In early 2000, a colleague and I submitted an application to our university HREC for a pilot project to modify a series of standardised wellbeing instruments for a longitudinal study of refugee youth settlement. The pilot study was collaborative in that we worked with a small group of young adults with refugee backgrounds to design sampling and data collection strategies and a set of research tools or instruments that could be used to gather qualitative and quantitative information about settlement experiences (Gifford, Bakopanos, Kaplan, & Correa-Velez, 2007; Gifford, Correa-Velez, & Sampson, 2009). Although the ethics application was straightforward, it was returned by the HREC as not approved. We were not surprised when our application was returned because in our experience, human ethics applications with/on refugees almost never get approved outright. However, we were surprised about the reason it had been returned. The HREC took objection to one of the questions we were using to explore how scaled items could be best presented
— a question chosen by the group of young adults collaborating with us on the pilot: ‘How much do you like ice cream?’ and ‘Given a choice between ice cream and pizza, which would you choose first?’. The HREC judged these questions as having the potential to cause harm to resettled refugee youth because they were refugees. The logic was that being refugees, these youth would have experienced starvation and like other forms of trauma, questions about food were seen as a risk to re-traumatise. We were asked to attend the next meeting of the HREC to explain our choice of foods such as ‘ice cream and pizza’ for this population and why we believed that these questions were unlikely to cause harm — to re-traumatise this group.

My colleague attended the meeting where, in less than five minutes and with virtually no discussion, the project was approved. My colleague explained that the committee was surprised to see that she — the researcher — ‘looked’ very much like some of the young people in the study who like her, had been born in Africa. She described to the committee that although all of the youth had a refugee past, they also were like other teenagers who enjoyed sweets and ‘junk’ food. She went on to point out that not all refugees were from Africa, not all refugees had been poor or starving and not all were still held victims by their past. The committee approved the study.

The second story relates to a media arts research project with young people from refugee backgrounds. The project was a partnership among researchers (led by myself and a colleague), government, youth service organisations and arts media organisations. The project aimed to investigate whether a cultural development approach through digital arts media could help these youth maintain their social connections with friends and family still overseas and if this in turn could support successful settlement in Australia. The research was designed to be ethnographic with researchers using participatory observation of project activities. A multilayered process of informed consent was developed and we took care to ensure that all participants
understood and had given their consent (both verbal and written) to the research. One of the workshops was conducted by a group of community artists who were teaching media art skills to the participants. The workshop began with introductions that were mostly for the benefit of the artists since the participants and the researchers all knew each other well by this stage in the project. However, when the researchers introduced themselves, the group of community artists expressed their view that it was unethical to do research with these refugee youth in the context of an arts-based project. Especially in relation to refugee participants, research was viewed to be incompatible with the goals of youth development through art media. Indeed, two of the artists clearly expressed their dismay and argued that research in general was intrusive and harmful for refugee youth.

Both of these case studies highlight the ways in which particular values shape the kinds of judgements that are made about the ethics of research that focuses on people with refugee backgrounds. In both cases, the category of refugee is naturalised in that as a cultural concept it comes to take on a particular set of implicit shared meanings. The positions of both the HREC and the community artists about the meaning of the cultural category ‘refugee’ highlight how values and identities shape the ways we think about ‘what is right’ in the ethics of research with people with refugee backgrounds. The first story illustrates the power of the ‘refugee’ label and the implicit assumptions that it confers. The fact that my colleague ‘looked African’ but was not and had never been a refugee, confronted a range of stereotypes held by members of the HREC about African-born people and people with refugee backgrounds, and led them to re-assess notions of autonomy and vulnerability within this context. In the second case, community artists brought their own values to play that articulated both their own group identity and how they saw the identities of the participants. The artists saw themselves engaged in participatory, emancipatory practices that valued difference, marginality and promoted youth development. In con-
trast, research was seen to be a mechanism of control, of surveil-
lance and counter to the liberating space of art making. In both
case studies, the voices and values of the participants themselves
— to be something other than a refugee — became lost in the
tussle between the value cultures of HREC members, artists and
researchers.

