RITUAL AND POLITICS IN NEW ORDER INDONESIA:

A Study of Discourse and Counter-Discourse in Indonesia

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Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Swinburne University of Technology
February 2005
Signed Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the more active role played in Java by the urban wong cilik (the underclass; literally, the ‘little people’) in contesting the state’s authority, particularly during the later years of the New Order regime, and following its demise in 1998. I will provide examples of social practices employed by the wong cilik in their everyday lives and in their adaptation to periods of significant social and political upheaval. These demonstrate the ways in which they are able to contest the state’s efforts to impose its authority. These practices also develop and employ a variety of subversive discourses, whose categories and values diverge significantly from the official language of government. The examination of the relative linguistic, cultural and normative autonomy of the seemingly powerless underclass reveals an extremely contested political terrain in which the wong cilik are active rather than passive agents in urban society.

These ideas have developed out of urban field research sited around warungs (sidewalk food stalls), urban kampongs and in the city streets of the three Javanese cities of Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Jakarta. These urban social spaces will be shown to be significant for the underclass because they constitute sites through which they constantly interact with diverse social groups, thereby sharpening their knowledge of the contradictions and feelings of otherness manifest between the classes in Java’s large cities. It will be shown how, in these spaces, the underclass also experience the state’s attempts at control through various officially sanctioned projects and how the underclass are able to subvert those projects through expressive means such as songs, poems and forms of mockery which combine to make the state’s dominant discourses lose much of their efficacy.
Acknowledgments

I realize that without the help and support of many people and number of institutions this thesis will never have finished. However, I am alone responsible for the whole content of this dissertation. Accordingly, first of all, I am indebted many thanks to my supervisor, guru and friend, Professor Ken Young, who really gave me lessons and critiques to help me finish my thesis. Without his hard critiques I would not be able to finish it. Besides him, I would also like to thank number of people who helped bring this thesis to fruition. Firstly, to my co-supervisor Professor Alastair Davidson at the Asia Australia Research Centre, Swinburne University of Technology especially for his comment on one of the thesis chapters before he moved to Institute for Advance Studies Princeton University. Secondly, to Kelvin Rowley, who became my co-supervisor after Prof. Alastair Davidson moved to Princeton University. Thirdly, to Keith Foulcher from Sydney University and Professor Arief Budiman from the University of Melbourne who generously give their time to read one of the thesis chapters. Their comments on that specific chapter I gave to them was very significant in building the substantiation and abstraction of this thesis.

I also thanks to a number of institutions which bring the thesis to completion. Firstly, AusAID which gave me a scholarships for 2 years for the MA leading PhD program then continued by the generosity of Swinburne University of Technology scholarships for 1 years and 9 months to finish my dissertation for the PhD program. I also thanks to the head of the School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Prof. David de Vauss for inviting me to La Trobe University as visiting fellow to finish my thesis. Without his helped this thesis would never have finished. Indeed my gratitude also addressed to La Trobe university people for providing me office and academic facilities during my visit to Melbourne in August - October 2004. Thanks Professor Bambang Purwanto as the Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia Social Studies- Gadjah Mada University who always supported me to finish my dissertation. I also extend thanks for prompt responses to Fachry Ali, the director of LSPEUI, who involved me as LSPEUI researcher during my research in Indonesia in 1998. Without his help at that time I would faced a lot of financial difficulties in doing research for this dissertation. This was because Indonesian banks would not permit my ATM (Automatic Telling Machine) from an Australian bank to withdraw money from Indonesian local bank during the monetary crisis.

I also particularly thanks to Robbie Peters who really encouraged me to finish this thesis and helped me in editing almost every chapter from the beginning until the final stage. I also thank his partner, Diem. My gratitude is also addressed to Max Richter who edited my chapters and gave me some comments to my thesis, also to his wife, Tina. Their attention during the process of writing relieved my stress in writing up this thesis. Thanks to Kusyuniati as my ‘older sister’ who supported me and my family during my study in Hawthorn, Ann Loveband and David Stuart who gave some significant comments and helped with some of my weaker points in English. More than that, their help in editing my chapters also contributed significantly to finishing my thesis. Thanks also to Wendy Mee Ph.D from department of Sociology Anthropology, La Trobe University who also gave her generosity to edit one of my chapters, while she was very busy. Thanks to Prof. Nasikun as my informal teacher who always give me inspiration and support. He was the one who always asked about the “destiny” of my dissertation. I also thank all staff of CESASS-
UGM (Centre for Southeast Asia Social Studies- Universitas Gadjah Mada) as another kind of family who always supported me in dealing with the problems of this dissertation. I also appreciate to Irwan Abdullah, and Pande Made Kutanegara, my colleagues in the department of Anthropology, Gadjah Mada University who encouraged me to finish this thesis. Thanks also for Jim from Walailak University who encouraged in writing up this thesis.

In each trajectory of this dissertation and beyond, I have learned to understand the character of the members of my family. My wife, Swety Firmanti whose patience and understanding has been a genuine support and which always kept the work progressing. Tama and Iko my sons have also put up with the agony of writing the dissertation. My gratitude also addressed deeply to my mother who died in the year 1999, when I was writing up this dissertation. She always prayed for me to finish this work as one of her hopes --in continuing my father’s hope who died in 1985. I hope my absence from her burial will substituted by this thesis, as her hope for my future. I also thank the husband and wife who died before this dissertation finished; Pak Ban and Mbok Ban who took care of me since I was a baby and gave yet more attention during my research in 1998-1999 in Indonesia. They were very kind old persons who always prayed for my success.

Last but not least, I also thanks to my assistants, Nyarwi and Rohman and all my informants -- I can not mention all of them-- who gave me a lot of lessons and ideas which were very useful for this dissertation. Without their help this work would never have finished.
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GLOSSARY

Angkringan = A type of street food stall
Abangan = An Arabic word from Aba’an meaning practicing Islamic way but not strict; a syncretic Islam and Hindu Javanese
Aparat = Apparatus
Bapak = Father
Bapakisme = The Idea of fatherhood or Fatherism
Becak = Three cycle Pedicab for two pasangers
Berkuasa = Having an authority, or ruled
Betara Kala = God of Time
Bibit-bebet-bobot (Javanese) = a term in weighting some one to be chosen for husband or wife (the origin-the status-the quality)
Bupati = Regent
Camat = District head person
Ceret = Kettle
Cewek nakal = bad girl
Gubernur = Governor
Departemen Penerangan = Department of Information
DIY = Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Special Region of Yogyakarta
Durung Wong = lit. not being human, person(s) who are not mature socially
Gali = Thug
Hadiningrat = Hadi, meaning good, Ningrat, meaning nobility or place, Good nobility or good place
Hoyen = Food that already thrown to rubbish bin
Ibu = Mother
Ilmu = Knowledge, school, magic
Ilmu Putih = White Magic, magic based on Islamic teaching
Ilmu Hitam = Black magic, magic based on Satanic way
IR64 = A variety of rice
Jagoan = Acting to be macho
Jagoisme, Jagoanisme = Machismo
Jamasan = Purification, Cleaning with water and flower
Jamasan Pusaka = Purification of heirlooms
Jawara = Master of martial art, thug
Kabupaten = Regency
Kalangan bawah = Underclass
Kalangan Menengah = Middle class
Kalangan Atas = Upper class
Kamar Kos = Dormitory Bed room
Kecamatan = District
Keluarga = Family
Kepala Keluarga = Head of Family
Kere = Very poor
Keraton = Royal palace
Keris = Javanese weapon, knife with snake shape
Kethoprak = Traditional Javanese play
Kopi = Coffee
Kopi Jos = Coffee with burned charcoal
Kota = City
Krama = High language of Javanese
Kyai = Islamic Leader, the leader of Islamic Boarding School
Laut Selatan = South Sea
Lesehan = Sit down on the mat
Lonte Lanang = Male prostitute
Lurah = Village headman
Magrib = Dusk time, Islamic term for time to pray
Manusia = Human
Manusian seutuhnya = real human, mature person
Masyarakat = Society
Merakyat = Being closed to the people
Muhammadyah = Modern Islamic Organization
Mlarat = Poor
Modin = Islamic apparatus at the kampong level
Nasi = Rice
Nasi Kucing = lit. Cat Rice, small amount of rice wrapped with banana leaves
Ngoko = Lower Javanese language
Pasar = Market
Patih = At the regency level Patih act as Vice Regent
Pedagang Kaki Lima = Sidewalk trader
Pegawai negeri = Civil Servant
Pejabat = High Rank Bureaucrat
Pelajar = Student
Pemerintah = Government
Pemulung = Garbage scavenger
Pesantren = Islamic Boarding School
Petugas = Apparatus
Pil Koplo = informal name for drug
Preman = thug, (Freyman, Dutch)
Priyayi = Javanese aristocracy, ruling literati, higher officialdom
Pusaka = Heirloom
Rakyat = People
Rokok Kretek = Cloved Cigarette
Sapta Prasetya Korpri (Seven Loyalty Vow for Indonesian Civil Servant)
Segara Kidul (Javanese) = South Sea
Sekretarian Negara : State Secretariat
Sesaji = Flower or food for offering to the spirit
Setoran = Commission
Setan = Satan
Sura = The name of Javanese calendar system, based on lunar system
Surat Kabar = Newspaper
Tapa Bisu = Silent Fasting
Temu Wicara = Talk Show
Tempe = Fermented soy bean
Tertib = Order, discipline
Togel/Totor = lottery
Toko = Shop
Ulama = Moslem Intelectual
Upacara = Ritual
Upacara Labuhan = Ritual to throw bad charm to the sea
Warung = Food Stall
Waria = Transvestite
Warga = members
Wawasan Nusantara = (lit: Indonesian View), The Indonesian Geopolitical Doctrine
Wedana = Assistant of regional headman (bupati)
Wong = Person, people
Wong Cilik = lit. Little people, underclass
Wong Gede = lit. Big people, upper-class
Wong sugih = The rich
Wong Kantoran = Bureaucrat
Wong Gedongan = A person who live in a big house
Wong omahan = A person who live in house

Abbreviations

AD = Angkatan Darat, Ground Force
Aldera = (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat=People Demokcratic Aliance)
ANTV = Andalas Televisi, Owned by PT. Cakrawala Andalas television
Bakorstrada = Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Daerah, the Coordination Body for Establishing Regional Stability
BAMA = yayasan Bahan Makanan, Foundation for foodstuffs
BPUP = Badan Pelaksana Urusan Pangan,The Institution for Foodstuff Affair
Bulog = Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistic Body), Food sistrator at the national level
Dolog= Depot Logistik (Logistic Depot), Food Distributor at the regional level
DO = Delivery Order, as a license to transport, distribute and sell the rice from Dolog
D3= Three years Diploma, TAFE
DPP = Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Senator like position
DPR = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Legislative Body
DPRD = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daceah, Local Legislative Body
GAM = Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Aceh Merdeka Movement
Girli = Pinggir Kali, river side
HMI =Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Union
Kapolri = Kepala Polisi Republik Indonesia, Head of Indonesian Police
KPRP = Komite Perjuangan Rakyat untuk Perubahan, Comity of People Strugle for Changing
KOPASSUS = Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Armed Force
KOLOGNAS = Komando Logistik nasional, National Logistic Command
KPJ = Kelompok Pengamen Jalanan, Street musicians group
Peristiwa Malari (the acronym of Peristiwa 15 January 1974, the Incident of January 15th 1974)

MPR = Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People Assembly

NKK/BKK = Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kegiatan Kampus, or The Normalisation of Campus Life/Body for the Co-ordination of Campus Activities

NU = Nahdlatul Ulama meaning The Awakening of Muslim Intellectual; Organization of Traditional Muslim

PDIP = Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle

Perek = Perempuan Eksperimen, Experimental girl who practices promiscuity

PRD = Partai Rakyat Democratik, People Democratic Party

PKPB = Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, Care of the Nation Party

PMP = Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, The Education of Pancasila Morality

PMR = Pengawas Makanan Rakyat, Food for people Monitoring unit

Polda = Kepolisian daerah, Regional Police

PKI = Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party

PSK = Pekerja Sex Komersial, Commercial Sex Worker

RCTI = Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia, private TV station located in Jakarta

RT = Rukun Tetangga, administration unit in kampong, meaning Neighbourhood harmony

RW = Rukun Warga, administration unit in Kampung above RT, meaning harmony of members

Satgas = Satuan Tugas, Task Force

Satpam = Satuan Pengamanan, Security Force

SCTV = Surabaya Citra Televisi, private TV station located in Surabaya

Sembako = Sembilan bahan pokok, nine major foodstuffs

SMID = Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Students Solidarity for Democracy

SPI = Serikat Pengamen Indonesia, Union for Indonesian Street Musicians

SLTA = Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas, High School

SMK = Sekolah Menangah Kejuruan, Skill Middle School

SMA = Sekolah Menengah Atas, High School

SMP = Sekolah Menengah Pertama, Junior School

SMSR = Sekolah Menengah Seni Rupa, High School for Art

STM = Sekolah Teknik Menengah Technical Middle School

TVRI = Televisi Republik Indonesia, State owned TV station

Tramtib = Ketentraman dan Ketertibab, Tranquility and order

Tilang = Tindakan Langsung, Police operation to ride motor cyclist who do not possess driving license

VMF = Voeding Middelen Fonds, Food Intermediary Foundation

Warteg = Warung Tegal, Food stall owned by person from Tegal region (central Java)

YUBM = Yayasan Urusan Bahan Makanan

YBPP (Yayasan Badan Pembelian Padi, The Foundation and Institution for Rice Buying).
Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis investigates the forms of contestation that identify power relations between the *wong cilik* — literally, ‘little people’ (the subaltern classes) — and the *wong gede* — both ‘the rich’ and the controllers of state apparatuses — in contemporary Java. This necessitates examining the more active role played by the underclass in contesting the state’s authority, particularly during the later years of the New Order regime and the period following its demise in 1998. Through an examination of these social groups, the thesis intends to concentrate on the discursive practices of society as they are created and contested in a number of crucial urban sites. It will therefore provide an exposition of the formation of power relations between state and society. It will show the connections between the practices of everyday life and the creation of underclass counter discourses, providing an account of how they were operationalized among the *wong cilik* in the period of Indonesia’s New Order and the more recent transition toward democracy. I will provide examples of significant social practices employed by the *wong cilik* in their everyday lives, noting their adaptive strengths during periods of major social and political change, such as that of the late 1990s. Through these investigations I have identified the means they employ to contest the state’s attempt to impose its unchallenged authority and worldview. These practices also generate a variety of subversive discourses. The thesis will highlight the highly contested political terrain that exists in urban Java and the ways in which the *wong cilik* are active rather than passive agents.

These ideas have developed out of urban field research around the *warungs* (sidewalk food-stalls), the kampongs (local urban communities, usually of poor people), the streets and buses. These, as I will show, have been secured by the underclass as subaltern spaces that afford them a degree of personal and discursive freedom. These social spaces will be shown to be significant for the *wong cilik* because they constitute key sites through which the underclass interact with various social groups, thereby sharpening their knowledge of the contradictions and feelings of otherness manifest between the classes in Java’s large cities. It will be shown how, in these spaces, the underclass also experience the state’s attempt at control through various projects of domination and how the underclass subvert those projects through media such as songs,
poems and forms of mockery which work to make the state’s dominant discourses lose much of their efficacy. These moments and these urban spaces reflect the ‘disappearance of the centre’ thereby allowing contingencies of meaning to open up space for the *wong cilik* to reproduce and disseminate their own distinctive counter-hegemonic cultural productions through everyday life forms of discourse.

**A. Definition of *Wong Cilik*: An Emic Category**

Each of the terms *wong cilik* and *wong gede* actually embrace heterogeneous social categories. They nevertheless are key constructs used in social praxis and are employed by local people from an emic perspective. John Sullivan, who did field research in a kampong in the city of Yogyakarta, saw this and noted that he had encountered two general social categories, *wong cilik* and *wong gede*. He also recorded a few other social usages that classified residents according to their profession, their ownership of a house, and their membership of a particular neighbourhood within the kampong. Concerning the first two categories, he states that, *wong cilik* and *wong gede*:

‘...can appear quite reasonable as an empirical generalizations, but all are well-polished stereotypes, wielded in and around kampong for ideological affirmation rather than sociological elucidation’.¹ These terms are subjective characterizations utilised by both social groups in a stereotypical sense, to distinguish each other politically and culturally. They also reflect the forms of power relations and the pervasive contestation that prevails between the two. It is not only a matter of the possible possession of capital that makes the *wong gede* consider themselves to be superior (as having wider access to wealth) and to view the *wong cilik* as subordinates (because of their limited wealth). It is also a matter of objectification of the higher and lower group in order to allow certain socio-cultural distinctions to be perpetuated.

*Wong gede* and *wong cilik* are emic categories. They reflect local knowledge and experience, but these terms do not stand alone as words without a milieu. These stereotypical terms also reflect the basic conceptualization of power relations taken for granted in their contestations in various social settings. These emic meanings and the uses of these terms need to be investigated comprehensively without imposing external sociological categories on them. They exist first of all in a context of localised systems

of social knowledge. Even though these emic categories might be juxtaposed with conventional sociological categories such as ‘lower-class’ for ‘wong cilik’ and ‘middleclass/upper-class’ for ‘wong gede’, these ‘social scientific’ usages remain an external imposition, and even an irritant which distracts from the intimate workings of local knowledge, clouding the meanings of emic stereotypical categorization. Their socio-economic, cultural and political struggles are conceived in their vernacular discourses as being both opposed to the state and opposed to the wong gede. We can best grasp the coherent purpose of their everyday struggles if we respect the terms in which they are conceived. Accordingly, this thesis will examine how the wong cilik exert their creativity in constructing power relations with wong gede through contestation in everyday life. The thesis will show how the wong cilik creates relatively autonomous conceptual knowledge and normative standards in order to establish counter discourses addressed to the wong gede as their counterpart in exercising power. Therefore, in this thesis, I will employ the emic concepts of wong cilik and wong gede to understand the contested nature of power relations in urban areas.

‘Wong cilik’ is used by the underclass themselves to identify their social positions. ‘Wong gede’, by contrast, is not a term commonly used by the higher classes to identify themselves. For example, the wong cilik will readily say ‘I am wong cilik’, but the wong gede will never say ‘I am wong gede’. Furthermore, the term ‘wong gede’ is used by the wong cilik to describe the otherness of powerful outsiders who do not properly belong in the wong cilik’s social world. For example, the wong gede will never point their finger at someone, declaring ‘you are wong cilik’. If he/she uttered these words, they would be considered arrogant. On the other hand, wong cilik are prepared to point their finger at the opposite social category and say ‘you/they are wong gede’ to this person and to flaunt this symbol of otherness with stereotypical intent..

The social category of ‘wong cilik’, as used by the wong cilik, mainly refers to the poor, rural peasants, urban industrial workers, street dwellers, people living in slum areas, petty traders, street musicians, lower-ranking state functionaries and some petty clerical groups. All of these would, in a Javanese context, be seen as ‘underclass’ if we use conventional sociological categories. On the other hand the social category of ‘wong gede’ used by the wong cilik include wider more diverse groups, all of them, in one way or another, exercising economic or political power. They include, for example,
politicians, the rich, high-ranking bureaucrats (or priyayi in Javanese terms of social hierarchy) and state officials. Within the social category of wong gede there are some sub-categories such as wong gedongan (a person who lives in a big house), wong kantoran (a person who works in an office, characterized more often than not from their outward appearance such as their uniform and neat dress). These sociological sub-categories have limited uses here, because they are not central to the core stereotypical divisions of urban society. There are also pejorative terms such as wong gemede, meaning a person of wong cilik origins, but who acts as wong gede because they have close links with wong gede for political or economic purposes — they include, for example, preman (thugs). Students are a case, for example, of someone who is somewhat in-between, because they have been uprooted from the customary locales of these emic categories. If they have to be categorised by the wong cilik, usually they advert to the students’ parents’ emic category such as ‘student, child of wong cilik’ or ‘student, child of wong gede’.

B. Literature Review and Mapping

In this section I will discuss some of the major types of analysis that have been employed to understand socio-cultural-political phenomena in Indonesia. They can be divided into three major analytical types. The first type of analysis is the ‘descending’ type. These analyses proceed by looking at the ‘deduction of power starting from its centre and [are] aimed at the discovery of the extent to which [it] permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society’. The second one is the ‘ascending’ type of analysis (or bottom-up as opposed to ‘descending’ approaches), and the third is contestation analysis, a type of analysis which addresses power as an inherently contested field of social relations. This tripartite categorization maps out the very diverse range of approaches to understanding the relations of power in modern Indonesian society. It addresses variation in the choice of research object, and identifies the strength and weaknesses of different approaches, Classifying the existing literature in this way enables a clearer identification of what is significant and distinctive in this thesis, both in the specification of the research problem, and in the means of investigation and

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exposition.

**B.1. Descending type of Analysis**

The approaches I group together under the category ‘descending’ are those that emphasise the major structural influences that dominate society as a whole, and the processes that sustain these structures. These scholars therefore focus first on the political, economic and cultural configurations manifest in the centre of society. This, for them, is the locus of social continuity and change. Here they identify the generative sources of stratification in society, and the dynamic processes that reproduce the relations of exploitation and domination that permeate society as a whole. Typically, studies written in the descending manner describe contestation and accommodation between such major social forces — for example, studies of regime maintenance and change, or the evaluation of rival models of economic development. By their very nature, they are usually concerned with the state, with elites, and with the worldviews, legitimating rationales and cultural constructions of the powerful. These scholarly narratives tend to gravitate to events in the national capital (here Jakarta), and to the activities of the controllers of the state, and the dominant urban elites in civil society.

Obviously, these authors do acknowledge the vast majority of citizens beyond Jakarta and outside of these elites, but in doing so they extend their chosen analytical constructs to the analysis of the wider society. The ‘top-down’ nature of these theories tend to place emphasis on the institutions and practices that permit the population to be constrained, directed and managed by the powerful. The lives of ordinary people are therefore bounded by the institutionalised power of the state, and the interests of elites and dominant groups. Certainly they recognise that, in uncommon historical circumstances, these boundaries are disrupted and the social order changes in important ways. Even then, the impetus for change is likely to come from above, or if it does spring from the wider society, its articulation and organisation are the business of elites. Thus the lives, culture and orientation of the mass of society tend to be viewed from the top downwards, through ‘descending’ analyses.

Because of the centralised, top-down nature of these approaches, they are frequently inclined to be state-centric. They also tend to have ‘structuralist’ orientations in the sense that social organisation and behaviour can be understood largely as
consequences of the interaction of the major socio-cultural and economic institutions of society, institutions and social relations that set the conditions of possibility of effective social action. Usually their identification of the key historical, structural and dynamic features of society are influenced by one or more of the grand narratives of Western social science, even if these theoretical constructs are adapted critically, eclectically, and with attention to the singular characteristics of particular societies, such as Indonesia.

Having identified, subject to various limitations, the principal socio-historical forces that operate in society, descending approaches also have far-reaching influences on studies that attempt to understand localised social formations, and the characteristics of the remainder of society beyond the state, beyond the elites. At the very least, there can be a predisposition to trace the manner in which major structural forces, taken as given, operate in more localised and culturally disarticulated settings, in order to discover the ways in which these localised social processes contribute to the broad structural configuration of society. At their worst these approaches can show a marked lack of curiosity about the struggles and motivations of the *wong cilik*, since these can be seen to be moulded within institutions controlled by dominant groups belonging to, or aligned with, the centre. Either way, structure appears to prevail over agency, and these structural imperatives tend to diminish the significance of the everyday struggles of ordinary people. To the extent, then, that descending analyses correspond with ‘structuralism’ understood in this way, they lessen the role of human agency.

Let us consider the various contributions in the descending mode by writers on Indonesia, particularly with a view to examining their approach to human agency. Many, not all, can clearly be seen to be following structuralist approaches. Of these, the political economists most frequently conform to this pattern. The more theoretically developed contributions to political economy in Indonesia tend to follow, or to be influenced by, Marxian theoretical frameworks, and I will give these particular attention. It is useful, therefore, to begin with Marx’s own insight on the issue of structure and agency, written in 1869:\(^3\):

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Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

Marx himself, therefore, does not seek to deny the significance of purposive human action in history and society, but rather to understand it in its given historical, cultural and political context. Neither structure nor agency are excluded; both influence each other in a manner he called dialectical. The challenge is to clearly identify the dynamic and often contingent processes through which structure and agency influence each other. Too often descending analyses become absorbed in the task of demonstrating the pervasive and lasting effects of structure, and risk forgetting that these same structures must themselves be constantly reproduced through social action.

Still, a significant proportion of the descending approaches to Indonesia do not work in the Marxian tradition. Even so, they tend to share this concern with structure, and to follow a centralised, top-down and state-centric orientation.

Rather than being Marxist, the early authoritative studies of Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s were strongly influenced by the anti-Marxist, yet clearly structuralist, assumptions of modernisation theory. Among the most influential Indonesian specialists writing in this period were George McT Kahin and Herbert Feith. Their publications dealt principally with the formation of nationalism, parliamentary institutions, political parties and the state. The early influential writings of Clifford Geertz explored the cultural, religious and ethnic aspects of post-colonial Indonesia, and their connections with parties and the state. While these scholars later eschewed the certitudes of modernisation theory — particularly Feith — there is little doubt that these pioneering studies set much of the research agenda on Indonesia for decades to come.

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follow, and structuralist residues from modernisation theory were carried forward with them.

As the confident certainties of modernisation theory lost their hold in the 1970s, the next generation of scholars of Indonesia, many of them students of Kahin, Geertz, Benda\(^8\) and others, developed more sophisticated models — Feith’s\(^9\) ‘repressive-developmentalist’ model, McVey’s\(^10\) *beamtenstaat*; Crouch’s\(^11\) ‘neo-patrimonial regime’; Jackson’s ‘bureaucratic polity’\(^12\), and so on — they retained the established concern with political power and rule, the state, the politics of the capital and the contestation among the narrow strata of political, economic and religious elites. While they rejected the more blatant teleologies and Eurocentric assumptions of modernisation theory, they retained many of its other assumptions, producing analyses, some plainly ‘structuralist’, others less so, that remained in the descending mode. The achievements and limitations of this generation of scholars are succinctly laid out by Dwight King\(^13\), who draws attention to their lack of sustained attention to the far-reaching changes taking place in society more broadly, changes that had the potential to undermine the stable patterns of elite dominance.

A few scholars stand out against the broad conformity to state-centric studies of elites. McVey’s\(^14\) work in the comparative historical vein, while it can be mapped on the

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same terrain — historical state formation, Islam, the military, Indonesian Communism, proto-capitalist elites, and so on — displays a subtle historical awareness that is never comfortable with simple teleological assumptions from any quarter. Benedict Anderson’s work\(^\text{15}\) is also difficult to categorise easily, though, like McVey, he operates in the same territory while breaking with the developmentalist, functionalist and mechanically structural analyses that underpin other descending orientations. I will comment later on his celebration (in *Java in a Time of Revolution*) of the role of youth (*pemuda*) in the national revolution, one of a number of instances where he shows an interest in the rich and significant politics of Indonesian society beyond the elites. His knowledge of Indonesia’s diverse cultures and societies is deep, and he does not resort to ill-founded simplifications to justify his concentration on the state and elite politics. Nevertheless these concerns have absorbed most of his attention. In academic circles he is best known for his original propositions about nationalism\(^\text{16}\), the state\(^\text{17}\) and for his stress on the significance of culture\(^\text{18}\) in politics. The essay on ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’ is frequently cited, frequently mis-read, but nevertheless then mobilised by others to yield a ‘descending’ culturalist frame of analysis, particularly concerning Java.

Descending analyses tend to emphasise economic and political structures and their capacity to shape society, but not exclusively so. As we have seen, culture is also invoked to achieve a ‘top-down’ cognitive map of the socio-political and religious order of society. Anderson’s ‘Idea of Power’ argument is one instance of this, even if it is misrepresented. Clifford Geertz’s influential study of (pre-colonial) nineteenth century Bali (*Negara: The theatre-state in nineteenth century Bali*) argues explicitly against the universality of the modern western association of the state with ‘governance, in the


\[^{16}\text{Anderson Imagined Communities 1983, op. cit.}\]

\[^{17}\text{Anderson ‘Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Historical Perspective’}. Journal of Asian Studies, (1982) op. cit.\]

\[^{18}\text{Anderson ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’. 1972. op. cit.}\]
sense of regnancy, regime, dominion, mastery: statecraft\textsuperscript{19}, and stresses rather its associations with ‘stateliness — pomp, in the sense of splendid, display, dignity, presence’\textsuperscript{20}. The Balinese state, or negara, then was a (‘mythological’) ‘exemplary centre’ in which pomp did not serve power so much as power existed to serve pomp: ‘the court-and-capital is at once a microcosm of the supernatural order...and the material embodiment of political order\textsuperscript{21}. Geertz provides us with not just a state-centric, but a court-centric reading of Balinese culture and social organisation. The cult of the divine king and the vast competitive rituals and displays (funerals above all) celebrate the symbols and values of hierarchy and the theatre state. Geertz argues that these are ‘the driving force of Balinese life\textsuperscript{22} where we discover ‘the ruling obsessions of Balinese culture: social inequality and status pride’\textsuperscript{23}. While later scholars accept the correctness of Geertz’s questioning of Western notions of the ‘state’, Geertz’s view can be countered by a stress — best demonstrated in the work of Henk Schulte Nordholt\textsuperscript{24} — on the negara as being structured around a hierarchical order dependent on sources of authority found in both political and ritual domains. Carol Warren’s\textsuperscript{25} research shows that the stress placed on hierarchy (founded in the ‘state’, negara) in the Geertzian model underplays the countervailing egalitarian values of the ‘village’ or ‘desa’ (particularly the cultural values expressed in the organising seka principles of the ‘hamlet’ or banjar\textsuperscript{26}). There is no need to pursue the finer points of the ongoing


\textsuperscript{20} Geertz \textit{Negara} 1980, loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, p.13

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, p.13

\textsuperscript{23} Loc. cit.


\textsuperscript{25} Carol Warren \textit{Adat and Dinas: Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State} Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1995.

\textsuperscript{26} Warren \textit{Adat and Dinas} 1995, p.90:

Both Negara and Desa were ‘imagined’ symbolically and realized institutionally. ‘Exemplary centre’ and ‘village republic’ were of course more complete in their imagery than in their manifestation. Negara and Desa were metaphors for a set of relations, one of hierarchic, the other of egalitarian, corporate unity. Both are ‘mythic’ in the sense that neither of these symbolic totalities could be fully realized in the face of its practical dependence upon, or the transgressions of, the other. C. Geertz’s and Boon’s interpretations underemphasize the political dimension of the Balinese state and the symbolic
argument about the ‘Balinese theatre state’ here. The point of our examination of Geertz’s very influential study was to show the descending strategy in operation — he is reading society from the centre outwards. Here we observe a descending approach in the work of a leading Indonesianist whose focus is primarily cultural. In this case the centre is not just the capital and the state, but the royal court itself.

While the descending approach has been characteristic of a wide range of studies of Indonesia, cultural as well as political and economic, its clearest, and, in many ways, most enduring, manifestation is found in the studies of political economists. These are invariably ‘descending’ and almost always structuralist. Some, such as Jack Bresnan’s analysis of the late New Order regime, offer an explicitly non-Marxist political economy. However, by far the most influential political economy of Indonesia is the oeuvre of Richard Robison. His work belongs to the Marxian tradition of political economy. From the outset it sought to break intellectually with the established Cornell, Yale and derivative (e.g. ANU, Monash) orthodoxies offering a powerful critique of their limitations. Robison’s political economy demonstrates the strengths, but also the limitations found in descending approaches that are pertinent for my study. It also raises issues of structure and agency. I will discuss Robison first, and then the more recent work of his student, Vedi Hadiz.

Richard Robison has over two decades produced the most sustained, sophisticated and influential analysis of New Order Indonesia among political economists and certainly among those writing in the Marxian tradition. He has argued that the New Order period was a time of significant capitalist transformation of society, politics and the economy. He does not deny the importance of culture entirely. He proposes from his earliest publication (1981) that the issues of culture and politics ‘can best be analysed by means of a construct that explains change as a process of continuous and mutually conditioning interaction of culture, politics and foundations of Balinese village relations.


economics…’30. However, he insists that these interactions be analysed as being structured in a ‘specific historical context’31. This is sound, and in keeping with Marx’s proposition cited earlier (‘Men make their own history, but they don not make it just as they please…’). Nevertheless, the weight of his argument has an uncompromising structuralist emphasis, so that plainly, for him, the ultimate determination of the processes of social change in Indonesia arises from the dynamics of capitalism, which became the dominant mode of production in Indonesia.

Robison’s thesis was then more fully argued a few years later with the publication in 1986 of his Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. While he has modified his argument in some respects in his numerous publications since 1986, the structuralist qualities of his analyses since then have remained consistent32. In spite of his acknowledgement of Marxian dialectics, his is a structuralism which makes few allowances for cultural influences, and gives limited attention to the autonomous struggles of subordinate social groups.

As Robison’s work developed in the 1980s and 1990s, he came increasingly to emphasise two themes enunciated in The Rise of Capital. Firstly, as against certain Marxist orthodoxies, he recognised the high degree of economic and political independence possessed by Soeharto and state-based elites — these advantages flowed not only from the ‘overdeveloped’ beamtenstaat33 taken over from the Dutch, but on the coercive power of the army, the state monopoly of lucrative oil revenues, and the political vulnerability of the ‘pariah capitalists’, the Chinese cukongs who hold more than 80% of private wealth in Indonesia. This was theorised in Marxist terms by arguments about the relative autonomy of the state. Secondly, given the singular characteristics of the capitalist strata in Indonesia — dominated by Chinese clients of the state, and the business interests of indigenous ‘politico-bureaucrats’ — he came to

33 On the Beamtenstaat see Ruth T. McVey ‘The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia’. In Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds) Interpreting Indonesian Politics op. cit. 1982
emphasise the precedence of capital itself over the capitalist class. He emphasised ‘capital logic’ over ‘class logic’. The driving force behind Indonesia’s transformation was less the aims of the owners and operators of capital, and more the necessities imposed by the interior logic of the reproduction of capital through the accumulation of profits. His theoretical stance in the 1980s demonstrates emphatically the structuralist, and ‘descending’, organisation of his analysis of Indonesian society and economy – even the capitalists play second fiddle to the abstract, structuralist logic of capital. As I will show below, Robison’s more recent work has moved somewhat from a stress on the logic of capital, and now gives greater emphasis to the political struggles of ‘predatory oligarchs’ in post-Soeharto Indonesia. For all that, his work clearly exemplifies the characteristics of descending analysis.

The most accomplished Indonesianist influenced by Robison is Vedi Hadiz. Where Robison’s structuralism was well suited to his studies of the state and capital, Hadiz turned his attention to the other main development identified by the Marxian theorisation of capitalist social transformation: the growth of the propertyless proletariat. In this theoretical tradition, since class struggle is seen as the driving force of social change, the formation of a politically conscious working class is the most portentous consequence of capitalist development. Here attention must move beyond the elites of state and capital and engage with the struggles of ordinary people, and, crucially, address issues of individual or collective agency.

In the Indonesian case, there is much to investigate, particularly since organised labour had played, at best, a marginal role in critical historical turning points such as the fall of Soeharto in 1998. In his book *Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia*, published in 1997, Hadiz uses the ‘structuralist’ approach by analysing ‘the configuration of class forces, the role of the state, and the timing of industrialisation in both determining the political outcomes of industrialisation, and creating the context

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34 See Robison *The Rise of Capital*, pp. 120-124. For an extended discussion of these structuralist foundations in Robison’s work, see Yoon Hwan Shin, ‘Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political Patronage, Bureaucratic Interests, and Capitalists-in-formation in Soeharto’s Indonesia’. PhD Yale University 1989, chapters 1 and 2, especially pp. 24-42.


within which working classes and working class movements emerge’\(^\text{37}\). He also considers the significant role of ‘historical agencies’, thus appearing to diverge to some extent from a strict structuralist position. By ‘historical agencies’ he refers to the working class itself and its organisations, whose conscious efforts are stimulated by various experiences of involvement in activism and social movements in economic environments. However, he states that this approach ‘would not entail any serious departure from the structuralist position …’, because he believes that ultimately ‘the strategies of state and dominant classes toward labour are crucial in shaping the responses, ideologies, and strategies of the working class’\(^\text{38}\). While he diligently identifies both the growth in numbers of workers, and many clear but fragmented cases of worker militancy, his analysis leads him to the view that the workers’ collective praxis served mainly to consolidate capitalist hegemony under the New Order. While it is true that repressive military-backed industrial relations policies, combined with authoritarian political controls left the workers’ movement disorganised and barely conscious of its radical history (in the Old Order period and under the Dutch), this kind of pessimistic judgement owes as much to its descending theoretical approach as it does to the difficult industrial conditions workers had to contend with under Soeharto. While my thesis is not a study of the working class, I will show that a different approach to the discourse and practices of subordinate groups in Indonesia can reveal far greater manifestations of contested power and meanings once the inherent limitations of descending approaches are overcome.

The very recent book written by Robison and Hadiz displays some modulation from their earlier point of view. In *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*, they advance a different emphasis without departing from the characteristics of descending analysis. Now they are less emphatic about the ultimate determination by the economy, and place greater emphasis on ‘extra-economic’ factors. They argue\(^\text{39}\):


\(^{38}\) Ibid., p.17.

The crisis was played out within a system of extra-economic coercion of the market that had been not only the engine of its extraordinary growth but the very cement of power relations within Indonesia’s New Order. It was not the interventionism of a highly centralised state capitalism that was at the heart of the problem, rather, the rise of powerful politico-business families in the 1980s and the harnessing of the state to unconstrained interest of this privileged league of oligarchies…

Developing this argument, they suggest that the volatile political turmoil in Indonesia can be understood fundamentally in terms of the rise of a multifaceted politico-business oligarchy and its successful adaptation to power in consecutive predicaments that challenged the regime, and their capacity to capture new political and market institutions once the regime itself faltered. This is a very interesting analysis. They cannot be accused of a simplistic economic determinism, as they trace the reorganisation of state power in Indonesia from the perspective of the contest over power that preceded the fall of Soeharto and accelerated after he fell. To understand the macro level of politics, this kind of approach is indispensable. However, it still remains entirely absorbed with the way historical outcomes are determined by agents who have access to and who serve the capitalist mode of production.

The fall of Soeharto led to the displacement of individuals and even of key elements of the New Order oligarchy. Certain notable figures were ruined in the economic crisis. In spite of the turmoil brought about by the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the weight of the evidence and analysis provided by Robison and Hadiz shows that most of the elites have successfully adapted themselves to a new, more open and decentralized set of state institutions. In doing so, they have successfully reconstituted their power and retained many of their economic advantages, along with a significant measure of political influence. Robison and Hadiz show that while the established oligarchs have had to reinvent themselves, and have seen new players emerge to share their advantages, most have remained powerful. The oligarchs have found the ways and means to continue their most basic principle of operation, the use of state power to advance private gain. As Young notes:

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The authors do not deny — rather they celebrate — the real advances that the popular impetus for reform has produced, and the partial but significant unraveling of the earlier centralised system of authoritarian controls. These advances broke the hold of the old power coalitions that centred on the personal rule of Soeharto, his family and close associates. However, they do take issue with the prevalent assumption that either the impact of institutional reforms of democratic constitutionalism — a free press, freedom of association, decentralisation, electoral and constitutional reforms, independent scrutiny of government performance etc. — or those of neo-liberal globalisation, or both in combination, will inevitably overcome the messy, conflict-ridden attempts by entrenched elites to frustrate reform. The widespread desire for probity in politics and the hostility to the corruption of so many public institutions, economic and social alike, is clearly present, but, the authors stress, the reconstituted predatory oligarchs continue to dominate the military, bureaucracy, courts and the major political organisations. Against these well entrenched and powerful elites, civil society remains disorganised, and reformist programs lack effective organisation and a unified mass base in society.

We see here that the position of both these authors have moved a fair distance from the ineluctable ‘capital logic’ of *The Rise of Capital*. The oligarchs they now identify at the heart of the post-Soeharto system (those who had already developed a complex mode of domination under the New Order), can contest, facilitate and even frustrate powerful structural impulses — such as those of globalisation. This is much closer to a theoretical posture that recognises the centrality of contested power and meanings in shaping the course of social change. They have moved, but not that far. In the end, they turn to the consequences of structural influences. To give serious weight to the reality of socio-cultural struggles, they would have to give much more attention to what is taking place in the lives of ordinary people. Were they to do that, they would have made a fundamental change in their scholarly approaches which remain well within the descending mode. These observation mote the limitation of descending approaches, particularly its restricted capacity to understand fully the contested nature of power relations in the wider society. That does not suggest that they have much greater utility in dealing with longer-term social change. Raymond Williams\(^41\), for example makes a useful distinction between ‘epochal’ and ‘historical’ questions:

One thing that is evident in some of the best Marxist cultural analysis is that it is very much more at home in what one might call epochal questions than in what one has to call historical questions. That is to say, it is usually very much better

\(^{41}\) Raymond Williams, ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, *New Left Review*, 82, (1973): 3-16, p.8
at distinguishing the large features of different epochs of society, as between feudal and bourgeois, or what might be, than at distinguishing between different phases of bourgeois society, and different moments within the phases: that true historical process which demands a much greater precision and delicacy of analysis than the always striking epochal analysis which is concerned with main lineaments and features.

