Producing Elite Indigenous Masculinities

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As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility [...] were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did [...] then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (1966).1

This article asserts that elite indigenous tribal masculinity is a particular type of masculinity that has developed since colonisation, in part at least, mimicking dominant forms of invader/settler masculinity. While most commentators have outlined that the dominant forms of invader/settler masculinities were held to be inversely related to the mind of indigenous men, the productive nature of power imposed a different set of rules that challenged this dialectic so that aspects of invader/settler masculinity were necessarily imbibed into burgeoning post-contact indigenous masculine leaders. This masculinity has since been allocated disciplinary and authoritative power through notions of tradition and authenticity. Further, indigenous masculinity was often asserted as reflecting the collective will for liberation; in reality, elite indigenous masculinities have habitually served to exclude alternative forms of indigenous masculinity and indigenous women from leadership roles. Via a post-hegemonic analysis of indigenous masculinity, this article appraises the Janus-faced and ambivalent figure of the indigenous heterosexual patriarch; both oppressor and oppressed. The dialectics between hetero-patriarchal masculinity and feminism, and colonised/coloniser become complicated, as indigenous masculinities are both imbied with privilege and denied it; both performing colonial hetero-patriarchy and resistant to it.
In the postcolonial context, indigenous nationalist movements have inadvertently served to reproduce disciplinary forms of indigenous masculinity. The project of ‘decolonisation’ focused the rocky ship of indigenous ontological plight via cultural renaissances underpinned by notions of liberation and rights. The project sought to unveil colonial oppression, whilst ‘it remained the task of identity politics to emancipate, free or liberate a true, or more essential, individual or collective self’.\(^2\) It was often forms of indigenous masculinity that, in their cultural authenticity, were asserted as reflecting the collective will for liberation; in reality, elite indigenous masculinities have often served to exclude alternative forms of indigenous masculinity and indigenous women from leadership roles. While it is true that many indigenous women have been at the forefront of the indigenous liberation movement, it is also true that the radical female voice has often met resistance via the discursive formation of indigenous structures framed by indigenous masculine power and located within the ‘tradition’ of tribal organisations.

In terms of self-discipline then, Foucault may ask indigenous cultures: ‘who is speaking and who is authorised to speak?’, and thus what forms of indigenous subjectivity are being produced while others are subjugated? A prominent example of how disciplinary coercions produce indigenous subjectivities occurred during the distribution of a fisheries settlement (NZ$ 250–$350 million) awarded by the New Zealand State via a Treaty of Waitangi claim. In 1989, the State awarded ‘pre-settlement’ fisheries assets to ‘all Maori’ through the Maori Fisheries Act and in 1990 Te Ohu Kai Moana, or The Maori Fisheries Commission, was established to manage the allocation process. Te Ohu Kai Moana was comprised of influential Maori men including Sir Tipene O’Regan, Matiu Rata, Sir Graham Latimer, and Sir Robert Mahuta. The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act, 1992 ‘directed the commission to allocate the pre-settlement assets to its beneficiaries’; in it, ‘while the act occasionally refers to these beneficiaries as “all Maori” the role of Maori iwi had been given new prominence’.\(^3\) Yet, the Act did not proffer a definition of ‘iwi’. Here it is important to understand that ‘iwi’ can mean both ‘people’ in the general sense of the word and thus could relate to ‘all Maori’, whilst, ‘iwi’ can also refer to ‘peoples’ in the sense of large genealogical formations (i.e., tribes).
ambiguity meant that the term became the ‘focus of conflict and litigation – primarily between Maori – ever since’.4

Without juridical definition, Te Ohu Kai Moana took it upon itself to determine indigenous contemporary rights via postcolonial imaginings of pre-colonial ‘traditional’ culture. It decreed that ‘iwi’ referred to tribes as the original social formations under the Treaty, and that settlements would be divvied out accordingly. It defined ‘iwi’ as a composite of: (i) shared descent from *tipuna* [ancestors]; (ii) *hapu*; (iii) *marcae*; (iv) belonged historically to a *takiwa* [geographical district]; and (v) an existence traditionally acknowledged by other *iwi*.5 For all intents and purposes, Te Ohu Kai Moana outlined what has become the common understanding of a ‘traditional’ tribal conglomerate. Under this decree it was argued that ‘all Maori’ would gain advantage from the allocation as derivatives of original iwi. Importantly, inherent to the juridical process was the determination of what was traditional and historical. In August 1998, for instance, the Court of Appeal concluded:

The implementation of the settlement accords with Maori traditional values, although it will necessarily utilize modern-day mechanisms […]. The settlement was of the historical grievances of a tribal people. It ought to be implemented in a manner consistent with that fact. With all due respect to UMA [Urban Maori Authorities], who are formed on the basis of kaupapa [practice] not whakapapa [genealogy], they cannot fulfil such a role.6