In this chapter, I first begin by discussing what I mean by
value cultures and how an anthropological lens might open up
different ways to understand how and why different parties who
share the same concerns to promote respect and autonomy for
refugees, often clash when it comes to what is ethical research in
this field. Second, I explore the value cultures and tensions that
arise over differences of opinion between HRECs, service
providers and community organisations, and researchers and ask
whether values are or ought to be, relative or absolute. Finally, I
consider the power of the refugee label and ask in whose interest
does the process of ethical review and surveillance operate?
Importantly, to what extent do HRECs unintentionally reinforce
refugee victimhood by prioritising values of protecting over
respecting?

Ethics, Value Cultures and Fields of Difference in
Refugee Research

There is wide agreement that the ethics of research with
people who are or have been refugees is complex, changing
and challenging (Ellis, Kia-Keating, Yusuk, Lincoln, & Nur,
2007; Siber, 2009). There is a growing literature addressing
these challenges and common themes focus on the various
aspects of risk to vulnerable participants, the active involve-
ment of refugees in research and on issues surrounding partic-
ipant agency in the research (Hugman, Bartolomei, & Pittaway, 2011; Hugman, Pittaway, & Bartolomei, 2011;
Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007). Another important
area of scholarship concerns the inadequacies of institutional
ethic committees where principles often designed for medical
research are applied to the complexities of research with refugees and other vulnerable or marginalised groups (Perry, 2011). At stake are interpretations of ‘vulnerability’, the meanings of which are highly dependent on context and which, when not taken into account, can fail to recognise the agency of refugees as research participants (Perry, 2011). Indeed, Kirmayer and Rousseau (2004) have highlighted the moral imperative to conduct research that goes against the prevailing ideologies of HRECs, as in the case of research into refugees in detention. Here, in relation to detainees in Australia, research may be only possible without official permission or with deception. Indeed, HRECs run the risk of colluding with new forms of state power by preventing the documentation of forms of abuse precisely because of the illegality of doing research in these institutional spaces (Kirmayer & Rousseau, 2004). Importantly, Kirmayer and Rousseau argue that research that cannot be undertaken via formal channels as for example, documenting the plight of detainees, is a form of legitimate illegal action. Such are the complexities of navigating the ethical landscape of research with refugees and other forced migrants.

In addressing these complexities, the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford (2007) has developed a set of ethical guidelines that focus on ‘good practice’ — being informative and descriptive rather than authoritarian or prescriptive (p. 172). The guidelines explicitly recognise that the field of forced migration research is complex, and that an ethics of research cannot be guided by any single set of moral precepts, nor can they take the form of rigid instructions set by institutional bodies (p. 171). Further, they address not only refugees as the subjects of research, but also the wider field of stakeholders including sponsors, gatekeepers, governments and broader society. While not ignoring the need to protect research subjects, they recognise that in reality, this may not always be possible. Instead, emphasis is given to the importance of relationships
between the participants and researchers being based on trust, negotiation, the rights of participants and the respective roles, rights and obligations of parties other than research participants. Importantly, the guidelines aim to provide a practical framework for researchers in anticipating potential challenges in a complex and rapidly changing field and to assist them in making informed decisions in this context.

It is within this complex context that I return to the focus of this chapter — the clash of values in regard to what is ethical in refugee research. I begin with the premise that what is at stake are the different value cultures held by the various actors in the refugee research field and the tensions that arise when these clash. In first considering culture, I draw on the ideas of Arjun Appadurai (1996), who conceptualises culture not so much as a thing but rather as process: ‘... the process of naturalizing a subset of differences that have been mobilized to articulate group identity’ (p. 15). Importantly, culture as process forms itself around identity and difference in relation to something else. It is then, both situated and relational. Put another way, culture is about the making of collective identities that are different to an other — and these differences in turn reinforce the shared identities of a group, which again reinforce the differences of those who are outsiders. Appadurai suggests that it is the markers of group difference that highlight contestations of values about difference (p. 14).

This leads us to consider the concept of value. From an anthropological perspective, Graeber (2001) suggests that we can think of values as ‘conceptions of the desirable’ (Kluckhohn as cited in Graeber, 2001) or as ‘... ideas about what people ought to want’ (Graeber 2001, p. 3). Values are shared ideas about what people consider to be good, proper, meaningful and importantly, as Graeber argues, how these meanings turn into desire (p. ix). Again, from an anthropological perspective, values are not absolute, and some of the early ethnographic work compared the cultures of people living in
the same physical environment but who had vastly different value systems. For the purposes of this chapter, values are the collective, shared ideas about what is right (or ought to be right), they are often implicit, shape group identity and they guide what is meaningful and correct social engagement in the world. Group differences commonly focus on the contestation of values and it is to this I now turn.

