Introduction
You have already heard something about the pros and cons of population growth, and I’m sure will hear more over the course of this conference. Rather than talking about these, I’m going to focus on why it is that we are continue to have growth, despite the fact that as many as seven out of ten voters believe that Australia does not need more people.¹

But even with this focus it’s not possible to dodge the topic of costs and benefits entirely. For example, if population growth were clearly in the national interest the question of why governments pursue it would have a ready answer. Leaders often have to follow policies that many people do not like, simply because these policies are right. For example, they might legislate for a GST, or to outlaw discrimination against homosexuals, or to ban smoking in public places, or to eliminate the death penalty. And the potential opposition among political and intellectual elites might support them, even though they knew that many voters were offside. This would be because the potential opposition knew enough about the pros and cons to agree that the legislators were right and that the unpopular move in question should get their support. While voters might not like it, they do not know enough to make an informed decision.

But this does not explain Australian governments’ pursuit of substantial immigration-fuelled population growth. Even though many political and cultural elites may think it is in the national interest a sizable body of research shows that, overall, it is not.² They are wrong and do not know enough to make an informed decision. Others may be swayed by less forgivable considerations. So whatever their motives, an answer to the question of why governments want to go on pushing the numbers out to 36 million and beyond is not self evident.³

Consequently this paper will not focus on the intrinsic question of the costs and benefits of growth but on two extrinsic questions: why do Australian politicians insisting on pursuing it when a majority of voters are not in favour, and what is it about the political climate that allows them to do this? Thus it is about the politics of population growth which, in Australia, largely means the politics of immigration.

Immigration and client politics
An American scholar, Gary Freeman, has produced a general theory. He points out that in most liberal democratic nations immigration tends to be higher than most voters would prefer.⁴ As these nations are democracies, this is puzzling. Shouldn’t political elites respond to voters’ wishes (other things being equal)? Freeman argues that there are a number of reasons why they do not. First, few voters know very much about immigration, and certainly few of them understand its demographic implications. This is understandable. Debate is constrained, information is not readily available and, if people do get hold of it, it’s hard to interpret.

But the core of his argument is client politics. Immigration produces concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Some groups benefit from immigration-fuelled population growth and they lobby politicians to ensure that intakes stay high and to thwart attempts to cut back. Their numbers are small and, as most of the benefits of immigration flow to them, time and money spent lobbying for growth pays off. What are these benefits? More customers for housing and other goods; cheaper labour; fewer training costs; more members of one’s own ethnic or religious group; more diversity so that the majority ethnic group is diminished;⁵ more taxpayers with more warm bodies to boost the official figures for aggregate economic growth;⁶ and so on.
In contrast, the costs are diffuse. As the population grows, the majority endure lower wages, rising housing costs, increased pressure on infrastructure and the need to pay higher rates, tolls and taxes to extend it, increased congestion, more competition for education, health and welfare services, and reduced access to open spaces for recreation. But these costs are thinly spread. For each individual they are relatively low and they usually accumulate slowly. Consequently, any one person’s motivation to devote time and effort to trying to reduce immigration is less than the motivation of the beneficiaries who want to keep the numbers coming.

Data on income inequality and population growth for 23 OECD countries show that the higher the rate of growth the greater the inequality. See Figure 1. Of course a wide range of factors, such as the loss of manufacturing industries, may help explain this association but nonetheless it is in the direction predicted by Freeman’s thesis. High immigration tends to make most people worse off and a few people a lot better off.

Figure 1: Income inequality by population growth, 23 OECD countries, 2003-06

Sources: Data on income inequality are from The Equality Trust <https://www.e-activist.com/ea-campaign/clientcampaign.do> accessed 19 August 2011. These show the 20:20 income ratio averaged for the years 2003 to 2006. Data on population growth for 2006 are from the ABS, Statistics New Zealand, the ONS (for UK), the CIA (for the USA), with the remainder taken from the Population Reference Bureau, world data sheet for 2006. Notes: In recent years Singapore has experienced strong population growth; from 1980 to 2010 it grew from 2.4 million to 5.1 million. This includes growth in the number of migrant workers who are not counted as part of the permanent resident population, and are termed ‘non-residents’. In 1980 they made up 5.5% of the population and in 2010, 25.7%. See Key Demographic Trends, Department of Statistics Singapore <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/> accessed 21 August 2011. The 20:20 ratio is the top 20% of incomes divided by the bottom 20%.

Thus the theory predicts that high immigration makes the majority worse off in material terms. But we should add personal risks to Freeman’s diffused costs. As a number of Australians are well aware, critics of immigration-fuelled growth risk accusations of bigotry and racism; indeed one commentator even describes the current angst about traffic congestion as the ‘new xenophobia’.

The growth lobby
While small business may have a different view, big business in Australia is a strong supporter of growth. They warn that the population is ageing and argue that we need high immigration to stave off the collapse of the welfare system and increase the tax base. They also complain about labour shortages, with the immediate follow-up that we must bring in more migrants to fill these
shortages. At thirty-three years ago the script was the same; the population was ageing, Australia lacked skilled workers, and we must fill the gaps with migrants.

At times the argument about skill shortages does have a basis in reality; Australia’s neglect of local training does mean that we lack some skilled workers (such as nurses and engineers) while our continued pursuit of more migrants, and their dependents, makes such shortages worse. The more people we import the more workers we need to build new suburbs, and to provide human services. But the alleged need to import skills usually masks a more constant, underlying interest—pressure from property developers and other interests focused on growth in the domestic market. As Dick Smith writes that: ‘The easiest way for wealthy people like me to make more money is to have more population buying our goods and services... so it’s absolutely normal for business people to urge greater migration’.

Any large business selling to the domestic market profits from a growing economy and, other things being equal, aggregate GDP grows with population growth. The vested interests that profit from this include the commercial media, a factor which limits the possibility of open debate.

Politicians usually support big business on population growth because it is an easy way to boost aggregate economic growth and because it expands the tax base (though not as fast as it expands infrastructure costs). At the same time business interests, including property developers, contribute to party funds. While disappointed voters might ring up talkback radio, the rich and powerful have ready access to cabinet ministers.

An increase in aggregate GDP does not necessarily help voters. If there are any financial gains for them these would come from increases in per capita GDP. But any demographically induced increases in per capita GDP are miniscule, nothing like enough to compensate for congestion, escalating house prices, rising electricity bills, rate increases, and pressure on open spaces. For example, in 2006 the Productivity Commission found that a 50 per cent increase in skilled migration up until 2024-25 would lift per capita average annual income by only 0.71 per cent or $383, but that most of these gains would go to owners of capital and to migrants themselves. In fact the incomes of incumbent workers would grow more slowly than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, even in terms of the priced items included in the GDP, the existing population is financially worse off with growth than they would be without it. This tallies with the data on OECD countries in Figure 1 above. It also accords with research in the United States which found that areas with faster population growth were generally worse off and had higher unemployment than slower growing areas.

Population growth adds to the stresses of daily life for many Australians, and the very large increase in net migration in recent years have made the connections plainer to them. As was clear in the 2010 election, voters were starting to see what was happening and to become restive. This gives the growth lobby a second reason to mobilise. As well as keeping the pressure up to politicians, they need to drown out or neutralise the murmurings from below.