Among the obstacles to understanding that potentially arise within descending analyses is a kind of functionalist teleology. Because socio-economic structures can be seen (usually drawing on theories abstracted from misconceived historical analogies) to require conformity to certain patterns of behaviour, it follows that people will behave accordingly. They must if these structures are to persist. First one identifies structure, then one assumes conformity to the functional imperatives of that structure. Aside from problems of evidence and inference, this leaves out entirely the dimensions of struggle, the contestation of power by those who are expected to conform in this way. The work of Gramsci shows that, even within the Marxian tradition, this kind of top-down mechanical structural determination is far too simplistic. Gramsci, as is well known, wrote of hegemony, a synthesis of force and consent, as an aspect of successful domination that was not fixed, but was the outcome of continuous struggle, of permanent striving, a ceaseless endeavour to win over subordinate classes to the universalistic claims of the powerful. Hegemony, for Gramsci, was not a metaphysical abstraction outside of the influence of social agents. Hegemony is actively created, maintained and reproduced by real people. In Raymond Williams’ words:

We have to emphasise that hegemony is not singular, indeed that its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token that they can be continually challenged and in certain aspects modified.

While the New Order regime was authoritarian, it could not rely on repression alone, and it sought at every level in society to win over Indonesians to its vision of the correct order of Indonesian society. In normal times, even a military backed regime, and certainly a parliamentary one, ‘…is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent’.

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43 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith,
population with ideology) or a discursive conformity inculcated by fear. It strives for genuine intellectual and moral leadership in society, just as oppositional movements, too, struggle to contest established patterns of hegemony by forging their own normative, intellectual and cultural vision.

The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’ or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can and indeed must already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions fro the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even it if holds it firmly in its grasp it must continue to ‘lead’ as well.44

Gramsci here describes how classes (‘social groups’) become hegemonic, but in New Order Indonesia the dominant social groups are found within the state (Robison’s ‘politico-bureaucrats’). Domination by oligarchic elites, some client capitalist, some military and bureaucratic office-holders, all of them beholden ultimately to the President, suggest that the struggle for hegemony, while it takes place in civil society as well, emanates from the state’s project of constructing intellectual and moral leadership, and indeed Indonesian identity itself. Anthropologists such as Pemberton45 have explored the construction of emblematic keywords of Javanese identity — the familiar New Order shibboleths of development, security, tranquility and order, and more subtle ideas like the idealised condition of slamet, where ‘nothing happens’, where there is an absence of social agitation of any kind. With the dominant oligarchy so closely tied to, and frequently part of, the state apparatus, much of the impetus for building intellectual and moral leadership in the New Order emanated from the state. This is far from the crude Marxist notion of the state as the instrument of the ruling class. It is unsurprising then that writers such as Robison appeal to the concept of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state.

This freedom of the state to pursue its own aims without excessive concern for the interests of powerful classes, but still constrained by the necessity of maintaining the

economic, political and ideological foundations of its networks of control, surveillance and patronage, is a major interest of Indonesian social scientists as well. The most notable example of this is the work of Mochtar Mas’ud46. Mas’ud’s studies show the influence of structural Marxism, traceable to Louis Althusser’s ‘repressive state apparatuses’. He does not explicitly invoke Althusser’s concept of the ‘ideological state apparatus’47, however, preferring to draw instead on Guillermo O’Donnell’s political economy, notably his model of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’. O’Donnell, Evans and other Latin American specialists48 saw the authoritarian states of Latin America as assuming an autonomous economic role (not simply a directive political role) in capital accumulation. Others such as Dwight King claim to apply the bureaucratic authoritarian model, but King’s analysis, like the Latin American studies of Schmitter and Linz he refers to, are limited to a political taxonomy of repressive regimes. O’Donnell’s model, by contrast, locates the authoritarian regime’s emergence and characteristics in its structural role in economic development49. Applying these ideas to Indonesia, Mas’ud describes how the New Order state brought about a restructuring of the mechanisms of capital accumulation through the intervention of the military, technocrats and bureaucrats in the political allocation of economic opportunities that formed the foundation of the emerging capitalist economy. Mas’ud deals mainly with the first fifteen years of the New Order. Robison’s and Hadiz’s recent book — Reorganising


*Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* — traces the extension and ramification of the interweaving of oligarchic state and private interests in the late New Order and beyond. In the type of analysis undertaken by Mochtar Mas’ud, the state is identified as serving the organizational and structural centre from which economy and society are managed through a descending hierarchy of institutions and controls, from the capital city to the villages. Thus, while his analysis is distinct from Marxian studies such as Robison’s, it also exemplifies the main feature of descending analysis.

Given the powerful intellectual influence of descending analyses in the study of the major historical trends of social transformation, it is unsurprising that this approach will also have consequences for more localised studies as well. Two relatively recent studies, one by an anthropologist and the other by a political scientist, demonstrate the ways in which explanatory frameworks of the descending type can establish the boundaries of inquiry for more specialised, local investigations.

Both anthropologist Hans Antlov and political scientist John Sullivan investigate the dynamics of leadership in local communities: rural Java in Antlov’s study, and an urban kampong in Sullivan’s research in Yogyakarta. Antlov is particularly concerned with the cultural aspect of the excise of power in Javanese villages in the New Order period. As we have already noted, studies with a cultural orientation, no less than political and economic studies, may still conform to the descending paradigm. The most influential modern anthropologist working in this fashion is Clifford Geertz, who as we saw in his study of the nineteenth century Balinese state (*Negara*), clearly conformed to the descending pattern. A crucial concept, employed by Geertz as noted above, and widely used by others, is the concept of the ‘exemplary centre’. In the more ancient state structures of Indonesia, the court, the


52 See Pemberton’s critical assessment of the notion of ‘exemplary centre’ in his *On the Subject of Java*, 1995, *op. cit.* The significance of the idea of the exemplary centre for some scholars who find it applicable over centuries of modern history in Indonesia, and more broadly in Southeast Asia, is set out in Robert Cribb ‘Nation: Making Indonesia’. In Donald K. Emerson (ed.) *Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, N.J. 1999. See, for the regional relevance of
palace hierarchies, rituals, symbols and spiritually-endowed artefacts of the rulers were the source of both legitimacy and ritual order throughout the extended territories over which they claimed dominion. The microcosm of the exemplary centre was a ‘model of’ and a ‘model for’ the correct order of social relationships in society as a whole, a model which was replicated, with due variation, in localised settings. Those who invoke these ideas discover patterns of cultural continuity in the modern era, and the continuing influence of the ‘exemplary centre’ in the present. Hans Antlov’s study purports to do this in contemporary rural Java, by tracing the cultural paradigm established in the centre of the New Order down to patterns of community leadership at the village level. The regime, as we have noted, placed heavy stress on ideologies of harmony and control. Antlov records the local application of these cultural values. For example, he describes how local functionaries oriented towards the state guide the community in local collective self-help projects, mobilizing villagers under notions of mutual obligation (gotong royong) to achieve (state-directed) community objectives (construction and maintenance of village infrastructure and other projects). In his study, popular mobilisation and control are successfully facilitated by local leaders loyal to the state. In general, we are left with an impression of a docile populace, readily responding to their leaders and the state. These leaders are legitimized through the ‘traditional’ appeals of the hegemonic cultural discourse.

Sullivan’s work, published in 1992, analyses the relationship between state and society in an urban kampong in Yogyakarta. Sullivan’s work is particularly interesting since this kampong lies only a few hundred metres distant from the warungs on Jalan Malioboro that will be discussed as key sites of contested discourse formation in this thesis. Sullivan looked at kampong leadership as the key point in the social hierarchy where local leaders, not on the state payroll — the elected heads (ketua) of community and neighbourhood associations, RK and RT — interact with the lowest ranks of the salaried state bureaucrats (pegawai negeri). The RK and RT leaders are in a position to articulate the concerns and aspirations of ordinary Kampong residents to the civil

these ideas in pre-colonial times, David P Chandler. et al. ‘The Malay Sultans” and “The Javanese Kings”. In David P. Chandler et al. In Search of Southeast Asia. Edited by David Joel Steinberg. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

RK stands for Rukun Kampung (lit. ‘kampung harmony’) the kampong association, and RT for Rukun Tetangga (‘neighbourhood harmony’), the neighbourhood association. The leaders of these associations are called ketua (‘chair’ or ‘head’), thus ketua RT, ketua RK.
servants. At the same time, they can provide intelligence, maintain surveillance for the state, and can take responsibility for the implementation of state programs. Potentially, these popular leaders could frustrate the state, but where they can be successfully co-opted, they can also serve as an ideal extension of the centralised agenda of the government, both its concrete programs, and the propagation of its approved cultural values. In Sullivan’s study, the community leaders he met proved to be very effective conduits of the state’s influence. He describes their success in building *kampong* solidarity as a kind of ‘imagined community’ whose narratives of identity broadly assimilated the key elements of hegemonic state discourses. He, like Antlov, shows how the local leadership was able to mobilise the voluntary labour of *kampong* residents to carry out a state-initiated project for *kampong* improvement.

Now, as with most localised studies, these examples of successful state dominance could almost certainly be countered with contrary examples from elsewhere in Java and Indonesia. I don’t want to do this, my point of dissent comes from a different direction. I submit that these studies may be questioned simply because of the descending approach that they rely on. Sullivan’s case is the most striking example. I do not doubt that the *ketua* RK and other community leaders he worked with in an extended period of participant observation fieldwork were very effective in working with the state apparatus, and in facilitating the implementation of government programs. However, I seriously doubt whether that was all that was going on in this community. As I present my evidence in the chapters that follow, I will show that conformity to the state at this level masks a widespread and significant contestation of official discourses (which I call *bahasa pejabat*), and the vigorous and unceasing construction of contrary perspectives (which I call *bahasa rakyat*), as well as partially successful striving to get around state-centered prescriptions for social behaviour. Remember, Sullivan’s kampong was less than a kilometer away from the Yogyakarta research sites that I will examine. I don’t suggest Sullivan’s data were faulty. Rather, I believe that theoretical

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54 He deliberately invokes Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined community – see Anderson *Imagined Community* 1983, op. cit.

55 Dr. John Sullivan worked collaboratively in this Yogyakarta kampong with his wife, the anthropologist Dr. Norma Sullivan. He was therefore able to deploy a methodology of participant observation more commonly associated with anthropology for research in political science. See Norma Sullivan *Masters and Managers: A Study of Gender Relations in Urban Java*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 1994.
perspectives in general have this effect. Because he brought to the field a perspective on social organisation that looked predominantly to the centre both for patterns of domination and contestation, he found confirmation of his hypotheses in the work of the communal leaders, and had every reason to be satisfied with that. He was not in any case methodologically disposed to devote a high proportion of his effort interrogating the significance of the discourse and practices of the wong cilik. This thesis will show that too much of importance is lost when the meaning and consequences of popular social action are not given adequate attention. Yet it is almost a ‘structural imperative’ for descending analyses to do just that.

The most valuable contribution of local studies lies precisely in their capacity to go beyond the imperative of descending analyses. Descending approaches diminish the significance of the complex and varied social dynamics of society beyond its elites, ‘reading off’ central patterns onto society as a whole, failing to recognise the capacity of ordinary people to influence events, and, at worst, risking the denial of their agency. Perhaps the longevity of the New Order misled observers about its capacity to endure and the resilience of its control over people through its institutional practices and hegemonic discourses. Yet, in studies of Indonesia, descending analyses have tended to predominate, and to colour academic approaches to New Order politics and culture. They were not the only types of analysis that were applied to Indonesia, however, and they must be contrasted with ascending types of analysis to which I now turn.

B.2. Ascending Type of Analysis

In attempting to address the problems faced in an analysis of the so called ‘lower orders’ and their relation to the state in Indonesia, I would first like to deal with what Foucault identifies as a methodological precaution. He states:

56 E.P Thompson, in his well known book *The Making of the English Working Class* (Penguin, 1968), uses this term among others. Such are useful terms given that his research and analysis is unrivalled and that it does not deal simply with the working classes and what he calls its ‘sober constitutional history’, which helped silence a rich and effective range of practices and social forms that those such as Marx held in contempt, notoriously referring to them as scum, vagabonds, thieves and prostitutes, destined to disappear ‘in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product’ (see The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Books, 1967, p. 91). Given Marx’s view of the lumpen proletariat, there is no hope of any productive insights into their place. Fortunately Thompson offers such insight, particularly in his chapter entitled ‘Satan’s strongholds’.
… the important thing to realise is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the … degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society. One must rather conduct an *ascending* analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms.57

A study of New Order society in urban Java that attempts such an ascending analysis of power – one that starts at its locally and historically peculiar infinitesimal mechanisms – can benefit greatly from the body of anthropological investigations made into the urban kampong during the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The kampong is a social space peculiar to the wong cilik, according to one of these anthropologists, John Sullivan, who states:

Across Java today, it is generally accepted that kampons are vessels of the *wong cilik* … the little people from the bulk of their contents, or to be more precise, because they exist primarily to contain the little people—the mass of the urban populace … kampons are communities in a very strong sense and these communities are to some extent formed and controlled by the wong cilik.58

Kampons contain the mass of the urban populace, who are predominantly the *wong cilik*, on the other hand, however, kampons are also formed and controlled by their *wong cilik* communities. Sullivan’s elementary schema here helps establish the basis for an ascending analysis in a specifically urban Javanese context. What Foucault calls the infinitesimal mechanisms of power, have their corollary in Sullivan’s kampong community that is ‘formed and controlled’ by the *wong cilik*, on the other hand, what Foucault calls the more general mechanisms of power that might utilise, transform, displace and extend its infinitesimal mechanisms, have their corollary in Sullivan’s kampong as a space that primarily contains the little people. Although both Foucault and Sullivan here provide a methodological basis for some insight into locally based mechanisms of power, it remains questionable to what extent they are elicited simply to demonstrate what Foucault himself warns against, that is, ‘some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the … degree to which it


reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society’. By starting in the opposite direction, at the molecular elements of society – at its base – as Foucault also calls it, or at the kampong – a primary social unit, where the majority of the urban population live – according to Sullivan, these authors simply strengthen their thesis, which in the last instance illustrates a logic of almost complete domination, but which is made to appear more well founded because of the allusion that they did not simply deduce their thesis of domination from preconceived paradigms, but instead from investigation into the molecular elements of society. By illustrating the state’s control right down to the smallest administrative cells of the alley and the practices and beliefs taking place there, Sullivan allows himself to demonstrate that state control has no frontiers or limits at the lowest levels of society.

Crucial to this logic of the complete appropriation, control and utilisation by the state of kampong social forms is the notion that the people who are the objects of this control actively participate in and accept these subtle external controls without realising them as such, perhaps because, as Foucault’s descending schema sets out, the historically specific infinitesimal forms – at the most molecular levels, such as the neighbourhood for example – are utilised by the more general mechanisms of power – emanating from the state for example. This process renders power invisible to those who are its objects because it takes place through locally claimed and reproduced forms rather than external forms. These locally produced forms have been appropriated and utilised by the general mechanisms of power, which leads to the notion that those at the local level who participate in the reproduction of their local yet appropriated forms are then participating in the reproduction of their own domination.

This paradigm is clearly characterised in Sullivan’s work, where he posits, for example, kampong units, which ‘exist primarily to contain the little people’, but which are also ‘sustained by the practical efforts of their members’.59 This notion is extended to the idea, fact and or feeling of community itself, which is something kampong residents strive to maintain, demarcate and protect, according to Sullivan, but which is also however an essentially ‘invented tradition’ of ‘relatively recent vintage in many nation states’, whose ends are served by this invention and who act as ‘the main forces

in its formation’. Even the more conspicuous elements of state domination, such as the state’s bureaucratic structures – its ‘administrative organs, their staff, [and] the various state provided forms and foci’ – which reach into the kampong and which ‘work against’ and ‘actively oppress’ kampong members, are conveniently also considered by kampong residents as their ‘communal possessions [and] as integral to their community’. It is abundantly clear throughout Sullivan’s account that kampong people unknowingly participate in their own oppression, no doubt, however, Sullivan would contest such a crude reading of his text.

The device he uses to defend himself against accusations of a crude dominant ideology thesis is that kampong people also derive benefits from the system that works to oppress them. This is a versatile device because it allows for the qualification that kampong people are not simply oppressed by the oppressive system and that by not feeling so oppressed they fail to perceive that oppression and thereby can be more easily seen as actively participating in and reproducing the oppressive system and its seemingly ‘traditional’, yet ultimately ‘state-determined’ forms.

Those points where kampong residents break beyond and even oppose the state’s controls, to form a zone of what Foucault calls ‘necessary illegality’ or ‘a space of tolerance’, are also made to fit the model constructed by Sullivan, who states:

… the ward's apparent toleration of or blindness to various transgressions seems to play a role in fostering kampong unity and harmony, to the extent that it enhances popular images of communities as warm apolitical refuges, separate from, even vaguely opposed to, the state.

Even when positioned as vaguely opposed to the state, kampong practices can seem to do nothing but reinforce the state endorsed tradition of community and thereby remain fully articulated around ‘state-determined foci’.

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Any notion of a strong and centralised state in Indonesia that effectively suppresses and co-opts dissent, through bureaucratic and ideological apparatuses that have successfully accommodated themselves to differing local conditions across Java’s variegated social and political landscape has become all the more tenuous in the period since 1998. This period has witnessed unprecedented waves of dissent from among the wong cilik, contributing to a breakdown of the centre and social disorder, which will be investigated throughout this thesis and shown to have had foundations during the New Order period of governance to demonstrate the limits of the omnipotent state. It will therefore be a claim of this thesis to reverse Foucault’s methodological precaution aimed to see how local and historically specific ‘mechanisms of power have been invested colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms. A prime example of the more general mechanisms of power is the apparently leviathan state in Indonesia, which Sullivan posits as ‘the actor’. This thesis will capture the points at which these more general mechanisms of power have been disabled or limited by the wong cilik, rather than reproduced by them. For that reason, an initial review of the literature dealing with the kampong –as ‘vessels of the wong cilik’ following Sullivan– provides a starting point.

Central to the problematic conception of what Sullivan defines as a highly centralised and ‘remarkably consistent’ polity, which itself ‘supplies, controls, or structures … all critical foci at which the community recreates and replenishes itself’ is a notion of kampong residents as politically passive and, according to Sullivan, as never wanting to ‘involve kampong leaders in any appreciable risk’. This passivity is reinforced by a notion of the kampong people’s ignorance, which the anthropologist must keep in mind when communicating with the wong cilik, according to Lea Jellinek, who states:

Explanations put forward for events may grossly over-simplify complex factors beyond their immediate comprehension and control. Under these circumstances, the historian may be tempted to discard such explanations altogether.

Political passivity is a notion that is prominent in the accounts of kampong life in Jakarta by Jellinek and Murray, who found kampong social forms and the actions of kampong residents to have assumed a passive position in relation to the government and the modern economy; this was epitomised by Murray in the expression ‘I don’t want any hassles’ with the government, or in what Jellinek saw as the ‘ignorance and fear’ of the government by kampong residents, who she says ‘were too frightened to talk about politics’.  

For Murray, this passive relationship with the state fostered passive dissent, which was contained in the everyday life forms of ‘mutual cooperation, barter, reciprocity and non-credit seeking practices’, which she found to exist among the market women, the mothers and the street traders. An example of this type of woman was the ice cream seller called Ibu Bud who was at the centre of Jellinek’s account of the kampong and in whose house Jellinek stayed while in the kampong. Such women, according to Jellinek, were brought together as a unit – or cluster of neighbours – through ‘the proximity of residence and the sale of goods and services’ in the alley. These old market women and mothers moving around the alley and the market stalls constituted what Murray defined as ibu networks which reflected an ‘autonomous urban culture’ characterised by the high level of ‘mutual cooperation’ and ‘internal cohesion’ of their informal sector activities and their lower status, homogenous culture and lack of education. The autonomous urban culture of these old kampong women, according to Murray, had to ‘make out’ in opposition to the metropolitan superculture of the rich Jellinek saw the resident’s informal enterprises as excluded from the metropolis beyond the kampong; she states:

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72 ‘They were brought together, according to Jellinek, into groups like Ibu Imah’s, which became rather formalised. Jellinek found proximity to be more important that kinship. See Lea Jellinek. *The Wheel of Fortune*:....1991.p...36-37. Sullivan also stressed participation and proximity as the most important definer of community membership. See John Sullivan, ‘Back Alley Neighbourhood’, 1980. p.13.
With the growth in the number of cars along Jalan Thamrin they found it increasingly difficult crossing that road to get into the lucrative suburb of Menteng.

…The ice cream traders found themselves banned from where they had previously made a thriving business, in the parks, fair grounds, schools and bus stations of central Jakarta.75

Anthropological accounts of the kampong made much of contrasting the kampong with the world beyond, with Guinness capturing its figurative dimensions through the long standing popular perception of the kampong versus street-side division, stating:

Behind these impressive streetside buildings lies the kampong community of Ledok, covering an area of a seventh of a square kilometre. It lies on the sloping banks of the river, hidden completely from the streets that ring it on three sides.76

Sullivan characterises the physical characteristics of this streetside versus kampong division in a similar vein to Guinness, stating:

The majority of the 80 per cent living off-street are kampong folk—the wong kampong—and to most people, these spaces behind the big stone homes and the shops and offices are the kampong territories proper; some better off Yogyakartans use the word specifically to signify the areas at the back of the better buildings.77

This concept of a divide between kampong and street is extended by Murray who holds that the kampong was diametrically opposed to the rest of the city, which was ‘a fantasy far removed from the lives of kampong dwellers’.78 Murray’s point here underlies a theme regarding kampong people’s feelings of detachment from the world beyond the kampong, which was a point also made by Sullivan, who states:

… statements on this topic tend to depict it as a group of poor, insignificant ‘little people’ (wong cilik) striving to survive without major catastrophe in a world run by and for the rich, important, ‘big people’ (wong gede).79

This great divide between kampong and city did not, however, protect the kampong from encroachment. Both Jellinek and Murray, for example reported that

77 Guinness, P. Harmony and…1986.p.45.
many kampong occupations, products and services were dying out and being replaced by the more modern and impersonal practices found in the wider city outside of the kampong, particularly among the middle class, whose modern consumer goods, according to both writers, were becoming cheaper and encroaching upon the kampong’s petty commodity production economy. Jellinek, for example, states that kampong residents ‘autonomy and scope for individual initiative in work and housing were increasingly restricted by an expanding bureaucracy and modern economy’, leading to increased insecurity, which ‘enhanced their inability to cooperate’. The informal economy represented in Murray by the female market traders and in Jellinek by the female street stall traders, appeared crucial to the reproduction of the kampong community as a whole in the accounts of both these writers. Murray, for example could not divorce the demise of the old women’s street trade activities with the threatened demise of the kampong as a whole, stating:

The urban kampong is under pressures from outside which is diametrically opposed to the informal socio-economic networks that involve women street traders, whose individuality, humour and autonomy shape their everyday life and that of the kampong.

Jellinek, illustrating the demise of income earning opportunities for female street traders and the related kampong cottage industry, pointed out that the banana leaves, in which the ice cream sellers wrapped their ice creams, and the home made ice cream cones – both of which were provided through the household or cottage industry – were being replaced by mass produced plastic sachets and ice cream cones now being sold in clean and enticing large chain outlets in the plazas. Jellinek shows that the women who held on to their rickety street stalls and pushcarts were forced from the street-side through constant policing operations. For Murray, this demise in street trade was leading many women into lives as prostitutes and hostesses rather than market women

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82 Trading was not so viable an income earning option anymore according to Murray (1991: 96)
83 Jellinek states: ‘… with the rise in the cost of living, increased desire for consumer goods and greater education, the emerging middle class from within the kampong became more budget conscious. Being more mobile, they bought their food in bulk further afield or in new cooperative stores at their places of work’ (85).
The kampons of Jakarta studied by Murray and Jellinek, appeared to be imploding under the pressure of encroachment from outside. The traditional income earning activities of the kampong poor which Murray claimed, ‘shape their everyday life and that of the kampong’, were dying out under these pressures and enabling the kampong’s more wealthy families to stand apart form the rest of the kampong by building bigger houses or by simply moving out of the kampong to fade into the middle class. According to Jellinek (1991:42), these wealthy residents no longer ‘had need for the social ties of before’. The kampong was also threatened by the new residents, the new occupations and the new consumption differences that emerged, which lead, according to Jellinek, to ‘a sense of separateness’ and ‘a loosening of ties’ among kampong residents.

In the accounts of Guinness and Sullivan, which were located in the much smaller town of Yogyakarta, however, the presence of newcomers and outsiders did not threaten kampong solidarity, which appears an almost impregnable social fact and was, in fact, reinforced by the presence of outsiders, who Guinness reports were not allowed complete integration and respect. This theme of solidarity in the face of outsiders was at the core of Sullivan’s kampong community, which he defines as ‘an in-group which likes to identify itself in terms of several out-groups’.

Kampong residents, from all of the accounts, looked down upon supposedly lesser individuals like prostitutes, domestic servants, beggars, the homeless, river-flat dwellers or the famed *gelandangan* (the often itinerant homeless) – all of whom were consigned to the status of outsiders and heavily ostracised. In Guinness’s kampong – which he admits consisted of the poor and the not so poor – residents lived in fear of and kept as far as possible a distance from the nearby river-flat squatters; while, in

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86 This is despite the observation by Jellineck that most kampong residents preferred informal sector work and that it tended to earn more money than work in the formal sector (Jellinek, 1991:14, 19-20) and the observation by Murray (1991:20) the kampong was not an imported rural logic, but an adaptation to the urban environment.
88 Guinness, P. *Harmony and*…1986.p.35
Sullivan’s kampong, people would throw stones at the *gelandangan*, for whom they felt the most animosity. 90 About this attitude to the *gelandangan*, Sullivan comments that kampong people ‘generally seem to hate the *gelandangan* in their environs and hate them because they are so badly off’. 91 For Murray, prostitutes, and even to some extent domestic servants, were derided and placed at the bottom of the social scale by kampong residents. 92 The kampong outsider and their types are more schematised in the works of Jellinek and Sullivan, with Jellinek identifying five categories of outsiders, including the ostracised, like Murray’s prostitutes, and the ‘very poor’, 93 while Sullivan identified two groups – the *gelandangan* and the recently arrived – and fixes into a diagram the lines that demarcate these outsiders from kampong residents. 94

The metropolitan superculture of the rich was not the object of contempt for kampong residents, it was, instead, those ‘other’ poor and outcast individuals, for whom such contempt was reserved. Kampong people envied the middle class lifestyle and their increasingly seductive metropolitan superculture – an attitude which Murray laments was leading to the demise of her autonomous kampong culture centred around the market women and what Jellinek saw as the breakdown of important social ties within the kampong.

Political scientists have uncritically adopted this notion of social envy to account for or discount the other 70% of the urban population in their illustrations of the middle class as the agents of political change in Indonesia. The middle class, who cannot find work with their educational certificates, are to become the agents of a potentially revolutionary discontent, according to Dick, who relies heavily upon the work of Jellinek and Guinness for his insights into the kampong, which he uses to paint a classic picture of social envy and political passivity among the working classes of the kampong, thereby leaving the space of mass political mobilisation vacant for the more

92 ‘Being a domestic servant was an open admission of poverty’ according to Jellineck (86).
93 These were the better off middle class residents, the very poor, the transient, the culturally distinct and the ostracised.
94 The registered inferiors ‘inhabit a neighbourhood without being neighbours’ and are largely represented of the recently arrived who have not yet fully participated in the community life of the kampong (126). See Allison Murray. *No Money,…* 1991.p.41, see also Sullivan, J. *Local Government…* 1992.p.110-133.
educated, astute and discontented middle classes. Dick states: … ‘working class parents may well aspire to middle class materialism for their children, rather than seek to overthrow middle class rule …’. 95 This argument for the political passivity of the poor, or working classes as Dick terms them, is put forward despite his claims that ‘much of the benefit of consumer subsidies has flowed to the urban middle class, that they have been the ‘prime beneficiaries of government housing programs’, that ‘there seems to be little evidence of redistribution away from the urban middle class’ and that the ‘poor parents cannot afford to send their through six years of higher education’, which remains the preserve of the children of wealthier parents. 96 If these stark and conspicuous inequalities have not lead to any signs of dissent among the urban poor, despite ‘good political reasons why the government should fear urban ‘rice riots’, then Dick leans on the classic image of the poor’s pre-occupation with the emulation of wealthier lifestyles as the reason for their political silence. This silence, however, might have much more to do with what Onghokham termed the ‘opaque’ nature of kampong society for middle class analysts, who fail to recognise its ‘inner nature and workings … [which] are most thoroughly hidden and misunderstood’ according to Fredericks. 97

The urban poor were their own worst enemy according to Sullivan, who states:

… if the poorest of the urban poor – the gelandangan and the residents of the meaneast squatter settlements – do finally explode into wide revolt, it seems far more likely that they will run head-on into the more-numerous, better organised, long-time urban poor. 98

Unlike the students and the working classes, any attempt at revolt among the urban poor would implode according to this well worn thesis.

Kampong residents are also, supposedly, too disunited to organise or become the agents of mass demo style change, an attitude also expressed by Jellinek, who states:

They lacked the leadership and ability to organise to defend their own interests. But
most of all they lacked trust in each other to work together for a common purpose.99

This is an impression of kampong people held also by members of the middle
class within Indonesia; the late director of one of Indonesia’s largest NGO’s states: ‘The
notion that people’s movements should be initiated, organised or led by figures from a
lower class origin is no more than a myth’.100 According to the New Order’s
development strategy, the poor are passive ‘with participation widely understood as
implementation of the development program designed by state authorities’.101 Political
participation by the kampong people means something very different from that of the
revolutionary middle-class, it means, quite simply, as demonstrated by the above quote,
reproduction of dominant state-determined formations.

This is Sullivan’s impression of participation – as totally articulated to the
demands of the state – which relies heavily upon the subtle association of Fascist
regimes of domination with those purportedly operating in the Javanese kampongs of
the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Sullivan imports an illustration from Tokugawa
Japan – a precursor to the model Meiji fascist-type regime – which he directly
associates in its style with the state’s administration of social harmony, or rukun, at the
kampong level in Java, stating: ‘… rukun, resembles the notion of social harmony (ho)
enshrined in the ancient Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung)’. Employing the imagery
of the omnipotent state, he quotes the following Tokugawa example, which states: ‘…
the people need teachings and nurturing, but if the teachings are not obeyed one should
resort to punishments (kei) and military force (hei)’.102

This association of Javanese administrative styles with those of fascist regimes
in Japan is reinforced through the fact of Java’s short yet widely reported, influential
period of administration of Java by the occupying army of Meiji Japan during the
Second World War. Sullivan makes much of this association, stating, ‘the current
neighbour groups in Indonesia more closely resemble the neighbour groups of wartime

100 Aswab Mahasin. ‘On the Outskirts of the Periphery: Popular movements in the New Order’, Prisma,
Japan and Java than those found in contemporary Japan’. This model not only provides the basis of an argument for the total administration of the poor, it also legitimises the space of vocal middle class, megaphone style politics. Heryanto, for example, states: ‘… the tyranny which a variety of communist and fascist regimes have exercised over intellectuals has served precisely to strengthen their exalted and sacred status’. The students he continues, ‘are seen by all interest groups, including the government, as the only social group with political license to break the official rules’.

As not constituting the type of mass organisational forms presupposed for modern institutionalised demo-style politics, analysts could not make sense of lower class socio-economic formations and therefore passed them off as a-political. The wong cilik were, as Marx said of those forms that did not fit his own model – an anomaly – or as McVey complained of how the people were portrayed in historiographical accounts of South East Asia, ‘when they were not statistics, [they] appeared as objects for improvements, causes for concern or choruses for a new elite’. Those who have offered some insight into the kampong have served to no more than reinforce the wong cilik as passive objects viewed in terms of how they fit into the state’s administrative structures. Sullivan, who is the clearest advocate of this approach admits, however, that his approach ‘does not reflect the kampong’s approach to the same topics’. He states that although he believes the structuring of kampong community to be important, it ‘is not a hot topic of conversation in contemporary Yogyakarta and many other things besides neighbourliness are important to Yogyakartans’. Appearing to testify to the classically opaque nature of kampong society and its hidden contours to the eyes of ‘a middle class Melbournian’ as he defined himself, he can no more than allude to these ‘other things’ of importance besides neighbourliness, giving them only brief mention through the statement that the kampong is made up of ‘people of disparate means, professions, and education: road menders, academics, clerks, prostitutes, street peddlers,

shopkeepers, pimps, schoolteachers, panel beaters, numbers racketeers, soldiers, tailors, and distillers of illicit spirits’. There appears to be a sphere of illegality – a possible frontier – apparent in some of the activities just quoted, however, they remain unanalysed by Sullivan, no doubt well beyond the scope of his study. In his reckoning, the state is actor, thereby any agency at the local level that is not already utilised by the state must be left silent. This paper will attempt to address this silence and capture some of the more hidden contours and opaque social formations to shed light upon a far less passive relationship with the state than that attributed to the wong cilik by the above mentioned analysts of the kampong.

A recent analysis of wong cilik cultural production is given by Richard Curtis in his doctoral study on the cultural production of Javanese popular performance, in the Central Javanese cities of Tegal and Surakarta (Solo). He demonstrates that the wong cilik have a part in cultural production and make a significant contribution to contemporary wayang kulit (shadow-puppet plays) in Java. Wong cilik or the ‘subordinated class’ are not passive subjects subdued by the political and cultural elites nor by the classic norms that stem from the traditional prescriptions governing the art form of wayang kulit. He states: ‘It is misleading to rarefy wayang kulit as simply a high or classic art form in which dominant social form are imposed on passive wong cilik’ and he also shows that ‘the social meaning of dominant or official cultural tradition can be corrupted or marginalized by alternative traditions generated through involvement of the wong cilik, expressing their taste and concern, in the performance’. His analysis adds to the evidence against the portrayal of a passive subordinate wong cilik, demonstrating how, in the cultural field, they are actively involved in cultural production. However, his analysis is less clear on how the cultural meanings stem from wong cilik themselves and whether the existing meanings of wayang are actively contested. His analysis is uncertain whether the original meaning of wayang loses crucial elements of its significance in the wong cilik world view. He uses the terms ‘corrupted’ and ‘marginalized’ to show that wong cilik have an ability to interpolate their ‘taste’ into wayang kulit performances. He thereby shows that the wong cilik’s

taste can become meaningful, but only within the prevailing relations of domination. The account of dominant culture here is not a counterpart for the dispersed exercise of power, nor does he address processes of serious discursive contestation. Rather, the dominant culture is a ‘significant other’ which makes the cultural productions of wong cilik meaningful culturally. These kinds of analyses glorify the tragic history of the wong cilik in the urban areas of Java but tend to underestimate the autonomy of the underclass, viewing them a dominated culturally by the codes of harmony, and ineluctably bound to prescriptive hierarchies. In fact, as I will show in this thesis, the wong cilik have an ability to decode and refashion the cultural meaning systems that are deployed in dominant discourses. Accordingly, it is important to understand the significance of contestation in the cultural and material production of discourses.

B.3. Theories of Contestation

The influential theoretical point of view of this thesis in understanding contestation here will focus on Gramsci and Foucault, both of whom discuss, from their different political and conceptual perspectives, hegemony and discourse. These are the most theoretically adequate perspectives for understanding power relations between the regime and its subjects. Gramsci’s hegemony concept for example is a very subtle conceptual tool for understanding the desire of ruling groups for domination and the manner of its cultural mediation both in winning popular consent and in monopolizing coercive power. Gramsci himself also shows that he is aware that domination is never perfect and total. Therefore he argues that coercive power is held back in reserve, a final resort when consent can not be gained. One important aspect of Gramsci’s argument for my case is his insight that hegemony is not produced solely by one dominant group. Hegemony therefore, is exercised by whoever has the privileges of power, but the ‘moral and intellectual’ leadership of the powerful is always open to challenge by subaltern groups, and its effectiveness in the hands of dominant classes depends on their contingent success in winning acceptance of their ideas by people beyond the dominant classes. Foucault’s understanding of power relations opens up some more complex


possibilities beyond Gramsci’s insights. Domination and its opposite, for Foucault, cannot be formulated in purely dichotomous terms, such as a clear-cut opposition of a dominant class and the dominated class, simply because power is not concentrated centrally in this way; it is dispersed. Moreover, power does not reside in the hands of some central ruler or group, but rather rulers participate in a dispersed and complex chain of power, and that power has to be constantly exercised and reproduced. Both of them have certain important similarities, particularly in their understanding that power has to be actively employed; it does not reside passively in a stable condition.

Gramsci’s notion of hegemony gives due weight to social and cultural aspects of society, so that the ‘superstructure’ is not simply determined mechanically by the economic material base, even ‘ideology’ as superstructure may contribute to the constitution of social structure and social relations. In his prison notebooks, Gramsci discusses the role of intellectuals in the social world through his assumption that:

‘Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a ‘philosopher’, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.’

This shows his proposition that all men are ‘intellectuals’ and ‘philosophers’, which in the broad sense of understanding, are seen by Gramsci as performing important roles in the struggle of class forces. He distinguishes two categories of ‘intellectuals’, firstly according to their spatial and productive location. There are urban intellectuals who are engaged directly with the core capitalist system; and then there are rural intellectuals who are ‘not as yet elaborated and set in motion by the capitalist system’. The more important classification of two categories of intellectual arise from the distinction he makes of intellectuals based on their class, community and political roles. He identifies firstly ‘organic intellectuals’, whose function is to articulate the interest of their class, notably those embedded in community and workplace networks with other subalterns; and secondly ‘traditional intellectuals’ who are found already in positions of social and


structural influence such as teachers, philosophers, artists, journalists and clergy.\(^\text{115}\) The importance of ‘traditional intellectuals’ for the dominant class project of hegemony is obvious; but in the dispersed arenas of discursive contestation, the influence of ‘organic intellectuals’ is perhaps more telling, as Gramsci explains:

‘One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.’\(^\text{116}\)

As I will show, the ‘organic’ intellectuals among the *wong cilik* have exactly this kind of impact in the arenas of discursive contestation in urban Java. Gramsci saw modern social and political existence as a continual and complex struggle conducted through the discourses of the dominant classes — under his notion of ‘hegemony’ which ‘the dominant group exercises throughout society’ — and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government. The hegemony of dominant groups has to be won against the emerging ‘counter-hegemony’ of the subaltern classes.\(^\text{117}\)

Gramsci developed a subtle theorization of culture and power which is relevant to situations in urban Java. The powerful in society attempt to universalize their claims to rule, and win the consent of the governed by incorporating them into an overarching normative framework. Yet, as we will see, these attempts are at best partially successful and fail to win over the *wong cilik* who articulate counter-hegemonic understandings of their social situation. Even so, Gramsci’s approach deals in large social collectivities while the opposition to New Order hegemony in Java does not emerge as a unified front. More discriminating tools of analysis are needed.

Let me now consider Foucault’s ideas, in order to show how he further advances our understanding of the connections between established power and the contested

\(^\text{115}\) Gramsci, “The Intellectual” in *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, p.9-10


nature of discourse formation. He argues that there are discontinuities in the history of thought, as he states:

‘Beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid, homogeneous manifestation of a single mind or collective mentality,...,beneath the persistence of a particular genre, form, discipline or theoretical activity, one is now trying to detect the incidence of interruptions. Interruptions whose status and nature vary considerably...: they suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and force it to enter a new time, cut it off from its empirical origin and its original motivations, cleans it of its imaginary complicities; they direct historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings, and the never-ending tracing-back to the original precursors, towards the search for a new type of rationality and its various effects....''

This idea shows the important phenomena of ruptures in history and is part of his argument against the usefulness of the idea of ‘ideology’. Foucault stresses discontinuities, because ‘history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favour of stable structure’. History is discontinuous, and our understandings of history and society are subject to significant ruptures that are not determined by the linear advances of knowledge.

Furthermore, Foucault also argues that ‘the history that bears and determines us has the form of war rather than of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning’. In this case he suggests that we must analyse power through discourse. He is concerned that language itself is a form which actually constitutes relations of power, and power, for him, constitutes the development and maturation of forms of behaviour, modes of self-understanding, and codes of meaning.

‘...they show that the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured.’

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122 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980, p 114-115

This shows that Foucault’s concept of power is better understood as the creation of a strategy for life that incorporates stratagems of self-advancement that both constrain and facilitate subjects, breaking with notions that power resides in some way in someone’s hand. Rather power is contested dynamically and continuously in dispersed and localised arenas. Power here is not the conventional power of institutions and leaders, but the ‘capillary’ nodes of power that control individuals and their knowledge, the mechanisms by which power ‘reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’.125

By advancing the concept of discourse and understanding power relations in a more fluid and less deterministic way, he argues (in The History of Sexuality) that:

‘Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the concept’s complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.’126

This shows how discourse not only functions as an apparatus and ‘an effect of power’ but also as a pathway for contestation which allows us to understand that there is an ‘unstable process’ which renders meaning contingent because it is contested. Foucault’s point of view here provides a gateway to understanding the bewilderment of studying hegemonic discourse if we believe that the dominant class really does effortlessly dominate. In other words, the concepts of ideology, and even hegemony, pose difficulties in understanding the contingency of meaning for so long as we insist that the dominant class dominates without continuous effort, because once meaning is contested, it becomes contingent, and contingency is not a foundation for stable domination.

From his point of view it is understandable why he refused to use the concept of ideology, of which he argues that:

‘The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to

something else which is supposed to account as truth. Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientifi city or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc. For these three reasons, I think that is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection.\(^{127}\)

Foucault’s critique of ideology yields a vital idea in understanding power relations through discourse, because ‘ideology’ shows objectionable truth claims. To solve the problem of ideology, and Foucault expresses doubts about whether this is ultimately feasible, he advances the concept of ‘regime of truth’ as follows:

‘Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.’\(^{128}\)

He simply says that a ‘regime of truth’ is a type of discourse which functions and validates particular moral values. It is the means by which subjects recognize a given moral code, but one which also enables them to distinguish between true and false. It therefore serves to ground both normative and epistemological standards. For him, the production of truth is only based on the desirable qualities of multiple forms of limitation, and its capacity to ‘induce regular effects of power’.\(^{129}\)

His arguments here show that he tries to avoid determinism by using the term ‘effect’, rather than ‘truth’. He does not propose a monolithic or universal type of discourse, because ‘each society’ has its own discursive resources. These ideas have clear advantages over the concept of ideology.