I use the concept *value cultures* to bring together the idea of culture as collective identity constructed in relation to an other — in this regard, constructed in relation to ideas of what is right and desirable in the world. Bringing to the fore different *value cultures* as they apply to the ethics of refugee research can help to shed light on how, what would appear to be the sharing of common interests can turn into a battlefield of contested difference and ill intentions. There are at least three value cultures that we can draw out of these two case studies above, value cultures that articulate themselves by way of identity and difference with respect to the right way to protect and do no harm to refugee subjects. These are firstly, the value culture of the HREC, secondly the value culture of the community artists, and thirdly, the value culture of the researchers. Conflicts between these value cultures become apparent when issues of identity and difference are at stake. I argue that many of the tensions and conflicts that arise in refugee research between researchers, ethics committees, service providers, gatekeepers and stakeholders can be understood as clashes between taken for granted values — values that shape group identities. In particular contexts where multiple groups have vested interests, these value cultures come into conflict and highlight the sharp divides between group identities where the imperative to ‘protect’ and to ‘do no harm’ have vastly different meanings. Further, I argue that the naturalising of ‘refugee’ often results in erasing refugee voices from the ethics nexus.

The process of reviewing a research study involving people who are, might be or have been, refugees is informed by a set
of core values that implicitly shape how we understand what it is to be human and then, what it is to be a refugee. Hayden (2006), in considering what kinds of persons we understand refugees to be, argues that ‘the person … is a cultural category that refers to how we conceptualise the nature of the self’ (p. 481) and that within the international refugee regime, a refugee is constructed in relation to a ‘western’ person — an individual who is autonomous, has free will and the same human rights as others — all humans being held to be equal. The refugee individual is constructed as a person lacking these qualities or characteristics: ‘To the degree that refugees are represented as lacking autonomy, they are deprived of a fundamental aspect of what we consider our humanity’ (Hayden, 2006, p. 481). Importantly, Hayden argues that the way we conceptualise the refugee is shaped by both western assumptions about their needs and interests and by the interests of the organisations and people working with them. Thus, the refugee is constructed as a person without — a person in lack.

It is a fallacy to assume that the refugee in exile, while often lacking in autonomy, is also lacking in agency (Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2007; Kibreab, 2004). Within the international refugee regime, humanitarian organisations often reinforce dependency in the form of aid as charity and obligations that stem from humanitarian aid (Fassin, 2012; Harrell-Bond, 2002). Malkki (1996) argues that one of the consequences of the humanitarian refugee regime is what she refers to as a process of dehistoricisation — which is the erasure of individual histories where personal identities are reduced to a collective identity woven around notions of persecution, vulnerability, dependency and need. The question arises, what kind of a person is the refugee resettled? I argue that the process of dehistoricisation continues to define the identity of these individuals. It is difficult for the migrant who has arrived in Australia on a humanitarian visa to shed the refugee label and it is equally difficult for the host society, its institutions and
practices to relate to such persons in ways other than as refugees. The fact that this powerful labelling process is being increasingly resisted by migrants with refugee backgrounds themselves (Aidani, 2010; Kumsa, 2006) has had little impact on prevailing practice more generally, and this is especially the case in relation to the values which inform the ethics of research with resettled refugees.