So how do the forces for and against population growth stack up? (See Graphic 1 below.) The growth lobby does have a formal organisation, The Australian Population Institute (Apop), originally backed by the late Richard Pratt, with property developer Bert Dennis as its founding president. However they have not taken a leading part in recent population debates. That role has been played by spokespersons for organisations such as the Business Council of Australia, the Property Council of Australia, The Committee for Melbourne, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Australian Industry Group, KPMG, The Urban Taskforce (a property development industry group), the Urban Development Institute of Australia, the banks, individual businessmen such as Harry Triguboff, and editors and journalists in the commercial media (particularly the Murdoch press).
The stakes are high. In 2011 the residential property market was estimated to be worth $3.5 trillion, almost three times the size of the equity market and three times Australia’s aggregate GDP. Anthony Street writes that:

A vast component of the labour force is employed in industries connected to the residential property market including construction and building services, real estate agents, banking, mortgage broking and insurance, not to mention the ubiquitous property developers.

And then there is government: federal, state and local. Not only does the federal government see population growth as an easy way to boost aggregate economic growth, it has designed its current immigration policy so as to ensure that it meets its planned growth target of 3.25 per cent per annum in aggregate GDP. It is using people to serve a target for an increase in a measure of the economy rather than using the economy to serve the people.

The growth lobby is focused and well integrated with the political elite, many of whom share its aims. Politicians want population growth partly to appease their business backers but also to increase taxes and keep growth in aggregate GDP positive.

The population reform movement
If these are the forces pushing for growth, what of the opposition? The costs of population growth are of two broad types. First there are those that impact on the natural environment, such as loss of biodiversity, and pressure on resources. These include non-renewable resources such as oil, phosphate and arable land and potentially renewable resources, such as such as water, topsoil and the capacity of the ecosystem to recycle and absorb wastes (including excess greenhouse gas emissions). These are vital, but for many voters environmental costs may seem remote. The other set of costs are social and have become obvious and pressing, especially in urban areas. They include unwanted densification of existing suburbs, substituting high-rise for detached houses with gardens, traffic congestion, noise, pressure on social services such public transport and health care, unaffordable housing, jam-packed rental properties, rising prices for electricity and water, loss of parklands and the destruction of streetscapes as precious green spaces yield to developers.

Environmental groups
There are environmental groups that speak for the first set of problems, but they are usually reluctant to make the links between environmental stress and population growth. For example, journalists often assume that The Greens are opposed to population growth but this is not so. Their population policies focus on consumption, population distribution, and international social justice. They say nothing about numbers.

In the past the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has also found it hard to promote a low-growth population policy; some members wanted a smaller migrant intake on environmental grounds, but others feared that this would be racist and inhumane. In 1993 the then director, Tricia Casswell, put it like this:

… when we talk about population we first of all have to understand it in a global context. I guess we then have to really very clearly look at Australia and think very very long and hard about what that means for us. And I don’t think it’s easy to do that. I think it gets mixed up with a whole lot of other very passionate debates, some of them not without some racist tinges, and makes it very difficult for environmentalists to feel comfortable talking about it as an Australian issue...

Organised environmental groups are generally reluctant to take a stand on population growth. Indeed many activists are so committed to what they see as international social justice that they
are less likely to support immigration control than are people who are not involved in environmental activism at all.¹

While the situation remains unchanged for The Greens, the ACF has now found a clearer voice. But because of its long silence a new environmental group was formed in the late 1980s, Australian for an Ecologically Sustainable Population, later renamed Sustainable Population Australia (SPA). SPA has branches in all mainland states and the Australian Capital Territory and works hard to promote the cause of population stability. But apart from the new political party, the Stable Population Party Australia (SPPA), it is the only organised group consistently arguing for stability.

The Anglican Public Affairs Commission has also spoken out against growth. It points to the risks of environmental degradation for the world and for Australia and to our responsibility for future generations. A number of individuals, most notably Dick Smith, Labor backbencher Kelvin Thomson, and the former premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr have taken similar positions.

Despite this, organisations arguing for stability are nowhere near as numerous or as rich as those arguing for growth. In the hierarchy of power the growth lobby holds the high ground; it has money and influence and can even, through the Scanlon Foundation, fund its own demographic and social research.

**Graphic 1: The lobbyists, from power point presentation:**

If voters are still doubtful and can’t be persuaded, perhaps they can be shamed? Though some growth lobbyists make fortunes out of eroding the quality of other people’s lives, they don’t shrink from using moral arguments to justify their behaviour. For example, the *Productivity and Prosperity* report to the Burke Inquiry on population growth argues strongly that population growth increases Australia’s wealth but, rather inconsistently, claims that it would be morally wrong to resist this:

We argue that it is untenable, and in fact irresponsible, to argue that others should be kept in poverty so that Australia might enjoy unshared prosperity. Developed nations have a moral and humanitarian responsibility to assist others through both skilled and unskilled migration.
An *Age* journalist, while claiming that population growth boosted prosperity, added that: ‘There is a compelling humanitarian case, too, for good global citizens to share their abundance’.\textsuperscript{lx} Chris Berg, of the IPA, emphasises a ‘a moral necessity to maintain a high immigration intake. … [because] the most effective way we can help somebody living in the third world to crawl out of poverty is allowing them to move to the first world’.\textsuperscript{lxi} And a recent editorial in *The Australian* argues that: ‘we have a duty to share our prosperity with as many people, native-born and immigrant, as possible’.\textsuperscript{lxii} Others claim that older couples should move into units to make room for further growth; they should ‘downsize for society’s sake’.\textsuperscript{lxiii} At the same time developers stigmatise Australians’ efforts to protect their quality of life as nothing other than selfish NIMBYism.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

These are voices prominent in the broadsheet press. But some journalists and broadcasters working for commercial radio, especially talkback, do pursue a different line, for example Alan Jones, Ray Hadley and Jason Morrison on 2GB and David Oldfield at 2UE.

What is the effect of all this hectoring? Are Australians coming round to the idea that population growth will make them rich and good, if only they will adjust to accommodate it? Or are they still sceptical? Answers to this question may depend on which segment of the electorate we are talking about.

**Public opinion—attitudes to immigration and population growth**

But first, what do people in general think? There are now a number of surveys on attitudes to population growth, but they ask different questions and lack a long time series. However we do have a time series on attitudes to immigration. As this is the main driver of growth such a time series might be a useful guide to trends in attitudes to growth.

There are, however, some caveats. Many people do not know enough about demography to express their attitudes to growth through their opinions about immigration. For example, when some public figures tell them that, without immigration, Australia’s population would actually ‘be shrinking’ they may not realise its real role.\textsuperscript{lxv}

Nevertheless the data are there and, bearing these caveats in mind, they are useful. Figure 2 shows a series of public opinion polls which asked the same or similar questions over a 56-year period. The question read something as follows: ‘Last year [X number] of migrants came to Australia. In your opinion is [X number] too many, about right, or too few?’ Figure 2 does not show the proportions saying ‘about right’. This is partly for simplicity and partly because many respondents who have no clear opinion chose the ‘about right’ response.\textsuperscript{lxvi}
Figure 2: Attitudes to immigration, July 1954 to July 2010

Figure 2 shows that a majority of the Australian public has not always preferred lower immigration; in the mid 1960s, for example, the percentage wanting a larger intake exceeded the percentage wanting a smaller one. But from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, opposition to the current intake was very high. In a couple of polls more than 70 per cent wanted a reduction.