What is perhaps surprising here is the complicity of the postcolonial complex with this ethnic fundamentalism at the expense of other more individualised, non-gendered subjectivities. This complex is complicit with both postcolonial assimilation and neo-liberalism. While indigenous studies scholars, such as Kevin Bruyneel7, have highlighted the challenges to postcolonial temporal, spatial, and political models that indigenous tribal formations have brought to bear in postcolonial politics, seemingly tribal formations are less feared in New Zealand than in other contexts. Put another way, the indigenous subjectivities produced via the ‘Partnership’ process, far
from inherently challenging understandings of sovereignty produced by the postcolonial complex, in reality are complicit with them. Indeed, because the Treaty of Waitangi is a historical document that has produced a grievance mentality, the ‘rehabilitative’ approach presumes physical, spatial, spiritual, and epistemological displacement and loss and, therefore, its discordance with the immediacy of indigenous peoples serves to debilitate indigenous existentialism. Along similar lines, Jeffrey Sissons has noted that ‘[w]hereas settler nationhood required Maori to become Pakeha (i.e., white), post-settler nationhood requires Maori to become Maori’.8

The renaissance of indigenous ontological authenticity flies in the face of tacit nineteenth and twentieth century settler understandings of the nation state: that the most effective method to modernise and assimilate the indigene into being a citizen of the nation was to detribalise. ‘Tribalism, in particular, was perceived to be inimical to the interests of the liberal State because it promoted historic “we-they” attitudes and thereby militated against the liberal conception of one language, one culture, one state’.9 In contrast, the modernised indigenous subject has become a corrupted and inauthentic form of indigeneity, due to its devolution out of traditional culture and space. It is, thus, unworthy of being a ‘Treaty Partner.’ Likewise, the claiming process of Maori to rights, grievances, and even the ability to call oneself Maori (or at least an ‘authentic’ Maori), has been attached to the development of what Robert Niezen calls ‘ethnic formalization’.10

FOUCAULT AND INDIGENOUS MASCULINITY

Typically, in the colonial context power is very much seen as something that is performed on the indigenous subject. Yet as Foucault says, each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse, which it accepts and makes function as true. In relation to a key underpinning of Foucault’s work, then, I ask the question: how do indigenous cultural truths enact a variety of operations on indigenous bodies, thoughts and conduct to enable self-understanding as an indigenous subject? What indigenous subjectivities came to fill the postcolonial field and, in particular, how did indigenous masculinities manifest to be
nameable and desirable and, in terms of necropower, function to symbolically kill other forms of indigenous subjectivity? How have discursive formations within indigenous cultures themselves functioned to discipline indigenous subjectivities? Particularly, how do tactics of tradition and authenticity determine indigenous self-definition, subjugation and exclusion?

The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche upon Foucault is clear, not merely because of the common nomenclature (i.e., ‘genealogy’), but more fundamentally because of a desire to render knowledge as a strategic formation. What strategic function does the production of certain formations of knowledge and subjectivities serve? Through a conscious attempt to reject totalising and singular discourses, Foucault interrogates discourses in terms of the ‘strategic possibilities’ that enable disparate statements to be perceived as natural accumulations. In terms of indigenous masculinity studies, this suggests a shift away from the conception of subjectivities as traditional and towards an understanding that indigenous ontologies have no permanence, but are subject to a morphing biopolitical milieu. As Foucault puts it, while the linear historian seeks to describe ‘the evolution of a species and […] the destiny of a people’, the genealogist commits himself or herself to dissipating ‘the roots of our identity’.11

The concept of ‘sovereignty’ is central to understanding the production of an indigenous ‘partner’ capable of dialoguing with the developing colonial state. There are various meanings to sovereignty, but I use the idea in a Foucauldian sense, focusing in particular on the way he describes its transformation from ‘sovereign power’ (i.e., the power to take life or let live) to ‘biopolitical power’.12 In the context of this article, it is the power to produce authentic indigenous subjectivities and de-authenticate others. Here Foucault argues that we have

a legislation, a discourse, and an organization of public right articulated around the principle of the sovereignty of the social body and the delegation of individual sovereignty to the State; and we also have a tight grid of disciplinary coercions that actually guarantees the cohesion of that social body.13
Essentially, Foucault would suggest here that indigenous subjectivities have been ‘made to live and let die’ via the juridification and production of an indigenous subjectivity given recognition as the legitimate voice of the indigenous community.

Central to understanding the transformation of sovereignty outlined above is the notion of ‘biopower’, which I believe is critical to thinking about indigenous masculinity. Biopower refers to ‘a power whose task is to take charge of life’, requiring ‘continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms’.¹⁴ Such a power ‘has to qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor’; the ‘juridical institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses whose functions are for the most part regulatory’.¹⁵ The interconnection between biopower, genealogy and elite indigenous masculinities is thus the central concern of the present article. A genealogy in this regard teases out the discursive formation by asking: what are those heterogeneous statements that bind elite indigenous masculinity together? In the words of Robert Young: ‘What are its surfaces of emergence? What are the group of rules proper to its discursive practice? How does it order its objects?’¹⁶

In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault argues that the biopolitical regulation of a population operates beyond the conscious production and control of knowledge. That is, crucial to biopolitical control is internalisation; the self-imposition of regulatory mechanisms so that the material, the corporeal and ethos function in unison, albeit a unison tethered together via heterogeneous statements. In the context of the present article then, it could be argued that the conditioning of elite indigenous masculinities throughout colonisation has not only a symbolic genealogy but a material existence also. Here, the etiological importance of the word ‘genealogy’ should not be underestimated, for it does not merely refer to a textual genealogy. Foucault’s nomenclature is literally referring to the material and biological descent of corporeality, where the body is ‘totally imprinted by history’. To frame the following section, I thus draw upon one of Foucault’s most significant questions: how, ‘in particular historical moments, people become objects of knowledge’?¹⁷ This is a question that indigenous studies has, to date,
not sincerely engaged with. How does the indigenous subject become a subject? Who is given an indigenous voice or, rather, what voice is chosen to represent indigeneity? Concurrently, who is afforded ‘indigenous rights’ and the right to call themselves ‘indigenous’?

