noiriel documented precarity or security of immigrant housing as part of historically established policies to emphasise temporariness or to promote permanency among immigrants.

The institutionalisation of a permanent immigrant factor in French immigration policy, institutions and documentation, was highlighted effectively by contrasting it with the specific impermanency of official German immigration. (Hollyfield).

In the issue of whether immigration to France was for populationist or temporary labor reasons, I argued in my literature review that it could be inferred that France had a *self adjusting* population building demographic policy, that varied according to the employment situation, using the mechanism of granting or withholding work permits and renewing, upgrading, or failing to renew the graduated one, three and ten year *cartes de séjour*. For quite some time France had a virtually open border but the structure of the formal visa system acted as a long term selector. This structure could also facilitate the

selection of particular streams of immigrants. Europeans were increasingly favoured - especially with the closure of the borders in 1974 - with EEC nationals ultimately qualifying automatically for the ten year visa from 1998.

European law, ratified by France in 1973, institutionalised family reunion as an inalienable human right and over-rode French laws attempting to reverse this right.⁴ Housing logistics, however, act as an obstacle to the exercise of that right.

Writers have also explored racialism as an impediment to immigration in France (Freeman 1979, Noiriel). The system of preferring EEC immigrants could be explained partially in this way but equally it could be explained using Noiriel's theory that anti-semitism and anti-immigrationism have political rather than racial foundations. Formalisation of the European union and a greater European Economic Community, of which France is a political subset has made intra-EEC immigration of EEC nationals a virtual non-event. The majority of objections to this arrangement have been political, to do with economic protectionism, although groups like the National Front have also raised cultural, ethnological and racist objections as well in this context although most often in the context of non-EEC immigration, particularly illegal immigration.⁵

It is likely that the factors evoked in these other explanations referred to above did affect the immigration policy in France and Australia, however I believe that my theory is a plausible one and provides an explanation for a substantial part of the differences in the evolution of France and Australia's population policies.

I think I have made a good case that the different land development planning and housing systems in France and Australia were a major variable in the differences in the immigration policies of these countries, especially after 1974. Australia's system was highly speculative and depended strongly on immigration, which brought focused benefits to the property development and related or dependent industries.

The nationally based land development planning system in France did not favour land speculation and did not rely on immigration. Land speculation traditionally relies on episodes of peak demand to which fast or irregular spurts of population growth are an important contribution, but the French system did not develop an institutionalised

dependency on these and therefore no focused group of beneficiaries appears to have formed to encourage immigration as a source of such population growth. The public housing system provided for lower socio-economic groups and undertook, if it did not actually succeed brilliantly at this, to provide housing for immigrants. This meant that the French private housing industry confined most of its activity to the wealthier socio-economic sector, which included few of the traditional worker immigrants who entered the country in quantities, especially prior to 1974. So the French housing industry was not dependent on immigration-fed population growth either.

This lack of dependency on immigration in the French property development and housing industries would help to explain the fact that there was apparently little fuss when non-EEC immigration was officially ceased. After 1974, adaptation to economic and energy related strictures by the manufacturing sectors, including the building industry, appears also to have led to an absence of lobbying for immigrant labor. Manufacturing and other labour intensive industries changed their manpower needs, seeking more highly trained workers and more efficient technology. In this thesis it was important to consider French policy within the wider EEC context and this was something that not all writers offering explanations of French immigration policy had done. These changes occurred within a supportive European EEC political and economic environment, that assisted the ability of France and other EEC members to satisfy labor and market needs. The immigration changes were in harmony with similar policy changes among France's EEC neighbours. The French economy seems to have adjusted to the prospect of a stable or declining local population, supplemented by an export oriented market.⁶ The goal of a big local consumer market had never characterised French populationism.

Following the Oil Shock of 1973, it seems clear that French State-led policy reinforced economically based energy decisions by private enterprise and domestic users and that this policy was sustained. The French State also embarked on a long term plan to maximise France's energy self sufficiency and its capacity for energy exports and for alternative energies. Although France was a leader in nuclear energy production, similar energy independence enhancing policies were undertaken by France's continental neighbours, so the political, economic and social environment was supportive. France's post 1973 energy and demographic policies and practice seem to

indicate a greater attunement to energy related costs than seems to prevail in Australia in both the short and long term.⁷

The French agricultural system was and remains a beneficiary of imported labor, however cheap seasonal labor for French agriculture is allowed for by the French immigration system, which counts it apart from ordinary worker immigration and administers it separately.⁸

Industries like restaurants and hotels, municipal services, and construction in France, which tend to employ imported labor do not appear to be sufficiently organised or sensitised to this issue to form a pressure block to maintain or increase official supply. An unverifiable portion of their needs is almost certainly provided by illegal immigrants.

As long as this minor workforce remains illegal and relatively sparse it appears to exert little pressure on social security, education and housing costs, in part because it has no right to assert its presence. From time to time there are amnesties in France and other EEC countries where a proportion of this labour is given the opportunity to apply for citizenship and this seems to amount to a defacto permanent immigration policy at times. (As a balance to the toleration of illegal labour, the French have a quite aggressive system of fines and punishments for employers who push the envelope too far regarding illegal labour. This is exercised with a formal discretionary component.⁹)

There were and are a number of focused costs which appear to be associated with immigration in the minds of the public and politicians in France. Many are associated with housing. These include conflicts over allocation to immigrants of part of the taxes collected from employers for public housing. These tax issues have been used by the National Front to highlight the public housing shortage to the detriment of immigrants. Elections for HLM management committees have provided opportunities for the National Front to campaign for public housing to be the exclusive right of the French. Public housing is a public cost and responsibility, so any increased demand for it or conflict associated with it is problematic for the government. Immigrants (unless they are citizens of the European Economic Community) cannot vote in local elections and immigrant housing has become associated with violence and conflict so local councils

avoid allowing it to be built in their areas. Immigrants thus form a large part of those living in substandard housing. This must make it difficult for them to meet the requirements for organising family reunion, and thus would form a barrier to chain migration. This is also the perception of the immigrants' rights group, GISTI.¹⁰

Change to a populationist policy in the foreseeable future seems unlikely for France. The question of manpower for national defence no longer arises since France's size has caught up with that of her traditional enemies (whose fertility rates are lower, especially those of Germany, the original source of pronatalist competition). Furthermore, with the prominence of the European Union all these old enemies are now mutually dependent. The prospect of an aging population is viewed with a certain amount of equanimity, in the knowledge that this is a problem that has built in limits, since the aging population will die. The North American 'solution' of 'replacement migration' is viewed as profoundly eccentric by French demographers.¹¹ Economic solutions appear to be the only ones seriously contemplated and these are presently under discussion, with the necessity to capitalise French pension funds being as hotly debated as it was in Australia during the 1980s.¹² There is no noticeable European lobby that connects local population growth with economic growth; the strategy is for export trade. And so France enters the twenty first century, along with the rest of the EEC, with a well accepted possibility of population stabilisation and decline and a Malthusian economy.

Australia's position and outlook on demographic, economic and energy policy are quite different from France's. I have established that Australia as well as France (and other first world countries, including the US) initially responded to the first oil shock with Malthusian and energy saving approaches to policy. This showed that there had once been a more widespread will towards population stabilisation and energy conservation.

Clearly other forces must subsequently have prevailed in Australia and the USA to cause the sudden political, environmental and socio-economic policy about-turn, in contrast with France's consolidation of Colbertiste/Malthusian style policy, which occurred within a supportive EEC environment. Citing historical and contemporary evidence, I have inferred that institutionalised Australian land planning development and housing systems would have been among the forces creating obstacles to population stabilisation and energy conservation.

The turning point of the 1973 oil shock seems to have been overlooked in other immigration and population policy writing. This may be because, to my knowledge, no other sociological study of population policy and immigration in Australia has linked energy policy to immigration policy and housing policy. The material I raised covering the Whitlam government period in Australia had not before been used in this way, in this context or in such a combination. Generally immigration writing in the past had tended to skirt over the Whitlam era. Perhaps it was embarrassing for immigrationists who tended to support Labor to realise that Whitlam had reduced immigration. The apparent exploitation of "anti-immigrant" sentiments by which Money explained Whitlam's campaign and policies was probably another source of embarrassment. The Khemlani loan scandal was a very deep source of embarrassment and the plan of making Australia energy self-sufficient by laying a comprehensive natural gas pipeline came to be considered, if not in all mining circles, in most politico-economic circles, as an example of the Whitlam government's naive ambition.

Regarding France, to my knowledge, Postel-Vinay's Ehrlichian-like policy rationales have never been strongly related to post oil shock immigration and housing policy in anglophone works on French immigration policy before. And even though the French writer, Patrick Weil cites them, he does not really integrate these points into his explicit argument, except as evidence of Prime Minister Chirac's failure to deliver on promised housing for immigrants at the time. Much of my argument was derived from French writers' implicit acceptance of major changes in socio-economic and energy policy after the oil shock in works on immigration, particularly Weil's. I believe that my thesis is the first to make the differences between France and Australia (and Western Europe and the ESSS) on such policies explicit and relevant. Possibly only a comparison between the perspectives of the two countries could draw this out and for this an ecological orientation like the New Ecological Paradigm seems to have been necessary.

Central to my thesis was the existence in Australia of a growthist lobby group consisting of a number of high profile political and economic actors and agents who aggressively promote high immigration as a means of having a much larger population which they deem a necessity for economic growth. I showed that since the early 1900s manufacturing, particularly in Victoria, has argued for high population growth in order

to provide a bigger local market, rather than talking about exporting more, or indeed, contemplating a steady-state economy. Referring to Michael Cannon's work on land speculation and Neville Hicks' work¹³ on population boosting after the 1890s, I was able to relate early institutionalisation of a boom and bust syndrome in Australian property development and housing to population movements associated with the end of the gold rush and international finance changes.

The persistence of boom and bust features, the speculative nature of the industry, and the involvement of government and finance, recurred on a number of occasions after 1945, but in recent memory were particularly exemplified in the late 1980s. Trevor Sykes' study of the 'corporate cowboys' and property development and their interaction with bankers and politicians, and Peter Rimmer's early work on the role of foreign finance in construction and property development and interstate government rivalry, highlighted different aspects of this phenomenon.

Speculation and high prices have continued to increase with progressive market deregulation, financial system deregulation, and liberalisation of foreign acquisitions and takeovers law from 1975. With ever greater foreign investment potential, the stakes in keeping Australia's population expanding and housing and infrastructure demand high, must be enormous. These ever increasing focused benefits to the property development sector from population growth have reinforced the growthist housing lobbies' reasons to promote high immigration, especially in the light of lower rates of natural increase with the end of the baby boom.

Government policy towards housing in Australia is virtually laissez-faire. In the absence of being able to exert any practical controls on the wild course of housing and the dependence of the industry on foreign finance and high immigration, government is reduced to attempts to persuade industry to change by mere argument, if Minchin's efforts and Keating's opinion that property developers should not be allowed to contribute donations to political parties are at all indicative.

The Howard Government would probably prefer to exert greater control over both selection and numbers and kinds of visas and category jumps than it presently does, for national economic and environmental health, and for democratic reasons. A major

political obstacle appears to be the demands of the Housing Industry and allied business groups, such as building materials suppliers and manufacturers, seeking larger domestic markets. These industries are a focused group of immigration beneficiaries and it is in their interest to support any other pro-immigration lobbies. Property development and housing fund economically important and politically very influential industries downstream, including banking and building societies. The land development and construction industries and the building materials industries are important enough to have their own category grouping on the Australian stock exchange.¹⁴

The political pressures are complex and multi-level.¹⁵ Although the land development industry is not very labor intensive, the Housing and Construction industries, and those upstream, such as the logging and timber industries, and other building materials suppliers, are. They are therefore in a position to influence unions whose workers depend on projects going ahead. Traditionally these unions have exerted pressure on the ALP and the same industries' employer groups have exerted pressure on the Liberal and National Parties. Such industry pressure depends increasingly on a confluence of worker and employer interests and both major parties are probably targeted by both industry and unions these days.

Even allowing for inflation, buying a house is becoming increasingly expensive in Australia in the major State capitals. Not only is immigration policy evolving to select out poor applicants to Australia, but it seems that property development and housing policy are selecting in increasingly wealthy native-born and immigrant Australians¹⁶ and courting wealthy overseas buyers and professional investors. This leaves poor Australians facing a situation where they can no longer afford to dwell in Sydney and where only the outer suburbs of the other big immigrant receiving cities are still affordable. These are diffuse costs; such people are not organised or vocal. The option of home purchase as a hedge against poverty in old age is fast disappearing.¹⁷ A combination of high immigration, free market policies and an unwillingness by government to fetter the market by promoting social equity in housing by buying up land cheaply for resale to builders, strongly coincide with growing housing unaffordability.

House price rise in Australian cities is a form of demand related inflation and it contributes to inflation in the cost of living in those cities and in the areas outside the cities. A certain class of Australian residents and foreign based investors - those who own property in the high population growth cities - are often in a position to be able to profit from the fairly constant rise in city dwelling prices. In this sense dwelling price inflation provides speculative opportunities to those home owners. People who live in the cities but do not own land or dwellings, and people who live outside the cities, whether or not they own properties in non-growth areas, are not able to profit from this city dwelling price inflation, but they pay the price in higher rents or in a related general inflation. This means that there is a basic inequity between property and non-property owners in the city and between the country and the city. A land development planning and housing system that perpetuates and enhances this city-country and propertied-unpropertied classes divide may be one of the forces at root of the growing social and economic divide between these classes and the antagonism, and even perhaps the racialism, that accompanies it.¹⁸

The pattern of individuals capitalising on their houses by selling and moving, (as described by Shane Nugent) exacerbates the whole syndrome of an economy geared to property speculation and a society and industry affected by it.

In contrast the French affordability situation is relatively stable. Home ownership is steadily increasing and public housing has improved for French nationals, whilst the situation for "immigrant workers", their families, and illegals seems to remain the same.

In Chapter Eight I argued that one of several impacts of high immigration may be seen as a reinforcement of focused gain to the housing/property development industry in Australia and to the downstream beneficiaries. Considerable diffuse and rising costs to the Australian community in land and housing price inflation appear to be entailed, however. Comparing the Australian case with France shows that the system there, in the absence of migration impacting on the housing market, has managed inflation much better, despite the entry of foreign buyers into the market. A major difference in the French housing market was the absence of immigration as a factor contributing to demand related inflation.

The research suggests that the speculative benefits of high population growth have been magnified by globalisation of the property market and these rising stakes are likely to increase the difficulty of population stabilisation and energy conservation under the Australian land development and planning system.

Property development and housing and the upstream and downstream industries they benefit represent a major part of the Australian economy and these industries have continued to be particularly vocal about increasing population.

Population growth is also still cited as necessary for defence, although not by the military, who rely on technological superiority and mutual economic alliances rather than force of numbers in modern warfare. In a region with behemoth populations it is hard to see Australia ever catching up with the populations of its rapidly growing neighbours and so this argument seems absurd on several levels.

All in all, there does not seem to be much philosophical logic attached to Australian growthism. However there is the practical but covert logic of vested interests. As Gary Freeman theorised, the promoters of population growth speak for or come from industries and organisations that are focused beneficiaries of growth. And they have the ears of government. In contrast to France most items that appear as costs related to immigration there appear as focused benefits in Australia. This is in part because in Australia they are identified as private sector costs where in France they are identified as public sector costs. So, in Australia the following consequences of population growth are seen as opportunities for profit and thus all have their champions: the need for increased infrastructure, such as roads; the need for more houses; property inflation, which provides more local council rates and enables owners to speculate on their homes, increased local population density (more rate payers) and competition for space. Competition for space leads to rezoning and windfalls for speculators. Banks, building societies, insurance companies and other financial institutions all rely on property development and home mortgages as reliable sources of regular revenue with built in growth. Many other Australians rely on these institutions to provide them with loans and to invest their money for them, so they also rely on the role of population growth in raising land and housing prices. These are the focused benefits related to land

development and housing, but there are many other focused benefits built into the system, and more are being added every day.

Australia also competes internationally with its local production based on prices for petroleum based energy, particularly at the bowser, which are still comparatively cheap by European standards and so growth in population and consumption per capita seems only to present a problem in how fast Australia can acquire the investment capital to provide the infrastructure to keep satisfying demand and how to attract a wealthy class of immigrant. Lack of national planning at the level of infrastructure¹⁹ and pollution control or adaptation to new sources of energy means that Australia doesn't count the costs of all this growth; the only national accounts it keeps are a financial balance sheet that is ill equipped to cost the erosion of natural resources like water, soil and biodiversity. In the Australian economic system these problems are merely flagged as future opportunities for investment in technologies that may be used to fight them; sewerage recycling systems, mapping systems for locating salinization, freeways for redistributing and organising traffic congestion. Somehow the national accounting system is unable to question the advisability of continuing depreciation of the natural resources that provide essential services to the economy. Politically the question is raised but economically the system seems unable to support the political measures that could stop the damage.²⁰ It seems in comparison that the political and economic system in France and Western Europe has been more successful in costing population and energy consumption growth than Australia's and those of the other English speaking settler countries.

Quite a lot has been written comparing European and other Western demographic policies. To my knowledge, no anglophone population sociologist has previously identified the mechanics supporting a connection between land development planning and housing systems affecting immigration as a factor in population growth politics. Perhaps this is indeed because casual assumptions based on local models have blinded us to significant structural differences.²¹

Attention to the relationship between population growth and immigration on the one hand, and land development planning and housing systems on the other, has wider implications for sociological study. It could be applied to the developing world to see

if, for instance, Chinese development planning deters population growth whereas laissez-faire planning in India promotes it. A number of other questions present themselves. What is the system for land development planning in Israel, especially as concerns the Gaza strip? Will the fact that Vietnam and Algeria were colonised by the French make any difference to planning and development and population growth there in the long term, or did they miss out on the French planning reforms of the early 20th century? Can the fact that the population trajectories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia are so much lower than other South Pacific Islands be related in any way to the presence of French land development and public housing system there? A study of the land development planning traditions in Fiji (bloodline inheritance without the possibility of selling outside the Fijian ethnic community) might help to explain the difficulties in integrating the two disparate communities of Indian and islander Fijian. Future planning for housing and development in remote Australian aboriginal communities based on the research in this thesis might help to avoid the planning mistakes that lead to overpopulation and the destructive exploitation of significant regions that goes with speculative development. Comparing Australian land planning with French planning could also be used to further explain the growing inaccessibility of home ownership for Australians due to high prices and the flight to cheaper housing away from the major cities, especially Sydney. A survey of attitudes underlying the political divide between city and country in Australia might reveal an awareness of differences in landed asset values and allied grievances that need political attention. Overall, better appreciation of differences in land management might assist Australia to combat the growing desertification of our continent and the destruction of biodiversity and natural amenity due to uncontrolled land clearing.

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Environmentalism, Alan Parker, comments cited: Alan A. Parker, Secretary to the Town and Country Planning Association (Vic) 50 Stirling Street, Footscray. Victoria, Australia, 3011, Email alanpar@ozemail.com.au, Telephone 03 9689 3693, Fax 03 9687 9519

ENDNOTES

END NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

¹ See my Statistical Appendix, pp.24-29 and p.44, for more detail, where I also refer to later projections, including those with lower fertility rates. Note that the more recent the year from which projections were taken, the less the increase appears proportionate to the starting population. Therefore, when the population reaches 20 million, the projected increase would only amount to about 40%. Data referred to here was from Australian Demographic Statistics, June Quarter 1997, ABS Cat. 3101.1, p16, and *Projections of the Population of Australia, States and Territories 1995-2051*, Cat. 3220.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, pp134-135, Tables 9.8 and 9.9 and Population Projections, Australia, 1999 to 2101, Catalogue No. 3222.0. According to past trends in factors contributing to the rate of population growth in Australia, the decisive factor in these population projections is the rate of net migration. In France (see next footnote) this is not the case, since immigration trends are lower overall and also in relation to the population base. The ABS projection series explore a number of scenarios. None of them quite fit current trends, which are a fertility rate of around 1.77 and net immigration around 100,000 per annum. The 1995 Series C is probably the closest to reality, although it sets the fertility rate a little too high. One therefore concludes that population, according to current trends, will probably come close to, but remain under 28,270,700 persons by 2050.

The 1995 Series C: "High Fertility, High Overseas Migration", gives projections with a Total Fertility Rate of 1.865, net migration of 100,000, departing from a total population of 18,182,400 in 1996. Under such conditions, Australia would have been on course to reach a total population of 28,270,700 persons. This population would still be increasing at a rate of 0.4%.

Trends in net migration numbers are running against a similar scenario. Australia's total fertility rate has been below 1.865 now since 1994, when it declined to 1.85 and for the last couple of years it has been around 1.77. Total Net Migration went well over 100,000 in 1995 and 1996, but the average was 87,169 over the ten years from 1988-1997. Averages taking in fifteen and twenty years from 1997 back are however, in the low 90,000s.

The task of a sociologist is to take social trends into consideration as well as statistical trends. Many of these factors incline one to consider the proposition that a higher population outcome, around the realm of 26-28,000,000, based on migration at or above 100,000 might be as likely as a slightly more moderate outcome. In my statistical chapter I will also comment on fertility trends in Europe and whether Australia's fertility may decrease further.

In the current political climate the will of the people is for lower migration, but money backs high migration and pressures from the housing and allied industries are enormous. This is a major argument of my thesis. For immigration levels to fall, say to zero net, at any time in the near future seems quite unlikely. However something that might create conditions where such a trend could manifest at a date in the short term future would, in my opinion, be a major economic slump affecting Australia and the countries which are its major source of international

immigration, causing higher emigration and lower immigration. If present economic conditions accompanying the 2000 oil shock were to persist this would in my opinion provide conditions for much lower immigration settings.

² For detail see my Statistical Appendix pp 30-35. Sources: Quang-Chi Dinh, *Projection de population totale pour la France métropolitaine, Base RP90. Horizons 1990-2050*, INSEE, 1995, Annexe II, p.30 and Table A5, p.139, and projections carried out privately by INSEE for the French Economic and Social Council. These were ten Population Projections from 1990 to 2040. And they compared data from both INSEE and Eurostat Series. These latter ten projections were prepared by Annie Mesrine, Direction des statistiques démographiques et sociales, Department de la démographie, Division Enquêtes et études démographiques. The file had been prepared for the attention of Mme Artiguebieille, conseil économique et social, Paris. File sent to me by Suzanne Thave, Head of the Statistical Service on Foreigners at INSEE, dated and identified as Paris, 7 September 1998, No.69/F171.

Appendix 4, which is my Statistical Appendix, goes into much greater detail about the reasons for choosing one scenario over another in my statistical chapter. I will, however, state here my opinion, which is that the most likely scenario for France, going on current statistical, political and economic trends lies between the options of TFT at 1.7 and net immigration between 50,000 and 150,000, using the Eurostat series. With immigration at 50,000 this would give us a population in 2040 of 62,000,000. With immigration at 150,000 net the population might reach 66,000,000. This gives us a French population which would grow between four and eight million until around 2040/2050 when there would be quite an abrupt decline with the increasing death rate of the large baby boomer aged cohort.

My evaluation of these projections and opinions was made in the light of my own research into definition, collection, validity and reliability of demographic statistics in France and it is my considered opinion after examination of this data. It concurs with mainstream opinion in France.

³ In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joseph Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147, was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations?", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March.

⁴ See my Chapter Six, under the subtitle, "The Populationist Property Development and Housing Lobby in Australia today."

⁵ This is a conclusion I have drawn from my research into this area and I cannot cite any particular document that specifically makes the point that the French have accepted the idea of population stabilisation. I can say that immigrationism and pronatalism, the two forms of populationism institutionalised in 1945, are no longer representative of the mainstream and barely represented at all. Responses to the recent United Nations paper on Replacement Migration, were few, but all I could locate were highly critical, of the concept and the demographic calculations. For instance see Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, INED, No. 358, Juin 2000. Another indication of this absence of populationism is to be found in one of several investigations of the problem of financing pensions for an aging population. For instance, Jean-Michel Charpin, the Minister for Planning, oversaw a government enquiry into solutions for population aging and the result was *The Future of Our*

Pensions (L'Avenir de nos retraites), Documentation Francaise (Electronic), Paris, April 1999. Available electronically from the French government website "La Documentation Francaise", <http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/>. This is the French Government printer and publisher. In this document the idea of boosting the population through immigration is simply not even contemplated and there is only a murmur about birthrates being another aspect of the equation.

⁶ Although I concentrate on France and Australia, it seems true to say that French policy and development is often typical of recent policy and development in other member countries of the European Economic Community, and Australian policy and development resembles that of the United States, Canada and New Zealand. In other words, the conclusions I draw about France and Australia's demographic, development planning, housing and energy policies in this thesis are likely to be true respectively for other EEC countries and for other English-speaking settler countries.

⁷ The figures are well known: In 1804 the first billion was reached; in 1927 the second billion; in 1960, the third billion; in 1974 the fourth billion; in 1987 the fifth billion and in 1999, the sixth billion. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center. <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/popwnote.html>: US Census Bureau: "Notes on the World POPClock and World Vital Events," Note: Data updated 05-10-2000. On this site it says that, according to the current estimates, the world population reached 6 billion on 19-Jun-99 at about 5:56:07 AM GMT (June 19 at 1:56 am EDT). Because of the uncertainties of the estimates, and the fact that estimates are constantly being updated, it is possible that the estimate of when 6 billion was reached could change. The United Nations, whose population estimates differ somewhat from the US figures, marked the "Day of 6 Billion" on October 12, 1999. The world population estimates and projections used to produce these figures were developed by the International Programs Center based on analysis of available data on population, fertility, mortality, and migration. The analysis is performed separately for the 227 countries or areas of the world with a population of 5,000 or more. These analyses are based on census, survey, and administrative information. For most countries, and especially less developed countries, adjustment of the data is necessary to correct for errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the data. Since the most recent data for each country are at least two years old (and for most countries they are older), the population figures used for the clock are projections from those estimates based on assumed trends in fertility, mortality, and migration. As new data become available, all data are reevaluated and past conclusions may change. For general information about how these estimates and projections are made, see Appendix B of the report *World Population Profile: 1998*. These estimates and projections are contained in the International Data Base of which the home page is at <http://www.undp.org/popin/popin.htm>.

⁸ This is affected by population growth and may be measured in GDP, energy consumption or hectares of land. On all these measures, taken per capita, we find in most cases that the "wealth" of people in the first world is increasingly greater than the wealth of those in developing countries. Citing United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 1994, Rees and Wackernagel, in *Our Ecological Footprint*, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, British Columbia, Canada, 1998, p.1, state that "Increasing economic production has neither levelled income differences, made the 'haves' noticeably happier, nor satisfied the basic needs of the world's poorest one billion people. While 20 per cent of the world's population enjoys unprecedented material well-being, at least another 20 per cent remain in conditions of absolute poverty. In fact, the top 20 per cent of income earners take home over 60 times more than the poorest 20 per cent, and this gap has doubled over the last 30 years."

⁹ Oil Shocks refer to periods when global oil prices rise very steeply. I have written about this in more detail in Appendix 3 of this thesis. However, here is a short explanation: The first shock occurred around 1973 and was due to the oil producing countries, OPEC, forming a cartel, which forced oil importing countries to purchase oil at a very high price. Since the end of

the coal era industrialised nations' economies have depended more and more on oil, which is much more efficient than coal. Since the oil shock newly industrialising countries, with huge populations, like China, India and South East Asia, have become much more dependent on oil as well. Population growth and growth in consumption of industrialised produced goods which rely on high energy consumption mean that the world fears running out of cheap oil. This is because there is no cheap substitute currently available that can replace all of oil's functions. It is rumoured that the 1999-2000 oil shock may be linked to real resource supply problems in the face of growing demand and draw-down on established fields. Sources: The Australian National Geographic Encyclopedia of Australia, 1986, "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295. The definition and history of shocks and "counter shocks" can become quite complicated, see for example, Nicolas Sarkis, "Pétrole, le troisième choc?" (The Third Oil Shock?), in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 2000, p.1 (My translation) "Within the space of 27 years, between 1973 and 2000, the world oil market has been shaken by two major "shocks" and "counter shocks". To these should be added mini-shocks – always unexpected. Expressed in 1973 dollars, the price of petrol has almost quadrupled since the day after the October war of 1973 - \$2.67 per barrel in 1972 to \$9.82 in 1974. Prices reached an historical record of \$17.13 in 1982, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, before reducing to one third subsequent to the first counter shock of 1985-1986. The second major countershock of 1998 was marked by a fall in prices of 34.3%, followed in 1999 by a recovery to 42.2%. Despite that rise, and before the sudden rise at the beginning of 1999 took the cost of crude to around \$30, 1999 prices never went above (in 1974 dollars) half of their 1974 level." (In 2000 they were well above this 1999 level.) Sarkis's article also suggested that oil production may peak in 2005. For more on this see, <http://www.oilcrisis.com/gas/> which has articles by well known oil geologists and links to discussions on when oil will peak, the impact of this, and the viability of various substitutes.

¹⁰ H Martin and H Schumann, *The Global Trap*, Pluto Press, London, New York, 1997, pp108-110.

¹¹ This is well documented and the subject of frequent newspaper commentary, but see, for instance, Money, Jeanette, *Fences and Neighbours*, Cornell University Press, 1999 Ithaca and London, pp.10-13.

¹² Alexis Spire, "Asile politique 121,000 réfugiés vivent en France", in *INSEE Première*, No. 601, July 1998 and Joanne Kinslor, "Sending Asylum Seekers Elsewhere: Recent Developments in Australian 'Safe Third Country' Law", *People and Place*, Vol. 8, No.2, 2000, pp53-68.

¹³ In Australia this issue is not very prevalent, see Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Longman, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp.30-39.

¹⁴ For more detail see Chapter Six under the sub-heading, "The Populationist Property Development and Housing Lobby in Australia today." Examples are The Australian Population Institute (APOP), www.apop.com.au, the Housing Industry Association (HIA), www.buildingonline.com.au (follow links to 'industry information' then 'immigration') and the Business Council of Australia (BCA), www.bca.com.au (see menu for 'Population Policy', 'Sustainable Development' and 'BCA Papers', which contains texts of three issues which each have articles about population.) The Australian newspaper is also a supporter of population growthism and co-hosted the growthist conference "Australia Unlimited" in 1998 along with many manufacturing and other business concerns. The Housing Industry of Australia co-published, with Allen and Unwin, a book written by Steven Castles, William Foster, and Glen Withers, *Immigration in Australia*, St Leonards, New South Wales, Australia, 1998. This is a series of research articles which favor population growth for Australia. For some more discussion of the growthist lobby, see also Money, *op.cit.*, p.167.

¹⁵ This is less the case in France than in Australia. Unlike the situation in Australia and the US, legal defense of persons refused visas is not yet big business in France, although the situation is

changing. Illegals theoretically have the right to free legal aid, but don't often use this, perhaps because the legal profession tends to be quite conservative on these issues. In France the "Chevenement law" on immigration of June 1998 required that a motive be supplied for visa refusals for certain categories of applicants. These categories were spouses and parents of French citizens, beneficiaries of family reunion, foreigners with working permits, and students in higher education. According to the Minister for foreign affairs in 2000, this change in the law gave rise to a strong increase in appeals against visa refusals. The number rose from 10 appeals in 1997 to 1000 in 1999. Sources: *Le Monde*, 2 February 2000, "Des demandes en augmentation" (author and page number not available) and the Australian Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Tribunal. The Migration Review Tribunal recorded cases lodged between 1 July 1999 and 30 April 2000 as 5052. The Refugee Review Tribunal recorded at year ended 30/5/2000, 40,060 appeals lodged.

¹⁶ Pronatalism had been a strong force in Australian politics from the 1890s, at least, but after the Second World War it found its focus in the Santamaria led "Movement" (also known as "The Groupers"). The Movement had members from both Liberal and Labor Parties, mostly among Catholics. However members of the movement came into conflict within the Labor Party, resulting in the formation of a new break away party, the Democratic Labor Party. Most groupers, who were the major pronatalists in the ALP, allied themselves with the DLP. This party failed to succeed in its own right and fell into obscurity, and the pronatalist movement with it. The "Movement" did regroup, this time without Vatican support, and survives in different organizations today, including the National Civic Council and The Australian Family Association. In 2000 the Labor Party came out with a policy that had elements of pronatalism and in November 2001 John Howard's election platform included generous tax rebates to mothers of new babies. Sources: Paul Ormond, *The Movement*, Nelson, 1968 and Robert Murray, *The Split, Australian Labor in the Fifties*, Cheshire, 1970. There are currently signs of pronatalism gaining some support in the major political parties again - in ALP policy for 2000 and in John Howard's election platform for 2001.

In France pronatalist policy lasted until the late 1970s and virtually lost all currency with change of government in 1982. See, for instance, Dupaquier, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4: De 1914 à nos jours; Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, p.195, Table 29, "Evolution du barème des allocations familiales selon le rang de l'enfant, depuis 1938" (en proportion du salaire mensuel de base). This is a table showing the evolution of family allowances from 1938, as a proportion of the basic monthly wage. Since the early 1980s policies have been focused on overcoming broad socio-economic inequalities rather than on assisting large families.

¹⁷ Freeman, *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, the French and British Experience, 1945-1975*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979, pp.69-80.

¹⁸ See my discussion of this point in Chapter Four (Review of Traditional Literature) of this thesis for more detail. Some writers who credit the French program as having retained nation-building purpose are Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'race' and ethnicity in contemporary France*, Routledge, 1995, pp10-11; James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.55. Here he also contrasts the links between immigration policy and nation building in France with the absence of these in Germany, which did not have the same history of concern about population decline; Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France de la fin du XIXe siècle à nos jours*, Armand Colin, 1996, pp 195-196; Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, p.14: writes that the objectives of the immigration program in 1946 were clear and included the objective of returning to a bigger population. She adds that use of a State monopoly, the ONI to recruit foreign workers and the establishment of an official link between population policy and immigration (the Ministry of Public Health and Population which was advised by the High Committee of Population) underscores this commitment.

In Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.15 and Jacques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: De 1914 à nos jours*, p.472, it is noted that the principle of family immigration was established in a decree on 24 December 1945 and later confirmed in a circular by the Minister of Public Health and Population on 20 January 1947 which confirmed the political will to encourage permanent settlement of immigrants. The role of the French international immigration bureau, the ONI - (Office nationale des immigrations, now known as the OMI - Office des migrations internationales) in facilitating family reunion where appropriate lodgings were available was set out in a circular dated 20 January 1947. The progressive nature of the three kinds of residents' permits and the corresponding acquisition of social and civil rights was a system originally designed to encourage fertile immigrants of the "right type". The three tiered hierarchy of permanence in residents' permits and the decentralised administration of applications and renewals is a system which can permit discretionary fulfillment of the intentions with which they were originally designed. These intentions were to facilitate permanent settlement of desirable individuals of an age to have children - less than 35 years old.

Monique Hervo and Marie-ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers libres 219-220, Cahiers Libres 219-220, Librairie François Maspero, 1971, p.338, write about immigrants in Bidonvilles being urged to take on French nationality in order to get a house. They surmise that this is because of France's population building designs and cite M. Massenet, November 1968, No. 761, *Hommes et migrations, Documents*, who wrote that the highest aim of immigration policy was for the immigrant to naturalise.

¹⁹ For definitions of EEC, EU and related terms, such as Maastricht and Schengen, see Appendix 1, Glossary.

²⁰ See for instance, Charles-Albert Michalet, "France", in Dunning, John, H., (Ed.), *Governments, Globalisation, and International Business*, OUP, 1997

²¹ *The Australian Encyclopaedia*, Australian Geographic Pty Ltd, Terrey Hills, NSW, Australia, 6th Edition, 1996, "Mineral Industry", pp.2090-2093. [No author for this article is recorded. Instead there is a signature, "Bureau of Mineral Resources, Ed."] There was an embargo placed on the export of iron ore in 1938 because there were believed to be very limited reserves. It was not until 1949 that a series of important new ore discoveries began. In 1950 the value of mineral exports was \$69 million. In 1980 it was \$6802 million. "It was not until 1965 that the mineral industry produced what was probably the first favourable balance of overseas mineral trade in the twentieth century." (p.2092) Gold and some other precious metals have been traditional fallbacks in tough times but the high export role of gold, silver and copper and tin between the 1850s and the 1890s waned considerably after 1910. Gold production had a temporary revival in the 1930s and then did not greatly feature in the economy until after 1950. Also see various histories of Australia's mining industry, for instance, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983.

²² This is a major difference between the federal system of government (as in Australia) and the unitary system of government (as in France). Source: Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, Development and housing are regulated by States and local governments in Australia. (Per Terry Burke, personal communication: an interesting exception to this was where the Chifflay government did at one stage bring in an Australia wide regulation that no house could be more than 12 squares, due to shortages of building materials.) Later the Whitlam government was to attempt to synchronize planning at the State level by influencing it from the federal level, principally through funding inducements. I go into these matters further on in this thesis, in Chapters Three and Seven.

²³ The informal connotations were that within the EEC skills, education, economies and population pressures were increasingly similar to France's, whereas immigration from outside the EEC was identified with the third world, high population pressures, economic distress, low education and low skills. The formalisation of this process shows up in the net immigration statistics which, from 1975 to the mid 1990s, did not count EEC family reunion immigrants as immigrants, and which, over a long period, had already ceased to count other immigrants from within the EEC except in unusual circumstances. The collection of statistics for non-EEC and EEC was done by two different bodies. See Appendix 4 of this thesis for more detail.

²⁴ Despite a pro-high immigration stance in the Liberal Country Party coalition and their planned intake of 140,000 for 1971-72, net immigration was less than 50,000 in 1972. This is attributable to emigration, reflecting continuing difficulties in retaining immigrants. High emigration of all categories of immigrants began in 1969 and continued until 1980. In December 1972 the ALP came in with a policy to cut immigration, although they had a very positive attitude to immigrant welfare. The Minister for Immigration under the Whitlam government, Al Grassby, was actually in favor of quite high immigration, but, according to Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1987, pp 86-87, his recommendations for planned intakes were all "chopped back". Nevertheless in 1974 net total immigration was as high as that of 1971. With the recession hitting very hard in 1975 there was a low intake and high emigration continued. Sources for emigration data: ABS Year Books, 1971, 1979, 1982, 1988, "Overseas Arrivals and Departures" and "Categories of Overseas Departures", ABS Australian Demographic Statistics, 3101.0, June Qtr., 1984, June Qtr., 1989, Dec. Qtr. 1993, Dec. Qtr., 1996.

²⁵ More detail on this in Chapters Six and Seven.

²⁶ D.Burtenshaw, M.Bateman and G.J.Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981, p.ix.

²⁷ See, for example, almost all of E.O. Wilson's works, including, *The Diversity of Life*, Penguin 1992. Other examples are William Lines, *False Economy*, Freemantle Arts Centre Press, 1998; Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, Chatswood, New South Wales, Australia, 1994; Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning of Gondwanaland*, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, New South Wales, Australia, 1994; RD Graetz, MA Wilson, SK Campbell, *Landcover Disturbance Over the Australian Continent*, Biodiversity Series Paper No.7., Department of Environment, Sports and Territories, Commonwealth of Australia, ISBN, 0642229058, 1994.

²⁸ For instance, both Jaqueline in *De L'Immigre au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, pp.72-81 and Patrick Weil in *La France et ses étrangers, l'aventure d'une politique d'immigration 1938-1991*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, pp.100-102 and 270-276, have allocated analytical space to the issue of planning and housing. Costa-Lascoux, *op.cit.*, p.75, writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics. Books have been written in France specifically on the connection between homelessness, inferior housing and immigration, such as Monique Hervo and Marie-Ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers Libres 219-220, Librairie François Maspero, 1971.

²⁹ Jeanette Money's thesis will be commented on later in this thesis in more detail.

³⁰ See my Appendix 1, "Glossary", for more on these terms.

³¹ See Appendix 1, "Glossary", for a definition.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER TWO

¹ Usually dated 1973, the racheting of prices and the increasing militancy of OPEC began in 1970 and was not broken until the US and Europe and other major oil-importing nations countered the shock by decreasing their oil consumption. Attempts to synchronise their response began in February 11, 1974, with the Washington Energy Conference, which was attended by 13 industrial and oil producing nations. It had been organised by the U.S. to resolve the international energy problems through economic cooperation among nations. Henry Kissinger unveiled the Nixon Administration's seven-point "Project Independence" plan to make the U.S. energy independent. On December 22, 1975, President Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) effective February 1976, which authorized the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), participation in International Energy Program, and oil price regulation.

² For Marx and Engels, see Ed Ronald L. Meek, *Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb*, Ramparts Press, Berkeley, California, p 23 and p.94. For Durkheim, see, Durkheim: *De la division du travail social*, (First published in 1893), Frantext, réalisé par l'Institut Nationale de la Langue Française, <http://www.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/durkheim/divtrav.html>

This was a hypertext edition of the whole book, with an introduction by the author to the second edition.

In *De la division du travail social* [The Division of Labor] (1893) Durkheim's conceptual framework for his thesis was biological evolution. On this subject he cited Wolff, Von Baer, de Milne-Edwards (p.3), Spencer (p.262) and Darwin and Haeckel (p.174, pp.249-250). He referred to Darwin's observation that co-operation was possible between species in the same territory as long as they did not compete for the same means of making a living. He also cited a passage from Darwin describing how, in a territory open to migration, increased population led to increased conflict and increased specialisation of species in order to consolidate niches (pp.249-250). Although he obviously approved of Darwin's thesis, Durkheim thought that the theory of natural selection in the moral sphere was mitigated by the special qualities of human society, and this was a central part of his thesis. In *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim used Darwin's (Malthusian inspired) thesis as a jump-off spot for his own, which dealt importantly with population pressures.

³ R.E. Dunlap & W.R. Catton Jr., in "A New Ecological Paradigm for a Post-Exuberant Sociology", *American Behavioural Scientist*, Vol.24 No.1, September/October 1980, Sage Publications Inc., 1980, pp.15-47

⁴ *Ibid*, pp24-30.

⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, "C'était quoi, le tiers-monde?" ["What was the third world?"], *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2000, pp 18-19.

⁶ A convenient source that describes and documents a number of resentful groups, nations and movements is Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Harper Collins, 2000, for instance the chapter, "The Backlash", pp. 327-347.

⁷ "Material(s)": "Material" as opposed to a price induced crisis, or a politically induced crisis. "Materials" refers to the reliance on oil for transport of raw materials and components for manufacturing, as well as for the production of commercial energy used for processing etc.

⁸ R.E. Dunlap & W.R. Catton Jr., "A New Ecological Paradigm", *Op. Cit.* p. 27, cite Garrett Hardin, *Limits to Growth*, Meadows et al., 1972.

⁹*Ibid*, p.24.

¹⁰*Ibid*, p.31

¹¹*Ibid*, p.32.

¹² *Ibid*, p.32 and References, pp.44 and 46: Burch, W.R., Jr., "The Peregrine falcon and the urban poor: some sociological interrelations," pp. 308-316 in P.J. Richerson and J. McEvoy III (eds.) *Human Ecology: An Environmental Approach*, North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1976 and *Daydreams and Nightmares: A sociological Essay on the American Environment*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971; Michelson, W.H., *Man and His Urban Environment*, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1970.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.33.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.35.

¹⁵ For comments on differences between countries energy strategies post 1973, see for example at <http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Research/F-Policy/energy/energytf.htm>, a Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations, Edward L. Morse, Chair, and Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director: *Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century*, p. 42, "The experience of the 1970s has shown that energy security and energy price competition is enhanced by diversity of suppliers and of fuel choices. The economies of other countries such as Japan and Germany are better shielded from oil price changes than is the U.S. economy because of the greater emphasis on efficiency and conservation."

¹⁶ William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel, *Our Ecological Footprint*, The New Catalyst Bioregional Series, New Society Publishers, 1998

¹⁷ That is, it divides national consumption by the total population, and arrives thus at a per capita consumption value.

¹⁸ "Land" includes submerged land. "Biologically or ecologically productive land" is that on which life grows, and would include forests and marine algae. See Rees and Wackernagel, *Our Ecological Footprint*, Catalyst Bioregional Series, New Society Publishers, BC, Canada, Sixth reprint, 1998, p.88 for example.

¹⁹ See Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Explosion*, Simon and Schuster, Australia, 1990, pp58-59. This formula was coined by Paul Ehrlich, where I = Environmental Impact, P = Population Numbers, A = Affluence, T = Technology. It means that Environmental Impact is equal to the number of people multiplied by the amount of energy they consume and the amount of pollution they produce multiplied by the kind of technology they use to consume and produce. In order to determine the Affluence and Technology parts of the equation, Ehrlich uses estimates from the World Resources Institute based on indicators for 'per capita use of commercial energy'. Thus the per capita environmental impact of a person using hunter-gatherer technology to survive would be less than that of a person from an industrialised culture using multiple products created through petroleum derived energy. Using this approach it is possible to compare populations in 'developed' and 'undeveloped' countries in terms of equivalent numbers of people.

Another variation on the IPAT method is I = PLOT: This formula is a variant on the I=PAT formula and was developed by the Australian CSIRO. The CSIRO is Australia's major scientific research body. In this formula I = Environmental Impact, P = Population, L = Lifestyle, O = Organisation, and T = Technology. Thus, Environmental impact is equal to Population numbers x Lifestyle x Organisation x Technology. The formula attempts to recognise the importance of the organisation of space and technology as determining factors in the quality and form and environmental impact of human settlement. See the CSIRO submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies Australian Population 'Carrying Capacity' Inquiry, 1994, Vol.5, pp. 1144-1219, p.1151

²⁰ <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/consume/mwfoot.html>, <http://dieoff.org/page110.htm>, <http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/rio/focus/report/english/footprint/>, <http://www.iclei.org/iclei/santiago.htm>, <http://www.mec.ca/coop/communit/meccomm/ecofoot.htm>, and the egroup, footprints@egroups.com. For calculations of "Footprints of nations" see, <http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/rio/focus/report/english/footprint/> and <http://dieoff.org/page110.htm>

²¹ "Malthusian". Malthus was primarily an economist and his works on profit and the corn laws (about importing versus self sufficiency, or, as we know it, liberal economics versus protectionism) are complimented by his demographic work. We need to remember that his arguments were conceived in the context of an agricultural economy where industrial manufacturing was only just beginning to be experienced as a political force. In his essay, *Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, Malthus made the point strongly that it was only where profits were considerable on agricultural product, that agriculture would expand into marginal lands. (He linked expansion into marginal lands with eventual increases in production.) Where profit was low, the cost of extending agriculture was too high. Because of this relationship, farmers tended to concentrate production into the most high yielding areas of their properties. Malthus thought that it was desirable to encourage farmers to make more of their land productive. In his opinion, to get them to expand their productive area required some amount of protectionism and the encouragement of national self sufficiency, with government able to oversee the security of the production of staples.

Such a strategy was designed for the purpose of assuring a dependable market for agriculturalists, so that they would keep producing and expanding. Ensuring agricultural production meant that food and other necessities of life provided through agriculture would be available to citizens. Efficient agriculture meant that society could raise itself above mere subsistence. Malthus was not against external trade or overseas expansion (which in those days included colonisation). The demographic part of his theory was that the population of a nation

neither outstrip its food and staple resources nor become too numerous to be in a position to bargain for a living wage, nor too small to make farming too expensive for it to be worthwhile to landowners. The reason that staples should not be imported was that this might drive down prices for agricultural profit and thus cause a reduction in cultivated land. Then, if there was a war or the currency of a country fell in value, either of these things might make it impossible for the people of the nation to buy staples on an international market. If farmers had also stopped producing or increasingly restricted production to their best land, local supply could also become inadequate. The major works which have informed my understanding of Malthus's original theories are Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* and *A Summary View of the Principle of Population*; *The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn* and *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*.

²² 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A. , "Pétrole, les politiques pétrolières." For instance the United States Congress successfully opposed rises in petrol prices in 1974 and the imposition of taxes in 1978, whereas throughout Europe high prices and taxes were very quickly imposed. The United States' main innovation was in local exploration and development of oil fields.

Australia's approach was similar and the cost of petrol remained very low until 1978. (Australian National Geographic, *Australian Encyclopaedia*, 1996, "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295-2296)

²³ In fact primary production has become an increasingly unreliable major source of national income. Examples of countries richly endowed with mineral or agricultural wealth but with poor economies are Russia, Nigeria, Australia, Argentina, Canada and New Zealand.

The United States has a more diverse economy but is criticized for over-exploiting its energy and water reserves and covering its farmland with housing and other infrastructure to cope with an unmanageably large and growing population. Leon Kolankiewicz and Roy Beck, *Weighing Sprawl Factors In Large US Cities, A report on the nearly equal roles played by population growth and land use choices in the loss of farmland and natural habitat to urbanisation*, Analysis of US Census Data on the 100 largest urbanized areas of the United States, Numbers USA.com, March 19, 2001.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER THREE

¹ Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981

² Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, course notes for the Cities and Housing Program, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorne, Victoria, Australia, NO79AS487/2/6/1999, Module 2: "The Australian and International Housing Systems", 4.4.2, 'Systems of Government', p. 15.

³ Michael Cannon, *The Land Boomers, The Complete Illustrated History*, Lloyd O'Neil, Australia 1986

⁴ Neville Hicks, *This Sin and Scandal, Australia's Population Debate 1891-1911*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, ACT, 1978

⁵ Leon L'Huillier, "Depression and a National Economy", *Essays in Economic History*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1973, pp 186-207. In 1894 a run of bad seasons culminated in a backbreaking drought that had a severe impact on the wool industry and the cattle industry. The restocking of the latter was not completed until 1909. This added to the liquidity problems of financial institutions and was contributory to the crash. But things were different in the West. By 1903 Australia was the leading producer of gold in the world. Between 1886 and 1888 there was a gold mining revival, beginning in Queensland at Charters Towers in 1886 and by 1888 having spread to new locations in West Australia: Kimberley, Pilbara, Murchison, Southern Cross, Yilgarn, Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie.

⁶ Michael Cannon, *The Land Boomers, op cit*, Chapter 4, "The Hungry 1890s", pp36-48 and 377. In the 1890s this demographic and financial boom terminated in a terrible crash and starvation had actually stalked the streets of Melbourne, along with rioters, prostitution and infanticide, influenza epidemics and typhoid.

⁷ Michael Cannon, *The Land Boomers, op.cit.*, p.20.

⁸ Sandra Bardwell, *National Parks in Victoria 1866-1956, "For all the people for all time"*, PHD Philosophy, Dept Geography, Monash University, Clayton Campus, December 1974, (Two volumes, 742 pages).

⁹ Bardwell, *Op. Cit.*, p.320, citing C.W. Ligar, C. Hodgkinson, R.B. Smith, "Report on the advisableness of Establishing State Forests", Papers Presented to Both Houses of Parliament, Vol.IV (Session 1864-5). Some of the things they recommended were plantations of native and exotic species to serve future need.

In the 1904 Edition of the *Cyclopedia of Victoria*, the Editor, James Smith, claimed that in the 1860s he “induced the Ministry of the day to proclaim large areas of forest land Permanent Reserves” on the basis of his precautionary words about the dangers of soil erosion and siltation where hillsides were denuded of vegetation. Source: Bardwell, *Op. Cit.* p. 320 citing the *Cyclopedia of Victoria*, The Cyclopedia Company, Melbourne, 1906, Vol. I p.220

¹⁰ Leone Sandercock, *The Land racket*, Silverfish, Australia, 1979 and *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction publishers, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), 1990.

¹¹ Sandercock *op.cit.*, ascribes the particularly strong hold of the speculators in Victoria to the strong influence of the Country Party (which became the National Party later) on Victorian Government during the Menzies years. I am unable to comment on this factor.

¹² Sandercock, *Property, politics, and urban planning, op.cit.*, (1990), p. 1

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.195.

¹⁴ Sandercock, *The Land racket, op.cit.*, (1979), p.82.

¹⁵ Jean-Pierre Gaudin, "Urban planning techniques and political legitimacy in France at the beginning of the twentieth century", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 12, No.3, pp 515-530

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.515.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.515, Gaudin cites Bechmann, G., "Urbanisme et legislation en France", in *Où en est l'urbanisme en France et a l'etranger?*, Colloque de la Societe française des urbanistes, Strasbourg.

¹⁸ Jean-Pierre Gaudin, *op.cit.*, p.515, citing, Bechmann, G., "Urbanisme et legislation en France", in *Où en est l'urbanisme en France et a l'etranger?*, [What is the State of Urban Planning in France and Overseas?] Colloque de la Societe française des urbanistes, Strasbourg. [Conference of the French Society of Urban Planners, Strasbourg].

¹⁹ Encyclopedie Encarta 1998.

²⁰ Jean-Pierre Gaudin, *Op. Cit.*, p.522, citing Latour, 1919 on the Cornudet Act. (No further details of publication given regarding Latour, 1919.)

²¹ Jean-Pierre Gaudin, *op.cit.*, p.524.

²² See Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages).

²³ Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *op.cit.*, pp 68-69, write that there was “no established tradition of speculative office development prior to British involvement in the French property market. Indeed, in the mid-1960s, 80 per cent of new office space was for owner-occupancy. The situation changed rapidly in the 1970s, however, as British companies turned their attention to property development in Europe, and the balance in new office provision was reversed so that approximately 80 per cent of new office space was built speculatively. In much of Europe from the late 1960s onwards, British property companies became very active as promoters of new urban development. Their somewhat voracious methods were not always welcomed. In some cases, and notably in the case of Brussels, they were totally insensitive to the pre-existing urban fabric. In this case, controls were imposed somewhat belatedly to prevent further transformation of sensitive parts of the city.” Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth cite Goodall, B., *The Economics of Urban Areas*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1972, for an explanation of the rise of

speculative office building .as mostly due to “the massive flow of funds available for property investment in the postwar period via insurance companies and pension funds. Further, the restrictions on the increasing of capital in post-war Britain could be circumvented by the so-called leaseback transaction. This enabled a company to sell its interest in a property, but to lease it back from the purchaser. In the process, the company raised much-needed capital and the purchaser, often an insurance company, had found in property a secure investment for part of its funds. Property companies themselves were often funded by insurance companies with pension funds. All of this activity meant that property, seen as an investment with a very high return, in comparison with other investment and the added advantage of being at that time virtually inflation-proof, was being actively developed.”

²⁴ Van Vliet, (Ed.), *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, Greenwood Press, 1990, “Cross-National Housing Research: Analytical and Substantive Issues,” pp.1-83

²⁵ Unfortunately there was little material on France. Western Europe was mainly discussed in terms of Italy and Germany.

²⁶ Ed., Willem Van Vliet, *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1990, "Cross-National Housing Research: Analytical and Substantive Issues," pp1-83; p.3. In Japan, (which is a country known for the intense activity of the construction industry), the national government "is a powerful actor working in tandem with conglomerate firms to shape local development". "In Italy political parties have legislative and bureaucratic power to set rent levels and control landuse."

²⁷ The following were important sources.

Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, Mary Ann Wulff: “Australia”, Ed. Willem van Vliet, *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*. This describes trends in housing conditions and construction from 1945-1986, the changing context of housing provision from 1975-1986 especially in Europe. It covers tenure status, housing quality, housing construction, housing type and location, special population groups and changing patterns of household formation, the cost of housing , the role of housing institutions and organizations: planning, house building, housing design, finance, and the real estate industry. It gave me more information about the differences between Europe and the English speaking settler states.

Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Modules 2 and 7, institution published text of course notes for the Cities and Housing Program, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorne, Victoria, Australia. Terry Burke kindly provided me with these modules and answered questions I asked him. Module 1 was “The Australian and International Housing Systems” and Module 7 was the Land Development and House Building Industries. Module 1 gave a broad overview of different systems and used comparative graphs and tables to show different characteristics, usually using UN Demographic sources. Module 7 showed the still largely speculative nature of the Australian housing industry and the tendency for the majority of property developers to be separate from building firms and the relationship between these participants in the industry and their impact on labor conditions, technology used, housing supply and costs.

²⁸ Some sources were Michael Ball, Michael Harloe, Maartje Martens, *Housing and Social Change in Europe and the USA*, Routledge, London, 1988 and Laurent Ghékière, *Marchés et politiques du logement dans la CEE*, la Documentation Française, Paris, 1991, David Hayward, "The Reluctant Landlord? A History of Public Housing in Australia", *Urban Policy and Research*, Vol.14, No.1., 1996, pp5-21.

²⁹ These included Professor Ronald F. Henderson, Chairman, Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, First Main Report, April 1975, *Poverty in Australia*, Vol.1, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra 1975, p.269; Monique Hervo and Marie-

Ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, Cahiers Libres, 1972; Jacqueline Costa Lascoux, *De L'Immigre au citoyen*, La Documentation Francaise, Paris, 1989; Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, and Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Second Edition, OUP, 1985.

³⁰ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems", 5.2, 'Housing Production, Land Ownership and Development', Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorne, Victoria, Australia, 1999, p. 18. "The methods by which housing is produced, as well as its form, have important implications for housing policy, including low income housing provision. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States all have housing industries which are fragmented, largely small-scale, and oriented towards the construction of single detached housing, although the United States and Canada have made considerable inroads into multi-unit housing. For lower income housing provision and broader objectives, this has a number of advantages. It is likely to have lower management and maintenance costs than scattered detached housing and, by enabling higher densities, can reduce the land component of new construction costs. Construction costs in general can be reduced by the receptiveness of this type of housing to standardised factory techniques. It allows for the incorporation of community facilities if built at sufficient scale, for example, 50 plus units, and reduces infrastructure costs and enables a more consolidated urban form.

³¹ In France the housing industry adapted by greater energy efficiency of housing design, by refurbishing old buildings and most of all by adapting to customer demand and factory construction with major pre-payments, rather than borrowing to build speculative estates. The Government also reduced its annual commitments to public housing construction. Inflation, which affected the public's ability to purchase houses caused many in the building industry to go broke. Sources: Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, Paris, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages).

³² Peter J Rimmer, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian states: another round of interstate rivalry", in the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, E. Arnold, London, Vol.12., no.3., pp.404-24.

³³ Rimmer, *Op. cit.*, p.405, writes that since 1980 major Japanese construction companies had been hurt by policies of zero public sector growth, preference for regional contractors, and sluggish private sector activity in Japan (a result of fiscal policy in the early 80s). They had therefore sought work in other countries. They brought with them the funds invested by Japanese investors and banks, offering "the most favourable fixed price" and "to take an equity in the project if necessary, arrange loans at low interest rates from financial institutions in Japan or Australia" and guaranteeing "any money required if the project [went] over cost". (p.418). Australia, which was keen to attract major projects during the recession, largely in the hope of job creation, responded to these inducements. The States vied with each other to attract these Japanese construction projects, many of which were in real estate. Eventually a law was brought in making it illegal to sell real estate to foreigners, since the influx of Japanese capital inflated real-estate prices particularly in Sydney (p.421). The author writes that "keen for the economic benefits and political spin-offs, the states, as we have seen, are prepared to override the usual planning role performed by local government of directing development into preferred locations to meet economic, social and spatial preconditions." (p.417)

³⁴ Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction Publishers Edition, 1990, p.17

³⁵ Rimmer, *Op. cit.*, p.421, "Fearing a similar situation to Hawaii where foreign investment has sent house prices sky-rocketing, the federal government has ended its open access policy in respect of the acquisition of residential real estate for foreign-owner occupiers. [In September 1987] it stipulated that foreigners cannot buy houses or home units. Under these new

guidelines, approval is not required, however, for Australians living abroad, immigrants with permission to settle permanently in Australia and foreign companies seeking accommodation for senior executives."

³⁶ Ernest Healey, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor during the 1980s and Early 1990s*, Doctoral thesis, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, April 1997. See pp i-iii for the hypotheses. Healey does not specifically refer to property development.

³⁷ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, New South Wales, Australia, 1996 edition, printed 2000.

³⁸ R.H. Fagan, "Foreign Investment", in *Australian Encyclopaedia*, Terry Hills, NSW, Australian Geographic, Pty. Ltd, 1995, p.1394.

³⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 1393-1394.

⁴⁰ Now known as the *Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act (1975)*. Information about the changes to this Act over the years are to be found in appendices to the Foreign Investment Review Board Annual General Reports. An internet source is : http://www.firb.gov.au/policy_pubs/publications/AnnualReports/1999-2000/appd.htm A useful general source of the history of foreign investment in Australia is R.H. Fagan, *op.cit.*

⁴¹ Michelet, Charles-Albert, in "France", in Dunning, John, H., (Ed)., *Governments, Globalization, and International Business*, OUP, 1997, pp.313-334, p.317-322.

⁴² Willem Van Vliet (Ed.), *op.cit.*, p.19

⁴³ *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.18.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.32.

⁴⁵ Emile Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, Eighth Edition, Translated by Sarah Solovay and John Mueller and edited by George E.G. Catlin, The Free Press, New York, Chapter 1.

⁴⁶ Vaughan Monaray, *Animal Experimentation, A student guide to balancing the issues*, Australian and New Zealand Council of Care of Animals and Teaching, ANZCCART, P.O. Box 19, Glen Osmond, S.A. 5064, 1996, Chapter 2.

⁴⁷ Arno Karlin, *Plague's Progress*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1995.

⁴⁸ For a discussion of spiritual values attached to nature see Paul Collins, *God's Earth, Religion as if matter really mattered*, Dove, Harper Collins, North Blackburn, Victoria, Australia, 1994. This was a book written by an Australian Catholic priest who also campaigns for an end to population growth in Australia for ecological reasons.

⁴⁹ Bardwell *op.cit.*, pp.154-155 and p.331.