There were a number of reasons for this: voters were unhappy with the official policy of multiculturalism and worried about welfare dependence among recent migrants (which was linked to high levels of family reunion). But the scale of unemployment was a key reason.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s net migration reached new heights. In 1969 it had reached a peak of 129,000 (a figure close to the immediate post-War figures of around 150,000) but, by the late 1980s, it was over 170,000. (These numbers were not rivaled until the last five years when, in 2008, net migration peaked at 315,000.) The difference was that in the 1950s and 1960s...
unemployment was low. The average level of unemployment from 1954 to 1969 was 1.5 per cent; it was 10.7 per cent in 1992.

Figure 3 shows the association between levels of unemployment and dissatisfaction with immigration. For the whole period, 1954 to 2010, the coefficient of correlation between respondents saying the numbers were ‘too many’ and the per cent unemployed was strong: $r^2 = 0.5733$. The two variables are closely associated during the 1980s and 1990s; indeed one can watch dissatisfaction with immigration decrease in step with falling unemployment during the Howard years. However the interesting data come in 2010 when unemployment was falling but dissatisfaction with immigration was rising.

**Figure 3: Attitudes to immigration, July 1954 to July 2010, and per cent unemployed (at June)**

Sources: See Figure 2 for public opinion data. Data on unemployment from 1978 to 2005 are from *Labour Force, Australia*, Spreadsheets (September 2006) ABS, Catalogue no. 6202.0.55.001; 2006 to 2010 are from *Labour Force*, ABS, Catalogue no. 6202.0, various issues; 1976 to 1977 are from I. McAllister, M. MacKerras and C. B. Boldiston, *Australian Political Facts (Second edition)*, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1997, p. 520; 1972 to 74 are from B. Hughes, ‘The economy’, in A. Patience and B. Head (Eds), *From Whitlam to Fraser: Reform and Reaction in Australian Politics*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 15-16; the 1975 figure is from *Year Book Australia, 2001*, ABS Catalogue no. 1301.0; 1954 to 1971 are from McAllister et al. op. cit., but based only on data for the years 1954, 1961, 1966, 1971 (Excel’s fill function has been used for the intervening years).
Figure 4: Attitudes to immigration, July 1954 to July 2010, and net migration (at December)

Sources: See Figure 2. Immigration data for 1952 to 1977 are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, Australia’s Population Trends and Prospects 1993 (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994; from 1978 on they are from Demographic Statistics, ABS, Catalogue no 3101.0 (various issues). Note: Net migration is net total migration from 1954 to 1981 and net overseas migration (NOM) from 1982 to 2010. There is a break in the series for NOM in 2006 when the way in which it was calculated changed. This meant that some 20,000 net migrants who had been missed under the previous method were now included. See B. Birrell and E. Healy, ‘Net overseas migration: why is it so high?’ People and Place, vol. 18, no. 2, 2010, p. 58.

Figure 4 suggests that up until around 2002 there was little association between the level of net migration and the degree of scepticism about it; this is in tune with Freeman’s theory. People do not know much about the demography of immigration, and it is hard for them to get reliable information that they can understand. In contrast Figure 3 suggests that any level of substantial immigration during periods of high unemployment is likely to be resented.

But the scale of net migration that eventuated by 2008 was unprecedented; people living in the major cities could not help but be aware of it. In a short space of time traffic became noticeably more congested and public transport suddenly overcrowded. Commuters no longer hoped for a seat; they were lucky if they had a secure handgrip to hold on to. At peak hours railway employees appeared on the platform to stop passengers boarding overloaded trains.

The first part of Freeman’s argument, that mostly the general public do not have a clear idea of what is going on, began to fail. The changes were so dramatic that most urbanites did get an idea and, even though levels of unemployment were fairly steady, they started to object. Figure 4 shows a sharp increase in the proportions saying the number of migrants was too many by around 2009, 12 months after the 2008 surge.

At about that time we begin to get a number of polls and surveys on attitudes to population growth itself, rather than just to immigration. Their results vary with the nature of the question asked, and whether it was asked by phone or by anonymous, self-completed questionnaires, or by the online internet-panel method.
Table 1: Attitudes to growing to 36 million in 2050, or to growth in ‘your suburb’ (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>36m in 2050 is:</th>
<th>Nielsen April 2010 %</th>
<th>Would a population of 36m by 2050 be:</th>
<th>Scanlon June 2010 %</th>
<th>Feelings about growth (in 24 cities):</th>
<th>Productivity Commission January 2011 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too many</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Too large or much too large</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Would not like it</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too few</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Too small or much too small</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Would like it</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>About right</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Don’t care</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(Refused)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Other/ don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>15,956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The Nielsen question in April 2010 was: ‘Recent population projections suggest that the Australian population will grow from 22 million people now to 36 million people in 2050. Do you think 36 million people in 2050 is too many people, too few people, about right or is this something you don’t have an opinion about?’ The Scanlon question in June 2010 was: ‘In your view, would an Australian population of 36 million by 2050 be too large, about right or too small?’ (21% much too large, 31% too large, 37% about right, 4% too small, 1% much too small, 0.2% refused, 7% don’t know—these do not add exactly to the numbers above because of rounding.) The Productivity Commission question in January 2011 was: ‘Let’s suppose for a moment that your local Council has just announced changes to building, planning or zoning policies that will result in a significant increase in the number of people living in your suburb or community. How would you feel about having more people living in your suburb or community and the increase in housing required for this?’ Response categories: Would not like it; Don’t care one way or the other; Would like it: Other (please specify) and Don’t know.

Table 1 shows that three different surveys taken within less than a year find that just over half of respondents thought that either a population of 36 million in 2050 would be too large or that they would not like growth in the suburb or community in which they lived.

Table 2: Attitudes to growth in your suburb, 24 cities, April 2011 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Would not like it</th>
<th>Would like it</th>
<th>Don’t care</th>
<th>Other/don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All capitals</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunshine Coast</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geelong</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wollongong</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All non-capitals</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All cities</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Productivity Commission, see Table 1 for details and question wording. Online internet panel survey, total N = 15,956.
Table 2 shows that dissatisfaction is higher in capital cities, especially Sydney, and in the Sunshine Coast.

Table 3 shows the pattern of responses to a rather different question: not would you like more growth but does Australia need it. This was from a mailout survey which, like online internet-panel surveys, may strike respondents as more anonymous than a phone interview where there is real person at the other end of the phone line who may approve or disapprove of their response. 

Table 3: Attitudes to growth by state, December 2009 to February 2010 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia needs more people?</th>
<th>Queensland</th>
<th>South Australia</th>
<th>Victoria</th>
<th>New South Wales</th>
<th>Tasmania</th>
<th>Western Australia</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: People who did not answer this question (n=51) are excluded from the analysis. The 29 respondents from the Northern Territory are not shown separately but are included in the total. ACT stands for Australian Capital Territory.

This question, together with follow-up questions, was devised by the author and Bob Birrell who, along with a number of other researchers, paid to have questions added to the survey.

Table 4: Are there regions which need a larger or smaller population? April, 2010 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Larger population</th>
<th>Smaller population</th>
<th>Same population</th>
<th>Total smaller or same</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large capital cities – Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other capital cities like Adelaide, Perth, Hobart</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major regional centres</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller regional towns</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Essential Report No. 100416, 19 April 2010, sample 1,988 adults aged 18 plus, internet panel survey

Note: People were being asked about regions in general, not the regions where they themselves lived. The researchers say: ‘Opinions about the populations of the major capitals were similar across states, but respondents from SA/WA/Tasmania were less likely to want larger populations in their capital cities’.