**INDIGENOUS MASCULINITY, TRADITION AND GENDER**

Indigenous masculinity can and should be treated as a largely untapped rubric for examining the propagation of power in the settler colonial context. In serving two essentialised master binaries (i.e., colonised/coloniser and man/woman), indigenous masculinity enables a model for looking at postcolonial power. The two essentialised notions associated with the dominance of colonised man over the indigenous man, and man over woman, create the ambivalent figure of the indigenous heterosexual patriarch; both oppressor and oppressed. This Janus-faced analysis permits us to form a post-hegemonic and more productive understanding of settler colonial power. In this context, the dialectics between hetero-patriarchal masculinity and feminism, and between colonised and coloniser become complicated, as indigenous masculinities are both imbibed with privilege and denied, both performing colonial hetero-patriarchy and resistant to it.

What do I mean when I say ‘masculinity’? It probably goes without saying that my view of masculinity is anti-essentialist and that masculinity cannot be treated ahistorically, aculturally, orapolitically. My determination to question masculinity is thus opposed to the typically ontologically oriented endeavour of indigenous studies, of defining indigenous identity. Such a shift in enquiry intuitively directs us away from the belief in a true, deep and essential masculine core. It leads us to separate masculinity from men and indigeneity away from biological conferment. That is, and to paraphrase Simone de Beauvoir, ‘One is not born but becomes a woman’, which could be rephrased in this context as ‘One is not born but becomes an indigenous subject’. Implicit within this analysis, then, is the sense that masculinity does not exist, other than through historically constructed performance.
Here Foucault’s line of questioning becomes important to how indigenous studies could develop because it does not ask what is authentic, what is traditional, what was originally true and real prior to the arrival of the colonial invader/settler, but rather why have authenticity and tradition, for instance, come to play such a central role in how indigenous cultures discipline subjectivities? The notion of tradition is especially dangerous when it is predicated on the concept of authenticity simply because it relies on the idea that a homogenous indigenous culture ever existed and that this cultural monolith is knowable, predictable, and can be authenticated. In the New Zealand context, the recent spate of self-created pseudo ‘identity scales’ rating Maori identity would suggest that the process of cultural self-discipline has been internalised. Typically, these scales rate one’s Maori identity in relation to a number of key authenticity determinants such as fluency in the Maori language, visits to one’s marae or homelands, involvement in activities such as kapa haka, commitment to community groups, etc. Whilst I must highlight that none of these performances of culture are in any way oppressive in and of themselves, the idea that an indigenous person must enact certain behavioural performances to be considered authentically indigenous is extremely repressive.

Clearly then, tradition is a strategic object that serves to protect dominant forms of indigenous masculinity and, for the neo-colonial project, reifies a focus on the past, promoting nostalgia at the expense of an existential immediacy. This dialectic between reverence for the past and discontent in the present persists as the absence of a putative purity arising from the pre-colonial past is lamented in the polluted present. The discursive formation of a pure and authoritative masculinity serves to immobilise alterity. As a biopolitical strategy, then, tradition has served to kill variant forms of indigenous subjectivity. Alternative forms of masculinity became anomalies, deviant; they were excluded from community, from ritual, from existence. As Judith Butler puts forth, gender is a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions – and
the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction ‘compels’ our belief in its necessity and naturalness.20

Likewise, the heteronormativity of indigenous masculinities through the idea of tradition and the search for origins, in producing the indigenous hetero-patriarch or elite male leader who embodies an authenticated subjectivity serves to conceal its genesis as a cultural fiction. For indigenous peoples, the punishment of not acceding to such fictions is disbarment through de-authenticating tactics, which serve to drive such subjectivities from communities.

Important for the purpose of the present article is the comprehension that the biopolitical ethnic formalisation process that, for instance, helped determine the ‘tribal structure’ as an ‘original social formation’ has a gendered postcolonial genealogy. That is, the postcolonial tribal hierarchy was/is a cultural fiction underpinned by gender. In the Te Ohu Kai Moana case described above, for example, the individual indigenous leaders relied on to determine who qualified as being Maori, or rather who were to be afforded rights under the Treaty, were male and, in some cases, deemed ‘chivalrous’ (many of the members of the original Commission were knighted by the Queen of England, including Sirs Tipene O’Regan, Robert Mahuta, and Graham Latimer). O’Regan was also named by the right-wing National Business Review as one of the ‘New Zealanders of the Year’.