⁵⁰ *Quid*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2000, p. 202-204 "Parcs Nationaux", created by a law of 22/7/1960 and completed by the law of 2/2/1995 and a 1961 decree. Composed of a central zone, a peripheral (buffer) zone and Integral reserves (for scientific study and preservation of species). At present most or all of these parks are located in alpine or mountainous regions and are too small or too unprotected from hunters to ensure viability of 'super-predators', such as wolves, lynxes and bears. The case of bears is particularly disgraceful. Documentation on the state of megafauna was provided by Pascal Farcy, researcher and writer and website editor of Univers Nature: <http://www.univers-nature.com/> and interviews and letters exchanged with

France Nature, and the French groups devoted to wolves, lynxes and bears. In France there are also "Regional Natural Parks". Created by laws in 1979, 1991, 1993 and 1994, these parks are temporary creations with a ten year lease which may be renewed. Preservation of biodiversity is not a priority; preservation of rural or special cultures and revitalisation of depressed areas is a strong theme. These parks contain living villages and towns. Tourism and sports are encouraged. The whole park serves an educational purpose for visitors. There are also "Natural Reserves" (created in 1930 and modified at law in 1976, codified in 1989); "Biological Reserves"; "Voluntary Natural Reserves" (on private land) and "Hunting Reserves".

⁵¹ There is a distinction between 'wilderness parks' and botanical gardens, which were established earlier and according to another tradition. All capital cities and many regional settlements had such gardens and parks. The number in Ballarat ran close behind Melbourne. Source: Bardwell, *op cit*, pp154-155 and p.331. In France, Baron Haussman introduced, with the help of others, the concept of the English garden to France in the 19th century. Few - perhaps no park - would however attain the gothic grandeur of his *Buttes Chaumont* in Belleville, Paris. Most French parks would be small, symmetrical islands in a later tradition.

⁵² From an interview with Pascal Farcy, researcher and writer and website editor of Univers Nature: <http://www.univers-nature.com/> in December 2000 in Paris.

⁵³ Ronsin, Newman & Dubois, "Ecomalthusians and Pherologists", Conference 99: Nature, Society and History, *Long Term Dynamics of Social Metabolism*, September 30-October 2, 1999, Vienna, IFF, Social Ecology. Although this study identifies ecomalthusian organisations in Europe, they have far better representation and membership in the English Speaking Settler States, particularly Australia and the United States.

"Opinions among the authors of this collaborative work vary on the subject of Malthus's initial contribution. However it can be stated that Malthus established a paradigm for the scientific study of the relationship between human and other populations, both animal and vegetable, on earth, with the primary view of demonstrating the likelihood of persistent limits to growth imposed by the availability of food. In this paradigm Malthus made no allowances for the use of artificial birth control by human beings. New paradigms have subsequently evolved, incorporating part of the original. As Professor Ronsin has pointed out, the next stage was neo-malthusianism, which brought artificial birth control into the picture and advocated it as a political tool for workers to gain freedom from the need to work to feed large families and to compete with an overly abundant supply of labor. The Eco-malthusian paradigm derives from Malthus's original point of view regarding qualities and quantities of nature and relationships between species, but has access to far more sophisticated knowledge on this subject. It also takes from neo-malthusianism, for in general Eco-malthusians have no quarrel with socially acceptable birth control techniques. It accepts that the provision of food, whilst ultimately problematic, is currently a problem of distribution. But most of all it seeks to draw the line well above the mere provision of food and fight for quality of life and a rich biodiversity.

More and more, as global population pressure builds, the issue of preserving those parts of the world that are still in relatively good biodiverse condition, having substantial indigenous habitat, from the pressure that addition to their human populations would cause in terms of extra economic activity and infrastructure development, comes to a head."

⁵⁴ Hamilton, N.T.M. and Cocks, D., *Australia's Coastal Population: Environmental Impacts Today and Tomorrow*. Paper presented at Mobility in Australia workshop held by the Australian Population Association, Melbourne University, November 1994.

⁵⁵ *Collins English Dictionary*, Harper Collins, 1992, "Environment"

⁵⁶ Australia's ecology was to suffer dramatically from the introduction of exotic species because of the creationist point of view. Individuals determined to uphold these biblical traditions came into conflict with Darwinists in Australia shortly after the publication of the *Origin of Species*. Two memorable cases of the creationist approach to ecology in Australia were Ferdinand von Mueller and Edmund Wilson. Wilson was the founder of the Argus newspaper in Australia. He was also the founder of the Acclimatisation Society in February 1861, which he popularised via the *Argus*, leading to the formation of nine Victorian Branches. The Acclimatisation Society evolved from Botanical Gardens innovator, Ferdinand von Mueller's Zoological Society. Both organisations were dedicated to imposing exotic flora and fauna upon the Australian countryside. These 'acclimatisation' efforts formed a counterpoint to the attempts by others to preserve the Victorian Wilderness, although both groups joined in the creation of several National Parks, despite the fact that they were aiming for different styles.

Papers Wilson presented at the Philosophical Institute in 1857 (Colin Finney, *Paradise Revealed, Natural History in nineteenth-century Australia*, Museum of Victoria, Melbourne, 1993, p 90, gives the details of the contents of the papers.) display strong creationist views. His first paper was about his study of the Murray cod. He said that the cod only frequented rivers flowing north and west, eschewing those that flowed south or east. In the belief that it was a function ordained by God that man should put the finishing touch to the broad strokes of creation, he financed a scheme for the more efficient distribution of the fish, transporting them from their Murray River tributaries to streams running into the Yarra. In his second paper, entitled "On the Introduction of the British Song Bird" he advocated the importation and resettlement of skylarks and nightingales in Victoria. He believed this would provide an aural sweetener to the harsh laugh of the kookaburra and some of our more raucous species.

In 1864 Wilson became actively involved in a society for the promotion of assisted migration (of humans this time) and wrote a paper called "A Scheme of Emigration on a National Scale", which may indicate that he was a population booster.

He retired to Britain in 1867 where he lived in Kent on a property with a small zoo that included kangaroos, emus and monkeys. He came to know the Darwins well. One wonders what they thought of him.

Ferdinand Von Mueller was one of the Australian scientists who rejected Darwin's *Origin of Species* theories on religious grounds, professing his belief in the permanence of species and in a universe of order and design. (Anne Moyal, *A Bright and Savage Land, Scientists in Colonial Australia*, Collins, Sydney, 1986, p 145.) Unlike Darwin, he was struck by the potential productivity of 'our adopted country' which he optimistically envisaged as 'one of the most delightful and prosperous of the globe' and he believed that the north-eastern highlands of Victoria would suit the settlement of 'a large and prosperous population'. (Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p 368) Mueller was a hardy explorer and surveyed a number of points in the Australian Alps, where he is remembered for having been the first European to ascend the highest point of the Mt Buffalo plateau. A dedicated botanist, he published a twelve volume work on plants (many named after himself) written in Latin. From 1856 to 1873 he was Government Botanist and Curator of the Melbourne Botanical Gardens, from which position he was dismissed, possibly for failure to cater sufficiently to non specialist interests. (Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p 334.) He believed his purpose as Director of the Botanic Gardens included "the experimental introduction of foreign plants" and he was a great proponent and populariser of exotic species as a member of the Acclimatisation Society. (Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p 369-370)

"The worthy Baron and other plant and animal acclimatizers experimented so successfully that some introduced species thrived and multiplied as destructive vermin and others adjusted so well that they became noxious weeds. In one year he distributed over 7000 plants and 22,000 packets of seeds to colonists; in another year he distributed the 'remarkably prolific'

blackberry.” From D.J. Mulvaney and J.H. Calaby, *'So Much That is New', Baldwin Spencer, 1860-1929, A Biography*, MUP, Carlton, Victoria, 1985, p 95.

Likewise the concept of geological time and techniques for measuring it brought science into conflict with religion. Geological field surveying was stimulated by the gold rush. Andrew Clarke and Fred McCoy started a small group concerned with the institutional foundation for the education and encouragement of field workers, “thereby fostering the habit in Australia of [Australians] seeing themselves as Australians with ‘the visual images of their own land’ and an awareness of the ecological relationships of the antipodean natural world.” (Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p 339, note 116: Stephen Murray-Smith, “Scientific Investigation of Bass Strait - a Brief History”, *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria*, Vol. 85, May 1973, pp 73-78, p.74.) Andrew Clarke was the Victorian Surveyor-General from 1853 to 1863 and, for a short time, head of the Victorian Department of Lands. He founded the Museum of Natural History and promoted public reserves in the design of new settlements. McCoy was especially dedicated to the National Museum, but was also a founder of the School of Mines in 1870 and was Professor of Natural Sciences at Melbourne University, a renowned palaeontologist and foundation President of the Field Naturalists’ Club of Victoria.

The *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Gen. Ed., John Ritchie, MUP, Carlton, Victoria, Australia, 1991, Vol 5, p.134-136) records that “advancing age, the demands of the Museum, the growth of knowledge and his ardent anti-Darwinism decreased his influence...” and that “In June 1869 McCoy delivered a popular lecture of three hours in duration and another in July 1870, both published as *The Order and Plan of Creation* (1870), denying ‘authority, either in scripture or in science, for belief in the gradual transmutation from one species into another’ and finding geological confirmation for the *Genesis* phases of creation.”

Like Edmund Wilson and that other anti-Darwinist, Von Mueller, he was deeply involved in the Acclimatisation society (later to become the Victorian Zoological Society) . Bardwell records that W.K. Hancock “acknowledged McCoy’s achievements in paleontology but described him as “an ass [who] walked blind and deaf through the Australian bush” and who wished to fill its “savage silence” with the songs of English birds, although his beloved sparrows soon became far more of a curse than a blessing.” (Bardwell *op.cit.*, p.339, citing WK Hancock, *Discovering Monaro, A study of Man's Impact on His Environment*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, p.113.)

He served on the Royal Society of Victoria Council in the 1860s and was president in 1864 and vice president in 1861 and 1870. An increasingly acrimonious debate ensued between himself and the Reverend William Branwhite Clarke (1798-1878). Clarke is remembered for his brilliant work in calculating the age of the New South Wales coal deposits. He also assisted Darwin in his work in Australia and provided geological evidence for it.

⁵⁷ Contemporary estimates (1888) were of about 20 scientific societies in Australia with at least 2,500 to 3000 members. [Australia's population was about 2,750,000 in 1886.] Source: Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p 176, note 131, citing Minutes of general meeting of AAAS, 3 September 1888, part content of telegram to the British Association. For more detail see also, Colin Finney, *Paradise Revealed, Natural History in nineteenth-century Australia*, Museum of Victoria, Melbourne, 1993, and Anne Moyal, *A Bright and Savage Land, Scientists in Colonial Australia*, Collins, Sydney, 1986. These books are all about the scientific society of early Australia.

⁵⁸ Colin Finney records that the Sydney Morning Herald in 1880 reported “the popularity which everything connected with natural history enjoys in the present day. Botany, geology, and zoology are eminently popular sciences. Few, it is true, go deeply into them, but everyone likes to know something about them”. Finney adds that “a generation which had grown up under the blandishments of rational amusement and had been exposed to natural science in schools found

an outlet in the activities of local field naturalists' clubs." Colin Finney, *Op.cit.*, p.123-4, note. 44 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 1880.

⁵⁹ Neville Hicks in *'This Sin and Scandal', Australia's Population Debate 1891-1911*, ANU Press, 1978, pp 95-96 provides evidence of the great popularity of Charles Darwin's work in the great number of his books available in both public and private libraries in Australia in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Darwin wrote of Australia's great biophysical disadvantages, making shrewd observations on soil, vegetation, and climate. Coal deposits might provide Australia with energy for manufactures and transport, he observed, but of Australia's future prospects, he concluded: "I formerly imagined that Australia would rise to be as grand and powerful a country as North America, but now it appears to me that such future grandeur is rather problematical." From Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, 1994, citing Darwin, C.: *The Voyage of the Beagle*, 1845, Republication by Editio-Service, S.A., Geneva.

⁶⁰ See Chapter Six of this thesis. The property speculation industry ran aground during the 1890s crash, then was subsumed to the First World War and the despair of the Great Depression.

⁶¹ The Australian Natives' Association came into being in April 1872. According to Robert Birrel in *A Nation of Our Own*, Monash University Press, Melbourne, 1995, pp 89-103, the Association embodied a national attitude that was a reaction by the children of earlier settlers to the new wave of settlers and their children that arose with the gold rush. Birrel writes "The immigrant-born held power and the colonial-born aspired to it. It was a nationalistic movement that embraced the concept of Federation and encouraged "more recognition of Australian authors, Australian enterprise in manufacturing, Australian history in the schools, the conservation of Australian flora and fauna; anything in fact, which would promote an appreciation of Australian achievement and distinctiveness...[and distinguish Australian] characteristics from those of other nations, including Britain." (p 95)

Going by membership numbers this was an extraordinarily popular organisation and concept. In 1891-1901 numbers increased from 8,326 to 18,168 - more than the total membership of the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) in 1998, (according to a report in the *Australian*, p.3, (exact reference lost) and per ACF officers, Kelly Nolan, Michael Krockenberger, Telephone: 94161166). It was seen as admirably patriotic to conserve Australia's natural resources and there originated a concept familiar today: "That all things useful to man's existence must be used so that they will not only be beneficial to the present generation but will also be available to the next and future generations in an improved and more useful form." (Bardwell *op cit*, p 363, note 186: Menadue, Centenary History, p.277. and p.5. The Association began as the Victorian Natives Association, membership being confined to Melbourne-born citizens. See also: John E. Menadue, "The Historical Impact of the Australian Natives' Association", *The Victorian Historical Magazine*, Vol 42, February 1971, pp 501-520.)

Bardwell, *op.cit.* p. 325, describes the Australian Natives' Association as a prominent source of concern about forest management in Victoria. Although their focus tended to be on water, at their annual conference in 1903, they passed a resolution 'to bring before Parliament the urgent necessity for PROPER conservation of the State's forest areas' and three years later an important deputation to the minister concerned helped to save Mooroolbool forest for another day. In 1885 the Association criticised the "continued alienation of public reserves" and sent representation to the 1904 deputation organised by Baldwin Spencer for the permanent reservation of Wilson's Promontory. (Bardwell, *op.cit.*, p. 364.)

⁶² Exploration and settlement of Australia were hampered largely by climate and distance. Much of the continent is desert and explorers put their lives in peril when they attempted to cross the continent or to go into the interior. In the desert climate, rivers ran into the sand where Europeans had expected them to reach the sea. The settlement of Victoria was considerably delayed by the difficulty experienced in crossing the Blue Mountains. Settlements failed due to the harsh climate and poor soil conditions. Many history books detail these kinds of problems, for instance, C H Wright, *Conquering the Continent*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1960, pp.32-46; Watkin Tench, *A Complete Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson*, in *Watkin Tench 1788*, ed. T. Flannery, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1996; Jill Eastwood, "The Economy of New South Wales, 1788-1810"; Derek Phillips, "Development under Macquarie"; Sylvia Morrissey, "The Pastoral Economy 1821-1850"; in James Griffin (Ed.), *Essays in Economic History of Australia*, Jacaranda Press, 1970.

Flannery in *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, NSW, 1994, makes a good argument that the Australian climate and soils prevented Australian aborigines from developing agriculture. "The only agriculturalists ever to develop in Meganesea are found in New Guinea." (p.80) (New Guinea has volcanic soils and high rainfall and Meganesia refers to the land mass including Australia, Tasmania and New Guinea, much of which is undersea.) (p.42) The implication is that only through imported established agricultural techniques and some industrial technology would it be possible to sustain large settlements on the Australian continent. These same techniques have however been held responsible for degrading soil and water and for reducing the long-term biological carrying capacity of the continent. Mary White, *After the Greening*, Kangaroo Press, NSW, 1994, p. 262.

⁶³ On the site of Univers-Nature, <http://www.univers-nature.com/>, in November 2000 there was a special report on the return of big predators in France. "Today it appears that conditions for definitive re-establishment of big predators are optimum. The rural exodus and the shrinking of agriculture have created less human population pressure and forests are increasing. Restrictions on hunting have also permitted better management of big wild herbivores. Moreover public opinion has demonstrated through several polls that most people favor the long term return of big predators in our land."

The web site of the French Society for the Protection of Mammals, <http://www.mnhn.fr/sfepm/index.html>, reports that on the 25th of October the 23rd Francophone Mammalogy Conference responded to a parliamentary report on the Wolf, dated 20 October. Their response denounced the report's failure to come to terms with the wolf's re-establishment in France and to be mistakenly privileging the economically moribund French sheep industry over the rights of wolves to return to their natural home. "The report contents itself with simplistic solutions; eradication or imprisonment of the Wolf in zoos, justified by traditional bogies about the species. But people should remember that if the Wolf has a reputation for eating grandmothers and Little Red Riding Hoods, it is also a model of social structure, founder of ancient Rome and thus of our civilisation. Furthermore, aren't wolf-cubs still part of numerous youth movements?"

⁶⁴ MacArthur, R.H., and Wilson, E.O., *The Theory of Island Biogeography*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1967

⁶⁵ Microscopic communities are also disrupted, for instance those that live in soils. This leads to and is also an effect of changes in soil fertility. Changes to water conditions also lead to changes in microscopic communities in this environment. Eutrophication with overgrowth of dinoflagellates has historically caused poisoning of large animals, including humans of course. A remarkable study of the impact on human communities of eutrophication related to intensive pig farming in the Chesapeake Bay (US) area was the subject of a book: Rodney Barker, *And the Waters Turned to Blood*, Simon & Schuster, 1997.

⁶⁶ Wilson, E.O., *The Diversity of Life*, Penguin, London, 1992.

⁶⁷ Wilson, E.O., *Consilience, the Unity of Knowledge*, Vintage Books, USA, 1999. (First published in 1998 by Alfred A Knopf, Inc. New York). In Wilson's autobiography, *Naturalist*, Penguin, 1995, pp 324- 355, Wilson writes of the bitter attacks he sustained from the human arts-sciences, particularly sociology, after he published his book, *Sociobiology*, Harvard University Press, 1977. None of these attacks appears to have replied to the biology of his theory; the attacks were illustrative of the political nature of the social sciences and the political nature of social constructions. Some would say, of course, that biology is a political construction. Where do we draw the line? Wilson believes that science that refuses a molecular basis degenerates into incoherence under intensive examination. I must say that I agree with him.

⁶⁸ In 1770 the botanist, Joseph Banks, commented on the low density of the Australian Aboriginal population and surmised that this was due to the biophysical limitations of the continent, such as poor soil and an inhospitable climate. With Captain Cook he was engaged in an assessment of the capacity of the land to support the establishment of a penal colony. The geographer, Griffith Taylor, wrote, *Environment and Race: A study of the evolution, migration, settlement and status of the races of man*, OUP, London, 1927, which dealt with immigration, population and environment. Some of several later examples were a collection of essays: Birrell, R., Hill, D., and Nevill, J., (Eds.), *Populate and Perish*, published by the Australian Conservation Foundation and Fontana, 1984. Two books by ecologist, Doug Cocks', were *People Policy*, UNSW Press, 1996, and *Future Makers, Future Takers*, UNSW Press, 1999. In 1998 naturalist and poet, Mark O'Connor, published *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy & Snellgrove, and William J. Lines, published *False Economy*, Freemantle Arts Centre Press, 1998.

⁶⁹ Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, *op.cit.*

⁷⁰ He is not alone. This theme dominates ecology in the twentieth century. Flannery has his northern counterpart in Jarrad Diamond, who writes mostly about ecology in the Northern hemisphere. Examples of works by Jarrad Diamond are, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee*, Vintage, London, 1992 and *Guns, Germs and Steel*, Johnathon Cape, London, 1997.

⁷¹ Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, 1994, Chapter 8. This is actually a theme pursued thereafter in the book. Flannery also cites international work, for instance the work of David Tilman of the Department of Ecology, University of Minnesota, "Resource Competition and Community Structure," *Monographs in Population Biology* 17, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, USA.

⁷² Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning*, Kangaroo Press, 1994. Another work of national importance is *State of the Environment: 1996* (prepared by the State of the Environment Advisory Council, chaired by Ian Lowe), CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 1996.

⁷³ "Desertification"; people seem sometimes to misunderstand this word for an obscure technical term, but what it means is simply to turn an area into a desert; i.e. not able to support life or not able to support nearly as much life as it was once able to.

⁷⁴ Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning*, Kangaroo Press, 1994, chapter 24. Works in this area of the degradation of Australian soils, water and biodiversity are too numerous to mention here. Some names that spring to mind are Doug Cocks, Barney Foran and Dean Graetz, all of the Australian scientific organisation the CSIRO. Their work has been used to

compile the *State of the Environment Report: 1996* (prepared by the State of the Environment Advisory Council, chaired by Ian Lowe), CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 1996. All have contributed numerous publications auspiced by various government bodies as well as private publishers. The view that Australia's ecology, including natural human life support systems, is fragile and endangered, seems to be universal among biophysical scientists here.

⁷⁵ *The State of the Environment*, 1996, (prepared by the State of the Environment Advisory council, chaired by Ian Lowe), CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 1996.

⁷⁶ As Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, and Mary Ann Wulff write, in *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, Ed. Willem van Vliet, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1990, "Australia", pp.721-762, p.747, "In Australia, planning for residential development has largely been facilitative, that is, broadly accommodative to market forces. In the immediate postwar years, particularly with respect to Sydney, the largest city in Australia, the metropolitan plans promised considerable intervention, including designation of greenbelts. But these plans, based on low-growth assumptions, collapsed under the pressures of rapid population growth. Subsequent plans have tended to follow market forces by allocating large areas of fringe land to urban development, almost all, with the exception of the national capital, Canberra, owned by private sector interests. Moreover, the ability to control land-price inflation through selective release of state land was lost."

⁷⁷ There will be more about this in Chapters Seven and Eight.

⁷⁸ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 2000, p.44, citing *The State of the Environment Report*, *op.cit.*

⁷⁹ Scott Buckingham, *Locating Koalas in the Australian Bush*, Bolwarrah Press, Victoria, 1999, p.61.

⁸⁰ Tower Hill, near Warrnambool, was first reserved for public purposes in 1866 and became a national park in 1892. Daniel Catrice, "A Brief History of Victoria's National Parks", *Park Watch*, March 1998, No.192, pp.25-27.

⁸¹ Clive Hamilton, "People Versus the Koala", *Sustainable Population Australia*, March 2001, No. 49, p, 8. Originally printed in *The Australian Financial Review*, as one in a series of three articles on Australia's population, on 23 January 2001, p.32-34.

⁸² Formerly Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population (AESP), formed in 1988 it changed its name to SPA in 2001.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

¹ Griffith Taylor, *Environment and Race: A study of the evolution, migration, settlement and status of the races of man*, OUP, 1927. There is absolutely no point in pretending that this work was free of the racialism that dominated contemporary mainstream culture. It was, however the "liberality" of Taylor's book that offended most at the time. The scientific quality of Taylor's geographical observations on climate and soils in Australia continues to be held in high esteem, however.

The Social-Darwinian stratification of "race" was an unfortunate preoccupation of the times. Mauco, a demographer in France, was also writing about this at this time in *L'Ethnie Francaise*. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, l'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938-1991*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.47, says, this paper was edited by Georges Montandon, professor of the Chair of Ethnology of the School of Anthropology from 1933. He was one of the leaders of the French school of racialism. A friend of the German Anthropologist, Hans Gunther, who was director of the Institute for the study of Jewish and ethno-racial questions, he specialised in the reconnaissance of "Jewish types" and was an "expert" who assisted the Nazis in Drancy concentration camp. He was executed by the Resistance in 1944.

² Brady, Edwin James, *Australia Unlimited*, Melbourne, 1918.

³ Lodewyckx, A., *People for Australia, A Study in Population Problems*, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1956

⁴ Jordens, Ann-Mari, *Redefining Australians, Immigration, Citizenship and Identity*, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1995, pp. 10-12. In 1948 Aborigines and Torres Straits Islanders became Australian citizens under the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948*. They did not however become fully entitled citizens in all States until 1973 and were exempted from compulsory voting until 1983.

⁵ Charles Price & Katharine Betts, "Immigration", *The Australian Encyclopaedia*, 6th Edition, Terry Hills, NSW, Australian Geographic, Pty. Ltd., 1995, p.1727. The white Australia immigration policy was gradually dismantled between the mid 1960s and the Whitlam government formally ended the use of racial criteria in the selection of immigrants in 1973.

⁶ For the meaning of "populationism" see the Appendix 1, which contains the Glossary.

⁷ Borrie, W.D., *First Report of the National Population Inquiry*, The Government Printer of Australia, Canberra, 1975.

⁸ *Populate and Perish*, Eds. R. Birrell, D. Hill and J. Nevill, published by the Australian Conservation Foundation and Fontana, 1984

⁹ *Immigration, Population and Sustainable Environments: The Limits to Australia's Growth*, Ed. Joseph Wayne Smith, Flinders Press, University of South Australia, 1991.

¹⁰ Jones, B., (Chair), *Australia's Population "Carrying Capacity": One Nation - Two Ecologies, Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies*, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p.8. (This report is often called "The Jones Report".

¹¹ Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, Sydney, 1994

¹² Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning*, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, New South Wales, 1994.

¹³ Doug Cocks, *People Policy*, Australia's Population Choices, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1996, and Doug Cocks, *Future Makers, Future Takers*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999

¹⁴ Mark O'Connor, *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1998

¹⁵ Tom Morrow, *Growing for Broke*, Tomorrow Press, PO Box 31, Holmsglen, Vic, 3148, published in 2001.

¹⁶ Birrell, B., and Birrell, T., Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, (1981 and 1987), Second Edition, 1987. (I used the 1987 edition.)

¹⁷ Betts, K., *Immigration Ideology*, MUP, Carlton, Victoria, 1988 and Betts, K., *The Great Divide*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 2000

¹⁸ Betts, K., *The Great Divide*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 2000, p.43, *State of the Environment Report, 1996*, Commonwealth Department of the Environment, Australia.

¹⁹ See Philippe Collomb, France Guérin-Page, *Les Français et l'Environnement: l'Enquête "Populations-Espaces de vie-Environnements"*, INED/PUF, Paris, 1998. This was an enquiry into how the French conceptualise "Environment" and chapter one was about the range, hierarchy and frequency of various associations made with the expression. "Biodiversity" was not a concern and the word "animals" hardly came up. Associations were very much generalisations of landscape and countryside, including farmland, as well as concerns about pollution.

Of course, we might infer the same sorts of associations among Australians, but we would then have to take note of the number of organisations here that are concerned with protection and enjoyment of local nature reserves, national parks and flora and fauna, as well as professional organisations formed around these, and organisations like Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population and the Australian Conservation Foundation. There do exist bird watching societies and various local fauna and flora groups in France, but their number and impact, as well as the subjects they study or protect, are extremely reduced in range compared to Australia.

²⁰ "Immigration and the Australian Economy", *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth*, Australian Institute of Political Science, *Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp 173-176.

²¹ Max Walsh, "The Politics of it all," in *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth*, Australian Institute of Political Science, *Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp 173-176.

²² Bob Birrell and Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People*, *op.cit.*, p.253 and Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*, p.27.

²³ Castles and Kosacks *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

²⁴ J. Collins, "The Political Economy of Post War Immigration" in E.L.Wheelwright and K. Buckley (eds), *Essays on Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, 3 volumes, ANZ Book Company, Sydney, 1975, Vol.1, pp. 105-29, J. Collins, "A Divided Working Class", *Intervention*, 7, October 1976, and J. Collins and P. Boughton, "Capitalism and Poverty", *Intervention*, 7, October 1976 and J. Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land: Australia's Post War Immigration*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988.

²⁵ Paul Wilson, "Immigrants, Politics and Australian Society", in G. Duncan, (Ed.), *Critical Essays in Australian Politics*, Edward Arnold, Melbourne, 1978, pp 172 and 173.

²⁶ Bob Birrell and Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People*, *op.cit.*, p. 29. The authors support their argument by pointing to policy changes in the late 1970s that sought to avoid the importation of unskilled labor. They also point to characteristics of the migrant population in Australia that indicate that it is not *overall* a deprived group.

²⁷ This is also an argument mentioned by Georges Tapinos in "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", in G. Luciani (ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, Chapter Six, pp 133-134 and by Freeman in *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies : The French and British Experience, 1945-1975*, Princeton University Press, 1979, p.90.

²⁸ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, Ringwood, Victoria, 1986. Another source I used was Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983. The first edition of the Birrells' book was in 1981 and the second was in 1986.

²⁹ Birrell, Robert and Birrell, Tanya, *An Issue of People*, *op.cit.*, pp.92-94.

³⁰ Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*

³¹ In Weberian terms it is more of a membership by values sort of group than a class and the author once explained to me that she used the term "class" in a general rather than technical sense because she felt it was more accessible to the general public as a term than "status group".

³² Eric Conan, "Faut-il relancer l'immigration ...", (Should Immigration be restarted?) *L'Express*, November, 2000. This was an article written around an interview with Emmanuel Todd and Michele Tribalat. Here is a part that I have translated. "For several months voices have been raised from several directions calling for more immigration in France. But this time they are not the voices of Parisien snobs calling for legalisation of illegal immigrants' status, abolition of national borders and global brotherly love. Today they are coming from Medef, [a major employer association] UN experts, the European Council, or some leaders of the French Right. But the reasons have changed. Far from being a badge of the Left for rebels without a cause or artists and film-makers who feel guilty because their professions benefit from national protection, this new immigrationism is motivated by goals that are both concrete and self-interested. Among these are business labor market needs since the return of economic growth, the demographic deficit, the problem of financing pensions, etc. The new controversy goes beyond national boundaries and the European Council, very divided on this issue, has decided to consider the legal matters in Brussels on the 30th of November and the 1st of December. ..."

The Express goes on to qualify the UN's idea of "Replacement Migration" as absurd and to explore the question of increasing immigration with two demographers - for and against - mainly on the basis of employment questions. Emmanuel Todd expresses the economic rationalist approach to long term unemployment, whereby he believes that long term unemployed French will compete more readily for jobs when they see foreign competition arriving. This perspective is a quite novel and somewhat barbaric one for the French and Michèle Tribalat expresses the more traditional French view, which is to utilise French nationals before importing labor. She also says we need to dispel the illusion that immigration has ceased; that it has in fact been climbing lately. "Do we have to, once again, as in the 1950s to the 1970s leave the management of immigration to economics?" she asks.

³³ Eric Conan, "Faut-il relancer l'immigration ...", *L'Express*, Paris, November, 2000

³⁴ Alain Bihr, *Le Spectre de l'extreme droite*, Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, 1998, pp 34-35

³⁵ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, (English translation by Geoffrey de Laforcade), Contradictions of Modernity Series, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, U.S., 1996.

³⁶ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p.262. Although his work compares European countries and the United States with France, it is predominantly a work on France.

³⁷ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p.229. This is where the extension of rural industry is discussed.

³⁸ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, Introduction, pp xivi-xiv and pp228-240.

³⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, l'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938-1991*, Calmann-Levy, 1991.

⁴⁰ Katharine Betts, "Problems with Population Policy", a paper presented to the Australian Population Association at their biennial conference, Adelaide, 3-6 December, 1996. The concept of elite power groups and bipartisan policy refers to the concept of an agreement between power elites to limit items for public discussion in order to protect the vested interests of the powerful.

⁴¹ See further on in this section.

⁴² The principle issues were housing and social integration, however numbers were an issue with particular groups at different times, notably with Algerian moslems. The same group gave rise to fears of violence since the country was for some time at war with Algerian independents. Concerns varied over the period between 1946 and after 1973. After 1973 numbers of non-EEC immigrants was the principle concern. See my Chapter Six on French immigration history.

⁴³ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, l'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938-1991*, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1991, pp 68-69. [France and her immigrants, the fortunes of immigration policy.] Some of these changes aimed to make employers more responsible for their housing, and to tighten up immigration formalities over the years from 1968 to 1974.

⁴⁴ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p 74. The reference to Algeria's oil refers to another motive for Algeria's having voluntarily ceased immigration to France in 1973. The usual motive ascribed is that Algerians were suffering from racial persecution in France - and this was of course quite true.

⁴⁵ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.81.

⁴⁶ Roselyne de Villanova, *Immigration et espaces habités ; bilan bibliographique des travaux en France, 1970-1992*, Paris, Ed. L'Harmattan: CIEMI, 1994, ISBN 2-7384-2244-6 [Immigration and inhabited spaces; bibliographic evaluation of the literature in France.]

⁴⁷ See for instance the Howard Government, *Government Response to the Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies, Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation – Two Ecologies, 1999*.⁴⁷ (The response was in 1999; the Report had been under another government in 1994.) "The Working Party on Regional Migration, established by the Ministerial Council of immigration and Multicultural Affairs at its May 1996 meeting, examined ways to encourage a higher proportion of migrants to settle in regional Australia and in States/Territories seeking increased levels of skilled migration." This is an attempt to convince people that the pressure on Sydney from immigration can be deflected to rural areas.

⁴⁸ Roselyne de Villenova, *op.cit.*, p.15

⁴⁹ Roselyne de Villenova, *op.cit.*, p.16.

⁵⁰ J.P. Frey, *Société et urbanistique patronale, tome 1: gestion de la main d'oeuvre et réorganisation des pratiques de l'habiter*, ISU, 1982. [Society and employer town planning, Vol.1: management of labor and reorganisation of practices for housing it.]

⁵¹ My translation of Granotier, *Les travailleurs immigrés en France*, [Immigrant workers in France] Paris: Maspéro, 1970, cited by M.Oriol in *Bilan des études sur les aspects culturels et humains des migrations internationales en Europe Occidentale 1918-1979*, ESF, 1980, cited without page reference by Villenova in *Immigration et espaces habités; bilan bibliographique des travaux en France, 1970-1992*, Paris, Ed. L'Harmattan: CIEMI, 1994, ISBN 2-7384-2244-6, p. 17.

⁵² Roselyne de Villenova, *op.cit.*, p. 17, citing her perception of a general consensus on this at a seminar at the Environmental Institute (l'Institut de l'environnement) (France, presumably Paris), 12 March 1986.

⁵³ Monique Hervo et Marie-Ange Charras, *Bidonvilles*, [Slums], Francois Maspero, Cahiers libres 219-220, 1972, p.350ff: "Les accords de main-d'oeuvre: Devant une telle situation, on peut se demander ce que renferment les accords passés entre la France et les différents pays d'où provient la main-d'oeuvre étrangère et dans quelle mesure, toujours à propos de l'habitat, ils peuvent protéger ces travailleurs et leurs familles. Reportons-nous donc au texte de ces conventions et accords en ce qui concerne la venue de la famille de l'immigré." (Labor agreements: Such a situation calls into question the meaning of past agreements between France and different countries that supplied foreign labor; as regards housing, what protection do they offer workers and their families? Let us therefore examine the texts of these conventions and agreements regarding the arrival of the immigrant's family.) The book then devotes several pages to the letter and the meaning of various laws and agreements. See also Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p. 147 and p. 241, about the major role of employers in providing housing to immigrants on industrial estates from the early 20th century to the 1950s. Note that despite these ambiguities, the French public housing system was supposed to be open to any permanent resident in France, of whatever origin.

⁵⁴ Villenova, *op.cit.*, p. 19, citing a Report from the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, February, 1991.

⁵⁵ Villenova, *op.cit.*, p. 19, citing a Report from the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration, February, 1991. p 27.

⁵⁶ Villenova, *op.cit.*, p 158.

⁵⁷ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, pp. 148-9. Garden produce from houses with gardens was also an important source of income to which immigrants in "large residential blocks" could not aspire, Noiriel comments.

⁵⁸ Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p.118-119.

⁵⁹ Gary Freeman in Freeman, Gary P., *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, the French and British Experience, 1945-1975*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979.

⁶⁰ Gary Freeman in Freeman, Gary P., *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, p.70, "In 1962 de Gaulle still envisioned a country of '100 million Frenchmen' and Debré argued brilliantly in the National Assembly for a high priority demographic program'. Freeman is

citing Debré quoting de Gaulle in that Assembly. Note that in a later article, the one that I have used for my main theory, Freeman accords a more mixed quality to immigration purposes in France.

⁶¹ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, pp70-71

⁶² Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France de la fin du XIXe siècle à nos jours*, [History of Immigration in France from the end of the 19th Century to our day] Armand Colin, 1996, pp 195-196 Schor also writes that family allowances were reserved to children born French in order to encourage people to have children in France. It seems to me, however, that he is incorrect in the matter of family allowance, since these are also allocated to children overseas of residents in France.

⁶³ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p. 178, Fig.2, "Situation in 31 December 1982". The prefectures had substantial independence in their application of policy.

⁶⁴ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.69

⁶⁵ Dupâquier, Jacques, *Histoire de la population française* (Vol.4), *de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1st Ed., 1988 p.471. [History of the French Population (Vol.4.), from 1914 to our day.]

⁶⁶ *Treaty of Rome*, March 1957. This freedom of access came later to Greece, in 1981 and to Spain and Portugal in 1986.

⁶⁷ Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: op.cit.*, p.471. On 2 November 1945 the National Immigration Office - *Office nationale de l'immigration* - ONI, was appointed by law to be the exclusive recruiting agency for immigrant workers of all nationalities, whatever their occupations or other characteristics. In 1987 the ONI became the OMI - *Office des migrations internationales*. Source of the date of the name change was Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornell University Press, 1999, p.117.

⁶⁸ In my Chapter Six, the history chapter, I go into a bit more detail about the OMI. It carried out its duties more or less stringently at different times and according to different populations. Its role has continued to evolve.

⁶⁹ Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: op.cit.* p.472 and Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.14 and 15.

⁷⁰ Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'race' and ethnicity in contemporary France*, Routledge, London, New York, 1995, pp 10-11

⁷¹ This structure continues. It is particularly relevant for family reunion. Note, however, that without a work permit, for most primary breadwinners, a residents' card is of little use, since they cannot support themselves without a work permit (which would also permit them to access unemployment benefits in case of losing their job.) See Appendix Four for more detail on kinds of visas. There have also been different policies on this, some of which have attempted to link residents' visas to work permits. The Minister for Employment has had more or less sway over resident permit policy at various times. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, goes into such policy changes in detail in the first half of his thesis. There is little point in citing particular pages because the policies changed so frequently.

⁷² Alex C Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'race' and ethnicity in contemporary France*, Routledge, 1995, p.63.

⁷³ André Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, Ministère de l'emploi et solidarité, Documentation Française, 1998 and *Migrations et Nationalité en France 1998*, Ministère de l'emploi et solidarité, Documentation Française, 1999.

⁷⁴ André Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, *op.cit.*, pp58-59. Although EU nationals may enter EU countries freely, and apply for work, there is a formal system available to them to register their residence (which gives them certain rights). When they apply to register as residents they are now automatically granted the 10 year resident's card. This is similar in duration to the French national ID card, which is also a ten year one. In the case of non-EU persons, especially those from countries not party to the Schengen agreement, i.e. third world countries, permission is required to enter France and residence and a work permit are not automatic. When a residence permit is accorded this is generally for a limited time, from one to three years. There has been no similar automatic granting of 10 year permits to non-EU persons.

⁷⁵ James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States, the Political Economy of Postwar Europe*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1992, p.55

⁷⁶ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.78, writes, further, that racist and other immigrant problems in France had provided opportunities for The Arab Workers' Movement, which was a movement that opposed the Algerian government, to gather in importance. There was a dangerous likelihood that the Arab Workers' Movement (MTA, Mouvement des travailleurs arabes) would enter into competition with the official association, The Algerians in Europe Friendly Society (*L'amicale des Algériens en Europe*). By deciding to stop emigration the Algerian government put itself in the spotlight as the champion of its expatriates and removed some support for potential revolutionaries.

⁷⁷ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 65-67.

⁷⁸ INED is the National Institution for Demographic Study (Institut national pour les études démographiques). The abbreviated name may be spelled in capitals or as a word Ined in French practice.

⁷⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 47-51

⁸⁰ Patrick Weil, *Ibid*, pp 55-65

⁸¹ Gerard Noiriel: *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p.260.

⁸² *Ibid*.

⁸³ Gerard Noiriel: *The French Melting Pot*, *op.cit.*, p.260-261, citing M-R Marrus and R Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, Basic Books, New York, 1981 and Robert Curtius, *Essai sur la France*, 1932. (No other details of publication provided.)

⁸⁴ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, 1979.

⁸⁵ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, 1979, p. 119, citing Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*. (No further publication information.)

⁸⁶ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, 1979, pp 46-58. Bilateral policy on immigration asking sender countries to co-operate in lowering immigration failed in Britain, although it seemed workable and durable on the continent. British policy focus shifted from immigration to integration and time needed for this. In 1966 the British tried early policies of diversity and Equal Opportunity. In 1968 the UK plunged into an ugly period of race politics, when a crisis in Kenya led to many immigration applications from Asians with British

passports. These were impeded by an act with a subtle racist mechanism for excluding Asians but allowing whites by means of a "grandfather clause" which facilitated immigration for those with connections in England and allowed descendants of white colonists to enter freely. In the same year Enoch Powell began his immigration activism. He was removed from shadow cabinet because of this. In 1971 an Act proposed a more labor-need based entry and settlement policy and moved towards informal policy making by the Secretary of State (in the French style).

⁸⁷ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.85.

⁸⁸ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.86.

⁸⁹ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.176. Here, in his chapter on the 'Economic Context' of French and British post war immigration, Freeman cites Kindleberger, Charles, P., *Europe's Post-War Growth: The Role of Labor Supply*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp 25 and 27, which found France much more efficient in putting "relatively scarce resources to efficient use". Kindleberger attributed this to French planning and the "fostering of larger and in general more efficient productive units." According to Freeman, Kindleberger put forward an analysis that described France's immigration intakes as part of thoughtful economic planning. There is certainly evidence that France thought that that is indeed what it was doing; one has only to consult the records of the (usually five yearly) plans. See, for instance *Quid*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2000: 1st Plan 1947-53 (Monnet) Aims: To build up essential industries and return by 1949 to the 1929 level and to give to France the means of production for producing more and faster. Evaluation: Objectives were mostly achieved. 2nd Plan 1954-57. Aims: growth in production, improvement in quality and saleability of products in the context of more liberal trade. Evaluation : Satisfactory : economic equilibrium was affected towards the end by the war with Algeria. 3rd Plan 1958-61 : Aims : make way for full employment of young people as they reach the age to work and guide the economy towards the Common Market (wider competition) with more monetary stability and a stable balance of payments. Evaluation : marked by the 1959 Rueff Plan of stabilisation, which brought about a slowing of growth which was largely wiped out by the intermediate Plan of 1960/61. 4th Plan 1962-65. Aims : expansion, modernisation, investment, but also redistribution of the fruits of profit, urban and rural planning and regional activity to benefit marginalised social categories and backward regions. Evaluation : Mostly quite well achieved but the overheating of the economy led to a plan of stabilisation in September 1963. Etc.

Freeman writes that, according to Kindleberger, high immigration between 1957 and 1963 was meant to accelerate economic growth. Then inflation occurred and the plan became to purposefully slow economic growth, although the labor supply was allowed to continue to increase - largely through the arrival of repatriates from Algeria. Freeman uses this as evidence of the reserve labor army syndrome.

⁹⁰ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, chapter seven.

⁹¹ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, pp216-229. Freeman adds that sometimes the issue of race (color) discrimination may seem more severe than just an issue of class. In such cases, he advises, immigrants should organise along race lines rather than class lines; as a kind of subproletariat.

⁹² Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.249.

⁹³ It should however be noted that there is no law in France which prohibits resident immigrants from accessing public housing; it only appears so in practice! In theory all who pay taxes have access. The practice is French first and it also left Europeans in slums, particularly portuguese immigrants.

⁹⁴ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, pp 263-265.

⁹⁵ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.265.

⁹⁶ For more on this see Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 100-101. Up to 1975 the FAS was responsible for accessing finances for some specific activities in the area of public housing for immigrants.

⁹⁷ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.170-171. For instance, he says the primary aim of the FAS was the provision of housing for immigrants utilising special funds. These funds were obtained, by withholding from Family Assistance funds grants due to migrants whose families did not reside in France. This funding source gave the program the appearance of being self-supporting.

⁹⁸ Freeman does not seem to mention that Algerian born French (generally 'moslem' as opposed to French immigrant stock) workers were the exception to this rule. They were entitled to social security and to public housing. Although they were technically not immigrants they are treated as such by Freeman and many others (including myself for statistical purposes) at different times. They also seem to have been the most resented of all "immigrant" groups in France.

⁹⁹ "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", *International Migration Review*, Centre for Migration Studies of New York Inc., Staten Island, New York, vol. 24, no.4, 1995, pp.881-901.

¹⁰⁰ Freeman, Gary, *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p. 76-77

¹⁰¹ Freeman, Gary, *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p. 76-77

¹⁰² Georges Tapinos, "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", in G. Luciani (ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, Chapter Six, pp 127-144.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p 133.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Birrell and Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People*, *op.cit.*, p.255.

¹⁰⁹ Tapinos, Georges, "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", *op.cit.* , pp 133-134..

¹¹⁰ James F. Hollified, *Immigrants, Markets and States*, *op.cit.*, p.222.

¹¹¹ Georges Tapinos, "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", *op.cit.* , p 139.

¹¹² James F. Hollified, *Immigrants, Markets and States*, *op.cit.*, p.222.

¹¹³ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.57.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.53.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.59

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.55

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.88. This is probably explained by the strong involvement of unions in policy and agreements involving contracted immigrant labor in Germany.

¹¹⁹ This legal feature will be described and discussed in my chapters six and seven.

¹²⁰ Hollifield, *op.cit.*, pp74-75

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p.76

¹²² *Ibid*, p.76

¹²³ *Ibid*, p.76, note.5, cites Secrétaire d'état aux Travailleurs Immigrés, *La Nouvelle Politique de l'Immigration*, Paris, Documentation Française, 1977. "Exemptions, however, accounted for only 14 percent of total worker immigration controlled by ONI in 1974-75. See Hénneresse, *Le Patronat et la politique d'immigration*, pp.433-444.

Thesis author's note. From 1974 INSEE figures for net immigration and OMI figures for entries of permanent workers and temporary (mostly agricultural) workers do not cease completely, but undergo a profound and sustained reduction.

¹²⁴ Money, Jeanette, *Fences and Neighbors, The political geography of immigration control*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, USA, 1999, p.17.

¹²⁵ Freeman, Gary, "Modes of Immigration Politics", 1995, *op.cit.* pp.881-901.

¹²⁶ Money, *op.cit.* Her research question, described on her page five, is What accounts for differences in the patterns [volume] of immigration flow in different countries?

¹²⁷ Money, *op.cit.*, pp.157-205

¹²⁸ Money, *op.cit.*, p.9

¹²⁹ Money, *op.cit.*, p. 188

¹³⁰ Money, *op.cit.*, p.189, citing Grattan 1993:129 and Price 1974.

¹³¹ Money, *op.cit.*, p.190, citing, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 October 1972.

¹³² Money, *op.cit.*, p.192.

¹³³ Money, *op.cit.*, p.99

¹³⁴ Hollifield, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-71

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p.209.

¹³⁶ Hans van Amersfoort, "Migration control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands" in *Mechanisms of Immigration Control, A comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, Eds. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar, Berg, Oxford and New York, 1999, pp.135-167. Post war migration also led to housing problems in Holland and to regularisation

of the immigration process. The work permit became the most important tool for regulating migration and employers had to specify their need for numbers and kind of work and were obliged to provide minimum standards for housing. (p.147) Since 1994 a national ID system has reluctantly been introduced against great opposition for among others, the purposes of controlling social welfare fraud, including use of public housing by non-nationals. (p. 161)

A housing standard for family reunion also exists in Norway. (p.211)

¹³⁷ This is presumably because her focus was elsewhere; she is looking for indications of electoral dissatisfaction with immigration.

¹³⁸ Expression explained in Jeanette Money, *op.cit.*, in a footnote on page 183.

¹³⁹ For these statements Money and Cole cite Birrell and Birrell 1981, but give no page number, and do not refer specifically to examples of lobbying from the housing and property development industries. However Birrell and Birrell in *An Issue of People*, Longman Cheshire, 1986, p.87. cite submissions to the National Population Inquiry 1973 from the Housing Industry Association, Stocks and Holdings, and the Australian Chamber of Commerce, which elegantly illustrate lobbying at a national level undertaken by national organisations representing their industry.

¹⁴⁰ Money, *op.cit.*, p.182.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp.182-184

¹⁴² *Ibid*, pp. 176-179

¹⁴³ "Henderson Poverty Report", Henderson, Ronald F., (Chairman), *Poverty in Australia, First Main Report of the Commission of Inquiry into poverty*, Canberra, AGPS, 1975

¹⁴⁴ Money *op.cit.*, pp. 176, 183, 203. Note pp. 176-179 that she makes the case that Australians were linking high property prices to immigration and, on page 189, that Whitlam's high profile urban development election policies tied immigration policy to the adequacy of the urban infrastructure.

¹⁴⁵ Money uses complicated multiple regression statistics for France and Australia in an attempt to establish a statistical background to her theory. The basis for these calculations is, however, shaky on a number of grounds. These include her somewhat uncritical use of census statistics, her largely unqualified use of OMI statistics, and her inadequate understanding of Australian migration statistics. She has chosen OMI immigration statistics for France and, for Australia, the formal permanent intake statistics which correspond so closely to the formal Planned Permanent Intake Program. Money, *op.cit.*, pp168-169.

Both the OMI and the Australian Planned Intake only count a selection of immigrant entries, and therefore do not reflect the immigrant population with much accuracy.

The Australian planned intake is the annual "quota" of permanent places offered to immigrants under the government immigration program, known as the "Migration (non-Humanitarian) program", which excludes from its count refugees and other humanitarian categories, and New Zealanders. The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs explains that "The Migration and Humanitarian Programs are set by the Government on a financial year basis following consultations with [various bodies and interest groups].") (Source: *Population Flows, Immigration Aspects, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs*, December 1999, p.13. Outside this program, however, many other entries are brokered, including a one to four year category that has quite wide application and from which certain applicants may prolong their stay or convert to permanency without leaving the country.

The permanent intake statistics are not used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics because they so poorly reflect actual flows; the ABS goes by what people state their intentions to be on forms given to them prior to disembarking at sea and air ports. (Source: ABS, glossaries at the end of Australian Demographic Statistics quarterly publications, cat. No. 3101.0.) (My own work depends largely on ABS statistics.)

The OMI statistics, although they do not entail a "quota" have a similarly formal basis to the Australian permanent intake, largely excluding European nationals and other categories, such as refugees, including temporary entries. (See my Appendix 4 for more detail).

Money never adequately explains exactly what she is referring to statistically at any time when referring to demographic statistics. In one table, where the contents are described as OMI statistics, she includes agricultural workers and family reunion, but nowhere does she say which parts or for what purpose this table had been used in her text.

In assessing anti-immigrant pressure in certain French electorates between the years 1962-1982 Money uses national census data to judge the size of the immigrant population in different departments. Here again she is using particularly unreliable statistics.

Michel Massenet, a former Director of *Population and Migrations (INSEE)*, has criticised census data. In "La Mésure de la population d'origine étrangère, hier, aujourd'hui et demain", in *Morales et Politiques d'Immigration*, Ed. Jaques Dupâquier, PUF, 1998, p.15, he writes [my translation]:

"...in 1975 ... the State Secretary for Social Affairs stated that the rate of error in census data on foreigners was not 3.6% but 22%. Now, if we add together the figures I have given you and combine them with INSEE's 3.6% our error rate is even higher than 22%. ... [if] we want to harmonise the rate of error with INSEE, then we must [also] take into account the corrections that INSEE retroactively makes to its figures."

As well as the usual inherent problem of the unreliability of self-reporting that censuses suffer from, added to this, in France, is the difficulty of defining the populations of "foreigners", "Algerians" and "immigrants". This difficulty results from the statistical disappearance of members of these categories due to the process of naturalisation or of being born in French colonies or of being born to citizens of French colonies. Money thus arrives at three indicators of anti-immigrant pressures in French departments which might be more - or less - reliable and valid. These are: 1. Level of unemployment; 2. Growth in immigration; 3. Combination of growth in immigration and unemployment figures.

She goes on to attempt to extrapolate the level of the 'Algerian' population in France from national census statistics to a departmental level. She describes her results as correlating anti-immigrant sentiment with sensitivity to the presence of Algerians around the 1962 census. In her analysis of her multiple regression results, from 1968 on, she interprets the presence of aliens as correlating very little with general anti-immigrant sentiment, but as correlating with anti-Algerian sentiment in particular. However her "anti-immigrant sentiment" indicator is of questionable validity for it seems to lack any element of public opinion; she has apparently inferred anti-immigrant sentiment from the presence of unemployment and growth in immigration.

She then rates departments with high anti-immigrant scores on their "swing" electorate value and finds that a lot of the high swing electorates had high "anti-immigrant" scores as well. (This boils down to her discovering that they had lots of immigrants.) Although her statistics are not very impressive, she backs them up with additional solid documentary evidence of contemporary concern on issues to do with immigration. (Money, *op.cit.*, pp. 131-136) This

documentary evidence adds weight to Money's argument and was a useful source of information for my thesis.

¹⁴⁶ See my discussion of statistics in Appendix 4, p.10-11.

¹⁴⁷ Money, *op.cit.*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁴⁸ Money, *op.cit.*, p.109. She does mention numbers of repatriates that settled in Marseilles and Rhone-Alpes area between 1946 and 1975 on p.127, but does not give the readily available information about annual intake nationally.

¹⁴⁹ The immigration flow chart she reproduces on page 113 is from OMISTATS and only gives entries of non-French immigrant workers as 160,097 persons. Insee however records, together with natural increase, an increase of over one million persons in that year.

¹⁵⁰ Money, *op.cit.*, p.9.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.113, Table 5.1.

¹⁵² Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁵³ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages).

¹⁵⁴ See Chapter Six on this issue.

¹⁵⁵ This is how it appeared in the INSEE net immigration statistics. Had it been counted as internal immigration the flow of repatriates would not have appeared in these immigration statistics. I suppose that, if Money and others were using SOPEMI international immigration statistics the repatriates would not have shown up there.

¹⁵⁶ For instance Money's work implicitly assumes that the ethnic characteristics of aliens in general and Algerians must be a major problem in immigration toleration, but does not investigate the impact of sheer numbers of repatriates and does not examine immigration numbers within the context of the total annual population growth rate.

¹⁵⁷ See also Villenova, *op.cit.*, p.23, who writes (my translation), "If the border is inconveniently unclear for young people, it is even more unclear for non-mainland French people (Dom Tom) and French moslems. These people are not categorised as immigrants but are often mistaken for foreigners by officials in institutions or by their own mainland compatriotes. Such confusion may be exacerbated by the fact that nationality in ex-colonies varied according to policies over the period."

¹⁵⁸ Here is a chronical of events from the United States Energy Information Administration, entitled, *World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies: 1970 - 1999*, URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html>; File Last Modified: January 25, 2000. Contact: Douglas MacIntyre : douglas.macintyre@eia.doe.gov

1970

Jan 1

U.S. Federal oil depletion allowance reduced from 27.5 to 22.0 percent.

May 3

TAP line from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean interrupted in Syria, creating all-time tanker rate highs from June to December.

Sep 4 - Oct 9

Libya raises posted prices and increases tax rate from 50 percent to 55 percent. Iran and Kuwait follow in November.

Dec 9-12

OPEC meeting in Caracas establishes 55 percent as minimum tax rate and demands that posted prices be changed to reflect changes in foreign exchange rates.

1971

Jan 12

Negotiations begin in Tehran between 6 Gulf producing countries and 22 oil companies.

Feb 3-4

OPEC mandates "total embargo" against any company that rejects the 55 percent tax rate.

Feb 14

Tehran agreement signed. Companies accept 55 percent tax rate, immediate increase in posted prices, and further successive increases.

Feb 24

Algeria nationalizes 51 percent of French oil concessions.

Apr 2

Libya concludes five weeks of negotiations with Western oil companies in Tripoli on behalf of itself, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iraq. Agreement raises posted prices of oil delivered to Mediterranean from \$2.55 to \$3.45 per barrel; provides for a 2.5 percent annual price increase plus inflation allowance; raises tax rate from a range of 50-58 percent to 60 percent of posted price.

¹⁵⁹ See Katharine Betts, "Problems with Population Policy", a paper presented to the Australian Population Association biennial conference, Adelaide, 3-6 December, 1996

¹⁶⁰ During a visit to his Paris apartment to collect copies of documents on the morning of Saturday 13 January 2001.

¹⁶¹ Tapinos, "The Dynamics of International Migration", *op.cit.*, p.133.

¹⁶² In response to a question that I asked Postel-Vinay during a visit to his Paris apartment to collect copies of documents on the morning of Saturday 13 January 2001. See references to other documents supporting these recollections of Postel-Vinay further on in my thesis, where I go into the events of 1974 in more detail.

¹⁶³ Aristide R. Zolberg, "Are the Industrial Countries under siege", in G. Luciani, (Ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, pp.53-82, p. 61 : "In the 1970s, mounting objections by conservative segments of the citizen to the presence of culturally and often somatically distinct minorities, as well as the

oil crisis and ensuing economic crisis, prompted the governments of the industrial countries to undertake a drastic reevaluation of ongoing immigration, but the difficulty of reducing the flows to the desired level, as well as to restoring the *status quo*, precipitated renewed fear of 'invasion'. In the United States, in the 'stagflation' 1970s, estimates of illegal immigrants escalated to as high as twenty million, on the basis of which it was argued that the nation had 'lost control of its borders'. The major solution proposed was to impose sanctions on employers of unauthorized labour, but this failed of enactment because of resistance by organized business interests, so that in 1979 the Congress established a commission to overhaul the entire immigration system."

See also Stephen D. Mumford, *The Life and Death of NSSM 200: How the Destruction of Political Will Doomed a U.S. Population Policy*, Centre for Research on Population and Security, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 1996, pp.51-57 and, regarding religious pressure, the role of a political lobby group of American bishops of the Catholic Church in the United States, pp.179-352.

¹⁶⁴ Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", 1995, *op.cit.*, pp.881-901.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

¹ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, and "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", 1995, *op.cit.*, pp.881-901.

² *Ibid*, p.885. Here Freeman cites Wilson, J.Q., ed., *The Politics of Regulation*, Harper, New York, 1980, "The analysis in this section builds on the framework devised by James Q. Wilson that derives four types of politics from whether the benefits and costs of policies are concentrated or diffuse: client (cb,dc), interest group (cb,cc), majoritarian (db,dc), and entrepreneurial (db,cc)."

³ *Ibid*, p.892. In defence of France, in Freeman's argument the French are not cast as more racist than Australians or Americans; it is only in the absence of strong pro-immigration lobbies that racism seems more influential and if you don't take their economic reasons seriously, which I do.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp.885-886.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp.881-901

⁶ *Ibid*, p.881. He later gives a number of examples of these "unfortunate consequences" on pages 890 & 892. . Some of these include the complications of decolonisation, unforeseen consequences of guestworker programs, and conflicts associated with ethnic and religious minorities, such as the muslim scarf conflict in schools in the French lay State, conflicts over the practice of female circumcision, and domestic political flack over the Gulf war.

⁷ *Ibid*, p.890, note 9, "In the immediate postwar period, the French government considered launching a program of permanent immigration in order to remedy the demographic deficit caused by war losses and long-term population decline. The program was never fully implemented and a temporary manpower strategy quickly supplanted it." He cites Tapinos, *L'immigration étrangère en France 1946-1973*, Paris, PUF, 1975 and his own work, Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*

⁸ *Ibid*, p.892. In this article it would have been good if Freeman had tried to articulate the difference between international immigration and Moslem immigration as an internal immigration issue by French nationals, since Algeria was, up to 1962, a part of France, and its nationals retained special rights in France until 1968 and children born to those Algerians who were once French still retain naturalization rights. He also does not articulate the definitional problem of the many legal and statistical differences between "worker immigration" of mostly non-European origin and immigration from within the European Economic Community. Nor does he explain why family reunion is a legal issue in European law and how this affects and affected the ability of France and other EU member-states' "failure of governments to halt immigration in 1973 and the indecisiveness with which they responded in the aftermath of 1973...".

⁹ For instance, Brimelow, *Alien Nation*, Random House, New York, 1995, pp.173-175.

¹⁰ Gary Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics", *International Migration Review*, 1995, *op.cit.*, pp.885-886.

¹¹ This is not to say that the building industry in France does not import workers. See Money, *op.cit.*, p.149 who says that the Federation Parisien du Batiment (FPB) stood in sharp contrast to the CNPF (Chambre de Commerce et de l'Industrie de Paris), in pushing for high immigration up to 1975. In fact this assertion is contradicted by Patrick Weil, in *La France et ses Etrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.77-81, who writes that the CNPF expressed fears that, not only were poor countries organising into an oil cartel, their workers were also negotiating higher prices. As the economic situation worsened however the CNPF stopped protesting, but Weil attributes the one year lag on Germany by France regarding closure of borders, to manufacturer protest. However, regarding the FPB; it was looking for short term construction workers and the reason they still wanted them in 1974 is that the industry, although it was going into rapid decline, was still holding on in the private sector. However economic circumstances caught up here as well. Construction, as everywhere in the world, tends to profit from short term immigration and in France much of this is illegal immigration. In Australia we tend to import construction tradesmen and have done since the Second World War, due mainly to our great failure to train young Australians. In France the excuse is that the French do not apply for apprenticeships in sufficient numbers. Source: Personal communication from Prof Francis Ronsin, Histoire Contemporaine, Univ. Bourgogne in Dijon and author of *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, 1977. See more references and discussion on this issue of labor for construction industries in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

¹² Money, *op.cit.*, pp. 128, 139, 149-151, 153, 155. Money has commented on some of the differences in approaches to housing immigrants and the impact this may have had in sensitising local politicians who also hold positions in National French politics, but she has not remarked upon the absence of a development and housing industry lobby for high immigration in France. Money also uses Gary Freeman's approach, but her focus is on identifying immigration impact at a local level. She believes costs are focused in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of immigrants, but does not compare the presence and absence of roles of industry lobbies at a national level in response to benefits or absence of benefits from immigration.

¹³ D.Burtenshaw, M.Bateman and G.J.Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981, p.ix.