The concept of ‘regime of truth’ also has to be employed cautiously. For example, if society is differentiated as it is in my research in Java, where each cluster of

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society may have its own truth, and the state itself also attempts to prescribe it, then the truth itself will become contested in various arenas. This indicates the existence of a multifaceted contestation involving the dominant powers and various subsidiary elements of a differentiated society. Even within each cluster of society there are moments of contestation. The question that then has to be raised is: will there be ‘general politics of truth’? If there is, there must be a dominant power which tries to construct the type of discourse which functions as the ‘general politics of truth’. Yet whenever there is a such power then there will be opposition to it.

Domination, then, is contested, and because it is contested, it is contingent. Scott expresses my point of view that ‘subordinates in such large-scale structures of domination nevertheless have a fairly extensive social existence outside the immediate control of the dominant groups. It is in such sequestered settings where, in principle, a shared critique of domination may develop’. Even so, from his point of view things are not so clear. What kind of power relations allow a creation of spaces where the subordinate groups are able to develop their own counter-discourse? Despite his discussion of the construction of social spaces by ‘dissident subcultures’, his analysis finally focuses on ‘hidden transcripts’ which are very latent types of resistance. His analysis is not really clear about whether hidden transcripts may be transformed into open challenges which reflect the nature of class differences under certain social and historical conditions, as I will examine in this thesis.

My aim in this study is to understand the relationships of contestation between the dominant class (wong gede as defined before) and wong cilik, within the context of the New Order Indonesia. I will treat the state’s dominant power as the source of a macro-interventionist discourse’, as a type of discourse with which it officiously tries to construct a general framework of values. It is the endeavour of the state to manufacture its incontrovertible version of moral discourse based on the state’s blueprints. These are normative constructs that function to justify what is ‘assumed to be right’ from the regime’s point view, advancing ‘unchallengeable’ normative claims to gain consent.


from below. In practice, it tends to be dominant, but as Scott says, that domination can never be total because to some extent all such macro-interventionist discourses have a ‘genesis deficiency’, some inherent weaknesses that prevents its total domination. I will argue that this deficiency stems from the nature of discourse itself, that it cannot be united into a monolithic entity as desired in the ambitions of macro-interventionist power. This is because discourse facilitates and enables the partisanship of social groups, allowing them to mediate their spirit of membership and their ongoing sense of difference.

The genesis deficiency of the dominant discourses, within the context of Java, depends on some propositions that I will discuss throughout the thesis: 1) Javanese society is fragmented, and each fragment is relatively encapsulated. These phenomena will be discussed in chapter two and continued in chapter three; 2) this led the continual process of stereotypization between the dominant class and the subaltern, or between wong gede and wong cilik, irrespective of national regime changes. This will be discussed more concretely in chapter three; 3) because each social cluster is encapsulated and because they stereotype each other, the dominant class or wong gede do not have the ability to incorporate the wong cilik within their interests and worldview, and the reverse applies as well. The wong gede, as the dominant class, try to achieve domination from many aspects of social life as I will show in chapter four; 4) There is a historical rupture between wong gede and wong cilik, especially in the history of the reproduction of normative group values; the subalterns are less influenced by the terms of the dominant history constructed by the state (including the wong gede). So, when the dominant class tries to implement their project based on their own historical truths, it is negated and decoded by the subaltern groups through their discrete discursive practices, grounded in relatively unregulated subaltern spaces. Moreover, when the dominant class fails to gain consent, its claims become decentred by the subaltern groups. This will discussed in chapter five and six.

Returning to Gramsci’s ideas, as I stated before, the contestation between the dominant class and the subaltern in Java should be understood within the context of the four conditions I mentioned above. Within this context, contestation between wong gede (as the dominant class) and wong cilik through various means, shows that the wong cilik has the creative ability to negate the dominant discourses by contesting them, causing
the dominant discourses to lose their efficacy. This subversion of dominant discourses is consolidated in subaltern spaces, and through this the contesters have the ability to draw on their own class experiences for the purposes of fashioning subaltern discourses. This enables them to advance their creativity and to constantly disrupt the dominant groups. Thus, it is not about winners or losers, and not even about the more politically aware, as in Gramsci’s conceptualisation of a ‘war of position’, a battle for winning social hegemony, or ‘war of manoeuvre’, a battle to confiscate state power. Rather it is an ongoing struggle of negation, and the decoding of the macro-interventionist discourses through everyday life practices.132

The important aspect of the negation and decoding of macro-interventionist discourses is that subaltern discourses are always multiplying and reproducing themselves, connecting to many points within their own of horizontal networks. Accordingly, this thesis will analyse discourse and counter-discourse between wong gede and wong cilik in the contested arenas of everyday life. By stressing contestation, I will demonstrate how the subaltern (in this thesis, the wong cilik) has the ability and the creativity to construct counter-discourses against the dominant discourses. They work through an articulation based on non-linear thought, their vernacular language, their nomadic orientation (moving in many directions connecting one space to another, cutting across territorialities, intersecting with many other lines of discourse.), and their capacity to decode and negate hierarchy, and the vertical order (such as surveillance and policing) imposed by dominant social groups. This subaltern power is operationalized through day-to-day contestation.

C. Methodology: Approaching the Arena of Contestation

The ethnographic portion of the research for this thesis was accomplished in three Javanese cities of Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Jakarta. My field research itself was formally conducted from 1998 up to early 2000. This was the period of the of the New Order authoritarian state and the emergence of a democratic one. In addition to this, I was able to use my field notes (made in the period of 1990 up to 1997) that were the basis of various research efforts begun in the lead-up to my doctoral candidature. In the first three months of my formal research, I conducted observations in three cities I

mentioned above. In Jakarta I observed the nomadic pattern of the subalterns (street musicians, street traders) learning a great deal about their strategies of moving within and between urban spaces and the cultural aspects of their nomadic character. I observed their economic strategies, their network-building and the interconnected lines that ran between the different cities, in this case Yogyakarta and Surabaya. I used my early 1990s research data to enrich my observations concerning the life of the subalterns in Jakarta. In the following months until early January 1999, I focused my research in Yogyakarta as the main city I discuss in this thesis. During this period, I did not stay exclusively in Yogyakarta but also made trips to Surabaya and Jakarta, interviewing my informants on strategic issues that I had identified in the first three months of fieldwork.

This research focus on subaltern spaces such as warung (sidewalk food stalls), buses, city streets, and the kampongs of the poor. My research in warungs sought to understand the function of subaltern space as an arena where the intersecting discourses and intersecting worlds contested the formation of divergent ‘class’ discourses. It is ‘intersecting’ because people from various social classes congregate in these places and talk to each other. It is the space where subalterns gather their knowledge from various other social classes. It is also a crucial space for their discursive and material struggles. My observation on buses and on the streets allowed me to see the nomadic pattern of the more marginal subalterns such as street traders and street musicians. I learnt from months of participant observation how, in their material and discursive struggles in this difficult and sometimes hazardous environment, their experiences yielded a particular fund of knowledge allowing them not only to connect between one urban space and another, but also to cut across the spatial and cultural territorialities established by the dominant class. My observation in poor kampongs was mainly directed to understanding the patterns of power relationships between subjects within the kampong and within families. The type of data I gathered from these observations is mainly qualitative and based participant observation, on in-depth interviews and careful note-taking of their struggles, their conversations, and their daily experiences. I have also used some secondary resources, as well as previously documented sources such as statistical data from local government offices and local statistical bureaux. I have made extensive use of local and national press sources.
Through the understanding of contestation between wong cilik and wong gede, this thesis ventures an approach to understanding the way knowledge of power is produced, reproduced, disseminated, represented, contested and exercised in particular moments of everyday life politics. Moreover, it addresses the importance and the limitations of descending and ascending types of analysis. It seeks to go beyond this opposition, revealing the centrality of contestation in processes of discourse formation. This technique, I hope, will give us a wider understanding of the mutual influence between dominant and subaltern urban spaces, and the interplay of power and culture in the intersecting worlds of wong cilik and wong gede. In sum, contestation of power between dominant groups and their purportive subjects is a vital locus of cultural dynamics.

D. Synopsis of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section explains the urban social condition in which two chapters (Chapters Two and Three) will explain the phenomena of social space. Chapter two will commence with the description of Yogyakarta as the main arena in which the research was conducted. Chapter Two will provide an exposition of the intersecting worlds and intersecting discourses in which interclass social relations contest one another, principally in the social space of the warung. Chapter Three will discuss the phenomena of social differentiation, stressing its political aspects and the means by which people construct their social differences.

The next section will be on the operation of macro-interventionist discourses. This section consists of one chapter (Chapter Four) that will discuss the spectra of dominant discourses in the politics of everyday life. The discussion will focus on authoritarianism as a cultural discourse and its impact on the practices of everyday life. This will discuss the socio-political aspect of the dominant apparatuses i.e. civil servant and military rituals and their significance for managing the state’s relations with society.

The third section will discuss day-to-day contestation between wong cilik and wong gede through language. This section consists of two chapters (chapters five and six). Chapter five will discuss the social practices through which the wong cilik construct their understanding of the social world. These constructs have the potential to corrode, negate, decode and decentre the dominant forms of power, whether that is
found in the household with its dominant father figure or in the nation, where the family explicitly serves the allegory of legitimate power. Chapter Six will discuss the formation of nationalist ideas at the level of the *wong cilik* contrasting these ideas with state sanctioned discourses, showing how government orthodoxies are contested. This chapter will discuss the popularisation of the state nationalist project and show how it clashes with vernacular nationalist ideas. My understanding on this issue will lead me to discuss how the regime manufactured ‘state nationalism’ as a crucial element in the constitution of the dominant discourse. This chapter will examine how contestation in select urban spaces, and the underlying urban contradictions, stimulate the political consciousness of *wong cilik*, giving it greater sophistication and subtlety, allowing them to use their own cultural production creatively to subvert and corrode the state nationalist project. The last chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes and concludes my investigation of the problems of contestation.
Chapter Two:

Intersecting Worlds, Intersecting Discourses

A. Prologue: *wong cilik* and *wong gede*

The ethnographic description here will focus on Java, especially the three cities of Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Jakarta. I will treat the arena I will describe in those cities as socially constructed spaces. This chapter will describe the forms of everyday life politics expressed through social interaction, especially between society and the state and the forms of interclass relationships in roadside food stalls (*warung*), main streets, city buses and kampongs. These locales represent major points of intersection between the social worlds, and the associated discourses, of elite and mass in the Suharto era and during the transition toward more democratic and civil society. In these locales, examined here as research sites in these three cities, we discover mutual encounters between Indonesians who have a variety of significant connection with the state, and who frame their social and cognitive universe in the language of the state, and on the other hand the socially variegated masses, the *wong cilik*, who bring the discordant discourses of their each social worlds to this encounter.

In this chapter I will concentrate on *warungs*, the main street and public buses as I observed them in field research in Yogyakarta. In later chapters, I will introduce further empirical material from Surabaya and Jakarta. These are the cities of my direct participant observation, but among my reasons for choosing them is an awareness that these specific social milieux, and the associated patterns of social and discursive interaction, can be found in almost every town and city across Java and beyond. I will describe Yogyakarta as the main city where I conduct a research for this thesis as a background where *wong cilik* contest the discursive construction of the state-based elites, and create their own distinct discourses and social spaces. This chapter thus describes how the *wong cilik* utilize these limited spaces for their material and discursive struggles, and reveal the nature of the contestation between elites and masses in which the *wong cilik* produce and sustain their social spaces and their distinctive dissenting discourses in spite of large discrepancies in
power and wealth. In this chapter, I am trying to explore the everyday life form of power relations between the *wong cilik* and their social environment in urban areas such as their interaction with the rich, the thugs, police and local government apparatuses on the street (whether main street and *kampong* street).

The social category of *wong cilik* is universally employed in Javanese society. Its usage and agreed meaning is very general. It can mean simply ‘the poor’ or ‘underclass’; it also signifies a person who is not involved in state political activities and the bureaucracy. It is framed by a contrast with an opposite category: *wong gede*, which is also very general, can mean the rich, high-ranking bureaucrats, the politicians, and educational elites, such as teachers and lecturers at the university. The terms *wong cilik* and *wong gede* are also subjective social categories coming from the *wong cilik* themselves, but these terms are then commonly used to distinguish between the ones who are rich, involved in state activities on the one hand (*wong gede*), and the ones who are not like that (*wong cilik*). It seems simple, but in fact, it is a very complex terminology and is generally used in everyday discourses, and in serious public social analyses (by the press, academics, etc.). These terms are complex and subtle emic categories of social analysis and of social identity.

People who consider themselves to be *wong cilik* in urban areas include, for example, pedicab (*becak*) drivers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, street traders, street kids, *warung* owners, beggars, shoe shine boys, street musicians, rubbish scavengers, and so on. On the other hand, no one readily professes to be *wong gede* no matter how rich they are. ¹ The term *wong gede* is a label generally used by the *wong cilik* to contrast themselves with the rich (*wong sugih*), politicians, high ranking bureaucrats (*wong kantoran*), people who own big houses (*wong gedongan*), teachers, *kyais* (Muslim religious leaders), and so on.

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¹ John Sullivan did a research in Yogyakarta and he notes that there are two general social categories, *wong cilik* and *wong gede* and some other categories according to the profssion, ownerships of house, and the location where they live. Concerning the first two categories, in which as my focus of research he states that, *wong cilik* and *wong gede*: ‘...can appear quite reasonable as an empirical generalization all are well-polished stereotype, wielded in and around kampong for ideological affirmation rather than sociological elucidation’. See John Sullivan, *Local Government and Kampung Community in Java: A n Urban Case Study*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1992, p. 108.
who are not on the same social level as the *wong cilik*. For some reasons, such social kudos gained from affecting an aura of modesty, a person coming from a *wong gede* social background (for example, high-ranking bureaucrats or *kyais*) when they talk about the political situation, they will refer to themselves as *wong cilik*. Invocation of lower social rank, even if implausible, constitutes an assertion that they are not involved directly with the higher level of state politics (and therefore are exempt, they hope, from popular resentments). According to emic social classifications employed by unambiguous members of the *wong cilik* strata, students are an odd social group — neither categorised as *wong cilik* nor as *wong gede*. The social categorization for students is somewhat in between, and very close to the middle-class category in sociological terms. In understanding the power relations between *wong gede* and *wong cilik* and also the students, I will follow the logic outlined above. In other words, I have found these emic categories to be the most fruitful analytical categories for examining urban social relations, and patterns of discourse formation.

This chapter will show that the *wong cilik* has its own political life and power which is very significant in constituting their consciousness through everyday life discourse and practice. They are the people we can meet in the very mundane life situations, such as in the warungs, kampongs and along the street. These locales are the arenas of as their social life, and as the spaces where they interact with society and are involved in discursive and material practices. By understanding this social arena, this chapter will discuss how the underclass fabricates — materially and discursively — their consciousness through their struggles and experiences in these socio-cultural environments. In these material and discursive dimensions there are some aspect of recognition of self and others; life’s opportunities; contestation and struggle, which all of them practice in everyday life and share meaningfully by both genders in urban areas. To begin the discussion I will

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2 Social categories such as *wong sugih* (the rich person), *wong kantoran* which means a person who work in office (*kantor* is originated from dutch language, *kantoor*), and *wong gedongan*, which means means a person who live in a big house (*Gedong* literary means big house). These kind of people in general categorise as *wong gede* and the detail within *wong gede* is a tool to pin point the very specific person subjectively. Sullivan also discuss about this social categories, for detail discussion see John Sullivan, *Local Government and Kampung Community in Java: A n Urban Case Study*. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1992, p. 108.
commence, in Yogyakarta, with an examination of public spaces such as warungs, public streets, and kampongs. I will also describes the space in the city bus in Jakarta in which the wong cilik, compelled by economic necessity, struggle to secure a living space, and a respected social role, in these difficult environments.

B. Yogyakarta: The Arena

Yogyakarta is located in the Southern Part of Central Java. It is a special region since Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX declared that The King and the people of Yogyakarta would stand behind and support the independence of Republic of Indonesia in 17 August 1945. This special province of DIY (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta = Special Region of Yogyakarta) was a kind of thanksgiving gift from President Sukarno — the first president and the founding father of Indonesia — to Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX allowing him to rule an autonomous kingdom as one of the provinces in Indonesia. The Sultan is the governor of DIY. The governor at the moment is Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. He governs four regencies (kabupaten) — Sleman on the Northern part, Kulon Progo on the Western Part, Bantul on the South-western Part, and Gunung Kidul South-eastern part — and one kotamadya (municipality) the city of Yogyakarta which is the provincial capital. In the southern part of Central Java, Yogyakarta is bordered by the Indian Ocean. This city surrounded by smaller cities, which are parts of Central Java province, beyond the DIY’s boundaries. For example, north-west of Yogyakarta, lies a small city named Klaten, then on the north east, it bordered by Magelang city, then on the west, Purworejo city.

The cartographic outline of Yogyakarta region forms a shape like a mountain, in which right on the summit in the north there is indeed an active volcano named Merapi, meaning the ‘place of fire’. Perhaps this is because almost every night the people living around this mountain can see the sparkling larva on its peak. When rainy season comes, the

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3 The meaning of Hamengkubuwono is ‘the holder of universe’.

4 DIY is the abbreviation of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta meaning Special region of Yogyakarta. This is a special region governed by the Sultan Hamengkubuwono who acted as governor of this region. He is appointed as governor by the president exercising the power of the central government in Jakarta. The Sultan is not an autocrat, however. All of the executive’s decisions must be agreed by the local parliament and through democratic processes.
excess water from the mountain is flushed downhill through the rivers. Down to the south of the mountain there are three rivers: Progo River on the west, Code River in the Middle, and Opak River in the east. Their water flows deposit volcanic sedimentary soil over much of the province, contributing to its extraordinary fertility. Thus the agricultural yields have always been high, especially from irrigated rice cultivation. However, this mountain is also a source of natural disasters. The last natural disaster happened in the mid-1990s. Hundreds of people were killed by hot haze that descended from Merapi’s peak.

Table one below shows the number of people living within the cartographic outline of DIY whose outline forms a mountain shape on a map. The area of this Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY = Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) held 3,044,465 people in 1991 which had increased to 3,291,744 people by the year 2000. The population growth rate tended to decrease since 1971, i.e. from 1.09% in the years 1971-1980 to 0.72% in the years 1991-2000. This was because the family planning program, implemented in 1980s, has been active and successful. The population of the city of Yogyakarta in 2000 was 480,954 people, as shown in table one. This was the officially registered population. On an electronic board located in Malioboro street (the main street of the city), there is electronic real time population display of the city’s population, which shows that the day time and the night time populations are markedly different. The population in the day time can reach up to 1 million people. This is because of the large number of commuter workers from the rural regencies surrounding the capital enter the city of Yogyakarta during the day to work as traders, civil servants, and construction labourers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regencies/Municipality</th>
<th>The Number of Population</th>
<th>Growth Rates per Years (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>421,082</td>
<td>440,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>709,879</td>
<td>776,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>710,169</td>
<td>743,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>758,519</td>
<td>850,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>444,816</td>
<td>480,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.I.Y.</td>
<td>3,044,465</td>
<td>3,291,744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIYogakarta Dalam Angka, BPS, Multiyears procesed.

The area of DIY is 3,185.81 km² with a population density in 2001 of 1,042.62 per km², and this is still gradually increasing (see table 2 below). As shown by the table, the highest population density in the year 2001 was in Yogyakarta municipality, the capital city of the special region, where it was 15,413.82 per km². However, as the tables show, the density of the city has tended to decrease.

TABLE 2: The Area and the Population Density of DIY By Regencies and Municipality, in the Years 1997-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regencies/ Municipality</th>
<th>The Area of Region Km²</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Years 1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>586.28</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>742.35</td>
<td>746.96</td>
<td>751.70</td>
<td>757.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>506.85</td>
<td>15.91</td>
<td>1,501.22</td>
<td>1,513.34</td>
<td>1,525.42</td>
<td>1,539.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>1,485.36</td>
<td>46.63</td>
<td>495.70</td>
<td>497.70</td>
<td>500.41</td>
<td>502.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>1,433.95</td>
<td>1,450.20</td>
<td>1,468.42</td>
<td>1,490.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>32.50</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>17,798.50</td>
<td>14,988.15</td>
<td>15,197.02</td>
<td>15,413.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.I.Y.</td>
<td>3,185.81</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,016.27</td>
<td>1,024.84</td>
<td>1,034.31</td>
<td>1,044.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIYogakarta Dalam Angka, BPS – Bappeda DIY.

The rural areas, especially Kulon Progo, are relatively poor, and there are big discrepancies in income between the kabupaten and the city — see table 3 below. For example in the year 1999, in the whole region the GDRP per capita (in million Rupiah) based on actual prices was 37,799,020 then in the following years increased to 4,194,501
and 4,692,261 in the years 2000 and 2001 respectively. The highest GDRP shows by the municipality of Yogyakarta, then followed by Sleman regency, Gunung Kidul and Bantul, then Kulon Progo. Actually, Gunung Kidul has the poorest population, with especially poor returns from agriculture. Since 1998 this regency has developed mining industry, and this has lifted the official GDRP without greatly changing the situation of the villagers.

### TABLE 3: GDRP Per Capita Based on Actual Prices and Constant Price by Regencies and Municipality, Years 1999-2001 (in Millions of Rupiah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kabupaten/Kotamadya</th>
<th>GDRP per Capita Actual Price</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>GDRP per a Constant Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,484,049</td>
<td>2,452,649</td>
<td>2,689,395</td>
<td>935,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,602,221</td>
<td>2,892,843</td>
<td>3,169,446</td>
<td>1,064,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,999,445</td>
<td>3,316,722</td>
<td>3,584,581</td>
<td>1,354,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,577,724</td>
<td>3,949,037</td>
<td>4,502,102</td>
<td>1,582,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,201,290</td>
<td>8,024,748</td>
<td>9,172,009</td>
<td>3,286,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.I. Yogyakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,799,020</td>
<td>4,194,501</td>
<td>4,692,261</td>
<td>1,558,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *D.I. Yogyakarta Dalam Angka Year 1999-2001*, BPS, Processed

Table 4 below shows a break-down of the GDRP components into several economic sectors, such as agriculture, mining, industry and processing (which are usually categorized as primary sector), and electricity, gas, water and construction (which are usually categorized as secondary sectors) and the tertiary sector of trade, hotels, restaurants, transportation, communication, monetary, and services. The table below shows that in the year 1998, hotels, trade and restaurant sectors were the main contributor of GDRP growth, contributing 58.09% (undoubtedly influenced by the tourism sector’s capacity to earn ‘hard currencies’), which was then followed by the agricultural sector (56.35%). However, as the economy recovered from the 1997-1998 crisis, the contribution of these sectors decreased along with other sectors. Even the agricultural sector dropped to become the lowest contributor of GDRP growth, i.e. from 56.35% in 1998 to 5.29% and 7.15% in the years

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5 Even when the national economy had begun to show signs of sustained growth after the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, per capita incomes are low. Even at recent (January 2005) exchange rates of Rp. 9,142 = US$1.00, annual GDP per capita in actual prices (Rp. 4,692,261) equates to US$513.26. For urban Yogyakarta it was US$1,003.28, and Kulon Progo US$294.18 annually.
2000 and 2001 respectively. Drought that hit the region in the year 2000 and 2001 and this also had some influenced on these outcomes. Interestingly, growth in the services sector and in construction does not show much variation that could be attributed to the economic crisis. In general, the growth rate of GDRP initially surged in 1998 in the initial recovery phase, levelling out after that.

TABLE 4: The Growth of GDRP in DIY, Years 1998-2001 (Based on Actual Prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>56.35%</td>
<td>39.05%</td>
<td>5.29%</td>
<td>7.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mining</td>
<td>36.14%</td>
<td>7.84%</td>
<td>7.22%</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Industry and Processing</td>
<td>48.93%</td>
<td>24.61%</td>
<td>13.47%</td>
<td>12.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>49.27%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>30.95%</td>
<td>21.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Construction</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
<td>10.29%</td>
<td>13.88%</td>
<td>10.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Trade, Hotel and Restaurant</td>
<td>58.09%</td>
<td>20.27%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>11.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Transportation and Communication</td>
<td>27.20%</td>
<td>10.24%</td>
<td>12.25%</td>
<td>20.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Monetary</td>
<td>35.10%</td>
<td>8.78%</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Services</td>
<td>15.04%</td>
<td>17.23%</td>
<td>17.62%</td>
<td>16.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Growth Rate of GDRP</td>
<td>37.05%</td>
<td>15.65%</td>
<td>13.21%</td>
<td>13.97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Besides GDRP, an important statistical measure of the social and economic condition of the people in Yogyakarta is the Human Poverty Index (HPI), which has been adopted by the UNDP (United Nation Development Program) as their standard for measuring the condition of a population. As can be seen table 5 below, the average HPI of special Region of Yogyakarta in 1998 was 18.5% of the population. The worst component of this measure of poverty was the percentage of population without access to clean water resources, i.e. 48.9%. This was the main problem of this region in general. All of the regencies consistently show a very high proportion of people without access to clean water, even in the municipality of Yogyakarta, where it reaches 60.5% lacking clean water, higher even than in the rural regencies. The second most pressing problem is that of malnutrition among the population below 5 years old, in which the average reached 17.3% in the DIY

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6 Services in these statistical data consist of services provided by government such as tourist information, and provided by private businesses such as baby sitters or maid agents.
However, the access to health facilities is generally high, with a low percentage of people lacking access in almost all regencies and the municipality. The clear and striking exception is Kulon Progo.

**TABLE 5: Human Poverty Index**  
**Of DIY by Regencies and Municipality, Year 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regencies/Municipality</th>
<th>Population Predicted to have life expectancy less than 40 Years (%)</th>
<th>Illiteracy (%)</th>
<th>Population without access to clean water resources (%)</th>
<th>Population without access to health facilities (%)</th>
<th>Population below 5 years old suffering Malnutrition (%)</th>
<th>HPI</th>
<th>HPI Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kulon Progo</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIY</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indonesia Human Development Report 2001, Toward a New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia, BPS-Bappenas-UNDP.

**C. The Social Geography of Yogyakarta**

Spatially, Yogyakarta shows interesting socio-geographical phenomena that reflect the prevailing social cleavages of inhabitants which can be distinguished using cultural, social and economic identifiers. Yogyakarta, and the nearby Central Javanese city of Surakarta (Solo), constitute the cultural core of the ancient Javanese cultural heritage. This cultural tradition continues to be celebrated as a central component of Indonesian national identity today. The most refined and definitive of Javanese cultural forms are found in Yogyakarta and Solo, and are perpetuated through crucial institutions there. All the logic of the symbolism of high Javanese culture gravitates to the keraton (or kraton), the palace

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7 For an elaboration of the ambiguous incorporation of Javanese tradition, and an exposition of the way it has been constituted, reconstructed and appropriated from the colonial era to the present see John Pemberton *On the Subject of ‘Java’* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1994. Pemberton’s study is mostly concerned with Solo, rather than Yogyakarta, but much of what he discusses is relevant here.
of the Sultan. Hence, the first area I will discuss will be the district in which the broader society blends into the celebration of the high Javanese cultural tradition. It is the area, near to where Malioboro street terminates, namely the Sultan’s palace, its ceremonial square and

MAP 1: The Urban Area of Yogyakarta

Source: Yogyakarta Tourism Office
the adjacent parts of the city. The influence of the Kraton radiates outward, connecting the villages to the pivot of the kingdom. The second significant area is the set of residential districts where the wong gede live. The main instance of this part of society is found in the elite residential area built during the colonial era which has distinctively European style of architecture. It is the Kota Baru area. An additional elite area is the university housing complex. The third is the poor area, the home of the wong cilik. The wong cilik live in kampongs, both in the central urban area and in the urban fringe of Yogyakarta. The poor who live in the urban areas tend to be concentrated on the riverside of the Code, the river that that breaks downtown Yogyakarta into two parts. The poor kampongs predominate. Another significant concentration of poor people is found in the kampongs of the urban
fringe, about 2-3 km away from the business district. The fourth is the business district itself, where the various socio-economic classes congregate in the principal space of their economic activities. This also the place where the cosmopolitanization flourishes, connecting the inhabitants and the workers of this area with global consumer culture. This located in Malioboro street and its environs.

I will now look at each of these four major socio-cultural divisions of the city in turn. Map 1 gives a schematic overview of the city, with the Sultan’s palace clearly shown in the lower southwest quarter of the map. Map 2 shows in more detail the central cultural area around the two major palaces (of which, more below).

C.1. The Area for Tradition

The first social geographical area at the centre of the traditional society of Yogyakarta is located around the Sultan’s Palace and the closest neighbouring areas (see map 2). Beyond this area, villages surround Yogyakarta city, and there the inhabitants’ livelihood is mostly based on the agricultural sector. It can also be categorized as belonging to the traditional area. The Sultan’s Palace is located on the Southern part of Yogyakarta city (see maps 1 and 2). Historically, the existence of this relatively modern palace (Keraton Yogyakarta Hadiningrat) is ultimately connected with the involvement of Dutch colonial interests. Central Javanese kingdoms extend back over a thousand or more years, but the greatest in the modern era (here, seventeenth century onwards) was the kingdom of Mataram. By the eighteenth century, the Netherlands East India Company (VOC) had become powerful in Java, particularly in West Java. The Mataram ruler of Central Java, Pakubuwono II was more absorbed with dynastic intrigues than with confronting the VOC. There was a conflict between the resourceful Prince Mangkubumi and Pakubuwono II which started when Pakubuwono II broke his promise to Mangkubumi. He had promised that he would give some part of the Mataram kingdom to Prince Mangkubumi if he would defeat the rebellion of RM. Said. Prince Mangkubumi successfully defeated R.M. Said’s rebellion, but Pakubuwono’s promise was never fulfilled. Due to this, Mangkubumi changed sides and finally joined in the RM. Said rebellion against Pakubuwono II.

This conclusion of this particular rebellion was finally mediated by the Dutch through the Giyanti agreement, 13 February 1755. That was the first time the Javanese royal family employed Western diplomatic models to solve a conflict between the royal
elites. This diplomatic solution closed with the toast of beer then both side hugged each other.\(^8\) The Giyanti agreement divided the Mataram kingdom, splitting it into two, Surakarta (under Pakubuwono II) and Yogyakarta (under Mangkubumi who became Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono I). Even so, the RM. Said rebellion still struggling on against Pakubuwono until 1757. This conflict finally mediated by the involvement of the Dutch again, so that the Surakarta (Solo) part of the original Kingdom was now itself divided into two parts, into Mangkunegara (under RM. Said who became Mangkunegara I) and Surakarta (still under Pakubuwono). In early nineteenth century, following a complex conflict with the British under Thomas Stamford Raffles, allied with other Javanese aristocrats (Prince Natakusuma, brother of Hamengkubuwono II), Yogyakarta itself was divided into two parts i.e. Yogyakarta under Sultan Hamengkubuwono and Pakualaman under Pakualam I, as can be seen on map 2. However, the power of Sultan Hamengkubuwono has remained clearly superior to Pakualam, and this is reflected through the recent position of both kings. Sultan Hamengkubuwono is the Governor and Pakualam is the vice-Governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta.

Those members of Yogyakartan society who still adhere strongly to traditional belief-systems regard Sultan Hamengkubuwono personally as the centre of the harmony between the macro cosmos of the universe and micro cosmos of *kraton* and community. The people who have this kind of cosmology still practice the syncretic Hindu-Islamic Javanese tradition. They are Javanists\(^9\) (*kejawen*). For example, the aspects of good and bad of the Merapi mountain as mentioned before should not be viewed as good and bad per se, but in need of placement in a system of cosmic harmony. They believe that Sultan Hamengkubuwono (lit., the ‘Holder of the Universe’) is the appointed king who has the ability to maintain that harmony. Related to this myth, the Merapi mountain (*Gunung Merapi*) is cosmologically important especially for the people believe in the magical connection between the four important pillars between *Gunung Merapi, Tugu Jogja* (the

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\(^9\) Or, in the categories advanced by Clifford Geertz in *The Religion of Java*, they are both (elite (*priyayi*) and (mass) *abangan*.
Tower of Yogya), Yogyakarta’s Sultanate Palace (Keraton Yogyakarta) and The Indian Ocean (Laut Selatan: Indonesian, or Segara Kidul: Javanese). The alignment of these four points traces a straight line from the North to the South. The traditional Javanese living in rural areas and those who work in the Sultan’s service believe that Merapi Mountain is the first pillar. It stabilizes Java Island geologically. The Tugu Jogja is the second pillar that can be seen from the Royal Palace clearly, this has become the medium for the Sultan during his meditation. The third pillar is the Sultan’s Palace itself in which the Sultan is the centre of microcosm. Further, there is the fourth pillar in the South, namely the south sea which receives water from mount Merapi. This kind of geological connection has mystical meaning in Javanese cosmology that has to be diupacarakan (ritualized) once a year in order to maintain its harmony.

Once a year every 1 Sura (the name of the first month in the Javanese lunar calendar), the Sultan has to provide ceremonial offering (sesaji) to the mountain, and to the South Seas. On the Sura eve, some people in Yogyakarta prepare with ascetic disciplines fasting during the day. Then, in the middle of the night, they perform the ‘quiet walking parade’, a ritual procession in which they are not allowed to talk (tapa bisu). The route of the ritual parade traces the surroundings the fort of the Sultanate Palace. They believe that if they perform the ceremony correctly, the people in Yogyakarta will be blessed. Traditionally, this is then followed by the upacara labuhan (offering ritual) on the following morning, the first of Sura, by giving sesaji (offerings, consisting of foods, flowers, and agricultural products) to Queen of the South Seas in the Indian Ocean, and an offering made to Mount Merapi. The offering upacara performed by the Sultan to Mount Merapi and to the Queen of the South Seas is, according to these beliefs, a necessary effort to connect the Royal Palace to the Merapi in the north and to the Indian Ocean in the south, thus maintaining the harmony of macro cosmos or the natural harmony of the universe. It is believed that this ritual will contribute significantly to the prosperity and the happiness of the Yogyakartan people. Furthermore, people also believe that the Queen of the South (Ratu Kidul) who lives in the Indian Ocean (the fourth pillar) is also the wife of Sultan. His power to rule Yogyakarta flows from his betrothal to Ratu Kidul. The connection of four pillars is also believed to effect the unification of macro cosmos and the micro cosmos with the Sultan controlling the cosmic balance which in
practice means he must have control over the territory, and that he has supernatural foundations underpinning the legitimacy of his reign.

Another kind of upacara (ritual) in the Sultan’s Palace that is also conducted in the month of Sura is the jamasan (purification) for kerises and spears belong to the Sultan. Even the Royal carts also have to be purified. Some Javanese who possess ceremonial kerises and spears also conduct similar rituals in their own homes at this time. This upacara (ritual) called jamasan pusaka (the purification of heirlooms). This ritual is not only about the purification of heirlooms but has also become an important point of connection between the Sultan and the people (members of the traditional society living in urban areas and living in the villages). The Sultan as the ‘holder of universe’ (Hamengkubuwono) has the power to extend blessings to the people. People inclined to superstition, such as traditional traders, pedicab drivers, cart drivers, village people who work in agricultural sector, and people who serve Sultan in his Palace and so on, wait outside the royal palace in the afternoon of the first of Sura in order to get the wastewater that has already been used to clean the royal pusaka (heirlooms). This wastewater of jamasan can be used for many purposes, including the inducement of business success, the fertility of farms, and so on. Some of the warung owners also take that water in order to make their business attract many customers. While the Sultan’s influence is strong among the social groups I have named, he does command wide respect in Yogyakarta and beyond, especially among the Javanese people more broadly. The Kraton is a repository of cultural and political influence in the community, an influence that has a significant degree of autonomy from the New Order state. The potency of these traditional rulers and the belief-systems they embody is most intense in the part of the city in and around the Palace. Elsewhere, other influences have come to the fore. The elites of the wong gede have their own sources of power.
MAP 3: Elite Housing and the Poor Housing Area

Elite housing of Academic People
Elite Housing, (ex high ranking officers)
Shops, Hotels, Offices, Banks, restaurants

Food Suppliers for Warung Angkringan
Riverside Poor’s Area
Kota Baru Elite Area, built during the Colonial Period

Source: Tourism Office Yogyakarta
C.2. the Wong Gede Area

The second social geographical area is located two kilometres further on the North of Pakualam Palace, on the Eastern part of the Code River. It is a relatively new area, built up during the British colonial period (which was brief, 1811-1816), named Kota Baru meaning ‘New City’. This area — as seen on map 3 above — shows a well designed urban landscape reflected through the design of its housing and its block system, its drainage system and the provision of public areas. Compared to some other areas in Yogyakarta this Kota Baru zone seems different, because we can feel the European design of landscape. In this area, the colonial authority built a complex for Catholic Church, a seminary school, and a high school for the European children, as well as housing for the doctors who work for Bethesda Hospital and housing for some of the top ranking colonial bureaucrats.

After the nationalisation of colonial assets in the 1950s, these places belonged to the state. Some of the houses functioned as housing for the families of ministers and high-ranking military officers when Sukarno (the first president of Republic Indonesia) temporarily moved the capital city of Indonesia to Yogyakarta. Then finally, in later years, Sukarno gave those houses to high-ranking officers as a token of his gratitude, especially after the capital of the republic was moved back to Jakarta. Those buildings still exist until now and their functions remain not all that different to the colonial era. It is a quarter of unambiguous elite housing. This elite housing expanded up to the north part of Kota Baru which then connects with the new block of the Gadjah Mada University complex built in the 1950s. Wong cilik consider this university complex with its generous provision of quality housing for lecturers, as no less an area for wong gede than Kota Baru. The housing complex is very neat and shows the distinctive sociological character of a middle class area. As a complex, the people living in this area are more likely to have relationships within the same neighbourhood, with other academic people. In this complex we can find dozens of warungs on the roadside, which operate during the day and especially at night, when the number of warungs operating are double that of the day time. Warungs around the university have similar functions to warung in every part of the city. They provide relatively cheap food which is affordable for the students living in nearby houses. These warungs open until midnight, and most of the owners come from kampongs on the north of this complex. Gadjah Mada University had tried to move out some warungs that had set up
on the roadside because they made the road too narrow for traffic. Even though the university has already built fences to prevent warung owners recovering their space, it seems they do not want to move from that space. Wong cilik still need space for their economic struggle, no matter how difficult the struggle is when they have to claim it.

C.3. the Wong Cilik Area

The third social geographical area contrasts strongly with this elite area. As explained above, it is primarily located right on the riverside of the Code river --just about 200 meters on the east of Kota Baru fringe (see map 3 above). In this area, live some poor people who work in the informal sectors. Right on the West riverside, we can see the informal sector people working as tyre servicing tradespeople, flower traders, and in small motorbike or car servicing workshops. People who organize these businesses live on the riverside of the Code River. From Malioboro street, this area is just less than 1 km to the East. Some people living in this area also have jobs in Malioboro street where they work as parking attendants, shop-keepers, waitresses, coolies in the Beringharjo market or at the Tugu railway station; as souvenir traders, petty clericals for private companies, hotels and banks in the surrounding area; as lower ranking civil servants, food suppliers for warung angkringan, and various other underclass jobs.

The Code River, one of the rivers which divides the downtown area of Yogyakarta into two parts (Eastern area and Western Area), as seen on map 1 above marks out various interesting social phenomena. The royal palace of the Sultan Hamekubuwono and Malioboro Street --the business district built by the Dutch-- are located to the West of the river. This Malioboro street is the main business district in Yogyakarta. It involves various social economic classes, from roadside Javanese petty traders, medium-scale Chinese ethnic traders who own the shops, and big business people who own Malioboro Mall. As well, street musicians, shoe shine boys, warung owners, and other informal sector workers and entrepreneurs are active here. These are the important elements which have become one of the economic engines of Yogyakarta, servicing the tourist, academic and craft industries (the latter contribute to Yogyakarta’s fame for traditional silversmiths, batik manufacturers, painting, sculpture, etc.).

A few years ago, in the 1980s, the local government of Yogyakarta planned to move the people settled on the riverside of the Code removing them by force if necessary. The
agenda from local government to move the people out from the riverside ignited a dispute between the inhabitants of the Code kampongs and the local government. This also created anxiety among the wong cilik living in that area, leading to vigorous demonstrations against the local government. The idea out of shifting the riverside inhabitants was based on the argument that the Code riverside is a greenbelt area and their lives would be in danger if the river flooded. At that time, local government already prepared a housing complex elsewhere for the Code riverside inhabitants, but none of them wanted to move because the new housing complex was far away — it was located on the East fringe of Yogyakarta province, in Sleman regency — from the location of their jobs. People living on Code riverside mostly have jobs near the city. These are mostly in the informal sector, in activities such as suppliers of foods for the surrounding warungs, laundry services, cleaning service, selling newspapers, traders, becak drivers, selling tyres and tyre servicing, and various other lower class jobs.

At that time, the famous humanitarian activist YB Mangunwijaya was involved in providing support for the poor living in this area. Mangunwijaya — popularly called ‘Romo Mangun’ — was a Jesuit Priest of the Catholic Church in Yogyakarta. He was a newspaper columnist, a novelist, and also an architect. He was deeply concerned about the poor living in the riverside of Code River. He gave free education for the children of the riverside kampongs, designed and built a public meeting houses for the kampong people, especially with the aim of assisting them to solve their own problem democratically. He was engaged in a number of projects, all designed to empower the poor socially, politically and economically.