The leading advocates opposing this circumlocution of definitional power to recognised tribes were Urban Maori Authorities who often strongly voiced their dissatisfaction with being excised from the Treaty process in gendered terms. One leading spokesperson, John Tamihere, for example, labelled the Commission ‘new corporates, the Knights of the Brown Table – and their new weapon – money’.21 Interestingly, in his summation of the 1998 Court of Appeal decision, Judge Paterson clearly outlined the development of an iwi partnership ideal though the juridical process: ‘The government has encouraged the iwi concept over the last 20 to 30 years [...] decision making is now more from the top down rather than from the bottom up’.22 The implication is clear here. In formulating the best procedure to manage the Maori problem, the
state concluded that a hierarchical model was most ‘re-cognisable’, with tribal male leadership at the apex, a hierarchical structure that would facilitate the funnelling of power and resources downwards and outwards via hapu (sub-tribes) whanau (families), eventually reaching the indigenous citizen. Such a construction is commonly thought to be the constituent scaffold of ‘Maori society’. In reality, the structure reflects a patriarchal social assembly, an ‘old-boys network’ able to work with the upper echelons of state power. It is a configuration that merely reinforced the general conception of indigenous cultures as patriarchal, sexist and structured by male heredity. Hence, while it was often underprivileged Maori women and men who championed indigenous rights in the 1970s under the banner of the Treaty of Waitangi, two decades later the ‘Treaty Partner’ was male and wealthy.

The production of male leadership at the expense of women leaders at the vanguard of the 1970s political conscientisation movement eventually led to a claim being brought to the Waitangi Tribunal (the state body authorised to determine the validity of Treaty of Waitangi claims) lamenting actions and policies [that] have resulted in an undermining of Maori women so that their status as rangatira [chiefs] has been expropriated due to the Crown’s failure to accord Maori women status and power within the political, social and economic structures it has created.23

As will become clear below, the use of the word ‘rangatira’ was pointed. Unfortunately, as the submission solely blamed ‘the Crown’, the complicity of Maori male leadership went unnoticed.

I would argue that this elite indigenous form of masculinity (and its associated ‘traditional’ cultural plaudits) is in actuality a particular form of masculinity that has developed since colonisation, in part at least mimicking dominant forms of invader/settler masculinity. This is not to say that indigenous men unwittingly fell into hetero-patriarchy and innocently enjoyed its benefits; there must be more responsibility than that. To paraphrase Stuart Hall,
indigenous cultures have come to a point where we can no longer translate our collective identities through the notion of an ‘innocent’ indigenous subject. Indigenous hetero-patriarchal men have willingly enjoyed a dividend through association with dominant forms of colonising subjectivities. Regardless of the atrocity of colonisation, eternally pointing the moral finger at the ethical corruption of colonisation is out of place. In this instance, the contemporary hetero-normative patriarchal face of many indigenous cultures subjugates women and alternative forms of indigenous masculinity. Yet, rather than villainise hetero-patriarchal tribal formations, we should trace a biopolitical historiography that ushered in traditional Maori masculine subjectivities. That is, power produced an indigenous masculine subjectivity apposite to its context, not an indigenous subject replete with power.

PRODUCING ELITE INDIGENOUS MASCULINITIES

Foucault famously noted that

[p]ower is not something that can be possessed, and it is not a form of might; power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of that relationship. One cannot, therefore, write the history of kings or the history of peoples; one can write the history of what constitutes those opposing terms.24

In much of my previous work I have treated indigenous masculinity generally. That is, I have deconstructed the tropes that belie the complexity of indigenous men. In this article, however, I am particularly interested in the production of an indigenous masculinity that functions as the indigenous voice at the boundary of postcolonial politics. As I argue here, while most commentators have understood the dominant forms of invader/settler masculinities to be inversely related to the mind of indigenous men, the productive nature of power imposed a different set of rules that challenged this dialectic. Aspects of the invader/settler masculinity were necessarily imbibed
into the burgeoning post-contact form of indigenous male leadership. This masculinity construction has since been allocated disciplinary and authoritative power through notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘authenticity’.

The indigenous objects of colonisation that emerged in conjunction with the biopolitical management of Maori were dependent on producing colonial apparatuses designed to dialogue with a Maori voice made recognisable to the colonial state. The disordering of indigenous epistemologies that proceeded from the colonial complex compelled indigenous masculinities to interweave with colonial beliefs about indigenous men, and with the patriarchy and hetero-normativity of dominant forms of invader/settler masculinity. The dominant invader/settler masculinity was inherently tied to European humanism. As David Goldberg notes, the voices of Rousseau and Kant reverberate not just through the Enlightenment but across the moral domain of modernity [... ] self-commanding reason, autonomous and egalitarian, but also legislative and rule-making, defines a large part of modernity’s conception of the self.25

The liberal humanist appeal to the individual is, more succinctly, an appeal to an idealised universal European masculinity, where European bourgeois masculinity came to represent humanity: ‘this Man, rational, self-determined and, since Descartes at least, the centre of his universe, serves as the privileged unmarked term against which all humans are measured’.26 The production of indigenous men who mimicked (but not fully) this world of European masculine forms infiltrated and disordered the indigenous worlds.