¹⁴ For instance, almost all E.O. Wilson's works, of which a good inclusive example is *Naturalist*, Penguin, 1994, and which cites Robert MacArthur and E O Wilson, *The Theory of Island Biogeography*, Princeton University Press, 1967, as a crucial advance in conservation biology using geographical ecology. It looks at the viability of biodiverse areas according to their size and location and isolation. Much work has built on this theory. Other examples are William Lines, *False Economy*, (which is quite a sociological approach to the impacts of population growth in Australia on human experience and environmental richness) Freemantle Arts Centre Press, 1998, Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, 1994, Mary White, *After the Greening, the Browning*, 1994, RD Graetz, MA Wilson, SK Campbell, *Landcover Disturbance Over the Australian Continent*, Biodiversity Series Paper No.7, Dept Environment, Sports and Territories, Commonwealth of Australia, ISBN, 0642229058.

¹⁵ But that situation may yet change as forest cover increases with the shrinking rural populations. At the end of 1999 there was conflict between ecologists and shepherds in France over whether wolves, which were increasing in number for the first time this century, should be allowed a permanent niche France with their status protected through national land planning.

On the site of Univers-Nature, <http://www.univers-nature.com/>, in November 2000 there was a special report on the return of big predators in France. "Today it appears that conditions for definitive reinstallment of big predators are optimum. The rural exodus and the shrinking of agriculture have created less human population pressure and forests are increasing. Restrictions on hunting have also permitted better management of big wild herbivores. Moreover public

opinion has demonstrated through several polls that most people favor the long term return of big predators in our land."

The web site of the French Society for the Protection of Mammals, <http://www.mnhn.fr/sfepm/index.html>, reports that on the 25th of October the 23rd Francophone Mammalogy Conference responded to a parliamentary report on the Wolf, dated 20 October. Their response denounced the report's failure to come to terms with the wolf's reestablishment in France and to be mistakenly privileging the economically moribund French sheep industry over the rights of wolves to return to their natural home.... "The report contents itself with simplistic solutions; eradication or imprisonment of the Wolf in zoos, justified by traditional bogies about the species. But people should remember that if the Wolf has a reputation for eating grandmothers and Little Red Riding Hoods, it is also a model of social structure, founder of ancient Rome and thus of our civilisation. Furthermore, aren't wolf-cubs still part of numerous youth movements?"

¹⁶ For instance, both Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux in *De L'Immigre au citoyen, op.cit.*, pp 72-81 and Weil in *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, pp 100-102 and 270-276, have allocated analytical space to the issue of planning and housing. Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, p.75 writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics. Books have been written in France specifically on the connection between homelessness, inferior housing and immigration, such as Monique Hervo and Marie-Ange Charras, *Bidonvilles, op.cit.*

¹⁷ See my section on land planning for biodiversity in my chapter, "The New Ecological Paradigm".

¹⁸ Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, (for the Australian Association of Socialist Studies), A Silverfish Book, 1979, ISBN 0 908094 43 4, p 82.

¹⁹ Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83. In France national and regional planning is well developed. These plans are used to guide land use and transport policies at a more local scale

²⁰ Switzerland is unique in that it also holds national referendums on immigration. Source: Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics", 1995, *op.cit.*, pp.881-901

²¹ The Swedish example has been used as a strong contrast between British land development practices which permit massive speculation and the Swedish ones that don't in Peter Dickens, Simon Duncan, Mark Goodwin and Fred Gray, *Housing, States and Localities*, Methuen, London & New York, 1985. Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket, op.cit.*, p. 82 writes, "Experience in the country which has been most successful in land policy reform (Sweden) suggests that any program of State intervention on the supply side in the land market must be of a long term nature. In Stockholm as early as 1904 the city purchased 2000 hectares of surrounding development land at a time when the developed area was only 1700 hectares, and three years later legislation was introduced which permitted municipalities to dispose of land only on a leasehold basis, in order to maintain planning control and to discourage speculation. This process continued until almost all the remaining undeveloped land had been acquired, some 12, 600 hectares by the outbreak of World War II. In 1967, continuing this tradition of an active land policy, Sweden decided that local authorities should control all future development in advance of need. Despite slow and cumbersome acquisition procedures, advance land acquisition policies appear to have stabilized land values and encouraged coherent planning policies."

²² John Gray makes a similar distinction. As well as identifying England's property ownership culture as different from the rest of Europe's, he argues that the free market was an Anglo-Saxon

singularity in the 19th century. He writes that this "English paradigm" of the free market was interrupted by the second world war, which caused a more co-operative society. It resurfaced however during the 1980s in Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, as a consequence of neo-liberal policies." Gray describes the English speaking settler societies as "societies in which a culture and economy of agrarian individualism preceded industrialization." He attributes this, in part, to the early disappearance of the peasant culture in England. Gray, John, *False Dawn*, Granta Books, Great Britain, 1999, pp.13-14.

²³ Leonie Sandercock compares and contrasts United Kingdom planning and building with Australia in Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, *op.cit.*, pp.80-83. Here she also compares Britain with Sweden, over the period 1967 to 1970, where the British Labor Government, using the Land Commission Act of 1967, provided for the establishment of a central authority to assemble land banks for prospective development and generally to acquire, manage and dispose of land in the interests of the community. (The Act did not survive the change of government in 1970.) In British "new towns", says Sandercock, p.83, as in Canberra, "the development authorities own all the land and take all the development decisions and the market has almost no direct influence in determining land use. But both the new towns and Canberra are only a small proportion of the urban development occurring in Britain and Australia and the enlightened development planning approach in use in them must be regarded as somewhat of an aberration from the dominant free enterprise dictated development process occurring throughout the rest of Britain and Australia."

²⁴ John Gray, in *False Dawn*, also makes a strong distinction between England and the rest of Europe in this regard, "Unlike any country in continental Europe, England had long possessed a highly individualist legal culture of property ownership. Land had long been traded as a commodity ...". John Gray, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

²⁵ This post 1973 oil shock European Community policy of zero net immigration, which did not occur in Australia, Canada or the US, came to be nicknamed "Fortress Europe". Fortress Europe had evolved out of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. This treaty permitted visa free travel to citizens of the European Economic Community. The original signatories were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and West Germany. The United Kingdom and Denmark were added in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 made the European Economic Community into the European Union. In 1994 Austria, Finland and Switzerland were added.

²⁶ Guy Groux and Catherine Lévy, *La Possession Ouvrière, du taudis à la propriété, (XIXe-XXe siècle)*, Les Éditions de l'Atelier, pp104-112., INSEE, *Données sociales*, 1993, Figure 4, "Logements terminés par secteur de construction de 1949 à 1977 p.411. Housing Construction Totals from 1979-1989 were from INSEE, *Annuaire Rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988*, Table 1, "Situation de la Construction". Original Source, Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la Mer. From 1980-1994 my source was Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, "France", *Housing Policy in Europe*, Ed. Paul Balchin, Routledge, 1996, Table 9.2, p.127. (Figures for 1994 were provisional).

²⁷ D Burtenshaw, M Bateman, G J Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, 1981, and *The European City, A Western Perspective*, David Fulton Publishers, London, 1991 and Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83.

²⁸ Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, *op.cit.*, p 82. See also, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," Swinburne University of Technology, NO79AS485/2/6/1999, p. 19.

²⁹ This lack of change in the Australian industry is mainly detectable by comparing literature on the industry adaptations in France and Europe. Little change, except higher prices, is evident in the Australian literature of the time, but in the European literature there are many references to adaptations post oil shock economic crisis. See, for instance, Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.18, for a discussion about the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia. On p.32 Burke comments that developers in Australia frequently employ a strategy of "inviting as many builders as possible to set up display houses. Some have up to 60 different builders working on their estate at any one time. This fragmentation not only limits the degree to which the builders can appropriate development gains, but also further restricts their ability to embark on more industrialised forms of production techniques that might occur on site." See also Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, p.23, Chapter 3, "Housing Policy in France": "French housing policy has undergone considerable changes in recent years, but the process has been more evolutionary than the abrupt changes of direction that have characterised the UK. ... As in other countries, the impetus for many of the changes since the mid-1970s has been the need to contain costs and to target the measures more effectively..." See also Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages). This plots the course of the housing construction industry in France from WW2 and documents a number of industry and design adjustments to energy and financial strictures after the oil shock.

³⁰ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, pp. 387-405 and Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.19.

³¹ Some examples of protest groups are Save Our Suburbs (SOS) which has the political disadvantage of defending isolated middle class pockets from increased population density housing without addressing the overall cause of population growth; Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population (AESP), which has little money, but highly articulate supporters in the ecological scientific community and which gave rise to its counterpart, the pro-immigration APOP : www.apop.com.au , created by industries in support of high immigration; and Australians Against Further Immigration (AAFI) and the more widely based Pauline Hanson Party which have been morally invalidated by allegations of racist sympathies. See Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction Publishers, 1990, p.269, and elsewhere for an examination of groups attempting to stop Australian development and housing and how isolated they have been.

³² Algeria had unilaterally ceased immigration in 1973 giving the reason as racism, one year prior to France closing her borders. With the rise in oil prices, the CNPF expressed fears that Algeria was withdrawing not only oil, in line with OPEC, but that her workers were organising to negotiate higher wages as well. See Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.77-81, for an interesting discussion of other reasons and the role of OPEC.

³³ See further on in my main argument chapter, where I quote Postel-Vinay saying that his idea that the oil-shock related recession would be long and hard with materials shortages was influenced by that opinion from the head of the CNPF. I also reference a document where Postel-Vinay hints at the same thing.

³⁴ French universities are still almost free and no special fees are levied on foreign students. They are therefore a public cost. [Gisti-info] Le statut des étudiants étrangers: "Entre maîtrise des flux migratoires et logique de Marché", Tuesday 4 April 2000 from gisti-info@ras.eu.org. This was an email article from Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) – The Group for Information and Support for Immigrants, 3, Villa Marces 75011, Paris. Tel.

0143146066. The article talked about the limited numbers of foreign students that universities are allowed to take. Also Students, who have visas for less than one year (unless they are from the European Union) are not counted as permanent immigrants, although they may stay for several years and may be allowed to work.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER SIX

¹ Michael Cannon, *The Land Boomers, The Complete Illustrated History*, Lloyd O'Neil, Australia 1986, p 120.

² Leon L'Huillier, "Depression and a National Economy," *Essays in Economic History of Australia*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1973, p 190. (We could probably find a similar pattern in the United States.)

³ WH Eldred, "The Financial Crisis" in *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, II:7 (July 1893), p.227, cited by Neville Hicks, *This Sin and Scandal, Australia's Population Debate 1891-1911*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, ACT, 1978, p86, who says that Eldred was a former bank director acting in 1893 as Consul-General for Chile in Sydney.

⁴ *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, VIII:8 (August, 1898), p.292, cited by Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, p87.

⁵ Editor's note: 'Victoria's Loss' in *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, XI:8 (March 1898), p 24f, cited by Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, p87

⁶ Included with South Australia prior to 1901

⁷ Part of New South Wales prior to 1911

⁸ CH Wright, *Conquering the Continent*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1960, p 65

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, p.88.

¹¹ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, p.89.

¹² Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, p.9, Table 1.

¹³ Bob Birrell, *Federation, The Secret Story*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 2001, p.198 and notes 35 and 36.

¹⁴ These aspects have been treated exhaustively by Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*

¹⁵ John O'Hara, *The Crusaders, The Story of the Beginning of the Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales*, Published by Chamber of Manufactures, NSW, 60 York St., Sydney, August 1985, Pp 25-29

¹⁶ *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, "Beale, Octavius Charles," 1850-1930, p225, "As State President of the National Protection League, he kept Deakin, an old ally, informed on political matters in Sydney."

¹⁷ Michael Cannon, *op.cit.*, p 55. "Deakin soon showed that as a Cabinet Minister he was not the man to prosecute the authors of financial disaster with any vigour. ... Deakin was too closely

involved with several of the biggest land boomers to be very interested in checking their meteoric careers."

¹⁸ Michael Cannon, *op.cit.*, p 55.

¹⁹ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, pp 5-10. Mackellar nominated the original list of commissioners. The only one who was not nominated to Mackellar's list was William Arthur Holman. Holman only attended five meetings and did not sign the final report. Although one of five commissioners (Mackellar, Brady, Nash, Fosbery and Holman) who were members of the NSW Legislative Council, he was the only Labor member of the Commission. Nine of the original eleven appointees were already Mackellar's colleagues in various fields. Five were prominent businessmen: Hughes, Knox, Mackellar, MacLaurin, Beale and Littlejohn.

²⁰ *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, General Editor, John Ritchie, MUP, 1991, Volumes for 1891-1939: Mackellar Vol 10.p295; MacLaurin Vol 10 p 329; Hughes Vol.9 p 392; Knox Vol 9 p 626; Beale Vol 7 p 225; Paton Vol 11 p 162. All these biographical details are from this dictionary or from Michael Cannon, *The Land Boomers, The Complete Illustrated History*, Lloyd O'Neil, Australia 1986, pp.26-27, 127, 168-171.

²¹ Michael Cannon, *op.cit.*, pp.168-171

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Michael Cannon, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

²⁴ Michael Cannon, *op.cit.*, p. 127 and pp.26-27

²⁵ *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, MacLaurin, Sir Henry Normand, p 327

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ NSW Legislative Assembly 1904 cited in WD Borrie, 1958, *The Peopling of Australia*, George Judah Cohen Memorial Lecture, Univ. Sydney; cited in *Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One nation - two ecologies*, (*op cit*), p8.

²⁸ John O'Hara, *The Crusaders, The Story of the Beginning of the Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales*, Published by Chamber of Manufactures, NSW, 60 York St., Sydney, August 1985, Pp 25-29

²⁹ John O'Hara, *op.cit.*, p 29

³⁰ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, pp 88-89, note 30, citing the following: J.G. Farleigh, 'President's Address' in NSW Chamber of Manufactures' *Annual Report* (1908), p 17

³¹ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, citing J Barre Johnston, 'President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce: *Annual Report*, (1903), p 39

³² Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, citing George Merrivale, 'Acting-President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report*, (1906), p 31f.

³³ Neville Hicks, *op.cit.*, citing RJ Larking, 'President's Address' in Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report*, (1908), p 59

³⁴ Richard Cotter, "War, Boom and Depression", *Essays in Economic History of Australia*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1973, p251, "Politicians, both in England and Australia, avoided discussion of this development, for, inevitable or not, an industrial dominion economy was outside the scope of the imperial purpose. The role of Australia was seen in the traditional light

and the economy was to remain colonial. The growth of rural industries which would supplement the industrial might of the United Kingdom was the real task - all that was needed was men to populate Australia, money to develop it and markets in which to sell the resultant increase of primary products."

³⁵ Bob Birrell, *Federation, op.cit.*, pp 197-200. The Federation movement cannot of course be reduced to simple economic strategies. Birrell shows that the time of Federation was one of egalitarian social reform, with intense popular involvement and a strong patriotic sentiment for Australia as a *nation* in itself, independent from Britain.

³⁶ Edwin James Brady, *Australia Unlimited*, Melbourne, 1918.

³⁷ *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, General Editor, John Ritchie, MUP, 1991, Vol 7 pp387-388.

³⁸ William J Lines, *False Economy, Australia in the Twentieth Century*, Freemantle Arts Centre Press, Australia, 1998, p 50.

³⁹ *The Argus* newspaper, published by Edward Wilson, Melbourne, Victoria, 31 October 1919, cited by W J Lines, *op.cit.*, p. 47. (*The Argus* is no longer in existence.)

⁴⁰ Information on soldier settler schemes, locations and quality of land, and drift to the cities in the depression: William Lines, *op.cit.*, p 51 and Richard Cotter, "War, Boom and Depression", *Essays in Economic History of Australia*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1970, p253. William Lines also makes substantial comments on associated land degradation and salinisation.

⁴¹ Mary White, *After the Greening, op.cit.*, p.198. "Problems of salinisation of land are not recent phenomena that have suddenly appeared in Australia. It is only now [1994 publication] that they are costing the country an estimated \$100,000,000 a year in Murray-Darling Basin productivity alone that they are causing panic. In Western Australia in 1897, only about 65 years after the establishment of the Swan River Colony, it was noted that removal of native vegetation had resulted in salting of stream waters in the Northam-Toodyay district. Salinity is areas of dryland agriculture in the State is still increasing and yet more land in salt-prone regions is still being developed today, and no way of controlling salination or curing the salt-degraded land has yet been found."

⁴² Richard Cotter, "War, Boom and Depression", *Essays in Economic History of Australia, op.cit.*, p247

⁴³ William Lines, *op.cit.*, p 51 and Richard Cotter, "War, Boom and Depression", *Essays in Economic History of Australia, op.cit.*, p253

⁴⁴ Leonie Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, 1990, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁴⁵ Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People, op.cit.*, p. 87, citing a submission from Stocks and Holdings to the National Population Inquiry, June 1973.

⁴⁶ The dependence on housing construction is quite marked in this industry, even in CSR, which is one of the biggest and has many other holdings in Asia, the Pacific and the United States. "In Australia, as expected, housing starts have begun to fall, in line with the steep, post-GST fall in approvals, down 38% year on year to September. Building Materials' earnings in the second half will be well below the first half. Construction Materials is similarly affected. Other construction activity to June, was flat versus 1998-9, and is expected to decline significantly this year. Overall however, the restructuring of the CSR Group and CSRA's growth in the US has sharply reduced the group's exposure to the volatility of the Australian domestic building and

construction cycles." Source: Paul Saliba, writing about CSR for Lincoln Industries "Stock doctor" software for Stock market information, 21/11/2000.

⁴⁷ Richard Reed, *Baby Boomers and Property Busts*, paper for Australian Population Association Conference 2000, Melbourne. Richard Reed is with the Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning at the University of Queensland, St Lucia 4072. In his paper he states (p.4) "As well as providing basic shelter, the housing market is a pivotal element in Australia's economic landscape and is intertwined with interest rates, the consumer price index and inflation. ... A downturn in this industry can have dire economic and political consequences and all levels of governments are quick to identify and address decreases in housing demand."

⁴⁸ Leone Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, *op.cit.*, Transaction publishers, 1990, p.250 and elsewhere.

⁴⁹ For instance, regarding the Australian Press's interest in the area of property development, on Friday 1 December 2000, Mr Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd bid "close to 11 million for a major slice of the financially haemorrhaging online property player", realestate.com.au. The online property sector has other major media players as well, including Fairfax at domain.com.au. Surprisingly, Rupert Murdoch had recently commented that he did not think much of the internet as a current or potential profit centre. Source: *Australian Financial Review*, Friday 1 December, 2000, p.66.

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the media and population issues, see for instance, Mark O'Connor, *This Tired Brown Land*, *op.cit.*, "Media Bias and ABC Blues", pp.193-223 and Tom Morrow, *Growing for Broke*, *op.cit.*, "Thought Control", pp.225-251. In my thesis I did not mention the legal problems that journalists encounter when they attempt to report on suspicious claims by investment and business groups. Trevor Sykes explores this problem in *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, pp. 577-578.

⁵¹ Rimmer, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.405, says that since 1980 major Japanese construction companies had been hurt by policies of zero public sector growth, preference for regional contractors, and sluggish private sector activity in Japan (a result of fiscal policy in the early 80s). They had therefore sought work in other countries. They brought with them the funds invested by Japanese investors and banks, offering "the most favourable fixed price" and "to take an equity in the project if necessary, arrange loans at low interest rates from financial institutions in Japan or Australia" and guaranteeing "any money required if the project [went] over cost". (p.418).

⁵² *The Australian*, Friday, February 23, 2001, p. 39-40: "Top Guns carve up the world" by Maurice Dunlevy. "Real estate whiz kids are leading the charge on the world's property stage, making key investment decisions...Lend Lease... UBS Warburg global real estate chief ... control investment funds and assets worth \$US13 billion ... Where those funds are spent will have major property outcomes in Europe, Asia and North America. But one question remains: will any of the money find its way back to Australia?"

⁵³ This difference was described in my Chapter Three on land development systems, where I cited material from, Charles-Albert Michalet, "France", in Dunning, John, H., (Ed.), *Governments, Globalisation, and International Business*, OUP, 1997. In Chapter Eight of this thesis, the variation on foreign investment will be looked at again.

⁵⁴ Robert Harley, "Big four dominate commercial real estate lending", *Australian Financial Review*, (Property), Tuesday 20 March 2001, p.38. Harley is citing figures from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority's "latest" bulletin, *APRA Insight*, but he gives no date or page number.

⁵⁵ Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), "Australia Now, International Accounts and Trade: International Accounts - Ratios" (Current dollars) accessed on 8 September 2001 from the ABS Website, of which the general address is: <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/> (Incidentally, 42.4% of this was foreign debt, which had increased steadily from 39.4% in 1994-95 to 42.4% in 1999-2000).

⁵⁶ Robert Harley, "Big four dominate commercial real estate lending", *Australian Financial Review*, (Property), Tuesday 20 March 2001, p.38. Harley is citing figures from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority's "latest" bulletin, *APRA Insight*, but he gives no date or page number.

⁵⁷ *Australia Talks Back*, ABC National radio, 28 August 1997

⁵⁸ Gervase Greene, "Immigration vital for nation's future: Fraser", *The Age*, 23 October 1997

⁵⁹ Geoffrey Barker, "A Citizen in full", *The Australian Financial Review Magazine*, February 2001, p.8.

⁶⁰ *The Age*, 16 March, 1999, "Kennett calls for big rise in migrant intake".

⁶¹ Miles Lewis, *Suburban Backlash*, Bloomings Books, Victoria, Australia, 1999, p.viii.

⁶² Geraldine Doogue's ABC National radio programme, *Life Matters*, 10 June 1998

⁶³ Reported in the *Australian* on 27 April 1998

⁶⁴ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, New South Wales, Second Edition, 1996, (Year 2000 reprint), p.337 mentions that Pratt controlled Regal Insurance and Occidental Insurance in the late 1980s and was one of the funders of a shelf company called Bacharach Pty Ltd, which corporate cowboy, Abe Goldberg, used to purchase Brick and Pipe Industries, which he believed to be an unrealised land bank. Additional information about business interests was obtained from the Business Who's Who of Australia, Dun and Bradstreet Marketing P/L, 35th Edition, 2001.

⁶⁵ *The Australian*, 23 February 1999, p. 15.

⁶⁶ "There's room for more", *Herald Sun*, 12/2/1999, p. 19.

⁶⁷ Christine Jackman, "More Migrants, Pleads Kennett", *Melbourne Herald Sun*, 12/2/1999, p.16.

⁶⁸ More detail further on in this section. This information was yielded by investigating the business associations of the officials of Apop as listed on the Apop website and downloaded on 20/7/2001 from <http://www.apop.com.au/people.htm>. Additional information about business interests was obtained from the Business Who's Who of Australia, Dun and Bradstreet Marketing P/L, 35th Edition, 2001.

⁶⁹ Tom Morrow, *Going for Broke*, Tomorrow Press, 2001, p.109

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, "Five of the papers were delivered by university professors, two by PhDs, one by a Federal Cabinet Minister and one by a Shadow Cabinet Minister: impeccably qualified commentators, all - and none of them directly from the corporate sector that was hosting the event."

⁷¹ Alan Wood, "Our Shrinking Nation", *The Australian*, February 26, 2001, p 11

⁷² In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joshep Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147, was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March.

Many anglophone sources unquestioningly supported the UN study as a proposal, including *The Economist*, March 11, 2000 and Peter Ford, *The Christian Science Monitor* January 21, 2000, and (Reuters Press Release): "Ageing, shrinking populations face stark challenges UN population," by Robert Holloway, reported on Australian SBS 9.30PM News 21/3/00.,

The report was not much attended to in the French press, but where it was, it was greeted with some amazement. See Afsané Bassir Pour and Sylvain Cypel, "L'Europe aurait besoin de 159 millions d'immigrés d'ici à 2025", *Le Monde*, Thursday 6 January, 2000.

The reaction of the few French demographers who commented was to criticize its mathematics and to ridicule its concepts. See Henri Leridon, "Vieillissement démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000 and Hervé Lebras "Les Mauvais calculs de l'ONU", *Rebonds*, 29 March 2000. "To want to maintain at all costs the ratio of [aged to youth] is truly to try and fill the Danaïde's well. For France this would require [increasing numbers of immigrants each year] beginning at about 800,000 now, growing to two million per annum towards 2020, and three million in 2050. In total, between now and 2050, something like ... 100 million immigrants!"

⁷³, *Baby Boomers and Property Busts*, paper for Australian Population Association Conference 2000, Melbourne. Richard Reed is with the Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning at the University of Queensland, St Lucia 4072. Pages 5-6 of his article review arguments in housing analyst literature about the impact of the baby boom. Richard Reed Among other things he writes, (p1.) "The relationship between the ageing of the baby boomers and housing values is a current topic of debate throughout the world. Particularly in the USA warning have been sounded of a dramatic decrease in property values causing a property bust as the baby boomers move into the older generation. "With the passing through of the baby boom generation resulting in a shrinking population base in the prime home buying years, many are concerned about decreased demand and subsequent lower prices." Note that Reed's list of sources includes only one non-Anglophone source article, and this is Japanese. The Japanese property development industry is notoriously speculative. There are no European references.

⁷⁴ Christobel Young, *Australia's Aging Policy Options*, Bureau of Immigration Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1990.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Alan Wood, "People number-crunching", *The Australian*, Tuesday February 27, 2001, p.18,

⁷⁷ It seems apparent that the industry expects this kind of treatment. The article by Richard Reed, *Baby Boomers and Property Busts*, *op.cit.*, gives abundant material supporting this view. Richard Reed is with the Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning at the University of Queensland, St Lucia 4072. In his paper he states, p.8, "If demand fell due to a smaller population base a chain reaction would commence, decreasing the supply of new and established housing stock and indirectly influencing house prices ... On a brighter side, after considering the close analysis traditionally placed on new house construction any signs of a

slowdown from the baby bust would be quickly recognised and acknowledged by the relevant authorities and transmitted to the marketplace."

⁷⁸Sid Marris and Ian Henderson, "PM's panic rescue attempt", *The Australian*, Friday March 9, 2001, p.1.

⁷⁹I read this as a combination of the housing related population lobbies having taken their support to the Labor opposition. This calculated defection was followed by the return from oblivion of the Pauline Hanson Party with an election ploy that successfully persuaded Liberal voters to vote against Liberal incumbents, especially in rural areas. The Prime Minister then lowered a tax on petrol in an attempt to win back rural voters, but international petrol prices rose and the Australian dollar fell almost immediately, so Australian petrol prices rose again as well. Presumably reflecting the world recession, the building industry's place in the national accounts had fallen by 21.5 per cent in September and it fell by another 15.4 per cent in the December quarter.

⁸⁰ Wayne Adams, "Counting Heads", *The Australian*, May 4, 1999, p.31.

⁸¹ John Rouw, "Victorian Developer plans Chinese deal", *The Age*, Comment: What's New in Victoria, 21 May 2000. Here the Denis Family Corporation is described as a "major Victorian Land Developer" and Rouw also writes, "The Dennis Family Corporation is thought to be Victoria's largest private land developer, controlling major land holdings throughout metropolitan Melbourne and Brisbane." He relates that turnover in the year 2000 was reportedly over 139 million dollars.

⁸² Information in the Melbourne Phone Directory.

⁸³ www.austarab.com.au/coomesconsulting/

⁸⁴ All the information cited is available from Apop and I downloaded it on 20/7/2001 from <http://www.apop.com.au/people.htm>. Additional information about business interests was obtained from the *Business Who's Who of Australia*, Dun and Bradstreet Marketing P/L, 35th Edition, 2001.

⁸⁵ See the Sydney Institute Website at <http://www.sydneyins.org.au/board.htm> for information about the Board of Governors. See also, Jenna Price, "It's the G and A Show: Who are the Hendersons?", *Canberra Times*, 2/9/95. This is the article that gives information about the Chairman and some backers of the Sydney Institute, mentioning FAI insurance and Rob Ferguson, who is Chairman of BT Financial Group Ltd. Some examples of the Henderson's immigrationist writings are, Anne Henderson, *The Age*, 23/11/1998, "Why Fortress Oz is a Fairy Tale"; Gerard Henderson, "Empty Vessels Make the Most Noise", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20/4/1998; Gerard Henderson, "Hockey raises the heat under the melting pot", 24/7/2001. (This latter was a defense of Liberal politician, Joe Hockey, stating that Sydney was at risk of becoming a retirement village if it did not quickly double its population to eight million in a speech to the Committee for Sydney.)

⁸⁶ *Population Futures*, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE), 2000, (Report from consultants Spiller Gibbins Swan Pty. Ltd, (www.atse.org.au/publications/reports/population))

⁸⁷ Alan Jones, "The Business Council of Australia's Case for Population Growth: An Ecological Critique, *People and Place*, Monash University, Vol.9, No. 2., 2001, pp 49-56.

⁸⁸ HLM, Habitations a loyer moder  (Housing at moderate rental)

⁸⁹ *Quid*, Robert Laffont, Paris 1992, "Impôt sur le revenu" : "Contribuables imposables (en %) au 17-11-1988. Belgique 95,3. Luxembourg 94,7. All. féd. 84. Pays-Bas 83,3. Irlande 77,8. Espagne 75,4. G.-B. 65,6. France 52,1. Portugal 44,2." The rule tend to be that one in two people in France pay income tax.

⁹⁰ Michèle Cohen-Chabaud, "Un milliard de francs pour tonifier la construction d'HLM", *La Tribune*, 8 March, 2001, p. 2 and *Quid* 1992, "Epargne-Logement", and comments from Prof. Francis Ronsin, university of Bourgogne, Dijon, Contemporary French History, in an email entitled "Logement", received on 11/3/2001.

⁹¹ Isabelle Rey-Levebvre, "Bourse et habitat : le divorce," ["Stockmarket and residential real estate : divorce"] *Le Monde*, (supplément "Argent"), 11-12 march 2001, p.2: "There are only 25 residential real estate stock companies on the stock market in France and they represent less than 2% of capitalisation. None of them has made the CAC 40 and only four are represented in the SBF 120 index. All this means that real estate is invisible in the stock market."

⁹² Dupaquier, F., *Histoire de la Population Française*, Vol.4., *op.cit.*, p.183 and Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp23-24, and Francis Ronsin, (Prof of Contemporary French History at University of Bourgogne, Dijon, specialising in population history) verbal communication.

⁹³ Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, Paris, 1997, pp 84-85. A law in 1849 required foreigners to have resided in France for 5 years before being eligible for French nationality. Laws in 1851 and 1874 imposed French nationality on all those born of a French father. Compulsory military service was created in 1872 and by 1889 anyone born in France, even to immigrants, was French. In 1927 naturalisations were encouraged in order to "compensate the deficit in the French birth rate."

⁹⁴ Dupaquier, F., *Histoire de la Population Française*, Vol. 4. *Op.cit.*, , p.184.

⁹⁵ Dupaquier, F., *Histoire de la Population Française*, Vol 4, *op.cit.*, p.183. In 1900 the Austrian Hungarian empire had 46 million inhabitants, the British Isles had 42 million, France, without Alsace Lorraine, had 38 million and Germany had 57 million.

⁹⁶ This fear that the low birth rate in France would make the nation more vulnerable to Germany was first articulated by P. Leroy-Beaulieu in *L'Economiste français*, in 1881. Source: Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France*, Seuil, Paris, 1997, p.55.

⁹⁷ Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France*, *op.cit.*, p.13-14. Herve le Bras's study, *Les Trois Frances*, 1986, showed that in the Department of Hautes-Loire in 1856 30% of women died before they reached 20 years of age, and of those who survived, 50% were still unmarried at 25 years of age and 20% would remain unmarried their entire lives.

⁹⁸ Dupaquier, F., *Histoire de la Population Française*, Vol. 4., *op.cit.*, p.183 and Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp23-24, and Francis Ronsin, verbal communication

⁹⁹ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp. 27-28

¹⁰⁰ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp. 24.

¹⁰¹ Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France*, *op.cit.*, pp.55-56.

¹⁰² Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p. 24. In the mid-19th century, France was still a country of many regional dialects and several languages. National schooling, a national identity card and the institution of rights for citizens characterised this period. Schooling was designed to make everyone speak and read and write in standard French. The theory is that an influx of

immigrants may have assisted the ideological and language unification of the French as they identified themselves as French rather than immigrant.

¹⁰³ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁰⁴ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ By this I mean that France's immigration policies were beginning to fit into a European policy; that France and other European countries were beginning to co-operate, moving towards a European community strategy.

¹⁰⁶ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p 25.

¹⁰⁷ Cited by Ronsin, F., in *La Population de la France*, *op.cit.*, p.60. (My translation of the citation.)

¹⁰⁸ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁹ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.54-55.

¹¹⁰ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.54. At times special visas have been issued. For instance to Algerians after 1962 and to former *clandestins* after the amnesty of 1997. See details further on in text and later notes.

¹¹¹ A phrase attributed to the French sociologist, Jean Fourastié.

¹¹² Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française*: Vol.4, *op.cit.*, p.472

¹¹³ Later, in 1987, to become the OMI - *Office des migrations internationales*). See Glossary in Appendix 1.

¹¹⁴ Dupâquier, Vol 4, *op.cit.*, p. 471.

¹¹⁵ The DOM TOMS (Départements d'outre-mer) refer to the French Overseas territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana, and Réunion. Immigration from these countries is internal, not overseas, immigration. Other French overseas possessions are the "Collectivités territoriales": Mayotte and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, and the "Territoires d'outre-mer": French Polynesia, Austral and Antarctic French possessions, and New Caledonia and Wallis and Fortuna Islands.

¹¹⁶ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *op.cit.*, p.15.

¹¹⁷ OFPRA - Office Française pour réfugiés et apatrides - French Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons.

¹¹⁸ Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4, *op.cit.*, p.471

¹¹⁹ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.69

¹²⁰ André Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, *op.cit.*, pp58-59.

¹²¹ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.75. A fairly large proportion of immigrants specifically imported as workers were destined for building sites. This remains a traditional field for immigrants world wide, both highly skilled and unskilled. In 1997 the French Construction Industry employed about 16.5% of France's total foreign employee stock and the share of foreign employees to French employees was approximately 16%. The French Real Estate industry employed about 4% of France's total foreign employee stock and the share

of foreign employees to French employees was approximately 17%.¹²¹ In Australia the figure of foreign born employees in the construction industry was 31%. This did not take into account short term immigrant workers. (From ABS telephone service, figures for participation in the workforce by industry, May 1999.)

¹²² Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.* p.63. The problem was almost comically circular. In 1945 the ONI assumed responsibility for transporting immigrants' families in exchange for a financial deposit, but the shortage of lodgings made bringing families impossible. The Minister for Finances also imposed stringent limits on sending money out of France.

¹²³ Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.75. Costa-Lascoux writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics.

¹²⁴ *Treaty of Rome*, March 1957. This freedom of access came later to Greece, in 1981 and to Spain and Portugal in 1986.

¹²⁵ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.65 and *Encyclopaedie Encarta CD*, Microsoft, (Electronic version), 1998, "Chronology" of the Fourth Republic". March 1957 is the date when the Treaty of Rome permitted visa free short term travel between EC countries, although this did not apply to Greece until 1981 or to Spain and Portugal until 1986.

¹²⁶ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.65

¹²⁷ Although it did not ratify the agreement until 1973, France was effectively a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which guaranteed the right to leave a country and to choose one's residence. Until 1962, Algerian immigration was an issue of *internal migration* and settlement, and from 1948 entry of French citizens from Algeria was not recorded as international immigration. However, it is clear that, although Algeria was for a time officially French, Algerians were still mainly regarded as foreigners, for their religion, language, looks and culture.

¹²⁸ "Bidonville" - a french word for slum, used to designate shanty towns inhabited mainly by immigrants.

¹²⁹ Only 15,000 to 20,000 families of pro-French Muslims (91,000 persons) were able to settle in France between 1962 and 1968. Amongst the huge majority that remained in Algeria, a minimum of tens of thousands were assassinated by the F.L.N. ... Source : 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A. , "Harkis".

¹³⁰ Cited by Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.66.

¹³¹ Jean-Claude Casanova, "Effort d'assimilation et encouragement au retour sont-ils incompatibles?", in Jacques Dupâquier, (Ed.), *Morales et politiques de l'immigration*, Politique d'aujourd'hui, (Actes du Colloque, Paris, 15 octobre 1997), PUF, 1998, pp127-138.

¹³² Dominique Schnapper, *La Communauté des citoyens*, NRF Essais, Gallimard, 1994, p. 152 , and Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.41 says that the Secretary General of The High Committee of Population was created by the provisional government, with the racist demographer, Georges Mauco as Secretary General. There he remained until 1970. Mauco was the author of several detailed works seriously exploring racial theory and in 1945 he had cited health, moral and social dangers as a reason to avoid accepting Algerians as immigrant workers. See also, Harvey G. Simmons, *The French National Front*, Westview Press, Colorado, Oxford, 1996, pp 152-164.

¹³³ Algeria was a French colony from 1848-1962. The initial colonisation wars are usually described as starting in 1830. There were many battles between this time and the official beginning of the final Algerian-French war (1954-1962). Source, Bruhat, Jean, "Francais, (Empire Coloniale)", CD *Universalis* 3, Encyclopaedia Universalis, (Electronic) France, S.A., 1997

¹³⁴ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.85.

¹³⁵ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 67-68.

¹³⁶ In Spring of 1962, when the Territory had been left to the F.L.N. by the French army which had holed up in Algerian garrisons, the new [Algerian] government feigned clemency towards pro-French activists, and in Paris the government, under Charles de Gaulle, restricted refuge to a minimal number. Louis Joxe, Minister of State to Algerian Affairs, made a "top secret" directive to the [French] army on the 12th of May 1962. It threatened punishment to French soldiers who organized refuge in France for their Muslim allies "outside the general repatriation plan" and even gave orders for auxiliary troops that had landed in France to be sent back. In fact the "plan" only existed on paper, and the government was overwhelmed by an exodus of Europeans. Only 15,000 to 20,000 families of pro-French Muslims (91,000 persons) were able to settle in France between 1962 and 1968. Amongst the huge majority that remained in Algeria, a minimum of tens of thousands were assassinated by the F.L.N. ... Source : 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A. , "Harkis".

¹³⁷ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 67-68. The *Nekkache-Grandval Agreement* of 10 April 1964 set down quarterly quotas to be fixed by France and selected by the National Office of Algerian Employment (but using French doctors there for health checks). However these arrangements fell through, leaving the Evian Agreement still operational. In 1965, the new head of Algeria, Huari Boumediene, denounced them on grounds of the attitude of police authorities when carrying out frontier control, the fact that France had so far only accepted small contingents of workers from Algeria, and the perception that authorities favored Spanish and Portuguese workers and attempted to boost their numbers in order to be able to take fewer Algerians.

¹³⁸ *INSEE*, Total net Permanent Immigration. (See Appendix 4 for more information on this measure.)

¹³⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.65-68.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.68

¹⁴² Algeria's Huari Boumediene, expressed indignation and cancelled the *Nekkache-Grandval Agreement* of 10 April 1964 in protest at the fact that France had so far only accepted small contingents of workers from Algeria, and the perception that authorities favored Spanish and Portuguese workers, attempting to boost their numbers in order to be able to take fewer Algerians. (Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.65) In fact on 29 October 1971, the French signed an agreement with Portugal to take 65,000, when they were limiting Algerians to 35,000. (Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France*, *op.cit.*, p.202.) It is also widely believed that public authorities were unofficially prioritizing the legalization of the status of illegal Portuguese immigrants - many of whom were young draft dodgers fleeing a colonial war. They had instructed border guards to facilitate their illegal entry into France. Later they would make special family reunion provisions for them. (Patrick Weil, *op.cit.*, p.68) Until 1974 this situation favoring Portuguese persisted.

¹⁴³ In 1967 124,000 Algerians immigrated to France. Between January 1 and 10 May in 1968 a further 10,000 arrived. Negotiations to vary or replace the Evian Accords had begun in 1962, but the Evian Accords were still in place, due to the difficulty in reaching agreement. This meant that free circulation was still the default position. In order to place pressure on the Algerian negotiators (Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.67), (by what legal right is not clear, but perhaps due to being in a negotiating process) on the 15th of May 1968 the French placed a ceiling of 8000 on the number of Algerian workers who might come to France in the remaining part of the year. (This is another example of the rare imposition of a quota.

The terms of the special visas created in 1968 were:

- 35,000 Ceiling on Algerian workers for 1969 and 1970:
- Selection by Algerian Employment Office
- Health Checks by French Doctors working in the Algerian Employment Office
- Right of workers to remain in France for nine months to look for work.
- Resident's permit, valid for five years for Algerians arriving in France within the last three years.¹⁴³ (This was a variation on the usual visas.)
- Resident's permit, valid for ten years for Algerians who had been in France for a long time. This was another special visa. These permits are authorized by the Minister for the Interior (a person of greater importance than the Minister for Employment) and he was to remain the exclusive negotiator with the Algerian State.
- Algerian tourists were not subject to the same arrangements

¹⁴⁴ The official reason given was the rise in xenophobia and aggression against Algerians in France. There was plenty of evidence for this. Harvey G. Simmons, *The French National Front, the extremist challenge to democracy*, Westview Press, Harper Collins, 1996: "The worst incident took place in 1961 at a time when de Gaulle appeared ready to negotiate Algerian independence and when both the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale and the French extreme right Organisation de l'Armee Secrete had embarked on terrorist campaigns in mainland France. With the police and the Algerian community at loggerheads, on October 5, 1961, the police warned Algerians not to go out at night, not to form groups, and to close their shops and cafes at 7:00 in the evening. But the FLN called on Algerians to protest these restrictive measures, and on October 17 thirty thousand Algerians tried to march through the center of Paris. The police reacted with enormous violence, beating to death or drowning hundreds of marchers and herding thousands of others into parks and stadiums. The following day corpses were found floating in the Seine, while others hung from trees or were found in rubbish dumps. The author cites Milza, *Les Français devant l'immigration*, Brussels, Complexe, 1988, pp 119-121.

In 1973 in Marseilles five North Africans were killed and several injured. In the same city a bomb set off in the Algerian embassy, killing four. Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France, op.cit.*, pp226-227. Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.78, adds that racist and other immigrant problems in France had provided opportunities for The Arab Workers' Movement, which was a movement that opposed the Algerian government, to gather in importance. There was a dangerous likelihood that the Arab Workers' Movement (MTA, Mouvement des travailleurs arabes) would enter into competition with the official association, The Algerians in Europe Friendly Society (*L'amicale des Algériens en Europe*). By deciding to stop emigration the Algerian government put itself in the spotlight as the champion of its expatriates and removed some support for potential revolutionaries.

See also Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers, op.cit.*, p.77-81, for an interesting discussion of other reasons, the role of OPEC, and the reaction of the Confédération nationale du patronat français (CNPf). The CNPF expressed fears that, not only were poor countries organising into

an oil cartel, their workers were also negotiating higher prices. As the economic situation worsened however the CNPF stopped protesting, but Weil attributes the one year lag on Germany by France regarding closure of borders, to manufacturer protest.

¹⁴⁵ This convention dates from 4/11/1950 and was originally signed by the first signatories in Rome. It is administered by the European Commission of Human Rights, the Committee of European Council Ministers, and the European Court of Human Rights. After 23 years of procrastination France ratified with some exceptions the *European Convention Safeguarding Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties* of 4 November 1950. Source *Encyclopédie Universalis 3*, CD Version, "Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales".

¹⁴⁶ *Encyclopédie Universalis 3*, *op.cit.*, "Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales". There were a number of reasons advanced for failure to sign under the 4th and 5th Republics and they included circumstances attached to the war with Algeria and constitutional impediments.

¹⁴⁷ Personal information from colonial repatriates who came to Australia as immigrants in the late 1960s.

¹⁴⁸ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.83

¹⁴⁹ Hollifield pp74-75. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp.79-80: writes that the contradictions in the problem of immigration between divergent interests were increasing and harder to manage. Foreigners kept arriving to look for work in France, and some of them were wanted, but there seemed to be less and less need of them. Unemployment had risen since September 1973 and **the closing of the borders of the other European States has had the effect of diverting increasing numbers of migrants to France**. Because of the inevitable administrative delays involved in making this policy law (about two years), and because of broad support in the community, France took the unusual and somewhat irregular step of immediately publicizing this information via a ministerial circular of instructions, with the aim of apprising intending immigrants before they set off for France.(Patrick Weil p.86) According to Hollifield, Switzerland was first to close its borders and Belgium was the last. However there is evidence that other countries, such as Holland, developed similar policies around the same time, and mention of this will be made further on in the thesis text.

¹⁵⁰ These mass amnesties amount to a defacto immigration policy. The amnesties of 1975-1976 were largely meant to offset the harshness of policies reducing new immigration.

¹⁵¹ Since unemployment has remained very high in France since 1974, we could say that one of the principle signs of economic hard times has continued, as has the policy aiming for zero net immigration. Unemployment improved towards the end of the 20th century as the French economy improved and as the cohorts of young people presenting for the first time in the workforce began to diminish.

¹⁵² The number of illegal immigrants "*clandestins*" became a polemical issue which, by its nature, is impossible to establish with any accuracy. The *clandestin* stock has been estimated on the basis of one out of two *clandestins* applying for regularization during periods of amnesty. On that basis the number would be around 300,000 in 1997-8, according to the rate of amnesty applications over that period. The range of estimations varies from around 40,000 persons annually by those who refuse to consider *clandestins* as a threat, and at 100,000 plus by those who fear an invasion.

¹⁵³ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.100

¹⁵⁴ SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration, 1998*, OECD/OCED, Paris, 1999. (Electronic version), p69.

¹⁵⁵ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.100.

¹⁵⁶ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.190-195. The minister responsible for much immigration policy between 1974 and 1977, Paul Dijoud, saw himself very much as part of foreign affairs and consecrated much activity in this area. Foreign aid and cultural development of migrant cultures in France was accompanied by requests for assistance in managing immigration flows. The creation of the National Office for Cultural Promotion of Immigrants (*Office National pour la Promotion Culturelle des Immigrés*) was conceived in collaboration with sending States. Those States were thought to resent the alienation of their nationals and there is a view that Islamic culture in France was assigned a quite different status from other religions and that the rationale for this was to preserve immigrant affiliation with and cultural dependence on the sending states, which it was hoped would in turn make immigrants more likely to return to their countries of origin. The provision of rights and resources to immigrants also served to assuage the Left and to offset negative reaction to the reduction of immigration. If this was in fact the underlying policy (for those who were not expected to "integrate", then it is quite a different approach to Australia's multiculturalism, and does not fit the mould of integration or assimilation either. From 1975 France also provided training as part of a package for repatriation assistance to immigrants. This could also be seen as a foreign aid measure, for the sending countries were greatly in need of people with occupational skills.

Secretary of State, Georgina Dufoix (1983-1984) wanted to reinstate financial inducements to repatriate (Patrick Weil p.175) Prior to her period of office, financial aid to repatriate foreigners had been severely criticized and then abolished on the grounds that there had been insufficient negotiation with the countries of origin. So a new plan was designed in the context of foreign aid and co-operation on development. It was hoped this would limit the reactions from the Left. Furthermore, bilateral agreements would facilitate permanent repatriation and reduce the demand for residents' and work permits.

Ambassador Paul-Marc Henry was given a confidential mission to negotiate with the States in question. At his request all documentation regarding his mission was to be in the context of foreign aid to development. He created a permanent interministerial group which met several times and went on a number of trips to the countries concerned. Only in Senegal did he appear to meet with any success. Tunisia, Mali and Morocco all initially discouraged him because they were not keen on the return of their nationals. Their economic situation made them keen to continue to rely on France to provide opportunities to emigrants there. They relied on money sent home and they relied on an agreement by France whereby Moroccans residing legally in France received unemployment benefits when they did not have work. (p.175). However opposition diminished somewhat when the plan was described as applying to a limited number of their nationals who would be financially well compensated for returning home.

Jean Pierre Chevenement, Minister for the Interior and responsible for the bulk of immigration policy in 1997, stated, "We must consider two perspectives when we look at immigration : development aid and integration. Concrete strategies for development of the regions from which clandestine immigration originates will be put into place."

¹⁵⁷ Madjiguène Cissé, "Les Sans-papiers ne sont pas des délinquants", *Le Monde*, 2 February 2000.

¹⁵⁸ CIMADE -Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués. "Committee to co-ordinate movements for Evacuees", is the closest I can come to an translation. CIMADE also describes

itself as "Service oecumenique d'entraide" (Ecumenical Service of Mutual Aid). Its origins date to the 1930s. It has several addresses, of which the main one is 176 rue de Grenelle, 75007, Paris. The email address is renseignements@cimade.org and the main internet address is <http://www.cimade.org>

¹⁵⁹ *Le Monde*, 2 February 2000, "Des demandes en augmentation". (Author and page number not available).

¹⁶⁰ Michael Ball, Michael Harloe & Maartje Martens: *Housing and Social Change in Europe and The USA*, Routledge, 1988 ISBN 0-415-00510-8, [363.58 B193H], p. 175. In 1962 in France a famous strike was broken with the introduction of North African labor.

¹⁶¹ Costa-Lascoux, *De l'immigre au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.75.

¹⁶² Christine Garin, "L'Extrême droit subit un revers aux élections des représentations des locations HLM," *Le Monde*, 4 January 2000.

¹⁶³ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.110

¹⁶⁴ Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) – The Group for Information and Support for Immigrants, 3, Villa Marces 75011, Paris. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, pp 99-100

¹⁶⁵ Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4., *op.cit.*, p. 481

¹⁶⁶ The Council of State is the highest administrative court of the land. It has two main functions. The first is to give advice to government on the legality of laws and the formulation of regulations (decrees). The second is to function as a court which may overturn laws.

¹⁶⁷ Dupâquier p.480-481 and *Encyclopaedie Universalis 3 op.cit.*, "Droits de l'Homme" and "Convention Européene" and "Traité de Rome": For the notion of "human rights" is not just a philosophical one in the context of French law. France is party to international laws that override national law on issues of Human Rights and these include The European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties, created by the European Council on 4 November 1950, effective from 3 September 1953 (but only ratified by France in 1973), The *European Social Charter 1961*, effective from 1965, and the *Act of Helsinki August 1975* (issuing from the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975*). France is also signatory to the *European Agreement on the Status of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (1977) and the *International Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (UN, 1978). All these agreements contain defenses of family reunion and are influential on France but the European Convention has teeth in the form of the Court of Human Rights and other juridical structures.

¹⁶⁸ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 99-100

¹⁶⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.173

¹⁷⁰ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.64.

¹⁷¹ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, *op.cit.*, p.64.

¹⁷² *Alternatives Economiques*, 28 rue du sentier, Paris, hors série no.38, 4e trim., 1998, p.10, "Une immigration à la baisse".

¹⁷³ 1998- Loi sur l'entrée et le séjour des étrangers (from Mouvement des Citoyens, a small Socialist Left Political Party, headed by Jean Pierre Chevenement, who was also the Minister

for the Interior and the man effectively responsible for the bulk of immigration policy in 1998,1999, 2000 in France, <http://www.mdc-france.org/poscit.html#immigration1>)

¹⁷⁴ For details and dates see Appendix 1.

¹⁷⁵ OECD *Sopemi 1998 Report*

¹⁷⁶ Other countries which conducted amnesties were Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. OECD/OCDE Homepage, http://www.ocde.org/news_events/parutions/pb98-34f.htm, accessed 27 August 1999 at 1.39 pm, a press release from Paris, 9 September 1998, "Tendences des migrations internationales, Rapport annuel 1998".

ENDNOTES

PART II

INTRODUCTION

¹ Malthusian policies on immigration, energy use, land development planning and housing policies essentially boil down to policies which seek to contain population growth within the limits of what the region is able to provide in terms of essentials. They cost population growth. As I will point out further on, housing in France is seen as a public cost, rather than a private profit, and so the demands that population growth make on public provision of infrastructure are seen as costly.

Malthusianism as it applies to immigration numbers is, I think, self-explanatory. Malthusianism as I apply it to land development planning refers to planning and building policies and taxation which discourage speculation based on population growth. Growthist planning and building policies rely on population competition to produce housing and land price inflation and facilitate speculative development and building seeking to profit from these. I argue that Whitlam's policies were designed to discourage housing inflation and land speculation.

Self-sufficiency in essentials like food and energy has both economic and defensive reasons: Cut-throat competition with other regions may remove incentive from local producers to maintain an infrastructure and production sufficient to provide enough for local citizens to survive war or to purchase necessities on an international market when local currency values fall. Whitlam's ideal of national energy self sufficiency in the natural gas pipeline project is an example of providing necessities for the local population and maintaining control of their supply that will stand the local population in good stead in times of scarcity or war. The desire to discourage foreign ownership could probably also be seen in the context of maintaining control over the ability of the nation to control the production of essentials, although I have not explored that interpretation in this thesis. Malthus favoured a certain amount of protectionism for essential products in agriculture and wrote for an agriculturally based rather than an industrially based society. Whitlam's cutting of tariffs across the board may seem at first to contradict such a philosophy, unless it can be seen to be toughening up local industry so that it may reliably produce both locally and for international trade. See Appendix 5, Population Theories, "Thomas Malthus", and Appendix 1, Glossary, for more detail of my definition of "Malthusian".

² Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, *op.cit.*, 1987, pp.98-99. The government was immigrationist, aimed for a much bigger local market based on a much larger population, and was much more open to foreign finance.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN

¹ "French energy policy has been relatively consistent in recent decades, with the main policy objectives including: securing energy supply, achieving international competitiveness, and protecting the environment. The focus on energy security has led France to become one of the world's top producers and consumers of nuclear power. ... Because oil security has been such a concern for French energy policy-makers, there is a French law allowing the French government to refuse to close a refinery if it believes its supply or price security is at risk. Essentially, this gives the French government veto power over EU legislation regarding refineries. ..." French oil companies have important oil possessions in the North Sea, Africa, and Latin America. France imports most of its oil from Saudi Arabia and Norway, followed by the United Kingdom, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, and Russia. Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

² Etienne Dalemant et Jean Carrié, *L'Economie du Pétrole*, Ed. Que Sais-je?, PUF, Paris, 1994. The adjective "Colbertiste" derives from the protectionist economic management policies of the mercantilist Finance Minister, Colbert (1619-1683), who is popularly credited with the repair of the French economy after the excesses of Louis XIV. Colbert's protectionist ideas preceded Malthus's by more than a century and differed mainly in the value Colbert assigned to population building for national defence purposes.

Authors writing about France's economy generally tend to classify it as protectionist. For instance see the German book by Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, translated into English as *The Global Trap*, Zed Books, London, 1997, p.150: "Many French economists, in keeping with their country's tradition of protectionism, therefore call for selective restrictions on trade." Colbert in France and Cromwell in Britain have been described as the "chief practical representatives" of the mercantile system. Source: "Mercantile System", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1959. Although Malthus would have acknowledged the need to provide labor to colonies in order to exploit them, Colbert went to extraordinary pronatalist lengths - fining the parents of unmarried men and women of a certain age, offering bounties to persons bearing more than 10 children in the colonies, and forcing nubile young women in French prisons to emigrate to the colonies. Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A* In fact, compared to the British, the French had persistent problems populating their colonies. Whereas Britain felt the need to rid herself of "excess population" by sending it to the colonies, France's population size was distressingly small, having remained around 20 millions for several centuries, and the French were reluctant to emigrate. Source: Francis Ronsin, *La Grève des ventres*, Aubier, Collection historique, Paris, 1980, pp13-14.

Popular history holds his policies virtually responsible for France becoming a country of superior and specialised manufactures. It also holds him responsible for the failure of the colonies and numerous other perceived negative economic traits.

³ Colbert instituted detailed legislation to control virtually all aspects of production within France and her colonies, creating a series of national companies. He said that you must take wealth from outside France and then keep it inside. The colonies were there solely to provide wealth to France and forbidden to sell to outside markets. This was also the British policy at the time, under Cromwell. Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A*.

In Australia those who desired independence chafed under this kind of philosophy, which was maintained by Britain. For instance, the mercantilist economic philosophy towards Australia discouraged local development, since this would keep products in Australia. Nation-building through population increase was one of the strategies for independence that entrepreneurs in Australia embraced. Examined in this light it was understandable.

⁴ *Ibid.* Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

The first French company was Total SA (1924), followed by Elf-Aquitaine, which outgrew Total. The Total group was highly successful in Irak, in Iran, in the Emirates, Algeria and in the Sahara, until the time of the first oil shock, when Middle Eastern and Saharan countries nationalised their oil reserves. This took much of Total's income out of French hands.

The remainder of the Total Group explored further afield, finding oil in Indonesia, the North Sea, South East Asia and Columbia. After the 1973 oil shock, despite the income from these companies and the strong national relationship, France sought to maximise her industry and domestic independence from oil based energy, whilst at the same time maximizing the success of her international oil and gas exploration companies.

In 1976 Elf-Aquitaine became a public association. It wasn't until 1994 that the French government's share in this company was greatly reduced. In 1999 Total and the Belgian Petrofina joined, creating TotalFina, ranking in size sixth in the world and third in Europe. In the year 2000 TotalFina merged with Elf Aquitaine, becoming the fourth-largest oil company in the world. In the year two thousand the company was also completely privatised.

⁵ Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

⁶ France seems to represent quite a formidable international force in oil production and marketing, taking liberties with EU anti-competition laws⁶ and flouting US sanctions with impunity.

In fact France tends to run a diplomatic counterpoint to the United States in the Middle East, notably as regards Palestine and Iran. It is my impression that she represents Europe by her actions there and that the motive is to maintain European connections with oil supplies and diplomatic connections in case of war, particularly the threat of nuclear war from that region. "In the spring of 1999, the French oil giant Elf Aquitaine and the Canadian company Bow Valley signed a \$300-million contract (85% Elf and 15% Bow Valley) to exploit an oil deposit in the Persian Gulf, in Iranian waters. Although this contract appears to violate the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which threatens U.S. sanctions on any country with more than a \$40-million project in Iran, no such sanctions had been enacted as of October 1999." Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

⁷ 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Pétrole, les politiques pétrolières", states, "From 1974, reactions of industrialised countries that consumed petrol, and of the big petrol companies, were inspired by three principle imperatives The first was the need for *physically secure supplies of petrol* since petrol is indispensable in transport and for certain

kinds of industrial uses, and [furthermore] has an uncontested strategic role in case of [military] conflict.

⁸ In the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, countries which were not invaded and occupied during the first or second world wars it is difficult to imagine the effect that the first and particularly the second world wars have had on the shape of European economies. Nevertheless many things, including details of town planning are influenced by the idea of surviving sieges in France. For instance, all residential buildings are required to have functional chimneys in France. The visitor cannot help noticing the rows and rows of chimney pots on the roofs of Parisien apartments, and, if they thought about it, they might wonder why apartments with gas and electric heating needed chimneys. The answer is that the law requires this in case supply of fuel is cut off by disaster or war.

⁹ 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Suez, canal de", and an extract from an unnamed article by Andre Fontaine in *Le Monde*, 30 October 1976. De Gaulle was a major enthusiast for nuclear power.

¹⁰ *Year Book of Australia 2000*, Chapter 17, "Mining" and *The Australian Encyclopaedia*, Australian Geographic Pty Ltd, Terrey Hills, NSW, Australia, 6th Edition, 1996, "Oil and Natural Gas", pp 2291-2997 and Department of Science and Resources, <http://www.isr.gov.au/resources/petroleum.html> & http://www.isr.gov.au/resources/petr_legislation/index.html

¹¹ Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 191. On December 13, 1974 the executive council of the Commonwealth of Australia, made up of Prime Minister Whitlam, Attorney-General Murphy, Treasurer Cairns, and the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor¹¹ met to seek funding for Rex Connor's project and to fund unemployment reduction. For this they sought \$US 4,000,000,000 (four billion US dollars). The minute of the meeting stated,

"The Australian government needs immediate access to substantial sums of non-equity capital from abroad for temporary purposes, amongst other things to deal with exigencies arising out of the current world situation and the international energy crisis, to strengthen Australia's external financial position, to provide immediate protection for Australia in regard to supplies of minerals and energy and to deal with current and immediately foreseeable unemployment in Australia." The Governor General later signed the minutes of this meeting and those of a later one that reduced the loan sought two billion. Kelly and Tom Uren, (*Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995 pp. 209, 222, 223, 236-7), describe Rex Connor as having an impressive knowledge of the mining industry. Apparently Gough Whitlam had no knowledge of the industry at all and was convinced that Connor was a visionary.

¹² Australian National Geographic, *Australian Encyclopaedia*, 1996, "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295-2296.

¹³ Youngquist has an interesting chapter on the politics of the poor and rich States of the United States of America according to their oil possessions and their income or costs from State taxes on petroleum crossing State borders. See, Walter Youngquist, *GeoDestinies*, National Book Company, Portland, Oregon, 1997, Chapter 5, pp.74-89.

¹⁴ Etienne Dalemont and Jean Carié, *L'Economie du Pétrole*, , Ed. Que Sais-Je, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1994, p.14 -17.

¹⁵ Based on, for instance BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/ and World Bank World Development Reports.

¹⁶ Etienne Dalemont and Jean Carié, *L'Economie du Pétrole*, , Ed. Que Sais-Je, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1994, pp 16-17.

¹⁷ Martin and Schumann in *The Global Trap*, Zed Books, London, 1997, p.109, suggest that the first and second oil shocks caused the post war "Keynesian edifice to totter", so that much of the Western world became dominated by the dogma of the "so-called neo-liberalism and monetarism associated with Reagan's advisor, Milton Friedman and Thatcher's mentor, Friedrich August von Hayek", after the conservative victories in Britain and the US in 1979 and 1980. On page 133 they observe "the concept of deregulation found enthusiastic support in the 80s among the managerial elite in Western Europe, but nowhere except in Britain was there a political majority behind it."

John Gray identifies England's property ownership culture as different from the rest of Europe's. He argues, furthermore, that that the free market was an Anglo-Saxon singularity in the 19th century. He writes that this "English paradigm" of the free market was interrupted by the second world war, which caused a more co-operative society. It resurfaced however during the 1980s in Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, as a consequence of neo-liberal policies." Gray describes the English speaking settler societies as "societies in which a culture and economy of agrarian individualism preceded industrialization." He attributes this, in part, to the early disappearance of the peasant culture in England. Gray, John, *False Dawn*, Granta Books, Great Britain, 1999, pp.13-14.