His projects on Code riverside were intensified as a response to the announcement that the local government would forcibly move the people living in that area. At that time in the 1980s, Mangunwijaya as an architectural designer did his own research into the alleged flooding hazard. Following his investigation, he argued that their lives would not be endanger by flooding because the structure of the riverside was safe for residential housing. He declared that he didn’t mind living there — in the house he designed himself — just to
prove that a flood would not endanger his life or anyone else’s.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, he proved it by living there for years while empowering the people. He built a community house for the inhabitants living in that area to practice democracy and to educate poor children. Under the supervision of Mangunwijaya and under the decisions of the local communities in their community house, the riverside of Code River flourished. His designs were neat and environmentally friendly, and led to an award granted by he Agha Khan Foundation. The Code river issue became a vigorous political movement, even in the difficult, repressive environment of Suharto’s New Order. It involved some student volunteers from Gadjah Mada University, and tenaciously opposed local government policy. But after a series of long negotiations, the dispute finally resolved and Mangunwijaya moved out, since it had become clear that the local people on the riverside had proven their ability to manage their own problems democratically. Mangunwijaya’s architectural designs still exist on the Code riverside. It has become something of a memorial — a building to remember Mangunwijaya after his death on February 10, 1999\textsuperscript{11}. This building also stands as a symbol of the struggle of the wong cilik against the dominant power.

\textbf{C.4. Business District and its Cosmopolitanization}

The fourth social geographical area which shows the activity of business is located parallel with the Code River, or 0.5 km on the West of this river. In this area there is the central business district called Malioboro Street. This area built and developed during the colonial era as a centre for economic growth, organised around the main thoroughfare extending from the \textit{Kraton} to the Tugu Yogyakarta. At one point on Malioboro street south of the railway station, there is a modern shopping mall (named Malioboro Mall) built in early 1990s which is connected to the Ibis hotel, an international hotel. There are at least two hotels holding three stars category (Ibis and Mutiara Hotel, in which a businessperson

\textsuperscript{10} This conflict also led to his resignation as a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University, because the department of Architecture, Faculty of Civil Technic at Gadjah Mada University did the research which recommend the local government that it should consider the area as a green belt, arguing also that if it flooded it would endanger people living on Code riverside.

\textsuperscript{11} For an outline of this campaign, and the lifetime of humanistic activism of Romo Mangun see the eulogy delivered by Nico Schulte Nordholt “Romo Mangun, Activist”, \textit{Inside Indonesia}, 59, July-September 1999.
owns the last one from Yogyakarta) and one state owned hotel named Garuda with four stars category. There are also some small hotels owned by local business people, which provide an accommodation for the tourists, since this city is well known as a tourist destination. It is second only to Bali as a tourist destination – the many cultural attractions and the artefacts made by the local artists and craftspeople attract visitors from around the world. This has incorporated the people around Malioboro Street, especially people living in Kampons Sosrowijayan and Dagen, into global consumer culture.

Besides the Mall there are numerous shops (toko). These are mostly owned by Chinese business people and many of these shopkeeping families have been here since the time this business district was built. Petty traders occupying the sidewalk, displaying souvenirs, and some various goods or foods they hope to trade. After businesses close each day around 21.00, food stalls (called warung lesehan, in which the customers have to sit [lesehan] on a mat) operate until the early hours of the morning.

Access to space on or near Malioboro is an indispensable condition for any business. Once a space has been secured, it is held with great tenacity. The traders who have already claimed their space for trading cannot be displaced by someone else. However, the first claimer can sell it to someone else, and so it is passed from one to another. In Malioboro Street there are two sidewalks, one on the western side and the other one is on the east side. The west sidewalk is more expensive than the east. The rental for two M² of trading space on the western side varies between Rp 4,000,000.00 and Rp 6,000,000.00. The cost on the eastern side is half as much. Whenever sidewalk traders run into difficulties in business, they just sell their place rights to someone else. Most people prefer to walk on the west side rather than on the east side. This habit is related to the number of shops in on this side. There are more than the east side. On the east side there are some hotels and mall. Sidewalk traders are not allowed to sell in the areas fronting these large establishments.

Most of the traders on both sides sell local foods such as gudeg, chicken and fried pigeon. Some traders are the inhabitants of the Code riverside kampons, others are from

For the text of the eulogy delivered by Nico Schulte Nordholt at the memorial service on May 6, 1999, see Nico Schulte Nordholt ‘YB Mangunwijaya’, Inside Indonesia, 58, April-June 1999.

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the very densely settled kampons on the west of Malioboro Street, named Sosrowijayan, Dagen and Pasar Kembang Kampung. Pasar Kembang kampong is well known for lower class sex, commercial workers and as a place for backpacker tourists to stay in cheap accommodation. The backpackers can then enjoy beer, girls and gigolos in certain cafes around that kampong. This kampong is very cosmopolitan. In it we can see many nationalities gathered to live. The available foods reflect this international, cosmopolitan milieu. The driving force of this kampong cosmopolitanization is the internal dynamic of economic processes that respond to tourism and to the influx of lower middle class tourists from various nationalities. Some Indonesian tourist guides get married (or live together with) to foreigners. They live in the area, then set up their own tourist business. Some local girls are also married (or live with) to foreigners, but then they usually move to other countries with their spouses.

This kind of cosmopolitanization has connected people living in this area with the global consumer culture. The effects can be observed in their consumption behaviour. In cosmopolitan areas, such as kampons Sosrowijayan, Dagen, Pasar Kembang and its surrounding area we can see conspicuous consumption behaviour by the local inhabitants who loiter around in the cafes where they socialise with the foreigners. The ‘out loud’ life shows of world music performances in those kampons stimulate their jiwa (soul) to coalesce within the atmosphere of cosmopolitan world. The Rasta hairstyle of the local kampong, the global language they speak with foreigners, and the imported wine and boutique drinks from local bars—as a cosmopolitan space—permeate their lifestyle. Some of the character of an urban Javanese kampong remains, but this area, largely, has become a global cosmopolitan kampong embedded in the city of Yogyakarta.

D. The Production of Spaces and Power Relations Among Subjects

This section is concerned with the importance of social spaces in those urban areas where the wong cilik interact with the broader urban social environments. It commences my exposition of the nature of power relations between subjects from the principal socio-cultural groups of urban society. This interaction is both a manifestation and a contestation of prevailing power relations. It is an interaction that is specific to these subjects, but also specific to the places where they interact. The wong cilik and their interlocutors act as agents of cultural production. From the contestation that arises in these places distinctive
discourses are fashioned, and the space itself is culturally constructed. I will show how the *wong cilik* are actively involved in their contestation with more powerful social groups, and with various other agents who represent themselves as the dominant subjects in the encounter. This section will focus on the *warung* as a space that reflects the manner in which the *wong cilik* construct relatively autonomous spaces for their material and discursive struggles. It also aims to understand the intersecting of variegated social classes and discourses that come together in these places, and the nature of power relations between subjects in this space. In order to show the specific moments of power relations, I will pick up some stories to identify some key discursive practices that are developed and used in these spaces. Having described them initially here, I will return to them more specifically in later chapters.

**D.1. Warung: Wong cilik and the Construction of Space**

The sidewalk *warung* largely is an urban spatial phenomenon in the three cities (Yogyakarta, Jakarta, and Surabaya) of my research. A *warung* should be understood as a space rather than simply just a place or an informal sector business. It is constructed within the conditions of the limited space permitted to *wong cilik* – limited because of a pattern of urban growth and governance that has marginalised them socio-economically and politically – and because of their limited economic capital. The feeling of being marginalised can be seen from their suspicion that these cities are designed for the big business owner rather than for the *wong cilik*, but they nevertheless have to meld together in it. For example, the side walk trader in Blok M Jakarta expressed their feeling of city space as stated below:

‘sempit dan kagak ada ruang untuk orang-orang kayak kita ini, makanya kita nekad aja jualan di pinggir jalan. Kalau ngga nekad di Jakarta mana bisa dapat duit. Kalau dikejar-kejar tramtbib yang kita siap berkelahi aja, ini jaman reformasi. Dulu ya nyogok aja Rp 5000,00, sekarang cari uang susah.’

(Squishy and no space for the people like us, that’s why we just have to dare to sell things on the sidewalk. If we are not bold, how can we earn money in Jakarta? If we pursued by the tramtbib officers, we are ready to fight with them, it is the reform era! Previously we just bribed the officers Rp 5,000.00, now money is difficult to get).

The expression of a sidewalk trader in Surabaya, was also illuminating when he said that:
‘Aku butuh duit dadi yo dodolan ning pinggir embong, nek polisi nglarang dodolan, aku arep nyauri nek luwih halal dodolan daripada dadi maling, pemerintahi gelem makani aku karo anak bojoku piye?’

(I need money so I am selling on the sidewalk, if the police do not allow me to sell in that space, I would say to them that the way I earn money is much more legitimate (halal) than to become a thief. Would the government feed me, my kids and my wife if I had no money?).

The limited space available in urban areas has forced them to utilise the sidewalks or any empty space to earn money, and use the space to start a business such as a warung. A warung is a small food stall. It is usually located on the sidewalk in urban areas or inside a kampong, in its internal narrow laneways. Warung owners in Jakarta, for example, are immigrants from Tegal, Wonogiri, Surabaya and some cities in West Java. Warung Angkringan owner-operators in Yogyakarta are from Klaten (as are Pak Man and Pak Min, who I will introduce below) and Wonosari. The hometown of a warung owner usually can be identified from the food they sell. For example, immigrants from Surabaya or from some other place in East Java usually sell East Javanese foods, such as nasi rawon (a kind of soup with beef; the colour is dark brown), pecel Madiun (vegetable salad with peanut dressing, a typical Madiun city food from East Java) etc. Immigrants from Tegal (central Java) mostly sell soto tegal (soup with coconut milk) and some other Tegal foods. People from West Java mostly sell Nasi Uduk (rice cooked with coconut milk, the taste is slightly salty). In addition, Chinese from Kalimantan sell Chinese food. These kinds of warung typically have a plastic roof coloured brown, blue or orange, and white fabric as the wall screen. On this screen usually is written the menu, from which we can determine where the owners come from. The warung itself is very humble, not as clean as a restaurant. They use two buckets of water to wash the kitchen stuffs until the water develops a dirty appearance because it has been used for so many dirty plates, glasses and spoons. Some warungs cook their food on the spot in the warung, and some of them bring homemade foods so they only need to reheat it. The customers mostly do not really show any concern whether a warung is hygienic or not, because the important thing in this place is the feeling of freedom which

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12 This statement is based on my Interview with Pak Slamet in Surabaya. During the crisis in 1998 Pak
cannot be found in the restaurant. In the warung, customers need not be polite and the way they eat need not observe good manners either. It is very different to eating in a restaurant.

Warungs can be categorised into two social classes first lower middle class warungs and second lower class warungs. The first one is not characterised through the condition of warung because most of them are similar, but rather from the stall’s clientele. If the costumers have cars, it can be categorised as lower middle class to middle class warung. Here the middle class elements eat food to enjoy the food itself and feel free. Then secondly there are lower class warungs. These are characterised by the condition of warung itself. Usually, they only sell cheap foods such as nasi bungkus (wrapped rice) or an item called as nasi kucing (cat rice), some fried tempe and tofu and some other relatively simple things. The owner of this warung usually does not cook the food. The food comes from catering services or food suppliers that are located in a nearby area. They just boil water to make coffee, tea or milk. This kind of warung called warung angkringan. In addition the customers of these warungs mostly coming from the lower classes. They are people such as becak drivers, taxi drivers, ojek (motor-bike taxi) drivers, street kids and street musicians, lower class and occasionally lower middle class students. The angkringan type of sidewalk warung is the place where the lower class to lower middle class hang out to pass their leisure time cheaply, and to enjoy the feeling of freedom. Warung in this case has become public space which accommodates the wong cilik’s interests in the contested social and economic geography of town and cities.

A prime example of warung life in Jakarta can be found right on the roadside between LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia = The Indonesian Institute of Sciences) office and PT.Telkom (state owned telecommunication company) in Jakarta, where any day of the week, we can find some warung’s that are busy serving their customers. These warungs sell homemade pre-cooked food. The owners of the warungs are migrants from various parts of Java. Most of the customers are from the lower ranking

Slamet wanted to build a sidewalk warung to support his family economically.

13 This categorisation is based on the way people talking about the customers of warung then they use it to label the class of warung. This categorisation is not consistent but rather temporary depend on the taste condition of the customers. Some middle class family try to involve in the warung business to provide food for middle class such as artist, and some middle manager. This is not called as warung but rather ‘café tenda’
bureaucrats from LIPI and PT. Telkom. The higher ranks are somewhat hesitant to hang out in this *warung* during lunchtime. They usually ask a courier to buy food for lunch for them, and eat it in the office. Indeed, it is different from the lower ranking bureaucrats; most of the lower ranks prefer to go out from the office. It is a matter of class distinction as expressed by one of the customers: ‘Wah...*warung* terlalu kumuh untuk pegawai golongan atas mana mau mereka’ (Hmm... *Warung* is too dirty for the high-ranking bureaucrats, why would they want to come here?) Some people, lower ranking officers make cynical remarks of this kind, expressing their solidarity and the boundary between them and their ‘betters’. Some expressions are not as resentful as the one before. They would say such things as ‘wah ya ngga pantes kalau boss harus makan di *warung* yang seperti ini, kalau mau ya bagus itu namanya *merakyat*’ (Hmm, that is not suitable for the boss if they have lunch in this *warung*, but if they want to do it, that’s good, it means they are down to earth and close to the people). Even so, both of these statements reflect hierarchical ideas which display the way the lower ranks give meaning to the top ranking officers’ eating out behaviour. This space is not just only a space for lunch but also meaningful for the lower ranking bureaucrats, because they can gossip freely, exchanging office rumours and issues and discuss the political situation. These *warungs* are the best space for them to share any ideas through their daily chats during the break time (12.00 to 13.00).

To some extent, *warungs* function as cafés do in New York, Melbourne, Singapore, Jakarta or anywhere. However, cafés in those cities, notably in Jakarta, are only for upper middle class persons, not for the under class workers or *wong cilik*. It is unaffordable. The *warungs* are for the underclass or for the people who can easily socialize with the underclass. A journalist of the main Yogyakarta Newspaper (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*) said to me in Pak Man’s *warung*:


(‘In that place it is nice, brother. All levels of society can be found in that place. In that place we can meet many kind of communities, from the intellectual, becak driver, labourer, actor, artist; even preman [criminals] are there. I feel comfortable when I hang out there. I often to go there at least 2 times a day: in the afternoon and night time. In 1970s or 1980s in Pak Man’s warung we can meet a lot of people such as Emha Ainun Najib, Djaduk Feriento, Butet Kertaradjasa, Untung Edan and Bongol who was a kethoprak artist, Landung Simatupang, Ashadi Siregar and one of the Pakubuwono VIII, but I just forgot his name. Perhaps, only in recent circumstances I see some youngsters here and mostly students. In that place, there is always a crazy man. He was there for ages, and I often saw him. Even sometimes I think that the crazy man is Pak Man’s ‘charmed being who stimulates sales [penglarisan]’ to make his business success ha..ha..ha…. Anyway, Pak Man is also a nice person to talk with, even though he is not that educated, but he has an artistic sense and sense of caring about others’)

Some people mentioned by the journalist demonstrate that the people who come to Pak Man’s warung15 are actually exclusively underclass. Some intellectuals, artists, students, the king’s relatives and even the ‘crazy man’ (penglarisan) are also involved in social interaction in this space. Some other warungs shows different profiles depending on the location. Students and the university’s lower ranking workers for example, mostly dominate the warungs around the university. However we can also find some lecturers who close to the students regularly involved in these warungs, but not the high ranking

14 Emha Ainun Najib is an artist of drama, poem reader, especially in choreographing an Islamic performance. Djaduk Feriento is a famous musician who combine Javanese and Western music instrument. Butet Kerta Radja is also a famous theatre artist. Landung Simatupang is a poem reader and intellectual involved in cultural criticism. Ashadi Siregar is a novelist and senior lecture in the department of Communication, faculty of Social Sciences and Politic, Gadjah Mada University. Kethoprak is a traditional Javanese play which usually tells a story about the historical period of Javanese kingdom.

15 In Malioboro street, Yogyakarta – see detailed description below.
university officers such as the deans or the rector (university vice-chancellor, or president). Meanwhile, during lunchtime lower-ranking officers from government offices or from the private sector predominantly occupy the warungs around government offices. Some high-ranking bureaucrats sometimes also join with their lower ranking staff especially those senior people who are called merakyat (‘close to the people’ or ‘down to earth’). However, some taxi drivers, construction labourers who want to have lunch also go to the same warung as the officers. In their lunchtime, they usually talk with people of similar social rank, but if they go to the warungs in the night-time they talk together and share information. During office hours, the clothes they wear has are signifiers which convey their social rank to each other distinctively. However, at night, especially when they wear casual clothes, Their rank is obscured somewhat, and it is easier for them to socialize with each other. Accordingly, we can see that these places are venues that permit useful interclass encounters. In this space, they can hear each others talking, even tough without communicate to each other. At the daytime largely, it is an impersonal encounter. For example, in one moment of time, some middle-class, middle-aged persons join this kind of warung, but they are not really involved intensely in discussion with the other people in the warung. They just drink for a while and then go. They are somewhat hesitant to socialise with them, so they do not sit very long. The younger middle-class patrons seemingly mix without hesitation and socialize with the people in the warungs, but they often come in a group. It is not like what the lower class and lower middle class usually do in this place. From this, we can see that such warungs at least three social classes (and sometimes more) encounter one another regularly in the warung milieu.

In this warung environment, people invariably categorise the social class of other customers from their personal point of view. More than anything else they use dress as the main signifier of social rank. For example, the underclass such as the owner of warungs, street traders and street musicians, categorise the lower ranking officers as kalangan menengah bawah (lower middle class) or wong gedo (lit: big men) but on the cilik (lit: little) end of the scale. Sometimes they also categorise these customers as wong kantor which means a person who works in an office (kantor is originates from the Dutch language, ‘kantoor’ [NL] means ‘office’) or as wong gedongan. Gedong literally means ‘big house’, so wong gedongan means a person who lives in a big house, which is also
means a rich person. It is a situation where they recognize each other’s social position in sociologically significant ways. These shared judgements of social standing then influence the patterns of mutual recognition and power relations between each if the subjects as they encounter one another in the everyday life of warungs.

In everyday life in these space, there are certain favoured times when people gather to eat, while drinking coffee or tea. Warungs usually re-open at 6.00 o’clock PM and trade until in the middle of the night. Some of them even start late, at 13.00 o’clock and close at 06.00 the next morning. Around 9.00 o’clock in the morning, we can see some taxis and becak (pedicab) drivers (becaks have been has banned in Jakarta, so we only find this vehicle in Yogyakarta and Surabaya) having a light breakfast and drinking some coffee, talking for a while as they rest. During lunchtime, around 12.00 and dinnertime around 18.00, people start to crowd into the warung space. In the evening they then continue to hang out between 10.00 PM to 03.00 AM. At breakfast and lunch times, they just spend a short time there, because they have to work; but at night until morning their social engagements in this space take somewhat longer. This is the important time when they share their ideas, talking more intensely than at breakfast and lunchtime. In this time, people not only enjoy food or coffee but they are also involved in discussing all kinds of issues that are interesting to talk about, the discussion often related to newspaper stories. More recently, the interesting topics have been mostly concerned with politics and the economy. This is because of the late 1990s context of economic and political crisis. Before the 1997-1998 crises, people usually talked about kampong and domestic issues, local matters and neighbourhood problems. During the Presidencies of B.J Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as ‘Gus Dur’), the discussion of issues of politics have been more intense than in Suharto’s era. Interestingly, during the Megawati presidency such discussion has decreased and has become less critical. The media (electronic and printed) which often published Abdurrahman Wahid’s controversial statements also contributed to this. During Megawati’s era, her silence gave the media less to work with. It was less dynamic compared to Gus Dur’s (Abdurrahman Wahid’s) era. The newspapers largely stimulate discussion in warungs especially about new and fresh news at the local or national level. The location of the warung where I did much of my participant observation (Pak Man and Pak Min’s warung: see below) in Yogyakarta for example is just

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500 metres from the *Surat Kabar Dinding* (wall newspaper) owned by the local newspaper company. In the morning, people such as pedicab drivers, petty traders, and some underclass workers read this newspaper. Siegel (1998) notes that in Jakarta the *Pos Kota* newspaper, which usually reports sensational stories about criminal activity in Jakarta, bridges the relationship between one and another, giving its mainly lower class readership a sense of connectedness. As Siegel says: ‘In *Pos Kota*, Jakarta is a place of accessibility. It is always possible that one actually knows someone anywhere in the city or at least knows someone who knows someone and that one thus has access to anyone’.  

Some *warung* s in Jakarta provide the *Pos Kota* newspaper, which is very popular among the underclass. It is also a strategy used by the *warung* owners to attract customers by giving them access to the newspaper free, thereby extending their visit to the *warung*. The owner of the *warung* usually reads it in the morning before the customers come. In Yogyakarta, most *warung* s do not provide a local newspaper. However it can be accessed through the *Surat Kabar Dinding* (wall newspaper) provided by the newspaper company or even by local government. In Surabaya, very few *warung* s provide local newspapers. A few *warung* s near the central business district provide it for the customers when they have lunch. Lunchtime in the *warung* is an important moment in sharing ideas through talking to one another. It can take around a half to one hour. When lunchtime finishes, *wong kantoran* (office workers) go back to their office, the rest continue talking. They are mostly people like becak drivers, taxi drivers, side walk traders. At dinner, time this kind of *warung* is also important for the people who want to enjoy night life on the street. In Jakarta, for example, there are some artists, business people, famous advocates and famous TV presenters who like to go to *warung kaki lima* (sidewalk food stalk). These upper class people often encounter common people on the sidewalk. In this place, they meet with friends from the same class and less deliberately find themselves in adventitious encounters with the lower middle class. Even though they converse with their peers in a group, they can hear and observe each other talking. But rarely do these encounters spill over into a

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17 ‘Makan di Kaki Lima Siapa Takut?’ (Eating on The Side Walk Warung, Who’s afraid of it?) in *Kompas*
sustained mingling of the class-based discussion groups.

Accordingly, the *warung* has become a space where different social classes the interclass have opportunities to encounter, observe and, in subtle ways, respond to each other. It is a place of intersecting worlds and intersecting discourses. A *warung* in big cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta is an economic activity organised by entrepreneurs from the low-income sectors of the economy. Historically, *warung* businesses have provided foods for customers who come from low-income economic backgrounds, such as construction workers who worked on major development sites in big cities, some other migrant workers, and migrant students coming from many places of Indonesia to study in Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Jakarta. In more recent developments, *warungs* have become a trendy space for hanging out in order to connect with the variegated urban social classes who are attracted into the *warung* milieu. As the space for the exercise and development of discursive practices, these *warungs* provide rudimentary but congenial surroundings for social intercourse. They provide long wooden benches, where friends can sit together, in a setting where foods, meals or snacks, tea and coffee for drinking, and cigarettes are cheap and plentiful. IN totality, the *warung* owners create a place to make the customers enjoy themselves and want to linger in that space. *Warung* owner are not the only people who constructs this situation socially, since the customers are also involved interactively as part of the process of creating conviviality. The creativity of a *warung* has certain similarities to *ludruk*, a traditional form of street theatre popular among the *wong cilik*. In *ludruk*, the clown performers are also the producer and director, the writer, along with actors who perform the play. It is a dramatic form that draws in and involve the spectators. The *warung* owners and customers, like the clown performers and actors engage the crowd of which they are also a part to constitute a dynamic performance-like atmosphere in the *warung*, in which they are the authors of their own interactions. The experience of this creative dynamic has made the *warungs* becoming trendier, because the patrons feel interactively involved in the creation of that ‘social drama’.

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*Aris Arif Mundayat*
MAP 4: Malioboro and Its Surrounding Area

Source: Tourism Office Yogyakarta
MAP 5: Map of Pak Man and Pak Min’s Warung and Its Surrounding Area

Map Source: Tourism Office Yogyakarta
D.2. Some Stories from the Intersecting Worlds, Intersecting Discourses

On the north of Pasar Kembang there is a train station built during colonial era called *Stasiun Tugu* (Tugu Station). This railway station connects to the western to the eastern part of Java (Jakarta and Surabaya). Just next to this station and in front of the station gate, there are some *warung angkringan* (food stall).\(^{18}\) The *warung angkringan* located on the north of this station were a major focus for my research. The most renowned one is Pak Man’s *angkringan* then followed by Pak Min’s, both of them located on the same sidewalk just next to each other. Even the customers who sit on Pak Min’s chairs can

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\(^{18}\) *Warung* literary means food stall, and *angkringan* means the place to put the food on one side and charcoal stove (made from clay) on another side. This place can be carried on the shoulder to move from one place to another.
take food or drink from Pak Man’s *warung* and vice versa. They call it as ‘mutual help among the poor’ (*saling tolong sesama orang miskin*). These *warungs* provide *nasi kucing* (cat rice). They call it ‘cat rice’ because the amount of rice and *sambal* (chilli) with dried fish, or *tempe* (fermented soybean) that is served on top of some rice. Altogether the dish is as big as a fist or just about the amount of rice which most people would prepare to feed a cat. This rice is wrapped with banana leaves and then covered by paper (usually a piece of newspaper). These *warungs* open at 13.00 and close at 03.00 in the morning.

Two metres away on the east of Pak Man and Pak Min’s *warungs* there is a small kiosk selling alcoholic beverages, such as beer, local vodka, whiskey, and some other unregistered local brands of intoxicating drinks. This shop belongings to Ibu Yat. Ibu Yat lives near to Pak Min’s rented house in Bumijo, just around 200 meters from the place his place of business. According to Pak Min, kiosk belonging to Ibu Yat often creates jealousy, because she has a permanent structure. It is, in fact, illegal, but the tax payable by non-permanent kiosks and *warungs* are about the same, Rp 1,500.00. This makes the owners of non-permanent *warung* somewhat jealous toward Ibu Yat. Ibu Yat often explains to them that they should not to be jealous of her because she pays the same tax to the local government. Moreover, some police and *preman* (criminals) often ask her to give them beers and some alcoholic beverages (Vodka or Whiskey) that are more expensive than the tax payable to the local government.

Pak Man has been trading in that place since 1968. Back then he was still a student at junior school who helped his father to sell food to the train station clerical staff. His father asked him to go to Yogyakarta just to help out during the holidays. They rode a bus from his hometown in rural Cawas District, Klaten regency, Central Java. However, when the so-called *Gestapu* or *G 30 S/PKI* in 1965 happened, his father was afraid to sell food in that place, because at that time a lot of train workers were kidnapped or missing, and they were Pak Man’s customers.  

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19 *G 30 S/PKI* was a complex political conflict involving military and, allegedly, the communist party (PKI=Partai Komunis Indonesia) during Sukarno’s government in 1965. The New Order government led by Suharto blamed PKI elements in a military unit in Jakarta who murdered six generals in an apparent attempt at a coup. In Anderson’s analysis, *Gestapu* (the abbreviation of Gerakan September 30) is interpreted as grammatically American English not as Indonesian language, and perhaps even indicates the complicity of
sector for a few years. After they felt that the political situation was relatively secure, then that family continued to sell again in the same place as before, north of the Tugu train station in Yogyakarta.

In the village, Pak Man’s father was a respected person. Pak Man told me that he socialized with the people in the village very well and very often helped his neighbours when they faced difficulties. His house in the village faced north; close by his house there is a wide rice field which Pak Man owns. His house is fairly humble, architecturally made in the style of the traditional Javanese local gentry Near his house, there is a rice storage barn. Pak Man is relatively wealthy compared to his neighbours. He has two cattle (one female and one male) which his wife minds. To get the grass for her cattle, she pays someone in the village. Pak Man’s wife can make some money from the bull, by charging her neighbours’ for the servicing of their cows when they are ready to reproduce. She never say how much her neighbours have to pay for it, the amount is just up to them. It is in ways such as this that the Javanese neighbourhood communities continue to adhere to a system of moral economy.

Pak Man is the only son. That is one reason why he is somewhat wealthier than his neighbours. He inherited the rice field and house from his parents. After his father died he wanted to continue his father’s business selling food in Yogyakarta. He reasoned that it was economically unsound to rely solely on agricultural production. It was better to diversify and to have more than one source of income. Because he want to sell food in Yogyakarta, he asked his son in law (husband of his only daughter) to work as a share-cropper. Since the 1970s Pak Man selling food in the same place as his father, on the North of Tugu Train station. Pak Man inherited this space from his father. Rights to operate a business in urban streets can by tradition be passed on in this way. People knew him because he had worked with his father and the other traders knew he had the right to claim that space.

In operating this business, Pak Man set up a shift roster with his nephews, in which CIA in this coup. During this time thousands of PKI members were killed, including some of the Tugu Station workers who were involved with that party. According to Pak Man, they were often ate and spent time in his father’s warung and of course his father was their friend. Because of this, his father decided not to sell food in that place because he was afraid that someone might kidnap him and then kill him, eventhough he was not a
he works for 15 days in his warung in Yogyakarta, after which he can usually go back home to take arrest for two weeks in his rural home, Cawas village, in the region of Klaten (Central Java) just 45 km Northeast of Yogyakarta. Every time he goes home, his nephews are rostered on, and take over the warung angkringan business. He usually takes taxi from Yogyakarta to Klaten. The people in the village (Pak Man’s neighbours) call him a wong sugih (a rich man) because his neighbours observe him riding home in a taxi from Yogyakarta. At home, Pak Man just enjoys life with his wife and his only daughter and son in law.

Compared to Pak Man, Pak Min is less wealthy because he does not own any rice fields. Pak Man owns a rice field in his own village, and he also has rice field in neighbouring village close to Pak Min house. Pak Min’s father did not own any rice land, because he was just a farm labourer. He only owned the land on which his house was built, because the rest of his family’s land had already been inherited by his brother and sister. Pak Min lives in a house that he built gradually in stages, because he had to save money as the construction progressed. He imagined that if he could save some money from his warung in Yogyakarta, he would be able to floor his house with concrete and then tile it gradually. At the moment, he is concentrating on saving money from his job. So far his savings have materialised in two motor bikes, but these are under finance – one for himself and the other one for his wife. He said that he bought two just in case he did not have enough money, or if he wanted later to renovate his house then he would be able to sell one of his motorbikes.

In 1970s, Pak Min helped his uncle, whose name is Pardi, to sell food at a place close to Tugu Yogyakarta (on Malioboro street), but he did not earn a lot of money. He needed to earn more money so he decided to go to Jakarta in 1989. He was working as a construction labourer for 10 years, until he reached the point where he felt that he had saved enough economic capital to start his own warung. Circumstances in the construction


20 Pak Min lives not far from Pak Man’s village, so they know each other very well, and over a long period. Pak Min is already married and has one son who was 2 years old at the time of my fieldwork.
industry forced his hand as well. He finally opened his warung next to Pak Man’s place in 1999 with Pak Parno, (Pak Min’s cousin). His entry into the informal sector was also an attempt to overcome the personal backwash of the monetary crisis. The crisis developed swiftly in Indonesia in 1997-1998, but the impact lasted until 2001. Among the immediate casualties of the rupture in speculative urban construction were the big contractors in Jakarta, who abandoned all new building projects there. Because of this, Pak Min lost his job in Jakarta. He moved back to Yogyakarta and tried to make a living by setting up his own warung.

In the beginning, Pak Min and Pak Parno both contributed some economic capital to the new business. It required about Rp 2,500,000.00; this was used to buy equipment and other necessities for their warung. After he persuaded all of the food suppliers to agree to supply food for their warung, they started their business next to Pak Man’s warung. In the early days, Pak Min’s gross income only Rp 20,000.00 per day. From this he could save Rp 7,000.00 per day of which Rp 4,000.00 was put aside to pay rent of his accommodation in Yogyakarta; and Rp 3,000 was saved as a financial reserve for buying glassware in case there were breakages in the business. Pak Min’s nephews, Catur and Hono, were making some money, around Rp 11,000.00 - Rp 13,000.00 per day, depending on the number of customers. Their income was not that good at the beginning, Pak Min remarked:

‘Wah, pada awalnya disini sepi mas. Saya hampir putus asa. Dua hari saya berjualan, sampai modal habis, tak mendapatkan keuntungan. Padahal untuk mengumpulkan modal itu saya jualan macam-macam mas. Mulai mas-masan punya istri saya, maupun sedikit uang tabungan hasil kerja saya selama ada di Jakarta,’

(Gee, in the beginning there was no income. I almost give up. Two days I sold food here, till the entire capital was finished, we got nothing. Whereas to accumulate that capital I sold everything I had. Gold belonging to my wife, some savings and the money I got from Jakarta. I used it for that. After three days I was selling food here without income then I decided to go home for a long time)

Before he leaving for home, knowing that his business losses had destroyed his economic capital, he met an old becak driver. Pak Min never knew his name, so he treated him as a mysterious man. Pak Min’s situation was grim, and the two of them sat and has a serious conversation. Pak Min related the essence of it as follows:
The Old Pedicab Driver: ‘Min, reneyo le tak kandani. Aku jan mesake kowe. Ndeleng daganganmu gak laku-laku.’  
(Min, come here I want to tell you something. I feel sorry to see your trading is not that good)

Pak Min: ‘Dipun kandani nopo Pak?,  
(What are you going to tell me?)

The Old Pedicab Driver: ‘Kowe gelem ora daganganmu laku?,  
(Do you want your trading to be good? asked the old man while looked straight into Pak Min’s face)

Pak Min: ‘Nggih puron to Pak. Sirah kulo ngelu, dodolan mpun pinten dinten, sepi banget,’  
(Of course, I got headache. I already offer my food for sale, but no-one buys it)

The Old Pedicab Driver: ‘Min kowe poso mutih telung dino, mben selapan pisan. Insya Allah daganganmu laku’  
(Min, you have to try fasting and then break it by eating only rice and drinking water for three days. Do that every 35 days, If God wills it, your trading will be good)

Because he treated the old becak driver as a mysterious person, a man he had never met before and who had a somewhat mystical aura,, Pak Min rushed to go home and to test his advice. Back in his kampong he fasted for three days, and then broke it only by eating rice and drinking fresh water. This kind of fasting in the Javanese tradition called ‘white fasting’ (puasa mutih). He was tried to rely on Allah (God), and after the white fast he felt serene. A few days after that, he approached his cousin Parno to start their business again.

Pak Min: ‘No, do nggolek utangan maneh yuk!’  
(Parno, lets we borrow money again!)

Parno: ‘Nyilih ning endi maneh kang? Wong dagangan yo sepi ngono.’  
(Borrow from whom? You saw that our trade was not good at all) [he was somewhat hesitant to start that business again]

Pak Min: ‘Yo ninggone Pak Lek Parjan, lah, bongso 200-an ewu. Wis lah do mangkat ning Yogyo maneh. Sopo ngerti ono dalan rejeki,’  
(‘Of course we borrow from uncle Parjan, let’s say about Rp200,000.00’. Come on, just go to Yogya again, who knows there will be a good luck’) [Pak Min tried to persuade Parno to company him to Yogyakarta again]

A few days after both of them went to Yogyakarta bringing Rp 200,000.00 as their initial capital. Both of them contacted food-supplier living close to the Code River. They started their business at 13.00 o’clock, and a few days after that Pak Min was very busy serving his customers. According to Pak Min, he earns around Rp 125,000 to Rp150,000.00 net per day shared with Parno. Both of them have to work from 13.00 o’clock till 06.00 in
the morning. Compared to Pak Man, his income much lower., Pak Man earns around Rp 25,000.00 to Rp 300,000.00 net per day. Even so, it seems that his business was much more of a success than the previous one. Because of that, he told to Parno about the mysterious old becak driver. Both of them tried to find the mysterious becak driver, and finally they found him. They discovered that his name is Sukardi and that he lives near the Tugu of Yogyakarta. According to the some other becak drivers, Sukardi has paranormal power. One day Pak Min invited Sukardi to eat at his warung, free, in gratitude for the suggestion of ‘white fasting’. Pak Min no continues to practice ‘white fasting’ every 35 days to make sure his business stays successful.

Over each month, both Pak Man and Pak Min have the same system of working shifts. Pak Man goes back to his village every 15 days; Pak Min goes home every 20 days. When they are off, their relatives take over their business. Pak Min always takes bus to go home, but Pak Man always goes by taxi. Pak Man has a reason why he rides by taxi even though like Pak Min he could take the bus home: ‘Saya sudah tua mas. Anak saya juga sudah menikah, ngopo kok ngoyo-ngoyo numpak bus mung dinggo ngirit duit sih Mas. Wong rejeki wis dijatah karo Gusti Allah Wae’, (I’m already old, my daughter is already married, why do I have to be eager to take a bus to save money. I believe that wealth comes from God)’ he said in Indonesian language and mixed with ngoko Javanese. His ngoko language expressions are used to emphasise the words ‘why I have to be eager to take a bus for saving money. I believe that wealth is coming from God’ in order to show that he can afford it, and by saying it in ngoko language means he is already on the top of hierarchical order of Javanese society, or at least on top of Pak Min hierarchically.21 Another

21 The Javanese language is composed of three hierarchical languages. The first is the ngoko, used by wong cilik (the under class) who are not well educated, the majority of them still living in rural villages. Ngoko is also used between close friends. This usage does not reflect social hierarchy and shows an egalitarian relationship. Second, there is the krama madya (middle language), which is used among friends and in a bureaucratic environment. It is also used in casual conversation, when speakers want to show a sense of respect but still employ a relatively egalitarian vocabulary. The third level is krama, or krama inggil. This language used to show respect to the opposite speaker since they are older, wealthier, or higher in terms of social or bureaucratic rank than the person actually speaking. This can also be used to some one who was not recognized by the first speaker, or among Javanese who just know or recently met each other for the first time. By addressing Min in ngoko to display familiarity and a degree of superiority, Pak Man is excused from conversing in krama madya.
rationalisation for the assumption of a superior linguistic posture is because Pak Man has been selling food and drinks in the warung longer than Pak Min, and because Pak Min’s age is 20 years younger than Pak Man. Thus he feels that he deserves to take taxi to go home rather than taking bus. On the other hand, Pak Min said that he has to save money; taking a bus is much cheaper than going home by taxi. He saves money for the future of his family, especially for his children because his family does not have extra security in the form of village rice fields as Pak Man does.

Both Pak Man and Pak Min come from villages which are their homes. They are no all that concerned about hygiene in the space they use for business. Their warungs are somewhat smelly and dirty, and also poorly lit. Even in front of Ibu Yat’s warung, some people get drunk and throw up. Pak Min and Pak Man use only 15-Watt light bulbs to light their shops. The electricity is ‘stolen’ directly from the high voltage cable which passes over the top of the warung. They never feel guilty about using the electricity without legal permission, even though it is strictly prohibited. However, Pak Man and Pak Min have an interesting excuse which blends political meaning into their larceny. It reflects a spirit of contestation with the state as manifest in statements such as:

‘Aku yo ngerti nek listrikku kuwi nyolong setrum tapi aku mung nganggo 15 watt saben bengi, ora luwih. Iki ora ono apa-apane nek dibandingke koruptor sing njupuk luwih akeh soko negoro’. (‘I realize that I get the electricity from stealing, but I only use 15-watt every night, not more than that. It is nothing compared to the corruptors who take more that I take from the state’).

Merely 15-watts seems not enough, and Pak Min and Pak Man also add further illumination from fire lamps, demonstrating that they do not intend to take more than 15 watts. These fire lamps are located on the left side of where the proprietors sit down. Pak Man’s warung is three time bigger than Pak Min’s. 22 Both Pak Min and Pak Man organize the serving of food and drinks from their chairs. They sit down right in the middle of the angkringan. On the left side, there are some dishes where the customers usually serve themselves, though they may also ask Pak Min to reheat it on the charcoal stove. Among the dishes on offer we can find fried tofu with vegetables inside, sweet fried tofu, fried

22 Each warung size is 3 M² or about 1.5 M x 2 M.
banana, Yum Cha, fried tempe, fried cassava, bird’s egg satay, chicken skin or intestinal satay, cow-foot tendon satay, and some other organ food satays. Next to that, there is a place for cigarettes, from machine-made filtered cigarettes to rokok kretak (the popular Indonesian clove cigarettes). Meanwhile, on the right side of Pak Min there are three kettles, one big and two of medium size, on top of charcoal stove. Some people call this warung the ‘Three Kettles Café’ (Café Ceret Tiga) in order indulge in a little gentle mockery, making it sound a bit like an up-market café in the big cities. The long wooden bench surrounds Pak Man’s position. The customers occupy this place, facing Pak Man.

Pak Min seems busy every night, serving hundreds of customers (men and women) who come and go, and also some who hang out there for hours. He keeps busy making tea, coffee, milk, ginger coffee, ginger milk and the famous ‘kopi joss’ (coffee infused with a hot fire charcoal which makes a sound like ‘joss!’ when the glowing charcoal is immersed into the hot coffee). It is believed that this kopi joss will heal tummy problems. He has two assistants who either serve or receive the payments from those customers who cannot be reached by Pak Min directly. Their names are Catur and Hono. Both of them are Pak Min’s nephews from Klaten. While serving the customer, Pak Min also talks to his customers, sometimes he also collects payment from a customer once they have finished drinking, eating and talking with friends in his warung.

The customers of the warung are come from various places and occupations. They include also students from various universities in Yogyakarta. This city itself is famously named kota pelajar (student city), because students from regions and cities throughout Indonesia come to study in Yogyakarta. This factor contributes to the plural and cosmopolitan atmosphere of the city. It is just like melting pot of nations, both the numerous cultures of Indonesia itself, and from foreign lands. As a kota pelajar this place has become politically important, it had an important role in the growth of the student movements that took a leading role in overthrowing Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, and ushering in the era of reformasi (reformation). The warung angkringan of Pak Min is on the right side of sidewalk of Wongsodirdjan Street, which connects to Suryonegaran Street providing access to the police office responsible for traffic administration. If we walk to the west, right on the left hand side there is a wall separating Wongsodirjan Street and the Tugu train station. On the right side of this street, there are some houses for the high-
ranking civil servants who train administrative workers. At the end of the street, there is an old warehouse. During the colonial era it functioned as a store of trading goods brought in from other cities to Yogyakarta. This area is very quiet and dark, and very often used by prostitutes to make a date with customers. These street workers are both women and transvestites. Other prostitutes are also found just right on the south of the Tugu train station, in the Pasar Kembang area. Sometimes they also patronise or hang around in Pak Man or Pak Min’s warungs.