While bearers of postcolonial signs of indigenous masculine tradition seem authentic, they are preconditioned on an imposition upon the subjectivities of indigenous people. For instance, the introduction of technology influenced how Maori male leaders chose to enforce their power. In his comprehensive discussion of colonial and postcolonial Maori masculine leadership, Maharaia Winiata
outlines in *The Changing Role of the Leader in Maori Society* the imbrication of settler technologies and methods within chiefly habits:

The period [1800-1840] is important as showing traditional leaders keenly and actively experimenting in their dealings with Europeans. The result was a general widening in the horizons of the chiefs. They now had before them a range of European goods, techniques, codes, systems of value, and institutions to consider. The outstanding leaders in this period were the warrior chiefs, whose fame rested primarily on the possession of muskets [...]. While the uneven distribution of muskets was largely responsible for the exaggerated emphasis on this type of leader, they were nevertheless men who would have gained prestige under the old regime. That is, the muskets came into the hands of the men with superior kinship background. Moreover, the foundations of traditional leadership were sufficiently flexible to incorporate the newer status-giving ingredients without creating a new category of leader altogether.\(^{27}\)

Needless to say colonisation changed the way indigenous peoples view the world. The quote that opened this article is especially pertinent here, for, undoubtedly, perceptions of indigenous subjectivity, were, under colonisation, systematically altered and eroded: ‘like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea’.\(^ {28}\)

To understand how colonisation produced an elite form of indigenous masculinity we need to appreciate how the dialogic colonial process concentrated on producing a small number of male leaders at the tribal level while simultaneously eradicating the power of sub-tribal rangatira. According to Winiata the ‘*ariki* [tribal leaders] and *rangatira* [sub-tribal leaders] were the social and political leaders in [pre-colonial] Maori society, and they also played a part in the organization of economic affairs’.\(^ {29}\) Winiata goes on to outline the structure of pre-colonial Maori socio-political life:
The tribe itself was made up of several subtribes, each of varying size but perhaps averaging some two to three hundred people. The subtribe or hapu was located in the village and had therefore the basis for a more compact organization... Undergirding the more physical aspects of the subtribal village were the genealogies which joined all members to a common ancestor who may have lived up to nine generations back, and through him to the eponymous ancestor of the tribe twenty or more generations away. The subtribal ancestor (from whom the name of the hapu usually derived) was generally the one where the branch line stemmed away from the main ridge pole of the genealogy.30

The ‘Ariki’ – ‘the one in whom the senior lines of the genealogy converged’ – was recognised as the head of the tribe, but actual community leadership was the domain of rangatira.31

Significantly, the Treaty of Waitangi specifically guaranteed ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ (Article 2), which essentially afforded rangatira the right to exercise their power over their hapu lands, kainga (villages) and ‘taonga katoa’ (property and/or treasures). Not only does the Treaty of Waitangi’s text signify the importance of rangatira in 1840, it also points to the degradation of Maori social organisation since, and to the misrecognition of an ariki-like masculine person as the rational conduit between a confederacy of hapu (i.e., a tribe) and the State.

The production of a ‘tribal consciousness’ with the simultaneous naturalisation of an elite masculinity to helm the tribe is, like Foucault’s ‘organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’,32 Central to this organism are notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘authenticity’. While the production of an elite indigenous form of masculinity has been internalised, it is/was a matter of survival in terms of interfacing with an invader/settler state hell-bent on re-ordering the Maori world to resemble a hierarchical patriarchy that it could politically recognise and thus converse with. Here I align with Paul Meredith, who suggests that ‘tradition’ within the context of ethnic formalisation ‘is not only utilised as a normative guide but also to establish and sustain a citizenship which is
structured around subordinate/dominant power relations and inclusive/exclusive membership’.\(^ {33}\)

This does not mean Maori were non-agents within the development of this re-ordering process. In the latter half of the nineteenth century many hapu quickly reacted to the changing socio-political landscape by reconstituting ‘runanga’ (political assembly of the hapu) so as to enable them to interact with the colonial system. In the Waikato region, for instance, Winiata notes that many hapu attempted to create a system to interpret the imperial system:

The chiefs designed their movement on parallel and even converging lines with the wider governmental institutions of the country [...] [although] kinship remained an important factor in status. On the other hand, the influence of the resident magistrate was often thrown on the side of men qualified in the more technical requirements of the position [...] Another problem [...] was the existence of men of rank who were near-illiterate and therefore unable to discharge their duties as magistrates in accordance with the regulations. This was solved by the appointment of educated Maori officials as advisers to the chiefs. Thus there were brought into the scheme two classes of leaders, the hereditary and the educated. Frequently, however, such educated officials were also men of superior kinship background.\(^ {34}\)

Of note here is, firstly, the recognition by Maori that they had to create a juridical system able to interact with the laws imposed by the invader/settler state, particularly for Maori who lived in rural areas beyond the scope of European law (i.e., the majority of the population at the time). ‘The runanga was therefore made the basis for an institution to frame laws and dispense justice’.\(^ {35}\) Secondly, and more importantly, Winiata makes it clear that Maori leaders recognised the need for their political bodies to include ‘educated’ Maori men able to interpret and administer European procedures. Inadvertently, this also meant that at least a significant portion of
Maori male leaders were schooled in Victorian style boarding schools. It was them who, subsequently, authenticated a hybrid form of masculine leadership as the ‘natural’ and traditional form of elite masculinity: part indigenous; part Victorian.