¹⁸ Martin and Schumann, *op.cit.*, p.153

¹⁹ Housing standards vary between countries of course. Some countries tolerate slums and homelessness more than others. Australian and French standards are however broadly comparable in this area. Although slums exist in both France and Australia, they are not condoned. (Equivalents to French Bidonvilles and gypsie communities in Australia are for instance Redfern in Sydney and Saint Kilda in Melbourne, as well as various rural shanty-towns, including those associated with some Aboriginal populations.) Wide socio-economic inequity is still largely resisted. This contrasts with the situation in the third world and in the United States.

²⁰ A case in point: the role of international finance for Australian property development during the 1980s will be explored later in this thesis.

²¹ D Burtenshaw, M Bateman, G J Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, 1981, and *The European City, A Western Perspective*, David Fulton Publishers, London, 1991. These books highlight and contrast the careful central planning of European cities after 1945 compared to US cities. They describe and analyse planning in various regions and cities including French ones and go into the subject of public and private housing in some comparative detail.

²² Barry J Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman Scientific & Technical, 1987, pp 70 and 83. In France national and regional planning is well developed. These plans are used to guide land use and transport policies at a more local scale.

²³ 1995 *Encyclopaedia Universalis France* S.A., "Logement (Politique du)": "La Constitution de réserves foncières" and "L'expropriation et la préemption".

²⁴ 1997 *Encyclopaedia Universalis France*, S.A., "SAFER": Agricultural land must be sold through the SAFERs (Sociétés d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural) and only for

agricultural purposes. These SAFERs were established by law in 1962. Their purpose is to retain and improve agricultural land and to repackage it, usually in larger allotments.

²⁵ *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems" *op.cit.*, p.19. "Almost all housing texts and studies analyse housing issues separately from land issues. The cost of a dwelling and its associated affordability and location issues are intrinsically related to the cost and availability of land, yet rarely does any analysis of land filter into housing studies. Those who own land, and the procedures for its development, shape housing policy directly and indirectly. Thus, it is often overlooked that the ability of the social housing sector in many European countries both to expand and to provide affordable housing is due to the fact that sizeable components of urban land were owned by government or non-profit organizations." ... "By contrast, public housing in Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada, has been constructed on private land for which market prices have had to be paid."

²⁶ Department of Infrastructure, *Review of Development Contributions*, Draft Report and Recommendations, June 2000. This is a review of the Victorian Planning and Environment Act 1987, amendment 1995, no.50 of 1995 incorporating Part 3(b), "Development Contributions". The review has been undertaken by Jennifer Bowden and Art Truter of the Dept of Infrastructure, Victoria. It makes some comparisons with similar Acts in Queensland and New South Wales. Under Section 173 of the Planning and Environment Act or the general power to attach conditions to development approvals, it was possible for Councils to enforce requirements for development contributions. However, these processes were subject to case by case challenge. The Act was amended in November 1995 to give Councils the option of preparing formal Development Contribution Plans (DCP's) for incorporation into their planning schemes. This was intended to provide a more predictable and fair system for developers and councils alike. These DCP provisions are the main focus of this review. What the review finds is that councils often have not known where to start in negotiations for "contributions" with developers, costs from council to council have varied greatly and, in fact, few councils have actually gone ahead with this process. Where councils do negotiate an agreement with developers this may be subject to cumbersome scheme amendment process every time they wish to adjust their DCP's. "This problem is compounded by the fact that the Planning and Environment Act effectively mandates the preparation of DCP's as the only legitimate means of levying contributions. While many Councils have been happy to continue with the S173 approach to date, there is also a realisation that this is risky. If a developer were to refuse to enter into an agreement and have the matter heard by VCAT, the developer could reasonably argue that no infrastructure contributions should be required of them because the Council had failed to use the 'proper mechanism' under the planning legislation for setting up a development contribution policy." In other words it has proved very difficult to get private developers to pay the councils' costs and the costs to the neighbourhood, for instance in loss of amenity, etc.

²⁷ A notable exception is the Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr. See Mark O'Connor, *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy and Snellgrove, 1998, p.18. The more usual view is exemplified by such as the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Jim Soorley, who told the press that Australia needed to triple its population in the next 20 years (p.17). In Fri 12/2/1999 Melbourne *Herald Sun*, "More Migrants, Pleads Kennett", by Christine Jackman, p. 16, Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennet was reported, not for the first time, claiming that Australia could not survive economically without a much bigger population.

²⁸ The Federal Assistance Grant is allocated to local councils on the basis of population numbers and need.

²⁹ *Lifelines, Bulletin of the Community Biodiversity Network*, Vol 6. No.1. 2000, Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Research, Australian Museum, 6 College Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000, pp 1 & 11. This issue has a lot of information on the rate of land clearing in the various

Australian states and the number of species threatened by the accompanying loss of habitat. The web page is www.cbn.org.au

³⁰ This costly legal recourse is known as "injurious affection" and the legislation involved used to be the Planning and Environment Act. It has been replaced by the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (came into force 30 March 1998). This latest Act provides a procedure for awarding compensation for those who are affected by changes to a planning scheme. An owner of land is entitled to reasonable compensation if 1) the value of their interest in the land is reduced because of a change to a planning scheme or policy affecting the land AND 2) they have made an application within two years of the change, for development under the superceded scheme; AND 3) the application is refused or only partially and/or conditionally approved (s.5.4.2). The compensation provisions present a dilemma for a local government in introducing new planning restrictions. Should it expose the Council to compensation payouts or should it accept that the new restrictions will have to be phased in? The danger of phasing in the new provisions is that the ability to achieve the objective of the new planning restriction may be undermined by allowing development under the old scheme to continue for two years.

³¹ *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, Ed. Willem van Vliet, Greenwood, New York, 1990, Introduction, p 19.

³² Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, *op.cit.*, pp.27-29

³³ *Ibid*, p.31-32 & 35.

³⁴ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, *op.cit.*, p.34, Table 4, "Examples of Trading in Zoned Raw Land on Melbourne's Urban Fringe in the late 1980s", which shows increases in land prices of over 100 per cent in less than 12 months through rezoning and land trading. Also see Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174, Fig.8.1. "Australia: Required Annual Income to Purchase Median-priced House (real threshold income) 1972-1995 and Shane Nugent, "Why Sydney Keeps Growing – Trends in Population Distribution in New South Wales, 1991-1996, *People and Place*, vol.6, no.4, pp 24-32, "There were significant increases in housing costs in Sydney in the late 1980s. This may have either forced some people out of Sydney due to lack of affordable housing and/or encouraged some to profit from selling their Sydney house to move elsewhere for lifestyle reasons. House price increases in Sydney in the 1990s have generally been much slower."

³⁵ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: The Land Development and House Building Industries, *op.cit.*, pp31-32.

³⁶ See Note 65 and Sandercock, *The Land Racket*, 1979, *op.cit.*, Sandercock, *Property Politics and Urban Planning*, 1990, *op.cit.*; Groux & Levy, *La Possession Ouvriere*, Les Editions de l'Atelier, 1993, and Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, Viking, Ringwood, Victoria, 1985, the chapter "Cities", Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, *op.cit.* Note, however, that there is supplementary means of reducing speculation and thereby of reducing land price rises. This is to impose taxes on profits in land transactions which have resulted from unimproved properties. Such taxes are imposed in France (more about this later). Whitlam also attempted to introduce such taxes, specifically aiming at profits resulting from rezoning. I will refer to these kinds of taxes again later in my thesis. My reference for Whitlam's tax plans were Miles Lewis, *Suburban Backlash*, Bloomings Books, Victoria, Australia, 1999, pp 14-15.

³⁷ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, Chapter entitled, "The Cities", esp. pp.382-392. See also references to DURD in Tom Uren, *Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995, and

Leone Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction publishers, 1990, pp11-20.

³⁸ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.403. As Sandercock points out frequently in both her cited works, Liberal governments have been ever vigilant to preserve the advantages accrued from private property.

³⁹ Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, pp.26. "Approximately half of the owner occupiers in France are paying a mortgage, the remainder owning their houses outright. The expansion of the sector has been encouraged by a wide range of subsidized loans, to the extent that in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of new building was assisted in this way. Since 1977 the forms of assistance have been rationalized into three main schemes: PAP loans, PC loans, [and] PEL loans." The last one is a subsidized housing savings scheme. "In addition there are grants to assist with house improvement and a limited scheme of mortgage interest tax relief. PAP loans can be provided both for new building and to assist with the costs of improvements to existisng dwellings. They are subsidized by the State and administered ...principallly ... by ... a State-controlled institution that raises funds in the private market... "PC loans, or regulated loans... are regulated rather than subsidized, but rates of interest, although now fairly close to market rates, have in the past been significantly lower. This is because of the privileged access the institutions have had to low-cost finance, in particular current accounts (on which interest payment is prohibited in France) and the funds generated by the housing savings scheme, which involve an indirect subsidy and tax relief....They are normally on a fixed interest basis with a term of 10-20 years. ... "

⁴⁰ The elected public housing bodies are called Groupes de Représentation des locataires des HLMs (Group representing HLM tenants). These management associations are mixed "economic societies", meaning some of their money may be public and some from private investment. For instance the private investment may come from any source but the public funds could come from social welfare funds, such as family allowances. The HLM management societies are managed by a counsel composed of representatives of financial investors and representatives of tenants. The tenants' representatives are elected, but the investors' representatives are salaried. Because of the incursions by the National Front into these counsels a law was evoked whereby an association of tenants could not hide a political party. Christine Garin, "L'Extrême droit subit un revers aux élections des représentations des locations HLM", *Le Monde*, 4 January 2000.

⁴¹ HLM: "Habitation a loyer modere". Low rent public housing (usually high rise).

⁴² Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, pp.75-76, and Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, pp.270-273, write of quota systems and agreements, some of which were official, especially at a local level, to avoid concentrations of immigrants of more than between 10-25% and by replacing a family of immigrants with another family of immigrants. The informal system even came to treat non-mainlander French people, e.g. from Guyana, who were not white as part of such quotas. Housing shortages with the petrol shock exacerbated the associated lodging problems for immigrants, as has family reunion. Christine Garin, "L'Extrême droit subit un revers aux élections des représentations des locations HLM", *Le Monde*, 4 January 2000. In reaction to the National Front's growing involvement in the management of public housing through local elections, in 1997 laws were passed to make the FN's continuing involvement in such affairs much more difficult.

⁴³ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.21.

⁴⁴ Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, p.76-77

⁴⁵ Note that public housing is, in theory, available to any legal resident in France, whether French or immigrant, EEC or non-EEC. Broadly, this includes anyone with a one year plus visa. The reality however, was that immigrants, especially less well established and non-EEC immigrants, went to the end of a nearly endless queue. For more on the difficulty that immigrants have in accessing public housing see, for instance, the bibliographic work on this subject by Roselyne de Villanova, *Immigration et espaces habités ; bilan bibliographique des travaux en France, 1970-1992, op.cit.*

⁴⁶ <http://www.france2.fr/legislatives/partifn.htm>, accessed on 19/6/00 9:53 am. This was on the home page of the French television channel 2, under the banner, "Legislative Elections 25 May-1 June 1997, "The National Front's platform", "Housing, family, health". Under this heading was also included the objective of prioritising access for French families to public housing.

⁴⁷ It is important to understand (as mentioned on page 4) throughout this paper that "immigration" in this context means workers and their families from poor countries outside the EEC. The rich, famous, and talented from outside the union had less trouble. Members of the EEC were completely free to travel.

⁴⁸ In 1960 housing allowances made up 5.7% of total family allowances disbursed. In the early 1970s this had increased to 13.4% with several complimentary laws came into being whereby allocation of public housing firmly prioritized low incomes and larger families. HLM management was legally obliged to award priority to the largest families with the smallest incomes. The recession in 1973 imposed budgetary constraints of itself. The rise in unemployment increased demand on the State social security coffers. New areas of need developed and social policy was refocused again, targeting allowances to combat poverty and drifting ever further from the old goal of encouraging large families. Between 1959 and 1974 the amount of contributions to finance family allowances had nearly halved from 16.75% to 9%. In 1988 it was reduced again. In 1982 the new socialist government brought about big changes in family policy, effectively ending traditional pronatalist policy.

⁴⁹ Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe, op.cit.*, pp.24-25. "As supply caught up with demand and the costs of the policy became increasingly burdensome, it was felt that the support was not sufficiently targeted on those who most needed it. The 1975 Barre Report, which recommended a shift from bricks and mortar subsidies to support for the individual through housing allowances, and the subsequent legislation of January 1977, therefore marked a watershed in the development of French housing policy. ... Since then there has been a gradual but marked reduction in assistance to bricks and mortar through subsidized loans, in both real and nominal terms, and a switch to personal housing allowances. ... In the private rented sector, both the assistance and the level of construction declined, and in the social rented sector there was a more gradual fall in the amount of support: the level of activity fell from 1974 onwards, until by 1980 it was about half its previous level. ... However, despite the reductions in bricks and mortar subsidies, the costs of housing policy have continued to escalate as a result of the increased proportion of relatively poor people, the larger number of retired, and increased rates of unemployment."

⁵⁰ Jean Benoit, "Les Etats europeens devraient se concerter sur leur politique d'immigration", *Le Monde*, 24 September 1974.

⁵¹ See Appendix 6, Document 'B', p.A6-3 for a copy of the original in French: "Politique d'immigration", (Note de M. André Postel-Vinay pour le "Comité restreint"), 1 July 1974 (8 pages, numbered to 9, with pages 2 and 3 cut and stuck together and then photocopied. In this document Postel-Vinay was proposing, as well as to stop immigration, a huge housing program to accommodate those immigrants who were already in France (p.5): "This effort to house immigrants will require approximately 400 million francs in 1975, 800 million in 1976 and 950

million in 1977 ...It will require as well advances from the *Caisse des Dépôts* (the Deposit fund) to the *Caisse des prêts des HLM* (the Low Cost Housing fund), according to the usual method. ... The budgetary expenses incurred could be compensated for, either through savings made in other areas or through raising taxes, or through the creation of other state resources. With this in mind we have proposed the institution of a tax on businesses that employ foreigners. This tax could be proportionate on salaries paid to those employees or it could be calculated and paid in advance ..." There was a great deal more of the same.

Note that Appendix 6, Document "C" is the official statement of this policy, showing that Postel-Vinay's recommendations were officially taken up. There is a translation of this document at the end of Appendix 6.

⁵² Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, pp76-80. Costa-Lascoux describes the interactions of housing shortage, immigrant slums, and competition for government assistance, made very public through the violent conflicts that arose in the public housing estates.

⁵³ Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France, op.cit.*, pp.226-227. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers, op.cit.*, p.78 & 88. "Bidonvilles" was the term used to describe the slums inhabited mainly by immigrants that arose at city outskirts in France, especially in the north-east of Paris. Such a bidonville was at Nanterre. The 1968 student revolt began in Nanterre and was accompanied by manifestations of student solidarity with the immigrants living there. Thus it was that the situation of immigrants and housing received important media coverage. Out of this crucible came the policies for the destruction of the bidonvilles and the relocation of their immigrant inhabitants to better dwellings. Between 1967 and 1970 familial immigration had risen to 25,000 families per annum. By 1970 the intake was 38,000 and 650,000 foreigners were still living in Bidonvilles. However the annual program for public housing for French and foreigners was fixed at 125,000 dwellings

⁵⁴ Except for La Ligue Communiste, which was legally dissolved by the Conseil des ministres due to contravention of a 1936 law prohibiting political parties from bearing arms. See Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers, op.cit.*, p.75.

⁵⁵ Money, *op.cit.*, pp127-8. "But the regional specific pressure was even more clearly visible when, in 1969 and again in 1972 and 1974, the communist mayors of the Paris region issued statements condemning the concentration of immigrant workers in their neighborhoods. The 1969 declaration criticized the 'immigration policy designed to provide large capitalist companies a cheap workforce - to increase their profits - and to put pressure on the salaries of all workers'. After complaining of the forty-six thousand individuals still living in 117 *bidonvilles*, the statement came to the crux of the problem: 'Essentially, immigrant workers are concentrated in communist municipalities. They seek social aid ... But their massive presence in these communities comes also from the fact that it is toward them that the government systematically directs the new immigrants. The result for our cities is the insupportable charges [on government services] for which solutions cannot be found at the local level'.

⁵⁶ Monique Hervo and Marie-ange Charras, *Bidonvilles, op.cit.*, p.338, "Il est par exemple déclaré à l'intéressé que l'obtention d'un logement sera une contrepartie de son changement de nationalité. Beaucoup d'ailleurs représentants de la police, employeurs, ou même responsables sociaux, suggèrent ou conseillent nettement cette procédure, se faisant ainsi complices, consciemment ou non, de ce qu'on ne peut appeler qu'un « chantage », moralement intolérable.

Il est alors certain que quelques-unes de ces familles, qui ne savent plus du tout vers qui se tourner pour avoir un logement, finissent, dans le plus grand découragement, par céder à ce genre de pression effectivement exercée sur un bon nombre d'entre elles. Mais, en général, les familles qui prennent la nationalité française dans le but exclusif d'obtenir par là leur relogement sont en nombre très limité (il arrive d'ailleurs qu'un seul de ses membres effectue le changement, en général la femme). Ces changements de nationalité sont très violemment désapprouvés par leurs compatriotes ..." In English the content of this quote is that the police, employers and even social workers placed pressure on immigrants to take on citizenship in exchange for housing. The authors condemn this as a morally intolerable exercise. They say that some families gave in to this pressure, often compromising by allowing the wife only to naturalise, and that generally immigrant communities in the *bidonvilles* strongly condemned selling out on citizenship.

⁵⁷ Mark Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, MUP, 2000, p.303. Here Lopez documents how the Local Government (Amendment) Act of 1974 gave non-citizens the right to vote in local elections. "This successful campaign modified the nature of electoral politics in Australia [for] Citizenship is a fundamental criterion for political participation in electoral politics."

⁵⁸ The annual report on public housing, 13 March 2000, of the Bishop Pierre Foundation (La Fondation Abbé Pierre), which is a caritas organization, was widely reported in the French press. The report blamed lack of housing on insufficient construction of new HLMs, i.e. low cost public housing. It said that because of this lack many families were living in squats and slums. According to the report something like five million people in France have more or less seriously substandard housing. The report contrasted a mood of economic optimism with worsening public housing scarcity. The situation was just as bad in the private sector, it said. Although more money was available from the State to assist people to pay for housing, access to these allowances had become increasingly complex and inegalitarian and this added to the problem of the real dearth of affordable housing.

Since 1993, the report continued, PLA's (Prêts locatifs aides) – assisted rental housing loans – had declined by 45%. For every 80,000 budgeted for, only 50,000 were actually financed and allocated. There were more and more crisis and temporary lodgings, but they were overwhelmed and did not fulfill their function of staging people prior to their accessing permanent lodging.

In addition, the report criticized national housing policy for being too slow to adapt to changing demands and accused local housing politics of racially discriminatory practices equivalent to a "form of apartheid." "[Foreigners] are twice as likely to live in HLMs and to have only 1.1 rooms per person, in contrast with 1.7 rooms for French people."

⁵⁹ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, p.46.

⁶⁰ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses Etrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.38. An example of this is the treatment of Spanish refugees after the taking of Barcelona in January 1939. Despite the announcement that the frontiers were closed to republican refugees from the civil war, several hundred thousand were allowed to enter France. They were housed in inhumane conditions in refugee camps, despite public outcry. When many returned in the two years after hostilities, British and French governments attempted to obtain amnesty for them from General Franco. The French considered forced repatriation and it is possible that in April 1939 the police had received orders to forcibly repatriate. However protests from the French Left and a large part of the public, resistance from the refugees themselves and a degree of lack of cooperation from the Francoists themselves made this unviable. Eventually conditions in the refugee camps for those who would not return to Spain improved.

Page.40: On 12/4/1939 a decree was pronounced. In part inspired by the presence of Spanish refugees on French soil, it became possible to draft refugees into work teams or the

French army. In the same year 80,000 Spanish soldiers were interned in France and 20,000 were sent to work in industry, 20,000 to the army and 39,000 to work in agriculture.

⁶¹ Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, p.15: The OMI was assigned the role of facilitating family reunion "**where appropriate lodgings are available**" as set out in a circular dated 20 January 1947. Also Costa-Lascoux, *op.cit.*, p.64. The terms have not changed substantially since the Decree of 29 April 1976. This decree did not apply to nationals from member states of the European Economic Community, or a few African States or to Algeria. In the case of Algeria, however, an addendum to an agreement signed on 27 December 1968 was signed on 22 December 1985 (and proclaimed on 7 March 1986) made conditions applying to Algerian nationals and family reunion almost identical to those applying to other non EEC immigrants. The law that is currently applicable for non EEC family reunion and which contains the same conditions is Article 11, (no. 29 of L.no 93-1027 of 24 August 1993) of the French *Code Civil*. This law also requires that the foreigner has been resident in France for at least two years and is in possession of a resident's visa for at least one year's duration.

⁶² Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.63. The problem was almost comically circular. In 1945 the ONI assumed responsibility for transporting immigrants' families in exchange for a financial deposit, but the shortage of lodgings made bringing families impossible. The Minister for Finances also imposed stringent limits on sending money out of France.

Costa-Lascoux, *De L'immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, p.75. Costa-Lascoux writes that the shape of immigration in France was largely determined by housing and urban housing politics.

⁶³ Article 11, no.29, of the French *Code Civil*.

⁶⁴ Needless to say there were the usual exceptions which are generally dependent on wealth, education and special skills.

⁶⁵ Regarding the right to family reunion: Dupâquier, Jaques, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4. *op.cit.*, pp.480-481 and *Encyclopaedie Universalis 3* (Electronic Version) "Droits de l'Homme" and "Convention Européenne" and "Traité de Rome": For the notion of "human rights" is not just a philosophical one in the context of French law. France is party to international laws that over-ride national law on issues of Human Rights and these include The European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties, created by the European Council on 4 November 1950, effective from 3 September 1953 (but only ratified by France in 1973), The *European Social Charter* 1961, effective from 1965, and the *Act of Helsinki August 1975* (issuing from the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* 1975). France is also signatory to the *European Agreement on the Status of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (1977) and the *International Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (UN, 1978). All these agreements contain defenses of family reunion and are influential on France but the European Convention has teeth in the form of the Court of Human Rights and other juridical structures.

⁶⁶ There is also a requirement that income be sufficient for decent living and entry may be denied where public health or order might be negatively affected. Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen, op.cit.*, p.15, 64. The law that is currently applicable for non EEC family reunion and which contains the same conditions is Article 11, (no. 29 of L.no 93-1027 of 24 August 1993) of the French *Code Civil*. This law also requires that the foreigner has been resident in France for at least two years and is in possession of a resident's visa for at least one year's duration.

⁶⁷ GISTI, *Plein Droit no.12*, Nov. 1990, "Le Droit de vivre en famille", "Un Droit ou une tolérance?". (Also available on the net at <http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/12/droit.html>) :

"En dépit des nombreuses réserves émises par les praticiens et experts qui furent consultés, le rapport de la mission parlementaire d'information (rapport Marchand, mai 1990) a retenu, dans sa proposition no.10, le principe du maintien strict de l'actuelle réglementation en matière de regroupement familial et, en particulier, les conditions draconiennes concernant le logement, sous prétexte que 'ce n'est pas rendre service aux familles immigrées que de favoriser leur réunification dans des conditions de précarité ou d'insalubrité telles que leurs chances d'intégration seront presque irrémédiablement compromises" ... "Cette différence de considération permet à l'administration d'utiliser comme argument la crise du logement - dont les pouvoirs publics sont largement responsables - pour faire obstacle au regroupement familial; lequel, par ailleurs, n'est réglementairement autorisé, de manière limitative, que pour le conjoint et les enfants mineurs...."

The above paragraphs describe a parliamentary report that defended the suitable housing requirement for family reunion. The author of this article criticises the report and the government for cynically abusing the "housing crisis" to discriminate against the right of immigrants to a family life.

A comment that springs to my mind is the perception that there is a "housing crisis", when study of the history of public housing since the second world war indicates to me that this is a normal condition of public housing in France; never enough for immigrants.

⁶⁸ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp 56-57. In Australia accommodation was used as a requirement for sponsorship of some immigrants (mostly Southern Europeans) in the 1950s. In 1957 the campaign of "Bring out a Briton" was launched, where Australians were encouraged to seek out jobs and accommodation for British migrants. Such requirements were however not encoded and these days money, employment and many other factors overshadow accommodation in sponsorship.

⁶⁹ This situation has been written about quite candidly by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Pour une ouverture sélective des frontières", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 20 June –5 July, 2000, p.83, from an interview by Isabelle Monnin. Wihtol de Wenden is a Director of Research at the National Centre for Scientific Studies (CNRS) and author of numerous academic works. Another source on this is Mark J Miller, "Employer Sanctions in France", US Commission of Immigration Reform, 2430 E Street, NW, South Building, Washington DC, 1995, p.10, 17, "Roughly one third of all legal infractions and complaints concern the building sector alone (p.18) This situation was alluded to in correspondence with sources mentioned in the note below and by Prof Francis Ronsin *Histoire Contemporaine*, Univ. Bourgogne in Dijon and author of *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, 1977.

⁷⁰ For instance, at times of sudden heavy demand for building work, such as that generated by the unusual storm damage at the end of 1999, it is difficult to find the necessary skilled workers. Unsurprisingly, small building enterprises that are unable or unwilling to offer competitive conditions and wages suffer most from difficulty in attracting skilled workers. The need for rare skilled trades could arise especially where restoration of ancient buildings was required.

⁷¹ For France: Extracts from the following articles were provided to me by Catherine Comet of the Confederation de l'artisanat et des petites entreprises du bâtiment (CAPEB) via Agnès Thibault: agnes.thibault@wanadoo.fr : INSEE, "Difficultés de recrutement insee 94-00", 2000, contains the results of monthly INSEE questionnaires to Heads of Enterprises concerning their recruitment problems. CAPEB *Cellule Etudes Economiques*, AT: "Les Problèmes de recrutement dans les entreprises artisanales du bâtiment" is an article that appeared in the monthly CAPEB journal (18/11/1999) on problems of recruitment in small building firms. It presents results of a study done in 1999 for CAPEB on problems of recruitment by small building firms. INSEE, "Principaux indicateurs conj 0900" presents the results of a study by INSEE on difficulties of recruitment in the building sector during the period 1994-2000. I also

obtained assistance from Christine Salvat, salvat@apcm.fr of the Assemblée permanente des chambres de métiers (The permanent assembly of Chambers of Trades) <http://www.apcm.com/>. Replying to my request for information on the situation in France, in an email dated 28 Sept. 2000 suggested that keeping up the supply of apprenticeships is a permanent struggle, especially in regard to some outmoded or rarified trades, [which are of course in demand in the widespread restoration of ancient buildings in France], however she did not believe that this had given rise to seeking foreign tradesmen (from outside the EEC) since there were many French eager to take up such training and there is a strong government initiative to attract people to train for these trades. There are indications that the industry is actually resistive to the employment of immigrants since part of the government initiative is to combat rejection for racial reasons as well as to encourage the employment of women in these areas. See the above site regarding this. It is also possible to obtain more information by doing a search under "artisan" on the site of the Ministry for Employment and Solidarity: <http://www.travail.gouv.fr> Under the *Code du Travail*, Chapitre II, S.2, Art 43, L.115-1; Art 44, L.118-2-2, Art. 45, L.118-2-3,4, L.119-1-1 etc. there are sections dealing with collection of money from employers to subsidise apprenticeship courses, although the State remains in control of these courses nationally as with all education, and undertakes much of their subsidy. The financing of apprenticeships is currently under review to maximize funding and support for students to make the system more effective in taking up unemployed persons in France.

For Australia: Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, p.68.

⁷² E. Jay Howenstine, *Attacking Housing Costs, Foreign Policies and Strategies*, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, P.O. Box 489, Piscataway, N.J. 08854, 1983, p.29. The author states this premise.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp30-33.

⁷⁴ Birrell & Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp.67-68 and Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7, "The Land Development and House Building Industries," *op.cit.*, p.22.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ 1995 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Logement (Politique du)" and Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages).

⁷⁷ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996.

⁷⁸ French Population Data, from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institution nationale des études économiques (INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990." Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine. Indicateurs démographiques 1987 à 1997" Note that recent employer desires (over the years 2000-2001) for more liberal immigration apply to special skills and are not related to populationism.

⁷⁹ Household formation and homebuilding finance: Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages), and Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, "The Australian and International Housing Systems", *op.cit.*, p.18, "The European countries have had a much lower rate of household growth, and therefore housing demand, than Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States."

⁸⁰ Sources: "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, July 1996. (4 pages). Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.18, which refers to the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia. See also Gavin McCrone and Mark Stephens, *Housing Policy in Britain and Europe*, UCL Press, 1995, p.23, Chapter 3, "Housing Policy in France", "French housing policy has undergone considerable changes in recent years, but the process has been more evolutionary than the abrupt changes of direction that have characterised the UK. ... As in other countries, the impetus for many of the changes since the mid-1970s has been the need to contain costs and to target the measures more effectively..."

The French government subsidises apprenticeships as it does all other education and this would have facilitated the capacity of the French industry to radically reappraise its mode of operation, technology and training needs. Much of the financing for apprenticeships comes from an employer tax for apprenticeships (*Code du travail* and Article L.118-2 and subclauses cited on <http://www.apcm.com/> which is the net address of the Assemblée permanente des chambres des métiers, consacré à l'artisanat, à l'apprentissage et à la formation (Permanent Assembly of Chambers of occupations, dedicated to trades, to apprenticeships and to training).

⁸¹ Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 2, "The Australian and International Housing Systems," *op.cit.*, p.18, which refers to the different systems in Europe and the English speaking settler countries, including Australia. On p.32 Burke comments that developers in Australia frequently employ a strategy of "inviting as many builders as possible to set up display houses. Some have up to 60 different builders working on their estate at any one time. This fragmentation not only limits the degree to which the builders can appropriate development gains, but also further restricts their ability to embark on more industrialised forms of production techniques that might occur on site."

During the depressed period in housing in the mid-seventies in Australia private land developers wound back their release of land until demand returned - Terry Burke, *The Australian Housing System*, Module 7: "The Land development and House Building Industries", *op.cit.*, p.31 Note that this increased demand coincided with the return to high immigration. Other sources of Australian material on this period: Tom Uren, *Straight left*, Random House, Milsons Point, New South Wales, 1994, Leonie Sandercock, *Land racket*, *op.cit.*, Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, New South Wales, 1994; Brian Buckley, *Lynched : the life of Sir Phillip Lynch, mastermind of the ambush that ended Gough's run*, , Salzbury Publishing, Toorak, Victoria, 1991; Leonie Sandercock, *Property, politics, and urban planning*, *op.cit.*; Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975*, *op.cit.*

⁸² Money, *op.cit.*, pp 167-168, refers to changes in representation in government committees and boards consulting on immigration and population as "the game of musical councils". She says that until the 1970s membership of the two post war councils, the Immigration Advisory Council and the Immigration Planning Council, was "drawn primarily from the growth lobby, a group of relatively powerful economic interests that profited from an expansion in the domestic market. These interests included the construction industry, land speculators and developers, farmers, manufacturers and retailers ... Whitlam adjusted membership of both these councils to reflect "preferences for advice from those that favored lowered intakes". Then he abolished the department of immigration and replaced these bodies with a new one, the Australian Population and Immigration Council (APIC). "The shift in nomenclature represented the changing perspective on immigration issues in society, from a focus on immigration to concern about population growth." When the Fraser government succeeded the Whitlam government, it changed the institutions and the advisors again.

⁸³ Which the Whitlam government had apparently anticipated prior to winning office, due to Rex Connor's knowledge of minerals, energy and mining. See, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983, p. 138.

⁸⁴ Paul Ormerod, *The Death of Economics*, Faber and Faber, London, 1994, p.133-137. The experience of Great Britain and Norway was somewhat different due to their capacity to exploit the North Sea oil fields. (Note that further explanations for the economics and politics of energy policy during this period would require covering such contentious, varied, and complex material that even brief discussion is beyond the bounds of this paper.)

⁸⁵ See Jean-Marie Chevalier 1997 *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, France S.A., "Energie, Economie de l' " for a good synopsis of France's history as an energy poor economy and its nuclear development and technological adaptations post 1973. See also BP Amoco Historical Download Excel file of 'World Oil consumption' 1966-1999, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/ For more on this, see also Appendix 3, "Energy and Oil Shocks".

⁸⁶ See Appendix 3, pp 4-6.

⁸⁷ The fact that the suspension of immigration did not apply to Europeans is implicit and relies on expansion of rights to free circulation as countries became members of the European Economic Community and the European Union and it is usually expressed as an implicit assumption in all discussions of the 1974 changes to immigration policy. These details are discussed in my Statistical Appendix. However, for a direct statement that the suspension of immigration only applied to those outside the EEC, see Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours : données démographiques et affrontements idéologiques*, Seuil, October 1997, p. 37.

⁸⁸ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, pp. 79-80. (Note that the ban on worker immigration excepted family reunion, refugees, investors and other special cases.) Weil writes that the contradictions in the problem of immigration between divergent interests were increasing and harder to manage. Foreigners kept arriving to look for work in France, and some of them were wanted, but there seemed to be less and less need of them. Unemployment had risen since September 1973 and the closing of the borders of the other European States had had the effect of diverting increasing numbers of migrants to France. Another source was Georges Tapinos, "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", in G. Luciani (ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, Chapter Six, p.133.

⁸⁹ For instance, Money argues in Money, *op.cit.*, pp.118-119) that the Gaullists in the French government were particularly vulnerable during the 1973 and 1974 elections. She believes that departments with numerous immigrants and with high unemployment were likely to be anti-immigrant and that the government attempted to capture votes from these marginal electorates by catering to anti-immigrant sentiment.

Money's explanation of the political system and process in France whereby this was possible is plausible. In contrast with Australia's electoral system, which favors one party majorities in government and reflects a political landscape largely dominated by two parties, the French electoral system is made up of many different political parties.

There are two rounds of elections. If a party makes it past the first election, and many more than two do, it then looks around to see who it will try to team up with if it gets into parliament. When parliament is finally reconstituted at the end of the elections, it consists of complex multi-

party alliances, which range the spectrum from left to right. The government nearly always forms from a coalition of parties.

Money argues that the Gaullists (a populationist party) won majority government in 1968 but that this was a very unusual situation. By 1973, the year of the next legislative elections, resentment about immigration had built up in localities where immigrant presence was very high. At the same time the Gaullists realised that winning another clear parliamentary majority was improbable. Thus they made concessions to the centre-right electoral and parliamentary allies and their constituencies. The Gaullists were arguably a party in favor of nation-building and high immigration, but other right-wing factions were not in favor of continuing immigration and some of the concessions the Gaullists made were in the area of immigration.

In 1974 President Georges Pompidou died. This brought about an unscheduled presidential election. Because the President has the power to dissolve the lower house of Parliament (the National Assembly) and the National Assembly is crucial for determining the national parliamentary majority, the Gaullist alliances were placed under even more pressure. Jeanette Money asserts that this contributed to the "ultimate decision to stop immigration." (Money, *op.cit.*, p.119.)

⁹⁰ I agree with Weil, who concludes that, as long as the employers and the State saw benefit in having immigrants, nothing would stop them, short of a major crisis. He says that it was only in 1973 that economic recession, rising unemployment in France and the rise in oil revenues for Algeria (which became part of the OPEC cartel, thus turning the tables on France) would modify the facts of the situation and lead to a re-examination of immigration policy. By this he means that it was only when the elite no longer derived benefit from immigrant workers that the State would do something to stop the flow.

The reference to Algeria's oil refers to another motive for Algeria's having voluntarily ceased immigration to France in 1973. They had nationalised their oil supply and this action radically changed their relationship with France, which owned oil assets in Algeria which had now been taken largely out of French control. Perhaps the implication is that the Algerian government now believed there would be wealth and work in Algeria. Certainly, as part of the OPEC cartel, its commercial position was now hostile to France's interests. The official motive given by the Algerian government was that Algerians were suffering from racial persecution in France - and this was of course quite true. (Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p 74.)

⁹¹ Patrick Weil's documentation of events supports this interpretation. I have referred to Weil's explanations in Chapter 4, however I will restate his position here. Patrick Weil documented growing dissatisfaction among the French on issues related to immigration, but did not believe that this dissatisfaction contributed much, if at all, to the 1974 changes in policy. (Whereas Money did believe they had brought about a reduction in immigrants prior to 1974, however she was basing this belief on inadequate immigration statistics.) Weil argues that, although the dissatisfaction may have seemed to give rise to a series of laws and policies designed to improve the situation of immigrants in French society in the few years prior to 1974, the changes were ineffective and unenthusiastically applied, and made little if any impression on immigration numbers. My interpretation of the statistics leads me to find the same thing. (Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp 68-69. Some of these changes aimed to make employers more responsible for their housing, and to tighten up immigration formalities over the years from 1968 to 1974.) He suggests that these responses amounted to sops to popular resentment during which high worker immigration would continue.

⁹² Weil does not accord much weight to explanations based on racialism either. He writes that, although the issue of immigration was raised by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand, two major candidates in the 1974 election after Pompidou's death, in his opinion it was still not an election campaign issue. He bases this opinion on the fact that Jean Marie Le

Pen, President and candidate for the National Front in this election, made absolutely no allusion to the problem in the four pages and ten points of his platform. (Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.81.) Gary Freeman described Le Pen as having raised the subject several times in "muted tones", but that is as far as he is prepared to argue that anti-immigration policies were in the political air. He adds that Le Pen only received 190,326 votes in the May 6, 1974 balloting. (Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p.282)

⁹³ For more, see Appendix 3, "France's approach to oil economics" pp.4-6.

⁹⁴ These are plans formulated by the French government detailing aims and priorities for the years ahead. The effectiveness of the plans is also evaluated at the end of the period. The plans to which I refer in this text are the Eighth and the Ninth. My source for these plans was the *Quid*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2000, "Plans économiques".

The **8th Plan 1981-85**. 7 priorities : 1. Favor research 2. Reduce energy dependence on primary materials, 3. Develop a competitive industry and future technologies, 4. Develop agricultural and alimentary potential, 5. Develop training, 6. Consolidate rural protection, 7. Improve lifestyle.

9th Plan 1984-88, 1st law of Plan of 13-7-1983 (economic strategy and major activities). 2nd law of 24-12-1983 (means of execution). Priority programs for execution ; 1. Modernise industry, 2. Continue to renovate the education system and youth training, 3. Encourage research and innovation, 4. Develop communication industries, 5. Reduce energy dependence, 6. Act on behalf of employment, 7. Sell more in France and overseas, 8. Ensure an environment that is favorable to the family and having children, 9. Achieve decentralisation, 10. Live better in cities, 11. Modernise and and manage the health system better, 12. Improve justice and safety.

⁹⁵ See Appendix 3, "Energy and Oil Shocks", pp. 4-6.

⁹⁶ This philosophy is a constant, whether a Left or Right wing government is in power.

⁹⁷ See Appendix 3, "Energy and Oil Shocks", pp.4-6.

⁹⁸ From André Postel-Vinay, Minister responsible for Immigration from May 1974, in an interview in *Le Monde* 24/9/1974, cited by Weil in *La France et ses étrangers*, pp.83-84.

⁹⁹ See Appendix 6, Document 'B', p.A6-3 for a copy of the original in French: André Postel-Vinay, "Politique d'immigration", (Note de M. André Postel-Vina pour le "Comité restreint"), 1 July 1974 (8 pages, numbered to 9, with pages 2 and 3 cut and stuck together and then photocopied. For instance, he wrote that "Whilst our housing program has never exceeded 117,000 dwellings in total, for the entire population, French or foreign, the number of families of foreign workers arriving each year in France has risen, on average, to 38,000 since 1970. In a country like ours, where there are a considerable number of slums, the comparison between the two numbers - 117,000 and 38,000 - gives an idea of the tensions and social oppositions that can arise in response to such a high rate of family reunion." Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, p.86, contains details of the announcement that was circulated immediately to sending non EEC States warning them of France's decision to stop immigration and of the problems intending immigrant would encounter if they attempted to find work, housing and visas in France.

¹⁰⁰ From André Postel-Vinay, Minister responsible for Immigration from May 1974, in an interview in *Le Monde* 24/9/1974, cited by Weil in *La France et ses étrangers*, pp.83-84.

¹⁰¹ Postel-Vinay gave me a copy of this interview himself, commenting that he had just re-read it and wanted me to know that it was an extremely accurate journalistic account of his reasons for ceasing immigration. He told me this on the occasion of a visit to his Paris apartment to collect copies of documents on the morning of Saturday 13 January 2001. The quotation is of André Postel-Vinay, Minister responsible for Immigration from May 1974, in an interview with Jean Benoit in *Le Monde* 24/9/1974, pp 19-21.. Here is the original of the text translated above. "Le doublement de la population du tiers monde que l'on nous promet pour la fin du siècle, présente, à mon avis, des dangers considérables. [...] À moins que l'art et les techniques de développement ne réalisent des progrès d'une étonnante rapidité, à moins que l'esprit de solidarité ne se répande d'une manière imprévue, cette prolifération de l'espèce humaine aggravera la misère et la sous-alimentation sur de vastes territoires ... "Rejeter, par principe, l'idée d'une interruption ou d'une limitation des entrées de nouveaux migrants, cela reviendrait à soutenir que nous devons laisser se développer l'immigration, même si elle contribue à l'accroissement du chômage et au peuplement des taudis. Ce n'est pas défendable [...]. Je n'ignore pas les aspects choquants de toute mesure d'interruption ou de limitation des entrées, le caractère inhumaine de ces refoulements de la misère; mais cette misère hélas, risque d'affluer toujours davantage et d'arriver à des secteurs géographiques de plus en plus lointains : nous ne pouvons pas l'accueillir sans limites. Nous en périrons sans la soulager."

¹⁰² See Chapter 4, this thesis, for my literary review of these authors.

¹⁰³ During a visit to his Paris apartment to collect copies of documents on the morning of Saturday 13 January 2001.

¹⁰⁴ The CNPF is the National Federation of French Employers.

¹⁰⁵ In response to a question that I asked Postel-Vinay during a visit to his Paris apartment to collect copies of documents on the morning of Saturday 13 January 2001. See other documents supporting these recollections of Postel-Vinay further on in my thesis, where I go into the events of 1974 in more detail.

¹⁰⁶ See Appendix 6, Document 'B', p.A6-3 for a copy of the original in French: André Postel-Vinay, "Politique d'immigration", (Note de M. André Postel-Vinay pour le "Comité restreint"), 1 July 1974 (8 pages, numbered to 9, with pages 2 and 3 cut and stuck together and then photocopied. On page 7 he has written: "Dans la conjoncture présente, il y a tout lieu de croire que cette décision d'interruption serait bien vue des grandes organisations syndicales et, même, sans doute, du CNPF, au niveau supérieure." "In the present situation there is every reason to believe that this decision to stop [immigration] will be looked upon favorably by the big unions and, even, without doubt, by the CNPF, at a high level."

¹⁰⁷ As claimed by Georges Tapinos in "The Dynamics of International Migration in Post-War Europe", in G. Luciani (ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, Chapter Six, p.133.

¹⁰⁸ Money, *op.cit.*, p.188-189 argues that immigration was a sensitive matter at the level of a number of marginal electorates, particularly those suffering from competition for limited services and amenities. She attributes this to anti-immigrant feeling, rather than to a resentment at population pressure, but nevertheless she provides evidence for popular concern about immigration, for whatever reason.

¹⁰⁹ Money, *op.cit.*, p. 188. Money theorises that Whitlam had a number of strategies for attracting the swing vote in some marginal urban electorates at the time of the 1972 Federal elections. One of these, according to Money, was "to resolve urban problems, in part by reduced immigration intakes"

¹¹⁰ Money, *op.cit.*, p.189, citing Grattan 1993:129 and Price 1974.

¹¹¹ Money, *op.cit.*, p.190, citing, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 October 1972.

¹¹² See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

¹¹³ Previous explanations for these changes have related them either primarily to local economic and employment policy (Birrell and Birrell, 1987, *op.cit.* p.93) or to political exploitation of anti-immigrant sentiment (Money, *op.cit.*, p.192). However these explanations depend on situating the 1970s oil-shock related world economic recession at a much later date than I do. It is doubtless a matter of opinion whether one chooses to identify that recession as beginning earlier or later, however it seems inarguable to me that the early events I refer to were all part of the phenomenon.

¹¹⁴ Beginning on May 3, 1970, the OPEC countries faced their first world customers with a series of incremental and increasingly hostile demands for higher prices. In February 1971 Algeria nationalised 51% of French oil concessions and this act was followed by several other oil producing countries. On August 15, 1971, US President Nixon froze all wages, prices, salaries and rents - this was the devaluation of the US dollar. OPEC immediately told its member countries to negotiate price rises to compensate the lower US dollar. Data for these dates comes from the Chronological table entitled: World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies, 1970-1999, available as a download from the United States Energy Information Administration: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html>, edited to January 25, 2000. See also Appendix 3, for more detail, from page 2.

¹¹⁵ See Appendix 3, "Energy and Oil Shocks", p.3.

¹¹⁶ Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, Sydney, 1983, p. 138.

¹¹⁷ Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, op.cit.*, p. 138. Wilkinson comments, on page 139, "There is little doubt that some of Connors's ideas were far-sighted. ... He was correct in predicting the 1973 oil crisis and then, at a time when people world wide had overcome the fright of the OPEC moves, Connor continued to champion conservation of energy. Unfortunately he was denied the mean of achieving it. ..."

¹¹⁸ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, Ringwood, Victoria, 1985, p.256.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 768.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 259.

¹²¹ See Appendix 3, "Energy and Oil Shocks", p.2.

¹²² Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p.80.

¹²³ Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, op.cit.*, p 85.

¹²⁴ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.502.

¹²⁵ Brian Buckley, *Lynched, The Life of Sir Phillip Lynch, Mastermind of the Ambush that Ended Gough's Run*, Salzbury Publishing Pty Ltd, Toorak, Victoria, 3142, p.34.

¹²⁶ Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 191. The Governor General later signed the minutes of this meeting and those of a later one that reduced the loan sought two billion. Kelly and Tom Uren, (*Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995 pp. 209, 222, 223, 236-7), describe

Rex Connor as having an impressive knowledge of the mining industry. Apparently Gough Whitlam had no knowledge of the industry at all and was convinced that Connor was a visionary.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ This event that has not been much studied to date by demographic sociologists. Money, *op.cit.*, p.197-198, comments on the lack of attention to the period in general. Khemlani was the name of a shadowy figure from whom the government was supposed to be seeking the loan.

¹²⁹ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.769.

¹³⁰ This was also the time in the international geophysical community that the Hubbert Peak theory that oil would peak in the 1970s or in the 1990s (depending on population and consumption) was much discussed - in much wider circles than among geophysicists. References: M.K. Hubbert, "The Energy Resources of the Earth", *Scientific American*, vol. 224, 1971, p.69, and the Hubbert Peak page on <http://www.oilcrisis.com/> (last downloaded on 14/2/2001). Hubbert had a theory that massive human population growth was a transient product of a transient fossil fuel era and he propounded the merits of a steady state economy and encouraged national self sufficiency.

Whitlam and his government planned to make Australia energy self sufficient and to develop her reserves without "selling off the farm". Objections are occasionally raised that Australia (and the US and Canada) did not experience much pain during the First Oil shock. This is true, relatively speaking, but in Australia's case this was partly due to Whitlam's strategies to counteract the effects of the shock, as well as to the high value of the Australian dollar at the time, which meant that when petrodollar prices rose, Australia was less affected. Bradshaw, Foster, Fellows and Rowland, "Patterns of discovery in Australia: part 2," *Oil and Gas Journal*, Petroleum Publishing Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA., June 14, 1999, p.111. "In 1973 the global price of oil soared when war in the Middle East led to the Arab oil embargo, but, in Australia, political factors – regulated markets and prices and taxation – effectively blocked the effect of high oil prices." Refer also to the section on Oil in the Background Theory Chapters of this thesis, where a detailed history of significant events contributing to the definition of the first Oil Shock are given and which show that the USA and others took a number of decisive actions in response to the crises as they arose.

¹³¹ The very widely read book predicting global energy and materials shortages, *The Population Bomb*, by Paul Ehrlich, Simon & Schuster, Brookvale, New South Wales, Australia, came out in 1968. Consider also "Nugget" Coombs Boyer lecture of 1970, "A god-like viewer ... could properly conclude that the human species was like a cancerous growth reproducing itself beyond control and living parasitically on, rather than symbiotically with, the rest of creation and threatening not merely the environment, but itself as well", *The Boyer Collection*, ABC Books, 2001, cited by Frank Devine in his column in the *Australian*, 12/7/2001, p.11

¹³² Stephen D. Mumford, *The Life and Death of NSSM 200: How the Destruction of Political Will Doomed a U.S. Population Policy*, Centre for Research on Population and Security, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, 1996. This study also contains an appendix recommending population growth reduction as a method of combatting fossil fuel depletion.. (Appendix 2.) NSSM 200 stood for National Security Study Memorandum. This was an interagency study of world population growth, US population growth, and the potential impacts on national security. In this work evidence was given to support an argument that population policy initiatives failed largely due to interference from a lobby group of Catholic bishops in the United States (pp. 179-352).

Aristide R. Zolberg, "Are the Industrial Countries under siege", in G. Luciani, (Ed), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States*, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands,

pp.53-82, p. 61 : "In the 1970s, mounting objections by conservative segments of the citizenry to the presence of culturally and often somatically distinct minorities, as well as the oil crisis and ensuing economic crisis, prompted the governments of the industrial countries to undertake a drastic reevaluation of ongoing immigration, but the difficulty of reducing the flows to the desired level, as well as to restoring the *status quo*, precipitated renewed fear of 'invasion'. In the United States, in the 'stagflation' 1970s, estimates of illegal immigrants escalated to as high as twenty million, on the basis of which it was argued that the nation had 'lost control of its borders'. The major solution proposed was to impose sanctions on employers of unauthorized labour, but this failed of enactment because of resistance by organized business interests, so that in 1979 the Congress established a commission to overhaul the entire immigration system."

See also Mumford, *The Life and Death of NSSM 200*, *op.cit.*, pp.51-57 and,

¹³³ Borrie, W.D., *First Report of the National Population Inquiry*, The Government Printer of Australia, Canberra, 1975.

¹³⁴ Sharon Beder makes a good case that this was due to intentional anti-conservation/anti-environmental activity by corporations from the early 1970s in the United States and Australia as do Beck and Kolankiewicz about the retreat of the US environmental movement from advocating population stabilisation. Sharon Beder, *Corporate Spin, The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism*, Scribe, Melbourne, 2000, p.15 and Roy Beck and Leon Kolankiewicz, "The Environmental Movement's Retreat from Advocating U.S. Population Stabilisation (1970-1998): A First Draft of History," *Journal of Policy History*, Penn State University, USA., Vol. 12, No.1., 2000.

¹³⁵ As suggested by Jeanette Money, see my literature review, Chapter 4.

¹³⁶ There are many references for positive contributions to innovations in these fields. As well as Whitlam's book, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, the chapters, "Health", "Women", "Migrants", "Cities", Siedlecky and Wyndham, *Populate and Perish, Australian Women's Fight for Birth Control*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p.136-137, detail his government's support for family planning, subsidising of the contraceptive pill and health rebates for abortions. References for comparison with French policy may be found in several sources, for instance, Weil, *La France et ses étrangers*, *op.cit.*, pp.81-86 and 243-254.

¹³⁷ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, p.502. According to Robert Birrell & Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp.89 - 93 the Labor government's reduction in immigration was largely conceived as a measure to offset the impact of the rise in unemployment that the government expected would result temporarily from some massive cuts in protectionist tariffs for the manufacturing industry, however Whitlam's own statement contradicts this and the origins of this policy are dated to quite an early period, Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning*, *op.cit.*, p. 138, "[Connor's] opening words left no doubt that he felt Australia was on the right path: 'The national policy on minerals and energy approved at the 1971 Launceston Conference of our party has proved to be not only singularly relevant but even historically visionary in the light of subsequent events. We anticipated the world energy crisis (1973), have dealt with international currency turmoil, established a sound export pricing policy, checked the inroads into Australia of the multinational corporations, and secured the respect and understanding of our trading partners.'" On page 139: "There is little doubt that some of Connors's ideas were far-sighted. ... He was correct in predicting the 1973 oil crisis and then, at a time when people world wide had overcome the fright of the OPEC moves, Connor continued to champion conservation of energy. Unfortunately he was denied the means of achieving it. ..."

¹³⁸ Birrell, Robert and Birrell, Tanya, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp.92-94.

¹³⁹ For a description of the gradual changes from the late 1970s prior to Keating's deregulation of banking, see Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, pp.13-17. Martin and Schumann in the *Global Trap*, *op.cit.*, p.109, suggest that the first and second oil shocks caused the post war "Keynesian edifice to totter", so that much of the Western world became dominated by the dogma of the "so-called neo-liberalism and monetarism associated with Reagan's advisor, Milton Friedman and Thatcher's mentor, Friedrich August von Hayek", after the conservative victories in Britain and the US in 1979 and 1980. On page 133 they observe "the concept of deregulation found enthusiastic support in the 80s among the managerial elite in Western Europe, but nowhere except in Britain was there a political majority behind it."

¹⁴⁰ The difference between kilograms of oil and kilograms of oil equivalent is, of course, that the latter measure concerns all forms of commercial energy, not just oil. It simply measures all energy against the energy put out by oil.

¹⁴¹ Pierre Desprairies, *La Crise de l'Energie, le mal, le remède*, Editions Technochip, 1982, p.105.

¹⁴² Pierre Desprairies, *La Crise de l'Energie, le mal, le remède*, Editions Technochip, 1982, p.108.

¹⁴³ 1997 *Encyclopædia Universalis France S.A.*, (Electronic Version), "France - Données humaines et économiques -"La Vie industrielle", "Sécurité sociale", and Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française*, Vol.4,*op.cit.*, pp.202-203.

¹⁴⁴ In 1973 there was also an economic theory abroad in the OECD suggesting that the importing of cheap labor to France could result in employers failing to modernise and increase productivity by utilising new machinery and technology. Instead they would utilise low cost labour. Immigrant labour propped up businesses with poor performances, permitting them to survive when they should not. This was thought to block the natural tendency for survival of the fittest in the market. According to Michel Massenet, therefore, at a time when the international competition was particularly fierce, it did not make sense to have high unskilled worker immigration. Gary Freeman suggests that this theory was one that lay behind the cutting back of non-EEC immigration in 1974 during the economic crisis. Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, *op.cit.*, pp.202-203. He cites *Manpower Policy in France*, OECD, Paris, 1973, p.19 and Corentin Calvez, "Le problème des travailleurs étrangers", in *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social no.7 (27 March, 1969)*, p. 390, and Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism*, OUP, New York, 1965, pp.128-129 and Stephen Cohen, *Modern Capitalist Planning*, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London, 1969. Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, use a similar theory to explain the persistence of poor performing industries in Australia.

¹⁴⁵ The politics of nuclear energy are more sensitive in Australia than in most places, but Australia has been laggardly in exploring many energy alternatives, especially non-fossil fuel alternatives. This must be related at least in part to the abundance of our fossil fuel reserves, of which possibly the largest is coal. See, Brian Fleay, Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, West Australia, *Beyond Oil: Transport and Fuel for the Future*, Paper downloadable in .pdf form from the University Website, <http://www.wistp.murdoch.edu.au/> or available from the above policy faculty and Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning*, *op.cit.*, (last three chapters). There are quite strong rumours that Australia may promote liquefaction of coal as a fuel substitute, as well as oil bearing shales and sands. The pollution factors could be very serious. Coal can be turned into gasoline through the Fischer-Tropsch process. Environmentalist, Alan Parker writes, "The extra energy required to turn coal into oil will double the already high greenhouse gas emissions from transport. There has been a \$A 2

billion Japanese investment in a "brown coal to oil plant" in the Latrobe Valley in Victoria Australia. The plant has been mothballed until the price of oil goes sufficiently high. They have built a school for the workers children when they ultimately arrive. The same thing applies to Australian shale oil deposits in Queensland which are already in production. The need for a carbon tax will be crucial in just a few years from now." Alan A. Parker, Secretary to the Town and Country Planning Association (Vic) 50 Stirling Street, Footscray. Victoria, Australia, 3011, Email alanpar@ozemail.com.au, Telephone 03 9689 3693, Fax 03 9687 9519

¹⁴⁶ Between 1977 and 1982 the Liberal-National Party government raised the immigration intake goals again, to 90,000 and then to 120,000. This seems to be about the point where immigration policy ceased to respond to unemployment levels by adjusting migration downwards, which had been a practice prevailing, to a greater or lesser degree, in previous governments. (Demographic Statistics, ABS, Cat no 3101.0. Figures for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, *Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993*, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994.)

¹⁴⁷ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, «Le BTP depuis 1945», *Insee Première*, No. 472, Paris, July 1996. (4 pages), page 2-3. The most important factor in mounting operating costs has been the sharp rise in oil prices. In Sweden for example heating costs increased by almost 300% during the period 1968-1977. Most European governments took steps to improve energy efficiency over this period. The other two major causes of rising costs for operating houses are the increase in the price of water and in the price of labor. E. Jay Howenstine, *Attacking Housing Costs, Foreign Policies and Strategies*, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, P.O. Box 489, Piscataway, N.J. 08854, 1983, p.30.

¹⁴⁸ Pierre Desprairies, *La Crise de l'Energie, le mal, le remède*, Editions Technochip, Paris, 1982, p.109

¹⁴⁹ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, «Le BTP depuis 1945», *Insee Première*, No. 472, Paris, July 1996. (4 pages), page 2-3

¹⁵⁰ See Appendix 6, Document 'A', p.A6-2 for a copy of the original in French: Press Release dated 22/7/1974. (My translation). "Monsieur André Postel-Vinay states that on Monday 22 July 1974 he tendered to the Prime Minister [Jaques Chirac] his resignation as Secretary of State to the Minister of Employment (Immigrant Workers). The reason leading to this resignation was the big reduction, during budgeting decisions, of the program he had asked for, for 1975, in regard to the housing of immigrant workers and social action on their behalf. The housing program the Mr. Postel-Vinay proposed was commensurate in size with the recommendations of the VIth Plan, recommendations which have largely been lost to view. Although the program he was asking for was bigger than that of the VIth Plan for family housing, it was less than for group housing for foreign workers. Globally, the scale was about the same. Mr Postel-Vinay felt that the reductions made to this program prevented him from fulfilling his mission. This is not to say that he does not appreciate the necessity for austerity measures, but that, in his opinion, the supplementary expenditure that he was asking for could have been compensated for through savings made in less essential sectors."

¹⁵¹ Insee, *Données sociales*, 1993, Figure 4, "Logements terminés par secteur de construction de 1949 à 1977 p. 411 and Insee, *Annuaire rétrospectif de la France, 1948-1988*, Table 1, "Situation de la construction". Source for 1980-1994 was Maurice Blanc and Laurence Bertrand, "France", *Housing Policy in Europe*, Ed. Paul Balchin, Routledge, 1996, Table 9.2, p.127. (Figures for 1994 were provisional). Original sources: Ministère de l'Équipement, du logement, des transports et de la mer.

¹⁵² In 1967 "ZACs" (Zone d'aménagement concertés) came into being in France. Barry Simpson, *Planning and Public Transport in Great Britain, France and West Germany*, Longman, 1987, pp.73-74 describes these as if they were facilitators for private developers. A ZAC was a zone where considerable changes were envisaged over a short period of time under the *loi d'orientation foncière 1967*, which authorised public authority land requisitioning. With the ZACs such land was passed on to private developers, who were supposed to build schools and amenities in conformity with the needs of the future community. However the ZACs were full of tax loops and dodges and the developers were exempt from the general requirement for industry to contribute taxes for local infrastructure including internal roads, open space and parking. Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley and Sons, 1981, write, pp 68-69 that there was "no established tradition of speculative office development prior to British involvement in the French property market. Indeed, in the mid-1960s, 80 per cent of new office space was for owner-occupancy. The situation changed rapidly in the 1970s, however, as British companies turned their attention to property development in Europe, and the balance in new office provision was reversed so that approximately 80 per cent of new office space was built speculatively. In much of Europe from the late 1960s onwards, British property companies became very active as promoters of new urban development. Their somewhat voracious methods were not always welcomed. In some cases, and notably in the case of Brussels, they were totally insensitive to the pre-existing urban fabric. In this case, controls were imposed somewhat belatedly to prevent further transformation of sensitive parts of the city." Burtenshaw, Bateman and Ashworth cite Goodall, B., *The Economics of Urban Areas*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1972, for an explanation of the rise of speculative office building as mostly due to "the massive flow of funds available for property investment in the postwar period via insurance companies and pension funds. Further, the restrictions on the increasing of capital in post-war Britain could be circumvented by the so-called leaseback transaction. This enabled a company to sell its interest in a property, but to lease it back from the purchaser. In the process, the company raised much-needed capital and the purchaser, often an insurance company, had found in property a secure investment for part of its funds. Property companies themselves were often funded by insurance companies with pension funds. All of this activity meant that property, seen as an investment with a very high return, in comparison with other investment and the added advantage of being at that time virtually inflation-proof, was being actively developed."

¹⁵³ Australia's failure to adapt these new practices is explored in Terry Burke, Module 7 of *The Australian Housing System*, "The Land Development and House Building Industries", *op.cit.*.

¹⁵⁴ E. Jay Howenstine, *Attacking Housing Costs, Foreign Policies and Strategies*, *op.cit.*, pp30-33.

¹⁵⁵ Robert Birrell & Tanya Birrell, *An Issue of People, Population and Australian Society*, 1987, *op.cit.*, p.68. In 1966 2.8% of overseas born males had degrees, compared with 2.4% of Australian born males. 16.5% of overseas born males had completed secondary school whilst only 7.8% of Australian born had.

¹⁵⁶ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, Chapter entitled "The Cities", pp. 371-405. Although I will go on to derive a great deal of my information from Whitlam's autobiography, his account is corroborated by a number of authors on the issue of urban development planning. Leonie Sandercock has specialised in this area and in *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, USA, 1990, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition", p.13-20, gives a review of the literature that analyses the fate of Whitlam's urban planning initiatives.