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One night during my observation in Pak Man’s warung, I was there with some friends, and a motorcycle stopped in front of Pak Min’s warung. A girl on the back saddle
got off. I was thinking that the man would get off too, but he just dropped her off and then rode away. She was wearing dark blue jeans and a tight red shirt that made a well-defined silhouette of her body. That induced some of the warung customers to stare at her. While waiting for her tea she chatted with Ibu Semi (Pak Min’s assistant) about one of her friends who often came to that place. She wanted to know how busy she had been. She also asked how Pak Min was getting on. She asked Rahmat (Pak Min’s assistant and Ibu Semi’s son in law) why Pak Man was not selling food that night, and Rahmat replied that he was off today. That young woman, whose age was around 25, then asked Rahmat to make her a glass of tea. 23 She asked him in Javanese kromo language: ‘Mas kulo nyuwun teh panas’ (‘Brother, I want hot tea please’). Rahmat kept quiet did not reply anything to her, not as he usually does to all customers. He just asked to Pak Min to make hot tea, then when it ready Rahmat gave it to her.

When she was drinking her tea, suddenly her mobile phone rang in polyphonic tones. She grabbed it in a rush, then started to talk to someone on the phone. She spoke in Indonesian language with very rushed pronunciation: ‘Ya, saya ada di angkringan Pak Man. Gimana? Jadi kan? Saya tunggu disini,’ (‘Yes, I’m in Pak Man’s angkringan, how? so? I’ll wait here’). A few minutes later, while she was sipping her tea and eating fried banana while talking with Rahmat’s mother in law (Ibu Semi), a middle aged man approached her. He was wearing a black T-shirt and dark blue jeans. He did not say anything to that girl, but the girl in red stood up and paid Ibu Semi for her food and drink. As she paid, she was facing south because Ibu Semi was standing on the south side. The man who had called for her was facing north and it appeared that he did not want to face the people sitting in Pak Man’s warung. He was smoking and remaining quiet while waiting for her. After paying Ibu Semi, she went off with the middle age man on his motorbike. They went in the direction of Malioboro and no-one could see them any more.

I then asked Rahmat who she was. He told me with a smile on his face, that she was

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23 Rahmat had studied for a while at a provincial university in Purwokerto (Central Java), but then his family did not have enough money to allow him to continue his studies, so he came to work for Pak Min temporarily. He is the son in law of Ibu Semi who is also an assistant to Pak Man and Pak Min.
a cewek nakal (naughty girl) or perek (perempuan eksperimen = experimental girl).\(^{24}\) Rahmat also told me that her name is Tini, and that she often stayed around Pak Min or Pak Man’s warung for a while, just to await the arrival of her boy friends. He did not show any respect to that girl publicly, and perhaps that was because he was working together in Pak Man and Pak Min warungs with his mother in law (ibu Semi). However, it was clear that he was trying to protect her by avoiding calling her a prostitute. The terms he used (cewek nakal or perek) actually expressed an ambiguous impression. It is hard to presume with these words whether the speaker intends them to be negative or not. Through such means he was trying to soften any direct accusation that she was a prostitute. This shows the way he constructed power relations with her in front of someone else who asked about the girl. In this situation he has to protect her by not saying that she is prostitute. It was his way of attempting to make his customers give a measure of respect to the social role of one of the various underclass patrons of the warung, in spite of the fact that perek or cewek nakal would scarcely be held in high esteem.

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Another incident in the warung during my periods of observation there, reveals a different aspect of the way different elements of the wong cilik make use of this constructed public space to pursue their social objectives. This is an account of the relations that can be forged between gamblers and the premans (thugs). It also shows an interesting pattern of power relations that take shape between subjects in this space.

Some youngsters were parking their motorbikes in front of Ibu Yat’s liquor kiosk. Some of them had tattoos on their arms. One of them, while sitting on the saddle of his motor bike wearing a red T-shirt and displaying an ostentatiously tattooed arm, asked a person close to ibu Yat’s kiosk; ‘Piye.? Dijupukke maneh Piye?’, (‘What is up? Do you want me to pick up some?’). Then he replied by saying ‘Wis, sesuk-sesuk wae. Mbengi iki wis okeh kok.’ (‘Already, next time. This night there already is a lot’). Their conversation

\(^{24}\) Cewek nakal or Perek or experimental girl is not a professional sex worker but rather a girl who practic promiscuity. She might get some money from her new partner but it is not what she after for.

\(^{26}\) Papi’s boys call him as ‘god father’, this term inspired by the movie entitled The God Father.
was unclear, surreptitious; it sounded like something secret. Then, not long after their quick-fire exchange, the person close to Ibu Yat’s kiosk took out a piece of paper covered with puzzling pictures and numbers. I recognised that picture (an example of the picture follows in Figure 2). It was a ‘mystical guide’ used by gamblers to predict winning lottery numbers. It is mystical because, these pictures collectively, as shown below, reflect some kind of meaning that can only be interpreted mystically — very often a dream is used — until they can be associated with a series of numbers that might come up and win the lottery.

The picture shows on the paper usually the picture of animal that might form a random of number, and some forms of unclear picture, the picture of an old man like priest, bird, or the picture of other animals. The ability to interpret is depending on how often they play this kind of gambling. The more often they play the illegal lottery and interpret the mystical picture, the closer the accuracy of their prediction. From the picture he brought, obviously they are playing and selling illegal lottery called Totor or Togel, that was why they were somewhat using unclear language in front of many people because they have to consider about morality even though that this space give them a lot of freedom.

In Pak Man and Pak Min’s warung, very often gamblers and premans (thugs) were hanging out together. They were talking, predicting lottery number and waiting for lower rank preman tipper giving money to them. During my observation, one of the students we knew, named Toji, introduce us (My self, and my two assistants named Rowie and Putra, students from Gadjah Mada University) to ‘Papi’. Toji is working as a camera operator for one of the private TV station in Jakarta. He graduated from Gadjah Mada University in 1995. Since he was a student, he often hangs out in this warung together with Papi that was why he knew Papi very well. After he introduced me to Papi, then we joined with the people in Papi’s table, and on that place there were Asgit, Mones, Spiky, Petruk, and Rhino of which Papi call them as ‘bocah-bocah ku’ (in Javanese language means ‘my boys’).

Papi’s boys have some duty within his territory, for example, Asgit is a preman who monitor one of the area under Papi’s territory. He also runs a VCD/DVD and Sony Play Station rental business. All of the VCD/DVD and Sony Play Station on his rental are counterfeit, but under Papi’s protection his business running smoothly. Mones and Spiky are also Papi’s petty preman. Spiky graduated from middle technical school and he used to
have a furniture business but bankrupt during the monetary crisis and since then he often
moves from one to another profession. He often drunk together with Papi in that warung,
this friendship finally has made him become preman. His friends call him spiky because he
has natural spiky hair without gel hairstyling. Petruk has a duty to monitor and as operator
lapangan (field operator) of illegal lottery in Papi’s territory. He control some petty
premans whom every night have to come to the warung where they hang out to give a
report of income from Papi’s territory. Rhino is a bodyguard of Papi’s he is tough that is
why his friends call him as Rhinoceros. At that time, we were just listening more to them
rather than involve in their talking. Since then my assistants and me often joined into Papi’s
table and involved in their talking and joking. Papi is one of the premans in Yogyakarta
who often hanging out in Pak Man warung while waiting his petty preman under his
control giving money to him. At the moment he recognized as the ‘god father’ of the area
covering Malioboro Street, Solo Street (Adisucipto street), Gejayan Street, Diponegoro
street, and Mangkubumi Street, in which all of the are an important business district in
Yogyakarta.26 He also backing up billiard parlour, karaoke, and gambling in Yogyakarta.

In preman circles, Papi’s boys say that he has a long history to be the operation
target of military and police. He was the target of ‘Petrus’ (the acronym of Penembakan
Misterius = mysterious killing) in 1980s but some Chinese business people in Yogyakarta
who were close to him sent him to Netherlands for a few years.27 He has alias name as
‘Raja Tega’ (the No Mercy King) instead of ‘Papi’ which means father. He got this alias
name because all of his friend says that he has no mercy at all to some one who dare

26 Petrus is a neologism of two words, Penembakan (shooting) and Misterius [mysterious] in Indonesia
1980s, is it an act by the New Order regime to kill the thugs (gali or preman). Siegel notes from Suharto
autobiography that ‘Suharto saw the gali as incarnation of inhuman cruelty who created a generalized an
destablizing fear’. He also argues that Suharto as Indonesian president was responsible on this killing by
showing a quotation from his authobiography saying: ‘so the corpses were left where the were, just like that.
This was for ‘shock therapy’. In addition, he also shows that on the later edition this passage has been
excised. See James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta, Counter-Revolution Today. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1998,p.107-110. See also G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan KH, Suharto, Pikiran,
Ucapan, dan Tindakan saya: Otobiografi Seperti dipaparkan Kepada G.Dwipayana dan Ramadhan KH.
become the king of criminal. See also Johus Barker (1998) ‘State of Fear: Controling the Criminal Contagion
case of Petrus (Pembunuhan Misterius = mysterious killing) in 1980s has made Suharto’s regime
overpowered and mastered the criminals under the regime’s control.
enough to challenge him. His age is about 50s years old; he is one of the recognised *premans* in Yogyakarta. According to the story from his boys, he was once jailed in Nusa Kambangan, one of the famous jails in central Java especially for the high-class criminals. That is why police and military have known him very well. ‘Papi’s personality is actually looks calm, clean, neat --perhaps because he really like to wears white or light colour shirt-- and having moustache. In term of appearance, he does not look scary at all as usually stereotyped by storytellers that most *premans* (thugs) are somewhat looks scary. According to Pak Man he has sense of humour. However, some people said that he is straight forward and *keras* (literary meaning hard or tough). Some of his friends connect Papi’s character with his ethnicity. He is ethnically Batak, but living in Yogyakarta for years so he speak Javanese very well, both *ngoko* and *krama.*

When I observed Pak Man and Pak Min *warung* at nighttimes, he shows that he is tough. Papi told a story that he was just quarrelled with one of the police who accidentally hit Papi’s motorbike on the street when he was going to Pak man’s *warung*. Papi was very angry with the police officer because he felt undermine during the quarrel. Finally, Papi solve the problem of quarrelled, which made the police asked for forgiveness to him. Papi knew that he was a young police who just moved to Yogyakarta who did not know who Papi is yet. He said to his boys (Asgit, Petruk, Rhino, and Spiky) that he would hit him if he did not ask for forgiveness (‘Mau nek deweke ora njaluk ngapuro ning aku, wis tak antemi tenan, dasar bocah brandalan!’ = ‘If he did not ask for forgiveness, I would hit him, he just a scumbag!’). This story shows that Papi knows very well all police in Yogyakarta. In this case he also had to tell that he knows that there is a new police who just moved to this city and involved in the accident that made Papi angry. Furthermore, he demonstrated that he dared to challenge the new police officer in which he call as *berandalan* (scumbag). This is a story that gives an effect to the power relation between subjects in the warung and Papi (as I will show through the conversation between Papi and Pak Man later). Further more, while he was still angry about the police who just hit his motorbike, there was street singer. She is a girl about 14 years old, singing infront of Pak

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28 Batak is a name of ethnic group in Northern Sumatra.
Man customers near by Papi’s table. My friend Rowie, Putra and Maksum (Rowie’s friend) one of the Kyai’s son in Yogyakarta who join on the same table with Papi tried to find coin to give to her, but he could not find it in their pocket. Suddenly, Papi yell to the street singer with the ngoko language and rough, ‘Ngopo ning kono kowe, lungo kono. Tak culek matamu mengko, nek nengkono teru!’ (What are you doing here, go away, I’ll poke your eyes with my finger if you are here all the time!’). It was not only made the girl away from there but also somewhat shocking people around that table, even to his boys and this make his boys quiet, because they knew that he was angry. According to Pak Man, Papi do not like if there is a street musician singing close to his table, and every time there is a street musician asking some money from the people where Papi hang out he always angry and yell out loud to the street musicians.

Almost every night ‘Papi’ hanging out in Pak Man’s warung and he always picks up the same sit and table, it is located on the east of the warung. In this warung he is waiting for his petty premans under his control to give some commission to him. The petty premans job are depend on the territory they control. Some of them control the business district of Malioboro, means they are tipping money from business people who run shops, restaurant, entertainments business in that area. Preman who control prostitution area tipping money from the pimps organize prostitute in Pasar Kembang. Petty premans who control gambling business around Malioboro street tipping the agents some money for protection. Papi as a god father of his territory just sit down on the same spot every night, and none dare to sits on that place when they already there. He usually sit together with a person who has alias name as ‘Badak’ (the Rhinoceros), Jegrag (the spiky hair) and some other petty premans. In this warung, they were just talking about many things from politics, the income from tipping tax from shops, and waiting for the report from his petty premans about the illegal lottery he backed up. Papi, seems like to talk about politics perhaps because he is a PDIP members as Papi claimed himself active in PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan = Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle). 29 He is one of the Satgas

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29 PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) is a party lead by Megawati Soekarno Putri, the President of Indonesia who ousted president Abdurahman Wahid in the year 2001 (just after his first year of presidency). She leads the country for the period of 2001-2004.

Aris Arif Mundayat
(Satuan Tugas = Task Force) of PDI-P, He claimed that, every time Megawati come to Yogyakarta, he usually phoned by PDI-P personnel to give protection to Megawati. However, he said that he did not interested to involve in the stream of political interest in Jakarta.  

While Pak Man was busy serving his customer sitting in the same group as ‘Papi’, two people approached ‘Papi’. According to Pak Man they might be Papi’s boys, because he is the field operator for the illegal lottery (called Totor or Togel) in Yogyakarta and the boss of illegal lottery who operates under Papi’s territory named Situmorang, also from Batak as Papi’s and Rhino’s ethnicity. Papi and his premans under his control back Situmorang security, in which involving state apparatuses, by which Papi act as the mediator between the state apparatuses and the person who operates illegal lottery. The two men who just came sat down close to Papi’s table, then Papi asked Pak Man to make two glass of Coffee Joss. Papi asked pak man in ngoko language (Pak Man, Gawekke kopi Joss loro Pak’ = Pak Man, Make two glass of coffee Joss, Pak). The last word ‘Pak’ in this Javanese language function to make it polite as ‘please’ in English. He used the word ‘Pak’ because he use ngoko language, so it was just to make it polite order to Pak Man. Pak Man answer in krama language to show his respect by saying: ‘Inggih, ditenggo sekedap nggih’ (Yes, just wait for a while please).

While waiting their coffee from Pak Man, One of the two men who just came gave envelop to Papi by saying ‘Ini titipanmu’ (Indonesian language, meaning ‘this is your order’). Papi grabbed it and put into his pocket, then he continued to talk with them. One of the Papi’s petty preman who collect income from illegal lottery showed him a kind of summary account of income (of what they call as ‘rekapan’ in which coming from the English word ‘recapitulation’), from the illegal lottery. Then after they finished talking about it, they were drinking their coffee. After a while, both of them asked to Papi was

30 Satgas (Satuan Tugas = Task Forces) is security guard unit to protect parties’ elites and the parties office from ‘enemy’. All Satgas of the parties in Indonesia are wearing military look uniform. The outward appearances of Satgas uniform depend on the party’s colour. For example, PDIP colour is red, and the Satgas uniform also colours red with military camouflage style of uniform. The uniform of Golkar (the former ruling party during Suharto era) Satgas colours yellow also military camouflage style. The Islamic party such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development party) colour green, and so do its Satgas uniform.
leave to go, to check some other places lottery income. After they were off then Papi took the envelope from his pocket and open it in front of his fellow premans. He showed to Pak Man first, that he got Rp 1,000,000.00 from the two men who just came there. Both of them involved in conversation in front Papi’s boys. Interestingly Papi, once again, speak ngoko and Pak Man spoke kromo as I quoted below:

**Papi** (in ngoko): ‘Man, delengo iki. Aku nggur lungguh wae nek kene diwenehi duwit wong sak juta, lho piye? Kowe gelem nggur lungguh ngene iki entuk duwit sak suta?

(Man (he call his name without Pak), look at this. I just sitting down here some one give me money Rp 1000,000.00, see? Do you want just sitting down like me then received money one million Rupiah?)

**Pak Man**: ‘Yo, inggih purun to Papi’

(Yes, of course I want Papi)

**Papi**: ‘Nanging kowe gelem ora, ono syarate lho…’

(But, do you agree or not if there is a prerequisite…?)

**Pak Man**: ‘Lha, syaratipun menopo to Papi?’

(What is the prerequisite Papi?)

**Papi**: ‘Yo syarate kowe kudu dadi preman, koyo aku mene iki. Gelem po kowe?

Ha..ha..ha.’

(Yes, the prerequisite you just have to be a thug, as me. Do you want? Ha…ha…ha…)

**Pak Man**: ‘Wah nek ngaten meniko nggih kulo mboten purun, lha mangke ingkang sadean angkringan sinten, Ha…ha…ha…’

(Wow, if like that I don’t want it, then who will serve in the food stall? Ha…ha…ha…)

After they were talking about that, all premans on the space where Papi occupied were laughing together. Papi and Pak Man have had close relationships for a long time, and they understand each other position. In the eyes of Papi’s followers, he viewed as a person who understands the condition of his boys. When his boys do not have money and need it for their family, he often helps them by giving the money they need. He also viewed as a cool person, relax and never afraid to any one and dare to do anything he thought that it is right. That is why he called as ‘the King of No Mercy’. According to his boys Papi never talk about his family, and none dare enough to ask about it, this somewhat make him looks mysterious.

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Another social drama happen in another time during my observation, it was in the morning In May 20th, 2003, at 10.00. I bought Kompas Newspaper then hung out with the
newspaper seller who was just selling his newspaper near by the warung. At that time a police officer and construction worker also hang out in the same warung.\textsuperscript{31} We become involved in long conversation about politics as I quoted below:

**Policeman:** Kompas is difficult to read because it is middle class’ newspaper, most of the news is about politics and economy. Wong cilik do not understand it. (Kompas itu sulit dibaca karena korannya, isinya pun lebih banyak soal politik dan ekonomi. Orang kecil tidak paham apa artinya)

**Me:** Yes, this newspaper is somewhat hard to read. Like this title for example, it is about Nurcholis Madjid who would be promoted by Golkar as the presidential candidate.\textsuperscript{32}

(Ya, Koran ini memang agak berat untuk dibaca. Seperti ini misalnya, ini tentang Nurcholis Madjid yang pernah akan di jadikan calon president oleh Golkar)

**Newspaper Seller:** Nurcholis is a middle class who read Kompas. (Nurcolis itu kelas menengah yang baca kompas)

**Policeman:** Do you think that wong cilik at the village level know who he is? (Apakah kamu piker orang kecil di desa tahu siapa dia?)

**Newspaper Seller:** Of course none of the wong cilik at village level know him, because they don’t read newspaper. For them it would be better to buy food rather than buy and read newspaper. (Tentu saja tidak ada satu pun orang kecil di tingkat desa tahu dia, karena mereka tidak baca Koran. Bagi mereka lebih baik jika untuk beli makanan daripada beli dan baca koran)

**Me:** What about Megawati? (Bagaimana tentang Megawati?)

**Policeman:** Megawati is supported by PDIP’s people, what has she given this country? She does not make wong cilik happy, nor has she given them a better life, her party just make the thugs (preman) richer or even make them become legislative members or even Bupati then they are corrupt. (Megawati itu hanya di dukung oleh orang-orang PDIP, apa yang dia berikan kepada Negara? Dia tidak membuat orang kecil bahagia, tidak juga memberikan mereka kehidupan yang lebih baik, partainya hanya membuat preman lebih kaya atau bahkan menjadikannya anggota dewan perwakilan atau bahkan bupati yang kemudian korup)

\footnote{The data I use in this case also used for my paper entitled \textit{Political Figure, Civil Society and the Half-hearted ‘Reformasi’} presented in the seminar ‘Indonesian Elections 2004: End of Reformasi?’ This seminar organized by Regional Studies Program, Institute of Liberal Arts, Walailak University, 18 June 2004 Walailak University, Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Thailand.}

\footnote{Nurcholis Madjis is a well known intellectual Muslim living in Jakarta. Before the presidential election he was nominated by the intellectual in Golkar (Golongan Karya = Functional Group) Party as one of the the presidential candidates from this party. But he withdrew from the candidacy before the internal convention held to elect the nominated candidates.}
Newspaper Seller: I voted for PDIP in 1999 election, then I regretted it. I was thinking that PDIP was the party for *wong cilik*, in fact it is not! I was disappointed because *wong cilik* already supported her position when the head quarter of PDIP in Jakarta was attacked by some people from Suryadi’s PDI. Some of them even died, perhaps hundreds. But now when she become president she never talk about it, she did not even want to visit the head quarter when the members of PDIP held a kind of ceremony to commemorate the attack and the member who died for her. So *wong cilik* for her just used to support her power! Now *wong cilik* face a lot of difficulties in finding job, but she never think how to make job for the people. Golkar was much better, actually. I voted for Golkar before ‘reformasi’ but regretted because they were corrupt, but then voted for PDIP and regretted again. Ha..ha..

Policeman: Lucky I have no right to vote, ha..ha. (Untung saya tak punya hak pilih ha..ha.)

Construction Labour: Megawati become president just because she is Sukarno’s daughter. A long time ago I voted for Golkar, because the head of hamlet asked me to vote for it, then in the last election I voted for PDIP, I thought she would be the messiah (*Ratu Adil*) because of her father. I remember when I was a young boy when Sukarno died, his picture was on the moon. Yes Sukarno’s face was on the moon! If Suharto died his picture would not be on the moon, neither Gus Dur nor Megawati. Megawati was not *ratu adil* because she just quite and never thinks about the people like us. If she was *ratu adil* she would think about the people like us who suffer economically. She just thinks about her self not like her father who always thought about the people and the country, that’s why his picture on the moon because he wanted the Indonesian remember him on their heart. Yes I always remember Sukarno! And I am disappointed about Megawati.

(Megawati menjadi president hanya karena dia anak Sukarno. Dahulu saya pilih

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33 Kompas (28 July 2002) published that the victims’ family were paid Rp 10,000,000,00 by PDIP’s leaders and all of them have to sign a kind of statement saying that ‘The victims’ family surrender the case to solve 27 July 1996 to Megawati Sukarnoputri, the leader of PDIP. ‘Tim Pembela Demokrasi Indonesia Usut Tuntas Kasus 27 Juli’ in *Kompas*. 28 July 2002.

Me: What do you expect from Megawati?
(Apa yang kamu harap dari Megawati?)

Construction Labour: If the condition is the same as to day, Megawati has to be changed with the new president. I have not yet any idea which party I will vote for. I will wait for the situation and try to get some information from some people. However, voting for one of the parties we always treated as rubbish.

From the discussion as quoted above, we can see that there are some cultural elements of mysticism but then turn into class-consciousness especially as uttered by the Construction Labourer. This shows by his first assumption that Megawati is Ratu Adil just because she is Sukarno’s daughter. The construction labour in this case has changed his mind after experienced some economic difficulties during the Megawati presidency then he was disappointed over her policy, and interestingly this kind of disappointment construct a kind of class-consciousness sown by his uttering that his social class just is ‘rubbish’,

34 In the general election 2004, this construction labour voted for PKPB just because some one promised to him that he would get Rp 20,000.00 if he voted for that party. He did not know the abbreviation of PKPB because he can not read, he just noticed this party from the picture. Her wife voted for PDIP also because she expected Rp 20,00.00 but finally she did not get that money. While their son spoilt the ballot by punching a lot of parties picture. In presidential election 5th July 2004, he voted for Megawati just because one of the prominent person in his hamlet saying that he get rice for poor is actually from Megawati. His wife still voted for Megawati and his son voted for Susilo Bambang Yudoyono. When he voted for DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah) he was choosing the beautiful one, she did not know who she is, what he think at that time just because she is beautiful. When I show the picture to him he pointed the candiate he though beautiful and she is actually wive of Sultan of Yogyakarta. Newspaper seller voted for Golkar in 2004 general election, because he disappointed toward PDIP and hoping that Golkar will make the situation better than under Megawati.

35 The ‘just ruler’ of popular legend, who will emerge to bring justice and prosperity to his people.
which means their voice has no significant point in politics. In fact, he became very pragmatic, because in the 2004 general election, he voted for PKPB (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa= Care of the Nation Party) --led by Suharto’s daughter named Siti Hardiyati Rukmana (whom popularly called as Tutut)-- just because some one promised him that he would get Rp 20,000.00 if he voted for that party. Interestingly, until now he do not know the abbreviation of PKPB because he can not read and he knew this party just a few hours before he went to the ballot, he just noticed this party from the picture only because some one --who promised him Rp 20,000.00-- told him only about the picture not the name of the party. After he went to the ballot he asked to the person who promised him the money, but he just got Rp 10,000.00. His wife voted for PDIP also because she expected Rp 20,000.00, but finally she did not get that money, because some one who promised to her, ran away. While their son --who are still in technical high school-- spoilt his ballot by punching a lot of parties’ picture.

Furthermore, when the construction labourer voted for DPP (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah = Senator like position) he was voting the beautiful women, he did not know who she was, he voted for her at that time just because she was beautiful. When I show the picture to him he pointed out the candidate he voted for, and she was actually wife of the Sultan of Yogyakarta. This case shows that the shift from traditional perspective to class as the basic idea in influencing electoral behaviour is not linear. According to the idea reflecting from this conversation, the construction Labourer idea in choosing one of the parties is not merely ideological but rather based on a combination between mysticism and class-consciousness but by the time he was in the ballot chamber he was very pragmatically choosing PKPB just because of money. It is quite different if we compare with Newspaper Seller who shows that his idea was relied more on class-consciousness in judging which party he will vote. When he voted for PDIP he felt as wong cilik who has sympathy toward PDIP, but when there is no real change and he felt that the political reform was half hearted

36 Siti hardiyati Rukmana is one of the daughters of Suharto (Indonesian President for the period 1966-1998). On the last period of Suharto’s government she was a minister of Social Affair.

37 During that period the exchange rate of AU $ 1 toward Rupiah was around Rp 6200.00.
he voted for Golkar again in 2004.  

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According to some stories, I described above, warung of Pak Man and Pak Min has become a space where the interclass social relation is happening. It is a space constructed by wong cilik through their everyday life discursive practices by which has become intersecting world and discourses. Their relation in this space to some extent is personal but also somewhat anonym. Personal relationships as I describe above give a protection to each other, such as in the case when Rahmat did not say that the girl is prostitute but rather cewek nakal, which was more subtle. The relationships between Pak Man, the cewek nakal, the gambler, students and preman also with some other warung customers creates a social ties in which each other understand their social position and constructs a situation where the relationships relatively anonym and egalitarian. The relative anonymity, here gives a possibility in constructing the feeling of freedom by which people can share their idea, whether political or apolitical, freely. It is the space where they feel that the are not under surveillances. Accordingly, the warung Angkringan of Pak Man and Pak Min are not only the best place for eating cheap foods, for lower income students, petty clerical, petty traders, policeman, taxi drivers, becak drivers, but also for the rendezvous of students involved in students movement, premans (thugs) seniman (artist) in Yogyakarta, also for dating of cewek nakal. They play their role and they display their discursive practices in this intersecting world publicly.

E. Wong Cilik and the Street: The Story of Social Encounters

This section will discuss about the life of wong cilik and its social encounters on the street. This will show the power relation between wong cilik and the state apparatuses and other social groups in which categorize not as wong cilik. Through this encounter we will be able to understand how wong cilik give meaning to the state apparatuses or other social groups consisting of rich people by which they categorise as berkuasa (ruled). Moreover,

38 This account is base on my paper entitled Political Figure, Civil Society and the Half-hearted ‘Reformasi’ presented in the seminar ‘Indonesian Elections 2004: End of Reformasi?’This seminar organized by Regional Studies Program, Institute of Liberal Arts, Walailak University, 18 June 2004 Walailak University, Nakhon Sri Thammarat
this section will demonstrate how *wong cilik* construct space in a moving space such as bus for their economic struggle and construct power relation with the various social classes.

**E.1. *Wong cilik* and the Street: the Police, Kampong Kids, and Accident**

One day in the kampong of Pogung, urban fringe of Jogyakarta (around 3 km north of Malioboro Street), some children above seven below ten years old were playing on the street of the kampong with their bikes.\(^{39}\) It was about 16.00 o’clock in the afternoon and all of them involved in it were boys. After they were getting bored riding bikes around the kampong’s street, they stopped and played another game. They were playing ‘police operation’ game. In this game some boys acting as a ‘motorcyclists’ and some as ‘police’. The ‘police’ conducted an operation to check driving licence of the motorcyclists. The boys who act as ‘polices’ stood on the left side of the kampong street, and the boys who act as ‘motorcyclists’ rode their bikes and passed around in front of the ‘police’. One by one the ‘polices’ stoped the ‘motorcyclists’ and asking whether they have driving license or not or wearing helmet or not. Some of the ‘motorists’ who were stopped by the ‘police’ always said that they possessed driving licence.

After a few moments, the one who acted as police officer said to to the ‘motorcyclists’: ‘*Wah ora kepenak nek kabe podo nggowo SIM*’ (‘Gee, the game is not fun if all of you saying that you possess driving licence’).\(^{40}\) Then he continued: ‘*Salah sijine kudu ono sing ra nggowo SIM terus mengko ditakoni polisi*’ (One of you should say that you do not possess driving license, so the police would question you). The game continued and the one who was acting as ‘police’ in that role-play had a right to stop some boys who act as ‘motorcyclists’. There was an interesting conversation between ‘police’ and the ‘motorcyclists’ when the police stop the a ‘motorcyclist’. The police asked the motorcyclists to show their driving license. One of the ‘motorcyclists’ pretended that he did not has driving license as the scenario already agreed before. Interestingly, the one of the

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\(^{39}\) These kids were coming from family with lower to middle level of income per month. The kampong it self is becoming new middle class settlement, in which some poor family who used to be a peasant with small cultivated land, but now were already sold. This kampong named Pogung located in Kabupaten Sleman, Special Province of Yogyakarta. This kampong is just around 2 km away to the North of Malioboro.

\(^{40}\) *SIM* is the abbreviation of *Surat Ijin Mengemudi* (driving license) which is categorising in to different type of license depends on the type of vehicles. Such as SIM C is for motor cycle, SIM A is for car, SIM B (which
boys who acted as a policeman asked him in Indonesian language with high tone (pretended to show that he has power) ‘Punya uang lima ribu apa ngga?!’ (‘Do you have Rp 5000.00 or not?!), ‘Kalau punya, kamu harus bayar ke saya! ’ (‘If you had it you had to pay me!’). The ‘motorcyclist’ pretended that he was afraid then he said to the ‘police’ ‘Saya tidak punya uang, saya hanya bawa Rp 1000.00 saja, bagaimana? (I don’t have money, I just bring Rp 1000.00 only, what I have to do?). Moreover, the ‘police’ said ‘Ya sudah Rp 1000.00 juga tidak apa-apa’ (‘That is all right, Rp 1000.00 it doesn’t matter). Moreover, the ‘motorcyclist’ pretended to give the ‘policeman’ money (by giving his empty hand to the police) and the ‘police pretended looking around just to make sure no one witness on him. This kind of game was practice repeatedly, until they felt amused and bored.

Finally, they changed the game into different scenario that was a play role of accident on the street. In the new scenario, one ‘motorcyclist’ came from the right and the other from the left. There were no ‘police’ and the street, they were sitting down in front of the house (of what they call as pos polisi [police post]) in the kampong near by the location where they played the game. The ‘motorcyclist’ came from left and right collided, right on the spot where they were agreed that the ‘motorists’ should be involved in collision. They pretended to quarrel and to blame each other and finally pretended to fight. One of the kids who acted as a ‘police’ accidentally passed on that spot and stopped. He pretended that he had to separate the ‘fighting’ but he could not, so he had to call some other police through his handy talky, radio communication. He just used his hand, pretended as two-way radio communication. After a while some ‘police’ came to the spot where the ‘accident’ happened and separated the two ‘motorcyclists’ involved in collision and fighting. After they separated the two ‘motorcyclists’ from fighting, again the ‘police’ asked their license and the same language of bribery uttered in similar way like the previous game. After that, they were just laughing and the game finished.

This was just role-play among the children in which they copied from the real life of police operation on the street. The police operation mostly has some code names such as ‘zebra operation’ (for routine operation to fine the motorcyclist who are not bringing licence and the letter of possession of motor cycle or car); ‘operasi ketupa’ (‘ketupat is consisting of B1 and B2 for light truck to heavy truck).
operation’ always held during Ramadan, to prevent the street from accident during the Idul Fitri [celebration of finishing fasting month in Muslim tradition] day where people usually going to their home town to visit relatives); and ‘operasi lilin’ (‘candle operation’ function is the same as ketupat operation but it held during Christmas time). The interesting phenomenon here is how the children give meaning to the police and translating it into their social world as a game and for fun. The important aspect in this children game is the process of recognition about police and the meaning of street. The kampong kids, pictured police officer as state apparatuses in negative reputation, as parasites who asked money from motorcyclist on the street. Furthermore, this role-play also shows an imagination that there was uncertain situation on the street, whether they, the motorcyclist, might get fortune or misses it when they faced police officer. This kind of play role is not a matter of socialisation where the kids passively received an idea from their social environment but rather actively giving the meaning of what they experienced. They have ability and creativity to make the police officer as an object of mockery that makes them laugh through the role play they created.

The kids played police role is actually not only having fun by copying what the police act of bribery, but also shows how they internalise threat from police as something normal in everyday life of the street. In this game, they also show how the way constructing the space for their own on the kampong street. At the same time they also internalise the authority of ‘police’ as a figure that has power from its social and political position over the ‘motorcyclists’ which give them an idea on how to earn money from state authoritative symbol. To a great extent, it is not only about the obedience toward the police but also playing a kind of mockery game, which function to undermine the police function. This is a process experiencing self with the real world, by which they internalise in their life through a learning process on how power to be exercised publicly. The internalisation of experiences here will constitute power relation between state and society as reflected from the relation between police and motorcyclist whether in kid role-play or the real accident happened in Pak Jawadi as I will describe below.

41 Ketupat is a kind of food made from rice and wrapped with palm leaves. This food usually provided by Moslem during Idul Fitri (when fasting month finish).
Pak Jawadi is a becak driver who lives in a small village in Kabupaten Sleman. He is working as a becak driver during the waiting period after he planted rice in the rice field he maro (half share, in which the owner of rice field get 50% of yield and so do the labour) form the wage land (bengkok) of Kelurahan village apparatus. In this waiting period, he works as becak driver and his son taking care of his rice field. As a becak driver he usually sit down on his becak –which park near by warung angkringan on the left side of Kaliurang street– at the day time while waiting for passengers. One day he helped the old woman to cross Kaliurang Street. Because of that, he went down from his becak to give a hand to her. On the middle of the street, he saw from his right side one motorcyclist run very vast. He was confused whether to continue crossing the street or not. He decided to stop right in the middle line, but unfortunately, the motorcyclist hit him and the old woman. The accident happened. The motorcyclist just got minor injury, but Pak Jawadi’s right leg broke because the motorcycle hit right on his leg. The old women suffered only minor injury. The people around the accident location helped them; some of them were pak Jawadi’s friends and kampong people. Pak Jawadi brought to the nearest hospital, the motorcyclist brought by the police who just came after a while. Moreover, two of the becak drivers became the witness of accident. It was in the mid day of 18 November 1998.

The story is not finish yet; it developed into little conflict. According to Pak Jawadi’s family, the report from the police said that the motorcyclist drunk and affected by drug (called pil koplo, a kind of amphetamine). He just captured by the police a few week before the accident happened, because he did not have driving license when the police conducted ‘operation’. His family bailed him out and his motorcycle became a guarantee. Not long after that, his family bribed the police to recover the motorcycle, in which after that it crashed pak Jawadi. Among the becak driver it become a kind of rumour that the boy is ‘anak nakal’ (naughty boy) and anak ‘orang kaya kampung’ (the child of the rich in kampong). It became a rumor because the boy’s family seemed did not want to help pak Jawadi for the hospital payment and the process of recovery, which was need a lot of

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42 Kaliurang street is heading to the tourist destination for vacation in some resorts and enjoys Mountain View.
money whereas that family is richer than pak Jawadi. More than that, they already promised to help Pak jawadi financially as ‘jalan damai’ (lit. the peace way) to avoid court. In practice they just give Rp 500,000,00 whereas the payment of the hospital already reach Rp 2,000,000.00.

Because of the financial problem, Pak Jawadi moved out from hospital, then he was doing medical treatment on weekly bases. The promised which never be fulfilled by the family of the ‘naughty boy’ made pak Jawadi’s family had to use police to solve the problem. His younger brother who has close connection to the police suggested him to do that. His brother and his police friend came to the boy’s family –who accidentally hit pak Jawadi on the street– to ask them to help pak Jawadi financially. If they do not want to help as what they promised before, they will bring the case into the court and they claimed that they will win because the ‘anak nakal’ (the naughty boy) drunk and was taking drug while driving motor cycle. This shows that the involvement of police in this case is the way Pak Jawadi’s brother using state symbolism to bluff the boy’s family. By using this, they finally made the case discharge. In this case, Pak Jawadi’s brother told me in Javanese middle (krama madya) about the involvement of police into that case as quoted below:

‘coro kados niki kedah dingge, menawi mboten wong cilik sing kalah, kulo katah kenalan polisi sing biasa nongkrong teng warung kalih kulo. Mas Jawadi wis ngalah ‘damai’, bakale kelangan pekerjaan mbecak, lha kok mboten purun mbantu, niku rak詹enge mboten tanggung jawab marang nopo sing di janjekaken’

(‘This kind of tactic should be applied, if not we are the little people will lose, I have a lot of police friends who usually hanging out in the warung with me. My brother Jawadi ‘had been good enough not to sue him through the court’, my brother will lose his job as a pedicab driver, how come he did not want to help him, it can be said that he is not responsible wit what he promised’).

The negotiation between Jawadi’s family and the so called ‘naughty boy’ family took times, this was mostly because every time Pak Jawadi’s family try to negotiate they only got a small amount of money from the naughty boy’s family that should be spent for Pak Jawadi’s medical purposes. Because of this, Pak Jawadi family had to try many times to approach the naughty boy’s family for financial support. On the other hand, this kind of approach for the naughty boy’s family created a prejudice that Pak Jawady’s family only tried to rip them off. Indeed, it is an attempt to stereotype the poor as threat for the rich. In
spite of the fact that the financial assistance finally had been made to Pak Jawadi, the tension between ‘the have’ and ‘the poor’ remained there and might emerges in different context and manifestation as I will discuss in the next chapter.

E.1.2. *Wong cilik* and the Space on City Buses

City buses (*bis kota*) are an important transportation system for the *wong cilik* in urban areas. These buses are usually start to hit the road at about 04.00 in the morning and will be back to the garage around 21.00 at night. This is timetable for city bus in Jakarta and Surabaya. In Yogyakarta, the timetable is different, in which they will start at 6.00 in the morning and go to the garage around 18.00 Around 06.00 in the morning in Jakarta, this bus full of students who want to go to school, and some people who are going to their work places. The students who take the bus in early morning mostly come from urban fringes in Jakarta (such as Tangerang), because their schools are in the city. Most of them are STM (STM is the abbreviation of *Sekolah Teknik Menengah*, now it become *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan* = Skill Middle School) students. These are technical middle schools, unlike the more conventional academic SMA (general high school) stream.

Tangerang is design to be an industrial area in which so many labours live around this area and their children goes to STM or *Sekolah Kejuruan* (School to improve skill). This is practical school as level as high school in which after they graduated from the school they are expecting to get job in industrial or services sectors. This is because most of the STM and *Sekolah Kejuruan* located in Jakarta not in urban fringe yet, on the other hand, SMA (*Sekolah Menengah Atas*) or high school sited in urban fringes area.\(^{43}\) Related to the *rayonisasi* (regionalisation) of school, STM is not yet regulated through *rayonisasi* system because it cannot be found in urban fringes.\(^{44}\) Because of this, the students from urban fringes in Jakarta have a tendency to fighting with the students of SMA 3. When I did a research in that area, I witnessed a fighting involving those schools. One of the students was drag till die by the city bus who already taken over by students. None dare enough to help the victim, everybody just tried to run away from the fighting site.

\(^{43}\) The term of *SMA* has changed into SMU (*Sekolah Menengah Umum* = general high school). Blok M is a business district area where supermarket, and Big mall and Plaza located on this area. There is also city bus station which connects that area to the urban fringes of Jakarta. The SMA3 Bulungan located within the range of Blok M. It is an elite school. Not far from this school there is a STM *penerbangan* (Technical Middle School for Aviation Study). The students of this school often fighting with the students of SMA 3. When I did a research in that area, I witnessed a fighting involving those schools. One of the students was drag till die by the city bus who already taken over by students. None dare enough to help the victim, everybody just tried to run away from the fighting site.

\(^{44}\) *Rayonisasi* system now has changed into NEM (*Nilai Ebtanas Murni* = pure national examination mark) in which school have to accept certain standard of marks depending on their standardization.
fringe have to go to Jakarta city, but then in the city the SMA students look down at them socio-politically.