The data in Table 4 stem from the relatively anonymous method of an internet-panel survey asking whether Australia needed a larger or smaller population in various areas. Here 87 per cent rejected growth for the larger capital cities, preferring either to keep these cities at the same size or to reduce their populations.
The data present in Tables 1 to 4 do show that results from recent polls about population growth vary. But regardless of the way in which the question is worded or the method of research employed, at least 51 per cent of respondents reject further growth. And many as 87 per cent think that Australia’s large capital cities do not need it. The data on current public opinion show that in no case does a majority want either substantial population growth or higher immigration.

**Cosmopolitans and patriots — understanding currents in public opinion**

So far the evidence supports the main part of Freeman’s theory. Vested interests that enjoy concentrated benefits from growth endorse it, and are organised and vocal, while the general public which pays the diffused costs is inclined to be against growth but to lack strong organisations to voice their discontent.

The major political parties follow a bipartisan line. Usually this means that both sides quietly support it. But if growth does become political both sides have recently said that they were not really for it, though during the 2010 election campaign they refrained from making any clear commitments. Afterwards both sides dropped the topic and Labor increased the permanent intake. During the campaign, for example, Julia Gillard said we should not ‘hurtle down the track towards a big population. I don’t support the idea of a big Australia with arbitrary targets of, say, a 40 million-strong Australia or a 36 million-strong Australia. We need to stop, take a breath and develop policies for a sustainable Australia’. But at the May budget in 2011 she endorsed immigration increases that will set us precisely on the track that she had previously rejected, and the opposition raised no objections. (And the media did not, with one exception, make anything of this particular broken promise.)

So whether they are for growth, as they normally are, or temporarily sceptical about it, political elites agree with each other. They may believe that growth is indeed in Australia’s best interests but, if they do not, there are powerful donors with deep pockets to remind them of where their party’s best interests lie. Besides there are always risks for politician who step away from the well-trodden path of economic questions: the left-versus-right agenda of better services and social welfare versus lower taxes and free markets. This is familiar ground. Step off this track to talk of gay marriage, euthanasia, animal rights, or immigration and you don’t know what will come to pass. Look what happened to Mark Latham in 2004 with his campaign theme of reading to children.

But if politicians ignore a burning issue ginger groups often form to remind them of its importance and badger them to pay attention. We have seen this with activists concerned about mental health, disabilities, forests, child abuse, women’s rights and freedom for David Hicks. Why is it so hard to for civil society to mobilise on population reform? The diffuse nature of the costs cannot be the only reason. English men and women mobilised against the slave trade when they were not suffering any personal costs from it at all.

One answer is this. If an effective movement is to form it needs capable leaders. In the past it was enough for them to be intelligent and articulate. Today, such people are likely to be university graduates with professional qualifications. Social movements that cannot attract a handful of lawyers and policy experts to work for them pro bono are severely handicapped. This is a problem for the population reform movement, especially when it necessarily focuses on immigration.

In Australia members of the new, university-educated middle class have had their own reasons for keeping clear of immigration reform. There is a long answer to the question of why they should take this attitude. As with many creeds and orthodoxies, it’s a mixture of sincerely held beliefs and of extrinsic motives tied up with class, status and personal identity, and there is not time to explore it here. But as the numbers of university-educated professionals grew during
the 1960s and 1970s many of them were attracted to a progressive/cosmopolitan identity. This offered an image distinct from what they saw as a lower-middle-class Australian way of life, or from an unattainable establishment identity focused on aping the ways of an English upper class. Like most effective identities it was based on moral values: in this case internationalism, rights and anti-racism. This means it did not exist in isolation. The new professional middle class could define itself against those who did not share their values, especially the more patriotic, socially conservative, lower middle class, people who could be stereotyped as parochials, mesmerised by popular culture, advertising and consumerism, and unfriendly towards those who are racially different.

Paul Kelly writes that:

The ‘new class’ was a coalition of white-collar professionals—teachers, social workers, university lecturers, journalists, reformist lawyers, environmentalists, civil servants and union officials—products of a liberal education, affluence and the women’s movement.

He argues that the ‘the politically aware tertiary educated elite [were] the most influential force in Australian society in the post-1960s’. But in his view they are all left-wing.

If the words ‘left-wing’ still mean support for the state and the redistribution of wealth against support for the market, this is not always so. Progressive/cosmopolitanism can appeal to business graduates and economists just as much as to left-wing arts graduates. Indeed as the forces of globalisation mushroomed in the 1980s and 1990s, cosmopolitanism gained material as well as moral advantages for graduates working in financial services, investment banking, stock exchanges, currency exchanges and so on.

The old left/right axis still dominates political rhetoric but other questions have infiltrated progressive politics. While the new class identified by Kelly (and others) does not in fact line up neatly along the old left-versus-right trajectory, Kelly has pointed to a significant divide in the politics of modern western nations including Australia. This is the gulf between the educated elite and the rest, the cosmopolitans and the parochials or the progressives and the social conservatives. It is a divide which can easily become the internationalists versus the patriots and, given the core values of the new class, a key marker of that divide is attitudes to race and racism.

Many educated cosmopolitans harbour doubts about their less favoured compatriots. They fear that, as well as being wanton consumers, ignorant of the Oxford comma, they have distasteful attitudes to cultural difference and race. Even if progressive cosmopolitans do not really believe this about their fellow Australians they know that they must show themselves to be absolutely above suspicion on such topics; any hint of deviation may bring social exclusion, disapprobation and attack. Indeed many progressive movements now focus not on wage justice for the worker but on the fight against racism.

While cosmopolitans who favour market forces are just as much against racism as are arts graduates and social scientists, the latter tend to be more vocal. They are also more likely to use the old-fashioned label of left-wing to describe their position. As one former Labor voter in NSW put it: ‘We’re not actually working Sydney people. We are all lefties’. (She now votes Green.)

The trouble with population reform in Australia is that it leads swiftly and logically to immigration reform and we all know where that path takes us—to Hansonism. So it is much better to concentrate your socially responsible efforts in other directions. And there are plenty of other directions available.
Though Australians of all groupings still care about economic issues, especially workplace matters such as fair work and work choices, we care about other problems too. And these do not fit along the old left/right axis, for example: abortion rights, legalisation of drugs, nuclear power, identity politics, and the role of the nation state in a globalising world. None of these map tidily onto the left/right continuum and neither does immigration.

So the old one-dimensional model of politics will not do. We need at least a second dimension, a North/South cultural dimension, with higher education marking the general separation between the two camps, rather than relationship to the means of production. This would put Kelly’s progressives in the North and the social conservatives in the South. From these vantage points they can eye each other off and prosecute the culture wars, which is a good name for any political battle not fought along the old left-versus-right continuum.

A two-dimensional perspective helps us understand a number of social and political questions and it especially helps us understand the distribution of attitudes to immigration and why these matter in the culture wars. (See Figure 5.)

**Figure 5: Two dimensional politics—economic and cultural questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic questions</th>
<th>Cultural questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan/progressive</td>
<td>(Bob Brown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Malcolm Turnbull)</td>
<td>(Pauline Hanson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotic/conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Attitudes to economic questions on the role of the state versus free markets are distributed among the left/right horizontal axis. Attitudes to cultural questions are distributed along the North/South vertical axis.

First, what happens if we use the model to analyse current political figures? If Figure 5 is thought of as four quadrants we would know how to place politicians such as Bob Brown and Pauline Hanson, people who are hard to fit onto a simple left/right spectrum.