Dominant forms of Victorian masculinity were focused around the rational achievement of mind over body, ‘whether through self-restraint or disciplines of power and strength’. The valorisation of reason and rationality in the eighteenth century Enlightenment is decisive to the formation of invader/settler masculinities: ‘Reason and feeling were separated and masculinity came to be associated with the objective, the practical, the scientific and the technological’. Colonisation, thus, brought with it the productive and repressive nature of nineteenth century bourgeois orthodoxy, stoicism and clearly demarcated gender divisions determined by heteronormativity. Hegemonic British culture, in particular was in a constant apprehensive state regarding the contamination of the masculine by the feminine, leading to the production of private boys’ schools and the explicit inculcation of stoicism through sports such as cricket and rugby. In the New Zealand context, it is no coincidence that colonial authorities attempted to create a Maori gentry modelled on their British counterparts through the creation of Maori boys’ private boarding schools. Te Aute, St Stephens, Hato Paora, and Hato Petera, for instance, were characterised by ‘muscular’ forms of Christianity resonant of Victorian British public boys’ schools. The colonial policy of creating a cultural divide between generations, and the increasing desire by Maori to be able to converse with the colonial system, led to the education of a select few Maori boys in elite British-style colonial institutions. Subsequently, an elite group of Maori men was created and crucially shaped by a specific type of British masculine leadership system.

Founded in 1854, for example, Te Aute was conceived as a place where young Maori men could be groomed in the fashion of the English gentry. Te Aute presented:

an extraordinary blend of various colonial legacies. Over the past 120 years, Anglicanism, Maoritanga [Maori culture] and rugby have combined to form a unique New Zealand institution ... [where Maori] families sent their
chosen sons to be educated in a replica of the nineteenth century English boarding school.\textsuperscript{39}

In effect, the colonial system, and in particular the education of indigenous male leaders, was designed specifically to create an ‘old-boy’ indigenous masculinity, that is, a burgeoning form of hybridised masculine leadership, which would enable more effective assimilation based on the premise that, once schooled, the indigenous ‘old boy’ would return to provide administrative leadership in their communities in the rural margins. Thus, Winiata notes that the intermediary between the tribe and the state mirrored this subjectivity and points to the juridical production of indigenous citizens:

If there is by negotiation concerning land-transfer, or commercial transactions, or any legal matter in which the relationships of the tribe with the Europeans are involved, then the educated leader comes into action. He is usually found as secretary, frequently as chairman or clerk, in various committees. He may write petitions, or other documents of interest to the tribe. The educated class of leader forms a specific group within the community, assisting the \textit{ariki} and the \textit{kaumatua} in those parts of their duties which touch the European.\textsuperscript{40}

While this might point to a necessary component of colonised indigenous life (and it was), nonetheless, it also signals the production of elite British styled indigenous masculine leadership, the fragmentation of the indigenous social order and, in particular, the degradation of hapu based politics and leadership. As Winiata asserts:

In tribal leadership the most striking change is the disappearance of the \textit{rangatira} leader of the \textit{hapu}. The term is now used as a courtesy title... the responsibilities formerly exercised by the \textit{rangatira} have
now been assumed by the *kaumatua* [the head of the family, as defined by Winiata].

Interestingly, Winiata also notes the loss of the sub-tribal level of Maori leadership or, rather, the devolvement of responsibility from the core social structure of pre-colonial Maori society (i.e., the hapu) to the hetero-patriarch of the modern Maori family. Essentially, such an outcome mirrored the bourgeois European family with its focus on economic rationality and normativity:

Through much of the nineteenth century the family was accepted as an essentially patriarchal institution. By law, men controlled the property in any marriage and the family was seen as a functional economic unit under the leadership of the male.

The production of two levels of leadership also mirrored the social stratification of leadership within European life in general, where a chasm existed/exists between the leadership provided by the state and the leadership of the nuclear family.

One of the purposes of inculcating indigenous cultures with hetero-patriarchy was to produce men who would conceive of paternal responsibility as a natural way of being. Moreover, ‘as long as the nineteenth century patriarch provided for his family, he could regard himself a “good father” and was, thereby, licensed to absent himself emotionally and, in the process, wreak huge damage on his family’.

The governance of indigenous men into patriarchal roles was ratified through the organisation of European bourgeois domestic life; the ideology and practice of ‘separate spheres’. So called ‘traditional’ indigenous culture came to reflect gender-role separation where a domestic sphere of action was defined for women, whereas men (but not all men) controlled the finances and importantly the political and public spheres. In New Zealand, for example, even today as these pseudo traditions are maintained, seldom (if ever) are women allowed to talk in the ‘traditional’ public sphere. The assimilation of invader/settler masculinity into indigenous masculinity led to the public and traditional face of power
at least to be exclusively male. Therefore, indigenous masculine leadership came to reflect modernity’s masculinity.