To distinguish between STM and SMU students in the bus through uniform is relatively difficult, but not for the students itself. Both SMA and STM students are wearing uniform white shirt and grey trousers during the school time. From the direction of the bus, the students can be noticed where they come from and where they are going to go to schools. This kind of knowledge related to their recognition to mark the students when they involve in fighting, so when they do not win on the fighting to day, then some other day they will take revenge by ambushing the bus that already noticed. The students from STM in Jakarta where the location of this technical is not far from Blok M shopping centre, told me that to distinguish between STM students and SMA in Bulungan complex as the elite school is just by recognising their uniform and their consumption behaviour after school.\textsuperscript{45} They also can be recognised through the vehicle they go to school everyday, if they use private car (they usually drop at schools by their parents because bring its own car is not allowed) they must be from elite schools SMA and they must be \textit{anak orang kaya} (children of the rich). If they took city bus they might be from underclass to lower middle class and they might be not elite SMA or STM students whom their parents does not have private car. Their uniform is actually the same, grey trousers and white shirt. However, they can distinguish it through the different on the fade or not. If fade and looks old or dirty they must be from STM (it is also indicate that economically they are underclass) and if it clean and neat they must be from SMA (it is indicate that they are relatively wealthy). The distinction from consumption behaviour can be seen from the place they drop by after school. Most of the elite SMA students usually goes to fast food restaurant (such as Mac Donald, Kentucky Fried Chicken) but not for the STM students in which they usually goes to \textit{warung} on the side walk of shopping centre complex.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45}I am still using the term of SMA and STM because most of the students still using this terminology insteaid of SMU (Sekolah Menengah Umum) and SMK (Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan).

\textsuperscript{46}In spite of the fact that Hutomo Mandala Putra (Suharto’s son) was graduated from STM Penerbangan it does not mean that the image of this technical school is an elite one. The image of STM as underclass schooling system is not only a hallmark of this school in Jakarta but throughout Indonesia and the clash between SMA and STM mostly happen in Jakarta. This kind of image then emphasise through the condition that the alumni of STM can not continue to study at the university level, except they have high mark.
The bus that starts in the morning and full of students is not interesting for the street traders or street musicians; because they know, they do not want to pay of what they are trading. Because of this, they prefer to earn money after the numbers of students are getting lesser but the passengers who want to go to the work places getting lots. In this bus the underclass street traders and street musicians have some opportunities to make money from the passengers by selling candies, cigarettes, playing music and singing, or reading poem. Bus conductor never asks them to pay the ticket. There is a kind of ‘pengertian’ (understanding or an ethical code) between bus driver, conductor and the street musicians or street traders in earning money in urban areas. They call it ‘kerjasama’ (mutual relationships) to help each other in living in the city like Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta, which is relatively difficult for them economically, especially in Jakarta and Surabaya.

The street traders have an interesting tactic in selling their products such as candies, magazines or newspapers. They usually put these products on passengers laps one by one and the sellers will wait for a while and let the passengers decide whether to buy or not. In this situation, largely, the passengers usually confuse whether they have to buy or not. Very often, the passengers who do not want to buy just leave it on their lap until the sellers take it. To some degree, this make them inconvenient, because if they open it up and read the newspaper they have to buy, so if they do not want to buy they just have quick read the page in front of him without open it further. This tactic makes the passengers feel inconvenient and confused. This happens because they do not want to spend their money to buy those stuffs. Perhaps they already subscribe it at home or just simply do not want to buy it. Most people I interviewed about that situation feel that there is a kind of ‘hidden force’ insisting them to buy it. This feeling exists especially among them who wear nice and relatively neat fashion. Some of them who do not want to buy and avoiding ‘hidden force’ are pretending to sleep and let the things remain on their laps and they are waking up when the seller take it.

can afford to continue their study, they can go to TAFE or the so called Politeknik (polytechnics), or D3 program which is provided by universities in Indonesia.
Similar situation also happen when the poem reader or street musicians play their guitar, harmonica or karaoke (the compact karaoke set usually brought by little girls singers to sing *dangdut* (a genre of Indonesian music, which is very popular among the *wong cilik*) and sing some songs. Some passengers pretend to sleep, but very often the street musicians wake them up just for asking whether they want to pay or not, if not it does not matter for the street musicians. In this case, the street musicians do not really like it, because they feel ignored as a person. They prefer if the passengers say, *‘maaf bang’* (‘sorry big brother’) or wave their hands rather than pretend to sleep just to avoid the street musicians asking for money. That is why street musicians wake them up. Except for the passengers that already sleep before they sing some songs, because they know that they just pretended. The interesting phenomena in this case, most of the underclass passengers feel that they do not have any burden not to pay that kind of offer, they just can say ‘no ‘or waving their hand. Nevertheless, not for the lower middle class who wear neat dresses. They do not want to pay in some degree. However, there is a kind of force coming from the situation, which insists the passengers have to pay at least Rp 100.00 into the cane or box provided by the street musicians.47

For the middle class taking city bus in Jakarta is not convenient enough, is not only because they will sweat inside the bus, but also because they do not really like the existence of the street musicians and street traders who earn money in the bus. Sense of dislike toward street musicians is actually coming from fear of underclass. This fear constructed through the pre-existence of stereotype (as it happen in the conflict between Pak Jawadi and the naughty boy’s family) that has become a discourse. That is why they prefer to use their own air-conditioned car, goes to the air-conditioned office, shopping in air-conditioned shopping mall and go home to air-conditioned house which in turn make them socio-culturally encapsulated as ‘air conditioned society’. Common bus is too hot for the one who wear suit and silky neat shirt and tie. More than that, the one that make the passengers scary is the way the driver drive his bus. It was like no passengers in the bus, or the

47 As a street musician, they can earn money from singing in the bus around Rp 5000.00 to Rp 10,000.00 per day. From this income they have to give the pemalak, or centeng or preman (who act as territory guardian) around Rp 300.00 to Rp 500.00 per day, this called as uang ‘palak’ (tip). This tip will share among the lower
passengers are valueless as human being. As bus, the big vehicle on the street, it is dominate the street like no one else on the street, the road is belong to bus drivers and the passengers just treated (of what they call) ‘ikan pindang’ (marinated fish) in box.

The system of ‘setoran’ (commission) conditions the act of bus drivers in driving their busses. They drive crazily on the street because they have to run after the commission money to the company. If they could fulfil the commission means the driver did not get any money for the day he was driving. This has made them have to rush and speed the bus in order to get money for the company and for them self. In this commission system the company get around 75% to 85% and the driver just only 15% to 25% per day income. This kind of system make the drivers have to compete with the others to get the passengers on the street. It forces them to earn money as much as they can, without considering passengers safety. The faster they speed the bus the more they get the passengers on the street and indeed the more money they will get. The passenger’s life is not the priority. Due to this many cases shows how the people angry to the bus driver if there is any accident. Very often the angry people running amuck and burn the bus and tortured the driver if they get him, but usually the driver run away if involved in bad accident. This problem also caused by the police who are easily to be bribed which then the road rule becoming easier to be offended.

The street seems become very competitive and the people who compete this space are not only bus drivers, but also taxi drivers in which the company also using commission system, street traders, street musicians and beggars, who see some opportunities to get buyers from the people waiting or riding buses. From the point middle class (wong gede) ranking police or military who have become their backers.

48The analogue of the passengers as ikan pindang (marinated sardine fish coming from the experience of the wong cilik (underclass) in choosing their daily menu. The price of ikan pindang is very cheap and affordable. That is around Rp 250.00 (5 cent AU). The taste is salty, so the small amount of fish and sambal (chilli) can become a lauk pauk (food) for big portion of rice. The rich family usually give this kind of fish for their cats or dogs. One box of ikan pindang consists of many little sardine fishes in small place just like the people squashed each other in the bus. This analogue is originated from the stereotype constructed by the rich to describe the poor, then it used not only by them self to categorise the underclass sociologically but also by who ever who want to name the cramped situation in a bus. They call it ikan pindang especially when they describe the passengers sweating in hot bus. Most of the middle class do not want to take bus because they do not want to be ikan pindang in the bus of course. It can be said that this expression is used to express that underclass is not considered as human being but rather ‘things’.
point of view this situation has made the street condition is not convenient any more. This point of view affecting state apparatuses in viewing the street because they are the wong gedes. Related to this, many cases show that the state does not expect the existences of underclass earning money on the street. In state point of view as stated on the quotation below shows that the underclass working on the street demonstrate that they are not tertib (discipline) and make the capital city is not nyaman (convenient). This kind of point of view is actually a bias of middle and upper class interests in viewing the city. Because of this, very often, state apparatuses ask the underclass to move out from the street by force and mostly through violence rather than persuasion.\(^\text{49}\)

Meski aparatnya banyak yang luka, di akhir rapat, Sutiyoso menegaskan seluruh jajaran Tramtib DKI tidak akan mundur dari tugasnya menertibkan pelaku pelanggaran.
Perda No 11/1988 tentang ketertiban umum harus ditegakkan, karena itu, penertiban jalan terus. ‘Masyarakat Ibu Kota wajib mendukung sebab yang menikmati kenyamanan, ketertiban, dan ketenteraman sebagai hasil penertiban juga masyarakat.’ Kata Sutiyoso.\(^\text{50}\)

(In spite of the fact that many of his apparatuses injured, in the last session, Sutiyoso stated that all of the DKI (Daerah Khusus Ibukota = Special Region of Capital City) Tramtib apparatuses will not retreat from their duty to discipline some one who broke the rule.
Regional rule No 11/1998 about the general order should be conducted, because of that, disciplinization must go on. ‘Capital city’s society have an obligation to support, because who enjoy the convenience, order and tranquillity as a result of disciplinization also society it self.’ Said Sutiyoso)

This news show how the involvement of governor of Special Region of Capital City, Jakarta, used violence against the street musician to go away from traffic light. In this kind of ‘sweeping’ some state apparatuses who are in charge for that duty injured. It did not

\(^{49}\)In August 14, 2001, there was a case reported in Kompas (August 15, 2001) that the pedicab ‘penertiban’ in Jakarta by Tramtib caused clashed involving hundreds of becak drivers, tramtib officers, and polices (Brimob= Brigade Mobil -mobile brigade). This clashed cause one tramtib officer died, and some people injured. More over, some cars were burnt. This incident was happen in Kecamatan Gambir and spread until West Jakarta area. See ‘Operasi Penertiban Becak Telan Satu Nyawa’ in Kompas, Wednesday, August 15, 2001.

mention how many street musicians injured. In this operation, the wong cilik (underclass) that should be disciplined by the state consisting pedagang kaki lima (side walk traders), gepeng (gelandangan dan pengemis = homeless and beggars), PSK (Pekerja Seks Komersial=Comersial Sex Workers, or prostitutes), Waria (Wanita-Pria = transvestites), joki (the third person who help drivers who will pass ‘three in one’ [one private car should be three person inside] street), Pak Ogah (the money tippers), pengamen (street musicians), pengedar kotak amal (charity workers), penderita cacat (disable people), anak jalanan (street kids), pedagang asongan (street traders), becak (pedicab drivers), gubug liar (cartoon houses of the homeless) et cetera.

The expression of ‘ditertibkan’ (to be ordered or disciplined) which is applied toward the wong cilik by the state and its apparatuses shows that they categorised as ‘liar’ (wild). Then they are not allowed to stay together with the masyarakat (the rest of complicity ‘normal’ society) especially they are who already tertib (order), in this case middle and upper class who are part of air conditioned society. From this kind of categorisation it can be said that street viewed by the state as a ‘wild space’ that need to be controlled. This also constructing of judgement that people who occupied street also categorised as ‘wild’ and need to discipline in order to create a kind of tranquillity in which the middle and upper classes will enjoy it. The concept of ‘wild’ here is like ‘the phantom’ not only for the wong cilik but also wong gede. In spite of the fact that there is an attempt to discipline the wong cilik through any kind of ‘operasi’ (operation) which has become a materialise ‘phantom’, still the wong cilik have an ability to utilise any corner of urban spaces for their economic purposes. This contestation is actually enable the state apparatuses to control space directly, they just use phantom to make the wong cilik working on the street afraid. The ‘operasi’ as the materialization of phantom has become a ritual for the state to construct fear.

Because the state apparatuses are not enabling to control the space, the only technic they have is using the local jagoan, which make the wong cilik such as street traders afraid. However, the street traders have their own techniques to avoid the preman, usually by running into the kampong, because they know that the preman afraid of the kampong people. To have a control over the space, premans construct teritoral boundaries to define who are the persons (or usually using ethnic identity) control the territories. For example in
Monas (monumen nasional = national monument) area is divided into four territory according to the ethnic who control it, that are Ambon (Ethnic from Molucas Island), Surabaya (East Javanese Ethnic), Menado (Ethnic from North Sulawesi) and Batak Ethnic from North Sumatra). The Ambones control the nightclub area, East Javanese (people from Surabaya) control Gambir area, Menado and Batak control the area around governor office. The people utilising that areas usually work as tukang parkir (parking man), centeng of sidewalk traders, or as the so call Pak Ogah (the money tipper) who ask money from the drivers because they manage the intersection traffic.\footnote{The term of Pak Ogah is coming from the Unyil puppet show on TVRI (Televisi Republik Indonesia = The republic Indonesia Television) children’s program. This puppet shows is about the story of kampung people’s life in urban fringe area. The puppet named Pak Ogah describe as a lazy man that always tip people who ask him about direction or any kind of information or pass in front of him. He usually hanging out with friends in the Gardu Ronda (neighbourhood post) since morning and late night. He sleeps there. He earn money from accidental jobs, such as parking man. This term then applied in to the people that do the same job, as ‘acidental police’ who manage the traficin the intersection where there is no traffic light. They tip money from the drivers. This kind of Pak Ogah do not exist in Yogyakarta and in Surabaya very view people doing that kind of job. The different name of Pak Ogah called ’Polisi Cepek’ (Polisi Seratus = Hundred Rupiah Police, cepek is a Chinese word).} If some one want to utilise that spaces they have to give some tip to the ‘boss’ of that territory in which the money usually end up to the police or military persons who become little bos of that areas.

The Tramtib (Ketentraman dan Ketertiban = Tranquility and Order) apparatuses have to consider the existence of the territorial bosses, so they have to coordinate with the leader of the territory whom usually police or military from the ground force.\footnote{Tramtib is a task force unit for tranquility and order belong to the local government. Their duty is to make the city in tranquil and order. In practice this unit (with the help of police and military if needed) is the one that raid and move by force the roadside traders, beggar, street musicians, homeless people and some other street dwellers which viewed as nuisances of the city which might jeopardy the urban inhabitant and tranquility and order.} According to the street traders and street musicians point of views, the raid operation by the Tramtib and police is only to increase the tip to pemalak (money tipper) or to make it more regular or discipline in paying the bosses or the territory guardian. In this raid, Tramtib officers and polices usually take the traders stuffs and if the traders want to take it back they have to pay Rp 150,000.00 - Rp 200,000.00 (between AU$ 30 - AU$40). These were the prices before the economic crisis. Some times the traders dare enough to fight with them even though it might endanger their life. Shoeshine boy and street traders I interviewed told me that he
fight with the Tramtib, because they take his stuff by force he tried to grab it back. At that
time, he hit one of the Tramtib apparatuses head until bleeding. He did not realise that the
tramtib backed up by cavalry troops. They just got him, brought into the police station, and
tortured him. After that raid operation the street traders, sidewalk traders, Pak Ogah and
parking men have to raise the tip from Rp 500.00 to Rp 1000.00 per day. After that, they
did not face any raid operation, except they want to rise the tip again. This is the pattern of
raid operation in their point of view, but not from the state, in which the governor treat
them as pelanggar aturan (the offenders of rule) and for polices and Tramtib officers point
of view this is an opportunities to earn money or to exercise their power instead of
menjalankan tugas (tour of duty). Accordingly, street in this case should not be treated as
just merely the infrastructure of transportation that connects one place to another for
economic purposes. It is also a ‘free space’ for the people involved in discursive and
material struggle on it. A feeling of freedom in this case constitute the way they define
street as a free space --as the same with the feeling in the warung situation-- which enable
them to do what ever they want on it, whether anarchically or not. This is their way in
constructing counter discourse against the regime and the rich in which categorised as wong
gede.

F. Summary

Warung in Java context is an important space for gathering as an alignment of
people from different social background into a milieu. The creation of space by the warung
owner has close relation to the process of claiming the space, which then creates a kind of
frontier for economic purposes. Once the location already claimed then this will belong to
the first claimer, which then can be inherited genealogically as what happens in Pak Man
case. The customers here also affected by that kind of frontierism in which makes them
stick with Pak Man because it has genealogical legitimation. Customers as social capital for
Pak Man here follow the logic of genealogical order. Pak Min show different case, he did
not inherit the location for his warung. He bankrupt first, then he tried again in different
time then he succeed. This shows that he has to struggle to claim the location for his warung

53 I randomly interviewed five shoe shine boys and four pedagang kaki lima in Jakarta to tell their experience
by the help of an old pedicab driver and Pak Man he finally has customers which then become his social capital which in turn also affecting his income. The process of claiming the space also shows by the case of preman named Papi. Once he always sit on the same table every time he hang out in warung then it become his space and his followers. This kind of situation not only shows how power relations are constructed but also how power is contested. The way Papi yel to the girl street musicians gave an effect not only to her but also the people around his warung, which then make the people think twice about the preman’s group. This kind of situation has contributes to the construction of milieu.

The way the owner of angkringan warung ‘inherit’ the space until it become a public space shows a historical process of struggle not only for accumulating economic capital, but also for social capital coming from customers. Pak man’s warung takes the benefit of social capital from his father, which is quite different with the way pak Min set up his own. Pak Min need to establish social capital from the customer rather that just based on the economic capital. Because when he just rely on the economic capital he failed in warung business even though his warung located just next to Pak Man. The existence of old becak driver who suggested him for fasting is actually one of his social capitals who often stay in that space. Moreover, The important aspect of warung is how the wong cilik are involved in the production of space. Which in turn shows that it is not only gives benefit for them selves economically, but also function as an important social arena which shows the intersecting social world and discourses involving so many social classes from the students, becak and taxi drivers, journalists, artists, civil servants, prostitute and the poor people.

Wong cilik in warung and the street are actually a phenomena of the creation of frontier space by which the people involve in the construction of milieu. The milieu of the warung and street, where the power relation in this space is relatively fluid gives the people feeling of freedom. The existence of preman, prostitute, students, becak drivers, civil servant, and petty clerical staffs whom involve into the same milieu then create an intersecting world and discourses. This situation of gathering in the warung, on the sidewalk, and on the street is a process of space production, which has a relation with the
feeling of freedom, in which in the case of warung this makes the customers feel comfortable.

The situation in the bus is somewhat different, the milieu of public transport space seems related to the difficulties in claiming it to be some some one space or territory. This is because it is a mobile space, and very much contested by everyone. The relationships between the mobile space and subject seems affecting the strategy of the streets traders to be tactical in struggling for their economic life. As shown by the street traders on the bus, in which he has to be tricky to the prospective customers who might buy of what he is selling. In this case, the street traders do not realy matter in maintaining their relationships with customers the important thing for them is how the prospective customer to buy without considering whether is it bothering them or not. It is very different with warung strategy, in which they have to maintain their customer by not insisting them to buy but caring of them to buy as what Pak Man and Pak Min do. It is their strategy in accumulating and maintaining their social capital as market, which will affect their income.

Inspite of the fact that there is an intersecting world and intersecting discourses in the spaces I described above, it does not means that this affecting the whole form of power relation. The conflict between the becak driver and the rich family, the fighting among the students in Jakarta is a reflection of place and space problems, which has relation with social encapsulation. The hypothesis advanced here is that the encapsulation of society --as I will discuss in the following chapter-- creates a kind of social paradox.
Chapter Three

The Encapsulation of Society and Its Paradox

A. Prologue

In this chapter, I will focus first of all on how people distinguish each other through various social practices within the ‘context’ of power relations in urban areas. To understand this, I focus on the relationship between classes, which I will trace through the politics of lifestyle practiced through conspicuous consumption behaviour. Moreover, I shall focus on their specific ‘ritual’ arenas where we see reflected the problems of identity and class consciousness, and some of the characteristics of class interaction. The prime arenas for viewing the relationship between classes in Indonesia at the turn of twenty first century can be found in a few notable public spaces, especially shopping malls. Malls have become a hallmark of conspicuous consumption behaviour. They contain cafes, pubs, fast food restaurants, cinemas, and discotheques. These are the places where the new rich spend their time for pleasure and this is also their favoured arena where they engage in, and continuously refine, rituals of identity. On the other hand the wong cilik are also found in these places —busy working in menial jobs such as tukang parkir (parking boy), but with some of them also just window-shopping (but never buying). In addition, there are key spaces such as the warung. The warung space is less modern. It reflects the oral culture in Indonesian society. These places are also important sites of class interaction at the level of everyday life, and therefore sites where class relations can be observed and better understood.

B. The Politics of Lifestyle and Social Encapsulation

Young says that the development of shopping mall in the major cities of South East Asian countries has become an arena where the people gain knowledge and become more sophisticated in their consumption behaviour.¹ His analysis is based on

¹In this case Young (1999) analyses the consumption behaviour, social differentiation and self identification of the new rich in Southeast Asia through his main interest in the outwardly ‘apolitical process of identity formation’ through consumption. However, he do not avoid the argument that the social process of life-style change in industrialising Southeast Asia have meaningful political effects for Aris Arif Mundayat
the middle class in Southeast Asia rather than the *wong cilik*. Distinctively, I will mainly
examine in this section how consumption behaviour constitutes power relation between
the *wong gede* (an emic social category that covers a range of conventional sociological
classes, from middle class to upper class) and the *wong cilik*. To understand this I will
examine conspicuous consumption behaviour as a politics of lifestyle, and then use this
understanding as a key point of entry to the phenomena of social encapsulation and
social contradiction. Moreover, I shall analyse consumption behaviour not as taking
place in an ‘apolitical’ setting, but rather in a ‘political’ one. This is important because
consumption behaviour to a great extent reflects the politics of life-style.

In this section I will show how *wong cilik* have also advanced the sophistication
of their political consciousness through their involvement in the burgeoning malls,
plazas, and entertainment parlours in urban areas. Certainly, they cannot afford to
emulate the consumption behaviour of the upper middleclass, and the *wong gede*
generally. The engagement of the *wong cilik* in these places is a paradox substantiated
through latent class conflict, which also contributes to the maturation of the *wong cilik*
political consciousness. Moreover, consumption behaviour as manifest in the ‘fashion
system’ reflects the power relations between classes, and corresponds to the processes
of self-identification, which in turn shores up distinctions between classes. To a
significant degree, this distinction manufactures political consciousness among the
*wong cilik*. To commence the discussion, I will first discuss the social encapsulation and
social paradox in historical perspective. That will be followed, secondly, by an
examination of the actual conditions of society I researched.

**B.1. The Historical Background of Social Encapsulation**

The New Order’s imposition of a racially based hierarchy negatively
discriminates against the Chinese, restricting their access to schooling, and to academic
and government service positions. This too can be traced back to the Dutch colonial
government, which established the tradition of ordering society on the basis of racial

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the bourgeois and middle-class groups. See Ken Young (1999: p56-85) ‘Consumption, Social
Differentiation and Self-definition of the New Rich in Industrialising Southeast Asia’ in *Culture and
hierarchies, as can be seen from the categories used in colonial era censuses. The education system was foundational in establishing racial orderings during the Colonial era, providing premium education to Europeans, Indo-Europeans and some of the Javanese nobility. The Javanese nobility’s new education would prepare them for work in the expanded Civil Service of the early twentieth century Ethical Era and relieve the European of his ‘burden’ of uplifting the common Javanese. The noble Javanese stood above his people, as the new modern, dandy and Europeanised native, and began operating more fully in what had been the exclusively Dutch domain of parliament and government; in this sense, he was not native, but a necessary Europeanised minority in Javanese society. These Europeans and priyayi (the Javanese nobility cum colonial bureaucrats) were schooled in the ELS (Europeesche Lagere School), providing them with instruction in Dutch, and another European language, along with subjects of academic vocation. Javanese of common origin — the rakyat kecil or wong cilik — unlike the privileged priyayi, received rudimentary instruction up to the level of primary grade two in the sekolah rakyat (people’s schools). The Chinese and Arabs, categorised as vreemde oosterlingen (foreign Orientals), were forced to meet their educational demands by founding their own schools outside the government system. Meanwhile, if the Dutch had been consistent in using the nomenclature of racial categorization in Dutch Indies to distinguish between one and another inhabitants they would have employed the term vremde westerlingen (Foreign Westerners). However, they did not, and preferred to consider them selves as Europeesche, which showed that they were different.

Racial discrimination, while raising the status of a minority of the Javanese, marginalised the people (rakyat) — the majority of the Javanese population — from politics. The colonial schools produced the politicians of the Nationalist and independence movements of early 20th Century Indonesian politics; these politicians provided interesting models of Javanese political behaviour. Sukarno (the first Indonesian president) for example was sent away by his father, to live with relatives who worked in the Civil Service, so that he could attend a Dutch school. The intention

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2 C. Fasseur "Cornerstone and Stumbling Block; Racial Classification and the late colonial state in Indonesia" in *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundation of the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942*. Edited by Robert Cribb. Leiden KITLV. 1994, p. 31-56

of placing Sukarno within privileged elite circles had distanced him from his rural *abangan* origins.\(^4\) Here Sukarno’s family sought a symbolic ‘replica’ of state authority, through association with the State via relatives in the Civil Service.\(^5\) Meanwhile, Suharto (the second Indonesian president ousted in 1998) shows different background with Sukarno. He originated from a Javanese village and never entered the *Europeesche* education system under the Dutch colonial government. His career was started from the lower ranking of the Indigenous Dutch Indies military. According to Anderson (1990) however, Sukarno and Suharto further differed in that Sukarno still embodied the symbolism of the *rakyat* (people) in his government, while in the government of Suharto, *rakyat* symbolism was largely absent, silenced by symbols of the omnipotent developmentalist State.\(^6\)

Beyond the distinctions of the colonial schooling system, social distinctions during the colonial period were also expressed through the fashion system. In Jakarta, for example, upper middle class Indonesians attended Dutch social gatherings, where they spoke Dutch and paraded themselves in the latest European fashions. Their realisation of a separate space of social sophistication was achieved in its most insidious form through the dispossession of kampong people to make way for the elite Menteng housing complex.\(^7\) The Menteng housing complex became the starkest expression of this social division, which saw poor kampong people squeezed behind the luxurious living quarters of an elite minority. Here, the social asymmetry mapped out across space

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4 The term of *abangan* is known to have originated from Arabic language *aba’an*, which means a person who does not practice Islam strictly. This word contrasts with *muti’an* which means a person who devotedly practices Islam. In the Javanese tongue, which cannot pronounce Arabic language easily these terms changed into *abangan* and *mutihan* respectively, which then interpreted as red for *abangan* (in Javanese word, *abang* means red) and white for *mutihan* (in Javanese word, *putih* in which as a verb changes into *mutih* and means white). In Clifford Geertz’s analysis *abangan* means one who practices religious syncretism between Hindu Javanese and Islam, and for *mutihan*, is the one who are devoted muslim or *santri* (a person who practices Islamic teaching piously). This practice also fed into patterns of political affiliation in which *abangan* tended to affiliate with the Communist Party and *santri* tended to affiliate with Islamic Parties. For further discussion see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1976.

5 A word often used for Civil Servants was the Dutch *ambtenaar*.


7 Menteng is an elite area in Jakarta built during colonial era. When it was built this area displaced the local inhabitants, of *betawi* ethnicity, into the kampong nearby Menteng and even some of those dislocated were then moved to urban fringes of Jakarta. See Susan Blackburn (1989), *Jakarta: a History*.  

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was expressed in the contrast between the humble and often traditional clothes worn by the kampong people, and the consciously expensive and modern clothes of the elite. This fashion distinction was further delineated in the contrast between the space of the new shopping centre and that of the traditional market, the former becoming a key locale for the display of elite fashion and style.⁸

Fashion and language, here, constitute a politics of lifestyle; this politics depends on hierarchical social distinctions communicated through clothing, speech and shopping locales. These kinds of distinction became powerful social classifiers. As practised and reproduced in everyday life, these distinguishing styles constitute rituals specific to particular segments of the population — as rituals of wealth and rituals of deprivation. However, these spatially distinct groups, and their rituals of life style, find an intersection —a meeting space or common space — where the distinctions are recognised and bridged to form a medium of communication between otherwise exclusive worlds. During the New Order period, this fashion-dependant politics of lifestyle was fuelled by the expansion of consumer capitalism through magazines, television, plazas, discotheques and karaoke bars. These forms commodify ‘New Rich’ lifestyles, using the body and sexuality to powerfully convey and manipulate ways of being.

B.2. Conspicuous Consumption Behaviour: The Politics of Lifestyle and Contested Identity

This section will discuss the power relations active between wong cilik and wong gede during the performances of the class specific ‘rituals’ of lifestyle in urban areas. The wong cilik are found mostly on the sidewalks, in the warungs and their environs. While the plaza, mall, bar, and discotheque are primary ritual arenas for the wong gede. The role of youngsters in this case is very important because they are actively involved in those spaces where the conspicuous consumption behaviours unfold publicly. Secondly, understanding the behaviour of housewives in buying food for their

household also important because it too displays the patterns of power relation between
*wong gede* and *wong cilik* in everyday life. Accordingly, in seeking elucidation of the
constructions of class-consciousness, I will mainly focus on how their knowledge
operates in imagining social position of themselves and others in this kind of urban
social environment.\(^9\)

**B.2.1. The Mall and the *Warung*: A Matter of Political Lifestyle**

The large urban centres are drenched with world brand name advertisements
such us Nike, Adidas, Benetton, DKNY, and dozens of others. A 1996 report in the *Far
Eastern Economic Review* pointed out:

‘…that McDonalds, Elle MacPherson and a host of other prominent brand
names are leading the charge … looking to get a lock on the pocketbooks of
Indonesia’s ever growing population of conspicuous consumers’.\(^10\)

The exposure of world brand names is not only carried on the huge billboards in
urban areas of Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Surabaya, but also enter the household through
TV. The penetration of these images led to Michael Jordan — the basketball player who
appeared in Nike advertisements — becoming one of the idols of the in kampong areas.
This follows a significant change in public media, the emergence of new private
television stations in 1990 like RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia) and SCTV
(Surabaya Citra Televisi) owned by Suharto’s sons, Indosiar owned by Suharto’s
brother, ANTV, and some other TV stations. All of these stations sought benefits by
welcoming globalized consumer behaviour. Before 1980s, about the only television
station most people could access was the state-owned TVRI (Televisi Republik
Indonesia), which was forbidden to advertise. Years latter, after president Suharto was
finally removed from his presidency after 32 years of ruling Indonesia, this public
station was allowed share the benefits of ‘brand warfare’. Some influential companies

\(^9\) The social category of ‘*kalangan bawah*’, ‘*kalangan menengah*’, and ‘*kalangan atas*’ for example, to
some certain extent , are very similar to the class analysis terminology of ‘*wong cilik*, ‘middle class’, and
‘upper class’ respectively.\(^99\) The word of ‘*kalangan*’ (‘group’) has been used to substitute the word ‘*kelas*’
(class) which is the hallmark of Marxism perspective. The massacre of PKI members in mid 1960s
following the banning of Marxism teaching in Indonesia, the word of *kelas* was always avoided in formal
speech and even in daily conversation, this is due to the fact of political trauma that always maintained
through threat discourse by the New Order regime. Somehow, these social categories are simply based on
economic classification. But it is not always, very often people also rely on very specific cultural codes
which is reflected from the appearance of persons –through the fashion system specifically– that can be
identified to categorise the others. The politics of life style, has become very important arena of culture to
demonstrate certain kind of cultural codes and in expressing their identity and class.
that produce consumer products are engaging in ‘brand warfare’, not only through billboards in urban areas, but also by all means of other media technologies that amplify their exposure publicly. These big companies are also quick to grasp opportunities for the marketing of their products in the rapidly developing modern retail centres like supermarkets and malls. As their customers are incorporated into these consumption behaviour patterns, the behaviour and the imagery of consumption constructs important aspects of their urban lifestyle.

In this creation of lifestyle, all social classes are targeted as consumers and conveyers of new-marketed styles. Poor youths, for example, are consumers of a large market of inferior brand-name clothing replicated (or even counterfeited) for cheap sale; they also participate in the culture of the plaza, strolling, window-shopping and sitting in the cafes without making a purchase. Low-ranking civil servants can take this participation a step further through an occasional visit to McDonalds or KFC to share a meal costing around Rp. 6,000, which, unlike the more expensive fast food restaurants, does not prohibit their participation. Their participation sharply contrasts with the rich who are able to spend their money drinking beer, cappuccinos, latte, or hot chocolate with high-class prostitutes or gigolos at Excelso café in Yogyakarta’s Malioboro Mall or in Tunjungan Plaza, Surabaya, -- or in Hard Rock Café, Planet Hollywood or similar up-market bars around the CBD of the major urban centres. My informant in Surabaya named Tejo often hangs out in Excelso cafe with some perek (perempuan eksperimen = experimental girls who practice promiscuity), who have some money from their boyfriends that allows them to fulfil their lifestyle needs. Tejo usually asks for fresh water rather than a boutique drink, but the girls treat him. Tejo himself is a gay man who works as waitress in one of the discotheque in Surabaya, and has a boyfriend living in Europe. His boyfriend sends him some money, which he saves for his future because his waitressing income is only enough for food and the rent of his dorm (kamar kos). He does not want to hang out in Excelso without his perek friend, because it too expensive. In expressing this he said: ‘wah gajihku bisa habis kalau saya tiap hari nongkrong di Excelso bayar sendiri, teman-teman perek yang banyak uang yang biasanya traktir saya, untuk jaga perasaan bisa saya hanya minta air putih. Kadang-kadang saya juga traktir mereka makan tapi di warung’. (‘Wow, my salary will easily run out if

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everyday I hang out in Excelso café and pay with my own money. My perek friend who has a lot of money usually treats me. I just ask for fresh water just to be polite. Sometimes I treat them for lunch, but in the warung’). He eats breakfast, lunch and dinner in the warung next to Tunjungan Plaza, which is within his budget.

In these kinds of public spaces there are lower class people replicating the behaviour of kalangan menengah (middle class). However, as bar girls and boys, prostitutes and gigolos they use their sexuality to serve the rich, who are their paying customers. For example, gigolos — referred to colloquially as ‘cats’ or ‘lonte lanang’ — service rich females. According to Tejo, ‘cats’ in Surabaya are usually rich, and some of them are students. Yogyakarta also shows a similar situation; most ‘cats’ often gather in Excelso in Malioboro Mall. Most cats are good looking, young and trendy, often donning tight white T-shirts that accentuate their youthful and muscular bodily form to please the eye of potential wealthy customers. They train regularly in the gym centre. The terms of ‘cat and ‘lonte lanang’, refer to distinctions of social class. ‘Cat’ is the term for rich or middle class gigolos and ‘lonte lanang’ is the term for lower class gigolos. In this case Tejo consider himself as homosexual. This distinction manifests power relations expressed in the ability to participate in what are, for the majority of the population, economically prohibitive rituals of sexual indulgence.

Wong cilik youngsters, by contrast, enjoy a cheap homemade whiskey called arak, made from the residue of sugarcane bought from the factory and costing around Rp 2,500. It is often strengthened with Panadol, powdered mosquito coil, or drugs containing amphetamine. It is shared between 5 to 10 people hidden in a graveyard, a warung by the river or along the railroad within shouting distance of the prostitutes operating there. As I described in chapter 2, nearby Pak Man and Pak Min’s warung in Yogyakarta there is a warung (kiosk) selling alcoholic beverages in which most of the customer are wong cilik youngsters. These drinking sessions constitute, for the drinkers, an arena for the manufacture of political power. They usually play a drinking game that acts as a measure of strength and invincibility, a contest that often leads to extreme sickness and even death among the competitors. This fabrication of bravado and power parallels the phenomenon of the tattoo among lower class males that Barker analyses,
which also serves to encapsulate male power and invincibility.\(^{11}\) These forms achieve their efficacy through their practice and reproduction in everyday life.

As mentioned before, the rich and poor kampong youngsters are brought together in the ‘warung’.\(^{12}\) Here, they are eating, smoking, gossiping, listening to each other, and talking about social and political problems where experiences are exchanged and a temporary relationship between the classes is created. The warung also creates a point of connection between classes that works together with the Pos Kota newspaper. For example, owners of warteg or warung Tegal (the warung run by people coming from Tegal region in central Java) in Jakarta usually provide Pos Kota newspapers. This newspaper plays a significant role in manufacturing an ‘imagined relationship’ between the wong cilik and the elites. It is imagined because it is formed from reading the newspaper, there are no real sustained direct relationships between the two social classes. Readers mostly develop their awareness of the other class through the news they read. Warungs, by contrast, create real physical and experiential relationships between classes, because here they encounter the intersecting worlds and intersecting discourses. Warung relationships are only temporary relationships and do not go far enough towards effecting a breakdown of the social hierarchy and the authority structures upon which it is based. However, the temporary relationship here contributes to the maturation of the wong cilik class-consciousness politically.

In the discos, karaoke bars, plazas, and supermarkets, unlike in the warung, social distinctions based on class and ethnicity are more clearly defined; Station Disco and Bongo Pub in Surabaya are good examples. In Station Disco, most of the clients are

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\(^{12}\) There are many types of warung in Indonesia, usually they are categorised by the type of foods they sell. In general terms, people call them ‘warung tegal’ or ‘warteg’ (usually in Jakarta), warung HIK and lesehan (in Yogyakarta) and angkringan (in Surabaya). The price of the foods is very cheap, for example one portion of wrapped steamed rice or fried rice together with a small piece of chicken, meat or tempe (nasi bungkus) costs between Rp 350.00 up to Rp 500.00 (AU 6 - 10 cents, AU$1 = Rp 5000.00). One glass of tea, coffee, or milk (sweetened milk) is around Rp 150.00 up to Rp 300.00. One person would
middle-class Javanese, while, at Bongo Pub, they are very wealthy upper middle class Chinese. The same situation also can be observed in Malioboro Mall in Yogyakarta, where the *wong cilik* only watch from distance, meanwhile the *wong gede* have an opportunity take expensive goods from that place. This distinction is evident in the location of each establishment; Station Disco is on the tenth floor of Tunjungan Plaza, while Bongo is in the more prestigious, Sheraton Hotel. Malioboro Mall in a big building joined with the Ibis hotel, whereas the *warungs* are found on the sidewalk of Malioboro Street.

Through the modern pubs, discotheques, plazas, fast food restaurants, cafes, clubs and multi-complex cinemas, local and Western forms have become both culturally and economically intertwined. On the other hand in the *warung* variegated social classes only intersect in the discursive practice, and their material struggle is separated. For example, the music played in these multi-national entertainment outlets range from pop, waltz, reggae, rap, rock, disco, and techno; there are virtually no local forms of music to be heard in these places, instead foreign bands often perform. In the *warung* sometimes the customers only can hear street musicians singing some song casually, even sometimes they have to face *preman* to occupy in that space. Female patrons often attempt to gain a degree of sexual intimacy with the male performers of such foreign bands. In one such example, a handsome Ricky Martin look-alike foreign singer performing at the Sheraton in Surabaya was pursued by the girls, most of whom were *perek* (*perempuan eksperimen* = experimental girl). Finally, one of the girls slept with him and her friend with the guitarist, creating some jealousy among the other girls. According to the girls, it was not about money and sex, but about the prestige of sleeping with someone from America. Here, the body—in this case, that of the Western

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13 This kind of characteristic originated from my informants when I did research in Surabaya. One of them (a girl) even hesitated to go to Top Ten or Station, just because it was not prestigious enough. She preferred to go to Bongo (Sheraton Hotel) or Desperado pub (Shangrila Hotel). She is the girl that finally went out with one of the foreign guitarists hired by the Desperado pub. The cover charge to Bongo (Rp 35,000.00 = AU$ 7.00) is more expensive than to Top Ten and Station in Tunjungan Plaza. (Rp 15,000.00 [AU$ 3] for weekdays and Rp 25,000.00 for weekend [AU$5]).

14 Very rarely do these kinds of places play local music. *Dangdut* music, for example, is played in very specific discotheques, which can found in Surabaya and Jakarta. However, they do not play the original *dangdut* songs, but play the mixed ones, i.e. techno *dangdut*, or disco *dangdut*. The music itself represents for many a local and global encounter that facilitates a sense of modernity and prestige.
Ricky Martin look-alike—becomes an expression of social distinctions and the politics of lifestyle, which is acquired here through a sexual interaction with that body. In the warung I described in chapter two, perek only use that space for casual stop over to be picked up by boy friends.

The middle-class who participate in these exclusive places, through which the capitalist world system expands the market for the consumption of its products, use these places to express their politics of lifestyle through the almost ritualised middle-class consumption of a Western lifestyle. The wong cilik may enter these spaces and participate in the practice of conspicuous consumption, however their participation differs vastly from that of the middle class. For example, the waiters who work through the night at Surabaya’s ‘Top Ten’ discotheque come from rural or semi-rural regions of Java. They live in dormitories in a nearby kampong and eat in warung along the kampong’s many alleys. Some of these waiters sell the drug ecstasy, or act as brokers for the many self-employed prostitutes who operate in the discotheque. Through the sale of ecstasy, the waiters make a profit of about Rp 10,000 per pill by increasing its price to the customer from about Rp 50,000 to Rp 60,000. Station discotheque also openly provides female company for its guests. These women can be hired at Rp 27,000 per hour to accompany male patrons. The girls, most of whom are Javanese, sit with an identifying number behind a glass window until they are chosen. Most often they are called by middle-aged Chinese men. People like Tejo and his friends, as discothèque waiters invite their relatives into the discotheque so that their relatives, who are also wong cilik, can ‘menjadi orang moderen’ (become modern people). These waiters sneak their relatives into the disco and provide them with free drinks, thereby avoiding the high cost of beverages, which are three times their normal price. On the other hand, the wealthy patrons of these nightclubs are capable of spending over Rp 100,000 per night—the equivalent of 1/3 of a month’s pay for the waiters. The favours provided to relatives are often tolerated by the disco management and are viewed by its poor Javanese employees as an unspoken right that supplements the meagre wage they receive for long nights of work in smoky, crowded, cold and noisy discotheques.