¹⁵⁷ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, p.382 and Leonie Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, *op.cit.*, p.13

¹⁵⁸ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.373.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.373-375.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.379-380. "In NSW for instance, the State Planning Authority was established in 1963 with no experts on housing, health, education or industrial development. To plan for five million people it had a smaller staff than Canberra had in planning for its first 100,000 people. "

¹⁶² Miles Lewis, *Suburban Backlash*, Bloomings Books, Victoria, Australia, 1999, p. 14. However his government was thrown out before this could be done.

¹⁶³ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p 373-375.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p387-388.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p388.

¹⁶⁶ Leonie Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning, op.cit.*, pp.13-16. Here Sandercock makes a critical analysis of the fate of the Whitlam planning innovations and comes to much the same conclusions as Whitlam, although she refers to a number of other sources.

¹⁶⁷ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.388

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p389-90.

¹⁷⁰ Mark Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, MUP, 2000, pp 303. Clause 5 of the Local Government Act 1974. Lopez records that this change to the Victorian Act was heavily lobbied by Zangalis and Sgro, who had been denied Australian citizenship due to their communist political beliefs.

¹⁷¹ Leonie Sandercock, *The Land Racket, op.cit.*, cited by Gough Whitlam in *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, p.390.

¹⁷² Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government, op.cit.*, pp390-391.

¹⁷³ Leonie Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning, op.cit.*, pp.11-20.

¹⁷⁴ The first edition of the book she is representing to an American audience in the Transaction edition, was published as *Cities for Sale: Property, Politics and Urban Planning in Australia* by MUP in 1977.

¹⁷⁵ Her remarks remind me of those from a medical practitioner in her 80s, Dr Shirley Francis, whom I interviewed about her masters thesis on the effects of contraception on the birth rate in a suburb of Melbourne in the 1970s. I commented to her that her thesis was written against a background of the educated middle-class when it was taken for granted that social equity and a clean and biodiverse environment would be given priority and that it was understood that we all lived in a precious and finite world. "Yes", she said, "We must seem terribly naive to people now. Do you think we were wrong?"

In fact, perhaps the idealists of the early 1970s were not wrong and it is possible to change Australia's land development practices. Perhaps Whitlam was simply terribly unlucky. What might change things is another crisis, by reducing the high immigration that seems to feed

housing demand, in order to permit a sustained challenge to some of our more antisocial land development practices.

¹⁷⁶ See my figure 8.1, Chapter 8 and the discussion below it. This figure also gives shows net overseas immigration. Trevor Sykes describes a wave of property crashes in June 1974 and at the start of 1977. See. Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, p.267. David Hayward, "The Reluctant Landlord", in *Urban Policy and Research*, Vol. 14., No.1, 1996, p.23, describes the property recession as lasting from 1975-1986. There were however also small peaks in 1976 and 1982.

¹⁷⁷ Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, *op.cit.*, p.17.

¹⁷⁸ Ian Manning , "Policies: Past and Present", Chapter 2, pp10-32, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p.14 and Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, p.404; Leonie Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁷⁹ Later to be renamed the *Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act (1975)*

¹⁸⁰ R.H. Fagan, "Foreign Investment" in *Australian Encyclopaedia*, Terry Hills, NSW, Australian Geographic, Pty. Ltd, 1995, pp. 1393-1394.

¹⁸¹ Trevor Sykes describes a wave of property crashes in June 1974 and at the start of 1977 in Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, p.267. David Hayward, "The Reluctant Landlord", in *Urban Policy and Research*, Vol. 14., No.1, 1996, p.23, describes the property recession as lasting from 1975-1986. There were however also small peaks in 1976 and 1982 which coincided with relative peaks in immigration. See my figure 8.1, Chapter 8 and the discussion below it.

¹⁸² Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, and Mary Ann Wulff, "Australia", *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, *op.cit.*, pp.722-762: p.728 &732, citing Stone 1979.

¹⁸³ Alan Bond migrated to Perth, Australia as a child with his English parents. He began business by property speculation which relied on land rezoning and although he finished up having many other kinds of investments, the basis of his business remained property. He wheeled and dealt for three decades, generally using time payment to deal with huge loans, including one that he floated with Kumagai Gumi. He won the America's cup in 1983, thus earning great popularity for Australia and the public approval of Prime Minister Hawke. He became a multi-millionaire, increasing his fortunes greatly during the 1987-89 period, but underlying this was a 20 fold rise in debt over the last five years and, in 1989 Bond Corporation announced a loss of 980 million, which was the largest in Australia's history to that date. Bond eventually went to prison, but not for very many years. Source: Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, Chapter Six.

¹⁸⁴ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, pp.57-58.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.58-141.

¹⁸⁶ "The push of the group [Stone writes about], including the Australian Treasury, was for a reduction in assistance for housing generally and an opening up of the housing market to market forces unfettered by subsidies or regulated interest rates that artificially lower the cost of home ownership, raise ownership expectations, and encourage overconsumption of housing." Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, and Mary Ann Wulff, "Australia", *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, *op.cit.*, pp.722-762: p.728 &732, citing Stone 1979.

¹⁸⁷ Birrell and Birrell, *An Issue of People*, 1987, *op.cit.*, pp.236-237. Criteria for skilled immigrants were made easier to meet in unilateral decisions made by the Department of Immigration without consulting the Department of Employment. Birrell and Birrell describe the Department of Immigration as actively supporting the immigration lobby. They describe this lobby as being made up of "well-organized, financed, and articulate industry associations and companies, and vocal ethnic associations who can claim to represent and perhaps to influence the voting intentions of significant numbers of citizens."

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER EIGHT

¹ For instance, Vivienne Milligan, *Australian National Geographic Encyclopaedia*, "Housing", p.1696 and Belinda Probert, "Is Australia History?", New South Wales Centenary of Federation, Barton Lecture Series: Holding Together, Class in the Year 2001, Newcastle City Hall 13 March 2001.

² *Housing Past, Housing Futures*, Technical Report 4, Summary, Infrastructure Victoria, , Metropolitan Strategy Project, GPO Box 2797Y, Melbourne 3001. Email metroplan@doi.vic.gov.au and <http://www.doi.vic.gov.au/metroplan> or telephone 1800 191 012.

³ See for instance, Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, *I am a Stranger, Will You Welcome Me?*, An issues paper, Collins Dove, 1991.

⁴ Information about these changes to The *Foreign Takeovers Act* (1975), now known as the *Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act* (1975) over time is available from the Foreign Investment Review Board in appendixes to its Annual General Reports, which are available on internet from http://www.firb.gov.au/policy_pubs/publications/AnnualReports/1999-2000/appd.htm Note that the Act is not confined to property investment but this seems to be a large part of its business.

⁵ Peter J. Rimmer, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.405 and p.418.

⁶ Peter J. Rimmer, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.417.

⁷ Except the Northern Territory and I have no data for Canberra.

⁸ Peter J. Rimmer, "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.419. Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, p.192 and p.205. In the late 1970s no Australian Bank would lend Alan Bond significant finance and he successfully took his business to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1978. In 1986 Kumagai Gumi joined Bond Corporation for a proposed \$300 million redevelopment to build Australia's tallest building in Sydney, which never went ahead.

⁹ Jan Macmillan, "Kumagai Gumi: buying into the Australian construction industry", Recorded 15 September 1985, Sydney, ABC talks programs, and cited by Peter J. Rimmer "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.419

¹⁰ For instance, the successful negotiation of the Adelaide Station Environs Redevelopment project involved legislation being passed by the State government in 1984 to alienate parkland

and remove railway land from planning and building controls. Peter J. Rimmer "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.412

¹¹ Peter J. Rimmer "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.*, p.421.

¹² See my earlier reference to the *Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act* and the Foreign Investments Review Board Annual General Newsletter, http://www.firb.gov.au/policy_pubs/publications/AnnualReports/1999-2000/appd.htm

¹³ Mike Douglass, "Transnational capital and urbanization on the Pacific Rim: an introduction," in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol 12, no.3, 1988, pp 346 and Peter J. Rimmer "Japanese construction contractors and the Australian States: another round of interstate rivalry", *op.cit.* p.419

¹⁴ See Isabelle Rey-Levebvre, "Bourse et habitat : le divorce", ("Stock Exchange and Housing : Divorce") *Le Monde* (Money section), 11-12 march 2001, p.2. This is an article about the failure of real-estate investment firms to take off in France.

¹⁵ Claudie Louvot, Division Comptes et études de l'industrie, "Le BTP depuis 1945", *Insee Première*, No. 472, Paris, July 1996. (4 pages).

¹⁶ Charles-Albert Michalet, "France", in Dunning, John, H., (Ed.), *Governments, Globalisation, and International Business*, OUP, 1997, p.330-333.

¹⁷ Maurice Dunlevy, "Top guns carve up the world", *The Australian*, 23/2/2001, (Property section), p.39 and 40.

¹⁸ The leading foreign construction firms in that area were the US (31.5%), Japan 26.5%, UK (12.6%), France (9.3%), West Germany (3.8%) and Italy (3.6%). Source: Lynn Crawford, Jason Kelleher and Lici Inge, *Construction Services and Export Growth: The Contribution of Immigrants*, Dept. Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, PO Box 25 Belconnen, ACT, 1996, p.35.

¹⁹ Source: Lynn Crawford, Jason Kelleher and Lici Inge, *Construction Services and Export Growth: The Contribution of Immigrants*, Dept. Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, PO Box 25 Belconnen, ACT, 1996, p.xix "Aid policy".

²⁰ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.* This work gives a detailed history of this time.

²¹ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, pp140.

²² Bolkus is widely felt to have promised Prime Minister Keating the immigrant vote if high immigration were maintained. Senator Barry Jones, who headed the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies Inquiry into Australia's Population Carrying Capacity, 1994, accused the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, headed by Bolkus, of being "client driven". He explained a perceived reluctance to deal with "immigration as a subset of population policy", rather than the reverse, to be due to "a pathetic short sightedness and self interest from people who have made their careers out of immigration". The source of these cited comments was a speech entitled, "Living in the Environment, Australia's Population Carrying Capacity Report", given by Barry Jones on Wednesday 27 March 1996 to students at the Health Sciences Faculty at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. The text I am quoting in this note was from a press release that accompanied the occasion.

²³ Terry Burke, Peter W. Newton, and Mary Ann Wulff, "Australia", *International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices*, *op.cit.*, pp. 722-762: p.725.

²⁴ See, for instance, Gray, John, *False Dawn*, *op.cit.*, pp.13-14 and Martin and Schumann in *The Global Trap*, p.109.

²⁵ Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict*, 1979, *op.cit.*, p. 119, citing Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*. (Freeman gives no further publication information.)

²⁶ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*, p.179-191

²⁷ The *Australian Encyclopedia*, Australian Geographic, gives an excellent summary of the worst massacres and chronicles the various discriminatory laws. Geoffrey, W. Dutton, *White on Black, the Australian Aboriginal portrayed in Art*, Macmillan, Australia, in association with the Art Gallery Board of South Australia, South Melbourne, Victoria, 1974, gives a social history of events and attitudes in fine art.

²⁸ "Settlers" or "invaders" depends technically on your perspective as to whether Australia was really a legal *terra nullis* or whether the Aborigines were the owners. If they never owned the land then all immigrants were "settlers" but if they did own the land and no treaty has been struck, then, arguably, all immigrants previously, now and in the future, are "invaders".

²⁹ Aborigines complain that they cannot get publicity for their objections to continued immigration. There are two very strong documents available on the issue of Aboriginal views on immigration and population increase but as far as I am aware they have never received public discussion. These were the Aboriginal Black Deaths in Custody Watch Committee (PO BOX 65 Broadway NSW 2007) Submission to the Australian Population 'Carrying Capacity' Enquiry', which was received by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies on 15 April 1994 and the ATSIC submission to the same enquiry (written by Lois O'Donoghue) in Volume 3 of the Submissions.

³⁰ The example of early trade ties with Britain was probably the model for this.

³¹ "Choice" has also become one of the mantras of economic rationalism, globalism and deregulation where these come into conflict with local protectionism.

³² Ernest Healey, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor during the 1980s and Early 1990s*, Doctoral thesis, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, April 1997.

³³ See Glossary Appendix for the meaning of this word.

³⁴ This was to develop into frank attempts to branch stack local branches with ethnic groups and to playing the ethnic vote and to what has been termed the "balkanisation" of labor wards. But that was later. See for instance, Paul Sheehan, *Among the Barbarians*, Random House, Australia, 1998, e.g. p.112, p. 222.

³⁵ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*, p.220. This was achieved by a reduction of the importance given to English competence plus a watering down of skills requirements.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p 254.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.276. The restrictive social norms were the result of the Blainey scandal, where an historian had criticised increasing the Asian component of the Australian population as unwise.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.270-272. "In 1985 unemployment was still high (7.9 per cent), but the 1982-83 recession had lifted and some Labor politicians, including Hawke himself, were more than willing to yield to the pressure ..." (p. 270). Citing Mark O'Connor, author of *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999, Betts relates that Tom Uren, minister for Urban and Regional

Affairs and Construction, described how “a combination of threats and inducements from certain business men with strong vested interests in population growth had worked upon certain ... susceptible members of the Australian Labor Party hierarchy.” (p.270).

³⁹ By Asia the Australian Bureau of Statistics refers to: South East Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and "other South East Asia"; North East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, "other North East Asia"; Southern Asia: India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, "other Southern Asia".

⁴⁰ K. Betts and Charles Price, "Immigration Control", *Australian Encyclopedia*, National Geographic, 1995, p.1726. In Victoria, for instance, 40,000 Chinese had immigrated by 1859. They were frequently in the majority on gold diggings and restrictive laws on Chinese immigration were brought in after riots on the Victorian goldfields. In 1878 the Australasian Steam Navigation Company attempted to replace crew with all Chinese for lesser wages. These developments led to Australia-wide moves to stop Chinese immigration, especially between 1888 and the 1890s, when restrictions were extended to other non-Europeans and incorporated into the *Federal Immigration Restriction Act 1901*.

⁴¹ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*, p. 272.

⁴² Here is another citation to the effect that immigration is seen to stimulate housing demand. "It is clear that immigration, through population growth, and translated into household formation, has had a profound impact on the demand for housing in Australia, especially in metropolitan Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. Builders' associations and real estate authorities are quick to point out the implication for building starts (mostly around the metropolitan periphery) if there is a significant change in the immigration intake. Source: Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy in *Immigration, Housing Costs and Population Dynamics in Sydney*, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, AGP, 1994, ISBN, 0 644 349107, p.8.

⁴³ Ernest Healy, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor 1983-1996*, PHD Thesis, Dept. Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, 1997, pp 48-59

⁴⁴ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, *op.cit.*, pp.135-136. "The most embarrassing disclosure in Connell's evidence to the Royal Commission concerned a party fund-raising lunch in June 1987, where the guest speaker had been Prime Minister Bob Hawke. The ALP was short of funds at the time, with a Federal election approaching. Connell claimed that Hawke had agreed to postpone a proposed tax on gold in return for donations totalling \$950,000. In a whip-round at the lunch Connell, Dempster and Bond had each put in \$250,000 and John Roberts \$200,000. In parliament, Hawke denied the allegation, but was later forced into an admission that he had discussed a gold tax before the lunch. This was the first of an embarrassing series of errors which led to Hawke's having to apologise twice to parliament in three days. While Hawke was trying to distance himself from WA Inc, it was revealed that in August 1987 - just two months after the notorious gold tax lunch - he had gone on a fishing trip with Bond, Connell and the Federal ALP's chief numbers man, Senator Graham Richardson. A video showing three of them huddled together in a small dinghy appeared on national television. Bob Hawke had managed the near impossible: for a while, his credibility looked lower than Connell's. The leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said: 'There is an enormous stench which has emerged out of the activities in Western Australia that has carried through to the very highest position in this government, to the Prime Minister.'

⁴⁵ Ernest Healy, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor 1983-1996*, PHD Thesis, Dept. Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, 1997, p.131, "The practical implications of our extensive exposure to the world this year [bicentennial year] are obvious. They have served to reinforce my Government's determination that the days of

Australia's inward-looking protectionist, somewhat xenophobic and unself-reliant world posture are past. In economic policy making, we are determined that our future lies with free and open competition, through multilateral trade, unfettered investment and especially through enmeshment with Asia and the Pacific....In our immigration policies, we are determined that the old White Australia policy remains dead and buried, and that selection procedures remain utterly free of discrimination on the basis of race." Cited from R. Hawke, "Looking towards the Pacific Century" (1988), in *The Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, 59 11, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, p.493

⁴⁶ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, *op.cit.*, p.280. The *Fitzgerald Report 1988* had recommended an intake of 150,000 immigrants in order to obtain a net intake of 125,000. From February 1987 to February 1988 Mick Young was the Minister for Immigration and planned high intake targets and, in fact, the net immigration for 1987 and 1988 was the highest since 1945.

Up until this time, between the 1958 Migration Act and the Migration Amendment Act 1989, which limited ministerial discretion, the Australian Immigration policy making political process had more resembled France's than Britain's. The way in which it was closer to the French was that it relied mostly on Ministerial discretion and could avoid public and parliamentary debate to a large degree. As increasing quantities of temporary visitors, however, successfully appealed to the Minister for Immigration for special treatment the process was perceived as unmanageable.

In 1989 a new Act limited ministerial discretion in the granting of visas in favor of the codification of policy as legal regulations. (C.Price & K. Betts, "Immigration", Australian Encyclopedia, National Geographic, 1995, p.1728). After 1989 issues were more likely to be debated in parliament and it is possible that debate, for instance on economic criteria, became more open.

⁴⁷ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, 1996 edition, printed 2000, pp.28-29.

⁴⁸ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy & Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, p 309

⁴⁹ Bolkus is widely felt to have promised Prime Minister Keating the immigrant vote if high immigration were maintained. Senator Barry Jones, who headed the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies Inquiry into Australia's Population Carrying Capacity, 1994, accused the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, headed by Bolkus, of being "client driven". He explained a perceived reluctance to deal with "immigration as a subset of population policy", rather than the reverse, to be due to "a pathetic short sightedness and self interest from people who have made their careers out of immigration". The source of these cited comments was a speech entitled, "Living in the Environment, Australia's Population Carrying Capacity Report", given by Barry Jones on Wednesday 27 March 1996 to students at the Health Sciences Faculty at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. The text I am quoting in this note was from a press release that accompanied the occasion.

⁵⁰ Lisa Allen, "Keating backs ban on developer donations", Australian Financial Review, 6/4/2001, p.10. The Lord Mayor of Sydney, Mr Frank Sartor, lent support to Keating's recent call for the real estate industry to be banned from giving political donations. Sartor added that "State governments are very concerned about investment levels and employment and they fear the flight of capital. They're very concerned to ensure that there is development happening because it's about jobs and economic activity. So it's a more complex issue than just saying developers are bad."

An angry property developer was reported to have commented that Sartor was just as keen as any other politician for donations. The New South Wales liberal Party fundraiser, Mr Michael Yabsley was also reported as having said, "Disclosure laws in Australia are among the toughest

in the world ... This is a brain wave from the sideline. Why wouldn't Keating have come up with this when he was a major beneficiary of those sorts of donations?" Mr Yabsley was reported in the article as having raised \$3.5 million from major companies, including property developers and builders such as Multiplex, Mirvac, Meriton and Stockland since the launch of the liberals' "Millenium Forum" in November 1999.

The article concluded with the remark that "most property developers" were "coy" about giving details of donations and went on to list a number of very small amounts.

Journalist Lisa Allen gave the following details: Lend Lease had "reported giving \$42,000 to the Federal ALP, \$62,500 to the Liberals and \$10,000 to the National Party." And, "according to the Australian Electoral Commission's website", Westfield Holdings', a shopping centre developer, had donated "\$10,705 to a Liberal organisation, Vapold, \$5000 to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) national office, and \$4000 to the New South Wales ALP."

Clearly these known official donations to political parties are not major sources of influence. More important, it appears, is the combined political pressure from the major land development and housing industries, plus the industries that benefit downstream. Members of Parliament and media owners with major land development holdings or other related investments, such as real-estate marketing, have information to barter, power to wield and interests to defend.

⁵¹ Ernest Healy, *The Political Economy of Immigration and Multicultural Policies under Labor 1983-1996*, PHD Thesis, Dept. Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, 1997, *passim*.

⁵² Paul Sheehan, *Among the Barbarians*, Random House, NSW, 1998.

⁵³ Leone Sandercock, *Property, Politics and Urban Planning*, *op.cit.*, e.g. pp 248-9

⁵⁴ Miles Lewis, *Suburban Backlash*, Bloomings Books, Victoria, Australia, 1999, p.239 Save Our Suburbs had its first official meeting On October 28,1997 in Malvern, Victoria.

⁵⁵ <http://www.ozdaily.com/sos/> This site gives data on State Branches (mainly based in Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide). I confirmed my impression of the Melbourne branches by talking with the State spokesman, who confirmed my impression that preservation of the natural environment and the push for population growth were not part of the Melbourne branches' concerns. Dr Tony Recsei, however, who is president of the Sydney Branch has spoken at conferences on the issue of immigrationism, population growth and their destruction of the natural environment. I cite his comments from an email addressed to myself: Subject: Re: Information sought and appended re housing/population/SOS

Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 17:12:28 +1000; From: "Tony Recsei" trecsei@zipworld.com.au To: "Sheila Newman" smnaesp@alphalink.com.au CC: "Gordon Hocking" ghock@ozemail.com.au:

"...Our contacts with the Victorian SOS are only fleeting, probably due to the differing laws applying in the two states. My impression from reading the book by Miles Lewis "Suburban Backlash" (Bloomings Books 1999) is that you are correct - SOS in Victoria concentrates more on built form than in bushland and biodiversity whereas Save Our Sydney Suburbs has a great concern for the retention of natural resources such as bushland and biodiversity. Kind regards, Tony Recsei"

The chronicler of the SOS movement, Miles Lewis, author of *Suburban Backlash*, Bloomings Books, Victoria, 1999, clearly has a wider historical and demographic focus.

Because the groups have linked nationally, at least by internet, there is some possibility that they could be able to take on a national planning perspective, however there is no indication that this is about to happen.

⁵⁶ Bob Birrell, "Immigration on the Rise: 2001-2001 Migration Program.", *People and Place*, Vol.9., No.2., Monash University, Australia, June 2001, pp.21-28. Preferences for permanent immigration would be shown to applicants who had studied for their degrees in Australian academic institutions, if their qualifications were defined among those skills in short supply. Because of the dominance of Asians as foreign students in Australian universities, combined with the tendency for high family reunion trends among immigrants from that region, especially given recent economic and political turmoil, this increased the chances of chain immigration.

⁵⁷ *Government Response to the Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies, Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation – Two Ecologies*, 1999. This was a government issued paper, with no publication or printing details, but was available on request from members of parliament. (Obviously the initial report had been made under the Keating Labor government, so the tag of 'tardiness' should by right mostly be borne by that government. Surprisingly this report foreshadowed extending family reunion in rural regions to first cousins and grandchildren.)

"The Working Party on Regional Migration, established by the Ministerial Council of immigration and Multicultural Affairs at its May 1996 meeting, examined ways to encourage a higher proportion of migrants to settle in regional Australia and in States/Territories seeking increased levels of skilled migration.

It said that the Working Party had reported to Ministers in December 1996 and that a "range of State/Territory specific migration mechanisms [had] been developed". These included the creation of the skill matching database as a tool for linking potential migrants to identified skill needs in regional Australia and the expansion of the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). This scheme enables employers in regional Australia to nominate overseas personnel for permanent entry to Australia where they are unable to recruit suitable skilled personnel through the local market. In addition there was a new category, the Regional Established Business in Australia, where temporary entrants were able to apply to become permanent immigrants if they had successfully established a business in a designated area of Australia. Furthermore, the introduction of the Regional Linked category allowed for the sponsorship of skilled relatives, **including first cousins and grandchildren**, to designated areas of Australia. Finally another category had been introduced, the State/Territory Nominated Independent (STNI) scheme, which provides States and Territories with the opportunity to nominate potential migrants with skills that are in high demand in their jurisdiction.

On the face of things this could result in new chain immigration. There is nothing to stop new immigrants from moving to the cities, sooner or later. It will be interesting to see if this regional *distant* family reunion is any different.

⁵⁸ "Humanitarian Program (Onshore), 'The Migration Program', *Population Flows: Immigration Aspects*, Economic and Environment Section, DIMA, 1999, 30 July. This was in the case of Kosovar asylum seekers.

⁵⁹ "With net immigration of 106,000 in 1997-98, and the net natural increase in population currently around 120,000 per annum, our population is increasing by almost a quarter of a million people a year", Senator Minchin said. "This gives us the fastest growing population in the developed world. Yet no matter the scale of our immigration program, the size of our

domestic market pales in comparison with the international one. Whether our domestic market is 20 million, or even 50% greater at 30 million, that is nothing compared to the global market of, since last Tuesday, over 6 billion people". ...⁵⁹

⁶⁰ Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, pp 181-183.

⁶¹ Ian Manning, "Policies: Past and Present", Chapter 2, pp10-32, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, Melbourne, 1998, p14.

⁶² Source: Commonwealth Securities, "Comsec", News and Research, "XDC- Dev & Contractor, www.comsec.com.au/info_FrameSet.asp : price and volume "Exponential Moving Average", 1st 11, period of time: one year.

⁶³ *Australian Financial Review*, Monday 2 April, 2001, p. 26, Mathew Chandler, "Victorian housing industry thrives on doubled grant".

⁶⁴ K. Betts, *The Great Divide, op.cit.*, p.220. This was achieved by a reduction of the importance given to English competence plus a watering down of skills requirements.

⁶⁵ Such as the Save Our Suburbs (SOS) movement.

⁶⁶ The concept measured with housing prices used factors in land price as an important part of the total housing package. To a great extent we are talking about land prices in Australia when we are discussing housing costs.

⁶⁷ By "wider and deeper" I mean a market with more numerous participants who have a greater range of resources with which to buy or to invest. For instance, such a market might take in nationals and residents of any country in the world. Some of these potential buyers might have access to more valuable currencies than the Australian dollar - for instance US dollars, Swiss francs or German marks. In comparison with the number of very rich people in Australia who wish to buy landed properties in Australia, the number of very rich people in the world who might wish to do so is potentially much greater.

⁶⁸ "Expansion" in addition to population being accommodated by geographical or infrastructure consolidation. Obviously all population growth, unless accompanied by a manifest drop in standard of living (as measured by GDP per capita) will entail an intensification, and, usually, geographical expansion over a greater area of land, of economic activity and infrastructure. This economic activity and infrastructure will include things like roads and mines and implementation of new technology to cope with pollution and greater drawdown on natural resources like soil, water, fisheries and forests. This greater drawdown does not necessarily imply that additions to population will personally directly consume more water, fish, wood, soil. What it does mean is that, in order for the economy to provide more businesses, services and jobs for the growing population, economic activity will need to intensify and expand.

⁶⁹ Joseph Comby, *La Boucle est bouclée*, p.4. *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000. Available on the internet at <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Granelle.htm>

⁷⁰ J.M.Bourke, "Social and Economic Aspects of Government Housing" in Jill Roe, Ed., *Social Policy in Australia, Some Perspectives, 1901-1975*, Cassell Australia Ltd., 1976, pp277-283. In 1943 the Chifley Commonwealth Government created the Housing Commission under National Security Regulations to investigate the existing situation and needs for the future in the immediate post-war period. The Commission reported that housing would be a vital aspect of effective regional and town planning and that 'The Commonwealth Government should take an

active part in housing'. (p.279). Subsequently the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement came about in 1945. In this the Commonwealth government agreed "to provide State Governments with funds for housing purposes repayable over a period of 53 years at an interest rate of 3 per cent. The Commonwealth further agreed to bear 3/5 of any possible financial losses and provision was made for families with low incomes to be granted rebates on rental. Things began to change, however, under the Menzies government. (19/12/49-26/1/66) When the first 10-year agreement expired, a new agreement for a period of only five years was signed in 1956. The new agreement, however, made no provision for the continuation of a rental rebate scheme, but increased the interest rate on moneys loaned to the State for housing purposes from 3 % to 4%." The 1956 CSHA agreement redirected 30% of funds that had been destined for public housing into strategies to assist the public tenants buying the houses they were renting.⁷⁰

⁷¹ Source: Housing Industry Association, *CBA/HIA Housing Affordability Index* tables and *Housing Industry Association Economic Research: Housing Affordability Index: Methodology and Data Source*, 15 April 2001.

⁷² Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy in *Immigration, Housing Costs and Population Dynamics in Sydney*, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, AGP, 1994, ISBN, 0 644 349107, p.76 concludes that "Changing patterns of foreign investment in residential property and Sydney's incorporation in the 'Pacific Rim' economic dynamism via investment in business, professions and tourism were almost certainly influential [on Sydney's rising dwelling prices].

Trevor Sykes relates: "At one of the parties Bond derided a table of WA Liberals, saying they had always helped overseas investors in the state but not the local entrepreneurs. Under Labor, Bond claimed, entrepreneurs such as himself would be given the mandate for any new projects. Then overseas capital would be invited to finance the projects and the local entrepreneurs would wind up with a free ride. The Liberals laughed, but the formula Bond enunciated was almost exactly what would happen." Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, Second Edition, 2000, p.71. The date of this would have been after September in 1983.

⁷³ Jean-Jacques Grenelle, *Où en est la promotion immobilière privée?*, p.4. Jean-Jacques Grenelle is an economics professor at the University of Paris XII, Val de Marne, France. And Joseph Comby, *La Boucle est bouclée*, p.4. Both these articles are from *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000 and are available on the internet at <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Grenelle.htm>

⁷⁴ Figure 8.1, which is for Melbourne only, shows the peak in 1989, possibly reflecting the milder immigration curve.

⁷⁵ Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174. Terry Burke, explains that "Threshold Income is the income required to afford a median priced house taking into account prevailing interest rates and lending conditions (for example, a 25% deposit on a loan to value ratio of 75%). The graph above shows the threshold income in 1990 Australian dollars required to consume a median priced house in Melbourne from 1972-1995."

⁷⁶ The main sources for this section were David Hayward in *Urban policy and Research* Vol 14. No.1 1996, "The Reluctant Landlord", and Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998

⁷⁷ David Hayward in *Urban policy and Research* Vol 14. No.1 1996, "The Reluctant Landlord", p. 23.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174.

⁸⁰ *Collins English Dictionary*, 1992, "inflation".

⁸¹ Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", *op.cit.*, Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 174.

⁸² Terry Burke, citing Raskall, P: *Who gets What Where? Spatial Inequality between and Within Australian Cities*, paper prepared for the Seminar on Spatial Inequality, Commonwealth Department of Housing and Regional Development, Canberra, 1991, in Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p. 169.

⁸³ Something to take into consideration is that a relatively high number of people in Sydney live in medium density dwellings, which partly enables them to overcome effects of high land prices. Nevertheless, this high density living could be said to be an effect of high land prices.

⁸⁴ See my appendix "House Prices and Affordability in Australia" for graphs of interest rates and other affordability components.

⁸⁵ Anything that increases the formation of new households seeking new premises increases demand. Divorce and affluence (the latter with unmarried children seeking independence in housing, or married couples seeking housing independent of their parents) are well known drivers of new household formation and hallmarks of post second world war lifestyle in western democracies.

⁸⁶ See the ABS *Australian Demographic Statistics* series, Catalogue No. 3101.1 and see also my "Statistical Appendix".

⁸⁷ Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, *op.cit.*, pp.387-388. As we know, Whitlam conducted quite a lot of his campaign and constructed subsequent policies on the basis of attempting to combat land speculation. He deplored the situation where in 1973 land prices had increased by "up to 46% in Melbourne and Adelaide and by 34% in Sydney". He attributed this to many years of immigration, combined with land speculation.

⁸⁸ Shane Nugent, "Why Sydney Keeps Growing – Trends in Population Distribution in New South Wales, 1991-1996", *People and Place*, vol.6, no.4, Monash University, Australia, pp 24-32.

⁸⁹ Junankar, P.N., Pope, D., Kapuscinski, C., Ma, W.& Mudd, W.1993, *Recent Immigrants and Housing*, AGPS, Canberra.

⁹⁰ Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy in *Immigration, Housing Costs and Population Dynamics in Sydney*, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, AGP, 1994, ISBN, 0 644 349107,

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.77. The affordability measure was BIS Shrapnel (the same used by Terry Burke in Fig. 8.2 this thesis.)

⁹² *Ibid*, p.11. "It is of interest here that Perth, the metropolitan area which relatively experienced immigration second only to Sydney during this period, had a low rate of increase in real house prices and was experiencing strong net internal migration gains as well.

⁹³ The reason for my preferring such a simple measure is given later in this chapter, but it boils down to comparability; I chose a measure as close as possible to the measure used by the French source I had access to for the period.

⁹⁴ Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy in *Immigration, Housing Costs and Population Dynamics in Sydney, op.cit.*, p.11. "Data Sources: Censuses: Demography: The 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991 Censuses are the primary sources for the study."

⁹⁵ The series I have used is the CBA/HIA "Affordability Index".

⁹⁶ There are signs that prices are rising again in the context of high immigration, and foreign buyers and with the impetus of Howard's doubling of grants for new home buyers. See further on.

⁹⁷ The race to beat the introduction of General Sales Tax is a complicating factor here and a probable cause of inflation.

⁹⁸ Shane Nugent, "Why Sydney Keeps Growing – Trends in Population Distribution in New South Wales, 1991-1996", *People and Place*, Monash University, Australia, Vol.6, no.4, pp 24-32. Shane Nugent suggests that the interstate outflow of people from Sydney is affected by the international inflow to Sydney. He believes this may be related to housing prices rising in response to demand relative to supply as affected by international immigration. He suggests that in recent years when immigration was lower (he is using Australian Demographic Statistics for June 1997 and probably Net Overseas Immigration as a measure, which is different from mine), housing prices fell and people from other States were more likely to go to Sydney. He speaks of a "displacement effect, whereby increased overseas migration 'pushes' more people to leave Sydney. Demand pressures on housing costs may be a factor." Writing in 1998 using ABS data from June 1997, about the impact of housing costs, he says, "There were significant increases in housing costs in Sydney in the late 1980s. This may have either forced some people out of Sydney due to lack of affordable housing and/or encouraged some to profit from selling their Sydney house to move elsewhere for lifestyle reasons. House price increases in Sydney in the 1990s have generally been much slower."(p.32).

⁹⁹ Ian Burnley and Peter Murphy in *Immigration, Housing Costs and Population Dynamics in Sydney, op.cit.*, p.76. "Changing patterns of foreign investment in residential property and Sydney's incorporation in the 'Pacific Rim' economic dynamism via investment in business, professions and tourism were almost certainly influential. How such linkages affect housing costs requires further investigation."

¹⁰⁰ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders, op.cit.*, p.189: "Throughout history, corporate cowboys have been attractive to lending institutions because they are prepared to pay whatever price is necessary to get money. Bond was prepared not only to pay the top going rate for money but to pay establishment and other fees as well. The interest and fees boosted the lender's revenue spectacularly and won plaudits for its manager. In fact, the fees and interest were often not paid but merely book entries. Let us say a speculator borrowed £100,000 at 12% for one year and incurred £5000 in fees. The interest and fees could simply be added on to the principal to make a total debt of £117,000 to be repaid in twelve months. Meanwhile the finance company had booked £17,000 to its own revenue. If the speculator were snowballing his business the interest and fees might never be paid, but be continually rolled up into larger and larger loans while the finance company reported larger and larger revenues and profits. If the speculator then went bust, these revenues would turn out to be phantoms and would have to be written off by the finance company's accounts."

¹⁰¹ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, 1996 edition, Printed 2000, p. 26: [After Black Tuesday in October 1987 the Reserve Bank of Australia eased interest rates and pumped money into the system in order to allay panic] "An amazing number of cowboys and their bankers failed to recognise that the game had changed. Alan Bond did three of his biggest and worst deals - the takeovers of Heileman and Bell Group and the attempted takeover of Lonrho - after October 1987. Many of the cowboys plunged into the commercial property market, oblivious to the lesson of history that a share market collapse is usually followed a year or two later by a property collapse. The financiers were equally blind. Tricontinental and the State Bank of South Australia were still making bad loans in 1988 and even 1989."

¹⁰² Terry Burke, David Hayward, *Housing Past, Melbourne's Housing Futures*, Swinburne Institute for Social Research, 1 November 2000, p.16.

¹⁰³ Source: Commonwealth Securities, ComSec, XDC - DEV & CONTRACTOR, Time Period 1 decade, Price and volume indicators "Exponential moving average", http://www.comsec.com.au/Info_FrameSet.asp, 19/03/01. These prices cannot be explained by overseas exports, which comprise only approximately 5% of the industry according to Phil Ruthven's business information service, Ibis International, at <http://www.ibisworld.com.au/>. This information was free for a limited period of time when I accessed it in March 2001

¹⁰⁴ Australian Financial Review, Friday 6 April, 2001, p.3, Susannah Petty, "Expatriates spur on \$1m-plus house sales". Susannah Petty, wrote that the dramatic dive in the Australia dollar had boosted offshore interest in local property to "new highs, with sales to expatriates and foreigners contributing up to 30 per cent of agencies' revenue in recent months." She added that this no doubt accounted in part for the "strong, often extraordinary, prices around the country, contradicting some analysts' predictions of a sharp downturn." She reported that these prices had stimulated Asian interest in Australian property, "with several agencies renewing ties in the region." In the previous week, "premium property specialist", Belle property, had formed an agreement with a Hong Kong office to "target Australian expatriates hunting for investments of, typically, \$1 million or more."

¹⁰⁵ See, for instance, ABS, Australian Household Expenditure Survey (HES), 4182.0, 1999, Table 16, "Capital City Households: Income and housing costs by tenure."

¹⁰⁶ See Isabelle Rey-Levebvre, "Bourse et habitat : le divorce", ("Stock Exchange and Housing : Divorce") *Le Monde* (Money section), 11-12 march 2001, p.2. This is an article about the failure of real-estate investment firms to take off in France.

¹⁰⁷ Jean-Jacques Granelle, "Où en est la promotion immobilière privée?", *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000 <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Granelle.htm>, p.5

¹⁰⁸ The illustration above comes from *L'Observateur de l'Immobilier*, No. 43, paris, 1999. The original data source is "Marché immobilier des notaires" (Notaries' property market) and INSEE *Annuaire statistique de la France*, ed. 2001. There was a further article in *Le Monde* on 3/3/2001, which commented on a similar graph. (*Le Monde* on 3/3/2001, "Evolution du prix du metre carré apres correction de celle des revenus.") The text reads: "*The price per meter squared of housing has remained within the parameters of 104 and 81 units, after correction for the evolution of disposable household revenue (which is equivalent to the total of all revenues, salaries, inheritances and all social welfare payments after deduction of taxes.) The recent rise hardly compensates the fall between 1991 and 1998.*"

¹⁰⁹ The leading foreign construction firms in that area were the US (31.5%), Japan 26.5%, UK (12.6%), France (9.3%), West Germany (3.8%) and Italy (3.6%). Source: Lynn Crawford,

Jason Kelleher and Lici Inge, *Construction Services and Export Growth: The Contribution of Immigrants*, Dept. Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, PO Box 25 Belconnen, ACT, 1996, p.35.

¹¹⁰ Joseph Comby, *La Boucle est bouclée*, p.1. Articles are available on the internet at <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Granelle.htm> *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000 Comby says that this was due in part to the opening up of the economy from 1992. See also Michelet, Charles-Albert, in "France", in Dunning, John, H., (Ed.), *Governments, Globalization, and International Business*, OUP, 1997, pp.313-334, p. 330: "First of all, France's foreign-investment control regulations have been substantially relaxed. The decree of 11 February 1992 extended the very liberal regime applied to foreign investments originating in the EU to the vast majority of foreign investments (those amounting to less than FF 50 million and relating to French enterprises with a turnover of less than FF 500 million)."

¹¹¹ Correspondence with Joseph Comby, Email dated 3 July 2001, joseph.comby@wanadoo.fr, "Re: Questions sur l'aménagement et logement etc.", "Comme vous je pense que le système français est sans doute moins "spéculatif": le taux de rotation de l'immobilier est plus lent, la fiscalité sur les mutations est plus forte..." ("Like you I think that the French system is without doubt less 'speculative': the real estate cycle rate is slower and taxes on property sales are greater...)Comby is the Chief Editor of *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, [Association for Real Estate Studies] 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000

¹¹² Joseph Comby, *La Boucle est bouclée*, p.2. Available on the internet at <http://www.foncier.org/articles/75/75Granelle.htm> *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000. Comby writes "That the speculative bubble was able to reach such proportions in Paris and that the banks were able to make such mistakes, it is precisely because of the novelty of this phenomenon in France. In Anglo-saxon countries where people are used to such property market speculations, there was not the same behaviour." (My translation).

¹¹³ Jean-Jacques Granelle, "Où en est la promotion immobilière privée", *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000 <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Granelle.htm>

¹¹⁴ Email dated 10/5/2001 from Prof Ronsin of the University of Bourgogne, Dijon, Department of French Contemporary History, in response to my query about the rise and fall in prices over the 1990s. French speculators need to sell fast in order to avoid extra taxes and to profit from price rises before the market self corrects. Their idea is to sell before they have even paid for their purchase, preferably within three months. At such times they aim to absorb the tax on unearned profits by adding it onto the price.

¹¹⁵ Joseph Comby, *La Boucle est bouclée*, p.2. Available on the internet at <http://www.foncier.org/articles/78/78Granelle.htm> *Etudes Foncières*, L'Association des études foncières, 7 avenue de la République, 75011, Paris, Tel. 33 156 982000.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER NINE

¹ In fact this could be described as a major difference between the Western States of the Old World that was once part of the Roman Empire and the New English Speaking World.

² *Mechanisms of Immigration Control, A comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, Eds. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar, Berg, Oxford and New York, 1999: Hans van Amersfoort, "Migration control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands", pp.135-167.

³ Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, *Population Flows, Immigration Aspects*, December 1999, p. 53. "Migrants are heavily represented in manufacturing, making up 31.8 % of the workers. 28.2% of workers in property and business services are also migrants."

⁴ See Chapter Six on the ratification in 1973 of the *European Convention Safeguarding Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties* of 4 November 1950 and the delaying of access to relevant tribunals until 1981.

⁵ See for instance Jacques Dupâquier (Ed.), *Morales et politiques de l'immigration*, Politique d'aujourd'hui, PUF, 1998. This is the edited record of conference papers and discussions at a conference held in Paris 15 October 1997. As well as some lively discussions including demographer, Michèle Tribalat and statistician, André Lebon, about the problems of collecting reliable immigration statistics, participants included a number of lay activists, including, for instance, René Gautier of Club Renaissance 95, who participated in three "Round Tables", pp. 84-156.

⁶ In my thesis, due to the pressure to ration words and therefore to leave some issues out, I did not go into the concept of exporting labor intensive industries to countries with low wages. This was however a component of French industry restructuring post oil shock.

⁷ Perhaps Australia sees its mineral wealth as a cash cow. The prospect of world energy shortages may not be feared by business so much as is perceived as likely to bring about concentrated benefits in trade. Perhaps the thought of profit overshadows attention to diffuse costs that will affect the general population as prices go up. (This will be the subject of further study by myself.)

⁸ André Lebon, *Immigration et Présence Etrangère en France 1997/1998*, La Documentation Française, 1998, p.8.

⁹ Mark J Miller, *Employer Sanctions in France*, A research paper from the University of Delaware in 1995, published by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 2430 E Street NW, South Building, Washington, DC 20037, 202-776-8400.

¹⁰ GISTI, *Plein Droit no.12*, Nov. 1990, "Le Droit de vivre en famille", "Un Droit ou une tolérance?". (Also available on the net at <http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/12/droit.html>) : "En dépit des nombreuses réserves émises par les praticiens et experts qui furent consultés, le rapport de la mission parlementaire d'information (rapport Marchand, mai 1990) a retenu, dans sa proposition no.10, le principe du maintien strict de l'actuelle réglementation en matière de regroupement familial et, en particulier, les conditions draconiennes concernant le logement, sous prétexte que "ce n'est pas rendre service aux familles immigrées que de favoriser leur réunification dans des conditions de précarité ou d'insalubrité telles que leurs chances d'intégration seront presque irrémédiablement compromises" ..." Cette différence de considération permet à l'administration d'utiliser comme argument la crise du logement - dont les pouvoirs publics sont largement responsables - pour faire obstacle au regroupement familial; lequel, par ailleurs, n'est réglementairement autorisé, de manière limitative, que pour le conjoint et les enfants mineurs...."

The above paragraphs describe a parliamentary report that defended the suitable housing requirement for family reunion. The author of this article criticises the report and the government for cynically abusing the "housing crisis" to discriminate against the right of immigrants to a family life.

¹¹ In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joshep Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147, was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March.

Many anglophone sources unquestioningly supported the UN study as a proposal, including *The Economist*, March 11, 2000 and Peter Ford, *The Christian Science Monitor* January 21, 2000, and (Reuters Press Release): "Ageing, shrinking populations face stark challenges UN population," by Robert Holloway, reported on Australian SBS 9.30PM News 21/3/00.,

The report was not much attended to in the French press, but where it was, it was greeted with some amazement. See Afsané Bassir Pour and Sylvain Cypel, "L'Europe aurait besoin de 159 millions d'immigrés d'ici à 2025", *Le Monde*, Thursday 6 January, 2000.

The reaction of the few French demographers who commented was to criticize its mathematics and to ridicule its concepts. See Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000 and Hervé Lebras "Les Mauvais calculs de l'ONU", *Rebonds*, 29 March 2000.

¹² At Prime Minister Jospin's request Jean-Michel Charpin, the Minister for Planning, oversaw a government enquiry into solutions for population aging and the result was *The Future of Our Pensions (L'Avenir de nos retraites)*, April 1999. This was available in July 2000 electronically from the French government website "La Documentation Française", <http://www.ladocfrancaise.gouv.fr/>. This is the French Government printer and publisher.

¹³ See Chapter Six.

¹⁴ To find these categories see Commonwealth Securities Limited net site on http://www.comsec.com.au/Info_FrameSet.asp.

¹⁵ The Lord Mayor of Sydney evoked the complexity of the political pressures in Lisa Allen, "Keating backs ban on developer donations", *Australian Financial Review*, 6/4/2001, p.10. Lending his support to Keating's recent call for the real estate industry to be banned from giving political donations, Mr Frank Sartor explained that "State governments are very concerned about investment levels and employment and they fear the flight of capital. They're very concerned to ensure that there is development happening because it's about jobs and economic activity. So it's a more complex issue than just saying developers are bad."

¹⁶ Terry Burke, David Haward, *Housing Past, Melbourne's Housing Futures*, Swinburne Institute of Social Research, 1 November 2000, pp 59-61. Here the authors criticise the practise of looking at average incomes in relation to housing affordability and examine the capacity of the market to provide for low income earners. "The table revealst he marked affordability constranints in 1999. Certainly, for lower income families who are not already home owners, the choice of stock is severely limited, which shows why they will gravitate to the areas (a few outer suburbs) where such stock is available. Households with an income 75 per cent of average earnings only have available to them 10 per cent of the available stock ..." The authors do mention foreign investment but do not consider the impact of overseas and foreign home buyers on the market.

¹⁷ Terry Burke, "Housing and Poverty", Chapter 8, pp.165-185, Eds. Ruth Fincher and John Nieuwenhuysen, *Australian Poverty: Then and Now*, MUP, 1998, p.174-175. "...Home purchase, as indicated earlier, is a hedge against poverty in old age. Most Australians are acutely aware that any hardship associated with ownership is likely to disappear as mortgage payments reduce over time."

¹⁸ This growing social divide has been mentioned by a number of authors, for instance, Katharine Betts in *The Great Divide*, *op.cit*.

¹⁹ Susannah Petty, "Planners say Policy void needs Filling", *Australian Financial Review*, 22/6/2001.

²⁰ Lenore Taylor, "Federal Government throws some carrots into pot of salty water", *The Australian Financial Review*, 11/10/2000, p.5. George Megalogenis, "Salt Tide Swamps Howard's Memory" Staff Reporters, "Premiers haggle over detail" (In a feature page on "The Fight Against Salinity"), *The Australian*, 11/10/2000, p.6.

²¹ D.Burtenshaw, M.Bateman and G.J.Ashworth, *The City in West Europe*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, Toronto, 1981, p.ix. These writers on urban planning have observed that "Assumptions and models derived from North American studies are not only simplistic in the European context, but at times quite erroneous. Cities in West Europe remain distinct, just as their approaches to planning remain distinct." This comment was made about writers on urban planning, but could apply to other comparative sociological studies of Europe.

APPENDIX 1.

GLOSSARY

Algerian : used to designate Algerian nationals before 1946 and after 1962, and designating French persons from the French overseas territory "Algeria" from 1946-1962.

Algerian Moslem : used to designate persons from Algeria who were not of French colonial stock but who may have been of French nationality. It is used to make an ethnic distinction between French persons who went to Algeria as part of the French colonising process and their children, whether born in Algeria or elsewhere, from persons of other origins in Algeria.

Algeria : In my thesis, until 1962, Algeria is a part of non-metropolitan France, i.e. located outside the European continent. After 1962 Algeria is an independent country.

Bidonville : The French word for slum, used to designate shanty towns inhabited mainly by immigrants

Boosterism : is a particularly Australian word for growthism (see below) and seems to have both demographic and economic connotations and to imply a particularly energetic kind of growthism.

CIMADE: Comite Inter-Mouvements Aupres Des Evacues. "Committee to co-ordinate movements for Evacuees", is the closest I can come to a translation. CIMADE also describes itself as "Service oecumenique d'entraide" (Ecumenical Service of Mutual Aid). CIMADE is an organisation formed for the assistance of immigrants and it is financed through donations and receives some government funding. It has locations at French international airports and employs a team of lawyers specially to help illegal immigrants and unsuccessful applicants for visa renewal or asylum to avoid deportation. Its origins date to the 1930s. It has several addresses, of which the main one is 176 rue de Grenelle, 75007, Paris. The email address is renseignements@cimade.org and the main internet address is <http://www.cimade.org>.

Colbertiste : The adjective "Colbertiste" derives from the protectionist economic management policies of the mercantilist Finance Minister, Colbert (1619-1683), who is popularly credited with the repair of the French economy after the excesses of Louis XIV. Colbert's protectionist ideas preceded Malthus's by more than a century and differed mainly in the value Colbert assigned to population building for national defence purposes.

Authors writing about France's economy generally tend to classify it as **protectionist**.¹ Colbert in France and Cromwell in Britain have been described as the "chief practical representatives" of the mercantile system.' Although Malthus would have acknowledged the need to provide labor to colonies in order to exploit them, Colbert went to extraordinary pronatalist lengths - fining the parents of unmarried men and

women of a certain age, offering bounties to persons bearing more than 10 children in the colonies, and forcing nubile young women in French prisons to emigrate to the colonies.' In fact, compared to the British, the French had persistent problems populating their colonies. Whereas Britain felt the need to rid herself of "excess population" by sending it to the colonies, France's population size was distressingly small, having remained around 20 millions for several centuries, and the French were reluctant to **emigrate**.⁴

Popular history holds Colbert's policies virtually responsible for France becoming a country of superior and specialised manufactures. It also holds **him** responsible for the failure of the colonies and numerous other perceived negative economic traits.

Colbertiste/Mathusian : (For "Malthusian" see below.) In my thesis I use these terms somewhat interchangeably and occasionally together, depending on what I am highlighting. Malthus and Colbert had similar protectionist economic philosophies in common, but since Colbert preceded Malthus and was far more influential in France, it sometimes makes more sense to describe Malthusian characteristics as "**Colbertiste**", especially when referring to latter day colonial-like behavior in acquiring oil assets. "**Colbertisme**" is however, not a very accessible term in English. Furthermore, France has lost the population building quality of Colbertiste economics, and has become rather Malthusian with regard to demographics and economy. So, when referring to low birth-rate, low immigration aspects of France's demographic policies in conjunction with energy conservation, "Malthusian" is more appropriate. Similarly "Malthusianism" is the correct expression to use as an opposite for "cornucopianism".

Confederation nationale du patronat français (CNPF) : The CNPF is the National Federation of French Employers.

Cornucopianism : This is an expression used to denote a philosophy that the world and nature are infinitely abundant and is an opposite of demographic Malthusianism.

European Economic Community (EEC) : The Treaty of Rome March 1957, effective January 1958, effectively created the European Economic Community (EEC) and permitted visa free travel to citizens of the EEC. The original signatories were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and West Germany. The United Kingdom and Denmark were added in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. For the purposes of this thesis, EEC refers to a number of separate countries which share similar interests and are co-signatories to a number of treaties. The countries referred to by the term EEC differ depending on the year.

European Union (EU) : The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 made the European Economic Community into the European Union. In 1992 this included France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In 1994 Austria, Finland and Switzerland were added. Features of the European Union include: A statute of European Citizenship, which guarantees free circulation to citizens of the EU; the right to run for office and to vote in local municipal elections in the member countries; the right to diplomatic and consular protection by the representatives of any EU state that has presence in a country where the specific EU state the person is a citizen of does not have representation. The

EU, for the purposes of this thesis, is a more closely bound form of the old EEC, to which the concept of overall citizenship has been added. The EU is in several ways more like one country with a number of states within it, whereas the EEC was several countries with a strong alliance. Because the EU came after the EEC and eventually contained more countries, it is sometimes more convenient in my thesis to refer to the EU in order to evoke all possible countries to date.

DIMA: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Australia).

"Immigration Department" or "Department of Immigration" used to designate DIMA or other earlier departments occupied with immigration in Australia, which had different names.

Dirigiste : Indicates a form of government characterised by State control over economic and social matters.

DOM-TOMS and other Overseas French Possessions : The DOM TOMS (Departements d'outre-mer) refer to the French Overseas territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana, and Reunion. Immigration from these countries is internal, not overseas, immigration. Other French overseas possessions are the "Collectivites territoriales": Mayotte and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, and the "Territoires d'outre-mer": French Polynesia, Austral and Antarctic French possessions, New Caledonia and Wallis and Fortuna Islands.

ESSS : English-speaking settler states : the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

French colonial : French persons who went to Algeria as part of the French colonising process and their children, whether born in Algeria or elsewhere

Growthism : At times populationism is interchangeable with "growthism" (another word which may be new to some) but this word frequently also implies economic growthism.

GISTI : Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) – The Group for Information and Support for Immigrants, 3, Villa Marces 75011, Paris.

HLM : Habitation a loyer modéré Low rental public housing - usually consisting of high rise appartnents.

Immigrationism : is fairly self-explanatory, I think, and refers to a philosophy, attitude or policy encouraging high immigration. "Immigrationism" and "populationism" are two useful terms I borrowed from the French immigrationnisme and populationnisme. I have dropped the typical French double 'n' when I have spelled them in English. An "immigrationist" is a person with a philosophy, attitude, etc. of immigrationism.

INSEE : L'Institut national des études économiques - National Institute of Economic Studies. Also spelled "Insee" in France.

INED : Institut national des études démographiques - National Institute of Demographic Studies. Also spelled "Ined" in France.

ONI : Office Nationale des Immigrations - National Office of Immigration. On 2 November 1945 the National Immigration Office (*Office nationale de l'immigration* - ONI) was appointed by law to be the exclusive recruiting agency for immigrant workers of all nationalities, whatever their occupations or other characteristics.'

OMI : Office des Migrations internationales - Office of International Migration - the new name for ONI from 1987.⁶

OFPRA : Office Française pour réfugiés et apatrides - French Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons

Malthusian : Malthus was primarily an economist and his works on profit and the corn laws (about importing versus self sufficiency, or, as we know it, liberal economics versus protectionism) are complimented by his demographic work. We need to remember that his arguments were conceived in the context of an agricultural economy where industrial manufacturing was only just beginning to be experienced as a political force. In his essay, *Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, Malthus made the point strongly that it was only where profits were considerable on agricultural product, that agriculture would expand into marginal lands. (He linked expansion into marginal lands with eventual increases in production.) Where profit was low, the cost of extending agriculture was too high. Because of this relationship, farmers tended to concentrate production into the most high yielding areas of their properties. Malthus thought that it was desirable to encourage farmers to make more of their land productive. In his opinion, to get them to expand their productive area required some amount of protectionism and the encouragement of national self sufficiency, with government able to oversee the security of the production of staples.

Such a strategy was designed for the purpose of assuring a dependable market for agriculturists, so that they would keep producing and expanding. Ensuring agricultural production meant that food and other necessities of life provided through agriculture would be available to citizens. Efficient agriculture meant that society could raise itself above mere subsistence. Malthus was not against external trade or overseas expansion (which in those days included colonisation). The demographic part of his theory was that the population of a nation neither outstrip its food and staple resources nor become too numerous to be in a position to bargain for a living wage, nor too small to make farming too expensive for it to be worthwhile to landowners. The reason that staples should not be imported was that this might drive down prices for agricultural profit and thus cause a reduction in cultivated land. Then, if there was a war or the currency of a country fell in value, either of these things might make it impossible for the people of the nation to buy staples on an international market. If farmers had also stopped producing or increasingly restricted production to their best land, local supply could also become inadequate. The major works which have informed my understanding of

Malthus's original theories are Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* and *A Summary View of the Principle of Population*; *The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn* and *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*.

Metropolitan France : Mainland France; part of the European continent

Maastricht Treaty : The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 made the European Economic Community into the European Union. The original signatories were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and West Germany. The United Kingdom and Denmark were added in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1994 Austria, Finland and Switzerland were added.

Non-metropolitan France : French colonies (when they were extant), such as Algeria, and overseas possessions - see "DOM-TOMS" above.

Nationally Co-ordinated Land Planning System : This is France's system. It is nationally based and co-ordinated and involves State direction of public land. Uses are planned a long time in advance. The State purchases land specifically for public housing, equips it with infrastructure and releases it to builders. Land is also set aside for forests, roads, agriculture and other social and economic uses.

The Property Development and Housing industries are a part of the Land Planning System.

ONI/OMI : Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: op.cit.*, p.471. On 2 November 1945 the National Immigration Office - *Office nationale de l'immigration* - ONI, was appointed by law to be the exclusive recruiting agency for immigrant workers of all nationalities, whatever their occupations or other characteristics.⁷ In 1987 the ONI became the OMI - *Office des migrations internationales*.⁸

Populationism : refers to a philosophy, attitude or policy encouraging population growth by any or all demographic means - natural increase and/or immigration and, arguably, low infant mortality and increasing longevity. "Populationist" refers to a person who holds this philosophy etc. These words don't exist in English but I find them very useful additions.

Property Development Industries/Property Development and Housing Industries : I use these terms more or less interchangeably. The simpler term, "Property Development Industry" generally includes the Housing industry, unless the context specifically concerns office building or, for instance, industrial or civil engineering infrastructure, such as mines, bridges and roads. Arguably, however, all such infrastructure development entails an accommodation component and therefore also involves the Housing Industry. **The Property Development and Housing industries are a part of the Land Planning System.**

RCDBR : Royal Commission into the Decline in the Birth Rate in New South Wales (1904).

Schengen Convention : The Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 became effective in 1995. On 26 March 1995 Schengen involved seven States: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Luxemburg, Holland and Portugal. Basically it permits free circulation within those seven countries to visitors who have obtained a tourist visa from one of these countries. It is designed in part to prevent visitors **from** utilising tourist visas from each country sequentially, thus staying potentially much longer than the usual three months accorded.

Statutory or Land Use Planning System : This is Australia's system. It is not co-ordinated nationally or even State-wide and is mostly ad-hoc, relying on the whims of private developers. Although land is initially zoned and there are forums for the public to raise objections to development initiatives, the system is piecemeal and **no**-one in one area is aware of what is being done in another area unless they take special steps to find out. Despite the fact that land is initially zoned, rezoning is comparatively easy, due to the absence of overall long-term planning at a sufficiently high level to over-ride local private interests leading to land speculation.

The Property Development and Housing industries are a part of the Land Use Planning System.

Unitary Land Planning Systems : Where the national system is dominated and controlled by a central or national government.

Upstream and Downstream Industries : (With reference to the Property Development and Housing Industries). These terms refer to those industries that are partly or wholly dependent on and/or interdependent with the Property Development and Housing Industries. Such industries include, upstream: building and engineering materials suppliers, such as mines, forestry, and manufacturing and design plants. Downstream industries include the ones that finance investment in property development and housing, notably banks, building societies, the stock market, as well as major business organisations which purchase property for its negotiable and speculative asset value and individuals who do the same. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the upstream and downstream industries to property development, but only sketches in the most obvious.

¹ For instance see the German book by Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, translated into English as *The Global Trap*, Zed Books, London, 1997, p.150: "Many French economists, in keeping with their country's tradition of protectionism, therefore call for selective restrictions on trade."

² Source: "Mercantile System", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1959.

³ Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A*

⁴ Source: Francis Ronsin, *La Grève des ventres*, Aubier, Collection historique, Paris, 1980, pp13-14.

⁵ Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: De 1914 à nos jours*: p.471.

⁶ Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornelle University Press, 1999, p.117.

⁷ Jaques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française: Vol.4: op.cit.*, p.471.

⁸ Source of the date of the name change was Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Cornelle University Press, 1999, p.117.

APPENDIX 2.

EVENTS AND POLICIES DISCOURAGING HIGH IMMIGRATION

In 1975 the first and last major post war enquiry into population size, *The National Population Enquiry (Borrie Report)* 1975, came out. It contained a number of ecologically based submissions including one from the Australian organisation of Zero Population Growth. This was obviously a product of the Whitlam era.

After this virtual political silence reigned on the subject of population policy for around for 17 years, with the exception of one fatal outburst.

In 1984 the issue of race, specifically Asian race, and whether Australians would tolerate a perceptible rise in visible Asian content in the population, emerged in comments made by Professor Blainey, a well respected historian and academic. A wide section of the press and academia denounced these comments as dangerously racist and, to this day, opinion remains divided on they actually were or not. A consequence of this occurrence was that *any* adverse comments on immigration, for whatever reason - even if they did not touch upon the issue of 'race' - became too politically explosive to make safely. This situation was exemplified by the cancellation of an Australian Conservation Foundation environmental conference on population numbers in Australia in August 1984, **through** fear that a specific ecological objection might be misinterpreted as racist.'