**Value Cultures of Institutional Human Ethics Committees**

The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC, 2007; updated 2009), *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (the National Statement) begins with a discussion of the values that guide the relationships between researchers and research participants. It states that ‘… respect for human beings, research merit and integrity, justice, and beneficence — help to shape that relationship as one of trust, mutual responsibility and ethical equality’ (p. 11). The value of respect is highlighted as being central:

> Among these values, respect is central. It involves recognising that each human being has value in himself or herself, and that this value must inform all interaction between people. Such respect includes recognising the value of human autonomy — the capacity to determine one’s own life and make one’s own decisions. But respect goes further than this. It also involves providing for the protection of those with diminished or no autonomy, as well as empowering them where possible and protecting and helping people wherever it would be wrong not to do so. (section 1, p. 11)

This preamble clearly sets the framework for HRECs in their consideration of the conduct of research with persons with refugee backgrounds. However, it has been my experience both as a researcher submitting applications for review and as a member of two HRECs (one a hospital and one a university committee) that in reviewing applications, the existence of any
subjects who are or have been refugees results in a focus on their refugeeness to the exclusion of any other criteria of personhood. The refugee label — whether in exile or in resettlement — comes to shift the focus of the value of respect from that of an autonomous person capable of determining their own life and making their own decisions to that of a person with diminished or no autonomy. The role of the HREC thus becomes focused solely on the need to protect — but from what is often not clear. Assumed vulnerability attributed to refugeeness has the effect of erasing the possibility for potential participants to exercise their own autonomy and make their own decisions about their engagement with social research.

The HREC that judged questions about ice cream and pizza to be potentially traumatising failed to acknowledge a range of other identities among these youth — that they were teenagers with similar likes and dislikes to other young people their age, that they represented a range of ethnic, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, that they lived in a range of family situations with a diversity of values about gender roles and family responsibilities. The young people in our study all considered these factors more important than that they had been refugees. Indeed, the assumption by the HREC that these youth needed to be protected because of their refugeeness could be cast as a lack of respect for the ability of these young people to make their own decisions and for their capacity to determine their lives. By uncritically prioritising the refugee identity, HRECs run the risk of further disempowering research participants with refugee backgrounds and erasing their voices from the social research arena.

A second consequence of the imperative to protect is the insistence by some HRECs on the provision of trauma counseling services regardless of the nature of the research and its potential risks. This ‘therapeutising’ of refugeeness (Marlowe, 2010) runs the risk of reinforcing dependency among people with refugee backgrounds and at the same time, serves the interests of a broader array of institutions in regards to what they con-
sider feasible or desirable in their management of refugees (Hayden, 2006). In sum, the risk of an ethnocentric focus on the part of HRECs when it comes to refugee research is that it can lead to a blindness to other social criteria and contexts that may be more important than refugeeness. The challenge for HRECs is to explicitly interrogate when being or having been a refugee makes a difference to a proposed piece of social research and why. This requires a standing back from the implicit values that HRECs might bring to what it is they consider a refugee to be. An essentialising of refugeeness leads to prioritising values to protect above values to respect indicating that the value cultures of HRECs tend to favour the former over the latter. This in turn effectively erases any possibility of conceptualising the research subject in terms other that one with a particular set of refugee vulnerabilities and precludes consideration of factors that might be more important to the particular research.

Value Cultures of Service Providers and Community Organisations

Community organisations and service providers working in the refugee sector are often motivated by a range of humanitarian values — to aid, to protect, to build capacity, to advocate for or on behalf of, to address needs — to do good in the world. Doing good can become as much an identity for individuals as for institutions. Particularly in the nongovernment, and community sector, values and identity play a strong role in shaping the motivations of its workers — where monetary remuneration is low and larger institutional structures mitigate against positive, more radical short and long-term social change. Service providers and community organisations are often fierce gatekeepers when it comes to refugee research. As gatekeepers, they may see themselves as refugee protectors — from outsiders and from institutional practices and forms of power that would do them harm. The potential for conflict with the academic research sector is high especially when it comes to
refugee research. As with HRECs, those working in the community sector are often guilty of unintentionally essentialising the construct of ‘refugee’ and in doing so, see their mission as protecting and advocating on behalf of these persons who are deemed to be vulnerable because of their assumed identity. In this regard, as with HRECs, the mandate to protect erases the courtesy to respect. And this in turn removes any possibilities of agency among individuals and communities who once were refugees and who are now their clients.