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15 This information comes from observations and discussions with patrons and employees of the discotheques Top Ten and Station in Tunjungan Plaza, Bongos Pub in Sheraton Hotel, and Desperados Pub in Shangrila Hotel. The observations were made on May 30, 1998; June 1, 1998; June 3 1998; and June 6, 1998.
B.2.2. Buying Rice from the Pasar and the Supermarket: Distinction and Identity

The different pattern of buying rice between the rich and the poor in urban areas reflects the socio-cultural and economic differences between them, differences that are also expressed through the politics of lifestyle. The poor and the rich have different lifestyles; they live in the same space but are encapsulated within their own worlds. This pattern of encapsulation can be demonstrated through their choice of market for the purchase of household goods, particularly rice and cloth. With the growth of malls and of a class of new rich in urban areas since the 1990s, pasar (traditional markets) have lost some of their customers. Hari Darmawan, the owner of the large domestic chain of Matahari retail stores which not only exists in Provincial capital cities but also at the regency levels, ‘compares what he wants to do in Indonesia with what Wal-Mart did in the United States: Revolutionise the way people shop by bringing them out of traditional local markets and into air-conditioned one-stop-shopping centres.’ (Thornton, 1995: 73). This is because the middle class prefers to go to the supermarkets—which provide not only clean and modern facilities, but also gives them opportunities to practice their politics of lifestyle publicly. This phenomenon is emphasised by the emergence of big grocery chains such as Hero, Gelael, Alfa and Goro since around early 1990s.

In this kind of modern market, rice is neatly packed in 5 kilo plastic bags marked with the colour brand name of the supermarket where the rice is sold. The appearance of rice packages is more attractive to middle class customers rather than those of the kalangan bawah—a social class that has low income. The strategy of selling images functions to attract customers from the kalangan menengah (middle-class). By contrast, rice in the pasar is located in a wooden box of containers without any plastic packaging. Furthermore, types of rice sold in the supermarket are of the high priced varieties, such as Raja Lele, Bengawan Super and some imported rice from Thailand which can be identified by the Thai script on the plastic bag. These varieties of rice cannot be found in the pasar, where only the cheaper medium to low quality varieties like C4, IR 64, Bengawan, and Mentik Wangi are sold. Rice traders in the pasar provide for customers from the kalangan menengah-bawah (lower-middle class) to the kalangan bawah (wong
cilik). According to a lawyer’s wife living in the Kampung Dinoyo in Surabaya which actually reflects common discourses about Malls in Surabaya:

‘The customers of Jembatan Merah Plaza mostly came from the kalangan menengah-bawah, it is an old building and no longer popular among the youth, who no longer choose to ‘hang out’ there. The kalangan menengah (middle class) usually prefer to go to Tunjungan Plaza, while the kalangan menengah-atas (upper middle class) usually prefer to hang out in Galaxi Mall. After Tunjungan Plaza was renovated it became very trendy for the kalangan menengah-atas, but after the expansion of the kalangan menengah bawah (lower middle class) they moved to the new and trendy Galaxi Mall. The rich in this plaza usually carry mobile phones and wear ARMANI, VERSACE, GUCCI, LOUIS VITTON clothing and accessories.

Dining in the mall’s cafes or restaurants is another form of conspicuous consumption and public display that wong gede constantly practice, similar to a catwalk-like display. This kind of pretension enables the rich to display their politics of lifestyle within capitalist culture. In this arena, we cannot see anything ideological, because ideology is apparently superseded by an homogenizing capitalism. In the pasar the situation is opposite to that in the mall or plaza; the people are totally different in the pasar, which is predominantly occupied by wong cilik Indonesians living in the kampong and some servants of rich families living nearby the main street. They wear sandals and are generally not dressed up, and the place itself is somewhat dirty and smelly. The smell of dried fish, blue-collar jobs, sweaty work and the struggle against poverty are the images of this place and the social class that work and shop there. In the case of the malls, they are usually surrounded by warung (particularly in Surabaya), boys selling newspapers, cigarette traders, becak drivers, taxi drivers, parking attendants, and some street traders. Most of these people surrounding the malls are the wong cilik from various ethnic groups who are trying to get access to that kind of economic system through various informal sector activities. In Jakarta territorialism and ‘frontierism’ are the main ways in which the wong cilik create and claim the spaces and thereby get involved in capitalist culture and economy. This kind of territorialism is usually based on patronage along ethnic lines, as demonstrated in terms that identify ethnic origin, such as arek (meaning kid), which identifies Surabaya people.

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16 This information is based on my observations from May to June 1998 in Tunjungan Plaza Surabaya from 10.00 AM to 4.00 PM. Other observations were also made in Surabaya Mall, Galaxi Mall, Surabaya Plaza, and Jembatan Merah Plaza between 10.00 AM to 7.00 PM.
Mall visitors do not merely go to the mall to buy rice and other food items, which they can find at a much lower cost in the pasar; instead the mall for these people serves as an arena to display their politics of lifestyle. Chinese Indonesians, who do not have any real political arena, utilise the mall as their arena of everyday life politics; it is also an arena that is economically affordable for the Chinese middle-class. Consumption behaviour, which has become the politics of lifestyle, is interwoven with the modernity or even the post-modernity of urban life as practised by the new rich. This has an impact on the person who is in the process of becoming a member of the new rich. For example, the wife of young lawyer in Surabaya states:\footnote{This conversation was held on the 8\textsuperscript{th} of June 1998}

‘Saya lebih suka untuk tidak pergi ke pasar, karena orang-orang di pasar kebanyakan tidak berpendidikan, jadi kalau saya ngobrol sama mereka, seringkali tidak pas, atau mereka tidak mengerti. Saya pergi ke pasar hanya untuk basa-basi saja, karena saya hidup di dalam itu a tak perlu ngobrol dengan mereka Meskipun demikian saya juga tak suka pergi ke Tunjungan Plaza, karena sekarang ini tempat itu sudah didominasi oleh kalangan menengah ke bawah bahkan kalangan bawah yang mau kelihatan modern. Maka dari itu saya lebih suka pergi ke Galaxi Mall, karena tidak ada orang seperti itu di sana. Sebagian besar dari mereka berasal dari kalangan atas’. I prefer not to go to the traditional market (pasar), because people in the pasar are mostly uneducated, so when I talk there is often a misunderstanding. I only go to the pasar for basa-basi (small talk) because I must live in the kampong with them. Because of that I prefer to go to the supermarket, the food quality is better, the place is nicer and cleaner and I don’t have to talk with them. However, I do not really like to go to Tunjungan Plaza, because this place is already dominated by kalangan menengah-bawah (the middle to lower classes), even the kalangan bawah (lower class) want to be modern. Because of that I prefer to go to Galaxi Mall, because there are no people like that there. Most of them come from the kalangan menengah-atas (the middle to upper classes).

This lawyer’s family had an income of around Rp 1,500,000.00 per month,\footnote{The average wage of a lawyer was around Rp 1,000,000.00 per month.} while the wife’s wage was around Rp 500,000.00 per month. At that time, the price of rice was reaching Rp 2000.00, about which the wife said: ‘sekarang harga beras telah mencapai Rp 2,000.00’ (‘Now, the price of rice has already reached Rp 2,000.00’). Her tone expressed that she was not overly worried. This is totally different with expressions coming from Bu Slamet—a wife from the same kampong who came from the kalangan bawah and whose family earned around Rp150,000-Rp300,000 per month—who stated: ‘wah, beras mundak Rp 2000.00 sesuk mangan opo iki, mumet aku’ (‘Wow, the
price of rice is rising to Rp 2000.00, tomorrow. What we are going to eat? I have got a headache’)

The above statement is not only discriminatory, but also reflects how the new rich define themselves as a part of the new middle class in Indonesian society. An opposite picture emerges from the kalangan bawah, whose kampong members in Surabaya and Yogyakarta prefer to buy rice from the pasar within or near the kampong, or directly from the rice mills in rural areas. In these kampongs some kiosks also provide rice and food items, but the prices are somewhat higher than in the pasar. For the poor there is no reason to buy rice from the supermarket, not only because the price is higher than in the pasar, but also because their class-consciousness makes them feel that they are not part of the mall culture. They identify themselves as part of a pasar culture, which is reflected in their consciousness as kalangan bawah or wong cilik. Entering the mall makes them feel somewhat inferior, even though they try to be part of mall culture so that they can sight-see and window-shop. This attitude is most common in the kalangan bawah among its housewives and husbands rather than its youngsters. The youngsters, in contrast, have no difficulties in becoming part of Mall culture, even though they do not spend any money in the mall, but rather spend their time hanging around smoking their cigarettes.

The above statement of the new middle class wife still living in the kampong demonstrates the tensions and contradictions within the kampong that result from vertical mobility. For example, the people who are in the process of vertical mobility feel that they are ‘too good’ for the uneducated people, who predominantly inhabit the pasar; even the food in the pasar is considered by the middle class as ‘too bad’ for them. This middle class attitude reflects the fact that the increasing price of rice during the economic crisis was not bothering them, although an exception to this was the highly-publicised case of the ‘Ibu Peduli’ (Mothers who Care) demonstrations in Jakarta. This movement consisted of a small group of middle class housewives who staged a demonstration over the New Order government’s failure to lower the price of

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19 This was a temporary movement in Jakarta during the monetary crisis (1998-2000) which gave sympathy towards poor families. This demonstration pressed demands such as reminding the government to consider the condition of the baby from the poor family who need milk for their growth by providing cheap milk for them.

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rice; these women were also active in assisting poor families in slum areas. Their work in the kampong, however, does not mean that they were not involved in increasing the price of rice for the kalangan bawah within the kampong. The middle class women contributed to kampong rumours about the high price of rice and the ineptness of the government, but this rumouring was no more than basa-basi, or white lies, for the middle class women; these women cared little about the economic turmoil that had no more than a minimal effect on the purchasing power and life-styles of the middle class. The socio-economic disparities and contradictions between the classes that on the one hand make the middle class afraid to face the wong cilik and on the other hand the wong cilik construct stereotypes of the rich that are not so easily diluted.

C. From Social Encapsulation to Threat: A Social Paradox

In the kampong near Malioboro street there is a notice board saying Pemulung Dilarang Masuk (Garbage Scavengers Do Not Enter!). This notice is addressed clearly to a specific wong cilik profession. However, in practice it also includes street kids who usually wander around Malioboro street. For the kampong people who live in their own houses, and who the street kids therefore describe as wong omahan, (which means a person who shelters in a house unlike the street kids who wander under the heat of the sun), street kids, garbage scavengers and other marginal people are a threat. That is why the wong omahan do not allow them to enter into their kampong. On the other hand, kampong people can also become a threat for preman, as I described in an earlier chapter. Furthermore, preman also may be a threat for street kids, or street musicians and even the police, while at the same time the police may become a real threat for preman because this state instrumentality has the legitimate power to crush hoodlums, as reported in the Jakarta Post:

‘City police deployed on Saturday their elite mobile regiment force to hunt down hoodlum bosses in an effort to diminish increasing street crimes. The elite force, consisting of dozens of high-talented armed personnel, have been assigned to concentrate on areas believed to be the most dangerous sites for passers-by and motorists. Blok M shopping area in South Jakarta, now notorious for hoodlums, is one of the targets. The first cleanup operation took place soon after a police lieutenant was killed by hoodlums in Blok M in March this year.’

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This kind of chain of interlinking mutual threats operates within the encapsulated society. It reflects a social paradox as I will explain in this section.

If we examine the entertainment businesses in Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta, we find that preman and members of the political party youth groups are the protectors of these businesses. In Yogyakarta for example, Papi’s boys’ tipping money — so called ‘uang keamanan’ (security money) — comes from the bars, pubs and discotheques in the territory he rules over. This informal protection is already well established, ensuring that the protection provided by these groups is honoured with an informal payment of Rp 5,000.00 to 20,000.00. The different bodies of party-backed youth organisations, satgas (satuan tugas = task force), and groups of low-ranking military officers often compete. There is conflict over which group has gained the informal privilege to tax particular entertainment businesses; sometimes one group can move in on the territory, for which the ‘rights’ had formerly belonged to another. This often necessitates a violent conflict to decide who will win control of the business.

The Pemuda Pancasila leader of Yogyakarta told me that before this organization was formed, fights between youth gangs were frequent, but these then declined somewhat after the Pemuda Pancasila organized them into a single organization and made clear-cut territorial rules. The soldier-like appearance — crew cuts and strong builds — of the members of these groups make them look ‘serem’ (scary). They are distressing to the customers of these businesses, who privately resent their presence. The Ketapang incident in Jakarta for example, which resulted from a conflict between local kampong Moslems and non-Moslem preman (thugs), was based on a conflict between the protectors of local illicit businesses and the surrounding

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21 After the fall of the New Order regime, the Pemuda Pancasila (the official youth group, with links to Golkar and the Military, and backed by the New Order regime back) members lost their influence somewhat. Some of them have joined with the new laskar (paramilitaries) affiliated with the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), called GPK (Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah = The Movement of Youth for Ka’bah). They became recognized as guardian of PPP and then some of its individual members were in a position to operate as the guardians of entertainment businesses in most cities in Java. Other political parties too have their own militias.

22 In Yogyakarta they usually give them around Rp 5,000.00 up to Rp 10,000.00, in Surabaya between Rp 10,000.00 up to Rp 15,000.00, and in Jakarta between Rp 15,000.00 up to Rp 20,000.00 depending on the number of customers.

23 This account is based on the information from the leader of Pemuda Pancasila in Yogyakarta.
kampong residents.\textsuperscript{24} In this incident, the two buildings used as entertainment sites were originally purchased by high-level military interests from North Sumatra as state pawn shops, which were then contracted out to Taiwanese business-people who used these government buildings to operate gambling clubs. According to sources among local residents, these gambling businesses received the protection and backing of a colonel from the Army Brigade and former security aide to President Suharto.\textsuperscript{25} Local residents are aware of the involvement of the military in the protection of these businesses. The military stay behind the façade of the formal and official security provided to this business and all other big businesses by the professional, police-trained civilian guards, known as SATPAM (\textit{Satuan Pengamanan} = Security Unit). This is reflected in the following statement by a local resident:

> Although the guardians are only Satpam, local kampong members know that real protection comes from ABRI officers. However, kampong members don’t mind because the criminals involved in the business are nice to them.\textsuperscript{26}

This quote indicates that common local ideas of corruption and criminal practice can move from the level of simple kampong and street-level rumouring to an established, formal and authoritative counter-discourse through their institutionalisation.

Various forms of lower-class crime in Indonesia are made acceptable as ‘\textit{saling tolong}’ (mutual assistance relationships) and ‘\textit{saling memanfaatkan}’ (beneficial use of one another). These forms of lower class criminality, which reclaim part of the product or surplus value extracted from the worker by the employer and, in other instances, which achieve access to part of the exclusive wealth conspicuously displayed by the middle-class, are tolerated by their middle-class victims with the rationalisation of ‘\textit{tidak melampaui batas}’ (not crossing the border). The term \textit{tidak melampaui batas} is commonly used in the entertainment business and in big companies like Nike, Adidas and Reebok in Jakarta. One of the black market shoe traders in Jakarta told me that:

> ‘Barang dagangan saya ini ya dari kawan-kawan di perusahaan sepatu seperti...’

\textsuperscript{24} The most comprehensive account of the incident is provided in the \textit{Jawa Pos} newspaper, (26 November 1998 - 28 November 1998), ‘Insiden Ketapang; Awalnya Ulah Preman, Akhirnya Warga Mengamuk’ (pp.1-3).

\textsuperscript{25} Jawa Pos newspaper, (26 November 1998 - 28 November 1998), ‘Insiden Ketapang; Awalnya Ulah Preman, Akhirnya Warga Mengamuk (1-3)’.

\textsuperscript{26} Jawa Pos, 26 November 1998 ‘Insiden Ketapang; Awalnya Ulah Preman, Akhirnya Warga Mengamuk (1-3)’.
Nike atau Reebok. Ini sepatu terbang namanya. Dikasih nama sepatu terbang karena di dalam pabrik sepatu itu ada alat yang melempar sepatu sehingga seperti terbang. Nah kawan-kawan yang kerja di situ itu sering menangkap sepatu terbang itu kemudian di jual ke pedagang seperti kita-kita ini’

(‘These trading goods come from my friends who are working for shoe companies such as Nike and Reebok.. This is called ‘flying shoes’ because in the company there is a kind of mechanical tool that makes the shoes fly. That is the moment when my friends working on that place catch the flying shoes, then they sell it to traders like us’)

Some shoe factory labourers steal shoes then sell them through networks that include buyers and protectors —such as under-paid factory security guards and foreman and underemployed friends in the kampong around the factories. This theft of high-priced shoes by the underpaid workers, who make them, not only reclaims part of the wealth and surplus product denied them by their wealthy multi-national employers, but also serves as a form of silent demonstration, challenge and inversion of the exploitation to which the workers find themselves subjected. One of the labourers I interviewed in Jakarta expressed this as quoted below:

‘Perusahaan kasih uang kita tidak cukup untuk hidup sebulan di Jakarta, salah satu cara untuk mencukupi kebutuhan hidup ya dengan mencuri sepatu seperti itu, baru kita bisa hidup. Hasil curian itu seringkali juga bukan untuk keperluan makan, paling untuk beli pakaian dan senang-senang, karena kalau untuk makan uang curian itu tidak baik’

(‘The company gives us money but not enough to live in Jakarta for a month, one of the strategies to fulfil our need is by stealing shoes as we did, so then we can survive. The money from stealing is not to buy food but rather for shirts, pants or for fun only, because if we spend it on food, money from stealing is not good at all’)

Without effective unions during the New Order, such forms of silent challenge constitute the only means through which workers can make an impact, however small, upon their exploitation. Additionally, the experiences in the ‘illicit economy’, through theft of expensive merchandise, makes such expensive products cheap through the black market and therefore accessible to the wong cilik. It also allows them access to the consumption goods of the international capitalist consumer culture and its modern symbolic forms of social capital or power.

The forms of mutual exploitation explained above constitute a discourse of threat, which encapsulates the middle-class fear of the under-class and the latter’s manipulation of that fear for their own benefit. It also involves, however, a redirection of fear, which the lower class often experience as directed towards them by the middle-
class through the medium of security guards, bouncers, soldiers and policeman who protect middle-class property, social space and persons from lower-class interference or appropriations. The use of threat by the lower classes is evident in the practice of street traders in Yogyakarta’s Malioboro Street who trade in front of the doorways of Chinese businesses — this is a space they illegally and informally appropriate. These incursions upon middle class space are tolerated by the Chinese through their fear that intolerance of these activities could result in the deliberate destruction and sabotage of their property by angered traders. Using threats, the traders force a sharing of valuable commercial space.

Another street-level discourse occurs in the form of ethnic stereotypes, which work to constitute a stereotype of Chinese people as rich and, therefore, subject to the arbitrary terror of poor Javanese. It serves to ridicule those poor Chinese who do not fit the stereotype, using expressions like Cino mlarat (poor Chinese). One of the street traders selling cigarettes in Malioboro Street is an ethnic Chinese. Some of his Javanese friends often make fun of him by saying ‘cino kok mlarat’ (Chinese should not be poor). Among the expression I noted from the street traders who sell on the sidewalk of Malioboro was ‘sing duwe toko cino sugih, mosok wong mlarat dodolan nang ngarepe kok ora entuk’ (the owners of the shops are rich Chinese; why are the poor not allowed to sell in front of their shops?). This kind of discursive practice constitutes an imaginative power relation between the rich, ethnic Chinese and the wong cilik. This kind of fantasy of racial sentiment has become very powerful because it is disseminated through daily discourses like rumour and gossip. Through continued usage, these discourses find their efficacy and become powerful symbolic practices that can be utilised to threaten those dominant groups that have disproportionate control over material resources. In spite of the wong cilik’s lack of control over material resources, they are very creative in managing power relations through their subtle use of threat discourses.

That politics of threat is evidenced in the following conversation I had with a small business owner in Malioboro Street:

My question: Menurutmu pedagang kaki lima di depan toko bapak kamu itu menguntungkan atau merugikan dari segi bisnis ?
(In your opinion, do the sidewalk traders in front of your shops give a positive or negative benefit to your business?)

Trader’s son: ‘Kalau kita mikirnya bisnis profesional, ya pasti bapak saya ngga

(If we think in terms of professional business, of course my father will not allow the sidewalk traders to sell their products in front of his shop, because it blocks the customers’ entry to the shop. Like Malioboro Mall for example, their management does not allow the sidewalk traders to sell their products in front of the building. They use the power of Pemda [Pemerintah Daerah or local government] to make their business look good, but how about people like us? Businessmen like my father cannot do that kind of thing, it is safer to just let them trade in front of the shop).

**My question:** Apa kira-kira yang akan terjadi jika bapakmu meminta mereka untuk pergi dari depan tokonya?

(What will happen if your father asks them to go away from the front of his shop?)

**Trader’s son:** ‘Wah, ya ngga berani, mengusir mereka, gila apa!?’ ‘Jadi, kita terima mereka asal ngga menggangu usaha kita aja, karena orang macam kita ini ada pada posisi serba salah’.

(Ugh, we are not game to refuse them, are we crazy? So, we accept them as long as they don’t bother our business, because people like us are in a difficult position). 27

From the above example, we can see intimidation coming from both sides. When I was in Yogyakarta in 1998, I experienced a similar situation. One morning at about 11 o’clock, two sidewalk traders came to my mother’s house in Kaliurang Street (5 kilometres north of Malioboro Street). One of the traders knocked at the door and the other sat on the chair of the veranda. When I opened the door, the person who knocked suddenly sat beside his friend, and put one of his feet up on the chair, then asked me directly in ngoko (low-level Javanese) for permission to sell food in front of the house. He made his request without introducing himself, and suddenly asked: ‘Entuk opo ora nek aku dodolan neng ngarep omah mu?’ (Can I sell foods in front of your house?). Whilst I was standing, I thought that it was rather strange, because, according to Javanese etiquette, visitors must formally introduce themselves and wait to be invited to sit down.

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27 The expression orang macam kita ini ['people like us'], in this case, is refers to the reality that they are Indonesian Chinese).
By disregarding etiquette, the street trader was indirectly challenging the sovereignty, authority and ownership I commanded over my own private property. I asked my mother whether it would be acceptable to her for a noodle stall to be set up in front of her house. Without a clear reason she replied: ‘Biyen yo wis tau taken koyo ngono, terus tak tolak, aku ora seneng’ (Some time ago someone also requested the same kind of thing and I rejected it, I don’t like it). For a while, I felt caught between the demands of my mother and those of the street trader, both of which lacked justification. With my only choice being to accept my mother’s wishes, I said to the traders: ‘Nyuwun sewu Mas, ibu mboten patoso remen menawi panjenengan sadean wonten ngajeng griyo, rumiyin nggih sampun nate wonten tiyang ingkang nakekaken angsal menopo mboten menawi bade sadean ing ngajeng griyo, ibu nggih mboten setuju. Nyuwun ngapuunten kemawon mas, kulo mboten saged mbantu, sebab griyo meniko sanes kagunganipun kulo’ (I am sorry older brother, my mother does not really like it if you sell [something] in front of [her] house, some time ago my mother refused similar demands from another group of traders. I am sorry, I can’t help you because this is not my house).

My rejection surprised them and, becoming somewhat angry, they raised their voices and continued to speak disrespectfully in the ngoko language. One of them said ‘lho, kok ora iso ki kenopo! (Gee, Why can’t we!). I felt awkward and immobilised—unsure of how to challenge the trader’s lack of etiquette and uncertain about the morality of rejecting the trader’s request during a time of great economic hardship. Through a respectful explanation in polite and high level Javanese, I explained once more the demands of my mother and my powerlessness under the circumstances. Perhaps because of my use of polite language and lack of any direct challenge, I was able to secure a grudging submission from the traders. However, three years later (in 2001) the local preman came back to my house. I watched him from inside the house as, carrying a machete; he climbed the mango tree out the front. I went out to ask him why he was cutting the branches without permission. At that time our conversation became tense, as quoted below:

**Me:** ‘Kok pelemku di kethoki kenapa mas? (Why are you cutting the branches off the mango tree, big brother?)
**The Preman (he was wearing black shirt and pant, and there was a PDIP**

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28 During the economic crisis, many unemployed persons sought an income through street side trading.
badge on his shirt): ‘Aku mung mangkas pang-pang sing nggantung ning ndalan ben ora nggangu wong mlaku’ (‘I am just cutting the branches hanging over the sidewalk that bother pedestrians’) 29
Me: ‘Kuwi orang nggangu wong mlaku, wong malah seneng podo ngeyup nek panas karo ngenteni bis kota lewat’ (‘The branches are not bothering the pedestrians, even some of them shelter from the heat under the branches while waiting for the city bus’)
The Preman (starting to raise his voice): ‘Adiku arep dodolan mie nang kene, nang arep omahmu golek duit halal’ (‘My little brother is going to sell noodle here, in front of your house, to earn legitimate income’)
Me: ‘Aku wis omong biyen nek keluargaku ora ngentuke adimu dodol nang arep omahku, lha kok saiki malah ngrusak tanduran pelem sing ora salah’ (I told you years ago, that my family was not allowing your little brother to sell in front of my house. Why are you destroying the mango tree; it is not guilty of anything)
The Preman (stepping down from the tree and yelling at me): ‘Aku saiki mekso kowe kudu ngijinke adiku dodolan nang arep omahmu, mengko sore adiku arep buka warung nang kene!’ (‘Now I force you to allow my little brother to sell foods in front of your house. This evening he is going to start selling his foods here!’)
Me (two becak drivers and my old neighbour approached to help me, and I started using high (kromo) Javanese language): ‘Nggih mboten saged kados niku caranipun pados panggenan sing halal, njenengan kedah ijin kalih wong sing wonten sak kelilingipun rumiyin, menopo ngjinaken menopo mboten. Menawi dipun ijinaken nggih monggo, menawi mboten nggih sampun mekso’ (‘You just cannot do it like that. If you want to find the legitimate space you have to ask for permission from the surrounding area. If they permit it, you can do it; but if not, don’t force them’)
The Becak driver: ‘Kowe ki yo ora ngawur ngono, wong arep dodolannang ngarepe omange wong kuwi yo kudu ngerti sopan santun karo kiwo tengenmu’ (‘You don’t have to be an anarchist like that. If you want to sell something in front of someone’s house you have to be polite to the people surrounding you’)
The Preman (while showing his machete to the becak driver): ‘Kowe ra sah melu-melu iki urusanku karo sing duwe omah’ (‘Hey you don’t have to become involved in this problem, it is between me and the owner of this house’)
The Becak Driver: Aku kuwi wong kampong kene, sing duwe omah yo wis tahunan urip nang kampong kene, wong koyo kowe kuwi mung ngisin-ngisinke kampong’ (‘I live in this kampong and so does the owner of this house, we have been living in this kampong for years. A person like you is just shameful for this kampong’)
The Preman’s brother (he came to the spot where we were arguing because one of the becak drivers called him): ‘Wis-wis ra usah podo ribut, aku ora sido dodolan nang kene nek carane koyo ngene’ (Enough, enough you don’t have to quarrel, I have decided not to sell from this place, if this is the way to get the space)
The Preman’s brother (approaching me after taking his brother away): Nyuwun ngapunten mas wau niku sanes kangmas kulo, kulo nyuwun tulung

29 PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan = Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle), this party led by Megawati Sukarno Putri, the Indonesian president for the period of 2001-2004.
kaleh wau niko dipun padosaken panggenan kagem sadean mie. Kulo sampun bayar dewekipun Rp 2,000,000.00. Kulo wastani ingkang sae kalihan njengen, terus nggih kulowastani duwit wau meniko nggih sebagian dipun sukakaken njenengan. Sampun mboten usah dipun penggalih mangke piyambakipun kulo urusipun. Kulo nyuwun ngapunten mas, saestu’
‘I am very sorry, he was not my brother, I asked him for help to find a space for me to sell noodles. I already paid him Rp 2,000,000.00, I thought that he would ask nicely to the owner of the house, then I thought that some part of that money would also be given to you. Please do not take it personally, I will take care of him. I really ask for your forgiveness’
Me: ‘Ya wis nek ngono ning ojo dibaleni maneh’ (‘OK, but don’t do it again’)

To interpret the power relations at play between Chinese traders — like my friend and the local traders demanding use of his shop-front — and the street traders, we need to see the meaning beyond the language uses. In the eyes of the street traders, the Chinese shop owners’ status as non-Javanese and foreign makes them illegitimate owners of land rather than rightful owners. The Chinese cannot placate the street traders with respectful and polite Javanese, because to do so would liken his ownership of the shop as not belonging to him, but rather as something he has appropriated. The sense of belonging to the language in this case reflects a national or Javanese ethnic identity not available to Chinese, who are seen as language appropriators or borrowers rather than true owners. An inability to command the same forms of respect reinforces Chinese feelings of powerlessness and fear in their relations with Javanese wong cilik, a relationship that has no class boundaries and poses as a powerful weapon in the hands of the predominantly Javanese traders. However, the preman representing wong cilik in the case of the attempt to claim the space in front of my house, was not supported by my neighbours the local kampong inhabitants, who contended that that kind of behaviour is shameful for the kampong. This was powerful enough to make the preman stop talking because he felt that his territorial claims were somewhat illegitimate in front of the kampong people.

Threats such as those mentioned above, force the Chinese to share space with the street traders. Both groups, however, are subject to the terror and the arbitrary power of the state, which through its security apparatus of police and soldiers, demands uang keamanan (security money), even though the frontline operators of the system are preman. Related to the security system in Malioboro street, the Pemuda Pancasila leader told me that:

‘Sebelum pembunuhan gali atau petrus, pemilik toko dipaksa untuk membayar
pada gali, praktek itu sekarang diteruskan oleh tantara atau polisi dari pangkat rendah dan anggota organisasi pemuda yang didukung oleh partai-partai. Gali sebelum petrus (pembunuhan misterius), dulu sering mereka memakai organisasi yang namanya mirip militer, Kotikam (Komando ketertiban Keamanan). Sekarang organisasi yang mengatur itu semua Pemuda Pancasila, memang banyak anggotanya yang bekas criminal, tetapi ada juga yang sama sekali bukan criminal. Yang bekas criminal pun kita bina bersama TNI, mereka dilatih ketentaraan agar punya disiplin yang baik sehingga tidak menjadi criminal lagi’.

(‘Before the killing of gali [thugs, another name for preman] or petrus [petrus = Pembunuhan Misterius=Mysterious Killings], the shop owners were forced to pay protection money to the gali, a practise now continued by low ranking military or police officers and members of party-backed youth organizations. The gali, before the petrus [mysterious killings], often used titles akin to military organisations, like Kotikam (Komando Ketertiban Keamanan, or Security and Order Command. Now, the organization which organizes that matter is Pemuda Pancasila, yes, a lot of its members are ex-criminals, but some of them also have never been involved in criminal acts. We and the TNI [Army] trained he ex-criminals to be disciplined in order that they will no longer be criminals’)

The shop owners in Malioboro street are mostly lower middle class business-people who lack access to high level military personnel, thus placing them beyond any protection from the threat of arbitrary state authority. In contrast, in Malioboro Mall, the big Jakarta-based owners use the local government to exercise an informal law forbidding sidewalk traders from selling their products in front of the mall. They use Satpam (satuan Pengamanan= Security Task Force), and these private security personnel are sufficient, since it is known that they have state backing.

D. Looking at Each Other From Self-Affirming Vantage Points

The contestation between the rich and the wong cilik can be seen in the process of stereotyping. Stereotyping here can be characterised as occurring in a form of linguistic battle, reflective of the underlying power relations, as the comment of the owner of a luxury car to his chauffeur illustrates:

‘Nanti kalau kita sampai di perempatan jalan ada pengamen minta uang, kasih aja uang Rp 100.00 biar mereka tidak menggores cat mobil kita’

(‘When we pass the intersection and there are street musicians asking for money, just give them Rp 100.00, so they will not scratch our car’).

A rich friend made this comment when we were driving around Jakarta during the 1998 economic crisis in his luxurious new sedan. The rich feel intimidated by the street musicians and feel compelled to be very generous towards them—giving them Rp 100.00 coins. The generosity of the rich, in this instance, is a tactic employed to placate
the threatening musicians and to avoid violence, because the rich stereotype the street musicians a threat. At that time there were street musicians seeking money around the traffic lights at almost every intersection. 30

Street musicians also have certain kinds of rules for the rich. These are rules of politeness, or sopan santun, imposed by the street musicians upon the rich, who must also understand these rules of politeness and, thereby, feel compelled to conform to them. Regarding this rule of politeness, one of the street musicians said:

‘Jika mereka tidak mau memberi uang, mereka tinggal menggerakkan tangan sebagai tanda untuk menolak pengamen. Tetapi jika mereka diam saja seperti pura-pura tidak melihat kita, itu membuat kita marah karena seolah-olah keberadaan kita sebagai manusia itu tidak ada artinya’.

(‘If they do not want to give some money, they wave their hand in refusal. But, if they just keep quiet and pretend not to see us, it makes us angry, because it undermines our existence.’)

The street musicians are very mobile, and have good networks among themselves throughout Java, making it possible for them to move long distances within their cities and across Java, making money from their informal trade. Through their ever-present command of respect and fear, the street musicians are able to gain a significant degree of control of the space on the street, that they can then exploit to make a living. However, the professional street musicians, such as those from the SPI ‘union’, do not agree with this practice, which they view as the exercise of terror to obtain money, rather than the provision of entertainment. For SPI members that kind of practice just contributes to a chain of terror which has no end. But in practice, people living in these encapsulated societies always look at each other from a favoured or privileged ‘blind spot’. By this I mean that within each of these encapsulated social worlds, stereotypes and other discursive means are developed to define self and others in ways that reflect lived experience, but which also validate the in-group at the expense of the out-group. These discursively bounded worlds inter-penetrate, and those of the state and the socially powerful prevail to some extent in the contested processes of

30 SPI (Serikat Pengamen Indonesia, or The Union for Indonesian Street Musicians) members are never involved in seeking money at the traffic lights because it is not professional. They prefer to sing on the sidewalk professionally without insisting that they be given money. This ‘union’ was set up in mid 1990-s by street musicians. This union is not legalised by law, and the members do not want to make it legal. The members have a good connection with the student movement and due to this they also treated this organisation as a kind of protest against the corporatist state. This independent union is very critical toward the government and was actively involved with the student’s movement in opposing Suharto’s regime before he resigned from his presidency on the 21st of May 1998.
discourse formation. However, the subordinate groups, principally those of the wong cilik, are linguistically adept in finding the symbolic means whereby the dominant groups are temporarily blinded or are vulnerable. Here the wong cilik tend both to create their own social categories and to subvert the meanings of the wong gede. Clearly the powerful have wide scope to construct self-affirming social categories. But so, too, are the wong cilik able to find sources of self-affirmation and to strengthen their class consciousness as is evident in the song entitled Serenade (quoted below).

The song is entitled ‘Serenade’ as shown below. It was created in the 1980s by a street musician called Anton Baret—a KPJ (Kelompok Pengamen Jalanan or Street Musicians Group) member. This song has already been claimed as the song of the street musicians and street kids. It has become a means for the street people to demonstrate the identity.

Serenade
Aku ingin nyanyikan lagu (I want to sing a song)
Bagi orang-orang yang tertindas (for the suppressed people)
Hidup di alam bebas (living in a free and natural atmosphere)
Dengan jiwa yang terpapas (with an incomplete soul)
Aku ingin nyanyikan lagu (I want to sing a song)
Bagi kaum-kaum yang terbuang (for the uprooted classes)
Kehilangan semangat juang (Losing their spirit of struggle)
Di tengah hidup yang bimbang (in the middle of an uncertain life)
Reff:
Kenapa harus takut pada matahari (Why do [we] have to be afraid of the sun)
Kepalkan tangan dan halau setiap panasnya ([we have to] clench [our] fists and get rid of the heat)
Kenapa harus takut pada malam hari (why do [we] have to be afraid of the night)
Nyalakan api dalam hati ini, usir segala kelamnya (Fire the fire in [our] heart, to get rid of the darkness)
Chorus:
Di lorong, lorong, lorong jalan (In the alley way)
Di kolong, kolong, kolong jembatan (Under the bridge)
Di kaki, kaki, kaki lima (On the side walk)
Di bawah menara (under the tower).
Kau masih mendekap derita (you still hug the sadness)
Kau masih mendekap derita (You still hug the sadness)
Aku ingin nyanyikan lagu (I want to sing a song)
Tanpa kemiskinan dan kemunafikan (without poverty and hypocrisy)
Tanpa air mata dan kesengsaraan (without tears and sorrow)
Agar dapat melihat surga (to be able to see heaven)

31 Dodo, one of the street kids in Malioboro street gave this lyric to me. He had already memorised it from years ago. He said that most of the street musicians on this street already memorised this song, because they feel that it reflects their life.
This song reflects wong cilik consciousness and identity in urban areas. Class-consciousness, which accompanies the rise of identity, is socially constructed by dominant discourses and by the under-class’s experiences of challenging the dominant groups. It is not merely about the construction of discourse by the dominant groups, but also about the ways in which the wong cilik contest the dominant groups. In this kind of power relation, the wong cilik are fabricating identity and consciousness through their opportunities to challenge the dominant discourse. This happens in many cities in Java, where the street musicians sing their critical songs in the bus or in front of warung customers.

In the 1980s, the above quoted song was often played in front of the customers of the warung lesehan in Malioboro Street Yogyakarta. In the 1990s however, this song was very rarely played, because the street singers had to follow market trends and also because they had to create hundreds of other critical songs. The musicians sang Latin songs, for example, when they became trendy. However, the above quoted song is still played when they hang around together with other segments of the wong cilik, such as shoeshine boys, street kids and sidewalk traders. The song is like their anthem or a ritual that works at maturing their class-consciousness and identity as an urban wong cilik. This ‘ritual of maturation’ has become an important arena for the wong cilik in creatively producing critical songs to challenge or criticise the dominant groups.

Another arena for the construction of counter-discourse was warung lesehan and angkringan in Malioboro Street during the 1980s. They are very well known rendezvous places for young intellectuals interested in social, political and cultural issues. Warung lesehan means the warung that sells food and where the customers sit down on mats. The warung lesehan, of which there are dozens in Malioboro Street as well as in the cities of Surabaya and Jakarta, open during evening and into the night. It is here that intellectuals and the wong cilik interact and bridge their distances by getting to know each other and sharing ideas in informal discussions. These informal discussions among intellectuals and the wong cilik in the warung played a role in triggering the maturation of political and class-consciousness among the wong cilik. Through oral communication, rumour and gossip, the wong cilik disseminate the ideas they gather in the warung to many others. The informal discussions in the warung were mostly about politics, culture, and social aspects of Indonesia. The intellectuals who
congregate in the warung lesehan usually ask the street musicians to sing certain songs and sometimes talk about the critical songs made by the street musicians. Furthermore, if the intellectuals held their informal discussions in warung lesehan, the street musicians who were having a drink in the warung would usually join them. The street musicians were usually invited to sing songs, with one of the songs being ‘Serenade’, the one quoted above. The phenomenon of the warung lesehan shows that if an intellectual knows one of the street musicians, they can easily join in, thereby creating a form of collaboration that brings them together, both the wong cilik and the lower middle class.

The relationship between young intellectuals and the wong cilik was relatively fluid; this was because most of the intellectuals came from lower middle class families. The lower middle class is relatively capable of making cross-class relationships. Very often some of the intellectuals can make multiple relationships with people from the upper middle class (such as the chair of the editorial group of certain well-known newspapers or magazines), the lower middle class (students involved in activism, young university lecturers, and young NGO members) and the wong cilik (street musicians, side walk traders, shoe shine boys and street kids). However, when they become part of the upper middle class, they become well known—employed by newspaper and magazine companies as columnists and invited to give many seminars—which makes their relationship with the wong cilik much less personal, while their relationship with the upper middle-class becomes more personal. With their popular profiles, their newspaper columns and media appearances they command high salaries. The more popular their name, the higher they are paid. Similarly, in their intellectual roles, they claim that when they give seminars it is like ‘ngamen’ (singing in front of the public, like a street musician), as observed by one of the Gadjah Mada University lecturers from the faculty of Social and Political sciences. Their relationship with the media, business and intellectuals is driven by the market economy.

In the early 1990s, meetings among the lower middle class in the warung lesehan became less frequent. This reduction of intellectual activity in Malioboro Street is largely related to the fact that marriage and family life drew older patrons away from the warung lesehan. Some in the lower middle class also found new places to socialise, such as the cafes around the tourist areas, which mushroomed in the early 1990s.
Perhaps the major reason for this reduction of intellectual activity in the *warung lesehan* has been the government policy toward restrictions on certain kinds of extracurricular activity. In 1978, the minister of education, Daud Jusuf, banned student organisations from becoming affiliated with political parties. This policy, called the NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kegiatan Kampus, or The Normalisation of Campus Life/Body for the Co-ordination of Campus Activities) was created by Minister Daud Jusuf to reduce political activity on campus. This policy is related to government concerns with the destabilising potential of student activism, concerns extending back to the Malari incident of the 15th January 1974, which was seriously intensified by the active involvement of students in politics. The government views student activity in politics as abnormal, because in their eyes the main duty of the student is to study and not to think about political practice. Student political activity was, therefore, ‘normalised’ through the creation of the NKK/BKK. This policy indirectly severed the connection between intellectuals and the *wong cilik*. After the introduction of this policy, informal discussions became less frequent and the connection between intellectuals from the class of the 1970s and later generations was also cut.