Whilst there is nothing inherently malevolent with the representation of indigenous culture through tradition, it is the fixated and arrested nature of so-called authentic indigenous masculinities that causes me to be most anxious. Such is the repressive and silencing nature of tradition and authenticity in indigenous discourses. The recourse to ‘origins’ has produced an invented tradition of hetero-patriarchy that serves to deauthenticate other forms of masculinity. Such foundational insecurity has led to ritual displays of physical manliness and hyper-masculinity, along with the traditionalisation of heterosexuality, homophobia, and patriarchy in Maori masculine culture (here patriarchy is defined as including crude acts of aggression, but more importantly as ‘men’s control of women’s bodies and minds [...] deeply entrenched in rituals, routines and social practices’. 44

Here it is important to draw attention to the idea of ‘dominant masculinity’. What Pierre Bourdieu refers to as masculine domination or *libido dominandi* and what Bob Connell refers to as hegemonic masculinity is, while limited, still important to deconstructing dominant forms of indigenous masculinities. Both, in their differently theorised ways, refer to an ideologically dominant form of masculinity discursively produced through practice and materialised/engendered in male bodies:

This inter relation of the gender order is kept alive through the dynamic principle of alterity or otherness, always constructed in relational opposition to each other [...] masculinity and femininity can float free from men and women per se and take on a quality that is simultaneously present in bodies, structures, practices, discourses, and ultimately symbolic universes that provide material for the ontological fabric of gender relations and gender identity in everyday life. 45

Thus, masculine domination is a discursive formation produced, internalised and effected through male bodies, but it is not male
domination per se. Put more positively, there is nothing biologically
determined nor culturally essentialist about masculine oppression,
yet the men produced through ideologically dominant forms of
masculinity are very real and have very real consequences for
women, other men and, indeed, for the ways in which indigenous life
is ordered.

NECROPOLITICS AND ‘FOURTH SPACE’

When one thinks of Bhabha’s conception of ‘third culture’, it is easy
to romantically imagine neo-indigenous cultural formations
unsettling the national narrative to the point that these cultural
expansions gain a foothold and disrupt the entrenched binary. Yet,
for too long indigenous scholarship has located itself within the
coloniser/colonised binary so that even as we set about to
‘decolonise’ we tend to romanticise the forms of resistance occupied
and the resultant postcolonial social formations. In doing so, we
forego an indigenous responsibility within the postcolonial complex,
we forget to hold indigenous people accountable for their choices, for
the complicity of indigenous identity formations, and for the
necropolitics that such complicity enables.

In the controversies surrounding the Maori Fisheries Act and
the establishment of The Maori Fisheries Commission, the primary
argument against allocating power to a few tribal leaders was based
on the suggestion that the Treaty referred to ‘hapu’, not ‘iwi’, and
that, as ‘traditional iwi [were] intermittent and non-territorial
formations [...] iwi tended to be arbitrarily defined by those in power
with regard to current political and economic opportunities rather
than merely by kinship or descent’.\textsuperscript{46} Certainly Winiata’s view reflects
this understanding:

There remain today a number of recognized \textit{waka}
amalgamations that are rooted in their ancient
boundaries... The amalgamations have no political
importance, but certain administrative arrangements
tend to give firmness to the \textit{waka} outlines. For instance,
Trust Boards set up to administer compensation monies
Likewise, according to Manuhuia Barcham, for the majority of the twentieth century, ‘[i]wi [tribes] were relatively weak politically, being more a cultural institution than a political one’. Then, ‘in the mid-1980s, with the implementation of new government policies, a period of re-\textit{iwi}isation began’.\textsuperscript{48} In Foucauldian terms, colonisation effected the death of a particular type of indigenous subjectivity and the production of another. In existential terms, however, it was influential Maori who in comradeship with the State wilfully enabled the production of a tribal consciousness.

The production of a masculine tribal elite enabled the unsettling nature of hapu collectives to be removed by the settler state. Their removal represented a foreclosure on the capacity of indigenous communities to produce intellectuals sufficiently grounded in local politics and culture, who also reside beyond hetero-patriarchal and state sponsored leadership. Hapu intellectuals or rangatira represented what settler conceptions of indigeneity feared the most: the production of indigenous subjectivities that acted beyond the panoptical vision of the State and the biopolitical coercion of state institutions (such as education). Of central importance, then, is how the definition of indigenous subjectivity is related to the processes of postcolonial ‘ethnic formalisation’ and, subsequently, how the production of an indigenous masculine elite functions to fulfil settler conceptions of the colonial state.

Yet, I think it is unwise to envisage postcolonial power hierarchically, that is, as a mere function of the state’s will, as somehow possessed by individuals (i.e., the so-called ‘neo-tribal elite’), and/or as inherent to any one collective. Rather, and paraphrasing Foucault, I see the postcolonial context as ‘a complex strategical situation’.\textsuperscript{49} To be an ‘authentic’ indigenous person, thus, is to be one with the prevailing discourses that construct indigeneity, which denote inclusion on the basis of exclusion. As National Party
MP Hekia Parata of Ngati Porou (a North Island East-Coast tribe) put it, ‘without tribes there is no Maori’.  