The second case study of the community artist’s reaction to the ethics of research with young people with refugee backgrounds can be interpreted as the research being seen as a threat to their own set of cultural practices and identities, which are made and remade in contrast to the assumed identities of refugee youth. The practices of youth development through art can only be executed with vulnerable, marginalised bodies, and it is this vulnerability made visible (or possible) through their refugeeeness that in turn legitimates the culture and identities of community artists. Liberating agency through art can only be performed on a vulnerable subject and refugee youth are the blank canvasses for this artistic expression. The researchers as participatory observers, in this context, are outsiders and moreover, outsiders with a different set of values in relation to their research subjects — which include both the artists and the participants. The researchers in this case study, one of whom also had a refugee background, saw the research participants as young people first; newly arrived migrants to Australia second and third, also with refugee experiences. Importantly, the researchers explicitly worked against an essentialising of these youth, an approach informed as much by their own experiences as by the broader theoretical literature that informed their own positions in the research field. Once again, the imperative to protect rather than to respect stems from a particular value culture shaping identity and practice among community artists working
within a youth development framework. This value culture stands in contrast to that of the researchers and resulted, in this case, in a clash of cultural values in relation to the construct of ‘refugee’ youth. Importantly and somewhat ironically, possibilities for transformation for this group of youth through art were limited by the very values about ethics of research held by the group of community artists ‘doing good’.

Value Cultures of Researchers

The value cultures of researchers in relation to what is ethical in refugee research are a complex and contested site. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the rigour and objectivity of the research methodology must come before anything else because it is the quality of the results that counts in the translation of knowledge or ‘evidence’ to policy and practice. On the other hand, there are those who argue that the other imperatives — the realities of refugees — take precedence over strict adherence to principles of objective scientific inquiry. Researcher value cultures are further complicated by the ongoing methodological debates between qualitative and quantitative approaches to social inquiry and by disciplinary traditions to research. Refugee research is widely regarded as being inherently multidisciplinary and this is a key strength. However in practice, the tensions between method, discipline and role of the researcher in relation to the research subject — remain problematic.

These tensions are played out in ongoing debates about the ethics of refugee research. For example, a key site of tension is research regarding asylum seekers where access to information and people is prohibited. Kirmayer and Rousseau (2004) argue for the legitimacy of what they refer to as ‘legitimate illegal action’ when researchers use deception to gain access to interview people held in detention. Correa-Velez and Gifford (2007) argue that asylum seekers have a right to be counted and that it is unethical for governments to with-
hold data about asylum seekers and people held in detention, from researchers. Harrell-Bond (2002) asks the hard questions about whether refugee research can ever be humanitarian and Harrell-Bond and Voutira (2007) have long argued for the centrality of the ‘refugee voice’ in research. Finally, questions about the role of the researcher as advocate remain hotly debated with those against arguing that this undermines the rigor of the research — and its objectivity.

These debates have given rise to a culture of critical reflection among many researchers in this field — regardless of whether or not they wish to engage in these critiques: ‘What are the pros and cons of the researcher being an insider or outsider?’; ‘Qualitative or quantitative approaches?’; ‘Participatory or researcher driven?’; ‘Who can speak for whom?’; ‘What does one do with ‘risky’ data?’. Although these issues are being productively interrogated in the published literature (Hugman, Bartolomei, et al., 2011; Hugman, Pittaway, et al., 2011) the research path leading into and out of refugee research remains perilous. The value cultures of researchers that inform the ethics of refugee research are multiple and contentious and are likely to remain so into the future. However, this tension is a key strength precisely because a researcher, whether they are a student, an evaluator, an academic, an insider or outsider cannot enter the field without having their taken-for-granted values challenged and reflected back to them in some form along the way. In sum, the value cultures of researchers are often more exposed and thus more open to ‘attack’ than those of HRECs and service providers and community organisations.

**Value Cultures of People With Refugee Experiences**

What of the value cultures of people who are or have been refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrants? This field of inquiry has barely been explored, which testifies to a general invisibility of ‘subject’ voices in refugee research more broadly (Harrell-Bond & Voutira 2007). Research from the ‘inside’ in remains
problematic largely for its absence. Aidani (this volume), and Kumsa (2006) are examples of the exceptions to the above in that they make clear their own position as researcher/former refugee and from this position, make important critiques of the values that are brought to refugee research. Importantly, they challenge the essentialised and naturalised refugee — the label ‘once a refugee always a refugee’ that sticks to people with refugee backgrounds or experiences. This critique is important because it challenges the implicit values that HRECs, service providers, community organisations and researchers alike all too often bring to the field of ‘refugee’ research. Malkki (1996) argues that people who are or were refugees are represented as dehistoricised subjects — or in other words, their personal, social and political histories and subjectivities are erased leaving them only with identities of victimhood. Importantly, any possibility of agency is rendered invisible and this I argue, lies at the heart of the problem of whose values inform refugee research. In a context where the research subjects are represented as victims, it is far easier to shape a research ethics as one that protects over one that respects.