We could also see why men like Malcolm Turnbull seem to be unlike John Howard. It’s not that Turnbull is more or less right-wing than Howard, but rather that they have different attitudes to cultural questions.

Can we map the voters? We could just put the followers of such politicians into the relevant quadrants, but that would make the theory that a two-dimensional the model helps explain
contemporary politics true by definition. What happens if we put people into the different quadrants according to their location in the labour force? (Here I’m drawing on a tradition of social theory which I don’t have time to explore now.)

According to traditional thinking we’d expect managers and professionals in the private sector, as well as small business people, to be on the right, and those who work for a salary to be on the left. But what about managers and professionals in the public sector? We’d expect them to support social spending and regulation, so they should be on the left.

The theory of the effects of social location on value positions on cultural questions hinges very much on the effects of university education. Not all managers and professionals have degrees so, rather than sorting voters by occupation alone, I will use education as well.

This means that we can split the graduates by whether they are in the public or private sector, and split the rest of the labour force by whether they are non-graduate wage earners or non-graduate employers (including self-employed people). Table 5 shows how many of each group there were at the 2001 census. (The circles on the ppt give a visual impression of their relative sizes.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Numbers and per cent of employed labour force, 2001, aged 20 to 64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduates—public sector (including managers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501,800 or 6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,911,400 or 65.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2001 Census data from the 1% users file supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
Note: Total employed labour force, aged 20 to 64 in 2001, is 7,526,699, of whom 20.02% were graduates.

The dividing line on the North/South axis is higher education. Graduates go North because we hypothesise that their lengthy education and concern to protect their status with a new identity has led many of them to a different value system from that embraced by Southerners. This analysis refines the model to link both education and economic location to values on social and economic questions. Figure 1 suggested where we might place some different politicians in the model; graphic 2 sketches some hypothetical, and stereotypical, voters (cartoons by Peter Nicholson, reproduced with permission.)
We can now draw a number of testable hypotheses from the model.

First, the model predicts that graduates in the public sector will tend to be part of the progressive/cosmopolitan left: their education system inclines them to cosmopolitan values and their economic location inclines them to left-wing values. Non-graduate employees also occupy an economic location which may make them tend to favour state intervention, social welfare and protection as far as economic questions are concerned. So we would expect the two groupings to tend to agree on such questions.

The model also predicts that private-sector graduates will be part of the progressive/cosmopolitan right. So we would expect them to disagree with the progressive/cosmopolitan left on economic questions and to be closer to non-graduate employers on such questions.

Second, we would predict that the progressive/cosmopolitan left and right would be closer to each other on social and cultural questions than they were to their less educated counterparts in the Southern sectors.

Survey data can be used to test these predictions.
Table 6: Attitudes to economic and social questions by education and employment status (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic questions</th>
<th>Graduate, public sector</th>
<th>Graduate, private sector</th>
<th>Non-graduate employee</th>
<th>Non-graduate employer (including self-employed)</th>
<th>Total % giving the response shown</th>
<th>Total n giving the response shown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keep Telstra in public ownership, % agree, 2003</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>*45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WorkChoices, % approve or strongly approve, 2007</td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social questions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same sex marriage, % should not be recognised by law, 2007</td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nudity and sex in films, % gone too far or much too far, 2010</td>
<td><em>27</em>*</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintroduce death penalty, % approve or strongly approve, 2010</td>
<td><em>13</em>*</td>
<td>*30</td>
<td>*52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: All of the data in Table 6 come from mailout questionnaires sent to random samples of voters. All files are available from the Australian Social Science Data Archives. The authors of the computer files concerned are not responsible for my interpretation of their data.


Notes: The 2003 question re Telstra was: 'Do you think the following enterprises or organisations should be in public ownership, private ownership or a mix of public and private ownership? …Telstra’. Table 6 has the per cent saying ‘public ownership’.

The 2007 question re WorkChoices followed one asking about respondents’ knowledge of the changes involved. It read: ‘Still thinking about WorkChoices, how much do you approve or disapprove of these changes?’ Response categories: strongly approve, approve, disapprove, strongly disapprove.

The 2007 question re same-sex marriage was: ‘Do you think marriages between same-sex couples should or should not be recognised by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?’ Response categories: should be recognised by the law, should not be recognised by the law, don’t know.

The 2010 question re nudity and sex in films read: ‘The right to show nudity and sex in films… [has]’. Response categories: gone much too far, gone too far, about right, not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough.

The 2010 question re the death penalty read: ‘The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder’. Response categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Retired people and the unemployed have been classified according to their last job; respondents who have never worked for pay are excluded from the analysis.

*Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .05 level.

**Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .01 level.

The data set out in Table 6 show that the two predictions made from the model are weakly confirmed. On the traditional left/right economic questions of selling Telstra and deregulating the work force the public-sector graduates are closer to the non-graduate employees than they are to either the private-sector graduates or to the non-graduate employers. The latter groups in turn are closer to each other than they are to first two groups.
On the social questions of same sex marriage, nudity and sex in films, and the death penalty the two groups of graduates are closer to each other than they are to the two groups of non-graduates, though there are still differences between them.

The three social questions conform more closely to the model’s predictions than do the two economic questions, especially in regard to the death penalty. All graduates are less likely to support this than are non-graduates. (However, public-sector graduates are still more progressive here than are their private-sector counterparts.)

What about immigration? The analysis suggested by the model predicts that graduates, regardless of the sector that they work in, will be more favourably disposed to immigration, and less negative about asylum seekers than non-graduates. Table 7 sets out results from five questions on immigration (and asylum seekers).

Table 7: Attitudes to immigration and asylum seekers by education and employment status (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Graduate, public sector</th>
<th>Graduate, private sector</th>
<th>Non-graduate employee (including self-employed)</th>
<th>Total % giving the response shown</th>
<th>Total n giving the response shown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce immigration, % saying a little or a lot, 2010</td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><em>59</em></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants good for the economy, % agree or strongly agree, 2010</td>
<td><em>64</em>*</td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants take jobs, % agree or strongly agree, 2010</td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><em>41</em></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn back all boats, % agree or strongly agree, 2010</td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><em>59</em></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegals must leave, % agree or strongly agree, 2007</td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table 6.
Notes: The first four questions are all from the 2010 AES, the fifth is from the 2007 AES.
The first question was: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?’ Response categories: increased a lot, increased a little, remain about the same as it is, reduce a little, reduced a lot.
The second was: ‘Immigrants are generally good for Australia’s economy’. Response categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly.
The third was: ‘Immigrants take jobs away from people who are born in Australia’. Response categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly.
The fourth was: ‘All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back’. Response categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly.
The fifth was: ‘Immigrants who are here illegally should not be allowed to stay for any reason’. Response categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly.
*Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .05 level.
**Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .01 level.

Here the model works well and the predictions are confirmed. Graduates in both sectors are more likely to support immigration and non-graduates are more likely to express scepticism. And the gap between the two Northern and the two Southern quadrants is consistently large, especially on the questions about boatpeople and illegal immigrants.
Perhaps the cosmopolitan/patriotic aspect of the North/South axis is more salient than the progressive/conservative aspect? Table 7 suggests that attitudes linked to borders, national identity and internationalism may be more important in the model than those that are linked to private morality. This idea can be tested by looking at four further questions, focused more on identification with Australia rather than immigration specifically.