It was not until 1992 that the next population policy enquiry came out, called *The National Population Council Report* 1992, which recommended a population policy for Australia. Between 1990 and 1992, *The National Greenhouse Response Strategy* and *The National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development*, which identified nine elements of a population policy consistent with ecologically sustainable **development**;² were published and *The Ahrlburg Report* 1994, on the foreign aid implications of the economic impact of unrestricted population growth. (This was in response to the Tasmanian Senator Harradine, who was against contraception and abortion and who was impeding foreign aid birth control initiatives.)

The Australian movement, *Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population*, which has a scientifically based philosophy, was formed in 1988. In 1994 an Australian Academy of Science symposium recommended early population stabilisation on ecological, economic and quality of life grounds, the Australian scientific research center, CSIRO, began the "Ecumene project", an internationally linked population modelling and projection study using environmental and economic data, and Tim Flannery published his Australian best seller, *The Future Eaters*,³ a scientific work on the **ecological** and economic evolution of Oceanic countries, which advocates a long term goal for Australia of between six and twelve million people.

Also in 1994 *The Australian Population "Carrying Capacity" Report*,⁴ (the "*Jones Report*"), was published. More than 90% of submissions, including those from Aboriginal organisations, argued against population growth. The enquiry's inspired recommendation was to separate political and administrative responsibility for population and immigration (to avoid contamination with racial issues). Immigration intake should become an *instrument* of population policy, rather than population policy a "long term side effect of *ad hoc* immigration policy".

The then (Labor) government, with Senator **Bolkus** heading immigration and ethnic affairs, who had promised the ethnic vote to the Prime Minister of the day, by favouring family reunion and a high migration program, could not deal with the "Jones" report. The Chairman of the Enquiry, Barry Jones, was also the national President of the Labor Party. An election was imminent. In the interests of Labor's return to power it was decided to keep a lid on the issues for fear of losing the ethnic vote. Jones expressed his opinion that the environmental vote would easily compensate for the ethnic vote, but failed to convince the Prime Minister.

In September 1995 the Government published its response to the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development 1994. This inadequate document was the work of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. It was also the Labor government's only reference to the matter of national population policy, which it rejected as too controversial. Other issues raised at Cairo were dealt with in a superficial manner and with only token reference to the environmental connection.

In March 1996 the **Keating** Labor government was resoundingly voted out of power.

During the period following **Keating's fall**, 1996 to 2000 there were a number of publications, events and movements which discouraged immigration for one reason or another.

In 1994 the Report on an **interparliamentary** enquiry into Australia's Population" Carrying Capacity was published and it did not encourage population growth. There was also an optimum population symposium conducted by the Australian Academy of Science in Canberra, which recommended population be stabilised as soon as politically feasible at no more than 23 million, and paleontologist, Tim **Flannery**, published the best seller, *The Future Eaters*, which advocated an Australian population for the long term future of between six and 12 million.

In 1996 John Howard, who had become leader of the Liberal Party, went on to become prime minister, despite the press constantly reminding the public of remarks he had made in 1988 – but since recanted – that it would help social cohesion in Australia if Asian immigration "were slowed down a **little**".⁵

However the popularity of the politicians, Pauline Hanson and Graeme **Cambell's** electoral programs probably reinforced the new government's policy towards immigration and ethnic affairs.

Pauline Hanson, disendorsed in February 1996 by the Liberal Party, for inflammatory comments about Aborigines and welfare payments, sailed into parliament as an independent and went on to found the extraordinary nationalistic Pauline Hanson Party. The Pauline Hanson party was possibly the most populist party since **Whitlam's** Labor Party and was supported largely by those who had been alienated from the economic mainstream over the 1980s. It was also bolstered by support from a newly relevant gun lobby, which had been disaffected by Howard's campaign against automatic rifles. The party became widely known throughout Australia in connection with anti-immigration statements, anti aboriginal specific welfare statements, protectionist economic policy, sympathy for the gun lobby, and suspicion that the rate of Asian immigration conflicted with national interests. There was little or no wider concern for the **environmental** impact of population numbers.

Former ALP member, Graeme **Cambell**, had been disendorsed some time previously for anti-immigration activism and he also ran for election as an independent and had a strong primary vote, but lost on **preferences**.⁶ Although Aborigines in his strongly Aboriginal electorate tended to vote for him, he was also a strong critic of Aboriginal specific welfare.

The new Liberal Government, under Prime Minister John Howard, with Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, brought in a number of changes to immigration policy which were designed to cut down on family reunion, enhance skills selection and discourage permanent immigration by refugees who might go elsewhere or return to their country of **origin**.⁷

The following publications were highly critical of immigration driven nation building in Australia. In 1998 journalist Paul **Sheehan** published *Among the Barbarians, the dividing of Australia*, which was a runaway national best seller. In 1999 population sociologist Katharine Betts published *The Great Divide* to wide press coverage, and Mark O'Connor published *This Tired Brown Land*, which, with a more natural sciences based approach, got little press coverage.

Illegal immigration has been targeted by the government as a growing **problem**.⁸ Although the press have tended to be **unsupportive** of measures to restrict legal immigration, they have supported bi-partisan motions to take strong measures to deter illegal immigration – especially of refugees (who mostly come as 'boat people'.) It seems there is little national ambivalence where boat people are concerned. Not even the building lobbies have much to say in support of them. Concern about boat people has steadily increased as the numbers arriving have increased. Since Australian forces engaged in peace keeping activities in East **Timor** there have been suspicions that the Indonesian government has been avenging itself against the Australian government by facilitating or at least failing to discourage the passage of boat people embarking from its shores and Alexander Downer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has attempted to address this issue.

In 1999 Mark O'Connor, ex president of Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population and author of anti-growthist *This Tired Brown Land* (1998) was appointed Australia's Olympic Poet and granted \$80,000 over a period of two years.⁹

The appointment of Mark O'Connor received support **from** the Labor premier of New South Wales (the State that receives the highest immigration), Bob Carr, who is a strong critic of population growth. Spurred on by the popular Bob Carr's frequent criticism of **immigration** forced growth on ecological grounds, the Howard government has stepped up policy statements committing it to encouraging immigrants to settle away from major population centres.

In 1999 it reiterated these statements, but shied away from a formal population policy, in the tardy *Government Response to the Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies, Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation – Two Ecologies*, 1999.¹⁰

As well in this government response (p.11) the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was described as having adopted a strategy of seeking to encourage **further** debate on population issues through public meetings, major seminars and conferences, speeches and newspaper articles, and through his department's publications. It is certainly true that formal public consultation has been stepped up since the Howard Government's coming into power.

Under the previous government the CSIRO Wildlife and Ecology Department had begun the Ecumene Project, which was a study of "Futures scenarios" using various population and lifestyle projections to determine their impact on natural resources, including water, soil, fisheries, forests (the Australian Stocks and Flows Framework (ASFF)). The then Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and its organ, the Bureau of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research, gave the Ecumene Project a very wide birth, having an 'economics' conception of planning divorced, for all practical purposes, from the wider environment and ecology. However the Howard government actually funded the Ecumene Project for a series of workshops in 1999 (in which Edwina Barton, the National Director of Australians for an Ecologically Sustainable Population was a **participant**¹¹) The Howard

government has undertaken to "use this model to examine the effect of three different immigration levels on a set of physical social and demographic indicators to the year 2051" and to make this information publicly available.¹²

Minister Ruddock often stated that setting a target population for Australia through a population policy debate was an unworkable ideal because it would be a source of constant dispute between the big population business lobbies and the small population ecological lobby.¹³ In an article in July 2000 he portrayed these ideological opponents at two extremes, but **claimed** that most people would settle on a figure close to that assessed as the optimum politically achievable by the Australian Academy of Science symposium on Australia's optimum population in 1994. That figure is 23-24 million. He thus opts for relatively early population stabilisation, whilst making it look as if there is serious pressure for a much smaller population. (In reality there is little such pressure.) In this way he disables the extreme **growthist** lobby and **arrives, de jacto** at a population target, or perhaps I should call it a **default**.

¹ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy & Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, p 269.

² "Jones Report", *Op Cit*, p 12.

³ Tim Flannery, *The Future Eaters*, Reed Books, 1994. Incidentally, Flannery will occupy the Chair of Australian Studies at Harvard University in 1998.

⁴ "Jones Report", *Op Cit*.

⁵ K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy & Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, p 203

⁶ The Australian voting system makes it possible for enemies to exchange preferences down the line in order to freeze out mutually unpopular competition. (This was to happen to **Hanson** in the 1998 federal election, where the established parties **realised** that she represented a serious popular threat.)

⁷ "Humanitarian Program (Onshore), 'The Migration Program', *Population Flows: Immigration Aspects*, Economic and Environment Section, DIMA, 1999, 30 July, Although there were no changes to the number of humanitarian immigrants, during the Kosovar crisis in 1999, Australia adopted the European model (with UNHCR approval) of short term asylum provision, in lieu of traditional Geneva convention model of **refugee** asylum, which has traditionally seemed to assume the granting of permanent residence to the person granted a "protection visa". Later that year it used the same model for receiving East Timorese refugees. See also, for details of Howard Government Reforms undertaken, **Bob Birrell**, *Immigration Reform in Australia; Coalition Government Proposals and Outcomes since March 1996*, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University.

⁸ Mark **Krikorian**, Center for Immigration Studies, 1522 K St. N.W., Suite 820, Washington, DC 20005, (202) 466-8185 fax: (202) 466-8076, center@cis.org www.cis.org "Ruddock plans stricter controls on illegal immigrants

Australian Broadcasting Corporation, October 27, 1999. The Federal Government says tough new laws are needed to help stem the flow of boat people arriving in the north of the Western Australia. Federal Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock says proposed changes will see a maximum stay of two-and-a-half years for illegal immigrants seeking **refugee** status. He says family member sponsorship programs would also be scrapped. Mr Ruddock says since July, more than 900 people from as far away as Afghanistan have landed in the Australia, compared to 20 over the same period last year. "If we're going to face these continuing arrivals, we're going to have to put in measures of this type," Mr Ruddock said. "In other words, we ought not to see, or the Opposition ought not to see these measures as excessive or unnecessary."

⁹ Personal communications via email informing me of this.

¹⁰ *Government Response to the Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies, Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation – Two Ecologies*, 1999. This was a government issued paper, with no publication or printing details, but was available on request from

members of parliament. (Obviously the initial report had been made under the Keating Labor government, so the tag of 'tardiness' should by right mostly be borne by that government. Surprisingly this report foreshadowed extending family reunion in rural regions to first cousins and grandchildren.

"The Working Party on Regional Migration, established by the Ministerial Council of immigration and Multicultural Affairs at its May 1996 meeting, examined ways to encourage a higher proportion of migrants to settle in regional Australia and in **States/Territories** seeking increased levels of skilled migration.

It said that the Working Party had reported to Ministers in December 1996 and that a "range of **State/Territory** specific migration mechanisms [had] been developed. These included the creation of the skill matching database as a tool for linking potential migrants to **identified** skill needs in regional Australia and the expansion of the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). This scheme enables employers in regional Australia to nominate overseas **personnel** for permanent entry to Australia where they are unable to recruit suitable skilled personnel through the local market. In addition there was a new category, the Regional Established Business in Australia, where temporary entrants were able to apply to become permanent immigrants if they had **successfully** established a business in a designated area of Australia. Furthermore, the introduction of the Regional Linked category allowed for the sponsorship of skilled relatives, **including first cousins and grandchildren**, to designated areas of Australia. Finally another category had been introduced, the **State/Territory** Nominated Independent (STNI) scheme, which provides States and **Territories** with the opportunity to nominate potential migrants with skills that are in high demand in their jurisdiction.¹⁰

On the face of things this could result in new chain immigration. There is nothing to stop new immigrants **from** moving to the cities, sooner or later. It will be interesting to see if this regional **distant** family reunion is any different.

¹¹ Personal communication

¹² *Government Response to the Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies, Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation – Two Ecologies*, 1999, p.19. "The Working Party on Regional Migration, established by the Ministerial Council of immigration and Multicultural Affairs at its May 1996 meeting, examined ways to encourage a higher proportion of migrants to settle in regional Australia and in **States/Territories** seeking increased levels of skilled migration. It reported to Ministers in December 1996. A range of **State/Territory** specific migration mechanisms has been developed, including:

- the creation of the skill matching database as a tool for linking potential migrants to identified skill needs in regional Australia;
- the expansion of the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) which enables employers in regional Australia to nominate overseas personnel for permanent entry to Australia where they are unable to recruit suitably skilled personnel through the local market;
- the establishment of the regional Established business in Australia (REBA) category, which enables temporary entrants who have **successfully** established a business in a designated area of Australia to apply for permanent residence;
- the introduction of the Regional Linked category to allow for the sponsorship of skilled relatives, including first cousins and grandchildren, to designated areas of Australia; and

the creation of the **State/Territory** Nominated Independent (STNI) scheme, which provides States and Territories with the opportunity to nominate potential migrants with skills that are in high demand in their jurisdiction."

¹³ Philip Ruddock, "Migration needs a dotcom rethink", *The Australian*, July 19, p.13 in the "Opinion" section. "Perhaps more than any other nation, Australia's prosperity is founded upon those **from** over 150 lands who have chosen to make our country their home. While in the past immigration considerations have focused on permanent resettlement and concepts of population, today the issues are more complex. In the dotcom world the redefinition of **geography**, travel and communications has constructed a new reality, which we must not only adapt to, but also seek to exploit.

With Australia's below-replacement fertility rate, and a net overseas migration level of about **65-75,000** people per year, it is likely that our population will grow to about **23 or 24** million by **2050**. At this time our population would have an age and size profile that would be stable. This is not a figure I believe would be of concern to most Australians. However, some view this outcome as unacceptable, and drive the debate with calls for the Government to commit all **future** governments to a long-term plan. In reality, many proponents frequently use the debate to push for a dramatic increase or a dramatic reduction in immigration.

At one side stand the advocates of a markedly smaller population. On the other are those who support a higher population. They hold the view that a substantially larger population would deliver all manner of economic riches. It is my belief that both positions are flawed.

Many advocating the less-is-best position suggest we should aim for a lower level of population on environmental grounds. While we must consider environmental aspects, I am not convinced that the social and economic costs of adopting such a position would outweigh any environmental benefits that may accrue from a marginally lower population. In order to examine the relationships between **Australia's** environment and population I have commissioned the **CSIRO** to undertake research I **trust** will shed more light on the area.

Increasing immigration to achieve a large population is too simplistic. We need to separate our ideas from the aspirations of the **1950s**, and move on **from** such anachronistic and confining arguments as populate or perish. Research by Professor Bob Gregory has demonstrated there is no clear link between per capita economic growth and population growth. If there were, many Third World countries would be economic powerhouses.

Today's **globalised** economic environment and labour market mean we have to be more clever with our approach to immigration to attract people with skills. There is not an endless queue of skilled migrants simply waiting to come to Australia. The highly skilled, who comprise a limited pool, are in increasing demand globally. Countries not traditionally viewed as migration nations are joining the race to lure them to their shores.

Increased international trade and investment, and the creation of new and growing markets for young skilled workers in sectors including information technology, has led to more people moving temporarily around the world. Not wanting their opportunities or abilities to be constrained, they are prepared to go to whatever job and whatever country offers them the best return on their skills.

To take advantage of these **opportunities**, the Government has developed streamlined short and long-term temporary entry provisions. These are rated among the most effective arrangements in the world for attracting this highly mobile and lucrative workforce.

As a result, long-term arrivals have grown in recent years to the point that they now account for almost **50** per cent of our net overseas migration. Only six years ago this figure was just above **20** per cent.

The tale this tells is strongly underscored by its comparison to movement in the Employer Nomination Scheme, a key category of permanent skilled entry. While the long-term temporary classes have grown exponentially, the take-up of permanent skilled visas through the Employer Nomination Scheme, a key category of permanent skilled entry. While the long-term temporary classes have grown exponentially, the take-up of permanent skilled visas through the Employer Nomination Scheme is flattening even with a domestic labour market characterised by growing numbers of skilled vacancies.

While some in the business community have championed the cause of permanent settlement, most employers have been "voting with their feet" for temporary entry by making much greater use of it.

The reasons are simple. Long-term temporary entry arrangements enable sponsoring companies to retain the skilled migrants they attract more readily. They allow employers and employees to try out their relationship without seeking a permanent commitment. They also overcome the problem some employers encounter when permanent entrants leave their organisation to work for a competitor.

Skilled long-term temporary entrants make a major contribution to Australia's international competitiveness, bringing with them new ideas, skills, technology, understanding and contacts. It is astounding that these provisions, and the outcomes they are generating for this country, receive such little attention, despite the glare of public scrutiny that illuminates Australia's permanent migration program.

We cannot afford to return to the days where permanent resettlement numbers were the goal, and skilled migrants and economic advancement were **unregarded** concepts. It is only through embracing new realities that we can **successfully** build Australia's path to tomorrow. (This was an edited version of an article which appeared in ***Options*** magazine, according to the Australian.

APPENDIX 3.

ENERGY AND OIL SHOCKS

Energy and Oil Shocks..... 1

Oil Shocks and Counter shocks..... 1

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Energy and Oil Shocks

What has energy consumption and oil economics got to do with sociology?

Clearly it has an impact on economies and anything which impacts on an economy may cause sociological constraints and sociological reactions.

In the area of sociological theory, Dunlap and Catton and Rees and Wackernagel had given sociological significance to energy use and their theories provide us with conceptual frameworks within which to examine relationships between numbers of people, lifestyles and energy consumption. Some of the statistical concepts for measuring indicators of these will be mentioned at the end of this section. They are discussed in much more detail in my Statistics Appendix, in the Energy Statistics section.

Conveniently, the major oil crises provided periods where economic impact and sociological reaction were highlighted and substantial records remain at the level of the popular press, specialist magazines and books treating the period. This is because policy formation was widely discussed and reported on internationally. It focused on decisions to do with consumption and energy pricing, potential alternatives to petroleum-based energy, infrastructure expansion or contraction, demographic expansion or stabilisation, public finance strategies such as encouraging saving, buffering unemployment, raising taxes, increasing protectionism, or borrowing externally. Some of these policies were more directly connected to the international crisis as an oil supply crisis and others were couched in more general terms of an economic crisis. But they were all apparently kicked off by the 1973 oil shock.

Oil Shocks and Counter shocks

Since my thesis identifies the 1973 oil shock as a sociological "turning point", I will define the concept of "oil shock" here. An "oil shock" refers to an interruption to supply of oil at usual prices or a material interruption, which causes large scale perturbation of industrial economies that rely on steady affordable oil.

Although the Suez Canal conflict in 1956 severely perturbed European oil supply, the term and concept of an "oil shock" does not seem to arise until 1973, the date at which

international oil economics began to change radically and came to the attention of popular media.

If the term "oil shock" did not enter the popular vocabulary until around 1973, the trends were evident, however, from mid 1970.

Beginning on May 3, 1970, the OPEC countries faced their first world customers with a series of incremental and increasingly hostile demands for higher prices. In February 1971 Algeria nationalised 51% of French oil concessions and this act was followed by several other oil producing countries. On August 15, 1971, US President Nixon froze all wages, prices, salaries and rents - this was the devaluation of the US dollar. OPEC immediately told its member countries to negotiate price rises to compensate the lower US dollar.¹

Here are some other dates of interest and relevance to my thesis.²

In Australia in late June 1971 the ALP Federal Conference at Launceston, Tasmania, approved a national policy on minerals and energy, which seems to have anticipated the worsening oil crisis.³ On 7 December 1971 Whitlam moved to recommence suspended debate on the need for Australia to establish sovereign control over the mineral resources of the sea bed off the Australian coast.⁴ In December 1972 the Australian currency was revalued.⁵ In May 1973 Cabinet authorised Rex Connor to confer with State Mines Ministers on the construction and operation of a national pipeline system.⁶ The Australian government implemented progressive reduction of the new settler program between December 1972 and late 1975, from 140,000 to 50,000.⁷

Internationally, on September 19, 1973 Algeria suspended immigration to France. October 17, 1973 OPEC oil ministers agreed to use oil as a weapon in the Arab-Israeli war and recommend an embargo against unfriendly states. Two days later Saudi Arabia, Libya and other Arab states announced an embargo on oil exports to the United States, which, shortly after, was extended to the Netherlands. On November 5, 1973, the Arab oil-producing states proclaimed a 25 % cut in oil production, and threatened worse. In November 1973 Germany officially ceased importing foreign labor.⁸ On the 23 November 1973 Germany suspended immigration from outside the European Economic Community (EEC).⁹ On the 27th of November President Nixon signed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA), to control major aspects of oil trade in the US.

On February 11, 1974 Libya nationalised three US oil companies and Nixon and Kissinger announced a seven point plan to make the US energy independent. On June the 13th the IMF created a special fund to lend money to nations that had become indebted due to the high oil prices. On 3 July 1974 France suspended immigration from outside the EEC.¹⁰

In Australia, on December 13, 1974 the executive council of the Commonwealth of Australia, met to seek four billion US dollars to finance national energy self sufficiency and to fund unemployment reduction." On 16 October 1975 Kerr dismissed Whitlam from office.¹²

In the "First World" economic growth and expansion after the second world war had relied on a world consumption of oil that increased by an average rate of about 7% **annually**.¹³ These massive quantities of oil were obtained at comparatively low cost, mostly from the oil producing countries of OPEC¹⁴, many of which were exploited under a colonial yoke.

In the "Third World", at the time of the Yom Kippur War - the OPEC countries formed a cartel for the first time to force oil importers to pay a much higher petrol price. This resulted in the first "oil shock" around 1973.

The very severe economic consequences of this first oil shock have been attributed to a combination of a low economic cycle, long economic dependence upon unrealistically low prices for petroleum based energy linked with extremely high consumption, wasteful technology, and numerous highly paid workers. The subsequent impact of more realistic prices devastated unprepared economies conditioned to post war boom conditions.¹⁵

A second oil crisis occurred between 1979-82, marking the replacement of the Shah of Iran by Khomeini. A "counter shock" occurred in 1985-86, when prices fell very low in response to the strategy of demand reduction from the oil importing countries. Counter shocks result from defensive action by oil importing countries whereby they take steps to reduce their demand for oil. This creates income problems for oil suppliers who tend to break ranks in a cartel and drop their prices in order to induce more demand. The Gulf War produced a brief shock in August 1992.¹⁶ 1999-2000 marked the beginning of another shock. These shocks and counter shocks are the way the market has come to be organised since the early 1970s.

The impact of the 1979-82 shock was magnified when the Federal American Bank launched a restrictive monetary policy to combat inflation and interest rates rose to 20%. The US dollar doubled in value in relation to most other currencies. This was good for net exporters of petrol and bad for net importers.

This combination of factors resulted in a world recession. The severity of this recession was all the greater since the developed world had still not recovered from the first oil shock, particularly in the areas of unemployment and industry restructure. The Western European strategy to deal with unemployment, as in France, involved drastically cutting immigration external to the EEC. Complementing this action was the increasing trend towards consolidation of the European community as a self-sufficient labour pool.

The symptoms of oil-shock related economic crisis were high unemployment, economic contraction, diminished production, and political turmoil. Two main political and economic strategies emerged with different social impacts. One was protectionist,¹⁷ conservative of energy and oriented to maintaining basic conditions for the employed and providing generous assistance to the unemployed. Government policy, inflation and increases in energy and materials costs encouraged technological efficiency and penalised high consumption. This policy was prevalent in continental Europe and affected the nature and production of the residential construction industry there. I will support this observation in my evidence chapter.

The other strategy was to provide the minimum of comfort to the unemployed and the **bankrupt** with the idea that the economy and the population would adapt more quickly and more realistically to the new situation and work harder and produce more for less. Policies encouraging technological improvement and energy conservation tended to lose priority or to be exploited for profit rather than for energy conservation. Cutting back on human resources was preferred to cutting down production, or money to expand production was obtained through borrowing. The market was prioritised over social welfare traditions and a philosophy of survival of the fittest developed. This kind of policy became prevalent in the English speaking settler societies, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Britain also tended more towards these policies, which epitomised the Thatcher **government** (1979-1990).

These kinds of policies could be interpreted sociologically as different methods of wealth **redistribution**¹⁸ in a world economy where available wealth had suddenly diminished. The first prioritises equity and the second allows market values to prevail despite widening social divisions based on wealth and access to power.

Concepts Involved in Financing oil exploration

The main concept is quite simple: Finding and developing oil reserves is very expensive and money is hard to come by.

Oil exploration, extraction, production and refining is highly problematic because it requires enormous financial investment at every level with a very high risk of no return.

After 1973, often in return for equity, those countries without oil reserves of their own offered finance to those oil bearing countries unable to self-finance exploration of their own reserves. Rich countries like the USA were able to finance their own petroleum exploration and development and a number of Arab countries nationalised their reserves, with varying results. As has been mentioned, France initially developed oil reserves in her old colonies and, when these colonies became independent, France continued to finance exploration in foreign territories, including Australia.

Comparative Oil Economics Theory

Economic theory on oil production and markets provided descriptions of market changes and attempted to account for the immediate strategic reasons for these. Works in this area discussed energy policy formation and spoke implicitly in terms of carrying and economic capacity with regards to energy, population and production as well as the durability of actual resources. Few of these economic and **historic** works provided any comparison, much less detailed comparisons, between France and Australia, however the British Petroleum/ **BPAmoco** and World Bank World Development Report's historical statistics on types and units of energy consumption provided comparable patterns of consumption over time for many countries, including France and **Australia**.¹⁹

As stated already, the 1973 oil shock marks the first major divergence in demographic and economic policies between France and Australia since 1945. Part of my thesis seeks to explain why France and Australia's policies diverged at this particular time. It is therefore reasonable to ask what, if anything, **did** the oil shock have to do with the end of populationist and low skill labour supply policies in France and why, to the contrary, did Australia resume populationist and expansionist policies so quickly after the oil shock?

Is an explanation to be found for this divergence in any of the literature on the subject of oil economics and oil crises?

France's Approach to Oil Economics

The literature only seems to provide some partial explanations. For instance France's conservative oil policies are described as "Colbertian" by Dalemant and Carrié.²⁰ The adjective "Colbertian" or "Colbertiste" derives from the protectionist economic management policies of the mercantilist Finance Minister, Colbert (1619-1683), who is popularly credited with the repair of the French economy after the excesses of Louis XIV.²¹ Colbert's protectionist ideas preceded Malthus's by more than a century and differed mainly in the value Colbert assigned to population **building** for national defence purposes.²²

The primary objective, which Malthus would have approved, was economic independence. This was to be achieved by gathering wealth through commerce and conserving and enhancing it. French exports should always outnumber imports. Colbert instituted detailed legislation to control virtually all aspects of production within France and her colonies, creating a series of national **companies**.²³ He said that you must take wealth from outside France and then keep it inside. The colonies were there solely to provide wealth to France and forbidden to sell to outside markets. This was also the British policy at the time, under **Cromwell**.²⁴

At the **beginning** of the 20th century, French oil economics were strongly modeled by government intervention, which sought to compensate for and cushion French industry from many of the effects of international competition in order to ensure its independence. This style was underpinned by national legislation between 1925 and 1928 to encourage oil exploration. France derived numerous tax benefits **from** its petrol companies.²⁵

The first French company was Total SA (1924), followed by Elf-Aquitaine, which outgrew Total. The Total group was highly successful in Irak, in Iran, in the Emirates, Algeria and in the Sahara, until the time of the first oil shock, when Middle Eastern and Saharan countries nationalised their oil reserves. This took much of Total's income out of French hands.²⁶

The remainder of the Total Group explored **further** afield, **finding** oil in Indonesia, the North Sea, South East Asia and Columbia. After the 1973 oil shock, despite the income from these companies and the strong national relationship, France sought to maximise her industry and domestic independence from oil based energy, whilst at the same time maximizing the success of her international oil and gas exploration **companies**.²⁷

In 1976 Elf-Aquitaine became a public association. It wasn't until 1994 that the French government's share in this company was greatly reduced. In 1999 Total and the Belgian Petrofina joined, creating **TotalFina**, ranking in size sixth in the world and third in **Europe**.²⁸ In the year 2000 TotalFina merged with Elf Aquitaine, becoming the fourth-largest oil company in the world. In the year two thousand the company was also completely privatised.²⁹

Apart from Dalemant and Carrie's description of the French system as Colbertian, however, I have found no literature to explain why different countries took different courses, although two obviously different blocs exist. To characterise them in ecological terms, the first block consists of the 'cautious' Western European countries without local oil supplies and the second, of the 'incautious' English-speaking settler countries with local oil possessions. It appears that France and other Western European countries took a Colbertian and Malthusian course. Australia and English-speaking settler countries with local oil possessions were economically and demographically more expansive and cornucopian in their approach - as judged by energy consumption, population growth, and infrastructure expansion.

For instance the United States Congress successfully opposed rises in petrol prices in 1974 and the imposition of taxes in 1978, whereas throughout Europe **high** prices and taxes were very quickly imposed. The United States' main innovation was in local exploration and development of oil fields.³⁰ Australia's approach was similar and the cost of petrol remained very low until 1978.³¹

There does seem to persist in some circles a general belief that "new" countries could go on expanding indefinitely, due to their abundant natural resources, which include oil, gas and other energy and mineral reserves. In fact primary production has become an increasingly unreliable major source of national income. Examples of countries richly endowed with mineral or agricultural wealth but with poor economies are Russia, Nigeria, Australia, Argentina, Canada and **New Zealand**. The United States has a more diverse economy but is criticised for over-exploiting its energy and water reserves and covering its farmland with housing and other infrastructure to cope with an unmanageably large and growing **population**.³²

This absence of comparative theory leaves questions that I attempt to answer, at least in part, through my hypothesis, which does indeed suggest that France's methods of organisation, with national land planning and strong public housing provision may have assisted the retention of a "Colbertian" protectionist approach to economics and social welfare, with a "malthusian" awareness of population carrying capacity.

Virtually all sources stress France's desire for energy independence and to decrease her reliance on oil. This seems a little odd when France has accumulated so many oil assets, albeit recently privatised, to the extent that she seems to be quite a redoubtable international force in oil production and marketing, **taking** liberties with EU anti-competition laws³³ and flouting US sanctions with **impunity**.³⁴ In fact there are some monetary benefits in this seemingly contradictory strategy, due to the exchange value of US petro-dollars.

Because oil is bought and sold in US dollars, any changes to the value of the dollar will affect purchasers using other currencies. If the dollar has a low value then petrol will be comparatively cheap; however, if the value is high, then the cost of petrol will be high. With a strong dollar, petrol exporting countries reap bigger financial profits.

Governments of importing countries outside the USA may combat these costs by imposing taxes nationally on oil imports. If these taxes are based on percentages of prices then State revenue will increase with dollar value. Nevertheless, the overall cost to the importer and user of petrol will be increased, and therefore the cost of production. This is another reason it makes sense for the European countries to enhance technological advantage in production in order to maximize GDP dollars per kilogram oil equivalent. It also makes sense for them to reduce local use of oil as a fuel. It is profitable however for the French to invest in overseas oil reserves for export to other countries, because that brings petro-dollars to the French economy.

Perhaps, however, the most important consideration for France is less economic than **defence**.³⁵ Such a motive would also explain the similarity of approach in most European states without local oil reserves. Europeans dread having supply cut off by international conflict and it seems very likely that they have evolved economic, supply and infrastructure planning strategies to combat this.³⁶ The 1956 closure of the Suez Canal and associated hostilities created a fuel crisis in France as well as fears of nuclear conflict and served to reinforce the politics of energy self-sufficiency, which were to De Gaulle's nationalistic taste **anyway**.³⁷ The 1973 crisis reinforced this process and France has been evolving an increasingly sophisticated energy policy since then.

What have France's conservative energy policies since 1973 got to do with my thesis, which deals with connections between population growth and infrastructure expansion - mainly housing? The connection here is **this**: Housing is particularly susceptible to changes in materials and energy prices and demand for housing is affected by economic and demographic growth contraction. It seems likely that where material and financial constraints operate on housing production, constraints to population growth and to household formation will also be **experienced**.³⁸

Where there is economic contraction and finance for public and private sector housing depends importantly on public subsidies, then unless the government is prepared to borrow to finance expansion, there will be very little expansion. I argue that this is the case for France.

In countries where a highly profitable property development and residential construction industry dominates, individual firms may be more inclined than taxpayer funded government housing to access international loans, in order to finance continuing **expansion**.³⁹ Sales will depend on demand. I argue that this is the case for Australia.

Because immigrants and native born all require housing, housing demand is particularly sensitive to population growth and household formation. By the same token housing shortages make it difficult to form new households and make founding a new family or reuniting a family from overseas difficult. Similarly where population growth contracts, housing production will contract, due to reduction in demand.

The sensitivity of the housing industry and housing production to changes in demographic growth rates as well as to economic and energy supply changes provides useful data for analysis. On the one hand we see a reduction in demand and, on the other hand, we see the industry responding to energy costs by increasing energy efficiency and restructuring. My hypothesis led me to the conclusion that the French economic and political system was more sensitised than Australia's to variations in the cost of housing as related to changes population growth and energy prices. The reasons for this conclusion will be developed in the argument of my thesis.

Australia's Approach to Oil Economics

Australia has used or attempted to use three main **strategies** to finance oil exploration. The first one, before the first oil shock, was nationalisation and protectionism with high prices and regulated markets. Another involved attempting to access a huge, unsecured loan. The third one involved inviting foreign companies to explore for oil in return for royalties and other taxes on the oil they extracted. This one is also known as allowing foreign ownership of assets, or, more vulgarly, "selling off the farm."

Unlike France, Australia is an energy resources rich country with important reserves of oil and other fossil fuels. From 1964 to 1973 domestic crude oil prices in Australia were substantially higher than international prices, which meant that oil extraction in Australia was highly profitable. Furthermore, from around 1965, what was known as the "absorption policy" required Australian refineries to buy all the crude oil produced in Australia. This situation provided strong incentives for oil prospecting. Companies extracting oil in Australia were also, however, prohibited from exporting any of their product, which meant that they could not profit from any international price advantages that occurred from time to time. Naturally the Commonwealth government also taxed crude oil **sales**.⁴⁰

At the time of the first oil shock the **Whitlam** Government developed a policy to protect and develop energy resources in Australia without selling any equity. A huge unsecured loan was sought to finance massive projects associated with this in December 1974. The projects and the method of finance were judged to be scandalous and grandiose and they contributed to the government's downfall. This method of financing oil exploration in Australia therefore did not go **ahead**.⁴¹

Under the Fraser (from 1975) and successive governments, foreign finance was sought in return for equity. Until 1978 Australian petrol sold within Australia at internationally low prices. In 1988 the market was entirely deregulated and government sought to derive income from Australia's oil reserves through a variety of new **taxes**.⁴²

Making money out of oil is not just a matter of selling barrels. Oil explorers must purchase licences, stake claims, pay forms of rent and surrender a proportion of their product as well as a proportion of their profits in many cases. Barrels may be taxed as they come out of the ground, and as they cross internal and national borders, and royalties and various other levies exist in many forms. Non oil-producing States may, as I have mentioned, also profit from taxes at many levels. Retailing of petrol to the general public and commercial enterprises is further taxed: In France and Italy up to around 80% of petrol bowser prices are government taxes. Taxes are also applied when bulk oil is brought into **countries**.⁴³ All monies derived from oil are affected by international pricing and the value of the dollar.

As I have mentioned, my observation of the statistics leads me to conclude that the English-speaking settler countries with oil reserves have tended to be less careful of energy and of their energy reserves and to practise less long term conservative economic policies, according to international statistical **comparisons**.⁴⁴ Their taxing policies on domestic consumption are also revealing. They tend to be much higher in

Europe and much lower in the English-speaking settler states and other states that have local oil reserves.⁴⁵




Fig. A.3.1 International Comparison of Taxes on Gasoline as a Percentage of Price

Here we can see that the clear trend is for Western European countries, even those with their own local oil (e.g. the UK and Norway) as well as those with off shore oil assets (e.g. France and the Netherlands) to tax more heavily than the English speaking settler countries.

Source: <http://www.iea.org/pubs/free/usa/04-usa.htm>, International Energy Agency. Download date was 29/1/2001.

Australia is an example of an expansive economy utilising a comparatively high, low taxed rate of petroleum energy. Some other examples are the United States, Canada and New Zealand, which have all tended to borrow externally more (see graph below) than the Western European States and which have all encouraged high population growth, mostly through immigration. All these States have similar housing and land development systems, in contrast to the more conservative Western European States.

They have also been a group that has stood out among developed countries by maintaining high population growth through immigration




Fig. A.3.2. Per Capita External Debt in US Dollars for Selected Nations

Source: Information on External Debts was from the CIA Economic Fact Book, which is a US government funded publication :

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/indexgeo.html>

Most debt figures are 1999 data, except France: 1996, China 1998, USA 1995, Canada 1996, Greenland 1995, Finland 1998, New Zealand 1998, Greece 1998, Australia 1998, Netherlands 1998, United Kingdom 1998. Only Norway was listed as a "Net Creditor" and only the Netherlands were listed as having a "debt of zero". Those countries with N.A. against their name presumably did not supply information.

Information for Total Population figures was from the World Gazetteer, <http://www.gazetteer.de/> last updated on 6/11/2001

Energy Statistical concepts and indicators

Ehrlich's I= PAT and Rees and Wackernagels' Ecological Footprint theories refer to concepts in physical energy theory. Both employed World Resources Energy *statistics* to determine the energy use of nations and per capita, most often referring to kilograms of oil equivalent commercial energy use in order to indicate per capita consumption. I decided to use the BP Statistical Review of World Energy in Gilbert Jenkins, Oil economists' handbook, 1986, Table 116, "World Primary Energy Consumption, for the years 1955-1960 and, for later years, from a downloadable [htm](http://www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/hprimarycons.xls) historic file from the BPAmoco website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/hprimarycons.xls because these were the only **longterm** statistics accessible to me and they were used in geological texts. These statistics permitted me to **visualise** trends in total energy used and in kinds of energy used. I studied these in combination with works describing the economics of the oil shock and subsequent adaptations.

There are many statistical indicators for the progress of nations in their adaptation to changes in the oil market. Cost of production may be measured in Gross Domestic Product per kilogram of oil equivalent and this is usually expressed in dollars. The World Bank keeps an historical record in its "World Bank: World Bank Development Reports". A rising \$GDP/kg oil equivalent may be taken as an indicator of increased efficiency although many other factors could be borne in mind when evaluating this measure. For instance Switzerland, which has a high cost of living, an affluent population, and lots of banks, has a very high \$GDP/kg oil equivalent, but how much of this reflects technical efficiency and how much reflects industries and commodities that may command a high price? All we can really say is that Switzerland manages to make a lot of money and uses comparatively little oil in order to do so. France also has a high \$GDP/kg oil equivalent, although the cost of living there is much less than in Switzerland.

Figures provided by the World Bank, in its World Development Reports **indicate** that France and most of Europe's efficiency in \$GDP/kg oil equivalent has improved greatly since the first oil and second oil shocks. This is also the case for most Western European countries and contrasts with the apparently lesser efficiency of the English-speaking settler societies which have local oil.

This perception is also supported if we only look at quantity of petroleum based energy imports in relation to national population size and per capita income.

So far it is generally held that shocks so far have all been politically and economically induced pricing shocks. Oil supplies are however generally anticipated to reach a peak at some stage in the 21st century whereupon the amount extracted will decline. Based on trends in extraction, per capita demand, industrialisation of poor countries and population growth, some have estimated that this will occur in the first decade of the 21st century.⁴⁶

¹ Data for these dates comes from the Chronological table entitled: *World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies, 1970-1999*, available as a download from the United States Energy Information Administration: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html>, edited to January 25,2000.

² Unless otherwise referenced data for these dates comes from the Chronological table entitled: *World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies, 1970-1999*, available as a download from the United States Energy Information Administration: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html>, edited to January 25,2000.

³ Rick Wilkinson, *A Thirst for Burning, The Story of Australia's Oil Industry*, David El Press, 1983, p. 138. Wilkinson comments, on page 139, "There is little doubt that some of Connors's ideas were far-sighted. ... He was correct in predicting the 1973 oil crisis and then, at a time when people world wide had overcome the fright of the OPEC moves, Connor continued to champion conservation of energy. Unfortunately he was denied the mean of achieving it. ..."

⁴ Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, Viking, 1985, p.256.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 240.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.502.

⁸ James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States: The political economy of Postwar Europe*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.76

⁹ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.80.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p 85.

¹¹ Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 191. The Governor General later signed the minutes of this meeting and those of a later one that reduced the loan sought two billion. Kelly and Tom Uren, (*Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995 pp. 209, 222, 223, 236-7), describe Rex Connor as having an impressive knowledge of the mining industry. Apparently Gough Whitlam had no knowledge of the industry at all and was convinced that Connor was a visionary.

¹² Gough Whitlam, *op.cit.*, p.769.

¹³ Etienne Dalemont and Jean Carie, *L'Economie du Pétrole*, , Ed. Que Sais-Je, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1994, p.19

¹⁴ OPEC: "acronym for Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The organisation was formed in 1961 to administer a common policy for the sale of petroleum. Its members are Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela." *Collins English Dictionary*, Harper Collins, 1992 reprint of 3rd edition, 1991.

¹⁵ Pierre Desprairies, *La Crise de l'énergie, le mal, le remède*, Editions Technip, 1982.

¹⁶ Dalemont and Carie, *op.cit.*, graph, Fig. 7, p 40.

¹⁷ Martin and Schumann in the *Global Trap*, Zed Books, London, 1997, p.109, suggest that the first and second oil shocks caused the post war "Keynesian edifice to totter", so that much of the

Western world became dominated by the dogma of the "so-called neo-liberalism and monetarism associated with Reagan's advisor, Milton **Friedman** and Thatcher's mentor, **Friedrich August von Hayek**", after the conservative victories in Britain and the US in 1979 and 1980. On page 133 they observe "the concept of deregulation found enthusiastic support in the 80s among the managerial elite in Western Europe, but nowhere except in Britain was there a political majority behind it."

¹⁸ Martin and Schumann, *op.cit.*, p.153

¹⁹ BP statistics in the early 1960s subsumed Australia under "Oceania" or treated in combination New **Zealand** and Australia. This undermines accurate comparison for this period.

²⁰ Dalemant and Carrie, *op.cit.*,. Authors writing about France's economy generally tend to classify it as protectionist. For instance see the German book by Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, translated into English as *The Global Trap*, Zed Books, London, 1997, p.150: "Many French economists, in keeping with their country's tradition of protectionism, therefore call for selective restrictions on trade."

²¹ Colbert in France and Cromwell in Britain have been described as the "chief practical representatives" of the mercantile system. Source: "Mercantile System", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1959.

²² Although Malthus would have acknowledged the need to provide labor to colonies in order to exploit them, Colbert went to extraordinary pronatalist lengths - **fining** the parents of unmarried men and women of a certain age, offering bounties to persons bearing more than 10 children in the colonies, and forcing nubile young women in French prisons to emigrate to the colonies. Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A* In fact, compared to the British, the French had persistent problems populating their colonies. Whereas Britain felt the need to rid herself of "excess population" by sending it to the colonies, France's population size was distressingly small, having remained around 20 **millions** for several centuries, and the French were reluctant to emigrate. Source: Francis Ronsin, *La Grève des ventres*, Aubier, Collection historique, Paris, 1980, pp13-14.

²³ Popular history holds his policies virtually responsible for France becoming a country of superior and specialised manufactures. It also holds him responsible for the failure of the colonies and numerous other perceived negative economic traits.

²⁴ Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A*. In Australian those who desired independence chafed under this kind of philosophy, which was maintained by Britain. For instance, this mercantilist economic philosophy towards Australia discouraged development, since this would keep products in Australia. Nation-building through population increase was one of the strategies for independence that entrepreneurs in Australia embraced. Examined in this light it was understandable.

²⁵ "French energy policy has been relatively consistent in recent decades, with the main policy objectives including: securing energy supply, achieving international competitiveness, and protecting the environment. The focus on energy security has led France to become one of the world's top producers and consumers of nuclear power. ... Because oil security has been such a concern for French energy policy-makers, there is a French law allowing the French government to refuse to close a **refinery** if it believes its supply or price security is at risk. Essentially, this gives the French **government** veto power over EU legislation regarding refineries. ..." French oil companies have important oil possessions in the North Sea, **Africa**, and Latin America. France imports most of its oil **from** Saudi Arabia and Norway, followed by the United Kingdom, Iraq, Iraq Nigeria, and Russia. Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL:

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A. , "Petrole, les politiques pétrolières."

³¹ Australian National Geographical, *Australian Encyclopaedia*, 1996; "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295-2296

³² Leon Kolankiewicz and Roy Beck, *Weighing Sprawl Factors In Large US Cities, A report on the nearly equal roles played by population growth and land use choices in the loss of farmland and natural habitat to urbanisation*, Analysis of US Census Data on the 100 largest urbanized areas of the United States, Numbers USA.com, March 19,2001.

³³ Despite France's limited domestic reserves and production, the French oil industry is an important actor in world energy markets. Major oil assets of French oil companies are located in the North Sea, Africa, and Latin America French imports come primarily from Saudi Arabia and Norway, followed by the United Kingdom (UK), Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, and Russia.

In the spring of 1999, the French oil giant Elf Aquitaine and the Canadian company Bow Valley signed a **\$300-million** contract (85% Elf and 15% Bow Valley) to exploit an oil deposit in the Persian Gulf, in Iranian waters. Although this contract appears to violate the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which threatens U.S. sanctions on any country with more than a **\$40-million** project in Iran, no such sanctions had been enacted as of October 1999.

Major merger activity within the industry is creating an even more powerful French presence in world markets. Its two major oil companies, Total and Elf **Aquitaine**, were both state-owned but are now fully privatized. In early 1999, Total merged with the Belgian oil company **Petrofina** to create TotalFina. TotalFina is the world's sixth-largest oil company and the third-largest oil company in Europe.

In the summer of 1999, TotalFina announced an unsolicited bid to take over Elf **Aquitaine**. Elf Aquitaine was larger than Total (**pre-TotalFina**), and it is only slightly smaller than the merged TotalFina. Elf Aquitaine countered **TotalFina's takeover** bid with a bid to buy TotalFina. Current plans call for an "amicable" merger of the two giants. The terms of the merger were agreed in September 1999, and the deal appeared imminent as of mid-October 1999. TotalFina Elf would be the world's fourth-largest oil company. Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

³⁴ In fact France tends to run a diplomatic counterpoint to the United States in the Middle East, notably as regards Palestine and Iran. It is my impression that she represents Europe by her actions there and that the motive is to maintain European connections with oil supplies and diplomatic connections in case of war, particularly the threat of nuclear war from that region. "In the spring of 1999, the French oil giant Elf **Aquitaine** and the Canadian company Bow Valley signed a \$300-million contract (85% Elf and 15% Bow Valley) to exploit an oil deposit

in the Persian Gulf, in Iranian waters. Although this contract appears to violate the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which threatens U.S. sanctions on any country with more than a \$40-million project in **Iran**, no such sanctions had been enacted as of October 1999." Source: Web Page of Energy Information Administration, United States Government, Country Analysis Briefs, "France", URL: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/france.html>, File last modified: November 2, 1999, Contact: Lowell Feld , lfeld@eia.doe.gov, Phone: (202)586-9502, Fax: (202)586-9753

³⁵ 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Pétrole, les politiques pétrolières", states, "From 1974, reactions of industrialised countries that consumed petrol, and of the big petrol companies, were inspired by three principle imperatives The first was the need for *physically secure supplies of petrol* since petrol is indispensable in transport and for certain kinds of **industrial** uses, and [furthermore] has an uncontested strategic role in case of [military] conflict.

³⁶ In the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, countries which were not invaded and occupied during the first or second world wars it is **difficult** to imagine the effect that the first and particularly the second world wars have had on the shape of European economies. Nevertheless many things, including details of town planning are influenced by the idea of surviving sieges in France. For instance, all residential buildings are required to have functional chimneys in France. The visitor cannot help noticing the rows and rows of chimney pots on the roofs of Parisien apartments, and, if they thought about it, they might wonder why apartments with gas and electric heating needed **chimneys**. The answer is that the law requires this in case supply of **fuel** is cut off by disaster or war.

³⁷ 1997 Encyclopaedia Universalis France S.A., "Suez, canal de", and an extract from an unnamed article by Andre Fontaine in *Le Monde*, 30 October 1976. De Gaulle was a major enthusiast for nuclear power.

³⁸ Housing standards vary between **countries** of course. Some countries tolerate slums and homelessness more than others. Australian and French standards are however broadly comparable in this area. Although slums exist in both France and Australia, they are not condoned. (Equivalents to French Bidonvilles and **gypsie** communities in Australia are for instance Redfern in Sydney and Saint Kilda in Melbourne, as well as various rural shanty-towns, including those associated with some Aboriginal populations.) Wide socio-economic inequity is still largely resisted. This contrasts with the situation in the third world and in the United States.

³⁹ A case in point: the role of international **finance** for Australian property development during the 1980s will be explored later in this thesis.

⁴⁰ *Year Book of Australia* 2000, Chapter 17, "Mining" and *The Australian Encyclopaedia*, Australian Geographic Pty Ltd, Terrey Hills, NSW, Australia, 6th Edition, 1996, "Oil and Natural Gas", pp 2291-2997 and Department of Science and Resources, <http://www.isr.gov.au/resources/petroleum.html> & http://www.isr.gov.au/resources/petr_legislation/index.html

⁴¹ Paul Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 191. On December 13, 1974 the executive council of the Commonwealth of Australia, made up of Prime Minister Whitlam, Attorney-General Murphy, Treasurer Cairns, and the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor⁴¹ met to seek funding for Rex Connor's project and to **fund** unemployment reduction. For this they sought \$US 4,000,000,000 (four billion US dollars). The minute of the meeting stated,

"The Australian government needs immediate access to substantial sums of non-equity capital from abroad for temporary purposes, amongst other things to deal with exigencies arising out of the current world situation and the international energy crisis, to strengthen Australia's external financial position, to provide immediate protection for Australia in regard to supplies of minerals and energy and to deal with current and immediately foreseeable unemployment in Australia." The Governor General later signed the minutes of this meeting and those of a later one that reduced the loan sought two billion. Kelly and Tom Uren, (*Straight Left*, Vintage, 1995 pp. 209,222,223,236-7), describe Rex Connor as having an impressive knowledge of the mining industry. Apparently Gough Whitlam had no knowledge of the industry at all and was convinced that Connor was a visionary.

⁴² Australian National Geographic, *Australian* Encyclopaedia, 1996, "Oil and Natural Gas", p.2295-2296.

⁴³ Dalemont and Carie, *op.cit.*, p.14 -17.

⁴⁴ Based on, for instance BP Amoco Historical Download excel file of 'World Oil Consumption 1966-1999', website, www.bp.com/worldenergy/xl/hxl/ and World Bank World Development Reports.

⁴⁵ Dalemont and Carie, *op.cit.*, pp 16-17.

⁴⁶ Dalemont and Carie, *op.cit.*, graph, Fig. 7, p 123, and Nicolas Sarkis, "Pétrole, le troisième choc?" (The Third Oil Shock?), in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 2000, p.1. For more on this see, the Global Hubbert Peak Page on <http://www.oilcrisis.com/aas/> which has articles by well known oil geologists and links to discussions on when oil may peak, the impact of this, and the viability of various substitutes.

PFEI C 4 : STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

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Introduction

The purpose of this appendix is to provide complex statistical and some other documentary evidence for my argument that France and Australia parted company on demographic policy after the first oil shock and developed a different approach to economics, human logistics and energy use. The statistics I used were mainly demographic or related to housing and energy. Because the housing indicators are relatively simple and comparable between nations, I have not gone into detail about them in this appendix. I have also talked about sociological indicators that may affect demographic policy and outcomes here. This is because sociologists have a different task from demographers. Demographers base their projections almost entirely on past numerical trends. A sociologist needs to take into account the kinds of social perceptions, values and pressures that have previously affected trends and which may affect them in the future. An example of such sociological indicators are the French responses to the UN "replacement immigration" push in 2000, which I mention here.

This appendix goes into some detail about the possible shapes of France and Australia's populations in the future. I felt this was necessary in order to justify my premises - that France's population is heading towards demographic stability and Australia's is not.

With regard to the population projections, I have left the reader with a wide range of graphs - particularly in the case of France - where I might have selected only the more likely options. I chose to do this because the French material is difficult to access in Australia. Since most Australians cannot read French I believe that my graphs and explanations in English add to the value of this thesis. One of my sources of projections from France - for Graph A.4.15 was a document which had been privately commissioned by a government committee and which I was able to obtain due to a fortunate connection. The reader is unlikely to be able to find this information elsewhere.

Here is a reminder about my research question. It was :

Why have French policy makers taken a different path on immigration policy from their counterparts in Australia over the last 25 years? Why have they adopted a consolidation policy while their counterparts in Australia have persisted with a growth policy?

To answer this question I used two hypotheses. These were that

(a) Australia took a cornucopian route and that France took a Malthusian route after the 1973 international oil related economic crisis, as evidenced by their policies and practices on energy consumption as may be related to infrastructure and population,

and

b) that the difference between French and Australian land development planning and housing systems was a major factor in these outcomes, due to the presence of an immigrationist property development and housing lobby in Australia and the lack of such a lobby in France.

Statistics in Australia and France are not directly comparable, but if they are defined and their weaknesses, strengths and local peculiarities are explained, they are comparable to a degree. To my knowledge no-one has previously attempted to define and compare French and Australian demographic statistics. As I have mentioned in my literature review, this lack makes it very difficult to evaluate comparative sociological works based on demographic assumptions deriving from these statistics.

There was thus a real need to establish a basis for comparison between French and Australian demographic statistics in order for comparative sociological comment to be meaningful. I believe that my original work on this problem adds value to my thesis.

A masters thesis is unfortunately too short for such an exercise and so I have **summarised** a few relevant parts of the information I have collected, analysed and defined over the past few years and consigned it to this appendix.

In my thesis I have also linked the idea of consolidation and growth, Malthusianism and Colbertism and Cornucopianism to energy use patterns. In the latter part of this appendix I provide detail and comments about the energy statistics I have referred to.

French Immigration Statistics

In reading different works about immigration and population numbers in France it becomes obvious that statistics cited do not always reflect **historical** population movements well. In fact the official French statistics put out by INSEE (L'Institut national des études économiques - National Institute of Economic Studies) only rarely reflect movement of EEC foreign nationals since 1975. When we read that France "ceased" immigration in 1974, we are then surprised to slowly realise that immigration from within the EEC did not cease;' although most of it was no longer recorded in the usual immigration **statistics**.²


The information that the OMI did not record entries for family reunion is readily available, usually as a note accompanying **statistics**.³

The information that "Worker Immigration" and "INSEE statistics for net immigration progressively included fewer and fewer EEC nationals from an early date, is less directly stated. Through dealing with INSEE statistics on nationalities of workers over the years one eventually infers it and finds one's explanation in the gradual enlargement of the European Economic Community and free movement within it.

The Treaty of Rome 1957, effective January 1958, permitted visa free travel to citizens of the European Economic Community. The original signatories were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and West Germany. The United Kingdom and Denmark were added in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 made the European Economic Community into the European Union. In 1994 Austria, Finland and Switzerland were added.

OMI statistics were recorded at the time of a mandatory medical examination for immigrants and those with free movement within the EEC were not required to have this examination. In this way the vast bulk gradually fell outside **this** statistical net and thus outside **the usual**

French definition of an immigrant. The only exceptions to this are those few (in the order of 5 -6,000 EEC nationals per annum) who, for one reason or another have had their employment processed by the OMI which then registers the EEC national as an immigrant worker.⁴



Graph A.4.1. France: Net [Permanent] Immigration 1946-1997:

Source: From 1946-1990, Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby, "La Situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", INSEE, Paris, 1996, Table 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990. Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine, Indicateurs démographiques 1987-1997.

The original source for the above figures is the OMI (Office of International Migrations). These statistics are frequently cited as if they were records of all immigration into France, but as I have explained above, they represent a limited picture. Officially the OMI traditionally handled the introduction of workers to France on behalf of employers and organized their visas. It also had the task of facilitating family reunion. From 1957 Europeans from EEC countries signatory to the Treaty of Rome 1957 could enter France without visas and seek work. (See text above for details of sequence of membership).

Except for Italian immigrants, these nationals do not show up in these OMI figures after this time. Since Italy was one of the original members permitted visa free travel the continued registration of a few thousand Italian nationals per annum through the OMI long after 1975 requires an explanation which, I can only hazard would relate to the persistence of traditional formal employment relationships between specific employers source towns. Italian worker immigration has a very long history in certain areas of France.

As countries joined the European Community their nationals ceased to be registered by OMI. From 1974 almost all immigration of foreign workers from outside the EEC was officially ceased. Nevertheless immigration for work purposes

continued within the **EEC**. (There is however no official record of these immigrants until the 1990s). Between 1947 and 1962 Algerians were French nationals and movement from Algeria does not show up as an international statistic over this period. The extraordinary intake for 1962 was mostly of a French colonial stock repatriating to France the year of Algeria's independence.

As we come to understand that EEC immigration did not cease, next our attention is drawn to the rise in family immigration, and we realise that this also did not cease with the cessation of "worker" immigration in 1974. We discover that this was due to an historic European legal interpretation that over-ruled French law.⁵ Moving on, we find that family reunion may, however, be refused, on certain conditions, one of which depends on "suitable accommodation".⁶

How reliable are French immigration statistics anyway?

Collection of migration statistics in France is in fact much more difficult than it is in Australia, because in France there are many entry points besides the national airports and it is easily possible to enter France unofficially.

For Australians the notion of collecting net immigration statistics in France seems so haphazard one sometimes wonders why they bother. There is no population register in France⁷ and almost no-one is checked off officially as they leave. Although there is no population register in Australia either, its island status makes it very difficult for people to come and go informally and immigration statistics are collected at all formal points of entry and departure. We discover that, apart from a limited number of official expulsions,⁸ departures in France are merely assumed to have occurred when a visa runs out. There is no actual verification of this, apart from censuses every 6-10 years. These are unreliable too, like most censuses, for well known statistical reasons, related to the unreliability of self-reporting and the lack of importance that most respondents place on official census statistics. (It goes without saying that illegally present aliens are unlikely to give accurate accounts of their presence.) Australian censuses are probably not any more reliable however, and are reasonably comparable with the French ones. A further measure used by French statisticians to gauge emigration figures relies on a survey of passport renewals and other contacts with French embassies by French living overseas. A little over half of French people travelling or living overseas reregister at French consuls and the remainder would be estimated according to information from censuses which indicates residents absent but not deceased.⁹

Against these technical problems with collecting immigration and emigration statistics in France should be balanced the information that collection of birth and death statistics is much better and so information about the total population born in France is a good basis upon which to build information about other forms of population movement. INSEE estimates that only about 20-30,000 French nationals emigrate each year. This and other population movement, including that of immigrants with residence in France has to date been adjusted according to six to ten yearly censuses. This means that changes in resident population numbers from census to census which cannot be explained by births and deaths (which are very reliably collected) are attributed to migration. The figure obtained for this is then compared with INSEE figures for total net immigration. Adjustments are then made to the net immigration total and the census total according to specialist information on trends, error rates, etc.


Ralph Schor, Costa-Lascoux, Dupâquier, and other immigration historians, as well as demographers and statisticians like Tribalat and Lebon,¹⁰ all acknowledge France's problems when measuring annual migration flows, although they have been criticised for this by some intellectuals, notably Hervé Lebras.¹¹ This is because attempts by such as Mme Tribalat and Dupâquier¹² to define and count immigrants in France have been perceived as an attempt to define an "out-group" for racist purposes.¹³ In America and Australia such counting and definition of immigrants goes on all the time, generally with an association of positive discrimination, which is generally considered benign.

Among those writers, Tribalat and, notably Lebon, also attempt to clarify ambiguities between the concept of temporary and permanent immigrants, EEC and non-EEC immigrants, internal and international immigration, "worker immigration" and family reunion, and to resolve problems in establishing reliable net immigration statistics, especially as concerns emigration.

Note that in France "Temporary" indicates visas for less than one year (but excludes tourists) and "Permanent" indicates visas for one year or more. This definition is more common internationally than Australia's. Australia used the same criteria until 1958, but since then "permanent" is self defined by immigrants stating their intention to reside "permanently" in Australia. "Long-term" is for those stating their intention to stay for a year or more but not to stay permanently.¹⁴

In this chapter I refer frequently to Andre Lebon's work, for its clarificatory and innovative qualities. He worked for the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity at time of my writing (2001) and is the author of a recent series of statistical publications, which appeared under that banner, beginning in 1997 and referring back about ten years.¹⁵

The anglophone comparative works on France and other countries that I have used do not make the points above clear. Jeanette Money and Gary Freeman occasionally refer to ambiguities, but tend to go on dealing with immigration as if the ONI¹⁶ (*Office Nationale des Immigrations* - National Office for Immigration - later known as the OMI - *Office des Migrations Internationales*) statistics referred to the entire immigration pool. Money analyses immigration entries only and makes no attempt to place these within the context of net totals. Hollifield, despite the solid nature of the rest of his approach, gives almost no data on the statistics he has used, but the few numerical examples he has given seem to come from the OMI.¹⁷ With regards to Gary Freeman, since his first major work on the subject was only published in 1979, it is quite possible that these subtleties had yet to constitute important trends.



Graph A.4.2. Comparison of different French Statistical Measures: Insee and OMI
Sources: Jeanette Money, Fences and Neighbours, p.113 and INSEE.