Discussion: Whose Values? In Whose Interest?

The above discussion leads to the key questions of this chapter. Whose values shape the ethics of refugee research? Why is this terrain so often one of conflict and contestation? Where is the agency of the research subject — the community or individual with refugee experience — in all of this? I want to conclude with a third story — that of one of my doctoral students, Anne, whose study aimed to explore the experiences of being a mother in a new country within the context of refugee settlement. The project involved conducting in-depth interviews with recently arrived women with children. Anne spent much time agonising about how she would enter the field, how she would represent herself, how she would be sure not to re-traumatise the women, how she would ensure informed consent, was her research important
enough to these women, how could she repay them for their time, and a dozen other concerns. Finally she had to just jump in. One of first interviews she lined up was with a woman, Ruth, who was a single mother, had six children, had spent years living in a refugee camp during which time she had organised food and education programs for orphans — and there were many of these children in the camp. As Anne began to explain the research and the informed consent to her research participant, Ruth abruptly reversed the roles and began to interview Anne. The interview lasted more than an hour during which Ruth set the research agenda, clearly articulated what she would and would not talk about and invited Anne (rather directly) to begin by sharing her own background and personal experiences about being a woman — challenging her about her status as a single woman without children — in Australia. As the supervisor, what I observed was a subtle but significant shift in values held by Anne from those focused on protecting to those of respecting. Importantly, this shifted Anne’s approach to the research, to the women who were now more interlocutors than participants or subjects and opened up possibilities for research that was something more than a focus on how refugee mothers cope in a settlement context.

In addressing the central question of this chapter — many different values, in what I have described as value cultures, shape the ethics of refugee research. These value cultures are implicit and normative and are the substance around which group identities are formed. Importantly, these value cultures express shared ideas — often taken for granted — about what is right. The conflicts that often arise between different groups around what is ethical in relation to refugee research stem from threats to the implicit value cultures of each. These threats translate to fundamental attacks on group identities and the worthiness of particular missions or projects. But what is really at stake in this clash of value cultures is the refugee — produced as a naturalised, essentialised subject — and who serves as a mirror reflecting back the values that shape the projects of the various stakeholders.
There are no easy answers to these dilemmas — especially in a field where all the players are well intentioned. The values that drive the ethics of research with refugees are neither relative nor absolute. Refugee research is always situational and contingent. The intent ‘to do the right thing’ when it comes to the ethics of refugee research, is often a reflection of particular value cultures of specific organisations and groups — the stakeholders if you will — in the refugee field. The conflicts that arise between different stakeholders, for example, among HRECs, community organisations, and researchers, are often about contesting particular identities invested in and expressed through their respective value cultures.

What is at stake in this contest of values? At the core are the personal and professional identities of the individuals involved in judgements about what is ethical when it comes to refugee research. These interests, although well intended, can act to override or erase those of the individuals and communities who are or have been refugees. The question that should be asked in this situation is what is the refugee? There is a need for recognition that the refugee layer is only one layer — albeit an important one — in the life stories of individuals and communities. And if we put this recognition first, then a common ground based first on respect might be a starting point for negotiating a stable common base that informs a fluid field when it comes to values that inform refugee research.

Endnote

1. The term *refugee* is problematic from many perspectives. First, the term is used not only to identify people who are found to be refugees under the formal UNHCR definition, but it is used to refer to a wide array of people who are forced and/or undocumented migrants. Second, the term is often used indiscriminately to identify people who have been, but are no longer refugees. This chapter focused on research with people who have been, but are no longer, refugees. The language to describe such persons is clumsy — people with refugee backgrounds, humanitarian settlers, people who have arrived on humanitarian visas, and so on. In this chapter, I used both the terms *refugee* and *people with refugee backgrounds* depending on context, while recognising them in places, my use of the term remains problematic.
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