Table 8 shows that the Northerners are more likely to say Australia should spend less on defence, and are keener than the Southerners on closer ties with Asia. They are also much less likely to say that they are ‘very proud’ of Australia’s history, and much less likely to think that being born in Australia is very important for being a truly Australian. (This last variable is only shown for Australian-born respondents.)

Table 8: Attitudes to questions concerning national identity (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Graduate, public sector</th>
<th>Graduate, private sector</th>
<th>Non-graduate employee</th>
<th>Non-graduate employer (including self-employed)</th>
<th>Total % giving the response shown</th>
<th>Total n giving the response shown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence, % spend less, or a lot less, 2010</td>
<td>*20</td>
<td>**19</td>
<td>**6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer relations with Asia, % not gone far enough or nearly far enough, 2010</td>
<td>*31</td>
<td>*32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s history, % very proud, 2003</td>
<td>**15</td>
<td>**21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being born in Australia to be truly Australian (A-born only), % saying this very important, 2003</td>
<td>**13</td>
<td>**17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table 6.
Notes: The first two questions are from the 2010 AES, the last two are from the 2003 AuSSA.
The first question was: ‘Do you think the Government should spend more or spend less on defence?’ Response categories: spend much more on defence, spend some more on defence, about right at present, spend less on defence, spend a lot less on defence.
The second question was: ‘Building closer relations with Asia has…’ Response categories: gone much too far, gone too far, about right, not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough.
The third question was: ‘How proud are you of Australia in each of the following…’ ‘its history’. Response categories: very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all, can’t say.
The fourth question was: ‘Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Australian. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…’ ‘to have been born in Australia’ Response categories: very important, fairly important, not very important, not important at all, can’t say. Table 8 shows the per cent saying ‘very important’ and is restricted to the Australian-born only (N= 1672)
*Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .05 level.
**Difference between sub-group and the sample as a whole is significant at the .01 level.

The results set out in Tables 6 to 8 show that the model is more useful for predicting attitudes to immigration and national identity than it is for predicting attitudes to economic questions and personal morality. It is not useless for these latter tasks. For example the gap between North and South was well to the fore in the 2008 controversy over Bill Henson’s photograph of a semi-nude 13 year-old girl. Police removed the work from an exhibition as supporters claimed that a work of art being censored while critics claimed that the child was being protected from further exploitation. Nevertheless the model is more useful for predicting attitudes to immigration and national identity.
This refinement of the model also helps us understand what the culture wars are actually about. Gay marriage may be the question of the moment for some proponents but the big questions that divide the North from the South concern the kind of Australia that we will become, the size of our national family and how we should relate to each other. Should the future Australia feel like a family where Australians care about each other and the land they share, or should it be a jumble of interest groups, individualists, bystanders and tourists?

We also need to think more closely about who is actually fighting the culture wars. There are few articulate spokespeople for the Southerners. Though when they do emerge (such as with Hanson or Howard) they can gain levels of support that astonish comfortable inhabitants of the North especially those in the North West).

The model is only a starting point. But when it comes to immigration, nations, borders, and national identity both types of Northerners tend to hold ideas which differ from those of Southerners. While some professionals may become dubious about immigration when skilled migration threatens there own jobs, and a few may offer support to organisations such as SPA, Northerners in general are more likely to support immigration and to take a flexible approach to border control. They are also less likely to take a nationalistic view of their Australian identity. This means that their ideas about Australia and its place in the world are more fluid than those of Southerners.

In contrast, non-graduates are more likely to see their nation as a safe haven, a sanctuary. For them it is the land of a people who are like an extended family, bound by ties of birth, love and pride. Unlike the Northerners, they are less able to claim a place for themselves in a changing and unsettled global arena: Australia is their shelter and their home.

**Conclusion**

The two-dimensional model provides a starting point for understanding attitudes to immigration, because it taps into a split on attitudes to internationalism and nationalism. Many battlefronts in the culture wars may really be about the role of the nation in a changing world. For example, identity entrepreneurs lobbying for group rights and self determination for indigenous peoples are often fighting against a particular idea of the nation, just as much as are those who argue for an open-borders approach to immigration.

Articulate Northerners often agree with each other on cultural questions, particularly those which touch on nations and borders. They may not know what Southerners think about these questions, or if they do, believe it best not pay attention. This is why immigration can be a flash point in the culture wars. If political entrepreneurs make an issue of it and try to mobilise the opinions of the South, Northerners are likely to react emotionally. Then we can start to hear talk about populism and nimbys, even bogans and rednecks.

The politics of immigration in Australia provide an interesting confirmation of Freeman’s core theory. The vested interests of the growth lobby actively push for continual growth, and are well-funded, powerful and influential. Organisations supporting stability are few and financially weak. But as Freeman predicts, a broad section of the electorate is dissatisfied with the outcome.

It is, however, hard for them to mobilise. They face structural problems. The costs they face are diffuse and the number of people affected is large. Consequently they lack a strong incentive to organise and, if they try to do so, it’s hard for them to find reliable information that they can act on. These are formidable obstacles. They are also hampered by the dominant climate of opinion. The educated minority who tend to play a leading role in most successful social movements doubt the justice of their cause.
This means that the growth lobby has useful allies. These are people who are not trying to turn a dollar but who believe that immigration is morally right and that support for it is a badge of belonging to a cultural elite. In contrast, though the immigration sceptics are more numerous than the active supporters, their political position is weak.

These circumstances explain why we have a de facto population policy geared to substantial growth even though most voters do not want it, and how it is that political elites and business lobbyists can achieve this outcome.

Graphic 3: Overview, from power point presentation
References


See B. Birrell, E. Healy, K. Betts and T. F. Smith, Immigration and the Resources Boom Mark 2, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University, 2011 for the 36 million projection. Some population growth is unavoidable. For example, even with nil net migration current fertility levels would take us to 24 million plus in 2051. But the major driver of growth in Australia is immigration. (With net overseas migration of 220,000 that 24 million in 2051 would become 38.3 million. These figures are taken from projection series 59 and 5 published online with Population Projections, Australia, 2006 to 2101, Catalogue no. 3222.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 2008. The both assume ‘medium life expectancy’ where life expectancy at birth rise from its current (2007) level of 79.0 years at birth for males and 83.7 years for females to 85 years for males and 88 years for females.)


In regard to this last motive see revelations about the former British Labour Government. Home Office documents reveal that: ‘Migration was intended specifically to alter the demographic and cultural pattern of the country: to produce by force majeure the changes in attitude that the Labour government saw itself as representing’ in J. Daley, ‘A sinister plot to change the way you think’, The Sunday Telegraph, 14 February 2010, p. 24. The strategy was revealed by speech writer Andrew Neather. See A. Neather, ‘Don’t listen to the whingers London needs immigrants’, The Evening Standard, 23 October 2009, p. 14. It had the effect not just of boosting ethnic diversity but of increasing the numbers of potential Labour voters; Commonwealth immigrants to Britain can vote as soon as they register. See also A. Green, ‘Paying the price for a decade of deception; commentary’, Daily Mail, 10 February 2010, p. 6; J. Slack, ‘Exposed: Labour’s secret plot to make a multicultural UK’, Daily Mail, 10 February 2010, p. 6. Scholars in the United States point to the role of prominent members of the Jewish community there in promoting immigration and multiculturalism in order to dilute any possible pressure on their community from the ethnic majority of old Americans. See K. MacDonald, ‘Jewish involvement in shaping American immigration policy, 1881-1965: a historical review’, Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, vol. 19, no. 4, 1998, pp. 295-356. Peter Brimelow quotes Earl Raab of Brandeis University’s Institute for Jewish Advocacy as noting happily that: ‘The Census Bureau has just reported that about half of the American population will soon be non-white or non-European. And they will all be American citizens. We have tipped beyond the point where a Nazi-Aryan party will be able to prevail in this country. We [Jews] have been nourishing the American climate of opposition to bigotry for about half a century. That climate has not yet been perfected, but the heterogeneous nature of our population tends to make it irreversible…’ P. Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster, Random House, New York, 1995, pp. 119-120.