This graph compares INSEE data (which is also published by INED) and OMI data taken from Jeanette Money's book. It is intended as an example of inadequate definition of key data. In her OMI "Total Permanent" statistics Money has included workers in possession of a temporary permit (for less than one year) including seasonal workers after 1977. The OMI "Workers Only" is also from Money's book and refers to non EEC immigrants with visas and work permits for one year plus. Clearly the numbers and the concepts of "permanent" vary according to the sources. My criticism is that Money failed to clarify the numbers and concepts involved, despite relying heavily on statistics for her argument. Money also only used "Entry" as opposed to "Net" statistics, but she did clarify this. I have taken the Net Total Permanent Statistics from INSEE in order to show how sources of immigration not included in the OMI statistics affect the numbers. For instance the very big spike in the INSEE Net Permanent curve marks the arrival of French repatriates arriving from newly independent Algeria. I have criticised Money for glossing over this influx in her book.


INSEE and OMI statistics: Net totals and Arrivals

Neither Money, Freeman nor Hollifield attempts to establish the reliability or validity of French statistics in themselves or vis-a-vis those of other countries. Some reference is made to the matter of internal immigration from Algeria prior to 1962 and to the gradual exclusion of the majority of European Economic Community immigrants from ONI statistics, especially after 1974, but the reader with no special knowledge of these matters could well assume that French statistics on net immigration or entries only were far more reliable and that they were defined in the same way as, say, Australia's migration statistics.

Only Money's book was contemporaneous with **Andre** Lebon's statistical work, but she may have begun her work before his statistics became available. At any rate she does not mention them.

Andre Lebon's statistics combine INSEE **data** with data kept by the Minister of the Interior, from 1993. They attempt to count all immigration except tourists arriving for less than one year. Lebon's work is a major critical source on French statistics. He is also cited in OECD reports on immigration in France as their major statistical source.

INSEE series and Lebon Series of Statistics




Graph A.4.3. INSEE series and two (consecutive) Lebon series of statistics compared, 1990-1997.

Source: Andre Lebon uses statistics collected by the Minister for the Interior. These began with one series from 1990 to 1995 and another from 1994-1997. Changes in definition resulted in the abandonment of the first series, but it is still broadly useful.¹⁸ The second series, from 1994 to 1997 includes visitors and family reunion from the EU, and defines the EU before 1994 as comprising 12 countries: France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Portugal, the United Kingdom. After 1993 the EU is defined as comprising 15 countries, with the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden. These statistics are edited and written up by André Lebon and published by the Ministry for Employment and Solidarity.

Temporary Entries:

The "Migration (non-Human)



Graph A.4.4. Lebon Data on Temporary Entries including Asylum Seekers from Third World Countries.


Source: OMI and OPFRA in André Lebon, *Immigration et Presence Etrangere en France 1997/1998*, Ministère de l'Emploi et Solidarite, Documentation Francaise, Paris, Dec. 1998, p.26. These entries are included in the second Lebon series in the graph above, k4.3.

"Temporary Entries" are those for persons with visas for less than one year and excluding tourists. (Remember that in France "Permanent" only means one year or more.) "Third World" or non-aligned countries (Pays tiers) refers to all those countries outside the European Economic Community, including America, Oceania and Ex-USSR. Here we see that temporary entries (excluding tourists and seasonal workers, the latter which went from 11,283 per annum in 1993 to 8,210 in 1997¹⁹) for the past two years amounted to around 38,000 and 46,000. These did not appear in the INSEE net permanent statistics. I did not take them into account when estimating immigration trends and population projections, since, if temporaries change category to permanent, they are picked up by INSEE permanent statistics. If they remain illegally in the country they are no longer registered anywhere and are outside the purview of this thesis.

Australian Immigration Statistics

The "Migration (non-Humanitarian) program" or the "Planned Intake"

The "Migration (non-Humanitarian) program" or the "Planned Intake" is the annual "quota" of permanent places offered to immigrants under the government immigration program, for which people apply from outside the country and to whom visas are granted. (In the year 2001 it became possible to apply onshore.) It excludes **from** its count refugees and other humanitarian categories, and New Zealanders. The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs explains that "The Migration and Humanitarian Programs are set by the Government on a financial year basis following consultations with [various bodies and interest **groups**]." ²⁰ The actual intake under this planned immigration program is comparatively easy to manage and rarely exceeds the planned intake (which Jeanette Money refers to as "Australian immigration intake targets") by more than a few **people**. ²¹ The actual intake under the planned immigration program seems to be the source that Jeanette Money has used as her statistical basis for estimating intake, although she refers to it as "Australian gross annual settler intake". I have attempted to show this in the graph, "Australia: Different Measures of Immigration".



Graph AA.5. "Australia: Different Measures of Immigration".

This graph gives a comparison of Totals for Net Overseas Migration at June 30 which is adjusted for Category Jumping and Net Total Migration, and Planned Immigration Intake Program and Program Visas Actually issued (both for financial years ending June). This last category on the graph includes the actual intake under the planned plus the humanitarian intake. This should not detract from my overall point which is that these numbers are well controlled, in contrast to the total net migration and the Net Estimated Overseas Migration adjusted for category jumping, which always contain a lot of surprises.

Source: K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999, p.342 for Humanitarian planned intake and visas issued; Net Estimated Overseas Migration (Adjusted for category jumping) and Total Net Immigration were from various issues of ABS *Australian Demographic Statistics*, 3101.0.

This graph should make it clear that the Planned Intake for the Immigration Program (and the Humanitarian program) and the program visas actually issued are well under control and one does not diverge much from the other. The two other major ways of measuring however seem unrelated to the planned immigration program and reflect much greater variation and greater and fewer numbers, with a general tendency upwards in recent years, whereas the planned intake slopes gently down.

Outside the Planned Immigration intake program many other entries are brokered, including a one to four year visaed category that has wide application and from which certain applicants may prolong their stay or convert to permanency without leaving the country. The permanent intake statistics are not used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics because they so poorly reflect actual flows; with regard to determining permanent and temporary movement the ABS

begins with what people state their intentions to be on forms given to them prior to disembarking at sea and air ports.²² They later adjust these stated intentions against changes in categories, thus obtaining another measure of net permanent and long-term immigration.²³ Total Net Migration takes into account ALL movements in and out of the country that are registered, without regard to intentions or time spent in Australia.

Such variations, especially if they are unexplained, have very important repercussions in the Australian population debate, especially at a popular level, because, depending on the measure used, the results can differ widely. This increases confusion and distrust in an already complicated area of statistics.

Total Net Migration

Total Net Migration is the difference between total arrivals and total departures - including: total permanent, total long term, and total short term (temporary, less than one year). This method avoids the pitfall of excluding people according to their expressed intention of being short, long-term or permanent. Instead, when added to the existing population it just provides a balance sheet of the total numbers of humans in Australia at any one time. It thus gives a real indication of the total population load of the country, permitting us to estimate the number of people "present at any one time - residents or visitors - making demands on Australia's accommodation, transport, media and entertainment services, consuming food, using power, requiring banking facilities and so on." ¹²⁴

Total Net Migration figures were, until recently, usually found in Part C of the ABS Australian Demographic Statistics, under a heading like "Net Overseas Movement". In publications prior to 1958 they were the principle measure and were referred to as "Excess of Arrivals over Departures", with the distinction of temporary and permanent from 1932. This method has been available throughout the period studied, (1945- currently) and therefore enhances validity, since it has always purported to measure the same thing. There is no comparable French statistical series.


Net Overseas Migration (from 1958 on)²⁵

As mentioned above, before 1958 Australia and France utilised international immigration statistics which had been standardised in Geneva in 1932. The Geneva International Conference of Statisticians established the following categories: Permanent Arrivals and Departures, which referred to persons stating their intention of staying in or leaving a country for a year or more. Temporary Arrivals or Departures were those persons stating their intention of staying in or leaving a country for less than a year.

The French continued to use these periods as their basic operational definition, but in Australia, after 1958, this category was usually subdivided into permanent, long-term and short-term movement. For purposes of international comparison however, all that is not 'short-term movement' (i.e. less than one year) in Australia may be counted as 'permanent'.

"Net Overseas Migration adjusted for Category Jumping" (retrospective from the early 1980s to 1976)

Instead of using the concept of Total Net Migration, which measures every movement at a particular point in time, another method has been developed that concentrates on establishing the number of people permanently established in Australia. Because people often stay longer than their stated intention and many permanent immigrants do not stay, an attempt has been made to account for real movements as distinguished from intended movements. In the early 1980s Net Overseas Migration was developed. This measure is based on the net permanent and long-term figures but was redefined by the inclusion of an adjustment for "category jumping" (changing from permanent, long term or temporary to some other category) and also every five years to take into account new census information. This adjustment was applied retrospectively to 1976.



Graph A.4.6. Comparison of different measures : Net Total Migration and Net Overseas Migration adjusted for category jumping.

Source: "Australia and France, Comparative Demographics, 1945-1998."
This graph shows how the numbers for immigration from 1945 - 1998 total up differently depending on whether you use "Total Net Immigration" or "Net Estimated Overseas Migration". Net Estimated Overseas Migration (Adjusted for category jumping) and Total Net Immigration were from various issues of ABS Australian Demographic Statistics, 3101.0.

As can be seen from the graphs in this section, different methods of measuring give different results.

Comparability of French and Australian Immigration Statistics

France has neither a Total Net Immigration measure, nor a method of adjusting for category jumping. In Net Permanent Immigration statistics in France, temporary immigrants who become permanent (i.e. have permission to stay more than one year), are only registered when they become permanent. Permanent immigrants from the European Economic Community (EEC) are rarely registered as such, because they only rarely are in a position whereby a formal application is made on their behalf or by themselves to the Office of International Migrations (OMI). In order to estimate EEC permanent immigrants (one year or more) Le Bon²⁶ has utilised police statistics (AGDREF)²⁷ which record applications for work permits by EEC immigrants.²⁸ An EEC immigrant may enter France freely and unrecorded and may seek work. Only after they have found work need they apply to the departmental police (*la préfecture*) for a work permit, which is virtually an automatic procedure. Since 1999 all EEC applicants for permanent immigration are automatically accorded 10 year visas. INSEE, which records overseas immigration, does not utilise these statistics in its overseas immigration record, which is essentially meant to be understood as a record of immigration originating from outside the EEC.

In France temporary (less than one year) immigrants from outside the EEC who are not participants in the Schengen treaty,²⁹ are also counted, with some exceptions, (see appendix for details) by the OMI and the Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), but these are not, of course, recorded in the INSEE statistics.

Children

It is very important to realise that children under 18 years of age are in a number of cases not counted in the immigration statistics. This is the case for the children of members of families reuniting with French citizens and for the children uniting with persons accepted as refugees or stateless in France. The reason is that minors do not require a visa and the statistics on these categories are collected by counting visas.³⁰ (Exceptions are minors between 16 and 18 years of age who request to work.) The numbers are not known, for obvious reasons, but the numbers of adults who fall into the categories where the children accompanying them go unrecorded range around 15 or 16,000 thousand per year.³¹ See Table A.4.2 of this appendix.

EEC and Temporary Entries

Visitors under the Schengen Treaty or from other European Union or European Economic Community countries are only estimated using random questionnaires at the borders and compulsory questionnaires that must be filled out on a monthly basis by professional providers of accommodation, such as hoteliers and camping and caravan parks. Questionnaires are also supplied to international visitors who come in through the major airports. The total of temporary and permanent is not recorded anywhere that I have found, although it must be possible to put these two estimates together. I have not attempted to do so owing to the difficulty of obtaining these figures and the complexity of estimating net figures. The French statistical system assumes that those who come on temporary visas return when those visas expire, unless proved otherwise. Some categories under which OMI and OFPRA count these

persons are: Beneficiaries of a Temporary Work Permit, "Stagiares" (i.e. people participating in some form of training as part of their formal or occupational qualifications), Students and Asylum seekers. Temporary Agricultural Workers are also registered by the OMI.

Tourists

France boasts that it is the world champion tourist destination. In fact the annual number of tourists is approximately equal to the national population number. At the first of January 1996 the permanent population was 58.3 million and that year there were 62.4 million tourists.³² Of course, each tourist **doesn't** remain continuously in France for the whole year. The average length of stay was one **week**.³³ To obtain an effective full time resident equivalent, I divided the annual number of tourists by the number of weeks in a year: $62,400,000 \div 52(\text{weeks}) = 1,200,000$ full time residents. This represents a large effective person population, with a high energy usage pattern. It could also be a factor influencing perception of foreign population numbers and toleration of the longer term immigrant, student and political asylum seeking population.

The Australian measure I have employed, Net Total Immigration, counts *all* types of immigrants, including tourists. This capacity to assemble all **data** in one place may be a reflection of the fact that Australian has a whole department devoted to immigration. France does not. The purpose of this measure is to determine the real contribution of immigration to population growth in Australia. The measures I have used for France only count Permanent immigrants from outside the European Economic **Community**.³⁴ The reader is unfortunately obliged to keep these problems in mind as best they can. I would recommend that they suppose the net EEC immigration numbers to be around zero until such time as net statistics should become available. This supposition is based on the idea that population and economic pressures within the EEC are similar enough for traffic between member countries to more or less balance out. Behind this idea is the concept of France as part of a larger polity - the EEC of which the European Union and France itself are components.

Illegal Immigrants in France

The number of illegal immigrants "*clandestins*" is a polemical issue which, by its nature, is impossible to establish with any accuracy. The *clandestin* stock has been estimated on the basis of one out of two *clandestins* applying for regularisation during periods of **amnesty**.³⁵ It is estimated at around 40,000 persons annually by those who refuse to consider *clandestins* as a threat, and at 100,000 plus by those who fear an invasion.

For those concerned about the impact on total numbers of illegal immigration in France, the way I have dealt with this problem in my mind is to assume that the tight **logistics** of housing in the cities and the limited availability of illegal work probably combine to make **this** unknown quantity smaller rather than larger. There is no doubt that a constant stream of illegal immigrants enters the borders of EEC countries and passes through France. Estimations of the immigrant stock must however be tempered by the difficulty for illegals to survive for a long time, which means that the bulk must move on when their illegal employment runs out or they can no longer stand the difficult living conditions. In my thesis I draw attention to the much greater difficulty that *legal* immigrants experience in finding housing than do French nationals. Since **immigrant** families are likely to be a major source of

accommodation for illegal immigrants, their own difficulty in finding lodging must present yet another barrier to long stays by illegals. My thesis concentrates on the logistics of housing for immigrants and the French and the greater problems of illegals may be inferred from this. There are of course other deterrants, including legal sanctions and fines for **traffickers** in illegal immigrants and for those who employ them. For more on this see Mark J Miller, "Employer Sanctions in **France**"³⁶

With regard to illegal entrants and overstayers in Australia, it is likely that climate and greater accessibility to housing make it easier to survive as an illegal than in France. On that basis I would suggest that INSEE net and Australian Total Net Immigration are reasonably comparable.

Differences in Census Definitions of the Population of Usual Residents


The French census counts those who report that they are in France for more than six months and who state that they are not in transit. All foreigners residing in France for less than six months, including workers, students, tourists on three month limits, and asylum seekers, not needing residents' cards, are not counted in the **census**.³⁷ All other residents, both French and foreign, are **counted**.³⁸ This corresponds to the Australian census definition of "the population of usual residents" (as opposed to the population "as enumerated" which tries to count absolutely everyone in the country) except that in the Australian version the operational definition of resident requires presence in Australia for more than a year unless the respondent is permanently immigrating. Due to these differences validity is affected to some degree when comparing these populations between the two countries.

Comparison of Numbers and Components of Annual Population Growth in France and Australia

According to past trends in factors contributing to the rate of population growth in Australia, the decisive factor in these population projections is the rate of net migration. In France this is not the case, since immigration trends are lower in relation to total annual population growth. (Note that I am not talking in terms of their relationship to total population numbers, unlike Jeanette Money.)

Net migration figures for Australia are, compared to France's, of high significance in determining population growth. This is because their contribution to total growth, on a proportionate basis, is much greater than in France. Between 1945 and 1997 Total Net Migration in Australia averaged 36.9% of Total Annual Population Growth - over one **third** - with a range of -7.0% to 58.6% and a mean of 40.4%.³⁹ This contrasts with France's average of 23.2%, a range between 6.3% and 74.7% and a mean of 23.8%. See the graph, "France and Australia: Immigration as a percentage of annual population growth since 1946".

Components of Annual Population Growth in France and Australia




Graph A.4.7. France and Australia: Migration as a percentage of total population growth

Sources for France were, from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institut national des études économiques (INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990," Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine. Indicateurs démographiques 1987 à 1997" (As at 1 January).

Sources for Australia were: total net immigration from 1945, defining Total Net Immigration as the difference between total arrivals and total departures annually as at 1 December. Sources were for 1945-1951, *Demography* 1954, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics; those for 1952 - 1977 were from J Shu, S E Khoo, A Struik and F McKenzie, *Australia's Population Trends and Prospects* 1993, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994; those for 1978-1997 are from Australian Demographic Statistics, ABS, Catalogue no. 3101.0 (various issues). Much of this data was kindly provided to me by Dr Katharine Betts, Swinburne University.


The purpose of this graph is to demonstrate a difference in French and Australian net migration trends, especially post 1974, on a comparable scale. In 1946 Algerians were still counted as foreigners, but they had free entry into France. This shows up as a peak in 1947. During 1947 Algeria became French and subsequently traffic from that point no longer registered as foreign and so does not show up on this graph. The high point in 1962 for France is when colonial French were repatriated at the time of Algeria's independence. It is possible to see that in both France and Australia 1975 was a particularly low period for immigration, when traditional workers were discouraged. Whereas in France immigration has never returned to pre-oil shock levels, in Australia it has. The rise in immigration after 1975 in France is mainly due to family reunion, asylum seekers, and regularisation of illegal immigrants.

Components of Annual Population Growth in France and Australia Numbers



Graph A.4.8. France and Australia: Comparison of Numbers for Total Annual Population Growth (Persons)

Sources : INSEE and ABS 3101.0"



Graph A.4.10 : France and Australia : Comparison of Natural Increase Numbers


Source : INSEE and ABS 3101.041

Population growth from all sources was much greater in France in

Graph A.4.9. France and Australia : Comparison of Numbers in Net Migration

Sources : INSEE and ABS 3101.041

The purpose of these two graphs is to give an idea of scale of immigration in France and Australia. For instance, immigration and population growth in France were **exceptional** in **1962**. The baby boom in France, combined with high immigration, **saw** much higher numbers than in Australia up until **1974**. After this the immigration numbers in Australia most **frequently** far **exceeded** those in France. Interestingly, total **annual** population growth in France has greatly diminished. Since **1994** Australia and France have had almost identical figures for total population growth. This is remarkable when you consider that France's population is about three times the size of Australia's.




Graph A.4.10. France and Australia : Comparison of Natural Increase Numbers
Sources: INSEE and ABS 3101.042

Population growth from all sources was much greater in France **until 1974** but, although **natural** increase numbers have remained higher than Australia's, which is not surprising given the base population numbers, the difference since the oil shock is not very great and is diminishing. In France natural increase dropped from **334745** in **1966** to **297535** in **1967** and from **327606** in **1972** to **163281** in **1976**. In Australia it went from **165712** in **1971** to **115148** in **1976**. These drops were due to decreases in the **birth** rate.

Australia: Population Projections

The ABS projection series explores a number of scenarios, as illustrated in the two graphs below, A.4.11 and A.4.12. The first and earlier series gives four population projections for Australia to 2051. The second and later series considers some new and useful variations in total fertility rates (TFR) and net migration in projections to the same date. I have not discarded the earlier set of projections, however, for the good reason that they give us a fixed point in time from which to measure changes in population size. If we keep using successive sets of projections bringing us ever closer to the year projected - 2051 - we lose our sense of proportion, overlooking the changes that preceded each new set of projections. As well as this advantage, they have the additional advantage of starting at the same date as the French series.

In the text below I give my opinion, which is supplemented by perception of social trends, as to the most likely outcomes of current population trends.




Graph A.4.11. **Australia** : The ABS 1995 Series of Population Projections with curves to 2051

Source: Raw data from Australian Demographic Statistics, June Quarter 1997, ABS Cat 3101.1, p16, and ABS Projections of the Population of Australia, States and Territories 1995-2051, Cat 3220.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra

What would happen without population **gains** from immigration in Australia? Series I 1995 is the only one that posits zero net **immigration**, but with a relatively high fertility rate. Australia would be on course to reach a total population of 20,710,000 in 2031, which would then begin to grow smaller. By 2051 it would have reached 20,170,100 and still be growing smaller at the rate of -2.4%. With lower fertility the outcome would be less **again**. Zero net immigration is an acceptable goal option in Europe. Although the achievement of **zero** net immigration is demographically possible, as we know, it is politically an outsider in Australia.

| AUSTRALIA : Average Total Net Migration at different periods | |
|--|---------|
| 1950-1999 | 89,597 |
| 1970-1999 | 89,590 |
| 1980-1999 | 102,195 |
| 1950-1959 | 88,121 |
| 1960-1969 | 91,096 |
| 1970-1979 | 65,640 |
| 1980-1989 | 111,650 |
| 1990-1999 | 82,522 |
| 1990-1995 | 59,020 |
| 1995-1999 | 106,024 |

Table A.4.1. Australia: Average Total Net Migration at Different Periods
Source: Australian Commonwealth Year Books and ABS 3101.0 for various years.




Graph A.4.12. France and Australia : Total Fertility Rates 1971-1998

Source for France: INSEE, F.Prioux, "L'Evolution demographique recent", Population, 1999, no.3.
Sources for Australia : 1972-1974: Australians, Historical Statistics, Ed. Wray Vamplew, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, p.53, Table MFM 81-88 "Age- Sepcific Fertility rates, Australia, 1921-1981; Australia Demographic Trends 1997, ABS, 3202.0, Chapter on fertility, for the years 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961, 1971, p.41 and from 1975-1995 p.148, Table 18.

Recent discussion, led by an Australian National University demographer, Peter McDonald, has suggested that Total Fertility rate might **fall** to **about 1.6**⁴³ as it **has** in some countries in Europe. Projections by the Minister for **Immigration** and Multicultural Affairs, Philip **Ruddock** rely on TFR **falling** to 1.6, **combined** with **unrealistically** low net **migration figures** based on the formal **planned migration** intake (See Graph A.4.5).⁴⁴ **Some** of the projections in the later series below are **based** on a **Total Fertility Rate** of 1.6 **after** 2008.

Although Australia's total fertility rate has slowed, the **European** model upon which the extrapolation of **this** trend was based may not be valid for **Australia**. Nevertheless the **trend** in Australia is certainly falling in the short term. In France, however, TFR has **returned** to 1.70 **and** above **from** 1995 to 1998 with figures for 1995: 1.70, 1996: 1.72, 1997: 1.71 **and** 1998, 1.75 for the past four **years**. This gives an average of 1.72. The average of 1.72 goes back at least ten years. A number of the projections for France in this chapter will be based on a total fertility rate of 1.7.



Graph A.4.13. Australia: The ABS 1999 Series of Projections without curves to 2051

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Projections based on an actual 1999 population estimated at 18,966,800 and making projections according to Series 1, Net Overseas Immigration of 110,000 per annum, and a Total Fertility Rate of 1.7 by 2008/9; Series II, Net Overseas Immigration of 90,000 per annum, and a Total Fertility Rate of 1.6 by 2008/9; Series III, Net Overseas Immigration at 70,000, Total Fertility Rate of 1.6 by 2008/9. I did not graph the curves leading to these projections because I did not have access to enough detail.

In Graph A.4.13. illustrating the 1999 series of ABS Australian Population Projections, we can see that the Australian Bureau of Statistics has changed some of its assumptions about immigration and fertility, assuming higher immigration and lower total fertility rates.

Series 1, which has the **highest** outcome, seems the most likely. The immigration rate is 110,000 per annum and fertility has been lowered to 1.7. This is in fact very close to the real current settings, although current TFR is slightly above 1.7 and recent migration is slightly below (on average) 110,000. The outcome of 28,194,700 represents an increase of 9,894,700 or 54% on the 1995 population of 18,300,000.

To this point my comments have been based entirely on past statistical trends. These are the trends on which government departments like town planning base their policies and plans for the future. The task of a sociologist is different, requiring social trends to be taken into consideration as well as statistical trends. My thesis has discussed the pressures for high immigration in Australia at length. It will come as no surprise that many of these factors incline me to consider that a higher population outcome, around the realm of 26-28,000,000, based on migration at or above 100,000 is the most likely.

I base my belief that immigration numbers will remain high on social trends and I therefore consider the 1999 Series 1 outcome as the most likely. Changes to immigration targets and components, particularly to do with proportion of family members and the possibility of applying for permanent visas whilst onshore, are also likely to promote increased immigration numbers. Although most Australians favor lower migration, the focused beneficiaries of immigration who lobby for it are powerful and can mobilise support and funds. Public information has also been presented in a way that tends to minimise the actual numbers of immigrants arriving. For instance the Minister for Immigration, Mr Ruddock (1996-) has tended to use the planned intake figures and visas issued under that program in public statements about immigration levels and has also tended to assume the inevitability of fertility falling to 1.6. It has been suggested that this manner of presenting the numbers has reassured the public by creating the perception that fertility and immigration are lower than they **are**.⁴⁵


For Australian immigration levels to fall, say to zero net, at any time in the near future seems quite unlikely. However something that might create conditions where such a trend could manifest at a date in the short term future would, in my opinion, be a major economic slump affecting Australia and the countries which are its major source of international immigration, causing higher emigration and lower immigration. If economic conditions accompanying the 1999/2000 oil shock were to persist or reoccur this would in my opinion provide conditions for much lower immigration settings. However this might be offset by selling off land to foreign money, as occurred **after** the crashes of the late 1980s.⁴⁶ If this were to occur, pressure for more migrants to consume housing would also occur and governments would be hard put to resist it.

The aforementioned series of projections from the ABS only projected trends for **fifty** years into the future. In 17 August 2000 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) released Population Projections, Australia, 1999 to 2101, Catalogue No. 3222.0, which project forward

one hundred years. In this series, the ABS projection which most closely matches Australia's present settings is Series 1, which assumes Net Overseas Migration (NOM - based on long term and permanent overseas movements) of 110,000 per annum and a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.75 children per woman. Under that projection, Australia's population in 2101 would be 31.9 million & still growing (at 0.21%), according to ABS. Such a population would represent an increase of 74% or 13,600,000 on our earlier 1995 base of 18.3 million.

Australia's current Total Fertility Rate is 1.74. According to ABS, Australia's Net Overseas Migration was 111,200 for 1999 & 111,600 for 1998. (Total Net Migration for those years was 129,444 and 84,794). Of likely future TFR trends, ABS says on page 46 that "Despite the small falls in the 1990s, it is reasonable to assume that the TFR could stabilise in the 1.7 to 1.8 range, say 1.75." However TFR could fall to 1.6 e.g. because "higher participation rates [of women in education and in the labor force] may result in smaller families and increasing childlessness, both of which would lower the TFR."⁴⁷

France: Population Projections




Graph A.4.14. France : INSEE Series of projections with Curves to 2050

Source: H i d data to 1945, Francis Ronsin, La *Population de la France, de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, Paris, 1997. For Future projections : Quang-Chi Dinh, *Projection de population totale pour la France métropolitaine, Base RP90. Horizons 1990-2050*, INSEE, 1995, Annexe II, p.30 and Table A5, p.139. Unfortunately the projection with total fertility of 1.8 and zero net immigration, was only available for the years 2000, 2020, 2030 and 2050, and appears above as unjoined black dots, although the key misleadingly shows a line joining these. The projection most instructively compared with this one was the one indicated with pink squares: total fertility rate of 1.8 but immigration at 50,000 net. What comparison of these two projections shows is the difference that a relatively small amount of immigration makes. Population would stabilise, but at a higher level and later than without that amount of immigration. The lowest population projection is for a total fertility rate of 1.5, with immigration at 50,000. This low fertility rate is quite possible and already occurs in more than one Western European country. It makes a real difference to the growth trajectory, which would be set for a steep decline. The line of

yellow triangles indicates an unlikely fertility rate of 2.1. The result is a rapidly increasing population. We can see that increased fertility makes all the difference to population growth in the French population. Immigration would have to be much higher than these settings to make much difference. In the next graph there are higher immigration settings, and a wider choice of fertility rates.

There were two sources upon which I based my opinions regarding the characteristics and properties of past and present population growth in France. The first was Quang-Chi Dinh, *Projection de population totale pour la France metropolitaine, Base RP90*, Horizons 1990-2050, INSEE, 1995, Annexe II, p.30 and Table A5, p.139, (see graph above). This source, although it does not give a wide range of immigration rates, is interesting because it gives growth curves and goes to 2050. Both sources start from a 1990 population base.

The second source was a further series of projections carried out privately by INSEE for the French Economic and Social Council, using its own and Eurostat information. (See graph below). These were ten Population Projections from 1990 to 2040. And they compared data from both INSEE and Eurostat Series.⁴⁸ This source lacked growth curves, unfortunately, and only projected to 2040. It provided, however, a greater variety of variables as well as two statistical sources. Another reason for including it is simply to provide further documentation of the scenarios that European demographers are prepared to consider for France. Most importantly for my argument that the French have largely accepted demographic stabilisation is the fact that no scenario contains anything like the New York UN Population Division's model for "Replacement Migration" in Europe, which will be referred to near the end of the demographic part of this appendix.



Graph A.4.15. France: INSEE and Eurostat Projections without curves to 2040

Source: These projections were carried out privately by INSEE for the French Economic and Social Council. They were prepared by Annie Mesrine, Direction des statistiques démographiques et sociales, Département de la démographie, Division Enquêtes et études démographiques. The file had been prepared for the attention of Mme Artiguebielle, conseil économique et social, Paris. Suzanne Thave, Head of the Statistical Service on Foreigners at INSEE sent me the file, dated Paris, 7 September 1998, No.69/F171.

The keys refer to the starting date for all the projections: 1990 and the end date, 2040. No curve was available, only the starting population of 56,577,000 persons and projected populations according to each series in 2040. The series contain variations for Total Fertility Rates (TFR) and Net Immigration (Net Mig). INSEE refers to one source of projections: "INSEE 1,2,3,4,5, and Eurostat to another: Eurostat 6,7,8,9,10.

What comparison of these two sources of projections shows is the small difference that immigration at levels ranging from zero net to 150,000 per annum would make. Population

would stabilise and then decline in all cases, but at a higher level and later with higher amounts of immigration. The lowest population projection is for a total fertility rate of 1.5, with immigration at 50,000. This low fertility rate is quite possible and already occurs in more than one Western European country. It makes a real difference to the growth trajectory, which would be set for a steep decline. However, in France TFT has returned to 1.70 and above from 1995 to 1998 with figures for 1995: 1.70, 1996: 1.72, 1997: 1.71 and 1998, 1.75 for the past four years. This gives an average of 1.72. The average of 1.72 goes back at least ten years. A number of the projections are based on a total fertility rate of 1.7. (From 1974 to 1998 the average total fertility rate was 1.81) (INSEE, "L'Evolution démographique recent", Population, 1999, no.3. Figures for 1997 and 1998 were still provisional as at 29 June in 1999) In a more unlikely scenario, a total fertility rate of 2.1 would produce a rapidly increasing population. We can see that increased fertility makes all the difference to population growth in the French population. Immigration settings would have to be much higher than ever before settings to make much difference, ludicrously high in the opinion of some. See Henri Leridon's comments in his paper for the French national demographic studies organisation, INED, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes ...", Population et Sociétés, No. 358, June 2000.

The starting populations for these graphs of projections were based on the 1990 census count of the French metropolitan population. Projections based on the 1999 census count might revise the projections slightly **downwards** to take into account the surprisingly small apparent population increase between 1990 and 1999. It is probable that censuses will be henceforth abandoned in France and replaced with rolling counts, supplemented by information on residential building stock.⁴⁹ Assessments based on building stock could be interpreted as an indicator that the French have a marked logistical approach to population policy; that when you have detailed information about residential housing and other building stock, you also have information about your human population numbers and their materials and energy requirements. When the ability to develop land and produce housing is only constrained by the ability to access foreign credit, as in Australia, the same process of reflection does not take place apparently.

The most likely scenario for France, going on current statistical, political and economic trends lies somewhere slightly above the outcome that would be **achieved** with the options of TFT at 1.7 and net immigration at 50,000, using the Eurostat series. With immigration at 50,000 this would give a population in 2040 of 62,000,000, an increase on the 1990 base of 9.6% or 5,423,000 persons. This gives us a French population which would grow slightly more than 5.4 million until around 2040/2050 when there will be a decline with the increasing death rate of the large baby boomer aged cohort.

As will have become clear in my thesis argument, I think that permanent legal immigration in France is structurally limited largely by the availability of housing. Andre Lebon's work reveals, nevertheless, that the real rate of permanent immigration in France is higher than that documented by INSEE in their usual immigration statistics, largely because they do not count the entry of minors⁵¹ when these persons accompany a spouse reuniting with a French national; and refugees and stateless persons. The exception is where a minor between 16 and 18 years of age applies for **work**.⁵¹ The reason is that minors not seeking work and refugees do not pass via the OMI where the medical examination that gives rise to initial statistical documentation takes place. For this reason it is necessary to add to the INSEE numbers a

quantity of immigrants that is impossible to estimate precisely, but which probably runs to several thousand persons.

| NUMBER OF PERSONS | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Members of family uniting with French National | 16,458 | 15,641 | 14,419 | 15,598 | 15,301 |
| Members of family uniting with refugees and stateless persons | | | 1,102 | 991 | 929 |

Table A.4.2. Sources and Numbers for Family Reunion where accompanying children are not counted by INSEE

Source : Lebon, *Immigration et prbsence étrangère en France en 1999*, Documentation Française, 2000, p.31 and p.33.

The above categories of family reunion fall through the INSEE statistical collection net where minors are concerned. This table gives us an idea of the numbers of adults involved. 82% of family uniting with French nationals were spouses, 9 % were parents. 520 persons were minors between the ages of 16 and 18 who were seeking work and who were thus counted.

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| INSEE Net Permanent Migration average from 1990-2000 | 58,181 |
| Assumed average EEC net Migration | 0 |
| Uncounted Children | ? |
| Total Annual Net Permanent Migration | 60,000 - 70,000 |

Table A.4.3. Some assumptions about total net migration underlying assumptions about likeliest population outcomes in 2040.

Source : *Lebon, Immigration etpresence étrangère en France en 1999, Documentation Française, 2000, p.31-33.* Lebon estimates the numbers of adults entering the country in the categories of reunion with a French national or as refugees/stateless persons amounted were between 16,000 and 17,000 between 1995 and 1999. ~~Some~~ or many are accompanied by children. These children are not counted. We have no immigration record of how many of these children remain in France. These minors seem to be the major outstanding uncounted legal permanent immigrants in France whose presence is likely to be a net gain. The other permanent immigrants not documented by INSEE are the majority of EEC immigrants, whose total number I have suggested we assume to be zero net

For the French population to be maintained at its highest level would require 300,000 immigrants annually from 1995, according to the UN Replacement Migration report.⁵²

Leridon says that, even without a single immigrant, the French population will still not begin to diminish before 2025, due to the longevity of the baby boomers.⁵³

INSEE net statistics for immigration over the past ten years were an average of 58,181 migrants per annum. To this I suggest we add zero net EEC immigrants, for reasons already mentioned. If the number of children involved in family reunions with French nationals and refugees were around 10,000 then we would be looking at a total net permanent legal immigration number of about 70,000.

This does not count tourists (running at about 60 million a year, nor illegal immigrants. Like the French government I am assuming that most legal temporary immigrants and tourists return home. Those that change categories legally from temporary to permanent are then picked up by INSEE. My assumption is based on the tight housing logistics. My preference is therefore a scenario with net legal immigration between 60,000 and 70,000 per year in France, which would give a population outcome above 62,000,000, perhaps around 64,000,000.

My evaluation of these projections and opinions was made in the light of my own research into definition, collection, validity and reliability of demographic statistics in France and it is my considered opinion after examination of this data. It concurs with mainstream opinion in France that the general trend is towards stabilisation.

The U.N. Migration Replacement Push and some French Responses

Responses to internationally based pressure to increase immigration are also important sociological indicators of population policy. Since 1974 French, and Western European immigration policy has been predicated on an ideal of zero net. Of course it has been well above this, largely due to European family reunion law and refugee and asylum policy. France and the European Union have been wrestling with the problem of achieving better immigration control as pressures have mounted. Illegal immigration is a third aspect of the problem.

In January 2000 an article issuing from the New York quarters of the United Nations received wide international coverage, particularly in the anglophone media. It canvassed a quite extraordinarily high immigration "solution" to Europe's aging population. Mr Joseph Chamie, Director of the UN Population Division,⁵⁴ was the spokesman for the press release, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations", 6 January, 2000 and for the final report, released on 22 March. The reaction of French demographers to this suggestion was to mock it. The Press was also critical. The press would be prepared to support the regularisation of long term illegal residents, but no-one wants or expects a huge influx of immigrants.

Nevertheless, from a solitary article in Le Monde on 10/1099, "Alain Juppe: Il faut accueillir de nouveaux immigrés" ("We need to take in new immigrants"), there was a small volley of articles from the French Right and business over 2000/2001.⁵⁵ They were not calling for a population building policy however, merely for access to skilled immigrants to be facilitated. In February 2001, however, there was a meeting of European Union heads of government, urgently seeking to co-ordinate border defense of a European space against unwanted immigrants.⁵⁶ The employer associations and the right suddenly were silent.⁵⁷

In my opinion, any attempt to encourage an influx of immigrant workers will once again meet with the logistical housing problems that have presented an obstacle to them in the past. Very well off immigrants, however, will be able to pay for more expensive housing, but they will still not be welcomed in the kinds of large numbers that make the private housing industry lick their lips. There is simply not the room and not the culture to make room.

Conventional and Unconventional Measures of Population Growth

This part of my statistical appendix provides support for the parts of my background theory and argument that refer to **relationships** between economy and energy consumption, land use, and human populations. Here I suggest that, for planning land use, human populations can be more adequately defined by their consumption patterns than by a simple head count.

If you **think** about it, the concept of defining high immigration or low immigration becomes quite problematic. As Castles, Fosters, **Iredale** and Withers write in *Immigration in Australia* (1998),⁵⁸ "whether **permanent** immigration of 85,000 ... is deemed large or small could depend on how it is seen in relation to the size of the prevailing population, or in relation to past immigration, or in relation to current immigration in other countries, or in relation to natural increase." To this could be added, 'in relation to total annual growth'.

Standards that judge immigration size by its relation to population size probably reflect the authors' hope to diminish the apparent impact of immigration and **this** reveals something of their values. Money states at the outset of *Fences and Neighbours* that she would like more immigration in order to give people from poor countries access to better lives,⁵⁹ and the publication of *Immigration in Australia* was partly funded by the Housing Industry of Australia. Both these works rely on measuring numbers of immigrants per head of population under the planned intake immigration program in Australia, inferring that Australia's immigration level has been falling as its population has been rising. If we take this approach to its logical conclusion and start in 1788 with the second European settler, the immigration ratio would have been 100%. Others would point out that Australia's population level has been rising rapidly because of the maintenance of high immigration.

In contrast standards that look at immigration's cumulative contribution to cumulative population increase tend to be focusing on infrastructure provision or environmental impact. Implicit in their tally of numbers of human beings is the average energy requirement of each person's lifestyle according to the economy they live in.⁶⁰

My own argument is that to maintain the same numbers of immigrants (even if their concentration per head of population decreases due to overall population increase) is to maintain the same additional stress to the economy and the environment through the provision of infrastructure as long as the energy cost of a human being remains constant. This would be the case if consumption had remained the same since, say, 1946. This is *not* the case, however, and so, if we are to analyse our unit of measure logically we are obliged to say that year 2000 Australians have a much greater environmental impact than year 1946 Australians. This is borne out by statistics on oil use, land clearing, water consumption and size of houses, among many others." The same is of course true for the French, although their per capita impact is a little more modest than the per capita impact of Australians. This means that in

economies with growth in per capita consumption, recent additions to the population have greater weight than earlier ones, for we can fairly safely assume that immigrants, no matter the humbleness of their origin, will participate in the economy and lifestyles of their adopted country.

In a sense, something has to give in periods of economic stress and materials and energy shortage. I argue in my thesis that after the first oil shock, France attempted to relieve economic stress by diminishing demand on the economy and material and energy resources. Part of this strategy amounted to slowing down population growth. Australia, although it began with a similar strategy, soon resorted to borrowing internationally in order to drive, maintain and satisfy demand and population growth.

Conventional economists already provide a measure by which a per capita value may be assigned to human beings within a certain economy, using the concept of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With **this** method, all economic activity is seen as a positive product and productive humans are our "ultimate resource" in the words of Julian **Simons**.⁶² But, to an environmentalist, this is like announcing profits before you have deducted costs in a business.

The monetary economy **has**, however, been utilised by environmental economists to provide indicators of quality (meaning 'grade') of energy resources to supplement measures of total industrial energy consumption. One group of authors has even come to the conclusion that there has been almost no productivity improvement since the late 1970s, but that an illusory gain has been due to recourse to **higher** and higher grades of energy, at great economic **cost**.⁶³

There have been a number of innovative attempts to conceptualise and redefine the unit measure "human" within the context of energy consumption and environmental impact. This is done by working out the total impact of a national or regional economy and then dividing it by its total population, to attribute an average per capita environmental impact, much in the way that gross domestic product may be converted to a per capita domestic product. In ecology the economic 'plus' of domestic product becomes a 'minus' in terms of energy consumption and pollution output.

In my background theory chapter I explored some **thinking** on this. Below I show how ecological population theories have produced new ways of measuring population, and I discuss the pros and cons of the foundations of some indicators used in my thesis argument.

Demography Related Energy Statistics

Ehrlich's $I = P \times A \times T$:

The first and simplest formula for measuring human units of a population was devised by Paul Ehrlich, where I = Environmental Impact, P = Population Numbers, A = Affluence, T = Technology. It means that Environmental Impact is equal to the number of people multiplied by the amount of energy and other resources they consume multiplied by the kind of technology they use to consume and produce. In order to determine the Affluence and Technology parts of the equation, Ehrlich uses estimates based on indicators for 'per capita use of commercial energy'. A common unit of measurement for this is 'kilograms of oil equivalent'.⁶⁴ The per capita environmental impact of a person using hunter-gatherer

technology to survive is much less than that of a person from an industrialized culture using multiple products created through petroleum or other fossil **fuel** derived energy. Using this approach it is possible to compare populations in 'developed' and 'undeveloped' countries in terms of equivalent numbers of people. For instance, if average annual commercial energy consumption of one Australian is 5,494 kg oil equivalent to one Bangladeshis' at 197 kg oil equivalent, **this** means that, for the energy cost of one Australian, you could in theory, get nearly 28 Bangladeshis. So to determine the population of Australia in Bangladeshi human units you would multiply the population of Australia, which is 19,521,862, by 28, which gives Australia's population as equivalent to 544,432,030 Bangladeshis. Ipso facto, Australia may have an overpopulation problem. France's estimated commercial energy consumption per capita is 4,355 kg oil equivalent, which, divided by 197 gives about 22. With a population numbering **58,882,310** French, France is carrying the equivalent of 1,301,687,614 Bangladeshis (58.8 million x 22). How many Bangladeshis is Bangladesh actually carrying? Approximately 133,997,360.

Technology is another part of the equation. How can we measure this? One indicator that is comparable across nations is Gross Domestic Product earned per kilogram of oil equivalent. A low earning power is indicative of primitive technology, but this is also affected by distance travelled and kinds of industry. Primary, rural industries **give** little for the dollar. Tertiary manufacturing tends to give a better return. State of the art technology that maximises energy extraction from fuel makes a big difference. Good design and insulation of buildings substantially reduces **heating and** air conditioning costs. We can see that France is well ahead of our other selections. French strategies for maximising energy efficiency and for restraining domestic demand from 1973 are an important part of my argument and will be discussed in a later chapter.

Here is a table rating selected countries according to these measures.⁶⁵

| COUNTRY | Per Capita Kg/oil equiv | Population | Bangladeshis equivalent per capita | Bangladeshis equivalent per nation | GDP per kg/oil equiv, \$US |
|---------------|----------------------------|---------------|--|--|----------------------------------|
| United States | 8051 | 284,620,383 | 41 | 11,631,871,592 | 3.4 |
| Canada | 7880 | 31,198,014 | 40 | 1,247,920,560 | 2.5 |
| Australia | 5494 | 19,521,862 | 28 | 544,432,030 | 3.7 |
| France | 4355 | 58,882,310 | 22 | 1,301,687,614 | 6.1 |
| China | 902 | 1,328,006,144 | 5 | 6,080,515,441 | 0.7 |
| India | 476 | 1,044,754,520 | 2 | 2,524,381,480 | 0.8 |
| Bangladesh | 197 | 133,997,360 | 1 | 133,997,360 | 1.7 |

Table A.4.4. Kilogram Oil Equivalent per capita as a measure of population equivalencein selected countries

$$I = P, L, O, T:$$

This formula is a variant on the I=PAT formula and was developed by the Australian CSIRO.⁶⁶ The CSIRO is Australia's major scientific research body. In this formula I = Environmental Impact, P = Population, L = Lifestyle, O = Organization, and T = Technology. Thus, Environmental impact is a function of Population numbers, Lifestyle, Organization, Technology. The formula attempts to recognize the importance of the organization of space and technology as determining factors in the quality and form and environmental impact of human settlement. I do not know of any statistical data published for any national economy under this formula. The formula **highlights**, nevertheless, the importance of factors like distance travelled per capita and transport used.

Ecological Footprint

The 'Ecological **Footprint**'⁶⁷ symbolises the amount of productive land required to sustain human life according to different economies. There are three measurement models, which are still being developed.

The first and oldest method is the ethanol fuel model. Ethanol is an alcohol fuel **which** can be substituted for petrol and other fossil fuels. It can be manufactured from crops. The model attempts to calculate how much land under crops would be required to make the amount of ethanol that would correspond with the estimated amount of energy and materials required for the production of goods and services consumed in an economy. Energy used to transport imported goods is also counted, as is the energy that would be required to produce those goods. If the land required to fuel the economy exceeds the land locally available, then the economy (or nation) has exceeded its carrying capacity, according to these measurements. The unit of measurement is hectares of productive arable land. So an economy **utilises** 'x' numbers of hectares of productive arable land. If you divide the population into the economy you get a human being defined in those terms. What is tricky about this method is locating and evaluating productive arable land.

The authors of the method have created an estimated hierachy of the footprints of **nations**⁶⁸ in hectares per capita (**ha/pc**). Here is a table giving data for our previous selection of countries.

| COUNTRY | Hectares per capita |
|---------------|---------------------|
| Australia | 9.0 |
| Canada | 7.7 |
| United States | 6.7 |
| France | 4.0 |
| China | 1.2 |
| India | 0.8 |
| Bangladesh | 0.5 |

Table A.4.5. Hectares of arable land per capita in selected countries.

With this system of measurement you would get 18 Bangladeshis to one Australian and 8 Bangladeshis to one French person. The amount of hectares per capita arrived at is by converting the country's consumption of energy into hectares of productive arable land. However the energy consumed in a country is not necessarily produced in that country. Australia is a large country, but has little productive arable land in comparison with, say, France or, indeed, Bangladesh. Its **high** hectare per capita rate could be a reflection of imported energy and products. If imports outweigh exports, which is very much the case, this figure could be a reflection of the national debt, which is quite high for a "first world country".

The authors estimate that there are five hectares of productive arable land per capita still available in Australia. This perception does not accord with current local perception of land degradation, including salinisation, topsoil loss, and climatic restraints. Were the authors treating native wildlife habitat where limited human activity takes place as land remaining for economic exploitation? This would mean destruction of numerous world heritage reserves. Retention and enhancement of Australia's remarkable natural biodiversity and wilderness areas needs to be explicitly catered to in any such equation.

The authors do not say how they arrive at their estimates of productive arable land and so it is not possible to utilise these statistics in their present state. Their model does allow for adjustments according to product exported, and this would make a difference to available useful land in the equation, since much of Australia's product is exported (but at low economic value) to overseas populations. I have discussed this issue a little further along under the heading, 'Export Population'.

In addition to the Productive Arable Land method, there is the Carbon Dioxide Emissions method, which looks at how much land needs to be covered by forests in order to absorb the Carbon Dioxide released by energy used in an economy. Here is a ranking of selected economies' per capita output of carbon dioxide (CO₂).⁶⁹

| COUNTRY | Carbon Dioxide Emissions (metric tons) |
|---------------|--|
| United States | 20.0 |
| Canada | 16.7 |
| Australia | 13.7 |
| France | 6.2 |
| China | 2.8 |
| India | 1.1 |
| Bangladesh | 0.2 |

Table A.4.6. Metric tons of per capita Carbon Dioxide emissions in Selected countries


Source: Source: World Development Report 1999/2000, Table 10: World Bank Energy Table.
Information for Total Population figures was from the World Gazetteer, <http://www.gazetteer.de/> last updated on 6/1/2001.

Not surprisingly, the Carbon Dioxide emissions mirror the order of the per capita oil consumption.

The Ecological footprint is notable in that its definition of productivity is not confined to man-made product, but also counts the productivity of natural areas, such as forests for carbon sinks. The greater problem for the future of the planet, according to the Wackernagel team, is the disposal of waste produced by developed nations, for which more biologically productive land than is globally available is required.

The third Footprint method attempts to account for the consumption of fossil fuels in its calculations, using the concept of "phantom land." By "phantom land" it means the productive land of former times, such as the forested land that produced coal during the carboniferous era. It attempts to estimate the amount of land that would have been necessary to produce these fossil fuels in former times. I have no published figures for such calculations.

Howard T. C



Graph A.4.16. Per Capita Energy Statistics for Selected Countries 1996

Source: Source: World Development Report 1999/2000, Table 10: World Bank Energy Table. Information for Total Population figures was from the World Gazetteer, <http://www.gazetteer.de/> last updated on 6/11/2001.

The English speaking seffler countries above all have very high per capita CO₂ emissions and relatively high hectares per capita. As a first world country, France is the odd man out Australia has the highest ratio of Co₂ emissions to kg/oil equivalent per capita consumption and the highest hectares per capita. France, which has the lowest kg/oil equivalent per capita consumption of the developed countries featured here also has the highest GDP per kg/oil equivalent and the lowest CO₂ emissions.

Much of France's superior economic performance can be attributed to substitution of nuclear energy for petroleum based fuel. Comparison of these indicators is a strong indication that France's energy use is more efficient than that of any of the other first world countries. (If gains in efficiency are indeed illusory, ⁷⁰ as has been suggested in a recent paper, or even if only some of them are, then France's superior economic performance could be due largely to population growth restraint and consolidation of resource use, rather than massive gains in fuel efficiency.)

Remarks beyond this about the other countries would need further exploration of their ha per capita footprints. Unfortunately there is insufficient data and detail to test the validity or the reliability and the true meaning of this measure because at present time it is just not sufficiently developed for international comparisons.

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Howard T. Odum's Emergy Evaluation⁷¹:

There is another popular theory for costing energy consumption, known as "eMergy Evaluation". Emergy measures the energy that goes to make a product or service and the measure is usually expressed in terms of solar energy or "emjoules".

The Emergy model utilises an energy hierarchy or order, beginning with solar energy, progressing to tidal and geological 'deep' energy, concluding with life-forms and human informationsystems.




Figure A.4.1 Howard T. Odum's Theory of Emergy Transformity

Source: Howard T. Odum, "Emergy Evaluation", Environmental Engineering Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville 32611, <http://dieoff.org/page170.htm>, downloaded 27/2/2001.

"Transformity" is defined as "the emergy (in emjoules) of one kind of available energy required directly and indirectly (through all the pathways required) to make one joule of energy of another type. The diagram above describes the transformation of energy from solar through ocean (tidal), land (geothermal etc), to bioforms, to fossil fuels (plant and animal in origin) used in the human economy which ultimately produce genetic and shared human information.

The concept of Energy and transformity is geared to encouraging the maximising of efficient economic use of energy using a scientific basis. It can also be used to evaluate an economy and this information can then be translated into per capita terms.

All the methods described above can be criticised for the inaccuracy of generalisations of energy values over different grades of fuel. "Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy," (referred to above) compares energy efficiency in monetary and energy terms between various countries since the first oil shock⁷². It comes to a conclusion that more efficient evaluations result if the financial cost of different grades of energy products is also taken into account, because prices reflect quality. This work has yet to be refined and replicated. However, at the present time, thermal measures (calories, joules, kg/oil equivalent etc.) are the best we have.

'Export Population':

The methods above have the advantage of permitting a further concept of population, that which I have called the "Export Population". By this I mean a population that lives by the produce of a regional economy, such as France's or Australia's, but which is not located on French or Australian territory. Such a population could be reconstructed approximately by looking at the quantity of food and fiber we export and calculating how many people it might feed and clothe. For instance it was stated in the Australian Population 'Carrying Capacity' Report⁷³ that Australia produces food for 50,000,000 people and fiber (clothing) for 300,000,000. Consideration was given to the idea that this overseas population (the export market) drew on the carrying capacity of the land and thus could be considered to constitute part of the population it supports in **addition** to the 'local market'."

Conclusion on Projections for France and Australia

France's recent history is a strong indicator that population growth is unlikely to accelerate in the next half century. Between 1946 and 2001, France's population grew by 18,914,482 persons, or by 47.13 %. From 1946 to 1974 (28 years) it grew by 25.4%. From 1974 to 2001 (27 years) it grew by 17.32%. Between the year of the base population for these projections, 1990, and 2001 France's population has grown by 2,462,713 people or approximately 4.35%, or an average of 0.39% per annum from 56,577,000 in 1990 to 59,039,713. France's growth up to 1974 was affected by both the high fertility of the baby boom and high immigration. After 1974 the contribution of both these factors declined sharply. Increased longevity means that the population remains large, although its base is reducing. If we consider that the Baby Boom went from 1947 to about 1966, and assume longevity of between 80 and 85 years, then between 2027 and 2051 the baby boomer generation will die off. With no other changes this will leave the French population several millions smaller. Since France, like most Western European countries is under considerable environmental stress due to the intensity of land use required by its economy, a smaller population even with similar per capita footprints would lessen this stress and the long-term need for greater infrastructure and technology for the maintenance of the population and its economy. If, as seems likely, petroleum based fuels become rarer and more expensive, France is ahead of a lot of other countries, including Australia, in the spatial organisation, planning and technology


for transport and other built infrastructure **mediating** economic and personal fuel needs. It currently has access to alternative fuel sources and technologies and potentially to others.

Australia's recent history is a strong indicator that population growth is likely to remain rapid or accelerate in the next half century. Between 1946 and 2001, Australia's population grew by 11,849,099 persons, or by 157.58%. From 1946 to 1974 it grew by 85.76%. From 1974 to 2001 it grew by 38.65%. Between the year of the French base projections, 1990 and 2001 Australia's population has grown by approximately 12.8% from 17,169,800 to 19,368,345 or an average of 1.6% per annum. Australia's growth, up to 1966 was affected by baby boom high fertility and high net migration. Although fertility declined rapidly **after** this, the **high** immigration continued. With increasing longevity this means that the population has continued to expand rapidly. We can assume that most of the Australian baby boomers will die between 2027 and 2051. If high immigration continues, however, the population will have continued to expand and will require more intense land-use, more infrastructure, and more technology to maintain its economy, even with similar per capita footprints. With exponentially expanding **drylands** salinity and other forms of desertification, plus massively degraded waterways, together with micro-climate changes brought about by local vegetation removal (without considering the possibility of macro-global climate changes) it is difficult to see how such a large population will survive without severe declines in quality of life, standard of living, health and longevity. **As** well **as** other bio-diversity die-off, the chances seem high for considerable human die-off due to the effect of desertification on the economy and environment. Petroleum based energy shortages are likely both to increase poverty and misery as cheap fuel becomes much less accessible to ordinary citizens. Pollution is likely to increase as coal and other lower grade fuels are substituted, since Australia has not invested in alternative energy sources. Poor design of built and transport infrastructure will add to the difficulty in reducing and satisfying energy demand for both personal and economic use.

Some Supplementary Information

Australia: Australian States and Territories: Overseas Migration and Total Population Growth Rates 1986-1999

Note that natural increase varies substantially between different Australian states and territories.



Graph A.4.17. Australia: Natural Increase for different States and Territories for the years ending June 1995-2000

The different colours illustrate different years. We can see from this graph that the Northern Territory has the highest birth rate. This is probably to do with the comparatively large proportion of the population which is Aboriginal, and has a higher birthrate than other Australians. Aboriginals are also comparatively numerous in Queensland, the ACT and West Australia, but their presence is dwarfed by the non-aboriginal proportion of the population in those States. All State and Territory birthrates are trending down, however.


Graphs A.4.18 - k4.25 below show rates of growth by overseas migration and total population growth in various States of Australia. Note that the total population growth includes interstate migration as well as the balance of births and deaths.

Sources for all the following State Graphs were: ABS Demographic Statistics 3101, "Percentage rates of resident population growth" at Year ending June. (Net Overseas Migration is adjusted for category jumping)




Graph AA.18. Victoria: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages

As in Sydney, in most years, Overseas immigration accounts for much of Victoria's population growth. It's role has declined recently, probably because of the role of increasing interstate migration.




Graph A.4.19. New South Wales: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages


We can see here that, for most years, more than half of the population growth rate is composed of overseas immigration, in this the largest city in Australia.




Graph A.4.20. Tasmania: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages



Graph A.4.21. South Australia: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages




Graph A.4.22. West Australia: **Overseas Migration** Rate and Total Annual **Population Growth** Rate as Percentages




Graph A4.23. Northern Territory: **Overseas Migration** Rate and Total Annual **Population Growth** Rate as Percentages

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Graph A.4.24. Australian Capital Territory: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages



Graph A.4.25. Australia: Overseas Migration Rate and Total Annual Population Growth Rate as Percentages

NOTES FOR APPENDIX 4

¹ Francis Ronsin, *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours : données démographiques et affrontements idéologiques*, Seuil, October 1997, p. 37. This is one of few sources where one will find a direct statement to the effect that the ban on immigration did not include persons from inside the EEC.

² The *préfectures* may have kept some records of work permits that were issued to EEC nationals, but there are no official records of this until 1990 when a series called AGDREF was commenced by the Minister for the Interior. AGDREF stand for L'application informatique de gestion des dossiers des ressortissants étrangers en France - Computerised Management of Files for Foreigners in France. Source: Andre Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France en 1997/1998*, Documentation Française, December 1998, p. 8.

³ For instance, in Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, De *L'immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, p.89, Table 2, "Family reunion (ONI) and schooling in reception classes for public education". (Regroupement familiale (ONI) et scolarisation en classes d'accueil pour l'enseignement public (1970-1987), note 3, "From 1975, members of families from the EEC were not counted in these figures" (My translation).

⁴ For confirmation of these peculiarities of the French statistical concept and recorded data see, Andre Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France en 1999*, Documentation Française, p.22, (My translation): "Nationals from the European Economic Zone : The free circulation from which benefit nationals from this zone, within which the seat of the European Union is located (made up of 18 and 15 States respectively, including France [SIC]) and the consecutive discontinuation of the medical examination, interrupted - in the course of the expansion of these zones - statistical recording by the OMI of those entering France. *The* only [EEC nationals] still recorded by that agency are those permanent salaried workers formally engaged by their employers in an employment contract". Here he also gives details of the numbers of EEC nationals formally processed by the OMI in the past few years.

⁵ On 29 April 1976 a government decree had made family reunion "a right that could not be opposed by the State. (*Histoire de la population française, Vol.4, de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, p. 481) In another attempt to limit family migration to France, the government attempted to reverse that decision with another decree on 10 November 1977. But on 6 December 1978, this decree was annulled by the Counsel of State which agreed with the first decree that had declared family reunion to be a human right beyond the reach of national law (due to over-riding international [European] law). Source: *Histoire de la population française, Vol.4, de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, p.480-481 and *Encyclopaedia Universalis* 3 (Electronic Version) "Droits de l'Homme" and "Convention Européenne" and "Traité de Rome": For the notion of "human rights" is not just a philosophical one in the context of French law. France is party to international laws that over-ride national law on issues of Human Rights and these include The European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties, created by the European Counsel on 4 November 1950, effective from 3 September 1953 (but only ratified by France in 1973), The *European Social Charter* 1961, effective from 1965, and the *Act of Helsinki August 1975 (issuing from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975)*. France is also signatory to the *European Agreement on the Status of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (1977) and the *International Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of Immigrant Workers and their Families* (UN, 1978). All these agreements contain defenses of family reunion and are influential on France but the European Convention has teeth in the form of the Court of Human Rights and other juridical structures.

⁶ The legislation was not qualified with conditions or limits, and allowed any foreigner, legally 'permanently' resident in France, to bring his family over. They would then also be entitled to all the rights of foreigners who are legally resident, including the right to work. To avoid running afoul of this law, attempts were made to limit the right to residence rather than the right to work, involving exploitation of the issue of housing, which had been associated with the family reunion laws from 1946.

The family reunion right was administered with the following restrictions: the foreign worker must guarantee that his lodgings are suitable for his family; in compensation for the rent he pays whilst awaiting the arrival of his family, he receives a premium of 1000 francs. (Source: Patrick Weil, *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, pp 99-100)

A circular dated 10 June 1981 abolished the requirement that non-EC families must make their application to reside in France from their country of origin [via the OMI]. The incidence of persons entering France on a Tourist visa, but with the intention of making the application for residence from within France was observed then to increase. So from 4 December 1984 applications for family reunion (from non EC nationals) were again processed via the OMI. Effectively they must to be made from outside France so that applicants were in a position to be refused. This was so as to avoid deportations where applicants were unsuccessful but were already in France. Inspections could be made by the OMI of the conditions awaiting the prospective family. (Patrick Weil, *La France et ses immigrés*, Calmann-Levy, 1991, p.173)

From 1984 temporary cards were issued to family members visiting temporary migrants (stamped "member of family"). (Source: Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, No.4886, 1989, p.64.)