In the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault describes discourses as based on interrelated systems, processes, languages, and institutions that allow the emergence of ‘truth’. Thus, rather than accepting the naturalness of indigenous male leaders, this article demonstrated the constructed nature of indigeneity, suggested that an elite indigenous masculinity did not just occur, and that it did not mirror a pre-colonial structure. While it may be argued that such a conception renders indigenous agency meaningless (i.e., how can we resist if indeed we are mere reflections of dominant discourses?), I fervently believe that to envisage new forms of resistance, self-critical awareness is key. This is especially so because indigenous politics has become overly determined by ‘authenticity’ and ‘tradition’. The logical outcome of a fundamentalist notion of indigeneity is that there can only be one authentic indigenous subjectivity. It is apparent that, via the juridical and biopolitical processes mentioned above, rangatira have been written out of political recognition. More important than the actual exclusion from access to colonial coffers, however, is the exclusion of what rangatira represented (and, thus, what their exclusion achieved symbolically).

It is, therefore, unwise to appropriate the idea of ‘third space’ without also understanding how the discursive nature of power works within this space to produce subjectivities. Simply being indigenous, or adhering to ‘traditional’ cultural practices, or even resisting the neo-colonial state does not naturalise a sovereign space located beyond the postcolonial complex. It is in this context that I critique some of the tacit understandings offered by Bruyneel. In his analysis there is a tendency to accept uncomplicatedly that indigenous forms of resistance inherently challenge neo-colonial structures. For instance,

In resistance to this colonial rule, indigenous political actors work across American spatial and temporal boundaries, demanding rights and resources from the liberal democratic settler-state while also challenging the imposition of colonial rule on their lives. This resistance engenders a ‘third space of sovereignty’ that
resides neither simply inside nor outside the American political system but rather exists on these very boundaries exposing both the practices and the contingencies of American colonial rule.\textsuperscript{51}

Too often in indigenous studies we fall into a coloniser/colonised binary, which debilitates our ability to see the density of the postcolonial complex. Too often indigenous studies scholars envisage indigenous acts as inherently sovereign acts against an omnipresent hegemonic colonial state; in so doing, they valorise the reactionary productions of indigenous subjectivities the binary creates. Lost, in this battle of good and evil, is the idea that the postcolonial complex produces both non-indigenous and indigenous citizens, whilst other subjectivities are excluded.

In quite a radical critique of the innate unsettling qualities of simply just ‘being’ indigenous, which is evident in both Bhabha’s and Bruyneel’s conceptions of ‘third’ spaces, I would argue that the postcolonial complex, through a force-field of discursive strategies, produces forms of indigeneity complicit with its agenda, which indeed are produced by the mere fact that they are more recognisable to the postcolonial state and are very much ‘inside’ it and complicit with postcolonial liberalisation. While acknowledging that postcultures are an implicit production of colonisation, it is imperative that notions of self-critique and responsibility underpin these new cultural spaces, together with a will to investigate what is being included and thus excluded under the name of ‘indigeneity’. Typically, the exclusion involves those who have been most displaced by colonial rule.

Hence, I propose a concomitant fourth space of necro-sovereignty, a dead space or a void of possibility where those excluded subjectivities are encouraged to die, yet simultaneously are freed from the will to be recognised. I argue that, for indigenous scholars, this space is as important as the third space of sovereignty. Indigenous political intelligence requires indigenous people to foresee the outcomes of the paths of political recognition. One must question: what narratives elite indigenous masculine formations serve to unsettle? Does their complicity as ‘Treaty Partners’ reside within or outside the postcolonial political imaginary? And,
subsequently, what benefits does their political recognition lead to? What is the cost of recognition? In the act of desiring recognition, what choices do we lose? Conversely, what freedoms are enabled via the necropolitics outlined above? Is a ‘fourth’ sovereign space a space of possibility? Ultimately, will political recognition through state bodies (which inherently re-locate indigenous groups within the coloniser/colonised binary) lead to outcomes of self-definition, choice, and responsibility?

Thus, I ask: is indigenous masculinity entirely historically contingent? Have indigenous masculinities only formed in the wake of colonisation? Are they complicit with invader/settler subjectivities? If the answers are yes, then the challenge indigenous peoples face is to realise that traditionalised elite indigenous masculinities have now become an encumbrance, and that often we are left holding on to false traditions, which only serve to exclude and limit indigenous men to hetero-patriarchal, hyper-masculine, stoical, staunch, violent, and often destructive behaviours. The task of indigenous masculinity studies is to help realise ‘that sense of choice and variety in self-definition that so many women have embraced as a means of personal and social liberation’. That is, to help indigenous men realise that they ‘are much freer than they feel’.

BIОГРАФИЧЕСКАЯ ЗАМЕЧАНИЕ

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NOTES

4 Webster, ‘Māori Retribalization’: 350.
5 Cited in Webster, ‘Māori Retribalization’: 350.


Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*: 37.


Cited in Webster, ‘Māori Retribalization’: 365.

Cited in Webster, ‘Māori Retribalization’: 367.


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Michel Foucault cited in Danaher, Schirato, Webb, *Understanding Foucault*: 123.


Meredith. ‘Urban Maori as “New Citizens”: 16.


Edwards, *Cultures of Masculinity*: 159.


Hokowhitu, ‘Producing Elite Indigenous Masculinities’

43 Beynon, *Masculinities and Culture*: 129.
46 Webster, ‘Maori Retribalization’: 366.
49 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*: 93.