xiv Dick Smith has offered a $5000 prize to any young person who can get definitive coverage of his Wilberforce award into the Murdoch Press. See <dicksmithpopulation.com/2010/08/16 extra-5000-prize-for-coverage-of-the-wilberforce-award-in-the-murdoch-press/> accessed 18 August 2011. The Wilberforce award is a $1 million prize for any young person under 30 who can impress me [ie Dick Smith] by becoming famous through his or her ability to show leadership in communicating an alternative to our population and consumption growth-obsessed economy’.

xv Assuming existing infrastructure has an average life span of 50 years, 2% of it will need to be replaced every year. If the population grows by 2% as well, infrastructure costs don’t rise to 2.2% of existing investment, they double, to 4%. See Jane O’Sullivan’s work quoted in B. Carr (Chair), Sustainable Development Panel Report: An Appendix to A Sustainable Population for Australia Issues Paper, Department for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra, 2010, p. 18.

xvi Bernard Salt describes this as ‘the property industry having meaningful private chinwags with ministers’. He implies that this is easy to arrange but no longer enough in what Salt sees as a climate hostile to population growth. B. Salt, ‘It’s time to fight the forces of negativity in the trenches’, The Australian, 7 July 2011, p. 29.

xvii Ridout reports research showing that a net overseas migration (NOM) of 180,000 compared to NOM of 70,000, adds around $3000 a year to average incomes in 2050 (giving a total of $105,000 p.a. rather than $102,000). See Figure 3.1, H. Ridout (chair), Productivity and Prosperity Panel Report, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra, 2010, p. 22. In 2006 the Productivity Commission estimated that a 50 per cent increase in skilled migration could lead to an increase in per capita GDP by 2024-25 of $384 p.a. or 0.71 per cent. Economic Impacts of Migration and Population Growth, Position Paper, January, Productivity Commission, Melbourne,
In 2010 housing in Melbourne cost 9 times the median household income (and 9.6 times in Sydney). This was much dearer than either London, New York or Washington. Costs were around 7 times the median household income for London, 6.1 for new York and 3.8 for Washington—Demographia survey, 7th annual report, 2011. Across all metropolitan markets in Australia the multiple was 6.1 times the average household income, 5.2 times for the UK, and 3.0 times for the USA.


A. Creighton and O. M. Hartwich, *Australia’s Angry Mayors: How Population Growth Frustrates Local Councils: CIS Policy Monograph 120*, Centre for Independent Studies, 2011, p. 4. The authors surveyed 120 local governments and found that 56 per cent had increased rates to cope with population growth.


Its web site is at <www.apop.com.au/> and as of 4 July 2011 it is out of date, quoting population projections of ‘between 25 & 27 million around 2050 before beginning to slowly decline’; this is however updated in their submission to the Burke inquiry (submission no. 117). For background see V. Trioli, ‘The population agenda’, The Bulletin, 19 February 2002, p. 31.

A search on Reuters Factiva data base (4 July 2011) for the ‘Australian Population Institute’ produced only five hits for the last two years.

See note 9.


See R. Denniss, ‘Banking on hasty growth’, The Age, 22 July 2010, p. 21

‘Without population growth, Mr Triguboff says the economy will stall. “I’d like to see 100 million, because I believe we will have many things to do here besides drilling holes and selling coal,” he said.’ ‘Population to hit 55m by 2050: Triguboff’, AAP Bulletins, 25 January 2010.


2006 p. xxxii. In a later report the Commission noted that population growth ‘can magnify existing policy problems and amplify pressures on “unpriced” entities, such as the environment, and urban and social amenity’. *Population and Migration: Understanding the Numbers*, Productivity Commission, Melbourne, 2010, p. 75


For example Imre Salusinszky writes that: ‘…the Greens … seem to oppose all immigration unless it is illegal’, ‘NSW Pressures of ageing about to ease’, *Newspaper XYZ*, 31 July 2009.


See the then new president Ian Lowe in ‘Population and a sustainable future’, *Habitat*, 2008, January, p. 21. In March 2010 the ACF nominated population to be included as a ‘key threatening process’ to biodiversity under the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act*.
See www.acfonline.org.au/articles/news.asp?news_id=2749&eid>. See also their submission to the Burke Inquiry: submission no. 289
See www.populationparty.com/.
See Anglican Public Affairs Commission, A discussion paper on population issues, March 2010 www.anglican.org.au/Web/Website.nsf/content/Commission:_Public_Affairs> and their submission to the Burke Inquiry: submission no. 304
See www.populationparty.com/.
Bob Carr chaired the panel on sustainable population for the Burke inquiry: Sustainable Development Panel Report: An Appendix to A Sustainable Population for Australia Issues Paper, Department for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra, 2010 (December)
The Scanlon Foundation has as its mission ‘to support the creation of a larger cohesive Australian society’ http://www.scanlonfoundation.org.au/missionandfocus.html. This statement was on its website as of 30 September 2010. It was no longer there as of 14 July 2011. Peter Scanlon, investor, and a former Elders executive with extensive property development interests, established the foundation ‘to sell the benefits of a bigger population’. See J. Masanauskas, ‘Scanlon backs population growth’, The Herald Sun, 4 December 2009, p. 74. The above is not meant to imply that researchers who have accepted Scanlon grants produce biased work. Rather, researchers with a sceptical approach would be unlikely to gain such grants, while those who already believe that growth is good would be more likely to be successful.
J. Niall, ‘Big Melbourne isn’t to be feared, you might find it’ll grow on you’, The Age, 23 April 2011
Chris Berg, research fellow with the Institute of Public Affairs and editor of the IPA Review, ‘Despite job fears, we must keep migration door open’, Sunday Age, March 1 2009, p. 19. See also C. Berg, ‘Charade must end, and both sides of politics know it’, The Sunday Age, 15 May 2011, p. 21; ADC director Hugh Morgan quoted in A. Kohler, ‘Rolling up the drawbridge’, Business Spectator, 25 May 2010
Editorial, ‘Babies are an economic bonus’, The Australian, 20 April 2011, p. 13
Andrew MacLeod, CEO of the Committee for Melbourne, quoted in J. Masanauskas, ‘Empty these nests—Planning group calls on older couples to give up big family homes’, The Herald Sun, 17 February 2011, p. 13. See also the managing director of Stockland, Matthew Quinn, quoted in F. Chong, ‘Packed to the rafters’, The Australian: Weekend Property, 30 April 2011, p. 6.
In 2006 Peter Costello said: ‘our national fertility rate (1.75 babies a couple) is less than replacement level. Only immigration is making our country grow’. P. Costello, ‘Have one for Australia’, The Sydney Morning Herald: Supplement, 26 January 2006, p. 2. This echoes Andrew Theophanous’ claim in 1981 that if we were to exclude the contribution of immigration we would see that Australia’s population was ‘actually shrinking’. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, 31 March 1981, p. 1115

See ibid., p. 28, and S. White, S. Cummings and Roy Morgan Research, *The Silent Majority III*, Clemenger/BBDO Ltd, Melbourne, 1997. This study asked respondents about their most pressing social worries and found that migrants using the welfare system as soon as they arrived concerned the largest proportion. Seventy per cent of their respondents were very concerned about this, while 52 per cent felt that migrants ‘take from Australia and give nothing back’.