At the close of the 20th century there were only five reasons that partners and minor children might be denied a French residents' permit:

1. If joining an illegal or temporary (less than one year) migrant
2. If the person they are joining did not have the [stable and sufficient] means to support their family
3. If housing was inappropriate
4. If the presence of a member or members of the family would present a threat to public order

If there was illness or sickness which could place public health, public order, or public safety at risk (Source: Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, No.4886, 1989, p.64.)

⁷ Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, No.4886, 1989, p. 31.

⁸ Jaques Dupâquier, *Morales et Politiques d'Immigration*, Politique d'Aujourd'hui, PUF, Paris, 1997, p.28.

⁹ Andre Lebon, *Migrations et Nationalité en France* 1998, Documentation Française, December 1999, Appendix 3, "The French population overseas", pp 61-63.

¹⁰ Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France de la fin du XIXe siècle à nos jours*, Armand Colin, 1996; Jaqueline Costa-Lascoux, *De L'Immigré au citoyen*, Documentation Française, Paris, 1989, Jacques Dupâquier, *Histoire de la population française, Vol.4, de 1914 à nos jours*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1988; In Ed. Jaques Dupâquier, *Morales et politiques d'immigration*, Politique d'Aujourd'hui, PUF, 1998: Tribalat, "De la Necessite de reformuler la question de l'immigration en France", pp45-76, Lebon, "Comment Mesurer les flux migratoires?", pp27-44.

¹¹ Some publications reporting on Le Bras' criticisms were: *Le Nouvel Observateur*, No. 1776, 19-25 November, 1998, pp116-118, U. Gauthier, "Des derapages racises a l'INED?"; *Le Monde*, 6 November 1998, pp.1 and 10, Philippe Bernard, Nicolas Weil, "Les Demographes sont en guerre".

¹² See for example, Jaques Dupaquier, (Ed.), *Morales et Politiques d'Immigration*, Politique d'Aujourd'hui, PUF, Paris, 1997, Michele Tribalat, "De la necessite de reformuler la question de l'immigration en France."

¹³ Illegal immigration is also an issue, with human rights concerns about the lack of rights of a small illegal subclass of workers in France.

¹⁴ Charles Price, *Immigration and Ethnicity, The Work of Charles Price*, Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Canberra, 1996, p.1.

¹⁵ Andre Lebon, *Immigration et prksence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, Documentation Frangaise, December 1998; *Migrations et Nationalité' en France 1998*, Documentation Frangaise, December 1999; *Immigration et prksence étrangère en France en 1999, premiers enseignements du recensement*, Documentation Frangaise, December 2000.

¹⁶ The ONI (*Office Nationale des Immigrations* - National Office for Immigration) was created by the French government in 1945. It was given a monopoly over the recruitment of foreign labor and facilitated family reunion into France. (Sources: Weil, Costa-Lascoux). I have been unable to ascertain exactly when or the reason why the name was changed to OMI (*Office des Migrations Internationales* - Office of International Migration.)

¹⁷ James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States, The political Economy of Postwar Europe*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.57. On this page he cites a figure for France in 1956. This comes from ONI "Total permanent entries" for 1956 or 1957 - Hollifield does not give the starting date for the statistics he is using. His accompanying observation that it was not until 1987 that the figure exceeded that of 1956 is incomprehensible and most probably a mistake. More precise statistical referencing would have assisted the reader and the argument.

¹⁸ Andre Lebon, *Immigration et presence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarite, Documentation Frangaise, Paris, 1998, p.8.

¹⁹ Andre Lebon, *Immigration et Presence Etrangere en fiance 1997/1998*, Ministere de l'Emploi et Solidarite, Documentation Francaise, Paris, Dec. 1998, p. 29.

²⁰ Source: *Population Flows, Immigration Aspects*, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, December 1999, p.13.

²¹ Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors, The political geography of immigration control*, Cornell University Press, 1999, pp168-169.

²² Source: ABS, glossaries at the end of Australian Demographic Statistics quarterly publications, cat. No. 3101.0 and personal experience of filling out these documents.

²³ Although I described the terms previously, I shall just repeat them as a footnote : In Australia since 1958, "permanent" has been self-defined by immigrants stating their intention to reside "permanently" in Australia. "Long-term" is for those intending to stay for a year or more but not to stay permanently.²³ Adjustment for category jumping takes account of changes of intention and behaviour.

²⁴ Charles Price, "Net Immigration and Population Growth, *People and Place*, Vol. 1, no.3, Pp32-35. Demographer, Charles Price argues that this is the most reliable measure of migration.

²⁵ Charles Price, *Immigration and Ethnicity, The Work of Charles Price*, Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Canberra, 1996, ISBN 0 642 26000 1, pp.18-19 and "Net Immigration and population growth, *People and Place*, vol.1, no.3, pp32-35.

²⁶ Andre Lebon, *Immigration etpresence étrangère en France 1997/1998*, Ministere de l'Emploi et de la Solidarite, Documentation Frangaise, Paris, 1998, p.8.

²⁷ Application Informatique de Gestion des Dossiers des Ressortissants Etrangers en France (AGDREF): Computerised data from files on Foreign persons administered by the Minister for the Interior. One interrupted series dates from 1994 and 1995 and another later one, now ongoing, dates from 1996. Most of these statistics come from the police departments that renew immigrants' work permits. See more in the Appendix on French immigration.

²⁸ EEC immigrants may freely enter France and seek work, however, when they have found work they are expected to register for work permits. This is as much a tax consideration as an immigration indicator.

²⁹ The Schengen Treaty permits foreigners to travel, visa free, between Germany, Spain, France and Portugal if these foreigners have already obtained the right to visit one of these countries. Under this agreement the right to stay in any or all of these countries is limited to less than three months. A major purpose of the agreement was to stop travellers from spending up to three months in each country, consecutively. The agreement only applies to travellers having permission to visit, not to work.

³⁰ Dupaquier, *Morales et Politiques d'Immigration*, Politique d'aujourd'hui, PUF, Paris, 1997, p.34-35.

³¹ Lebon, *Immigration et presence étrangère en France en 1999*, Documentation Française, 2000, p.31-33

³² Source: <http://Nwww.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PRATIQUE/CHIFRREF.HTM>, "Les chiffres de reference: La France en chiffres: L'INSEE", 11/22/97.

³³ French Tourist Bureau, Sydney, Australia. Tel. (02)92315244 Information given over telephone by Bernard Roucaud. His information obtained from Direction du Tourism, Observatoire Nationale du Tourisme, 2 rue l'Inois, 75740 Paris, CEDEX 15.

³⁴ Data is collected on a monthly basis from hotels and camping areas, so it would be possible to estimate a total population in addition to the national census data but this is not formally done and it can be said that the French system does not calculate the total population in the sense accorded to this term in Australian demography. Figures arrived at by adding data about tourist stays and short term visa holders will lack both reliability and validity, due to different methods of collecting data. Another problem is that According to Suzanne Thave, Head of the Statistical Service on Foreigners at INSEE, although the Minister for the Interior (who is the minister responsible for Immigration in France) keeps records on the number of foreigners living in France with temporary (less than one year) visas, these records do not count children and present problems of comparison with census data. Email from l'INSEE, dated 18/1/99, 17:32:41 from Suzanne Thave in response to questions. Suzanne Thave is Chef du service des statistiques sur les etrangers at INSEE, 18 bd. Adolphe Pinard, 75676 Paris CEDEX 14, Tel 0141175391.

INSEE does however use several other sources to supplement census data. It describes these as "data from registry office (tat-civil), family benefits allocations, electricity accounts, electoral information, and extrapolation on past trends". The registry office data - births, deaths and marriages - is a way of monitoring the 'movement' of the population. Letter from l'INSEE, 21/12/98, Ref. 24-No3., from Annie Rousset at INSEE Office 50 Avenue Garibaldi -87031 LIMOGES CEDEX. "L'INSEE se base sur les recensements de la population, et publie regulierement des estimations de population pour lesquelles il utilise plusieurs sources: Etat-civil, fichiers des caisses d'allocations familiales et des abonnées electriques, donnees electorales, et prologation des tendances passees."

³⁵ On that basis the number would be around 300,000 in 1997-8, according to the rate of amnesty applications over that period.

³⁶ Mark J Miller, "Employer Sanctions in France", US Commission of Immigration Reform, 2430 E Street, NW, South Building, Washington DC, 1995

³⁷ Ronsin, F., *La Population de la France de 1789 à nos jours*, Seuil, October 1997, personal communication, email, Tuesday 8 December 1998. "Il faut faire tres attention a distinguer les immigrés et les étrangers. Les immigrés sont nés hors de France sans être Français. Ils vivent en France et certains d'entre eux peuvent être devenus Français, ils restent aussi immigrés. Les étrangers ne sont pas Français mais ils peuvent être nés en France et, même, leur famille peut avoir vécu en France depuis plusieurs générations. Tous les étrangers ayant résidé en France moins de 3 mois (travailleurs, étudiants, touristes...), qui, donc, n'ont pas besoin d'une carte de résident, ne sont pas recensés.

³⁸ From a copy of the 1990 census provided to me by Annie Rousset, Service Etudes Diffusion, INSEE, 50 avenue Garibaldi, 87031 Limoges CEDEX, accompanied by a letter dated 11/1/99 Ref 24-No36/SED.

³⁹ These are my own calculations based on Net Total Immigration, which(define). However, when I quote ABS projections I am citing the measure they use, which is "Net Overseas Migration". In the case of projections the difference doesn't really matter, because no attempt is being made to measure actual immigration, which is where operational definitions become problematic.

⁴⁰ For Graphs A.4.8, A.4.9 and A.4.10, sources for Net Total Migration, Natural Increase and Total Annual Population figures for Australia data were Total population figures from 1978 to 1999 are from Demographic Statistics, ABS, Cat no 3101.0.

Figures for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994

Figures for 1945 to 1951 are from Demography 1954, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. Natural increase figures were updated from ABS 3101.0 June 114 2000 from 1994 and had changed upwards due to the practice of using occurrence based data whereby figures are from registrations of births and deaths of which there is often a delay from quarter to quarter.

(Total population at 31st of December of the year named)

Sources for French data for net migration, natural increase and total annual population figures were from 1946-1990: Roselyne Kerjosse, Irène Tamby: "La situation démographique en 1994: mouvement de la population", Institution national des études économiques(INSEE) Paris, 1996, 264P.: carte, graph, Tableau; 30 cm, Tableau 3, "Evolution de la population totale depuis 1946, Evaluation fondée sur les résultats des recensements de 1946 à 1990." Data source for 1987-1997 was INSEE: "France Métropolitaine, Indicateurs démographiques 1987 à 1997", but some of these figures were revised from 1992, when my total population figures also came from INSEE but were taken from their net site on [wysiwyg://58/http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/pop_age3.htm](http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/pop_age3.htm) and differ slightly from the ones preceding due to retrospective adjustments reflecting the results from the 1999 census.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid*

⁴³ At a conference at the Australian National University, "The Transformation of Australia's Population 1970-2030", McDonald said that the figure of 1.6 TFR was not the result of a complex calculation. He indicated that it was something of a stab in the dark.

⁴⁴ See DIMA, Population Flows, Immigration Aspects, December 1999, p.10, Figs 1.21 and 1.22, which provide comparisons between ABS and DIMA projections.

⁴⁵ K. Betts, "Immigration: Public Opinion and Opinions About Opinion", *People and Place*, vol. 8, no.3, 2000, pp60-67.

⁴⁶ Trevor Sykes, *The Bold Riders*, Allen and Unwin, second edition, 2000, p.24 and p26, [After the share market collapse of "Black Tuesday" 21 September 1987] ... "many of the cowboys plunged into the commercial property market, oblivious to the lesson of history that a share market collapse is usually followed a year or two later by a property collapse."

⁴⁷ Note that France may have comparatively high TFRs for Europe due to measures to assist female participation in the workforce so as to maintain women's consumer power, on the theory that women would forgo children in order to maintain purchasing power. Examples of important measures in France are subsidising child care facilities and **harmonising** school hours and child care with work hours. Australia, however, has very few comparable provisions to support maternal independence and consumer power and therefore may well follow the lower TFR European trends rather than France's.

⁴⁸ These later ten projections were prepared by Annie Mesrine, Direction des **statistiques démographiques** et sociales, Department de la **démographie**, Division **Enquêtes** et études démographiques. The file had been prepared for the attention of Mme Artiguebaille, conseil économique et social, Paris. File sent to me by Suzanne Thave, Head of the Statistical Service on Foreigners at INSEE, dated and identified as Paris, 7 September 1998, No.69/F171.

⁴⁹ See INSEE working paper on this: "Post 2000 Census Research Project in INSEE" by Michel Isnard, INSEE - Timbre F040, 18 Bd A.Pinard, 7675 Paris Cedex 14, France, Tel +33 1 41 17 67 67; Fax +33 1 41 17 52 79 Email: michel.isnard@insee.fr

⁵⁰ Minors - persons less than 18 years old

⁵¹ Andre Lebon, *Immigration et présence étrangère en France en 1997/1998*, Documentation Française, December 1998, p.19.

⁵² Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000. This is a French INED demographer's article criticising the UN Replacement Migration Report - released on 22 March 2000 by Mr Joseph Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147.

⁵³ Henri Leridon, "Vieillesse démographique et migrations: quand les Nations unies veulent remplir le tonneau des Danaïdes...", *Population & Sociétés*, No. 358, Juin 2000.

⁵⁴ Mr Joseph Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, tel: (212) 9633179, Fax. 212 963 2147. The UN seems to be becoming an agent for populationism lately. It relies so heavily on US funding and that funding has increasing strings attached by the American congress, which seems to be held hostage by a pronatalist, anti-abortion and growthist right.

⁵⁵ *Le Monde* 11-12 février 2001, Danielle Rouard, "En Italie, les patrons militent en faveur d'un relèvement des quotas d'entrées pour les étrangers" and Caroline Monnot et Sylvia Zappi, "La pénurie de main-d'œuvre relance le débat" in *Le Monde*, 11-12 February 2001.

⁵⁶ Philippe Lemaitre, "Les Pays de l'UE luttent contre la pression migratoire", *Le Monde*, 11-12 February 2001.

⁵⁷ *Le Monde* 11-12 February, 2001, "Le Medef modère son avis sur un sujet politiquement sensible" from "our correspondent".

⁵⁸ Castles, Fosters, Iredale and Withers, *Immigration and Australia, Myths and realities*, Allen and Unwin in conjunction with the Housing Industry of Australia, 1998, pp 6-7.

⁵⁹ Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors, The political geography of immigration control*, Cornell University Press, 1999 p.x. However she does not explore the alternative of foreign aid, which is potentially much more effective value for dollar.

⁶⁰ See, for instance K. Betts, *The Great Divide*, Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999 and Mark O'Connor, *This Tired Brown Land*, Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999.

⁶¹ As well as the statistics I give here and in the other parts of my thesis, a good source is the Australian *State of the Environment Report* 1996. State of the Environment: 1996 (prepared by the State of the Environment Advisory Council, chaired by Ian Lowe), CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 1996. Also cited by Katharine Betts in *The Great Divide*, Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999, pp 43-46.

⁶² Julian Simons, *The Ultimate Resource*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 1981.

⁶³ C.J. Cleveland, R.K. Kaufmann, D.I. Stern, "Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy," *Ecological Economics* 32 (2000) 301-317, <http://www.dieoff.org/cleveland.pdf>. Their (fascinating) work has been criticised in an unpublished document for a circularity of definition of economic indicators of fuel quality and for the lack of comparability of international data used in some graphs.

⁶⁴ Source: World Development Report 1999/2000, 1996 figures. A kilogram of oil equivalent means that when you burn a substance this gives you the energy that you would get from burning a kilogram of oil. "Commercial energy" excludes primitive fuels, like dried cow pats, gathered wood, etc., because information is not available on quantities used. Defining a kilogram of oil equivalent is not really simple; measures vary between countries and agencies. Oil comes in many grades and not all grades cost the same amount because they don't all give out the same amount of energy. We have to take this measure as an approximate one. The consumption of national economies tends to be measured in metric tons. Kilograms of oil are utilised for per capita estimates. Not all agencies measure in kilograms (or metric tons); there are some other complex and specialist methods, which are extremely difficult to convert. Up until the 1980s the major unit of measurement was kilograms of coal equivalent. Conversions of historical records are quite difficult because coal also varies in its burning qualities.

⁶⁵ The population figures are from The World Gazetteer, <http://www.gazetteer.de/>. Most are for the year 2000. The GDP per kg oil equivalent and the per capita kg oil equivalent figures come from the *World Bank Development Report 1999/2000*, Selected World Development Figures: Environment: Table 10, "Energy Use and Emissions" (1996 data).

⁶⁶ Introduced in the CSIRO submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies Inquiry into Australia's Population Carrying Capacity, Volume 5, 1994.

⁶⁷ Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint*, New Catalyst, Bioregional Series, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, B.C., Canada, 1996.

⁶⁸ Source: <http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/rio/focus/report/english/footprint/>

⁶⁹ Source: Selected World Development Indicators, "Environment", World Development Report, 1999/2000.

⁷⁰ C.J. Cleveland, R.K. Kaufmann, D.I. Stern, "Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy," *Ecological Economics* 32 (2000) 301-317, <http://www.dieoff.org/cleveland.pdf>

⁷¹ For more information see H.T. Odum, *Environmental Accounting, Emergy and Decision Making*, John Wiley, New York, 1996. There is also a refereed paper which compares energy efficiency in *emergy* terms between various countries since the first oil shock, C.J. Cleveland, R.K. Kaufmann, D.I. Stern, "Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy," *Ecological Economics* 32 (2000) 301-317, <http://www.dieoff.org/cleveland.pdf>

⁷² C.J. Cleveland, R.K. Kaufmann, D.I. Stern, "Aggregation and the role of energy in the economy," *Ecological Economics* 32 (2000) 301-317, <http://www.dieoff.org/cleveland.pdf>

⁷³ Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Long Term Strategies: *Australia's 'Carrying Capacity' : One Nation - two ecologies*, December 1994, AGPS, Canberra, P. 90, "Enquiry witness Dr Howard Dengate argued that Australia is, through its exports, already feeding 50 million and clothing 300 million people in other countries ... The calculation is based on subsistence conversion factors such as 250 kg of wheat per person per year."

⁷⁴ House of Representatives Standing committee for Long Term Strategies, Inquiry into Australia's Population Carrying Capacity, Melbourne, Friday, 29 July 1994, *Official Hansard Report*, Canberra, p.126, recording Chairman Barry Jones' remarks.

APPENDIX 5

POPULATION THEORIES

APPENDIX 5.....1

POPULATION THEORIES.....1

 Thomas Malthus1

 Colbertisme.....2

 Darwin.....3

 Marx and Engels.....3

 The Chicago School.....4

 Cornucopians.....4

Thomas Malthus

Population science has its roots in biology and economics. To understand the concept of population policy I first went to the original populariser of the notion, Thomas Malthus, who had his feet in both camps. It is easy to see why the evolutionary theories of Darwin, Wallace, and other natural scientists, were inspired by Malthus' work and why modern biological natural sciences continue to be informed by it. Other species have not acquired sophisticated technology and therefore their habitat demands have not changed. In contrast, most modern economic theory has little place for Malthus, or for biology for that matter, except where the latter may return a financial profit, in medicine or agriculture for instance. Recent economic discussion of Malthus's work, especially his essays on population, tends to overlook the biological character of his theories, which define the world, to some degree, in terms of vegetable and animal. Since humans have acquired more and more technology, their spatial habitat needs have changed. In recent times, however, a new body of "eco-malthusian" theory has evolved.* What is often forgotten, it seems, by many modern economists, is that humans may wish to preserve old and new habitat choices for aesthetic, spiritual and, moreover, for survival reasons, since our bodies may not be able to deal with continuing large scale radical changes. The human immune system is still adapted to deal with the organisms humans co-evolved with and massive biodiversity disorganisation may lead to fast evolving small organisms, such as insects, bacteria and viruses, out-competing human beings.² This is one of the concerns of eco-malthusians.

The major works which have informed my understanding of Malthus's **original** theories are Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* and *A Summary View of the Principle of Population; The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn* and *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*.³

Malthus was primarily an economist and his works on **profit**⁴ and the corn laws (about importing versus self sufficiency, or, as we know it, liberal economics versus protectionism) are complimented by his demographic work.⁵ It needs to be borne in mind that his arguments were conceived in the context of an agricultural economy where industrial manufacturing was only just beginning to be experienced as a political force. In his essay, *Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, Malthus made the point strongly that it was only where profits were considerable on agricultural product, that agriculture would expand into marginal lands. (He linked expansion into marginal lands with eventual increases in production.) Where profit was low, the cost of **extending agriculture** was too high. Because of this relationship, farmers tended to concentrate production into the most high yielding areas of their properties. Malthus thought that it was desirable to encourage farmers to make more of their land productive. In his opinion, to get them to expand their productive area required some amount of protectionism and the encouragement of national self sufficiency, with government able to oversee the security of the production of staples.

Such a strategy was designed for the purpose of assuring a dependable market for agriculturalists, so that they would keep producing and expanding. Ensuring agricultural production meant that food and other necessities of life provided through agriculture would be available to citizens. Efficient agriculture meant that society could raise itself above mere subsistence. Malthus was not against external trade or overseas expansion (which in those days included **colonisation**).⁶ The demographic part of his theory was that the population of a nation neither outstrip its food and staple resources nor become too numerous to be in a position to bargain for a living wage, nor too small to make farming too expensive for it to be worthwhile to landowners. The reason that staples should not be imported was that this might drive down prices for agricultural profit and thus cause a reduction in cultivated land. Then, if there was a war or the currency of a country fell in value, either of these **things** might make it impossible for the people of the nation to buy staples on an international market. If farmers had also stopped producing or increasingly restricted production to their best land, local supply could also become inadequate.

This view suited early Australian settlers in a pioneering **agricultural** economy where Malthus's protectionist theories lacked the opposition provided in England by a rising industrial manufacturing sector. Protectionism dominated Australian **agricultural** and foreign policy from early times, and, until the 1980s or thereabouts, provided common ground for both labour and capital. Since the 1980s the Australian economy has become more liberalised and **globalised**.⁷

Colbertisme

In France (and Europe) the economy has maintained more Malthusian characteristics⁸ (often described as **Colbertiste**⁹ by the French) than Australia's, particularly since 1974, in respect both to agricultural protectionism, energy self-sufficiency, and demographic stabilisation. French agriculturalists are of course famous for their lobbying to keep French pricing protective towards French agricultural production and consumption.

It is because of these differences that I have gone to some trouble here to define some of Malthus's economic theory because it is my impression, as I argue in my thesis, that France's politics have retained many Malthusian characteristics, whereas Australia's have tended more and more towards the "cornucopian".

Colbert's protectionist ideas preceded Malthus's by more than a century and differed mainly in the value Colbert assigned to population building for national defence purposes.¹⁰ Although Malthus would have acknowledged the need to provide labor to colonies in order to exploit them, Colbert went to extraordinary pronatalist lengths - fining the parents of unmarried men and women of a certain age, offering bounties to persons bearing more than 10 children in the colonies, and forcing nubile young women in French prisons to emigrate to the colonies. In fact, compared to the British, the French had persistent problems populating their colonies. Whereas Britain felt the need to rid herself of "excess population" by sending it to the colonies, France's population size was distressingly small, having remained around 20 millions for several centuries, and the French were reluctant to emigrate.¹¹

Darwin

Darwin, Wallace and other natural scientists were inspired by Malthus' work. So were economists at one time. Contemporary documents indicate that Malthus' views impacted strongly on early Australian culture and were reinforced later by Darwin's theories.¹² When academic 'political economists' in Australia abandoned the Malthusian principles of protectionism and demographic prudence, these nevertheless continued to underpin the world view of much of the Australian scientific (natural sciences) community as well as popular political and economic sentiment.¹³ One reason Malthus's theories lost favor in Britain was the rise in importance of the industrial manufacturing sector, which began to overshadow Britain's **agricultural** economy in the 19th century. With this, mainstream 'Western' economic discussion evolved away from Malthus, via Ricardo. (Malthus is generally characterised as being preoccupied with supply, whereas his friend, Ricardo, wrote about **distribution**.)¹⁴ Mainstream scientific evolutionary discussion, however, continued to build on Malthus via **Darwin**.¹⁵ A gulf has developed between thinking and values in the economic and natural science disciplines. Outside the United States, sociology found a third way, via **Marx's** theories, which were in opposition to Malthus's.

But to return to Malthusian thinking in Malthus's era: a final factor in that agricultural society that united his economic theory with demographics was his observation that the reproductive capacity of the vegetable kingdom was limited to the availability and productivity of arable land, and that humans and other animals would always multiply to the limits of the available food supply if nothing else stopped this trend. In Malthus's time, disease and famine were major impediments to growth in Europe, but humans have since been able to overcome many of the limitations these imposed, with medicine and the agricultural revolution. Most of these benefits humans have kept for themselves and they have sequestered more and more territory from other species to maintain their growing number and constantly expanding activities.

Marx and Engels

Marx and **Engels** believed that Malthus's demographic theories were specious **and** designed to maintain the dominance of the ruling classes over the **workers**.¹⁶ By inference, Malthus's thesis was manufactured to fit his own ruling-class motives. **Marx** wrote that an abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only and only insofar as man has not interfered with

them.¹⁷ Engels wrote "Of the Darwinian theory I accept the theory of evolution but only take Darwin's method of proof (struggle for life, natural selection) as the first, provisional and incomplete expression of a newly discovered **fact**."¹⁸

Essentially, Marx was preoccupied with the distribution of wealth rather than the problem of supply and saw wealth uniquely as that produced by human effort. The source of wealth was taken for granted : "The productive power at the disposal of mankind is immeasurable. The productivity of the land can be *infinitely* [my emphasis] increased by the application of capital, labor and **science**."¹⁹

The Chicago School

In the United States the Chicago school of sociology, influenced by Thorstein Veblen's theories that "barbarian" culture prevailed in modern societies visited the themes of urbanism and land speculation, noting distressing trends, but ultimately placing their faith in the laissez-faire system of the American **Dream**.²⁰ The Chicago School, which dominated sociology in America up to the 1930s was biologically oriented and influenced Spencer's interpretation of Malthusian theory. Its members have been referred to as "human **ecologists**".²¹

Cornucopians

Marx and Engels' "cornucopian" point of view was shared by champions of capitalism as well and continues to be **popularised** by the writings of Julian Simons, *The Ultimate Resource*, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton N.J., 1981 (deceased 1999) and B. Wattenberg, *The Birth Dearth*, Pharos Books, 1987.

However these writers are not notable economic theorists. Although Julian Simon was a professor of **economics**,²² his position is too extreme to be generally influential. In Australia there are a number of economists who propound **growthist** theories, including Professor Glen Withers of the Australian National University,²³ Professor Neville Norman of Melbourne University, and Professor Raja **Junankar**²⁴, Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney. I have not been able to **find** examples of capitalist theorists with comparable status to Marx and Engels who assume resources will never be a problem. Nevertheless this seems to an implicit belief in mainstream commercial circles and is **frequently** represented by the Australian Chamber of Commerce, see for instance the opinions expressed by the chief executive of that organisation, Mark **Paterson**.²⁵ In fact this view of commercial associations goes back to the beginnings of the 19th century at least in **Australia**.²⁶

¹ Ronsin, Newman & Dubois, "Ecomalthusians and Pherologists ", Conference 99: Nature, Society and History, Long Term Dynamics of Social Metabolism, September 30-October 2, 1999, Vienna, IFF, Social Ecology. The paper was presented at the conference and is available on CD from the university and accessible on the university web-site at <http://www.ined.fi/vovulati/france/index.html> Below I cite passages from pages 2 and 3, defining "Eco-malthusianism" and "pherology"

"In summary, the ideological basis of **Eco-malthusianism** is that: - Growth economics relies on human population growth to ensure continuous growth in consumption and the generation of material wealth through the institution of scarcity of basic resources and natural amenities. Examples of these would be land, water, natural biodiversity and positional goods.

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- This economic system is already reducing quality of life and has begun a process which will drastically affect the capacity of the biosphere to support life.
 - Limiting human population growth is potentially the most effective way of placing a structural limit on such runaway economic expansion.

Malthusianism is traditionally understood as essentially limited to problems of availability of food. Eco-malthusianism however, is concerned with the ecological basis of life itself, and with quality of life. Eco-malthusian movements are therefore more alert to the problems of the continuing availability of positional goods, including living and housing space, leisure and wilderness space, for everyone, the need to conserve biodiversity, and the viability and sustainability of economic and social activity.

The Ideological Basis of Pherology

The word "pherology" comes from the greek "pherein" meaning "to bear, or carry". It was coined by members of the Optimum Population Trust and refers to the notion of "carrying capacity". Pherologist refers to an "ecological **demographer**".⁵ Pherology attempts to measure the amount of biologically productive land and biodiversity required to sustain human and other populations within a given economy. Depending on the values and sophistication of the model, biodiversity for its own sake may be allocated from around 12.5% to upwards of 50% of world space. A simple concept was first **popularised** by Paul **Ehrlich**, in the late 1960s. A more complex model - the Ecological Footprint - was developed in the 1990s by William Rees and **Mathis** Wackernagel in Canada. This latter pherological method and movement has now extended to many different countries and includes books, footprint sites, projects and **email** study groups in several languages."

² See for instance, Arno Karlen, *Plague's Progress, A social history of man and disease*, Victor Gollanz, London 1995 and Rodney Barker, *And the Waters Turned to Blood*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1998.

³ Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* and *A Summary View of the Principle of Population*, Penguin Classics, Penguin Books, London, 1985; Thomas Malthus, *The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, John Murray, London, 1815 and Thomas Malthus, *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*, John Murray, London, 1815, republished in Pickering Masters: *The Works of Thomas Robert Malthus: Essays in Political Economy*, William Pickering, London, 1986 Vol 7.

⁴ He used the term "rent" for profit.

⁵ Thomas Malthus, *The Grounds for an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn*, John Murray, London, 1815 and Thomas Malthus, *An Enquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent*, John Murray, London, 1815, republished in *Pickering Masters: The Works of Thomas Robert Malthus: Essays in Political Economy*, William Pickering, London, 1986 Vol 7.

⁶ It will not have escaped some readers that convict labor and slavery are ways that have been used in colonies to overcome the problem of the cost of expansion into marginal lands.

⁷ Sheila Newman, "Thomas Malthus and Australian Thought", *The Social Contract*, Vol.VIII, No.3, Spring 1998, The Social Contract Press, 316% East Mitchell Street, Petoskey, MI 49770, USA., pp216-222.

⁸ Alain Bihr, *Pour en finir avec le Front National*, Syros, 1992, p.52, "D'une part, la survie des classes moyennes traditionnelles impliquait de freiner le développement du capitalisme français.

La formation de ce bloc est ainsi responsable du malthusianisme qui a longtemps caractérisé ce dernier. Faiblesse du développement industriel global, lenteur de la concentration du capital dont l'essentiel demeurera longtemps familial, bourgeoisie fielleuse et peu entreprenante, rôle moteur de l'Etat dans quelques secteurs de pointe seulement (**chemins de fer**, armement, **aéronautique**) : tels seront **quelques-uns** des traits les plus **caractéristiques** du capitalisme **français** de la première moitié de ce siècle. Un capitalisme plus soucieux en **définitive** de rente que de profit."

My translation: On the one hand, the survival of the traditional middle classes depended on inhibiting the development of French capitalism. The qualities that characterised this bloc was thus responsible for the **malthusianism** that defined French capitalism for a long time. Feeble progress in a narrowly based industrial sector, slow accumulation of capital of which the most part was to remain family based, a **fearful** bourgeoisie with little entrepreneurship, and the State taking a leading role in only a few sectors (railways, **armes**, aircraft and shipping): these are a few of the characteristics of French capitalism in the first half of the century. This was a capitalism that more concerned with income than with profit.

⁹ Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A.*: When France's conservative policies are described as Colbertian, the reference is to the protectionist economic management policies of **Colbert (1619-1683)**, the Minister who has the popular reputation of having repaired the French economy after the excesses of Louis XIV. Colbert's ideas about trade of essential products, not going into debt, and general protectionism were in many ways similar to Malthus's (whose thesis they preceded). The primary objective was economic independence. This was to be achieved by gathering wealth through commerce and conserving and enhancing it. French exports should always outnumber imports. He began a series of national companies and was virtually responsible for France becoming a country of superior and specialised manufactures. He said that you must take wealth from outside France and then keep it inside. He insisted on trade preferences between France's colonies and the mainland, forbidding colonies to sell to outside markets. The colonies were there solely to provide wealth to France.

¹⁰ Source: Jean Imbert, "Colbertisme", 1997 CD *Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A.*

¹¹ Source: Francis Ronsin, *La Grève des ventres*, Aubier, Collection historique, Paris, 1980, pp13-14.

¹² Sheila Newman, "Thomas Malthus and Australian Thought", *The Social Contract*, Vol.VIII, No.3, Spring 1998, The Social Contract Press, 316½ East Mitchell Street, Petoskey, MI 49770, USA., pp216-222.

¹³ Sheila Newman, "Thomas Malthus and Australian Thought", *The Social Contract*, Vol.VIII, No.3, Spring 1998, The Social Contract Press, 316% East Mitchell Street, Petoskey, MI 49770, USA., pp216-222.

¹⁴ Heilbroner, R., *The Worldly Philosophers*, Penguin, Sixth Edition, p.102, "For Malthus the issue was the immensely important one of How Much Is There? For Ricardo it was the explosive issue of Who Gets What? No wonder they disagreed endlessly; they were **talking** about different things."

¹⁵ For instance, Richard Dawkins, **Jarrod** Diamond, Tim **Flannery**, the **Leakeys** etc.

¹⁶ Ronald L. Meek: *Marx & Engels on the Population Bomb*, Ramparts Press, UK, 1971, p.18.

¹⁷ Ronald L. Meek: *Marx & Engels on the Population Bomb*, Ramparts Press, UK, 1971, p.23

¹⁸ Ronald L. Meek: *Marx & Engels on the Population Bomb*, Ramparts Press, UK, 1971, p.197

¹⁹ Engels: *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* 1844, cited in Meek, *Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb*, Ramparts Press, UK, 1971, p.57.

²⁰ Dennis Smith, *The Chicago School, A liberal critique of capitalism*, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, pp 91.

²¹ Dennis Smith, *The Chicago School, A liberal critique of capitalism*, Macmillan Education, London, 1988, pp 137-8.

²² At the American University of Maryland.

²³ See Stephen Castles, William Foster, **Robyn Iredale**, and Glenn Withers, *Immigration and Australia, Myths and Realities*, published jointly by the Housing Industry Association Ltd and Allen and Unwin, Australia, 1998.

²⁴ Junankar contributed a highly **populationist** view to a feature article "Australians all, let us get the numbers right", in The Australian Financial Review, 23/1/2001, p.32-33.

²⁵ Also to be found in the feature article "Australians all, let us get the numbers right", in The Australian Financial Review, 23/1/2001, p.32-33.

²⁶ The business community easily convinced itself that rapid population increase would provide a solution to all its problems, especially after the 1890s, when the property market lost momentum. By this time building societies had mushroomed and banks had begun to invest heavily in property. Source: Leon L'Huillier, "Depression and a National Economy," *Essays in Economic History of Australia*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1973, p 190. In 1893 the New South Wales bankers' *Journal* published an article by WH Eldred wherein one of the causes of the **financial** crisis was identified as "the cessation of immigration caused by the withdrawal of government aid, whereas the true policy of the country lies in encouraging population." Source: WH Eldred, "The Financial Crisis" in *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, II:7 (July 1893), p.227, cited by Neville Hicks, *op cit*, p86, who says that Eldred was a former bank director acting in 1893 as Consul-General for Chile in Sydney.

Other writers to the same journal made similar points: In 1898 an unidentified correspondent linked the approximately 40% population increase in the 1880s with six-fold increases in public and private borrowing. He said how much **might** have been reaped **from** this if the borrowed money had been put into 'productive works'. He felt that the consequent demand for labour would have attracted emigrants from **as** far away as Europe. Source: *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, VIII:8 (August, 1898), p.292, cited by Neville Hicks, *op cit*, p87. The same year the editor bemoaned the departure from Victoria of 50,000 adults in three years, which he believed, had badly affected the State's population numbers. He expressed the hope that a liberal government, a good season or two and some opening up of the **backcountry** would make people stay. Source: Editor's note: 'Victoria's Loss' in *Journal of the Bankers' Institute of N.S.W.*, XI:8 (March 1898), p 24f, cited by Neville Hicks, *op cit*, p87

After 1900 the business community became quite desperate about increasing population. In 1903 the President of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce announced that it is necessary to have a population "which steadily increases as commerce itself does." In 1905 the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures supported Prime Minister **Deakin's** immigration proposals because

"Desirable immigration means more people, and more people means more capital, and the utilization of millions of acres of unused territory, and thus increasing our national wealth".

(Founder of the Federated Chambers of Manufactures, President of the New South Wales **Chamber** of Manufactures **from** 1902-1904 and President of the Chamber of Commerce, Octavius **Beale**, was an "old ally" of **Deakin's**. Source: Australian *Dictionary of Biography*, "**Beale**, Octavius Charles," 1850-1930, **p225**, "As State President of the National Protection League, he kept Deakin, an old ally, informed on political matters in Sydney." He was also to become one of the Commissioners on the Royal Commission on the Decline in the Birthrate 1904.

In 1906 the acting President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce enjoined, "an increase in population means an increase of wealth not only of the few but of the many." In 1908 the President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce pushed for immigration on the grounds that suitable immigrants would be consumers as well as producers and should therefore be welcomed by all classes". In 1907 the **General** Council of Chambers of Commerce asked the government for a steady stream of immigration to provide for the "growth in industrial manufactures which will shortly exceed the volume of consumption of the present population". In 1908 the President of the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures stated that:

"...to get any benefits **from** increased protection they must get increased payment and that could not come **from** their own limited populations. A wisely managed scheme of immigration would be as much the saviour of the manufacturers as **anything** could be." Source: Neville Hicks, *op cit*, pp 88-89, note 30, citing the **following**: J.G. Farleigh, 'President's Address' in NSW Chamber of Manufactures' Annual Report (1908), p 17 and J **Barre Johnston**, 'President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce: Annual Report, (1903), p 39; Report of the Council in NSW Chamber of Manufactures Annual Report, (1905), p 9; George Merrivale, 'Acting-President's Address' in Sydney Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, (1906), p 31f; RJ Larking, 'President's Address' in Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, (1908), p 59; General council of Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report (1907), p 47.

(Note that the above represents an early reference to enlarging the local market of consumers.) There was much more of the same. Related demographic concerns were about population distribution, especially as regards opening up further territory for **farming**. There was still a perceived colonial duty to open up the land. Source: Richard Cotter, "War, Boom and Depression", Essays in Economic *History of Australia*, Ed. James Griffin, Jacaranda Press, 1973 **p251**, "Politicians, both in England and Australia, avoided discussion of this development, for, inevitable or not, an industrial dominion economy was outside the scope of the imperial purpose. The role of Australia was seen in the traditional light and the economy was to remain colonial. The growth of rural industries which would supplement the industrial might of the United Kingdom was the real task - all that was needed was men to populate Australia, money to develop it and markets in which to sell the resultant increase of primary products."

We can see here that a rise in Australian anti-Malthusian thinking coincides with a rise in the financial and manufacturing side of its economic community that occurred between 1850 and **1890**. In Malthus's time this was foreshadowed by the ideological and political divisions over the economic implications of the British Corn Laws between (agricultural) Landlords and Manufacturers in Britain, who tended respectively to be Malthusians and **Ricardiens** regarding the importation of corn. Source: Robert **Heilbroner**, *The Worldly Philosophers*, pp 78-82

APPENDIX 6 -

Copies of Original Documents from André Postel-Vinay

Documents are labelled "Document 'A', 'B', 'C', at base of page.

Contents

Document 'A': "Communique" : Press Release dated **22/7/74**
Subject: Postel-Vinay's resignation as Secretary of State.

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Document 'B': "Politique d'Immigration", dated 1 July **1974**
Subject: Immigration Policy.

p. A6-3

Document 'C': "Communique concernant la **politique** de l'immigration" dated **4 July 1974.**
Subject: Official **government** press release regarding the suspension of immigration and associated measures.

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Translation of Document 'C'

p.A6-14

22/7/74

COMMUNIQUE

APV

d'André Postel-Vinay

Monsieur André POSTEL-VINAY fait connaître qu'il a donné au Premier Ministre, lundi 22 juillet 1974, sa démission de Secrétaire d'Etat auprès du Ministre du Travail (Travailleurs immigrés).

Ce qui a conduit M. POSTEL-VINAY à donner sa démission, c'est la forte réduction qui a été opérée, au cours d'un arbitrage budgétaire, sur le programme qu'il demandait, au titre de l'année 1975, pour le logement des travailleurs migrants et l'action sociale qui leur est destinée.

Le programme de logement que proposait M. POSTEL-VINAY était d'un volume comparable aux recommandations du VIème Plan, recommandations qui ont été largement perdues de vue. Le programme qu'il demandait était toutefois plus important que celui du VIème Plan pour les logements familiaux, mais il l'était moins pour les foyers de travailleurs étrangers. Globalement, l'ordre de grandeur était à peu près le même.

Monsieur POSTEL-VINAY a jugé que les économies opérées sur ce programme ne lui permettaient pas de continuer à remplir sa mission. Il ne méconnaît nullement la nécessité de l'austérité budgétaire, mais il estime que les dépenses supplémentaires qu'il réclamait auraient pu être compensées par des économies sur des secteurs moins essentiels.

X
Livre 12, 4

POLITIQUE d'IMMIGRATION

(Note de M. Andre' POSTEL-VINAY pour le 'Comité restreint'

Avant d'indiquer quelles devraient être les grandes lignes de notre politique d'immigration, il paraît nécessaire de rappeler les données essentielles du problème.

Ces données concernent d'abord l'importance de l'immigration et la situation du logement social en France.

Au cours des trois dernières années, le nombre des entrées annuelles d'immigrés a été, en moyenne, de 225.000, dont 150.000 ouvriers et 75.000 femmes et enfants. Compte tenu des sorties, le solde migratoire annuel peut être évalué à 150.000 personnes environ. Encore ne s'agit-il là que des immigrés officiellement recensés. A ces migrants s'ajoutent tous ceux qui entrent irrégulièrement en France. Cette masse d' "irréguliers" s'emploie au marché noir du travail ou vit misérablement en chmage et sans secours.

Nous ne maîtrisons nullement ces mouvements migratoires. Ils se développent suivant les demandes des entreprises, qui, jusqu'à une date récente, étaient satisfaites sans contrôle. Ils grandissent aussi d'une manière indépendante de ces demandes, suivant leur force naturelle, qui croît avec la misère du Tiers Monde.

Cet afflux d'étrangers - pauvres ou très pauvres - se produit dans un pays où le problème du logement social reste très grave.

En 1970, le VIème Plan avait évalué à plus de 650.000 le nombre des étrangers vivant dans des bidonvilles ou des taudis. Bien que plusieurs

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grands bidonvilles aient été rdsorbds depuis lors, la situation du logement des immigrés n'a pas cessé d'empirer. Alors que le solde migratoire annuel a été de l'ordre de 150,000 personnes, le nombre des appartements mis annuellement à la disposition d'dtrangers - en HLM, PLR ou cités de transit - n'a jamais dépassé 14.000, à quoi il faut ajouter 20,000 "lits" pour les travailleurs migrants "isolés". Chaque année, plusieurs dizaines de milliers d'dtrangers sont donc allés grossir la population des taudis. Cette aggravation a été ressentie par tous les organismes qui s'occupent du logement des étrangers dans les grandes zones d'immigration.

Quelques chiffres méritent encore d'être cités. Alors que notre programme annuel de logements sociaux n'a jamais dépassé 117,000 logements, au total, pour l'ensemble de la population, française ou étrangère, le nombre des familles de travailleurs étrangers qui arrivent annuellement en France s'est élevé, en moyenne, à 38.000, depuis 1970. Dans un pays comme le nôtre, où subsiste une masse considérable de taudis, la comparaison de ces deux chiffres - 117.000 et 38,000 - donne une idée des tensions et des oppositions sociales que peut susciter une immigration familiale aussi forte. Cette immigration familiale grandit, elle aussi, sans contrôle et à un rythme inquiétant : 25,000 familles par an, en moyenne, pendant les années antérieures à 1970 ; 38.000 familles par an, en moyenne, depuis 1970 ; plus de 16,000 familles pendant les 4 premiers mois de 1974, ce qui correspondrait à 48,000 familles pour une année complète.

Les difficultés et les dangers qui grandissent nous imposent de modifier profondément - et très vite - notre politique d'immigration. Dans l'immédiat, cette politique doit avoir trois principaux objectifs : augmenter fortement l'aide sociale aux ouvriers immigrés, en particulier pour leur logement; limiter strictement l'entrée en France de nouveaux travailleurs; apporter les améliorations indispensables aux conditions d'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère.

L'augmentation de l'action sociale en faveur des immigrés doit consister, par priorité, à améliorer leur logement. Les autres formes d'aide sociale doivent être également développées, notamment celles qui ont trait à l'accueil, à l'alphabétisation ou à la formation professionnelle; mais la question

primordiale est celle du logement : on ne peut pas compter sur l'efficacité d'actions sociales menées dans des taudis.

Ce problème du logement des travailleurs étrangers doit être assumé par l'Etat, dans le cadre des procédures H.L.M. Un programme complémentaire devra être prévu, à ce titre, en 1975. Il comprendra 11.000 logements sociaux pour les familles de travailleurs étrangers et 15.000 "lits" pour les ouvriers étrangers "isolés".

Ce programme complémentaire portera de 117.000 à 128.000 le nombre total des appartements H.L.M. ou P.L.R. à financer l'an prochain pour l'ensemble de la population, française ou étrangère. Compte tenu des dispositions adoptées jusqu'ici, ce programme permettra d'affecter environ 27.000 appartements de ce type à des familles immigrées. Il augmentera, d'autre part, de 25.000 à 40.000 "lits" l'importance des logements dont la construction devra être lancée, la même année, pour les ouvriers étrangers qui vivent, en France, sans famille.

Globalement, le programme de logement ainsi prévu, pour les immigrés, en 1975, atteint un ordre de grandeur voisin de celui que le VIème Plan avait recommandé : la part réservée aux ouvriers "isolés" est inférieure aux recommandations du VIème Plan, mais celle des logements familiaux est, au contraire, nettement plus importante, pour tenir compte de l'augmentation récente - et très forte - de l'immigration familiale.

Ce programme 1975 de 27.000 appartements et 40.000 "lits" doit être considéré comme un strict minimum. Il est même gravement inférieur aux besoins, dès lors que la population étrangère vivant dans des taudis peut être évaluée à sept ou huit cent mille personnes et qu'elle risque de croître encore, tout au moins jusqu'à l'achèvement des nouveaux programmes de construction.

Nous n'avons cependant pas cru devoir proposer un programme plus important, étant donné les difficultés variées que rencontre l'exécution de ce type d'investissements. Des changements de méthodes et de procédures devront être opérés pour vaincre ces difficultés et lancer des programmes plus vastes; mais cela n'ira pas sans délais.

Cet effort pour le logement des immigrés exigerait des crédits de paiement de l'ordre de 400 millions en 1975, 800 millions en 1976 et 950 millions en 1977, compte tenu d'une certaine augmentation des programmes après l'an prochain. Il nécessiterait aussi des avances de la Caisse des Dépôts à la Caisse des prêts H.L.M., suivant la méthode habituelle. Enfin, il serait complété par le développement d'autres actions sociales - liées ou non au logement - qui obligeraient à prévoir des crédits supplémentaires d'environ 113 millions en 1975, 176 millions en 1976 et 208 millions en 1977. Toutes ces opérations ont été décrites dans les propositions budgétaires adressées par le Ministère du Travail au Ministère des finances le 4 avril dernier.

Les charges budgétaires correspondant à ces efforts pourraient être compensées, soit par des économies opérées dans d'autres domaines, soit par des augmentations d'impôts, soit par la création de nouvelles ressources de l'Etat. A cet égard, nous avons proposé l'institution d'une taxe à la charge des entreprises qui emploient de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère. Cette taxe pourrait être proportionnelle aux salaires versés à cette main-d'oeuvre ou calculée de façon forfaitaire. Elle permettrait d'équilibrer toutes les dépenses de notre programme. Elle offrirait aussi le grand avantage d'inciter les entreprises à moins recourir à la main-d'oeuvre étrangère en les faisant participer aux charges considérables que l'immigration impose à la collectivité.

Nous avons également proposé que l'Office national d'immigration perçoive une redevance complémentaire à l'occasion des "introductions" de travailleurs étrangers demandées par des entreprises françaises. Il est inadmissible que cette redevance reste fixée à 250 F. par ouvrier immigré. Il faudra la compléter par une taxe d'un montant considérablement supérieur - 2.000 F. par exemple - dont une part pourra servir à la constitution d'un fonds de rapatriement et de secours pour les étrangers en chômage, le reste étant reversé au Fonds d'action sociale ou à l'Etat. Si justifiée qu'elle soit, cette taxe n'aura qu'un rendement relativement faible en comparaison d'un impôt à la charge des entreprises employant de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère. Il devient en effet nécessaire de freiner fortement les "introductions", voire de les interrompre pendant quelques mois.

Nous devons limiter les entrées de travailleurs étrangers en fonction des possibilités d'emploi et d'accueil de notre pays. Nous y sommes contraints par d'impérieuses nécessités sociales et politiques, Nous pouvons aussi invoquer, en faveur de cette limitation, les risques de récession qui pèsent sur certaines industries. C'est ce qu'ont fait les Allemands, quand ils ont décidé d'interrompre, en novembre 73, les "introductions" de travailleurs étrangers.

Comment procéder à cette limitation ? Pour 1975, il faudra étudier un objectif annuel d'immigration. Il faudra limiter, ensuite, les "introductions" et les "régularisations", de manière à ne pas dépasser cet objectif. Dans l'immédiat, c'est-à-dire pour le second semestre de cette année, nous avons le choix entre deux méthodes :

La première méthode consisterait à nous fixer un objectif semestriel qui réduirait l'immigration de 1974 à un niveau nettement inférieur à celui de 1972, année d'immigration relativement faible, mais de forte croissance économique. Cela conduirait à plafonner les "entrées" du second semestre 1974 à environ 20 % au-dessous de celles du premier semestre, Il faudrait donner, pour cela, des directives précises aux Directions régionales du Travail et à l'Office National d'immigration. Il faudrait aussi faire jouer, avec plus de rigueur, ce qu'on appelle "la compensation".

Compte tenu des dangers grandissants de l'immigration, cette première méthode de freinage correspond au strict minimum que nous puissions envisager. Une autre méthode, plus ferme et plus nette, serait bien préférable. Elle consisterait à décider d'interrompre l'immigration pendant les prochains mois. Nous pourrions aisément justifier cette mesure, à la manière allemande, par la crainte d'une récession dans certaines industries et souligner, en plus, les graves difficultés de logement auxquelles s'exposeraient les nouveaux arrivants.

Cette deuxième méthode offrirait de nombreux avantages. Par son caractère plus spectaculaire, elle n'agirait pas seulement sur l'immigration officielle, elle freinerait l'immigration clandestine et les arrivages de "faux touristes". Elle nous permettrait de nous opposer plus efficacement à l'immigration familiale, au moins pendant la durée de l'interruption générale.

Dans la conjoncture présente, il y a tout lieu de croire que cette décision d'interruption serait bien vue des grandes organisations syndicales et, même, sans doute, du CNPF, au niveau supérieur. Annoncée comme une mesure provisoire, prévue pour les prochains mois, assortie - s'il le fallait - de quelques dérogations, elle ne créerait pas de gêne économique sérieuse. Les mois de juillet et d'août sont des mois de faible immigration, D'autre part, les "contrats d'introduction" déjà transmis à l'étranger continueraient de s'exécuter. Le problème pourrait être revu en septembre, en fonction de l'évolution constatée d'ici 13.

Cette interruption de l'immigration devrait être complétée par quelques autres décisions, dont les principales seraient les suivantes :

- Decision de renforcer le contrôle de'sfrontières, les personnels qui y participent et les sanctions contre les fraudeurs;
- Décision de rétablir progressivement le visa préalable d'un Consul de France sur les passeports des pays qui nous envoient de la main-d'oeuvre. Cette décision est indispensable pour réduire les entrées de "faux touristes". Elle est, en particulier, nécessaire pour pouvoir limiter l'immigration familiale. Sa mise en oeuvre s'opérerait, bien entendu, en respectant les formes et les délais prescrits par les conventions que nous avons conclues à ce sujet.

Il faudrait également prévoir d'autres mesures :

- Un effort d'information, auprès des pays exportateurs de main-d'oeuvre, pour leur montrer la nécessité de notre nouvelle politique;
- D'autres efforts, destinés à obtenir une meilleure coordination des politiques européennes d'immigration;
- La nomination de représentants des grandes organisations syndicales au Conseil d'administration de l'Office national d'immigration;
- L'obligation de consulter les comités d'entreprise sur les conditions de logement prévues pour les ouvriers étrangers dont les employeurs demandent l' "introduction". Cette dernière mesure, il est vrai, n'aurait pas d'effet immédiat, dans l'hypothèse d'une interruption de l'immigration officielle. (I)

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creation d'une redevance complémentaire sur les "introductions", que nous avons proposée plus haut, n'aurait pas non plus d'effet immédiat dans cette hypothèse. Elle n'en demeurerait pas moins justifiée.

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Ce freinage de l'immigration - individuelle et familiale - doit s'accompagner d'autres dispositions, destinées à améliorer les conditions d'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère déjà installée en France. Notre politique d'immigration doit ainsi tâcher de parvenir - par tous les moyens raisonnables - à la détente sociale nécessaire, dans ce dangereux secteur.

Deux principales catégories de dispositions doivent être prévues à cet effet :

- Les premières doivent tendre à l'allègement et à la simplification du régime des titres de séjour et de travail. Les textes actuels, malgré leur lourdeur et leur complexité, n'atteignent pas les résultats qu'ils recherchent. L'étude de leur réforme ne peut pas, cependant, s'opérer sans délais, ni sans consultation des organisations syndicales. En dépit des problèmes que posera cette réforme, il va falloir la mener et la faire aboutir rapidement.
- Le deuxième type de dispositions à prendre, dans ce domaine, concerne la lutte contre les trafics de main-d'oeuvre et le marché noir du travail. Les moyens de contrôle doivent être renforcés, ainsi que les peines prévues contre les trafiquants de main-d'oeuvre, les organisateurs de passages frontaliers clandestins et les employeurs qui utilisent irrégulièrement des ouvriers immigrés.

Telles sont les grandes lignes de la politique d'immigration que je sou mets au Gouvernement. Les trois types de mesures proposées (développement des programmes d'action sociale et de logement; limitation des entrées de travailleurs étrangers; allègement de la réglementation et durcissement de la lutte contre la fraude) forment un ensemble qu'il ne paraît pas possible de dissocier. Les aspects restrictifs de cette politique ne peuvent pas se concevoir sans leurs contreparties sociales; et la réciproque est également vraie.

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En proposant au Gouvernement cette nouvelle politique, je tiens à souligner encore sa nécessité et l'urgence des mesures qu'elle comporte. L'abandon ou l'atténuation de certaines de ces mesures (I) ne me paraîtrait pas acceptable. Les dangers que l'on a laissé grandir en permettant à l'immigration de se développer d'une manière anarchique et sans aide sociale suffisante nous obligent aujourd'hui à un changement d'attitude à la fois rapide et total. Encore est-il douteux que nous puissions réussir à réduire ces dangers, même en agissant vite, étant donné les risques - déjà très grands - de la situation présente et les périls qui vont croître avec l'évolution démographique du Tiers Monde. Au moins faut-il tenter d'y parvenir.

André POSTEL-VINAY

C'est-à-dire des mesures les plus importantes, parmi celles que je propose. Au nombre de ces mesures importantes, j'inclus, bien entendu, le programme de logement et d'aide sociale dont je demande l'engagement, en 1975.

PARIS, le 4 juillet 1974

8, AVENUE DE LA SÈVRE 75700 PARIS

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^I
COMMUNIQUE

concernant la politique de l'immigration

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I - Le Gouvernement considère que la politique d'immigration doit répondre à trois objectifs :

- augmenter fortement l'action sociale en faveur des travailleurs étrangers, en particulier pour leur logement ;
- limiter les entrées des travailleurs étrangers et de leurs familles en fonction des possibilités d'emploi et d'accueil de notre pays ;
- réviser la réglementation applicable aux étrangers en vue de l'alléger et de la simplifier tout en assurant aux intéressés une meilleure protection contre les abus et les trafics dont ils peuvent être victimes.

II - A cet effet, le Gouvernement a arrêté les orientations suivantes :

1°) Action sociale

- Le Gouvernement accroîtra l'effort en faveur de la construction de logements sociaux pour les familles étrangères, ainsi que de foyers pour les ouvriers étrangers "isolés". Ce programme utilisera les procédures H. I. M. et sera financé en partie sur fonds publics. L'importance de l'effort qui sera fait dès 1975 sera fixée dans le cadre de la procédure budgétaire.

- Des initiatives seront prises en vue de développer rapidement les autres formes d'action sociale, en particulier l'accueil, l'alphabétisation et la formation générale ou professionnelle des travailleurs étrangers et de leurs enfants.

- Une participation sera demandée aux entreprises pour compenser, en partie ou en totalité, les dépenses supplémentaires imposées à l'Etat par ce nouveau programme de logement et d'action sociale, destiné aux travailleurs étrangers. De même, la redevance versée à l'O.N.I. pour l'introduction des travailleurs étrangers sera augmentée. Les modalités d'application de ces décisions de principe seront étudiées par le Secrétaire d'Etat aux travailleurs immigrés en liaison avec les ministres intéressés.

2°) Limitation des flux migratoires

- Le Gouvernement décide d'interrompre provisoirement l'autorisation de nouveaux contrats d'introduction de main-d'oeuvre étrangère. Les autorisations concernant l'immigration familiale seront également suspendues. Cette mesure fera l'objet d'un nouvel examen en septembre ou en octobre.

- Le Ministre de l'Intérieur prendra les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher les passages clandestins de frontières. Les sanctions à l'égard des organisateurs de ces fraudes seront renforcées.

- Le Gouvernement met à l'étude les procédures permettant d'empêcher l'entrée de "faux touristes" sur le territoire national.

3°) Mesures diverses

- La réglementation des titres de séjour et de travail sera allégée et simplifiée.

- La recherche des infractions et la lutte contre le marché noir du travail seront renforcées. Les peines prévues contre les trafiquants de main-d'oeuvre et les employeurs qui utilisent irrégulièrement des travailleurs étrangers, seront aggravées.

- Le Gouvernement demandera que le projet de loi relatif aux droits syndicaux des étrangers, qui a été déposé sur le bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale en octobre 1973, soit examiné par le Parlement lors de la prochaine session.

- Les comités d'entreprise seront consultés sur les conditions de logement prévues pour les ouvriers étrangers dont l'introduction en France sera demandée.

III - Le Secrétaire d'Etat auprès du Ministre du Travail chargé des travailleurs immigrés assurera la mise en oeuvre de la politique ainsi définie, en accord avec le Ministre du Travail et les autres Ministres intéressés et en liaison avec les partenaires sociaux. Pour ceux des points évoqués qui ne comportent pas une exécution immédiate, il présentera, au Conseil des Ministres du 31 juillet, un ensemble de mesures d'application.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 'C'
(Translation by Sheila Newman)

Ministry of Employment
State Secretary

French Republic
Paris 4 July 1974
8 Avenue de Segur, 75700,
Paris
Tel. 567 5400

Press Release
Regarding **Immigration Policy**

- I. The Government considers that immigration policy needs to fulfill three objectives:

to strongly increase social support for foreign workers, especially as regards their housing
to limit ~~the~~ entry of foreign workers and ~~their~~ families according to **their potential** for employment and settlement in our country
to revise the regulations applicable to foreigners with view to making them less burdensome and simpler, whilst guaranteeing their beneficiaries better protection from the exploitation and **trafficking** which they have been victims of.

- II. To this effect, the Government has taken the following steps:

1. Social Action

The Government will intensify its efforts to build public housing for foreign families, as well as hostels for 'lone' foreign workers. This program will utilise the HLM process and will be partly financed by public funds. The actual sum for 1975 will be allocated in the budget.

Steps will be taken to rapidly develop other kinds of social support, especially settlement, literacy and general or professional training of foreign workers and their children

Businesses will be required to contribute in part or in total the expenses incurred by the State through this new public housing and socila support program for foreign workers. Similarly, the fees paid to the ONI for the introduction of foreign workers will increase. The application of these principles will be considered by the State Secretary for immigrant workers in **consultation** with affected ministers.

2. Limiting Immigration

- The Government has decided to provisionally suspend authorisation of new contracts for the introduction of foreign workers. Permits for family reunion will also be suspended. This measure will be reviewed in September or October.

- The Minister of the Interior will take necessary steps to halt illegal immigration. Penalties for those organising such **traffic** will be reinforced.
- The Government will be studying ways of stopping the entry of "false tourists" on the national territory

3. Various Initiatives

- The regulation of Residential and Work Visas will be lightened and simplified
- Investigations of infractions and combat against the illegal labor market will be stepped up. Punishments for illegal labor **traffickers** and employers who use foreign workers in irregular circumstances will be made harsher.
- The Government will ask that the project for a law regarding the union rights of foreigners, which was tabled for the National Assembly in October 1973, will be examined by Parliament in its next session.
- Business organisations will be consulted about the housing conditions expected for any foreign workers they ask for in the **future**.

III. The State Secretary to the Minister of Employment who has the responsibility of immigrant workers will oversee the execution of the **above** policies, with the approval of the Minister of Employment and other Ministers affected and in consultation with interested groups. For those among the points raised here that do not entail immediate execution, he will present a general view of steps to be taken to the **Counsel of Ministers** on **31** July.