Up until 1981 the numbers quoted for net migration are net total migration. From 1982 on they are net overseas migration. Immigration data from 1945 to 1951 are from *Demography 1954*, Bulletin No. 72, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. from 1952 to 1977 they are from J. Shu, S. E. Khoo, A. Struik and F. McKenzie, *Australia’s Population Trends and Prospects 1993*, (BIR), AGPS, Canberra 1994, and from 1978 they are from *Demographic Statistics*, ABS, Catalogue no. 3101.0

Various issues.

For the whole period from 1954 to 2010 for the association between levels of net migration and the per cent saying the numbers are ‘too many’ is only 0.0309.

Some commentators argue that if net migration is expressed in percentage terms it recent scale is not unique; in per capita terms it was higher in 1949 and 1950. See A. Markus, ‘Public opinion divided on population, immigration and asylum’, *Policy*, vol. 26, no. 3, 2010a, pp. 8, 13. This is true. In 1949 and 1950 the population grew from net migration by 1.92% and 1.9% respectively. In 2008 and 2009 the figures were 1.48% and 1.28%, though from 1951 to 2007 the average was 0.66%. The 1949 and 1950 figures are a function of the smaller base population in those years. Following this logic, as the second person disembarked from the first fleet in 1788, the European population of Australia grew by 100% from net migration.


This increase is apparent in the Australian Election Studies (AES) and the Australian Surveys of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) by November/December after the 2007 election. See K. Betts, ‘Dissatisfaction with immigration grows’, *People and Place*, vol. 16, no. 3, 2008, Table 1, p. 21. This shows that the proportions saying immigration should be reduced a little or a lot grew from 39% in 2005 to 46% in late 2007. (After the August 2010 election it was 52%; see 2010 AES computer file.) This series has not been included in the current paper as it relies on a different question: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?’ Response categories: increased a lot, increased a little, remain about the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot. The rise in dissatisfaction in late 2007 does not show up in Figures 2 to 4 because the two data points between 2002 and November 2009 are the first two Scanlon polls (June/August 2007 and June/July 2009). These found lower proportions saying the migrant intake was too high (35% in 2007, rather than 46%, and 37% in 2009). The difference in method, anonymous questionnaires for the AES and AuSSSA, versus phone interviews, might account for some of this discrepancy, or the fact that in both cases the Scanlon question on immigration came soon after ones on volunteering. In 2007 there were three questions on volunteering. These did not mention helping migrant groups, but came directly after a question on whether the respondent socialised with people outside his or her own ethnic or religious group and then soon afterwards were followed by the immigration question. In 2009 the volunteering question preceded the one on immigration, separated from it by two other short questions. It read: ‘The next questions are about unpaid voluntary work. By this I mean any unpaid help you give to the community in which you live, or to an organisation or group to which you belong. It could be to a school, a sporting club, the elderly, a religious group or people who have recently arrived to settle in Australia’. This implies that good people help others, including helping recent migrants. This might have made it more difficult in 2009 for respondents to express a preference for a lower migrant intake shortly afterwards, while the earlier series in 2007 could also have had some tendency to produce this effect. (The interview schedules are available on line under the heading of ‘Methodological Report’ at <http://arts.monash.edu/mapping-population/scanlon-foundation-surveys.php>.)
For example in the debriefing session at the end of the first Scanlon survey in 2007 some interviewers reported difficulty with some respondents’ answers to the question: ‘From which countries, if any, should here be less immigrants?’ They said that they ‘…sometimes found this question to be confronting when respondents gave answers that were incongruent with interviewers’ own thoughts’. ‘Methodological Report’, 2007, p. 30

This was made clear in the acknowledgements section of an article on the early release data: K. Betts, ‘Population growth: what do Australian voters want?’ People and Place, vol. 18, no. 1, 2010, p. 62.

For other polls on attitudes to population growth see K. Betts, ‘Attitudes to immigration and population growth in Australia 1954 to 2010: an overview’, People and Place, vol. 18, no. 3, 2010. There was an ANU phone poll asking the question ‘Does Australia need more people?’ in June 2010 which was published too late to be included in that overview. Unlike the AuSSA mailout questionnaire, this found that 52% said ‘no’ and 44% said ‘yes’. N=695. I. McAllister, A. Martin and J. Pietsch, Public opinion toward population growth in Australia: ANUpoll, ANU, Canberra, 2010. For a further overview of public opinion data see M. Goot and I. Watson, Population, immigration and asylum-seekers: patterns in Australian public opinion, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 2011.

In Barrie Cassidy’s view the population theme in the 2010 election dissolved when Julia Gillard said that even though she didn’t want to see Australia ‘hurting down a track to a 36 million or a 40 million population’ (interview with John Stewart, Lateline, 28 June 2010) she wasn’t going to cut immigration, and Tony Abbott said that he was going to cut it, but only to 170,000 per annum, a figure that we were reaching anyway as the overseas-student boom ebbed. Gillard was then able to accuse Abbott of simply wanting to implement her policy, and both of them stopped talking about population. B. Cassidy, The Party Thieves: The Real Story of the 2010 Election, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2010, pp. 154-6

Quoted in J. Gordon, ‘Gillard rejects “big Australia”’, The Sunday Age, 27 June 2010, p. 1

See B. Birrell, E. Healy, K. Betts and T. F. Smith, Immigration and the Resources Boom Mark 2, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University, July, 2011, p. 3.


See K. Betts, The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999

Census data show that in 1966 1.5% of the population aged 15 plus had degrees, in 1976 just under 3% and in 1996 just over 10%.


ibid., p. 20


Quoted in B. Lagan, ‘Once were Labor’, The Bulletin, 9 April 2002, p. 36

The actual marker is the culture of careful and critical discourse, a way of speaking and arguing that unifies much as a common language allows strangers who share the same ethnicity to recognise each other. See Gouldner, 1979, op. cit., pp. 19-30. Today this way of speaking and writing is best acquired at university. Thus a university degree serves as a rough indicator of whether a person is likely to be proficient in this culture and able to claim membership of the new class. Margaret Simons writes that ‘that when it comes to attitudes and political opinions, the presence or absence of tertiary education is the defining divide—more reliable than household income or notions of social class’. M. Simons, ‘Ties that bind’, Griffith Review, vol. 8, 2005, p. 21

This involves an elaboration of theories about the rise of the new class, and the relative economic insecurity of arts and social science graduates. See Betts, 1999, op. cit.

See Gouldner, 1979, op. cit.

Reasons for this are explored in depth in Betts, 1999, op. cit., pp. 79-90, 94, 156-165.

Robert Manne argues the no ‘issue could reveal more precisely the gulf in values that divides this group [The Left] from ordinary people. (It is precisely because the gulf is real and not a construct that Howard was so easily able to exploit it over Aborigines, asylum seekers and Muslims.) For the Left, the attempt to prosecute Henson was a sickening outrage, both an attack on Art, the only sacred in a secular world…’ R. Manne, ‘What is Rudd’s agenda?’ The Monthly, November 2008