Young middle class intellectuals, therefore, came to be less involved in rendezvous at the *warung lesehan* and in public more generally. However, a similar meeting to those of the *warung lesehan* in the 1970s was created in the office of a branch of the *Jawa Pos* newspaper in Malioboro street during the early to mid 1990s. These discussions inspired by Arif Affandi, a *Jawa Pos* journalist who had graduated from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University. The discussions were held weekly; and when these discussions resulted in a working paper it would be published the next day by the *Jawa Pos*, which would also provide the key speaker with the royalties from the publication. These discussions resembled the informal discussions held by the intellectuals in the *warung*, although, because the *Jawa Pos* discussion groups were held inside the newspaper building, the *wong cilik* could not get directly involved. However, the members of the discussion group often continued their discussions in *warungs* in front of the *Jawa Pos* office; it was at these moments that people from the *wong cilik* could become involved if they were friends with one of

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32. These discussions also often included foreign intellectuals during their visits to Yogyakarta.

*Aris Arif Mundayat*
the intellectuals. Most of the members of the discussion group held by Jawa Pos were students and lecturers who were involved in political activism. Their meetings in the Jawa Pos office forged an arena out of which the intellectuals developed their criticism toward the government’s authoritarian regime. These discussions were discontinued after the editors of the national magazines Tempo and Detik were banned by the New Order regime in the late 1990s, a ban which was aimed at the Tempo branch office taken over by Jawa Pos. Following this ban, the Jawa Pos held weekly discussions in its office in Kaliurang Street (5 km away from Malioboro Street). This relocation of the meetings away from Malioboro Street, which had been the site of much wong cilik activity, severed the ties between intellectuals and the wong cilik.

In the eyes of the wong cilik, especially the street dwellers, bureaucrats are understood as being intellectuals and intellectuals as bureaucrats. This understanding is reinforced when intellectuals and bureaucrats share similar political positions or opinions. Pendek (a nickname of one of the street kids) told me that: ‘Intelektual podo wae karo birokrat’ (Intellectuals and bureaucrats are just the same). This ideal conceptualisation by the wong cilik results from their meetings with the intellectuals in the grassroots arena. Because of this stereotype, the street dweller named Pendek who I invited to my class (Urban Anthropology) said to me that:

‘Konco-konco sakjane ra seneng nek bocah-bocah diteliti, paling bar diteliti mengko sing sukses yo intelektual, wong koyo awake dewe iki tetap wae koyo ngene’

(‘My friends actually do not like to be researched, after they research about us the one who gains success is the intellectual. People like us will be the same all the time’)

The refusal toward the intellectual researching street dwellers was based on the feeling that they feel objectified as an academic commodity that benefits the intellectuals rather than them. Because of this unequal relationship, the wong cilik prefer to be involved in discussions with the intellectuals rather than to be interviewed by them; by involving themselves in discussions they feel that they are being respected (rumongso di wongke). The wong cilik are more satisfied with the research methods of the Girli NGO—organised mostly by ex-students from Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta—which always involves street kids in its discussions. Girli’s tactics function mainly to educate the wong cilik through a free learning process.
Through everyday life interaction in the warung, the wong cilik force themselves into equal relationships with the intellectuals and attempt to be a part of the intellectual’s circuit. This strong attitude shows that their consciousness does not simply come from other classes but also originates from themselves. They do not, however, deny that some part of their political consciousness comes from the students they meet in the warung. This relationship fabricates the class-consciousness of both classes in making them more critical toward the state. This kind of political consciousness is not merely because of the role of the intellectuals, but also because of their experiences in facing the violence that comes from the state apparatuses—such as the military, police and Satgas Tibum (Satuan petugas ketertiban dan kemanan = civilian task force for the maintenance of order and safety). The intellectuals, particularly the students, also experience the same kind of violence. Their experiences of facing state violence and terror serve to educate them in how to face, trick and challenge the state apparatuses.\(^{33}\)

Returning to the song’s text I quoted above:

Aku ingin nyanyikan lagu (I want to sing a song)  
Bagi orang-orang yang tertindas (for the suppressed people)  
Hidup di alam bebas (living in a free and natural atmosphere)  
Dengan jiwa yang terpapas (with an incomplete soul)

The lyric ‘jiwa yang terpapas’ (incomplete soul) can be traced back genealogically through the concept of the dichotomy between ‘wis dadi wong’ (already human) and ‘durung wong’ (not yet human). This dichotomy is genealogically rooted in the Javanese priyayi’s ideal type concept of what it means to be a real human. The term ‘terpapas’ literally means ‘cut off’; with reference to the soul, it translates as ‘not intact’ or ‘incomplete’.\(^{34}\) The concept of ‘jiwa yang terpapas’ is similar to the priyayi concept of ‘durung wong’. In urban areas of Java under the New Order regime, the term priyayi was rarely used; a more commonly used term is kalangan menengah (literally, ‘middle-class’), by which I mean the New Order bureaucrats.\(^{35}\) This is largely because there has

\(^{33}\) For further example and analysis concerning state terrorism and state violence, see Ariel Heryanto (1993), *Discourse and State Terroism, A case study of political trials in new Order Indonesia 1989-1990*. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Monash University.

\(^{34}\) Because it is difficult to find an exact English translation, I translated it into ‘incomplete soul’, which is probably does not entirely capture its nuances.

\(^{35}\) For further understanding about this kind of middle class see K.R Young. (1990) ‘Middle Peasant, Middle Bureaucrats: Middle Class?’ In Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*. Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies.
been tremendous vertical mobility from among the common people or non-priyayi, many of who graduated from university and entered bureaucratic jobs in the civil service and private business sectors. The term 'priyayi' is only used by the older generation. Priyayi attitudes which originate historically with the Javanese aristocracy, however, are now adopted and somewhat modified by the new generation of kalangan menengah. The kalangan menengah actively and creatively reinterpret the ideas they have adopted from the dominant group, thereby empowering themselves in their relations with the dominant group. The concept of 'jiwa yang terpapas' is also adopted and reproduced by the kalangan menengah; and it is also used by the wong cilik to define themselves within social contexts where the dominant group exists. The concept of 'durung wong' (not yet human) and its opposite 'wis dadi wong' (already human) are socially constructed through certain kinds of cultural codes, which are usually based on a bureaucratic culture. The term wis dadi wong traditionally refers to the social status of a person who already has a good position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. For example, one of the construction labourers who often hangs out in the warung gave me an example of the 'dadi wong' concept as stated below:

‘Anak-anake pak Yusuf tonggoku wis podo ‘dadi wong’ kabez saik, ono sing dadi guru, ono sing dadi kepala sekolah, ono sing dadi kepala kantor nang sulawes, kabez ‘jabatan teles’ ‘

(‘My neighbour named Pak Yusuf has children who have already ‘become human’ (dadi wong), one has become a teacher, another a school president, and yet another has become a leader of state office in Sulawesi, all of the are ‘wet position’).

This expression means that Pak Yusuf’s children have already obtained important bureaucratic positions of the type called jabatan teles (literally ‘wet position’ meaning that the position that deals with a lot of money over and above the official’s direct salary). It also reflects the importance of the position of pemerintah (government) from the people’s point of view. The consequence of this point of view is that Pak Yusuf’s children and his family have to be respected by people because he/she/ or his family are already ‘dadi wong’ (lit: has became human) and should be diwongke (literally meaning ‘to be treated as a human’, but it could also be translated more generally as ‘to be respected’).

The usage of wis dadi wong establishes the new kalangan menengah socially, culturally, politically, and materially within society. Being established means having a house, having a fixed-term job, having a jabatan basah (‘wet position’), having a
monthly salary base, and having a family (no matter how corrupt the means employed to acquire those possessions). Having a house means having money and a neighbour that recognises and respects him. To be a respectable ‘real human’ (di wong ke) usually applies only to men and demonstrates that the concepts of ‘dadi wong’ or ‘durung wong’ are male constructs. By having a fixed-term job and a monthly base salary means having a respected social position. If someone has a job in the informal sectors, or in the factory industry, it means that she/he does not have a ‘real’ social position. They, therefore, are considered to be members of the kalangan bawah (lit. ‘lower class’), or the wong cilik, which makes them durung wong. This is a classification system that fabricates discriminatory stereotypes about the so-called kalangan bawah. Having no family and children is also socially stigmatised, but it does not mean that they are kalangan bawah, which is predominantly defined in terms of ownership of material things. However, a person can still be rich and have a good bureaucratic position, yet still be considered durung wong.

The binary concept of wis dadi wong and durung wong discriminates against the people who are durung wong, and wong cilik are invariably viewed as durung wong. It thereby imposes a distinction between classes or social categories. For example, homosexuals, prostitutes, street people, jobless people and single people will be classified as not yet human. Again, it is an expression of the discrimination of others by the dominant group, the group that is already established socially, economically and politically. Furthermore, it also has a disciplining effect on the younger generation of the kalangan menengah in manufacturing their lifestyle and cosmology of how to aspire to be a complete human being in the modern environment. Another concept, that of manusia seutuhnya (complete human being), was often used by the New Order Government to mobilise people for the pembangunan program (development program). The government apparatuses usually used the idea that only by participating in the nation’s economic development will people be able to become manusia seutuhnya. This also has political consequences, because the manusia seutuhnya also have to be loyal to the New Order government. This is a dominant weapon in the state’s construction of ideas about the proper order of the social world. The state usage of manusia seutuhnya is embraced by the kalangan menengah, who apply it to the people at the grassroots level who are durung wong.
The following lyrics from the song ‘Serenade’ show that the *wong cilik* do not passively accept this and are ready to contest the power of the dominant group.

‘Kenapa harus takut pada matahari, kepalkan tangan dan halau setiap panasnya. Kenapa harus takut pada malam hari, nyalakan api dalam hati ini, usir segala kelamnya.’

(‘Why do [we] have to be afraid of the sun [we have to] clench [our] fists and get rid of the heat. Why do [we] have to be afraid of the night, fire the fire in [our] heart, to get rid of the darkness’)

In spite of the fact that *wong cilik* identities are partially constructed through dominant discourse, the *wong cilik* challenge the dominant group by showing that they are physically and psychologically stronger. The dominant (or the economically comfortable) group, who define themselves as already human, are defined by the *wong cilik* as ‘chickens’ (*penakut*) or cowards (*pengecut*) in facing the heat of the sun. Because of they are afraid of the heat of the sun, the middle class use their homes, their umbrellas, their cars, to protect themselves from the sun’s heat or from the darkness of the night. From this, the *wong cilik* call the middle class as *wong gedongan* (‘the people of ‘the house’). These are people who have a big house and who do not socialize with others in their social environment. The *wong cilik* however uses no such barriers to protect them selves from the sun. On the other hand, the houses, cars, offices and malls used by the middleclass are comfortable air-conditioned environments. For the *wong cilik*, this air-conditioned lifestyle helps identify the middle class as ‘*manja*’ (spoilt) and physically weak. The *wong cilik* avoid this lifestyle because it compromises their much cherished tough, brave and macho personas. Macho culture among the *wong cilik* is also reflected in the following sayings:

‘*wah wong lanang kok mulih gasik*’ (*wah, he’s a man, but he goes home early*) and ‘*wong lanang kok wedi panas*’ (*he’s a man, but he’s scared of the heat*).

According to the *wong cilik* point of view, to be a man means to go to bed after midnight and not to be afraid to expose one’s skin to the heat of the sun without protection. Accordingly, the song quoted above is a manifestation of counter discourse, which the *wong cilik* cynically use to criticise and undermine the dominant group by subverting the dominant ideal.

The song’s lyrics about the alleyway, under the bridge, on the side walk, under the tower represent their familiar modern urban landscape where the daily life of the
homeless, street kids, sidewalk traders and other members of the *wong cilik* exist. The words di *lorong*, di *kolong*, di *bawah* mentioned in the lyrics shows that the *wong cilik* are distinctively different from the so called ‘orang rumahan’ (homed people), ‘orang gedongan’ (people living in a big house) and ‘orang kompleks’ (people from the luxury housing complexes) whose lives do not exist ‘outside the house’ but rather their worlds are ‘inside the house’. These expressions are intended by the so-called ‘anak jalanan’/‘orang jalanan’ (street kids/street people) to demonstrate that they live in poverty, but that they are tough.

Di lorong, lorong, lorong jalan (In the alley way)
Di kolong, kolong, kolong jembatan (Under the bridge)
Di kaki, kaki, kaki lima (On the side walk)
Di bawah menara (under the tower).
Kau masih mendekap derita (you still hug the sadness)
Kau masih mendekap derita (You still hug the sadness)
Aku ingin nyanyikan lagu (I want to sing a song)
Tanpa kemiskinan dan kemunafikan (without poverty and hypocrisy)
Tanpa air mata dan kesengsaraan (without tears and sorrow)
Agar dapat melihat surga (to be able to see the heaven)

E. Summary

The politics of life style in urban areas has contributed to the process of social encapsulation, which had its beginnings in the colonial period. This kind of encapsulation, class-consciousness and social distinction generates social contradictions in urban areas. As I have explained in this chapter, the *wong cilik* objectify the rich and the state as its opponents and use the pre-existing threat discourse, which, in itself, has become a media of power relations. This becomes an important arena of contestation, which is conducive to the maturation of *wong cilik* consciousness in urban areas. In New Order Indonesia, the *wong cilik* never viewed the state as impartial. According to the *wong cilik* point of view, the state is unfair, because it only represents and protects the interests of the business class. This *wong cilik* perspective is, however, imaginary, because their assumption about their ‘opponent’ is based on amorphous class and ethnic stereotypes. It constitutes a *wong cilik* fantasy, a fantasy that empowers them to face and contest domination. The *wong cilik*’s continual contestation of the state and business class’ power is also constitutive of *wong cilik* class-consciousness.

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36 I will analyse how Javanese *kalangan menengah* use the distinction of day and night to discipline the younger generation in chapter 4.

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Here, threat discourse has become an ‘unwritten law’ or moral code. The utilisation of this unwritten law constitutes a discourse of power, which becomes routinised and normalised through the process of daily oral communication. As an ethical/moral system, it advocates the sharing of resources and spaces and, therein, justifies the claiming of at least part of the space and resources controlled by the wealthy. As a discourse of power, then, it is facilitates a very real distribution of power, which begins at the level of oral communication. The continual verbal enforcement of this unwritten law dilutes the domination of the rich and undermines the formal laws of the state and private property, which ensure that domination. The unwritten law contains within it, and achieves its efficacy through, the threat of real violence. If the shop owners do not accommodate the wong cilik’s unwritten law, their verbal communication will turn from symbolic violence into real violence, through the mechanism of riots, looting, destruction of private property and sabotage. The involvement of the wong cilik in the looting of shops in the riots of May 13th-14th 1998 in Surakarta and Jakarta are evidence of the wong cilik using these events to enforce the unwritten law. The fact that the rioters were shot and burned inside the shops by the military demonstrates that they were not operating on behalf of the military, but that both they and the military and elements among the political elite were using the chaos for their own political and economic ends. The grassroots have two ‘imaginary opponents’—at an everyday-face to face level, the Chinese Indonesian business people and, at a more remote level, the state, which is assumed by the wong cilik as always unfair toward them.

The wong cilik is able, through the exercise of this unwritten law, to gain the acquiescence of the higher classes. The law’s efficacy resides in its symbology of violence, or a threat of violence that compels the middle class to placate the under-classes by satisfying their demands. The symbology of violence, in this case, stems from the fantasy of the rich, through their negative stereotyping of the poor. Actual physical violence more often occurs in the opposite direction, towards the poor rather than the rich. Instead, it is the state apparatuses, such as the police and lower-ranking military personnel, or petugas tibum (petugas ketertiban umum= ‘general order task force’), who are known as the main source of violence against the poor, who are known to torture the wong cilik, even while at the same time they blackmail the rich using the rhetoric of keamanan (safety).
The song I quoted above demonstrates how *wong cilik* consciousness is fabricated through a complicated process of adoption, construction and reconstruction, which involves much contestation and struggle — a process which in itself constitutes an historical and cultural moment out of which the *wong cilik* develops a mature self-conscious identity. The adoption of the ideas arising from dominant discourses — which I will discuss in the next chapter — can come from the state bureaucrats or a specific class, which usually becomes an ideal type, or even the type that the *wong cilik* opposes. The central role played by the state and its hierarchical order of bureaucrats in Indonesian history provided the political experiences out of which the *wong cilik* gave meaning to the position of the bureaucrat in Indonesian society. This kind of political consciousness has become the standpoint from which the *wong cilik* challenge the state and its representations and, thereby, the basis on which they attempt to empower their own identities. This political consciousness also becomes a basis for their own definition of Indonesianness in response to the dominant state nationalist project, which I will discuss in the chapter 5 and 6 (Section three: ‘Entwining Ideas to Counter Discourse’).
Chapter Four:  

On the Spectra of Dominant Discourses

A. Prelude

This chapter examines the operation of ‘authoritarianism’ as cultural discourse. I focus on the discursive practice of ‘threat’, which constructs authoritarianism and constitutes power relations between ordinate and subordinate groups. My discussion here will be based on how ‘threat’ as a discursive practice is manifested in family relationships, everyday social relations, and in the hierarchical relationships among civil servants. This analysis examines the dialectics of power as they operate back and forth between the level of mundane daily life and the institutional level of formal politics and administration.

My approach here contrasts O’Donnell’s concept of ‘Bureaucratic Authoritarianism’ (BA) which focuses on authority at the institutional level. O’Donnell’s model identifies the project of the military regime as the elimination of the threat from below, and economic stabilisation through the implementation of tight controls over the people via the bureaucracy.¹ This model was used by Mohtar Mas’ud (1989) to understand Indonesia under the New Order regime where the state led the restructuring of capital accumulation through the use of the military, technocrats and bureaucrats in politics.² In this type of analysis, the state became the centre. Although my approach moves in a different way, it does not oppose their viewpoint, which is very useful in understanding authoritarianism at the state institutional level. In my treatment, bureaucratic-authoritarianism manifests a dialectical engagement between the effects of the increasingly sensitive and volatile economic and political apparatuses of the state and the specific local responses to its effects. Here the discourse of ‘threat’ will be the focal point for an analysis of the mediation of the state's political and economic power by everyday local or grass roots practices.

B. The Practice and Interiorisation of Threat

The idea of authoritarianism as a cultural discourse in New Order Indonesia can be traced back to the concept of jagoanisme (machismo) and bapakisme (fatherism). These categories cannot be separated from the paternalistic tradition within the family (keluarga). Keluarga, in this sense, is not only a unit in the kinship structure of an extended or nuclear family, but also an arena of discursive practice in constituting power relations. Keluarga, in turn, establishes the process of power regimentation manifest in the practice of bapakism and bapak jagoan.\(^3\) It is an arena of discursive practice because it is conceptualised through conversations (as an exchange of meaning) in everyday-life, which are, by their very discursive nature, always contested. This process of contestation through everyday conversation helps to establish the efficacy of domination—of its limits, or of how thoroughly and effectively it operates. For example, the conceptualisation of rakyat (‘the people’, even, in another time, ‘the masses’) through the metaphor of anak (children) and istri (wife), and bapak (father) as leader of the rakyat, is a micro image of the relations of domination between the dominant state and the people. The position of Bapak within this discourse constitutes authority or power over the children (the rakyat).

The forms of threat existing in Javanese family relationships are usually invoked by employing the name of ghosts in order to control the children. Perhaps these threats are the oldest ones still existing and practiced by Javanese, especially those in rural areas or in traditional families living in urban areas. The very common sayings "aja guyon surup-surup, akeh setan lewat" and ‘aja kluyuran surup-surup mengko dipangan Betara Kala" (‘do not play around during dusk, many devils pass around here’ and ‘do not wander around during the dusk [or you] will be eaten by the Betara Kala’) are used interchangeably and are the best example of threat narratives.\(^4\) These threat discourses seem to rely more upon symbolic threat than the threat of violence. These are the two common forms of narrative threat by parents (or an older person, such as a grandfather or grandmother) to dominate their children and make them obedient — in this way, they

\(^3\) This topic will be discussed in the next section of this chapter

\(^4\) The same type of threat also takes another form of celeng gonteng (ghostly swine) in order to stop children crying at night. See Sindunata (1998) ‘Berburu Celeng’ at the Joko Pekik exhibition, Indonesia 1998, berburu Celeng. Yogyakarta. The word of Setan (Satan) and Betara Kala (God of Time) which feature in these phrases, stem from Islam and Hinduism respectively.

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relate to their parents in an hierarchical manner. In turn, the children often use those words to threaten their friends.

Returning to the discourse of threat used at dusk, I would like to argue that this temporal reference explains the separation of space between adults and children, and even gender which interpreted as a separation of political space. According to the dominant adult rules, space for adults is unlimited —night, afternoon or daytime; however, for children their times and spaces are restricted— only from morning to 5.00 PM, thereby excluding them from night time activities. Women are also limited. It will be not good if a woman is still outside the house after 21.00 o’clock at night. If a woman is still outside the house and she is socialising with a man, she will be considered as *cewek nakal*.

For most Javanese of the syncretic tradition, as for Hindu Balinese, dusk constitutes something ambiguous because it is not yet night (dark) and no longer day (light). This kind of ambiguity is believed to be the optimal space for ghosts, thereby instilling feelings of anxiety, fear, and hesitation that have to be defeated through asceticism and the practice of meditation, or interiorised through everyday life *praxis* and ritual. Other examples of such ambiguity are the intersections of rivers and where river meets ocean; ghosts are believed to occupy these places.

Threats that ‘many *Setan* pass around here’, and ‘[you] will be eaten by the *Betara Kala*’ further develop the individual Interiorization of meaningful feelings and experience. Here, taste or sense (*rasa*), becomes the basis of a psycho-politico ‘inner politics’ (*politic batin*), which guides power relations between *wong gede* and *wong*.

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5 This phenomenon of temporal demarcations features in some Islamic societies, as well as in Balinese Hinduism. Followers of Balinese Hinduism also practice daily ritual during dusk as well as in the morning and at midday. In this ritual they must *sesaji* (give foods to the ghosts) in the garden, *merajan* (small temple) and some specific places in the corner of the house or outdoors at dusk. In the practice of threat, Moslem and *abangan* groups only differ with regard to the name of the ghost. Puritan Javanese Moslems, for example, invoke the name of *Setan* (Satan) or other ghosts, such as *Jinni*, in order to ask the children to participate in *Maghrib* prayers, especially when they are playing around during dusk. *Abangan* people, in contrast to the more puritan Muhammadyah followers, prefer to use *Betara Kala*. For Muhammadyah followers, *Betara Kala* derives from Hinduism and is, therefore, not compatible with their puritan Islamic teachings. In addition, the followers of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) use the terms Satan, “*Jinni*” and *Betara Kala* interchangeably.

6 President Suharto meditated at the intersection of river (*Kali Garang*) in Semarang when he was Commander of Kodam Diponegoro. Now that place is monumented and called *Tugu Suharto*. This information is based upon interviews with local people.
cilik. This is because the word of Setan and Betara Kala refer to something terrible and terrifying for children as dominated persons. Furthermore, the word ‘dusk’ contains the Interiorization of the analogy of darkness as a sphere that cannot be foreseen — it is seen as something unusual and not a time for children. Children learn that only adults can be involved in the dark sphere, thereby reinforcing the hierarchical relationship between children and adults. Children internalise the idea of fear which stems from an understanding of Setan and Betara Kala as a source of horror. In children’s minds, adults are never afraid of the dark and of ghosts. For them adults have a kind of very special power that causes children to position the adult higher up in the hierarchy. Due to this, this threat effectively becomes an instrument for parental control, inducing children to follow the hierarchical structure or order. When children hear the word Setan, or reference to other ghosts, they are afraid and directly obey their parent in order to find protection. Accordingly, we can see that the origin of this kind of relationship is reproduced, interiorised, institutionalised and socialised in the relationship between parent and child in everyday family life. It develops here and then serves as an emotional-discursive template to affect the relationship between the dominant adult and the dominated outside the family circle.

This hierarchically imposed self-control is internalised by the child prior to his/her engagement with the wider apparatuses of the authoritarian state. In this sense, the Javanese culture of "rasa" provides the individual with a set of psycho-political devices, enabling their anticipation of usual political situations. Therefore, when they face threats from a dominant force such as the military, they will recall their old memory of ghosts or trauma. In such authoritarian contexts, the power of horror has become very effective as a mechanism of self-control. The internalisation of ghost threats often results in a hesitation to challenge the dominant discourses of the state. However, in those cases where people genuinely challenge the discourses of the state, they are, at the same time, challenging the threat itself, like conquering ghosts through meditation or specific rituals\(^7\).

\(^7\) For example, in some radical student groups such as PRD (prior to PRD becoming a party), there was a three pronged vow, i.e. "Tiga B" or Bunuh, Bui, Buang (‘Three B’ means dare to be killed, jailed, and kidnapped then thrown out by the regime) which had to be realised by the PRD member if they challenged the regime.
The social world that is already stratified through the hierarchies of time, space, age, social position and gender is still manifest in everyday life throughout Java. It is not simply operated by males but also reinforced by the consent of females, whereby both of them construct a dominant discourse in which they themselves become subjects. Men are the ones that monopolise the night world, where the power of jagoanism can be exercised. In manifesting jagoan power, the night world, magical power and tattoos become important.\(^8\) The night-time locus for displaying their power is the warung — a very important site. This is the place to which most men gravitate from night to early morning. The warung too is an arena of male-dominated discourse in which jagoanism is reproduced, disseminated and displayed publicly to demonstrate its power. When I spent time around warungs in Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta, elements of the military were also present there, as well as preman (criminals) and other socially marginal individuals.

The idea of jagoan is frequently manifested through threats of violence. In the urban kampongs of Central Java and East Java, for example, neighbourhood notice boards erected by kampung dwellers inform or indeed threaten drivers of vehicles to slow down when passing down the narrow streets or alley ways (gang sempit). The term of "ngebut benjut" on the notice board is a very simple phrase but semantically has powerful implications. The notice board means ‘if you are speeding, you will get a swollen face’. This is not only a message to the drivers of motor cycles but it also shows that the rule of law lies in the hands of kampung dwellers not with the legal apparatus at the district level. Transgressors are punished immediately without any trial.\(^9\) The form

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of threat in this case does not utilise ghosts or other supernatural powers but rather
direct physical trauma. The term *ngebut benjut* (Javanese language) can also be found in
Suharto’s hometown of Kemusuk. This notice board is located at the corner of the
alleyway of one of his family members there. During the riots in May 1998 around the
time of Suharto’s resignation, his family in this village and his family graveyard in
Surakarta were guarded by Kopassus (The Army’s ‘Special Forces’ Brigade).

During my fieldwork in Surabaya, I was talking to an informant, Pak Agus,
about *kampung* life and his practice of Javanese mysticism. He is a *becak* (pedicab)
driver and also occasionally does odd jobs such as painting houses. He is actually
homeless, but his relatives in that *kampung* allow him to sleep on the veranda and he
frequently sleeps in the mosque. The mosque with ‘jinni’, he said to me. He related his
experience, using the term *ngebut benjut*, about how he bashed up a young man in his
*kampung*. He beat him up because this youth did not want to get off from his motor
cycle after Pak Agus had already warned him three times on different days. The
interesting point in this case is the way he claimed that he was skinnier, smaller than the
young man he bashed, but he made him fall down (*njengkang* = falling down hard) with
only one punch. He believed that it was because he practiced Javanese mysticism. He
also claimed that he was doing it in the name of ‘*sopan santun kampung*’ (*kampung*
etiquette). This is an aspect of *jagoanism* practice supported by the pre-existence of an
unwritten law in the *kampung* — the *kampung* and its unwritten law here appear to be a
sacred social entity that should be maintained by *kampung* members and should not be
transgressed. To a great extent, the unwritten law here has become a ‘regime of
interpretation’, which enables the partisanship of social groups (or of classes or other
social formations) through differential meanings which mediate an internal sense of
belonging, an apparent sense of difference.

Another example of threat is the representation of the government
(‘*pemerintah’*) apparatus through police statues that have been set up at almost every
junction in urban areas and in some rural areas. Before the 1990s there were police
statues featuring funny-looking characters and faces, big bellies and short bodies (about

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75 cm) located in front of police offices. In the early 1990s when the police force had a new commander (Kapolri) these funny-looking statues were replaced with the more realistic human-sized statues. This replacement was due to the new commander’s belief that the previous statues did not reflect the charisma (wibawa) of the Indonesian police. Furthermore, the new commander also ordered these new larger statues to be set up at every street junction throughout Indonesia. This threat is less direct than that which is expressed on the notice board of the kampung street. Police statues, in this case, can be seen as a form of symbolic threat. At this level of interpretation it has become a miniature of the dominant state (pemerintah) which exists in the public sphere and in the interpreter’s imagination. Pragmatically, the aim of this statue is to remind drivers that the police are watching them, in order to make drivers be more careful. In Indonesia, where male police are well known as corrupt and open to bribery, the statue becomes the instrument of threat rather than an instrument to remind the drivers to drive carefully. Indonesian police statues represent the dominant apparatuses of violence, making the drivers more afraid (of violence and bribery) and even terrified (because of past and possible future trauma).

**FIGURE 3: Police Caricature**

The negative caricature of police is evident in the above picture from *Kompas* (2 of August 1997), which reads: ‘Oh my goodness, the evidence, ecstasy, just disappeared!’
This caricature, created by the cartoonist, GM. Sidharta, characterises the terrifying power of arbitrary and corrupt police authority. This is achieved in the cartoon, through the medium of the policemen’s thick moustache; which, according to popular stereotype, embodies "serem", understood as the power to horrify. This is an important symbolic component of the policeman's armoury of terror that enables him to command respect and fear. The belief that, as terrifying, arbitrary and corrupt, police power exists above the law, is evidenced in the above-mentioned quote, where the policeman mocks corruption, stating: ‘We lhadalah! ekstasi barang bukti je ilang!’ (‘Oh my goodness, the evidence, ecstasy just disappeared!’). In this expression, the policemen speaks in ngoko (low level Javanese) to Oom Pasikom — a representation of middle class or civil society — who says nothing, depicted as powerless to verbally challenge the policeman. Oom Pasikom, instead, expresses his horror through the mute expressions of a mime artist. The cartoonist also wanted to implicate the terrifying power of the Yogyakarta police force. This was implied through the police uniform, which has the ‘Polda DIY’ (Polisi daerah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta or, Police of the Special Province of Yogyakarta) initials embroidered on the pocket. The cartoon is an example of subtle protest, in the form of mockery, regarding the illegalities of arbitrary police power and people's inability to openly and directly challenge that authority. The cartoon serves as a means to portray and comment on the existence of terrifying police power, thereby transcending the silences invoked by that power.

C. Family, Father, **Jagoan** and Regime

The term **rakyat** (‘the people’) in Javanese families is not only used to characterise people within the context state and society relationships but is also used to categorise children and wives by the breadwinner (the father, or bapak). Within this context, traditionally, keluarga (family) is characterised as an autonomous small unit of society led by father as kepala keluarga (head of family), and then the housewife and children are the members (the rakyat or the people of this micro-society) of the family. Family in Javanese society is considered as negara kecil (mini state), consisting of the leader (father/husband) and the people (children and mother/wife). This paternalistic pattern of power relations, conditions the ‘rakyat’ (children and mother/wife) to obey the kepala keluarga, the father (bapak). The position of bapak in this case occupies the
peak of family hierarchical order.

This hierarchy is reflected in the conventions of the ritual of the evening meal, where the *bapak* is expected to take his food first and then the *rakyat* (the housewife and then the children) may follow.

Like the dinner ritual, where the *bapak* takes food first, followed by the *rakyat* (housewife, then children), the *jagoans* in street politics also have comparable privileges to the father in a family. They hold priority and are fearfully respected by their followers. Papi, the *Raja Tega*, who often hangs out in Pak Man’s *warung* has a priority to drink first. After Pak Man serves him his coffee, then he can be followed by his boys (Papi calls his boys as ‘*bocah-bocah*’ which means ‘children’ by here the meaning is better captured by ‘boys’). He also has the unspoken privilege of sitting first and choosing his chair first. No-one would dare sit together with Papi on the same table if they are not part of his group. He also has the right to order Pak Man to make coffee and to prepare food to be put on a plate to be delivered to the table where Papi and his boys are sitting. Again he is the one who commences eating first; the others must wait until he is ready. No-one in his group would dare to drink before him. Papi always speaks in *ngoko* Javanese language (low Javanese) to his boys and he boys also speak *ngoko* to him to show that they are close, but Pak Man speak high Javanese language to express his respect and a degree of fear. In this case Pak Man categorises him self as the outsider of Papi’s group even though it is his warung and he and Papi are very close. In Pak Man’s *warung* Papi acts like a father in Javanese family (in fact he is ethnically Batak, from North Sumatra), and that is why his followers and Pak Man call him as Papi which also means ‘father’. This privilege constituted through cultural practice, whereby the father, as breadwinner, must also be responsible for the family by providing food for his wife and children.

In the paternalistic Javanese family, the word *jago* in social relationships is customarily used to define machismo among the male children. The question ‘*mana nih jagoannya*?’ (where is your Jagoan?) — a question posed to parents as to whether or not

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they have a son — is a common Javanese expression. The concept of ‘son’ in this context is mostly based on the male-dominated cultural assumption that, with males, there is an expectation for the continuation of the family. This is related to the belief that the male is the one who carries the family ‘seed’. It is a paternalistic idea that undermines a woman’s social position. Similarly, if a man is infertile, he is instantaneously insignificant, both socially and politically. In this sense, the word ‘jago’ does not carry the usual connotations of banditry associated with the word in other contexts. Instead, the question, ‘mana sih jagoannya?’, symbolises the perpetuation of male centred family life and paternalism in general and, thereby, male social and political potency.

_Jago_ is a metaphor borrowed from the tradition of cock-fighting, which equates the _jago_ (rooster) with a hero. A rooster owner in Yogyakarta (in Sleman) explained that his jago also gives hope to the local people. He feeds his jago every morning and afternoon with high protein meals such as mixed eggs, honey, coffee, ginseng, and ginger. When I went there the _jago_ was in the cage, and some people had brought their hens for mating. Interestingly, when the people came near the cage, the rooster was suddenly aggressive, its face becoming red. The rooster tried to get out of the cage when it saw the hens. The owner released the jago then just in a few seconds the rooster had mated with the hens one by one. This kind of recognition of jago nature has influenced the term of jagoan. For the kampong people it offers hope, both in the form of money and victory. The _jago_ as hope is captured in its historically established role as both intimidator and protector, which makes it capable of effecting political outcomes.  

This has given the label ‘_sok jagoan_’ (smart arse as _jago_) an element of mockery toward the thugs. In colonial Batavia for example, there is the famous legend of a rebel named Si Pitung who was a _jago_ ‘trouble-maker’ in the face of any colonial policy.

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implementation (especially land taxation) at the village level. At the time the Dutch colonial government responded by hiring third party jagos to confront the local ‘hero’. This led to the binary opposition of jagoan ilmu putih (ilmu putih means white/god’s knowledge) and jagoan ilmu hitam (black/evil knowledge) in martial arts and mystical powers to distinguish good and evil respectively.

The concepts of good and evil within the context of jagoanism in this case usually related to the acts of the jagoan. If they assisted people suffering from repressive domination, they would be jagoan ilmu putih. This jagoan type usually related to the pesantren tradition, for example with the legend of Si Pitung, and they always became local heroes. On the other hand, if they supported the colonial government in suppressing the people it was known as jagoan ilmu hitam, by which categorized by the colonial as criminal as analyses by Siegel. This jagoan ilmu hitam follows a spiritual guru from a martial arts school which lay well beyond the realms of the pesantren (Islamic boarding school). There was one of the village headmen in the fringe of Jakarta, whose name was Mono, people addressed him as ‘Lurah (village headman) Mono’. People call him as jagoan (or ‘jawara’, which is the local West Javanese term). He attended the pesantren from the time he was in high school until he graduated from faculty of economics in one of the private universities in Bandung. He inherited the spiritual ilmu (spiritual knowledge) from his father, by which he has an ability to heal someone who has a disease induced by magic. He told me that one day he fought with nine people. At that time he was not carrying any weapons, but his enemies used daggers and swords. He fought for hours and he almost lost since he was exhausted from fighting nine people, yet he did not have a single scratch caused his enemies weapons. Fortunately, the police patrol came to rescue him and his enemies ran away. He claimed that he possessed ilmu putih learned from the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and his father. He has his own martial arts (Pencak Silat = traditional martial arts in Java) school in his house.

12 See a brief discussion on the Lenong drama in Basuki, Koesasi (1992) Lenong and Si Pitung, Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. The legend of Si Pitung has become a movie, and was also a lenong (traditional drama) series broadcasted by Jakarta TVRI television station. The main point was to show the heroism of Si Pitung as an expression of anti-Dutch and anti-colonial sentiment

The power of mysticism as *ilmu* (knowledge) of the *jago* within the context of the modern colonial state was not enough. It also had to be supported by power coming from the state. In this case ‘negara’ (the state) itself symbolises the peak of a body of unified knowledge. For example, the role of *ulama* (Muslim scholars) is categorised as *ilmu putih* in the pre-colonial Islamic era — they were afforded a certain accommodation by the Sultan as an intellectual class with cultural and political roots at the village level. This situation meant that the *jagoan ilmu hitam* had to boost their power via connections with the lower-ranking Dutch military as an alternative state symbol to the aura of power associated with the Sultan. In recent situations one particular Jawara (or *jago*) named Pak Budong in Bekasi, had a close relationship with the police, and even became a martial arts guru for some police intelligence agents. He became a *jagoan* after he learned martial arts. He learnt both *ilmu hitam* and *ilmu putih* from some West Javanese gurus. He then studied in Central Java and East Java too. I interviewed one of his gurus (Pak Ayut, he is an old man living in a village surrounded by industrial companies) who said to me that Pak Budong got his *ilmu* from *ilmu hitam* (‘black knowledge’) sources. He told me that he fought with Pak Budong just right after Pak Budong left him to follow a new guru. He claimed, and some people living around Pak Ayut supported this, that Pak Budong was defeated by Pak Ayut.

Pak Budong works as the guard for the industrial companies in this area. From this kind of job he earns around Rp 10,000,000 per month. From some companies he also was given the right to buy industrial waste. This gave him the means to compete with the Madurese\(^\text{14}\) who used to monopolise the industrial waste business in this area. To get that right from the companies he and his boys fought with the Madurese, and Budong’s men defeated the Madurese extracting an agreement that they have to share the industrial waste business 50:50 with him. When I interviewed Pak Budong, a policeman sat next to him and some of Pak Budong’s guards were sitting around him. Right on the table in front of Pak Budong there was a machete belonging to a follower of Pak Budong’s. Interestingly the police said to me: ‘Kalu mas tidak Percaya kalau Pak Budong kebal senjata, coba saja ini golok mas sabetin ke tangan Pak Budong’ (If you don’t believe that Pak Budong is weapon resistant, just take this machete and chop pak Budong’s arm’). Pak Budong keep quiet, and indeed I did not do what the police

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\(^\text{14}\) People originating from the island of Madura, lying off the north east coast of East Java.

*Aris Arif Mundayat*
asked me.

The relationships between Pak Budong and the companies is somewhat parasitical especially if it is viewed from the company side. One company officer who is in charge of the community development for one of the big companies in that area told me that the company gave a monthly salary Rp 600,000.00 to pak Budong and to certain other prominent jawara in the area just to guard the industrial area. However, the jawara gang played some devious games to stir up trouble in order to extract more money and to win further privileges like the concessions on industrial waste. The jawara were selling the industrial waste in the market, thereby expanding their income. Most of the Jawara leaders in this area earned between Rp 3,000,000.00 and Rp 10,000,000.00 per month. The rights to ‘guard’ each part of the industrial territory was divided through an agreement between the jawara and the companies. A comparable situation can be observed in the area of Malioboro in Yogyakarta. The shops become the target of the preman who demand to be ‘tipped’ for their security services (otherwise describable as an extortion racket). Malioboro street and its surrounding area are divided into several territories in which each small territory has been assigned to be ‘guarded’ by rank-and-file thugs. The big daddy preman, Papi, sits above them and controls the whole territory around Malioboro. Thus he is able to just sit around in Pak Man’s warung waiting for the money to flow in from the leaders of the small territories. From a typical small territory, at least Rp 1,000,000.00 has to be given to Papi.

From the kinds of case discussed above, it is obvious that there are some similarities between the role jagoan in the colonial era and now. Successive regimes have used jago, and this shows how long-established are the relationships between the state and violent criminals. The colonial government and the post-colonial governments of Indonesia routinely favoured the use of jago, and could, where necessary also turn to use locally based third parties to act as a brake and as a counter-force to jagoan if they felt they were tending to exceed their implicit boundaries to their usefulness. James Rush, ingeniously describes this in his work about the opium trade in Java describing important aspects of the opium political economy. There existed in the opium business a symbiosis between Dutch colonial government, Chinese ethnic traders and captains, the local elites such as bupatis, and the royal family — part of this symbiotic relationship
included the local *jagoan* (thugs).\(^{15}\) Through such connections, the Dutch colonial government allowed the process of the cartelisation of economic activities to become parasitic upon the people.\(^{16}\) To a great extent, these cartels victimised people economically and politically, and that of opium grievously so. To profit from the victimisation of the *rakyat* (people) in the colonial era, the cartels had to assure the government that *rust en orde* (*keamanan dan ketertiban* = security and order) would be maintained so they used *jagoan* (throughout Java) to give them full access and control over the *inlanders* (NL: ‘natives’).\(^{17}\)

The discourse of *jagoanism* and state symbolism is evident in New Order politics. In this political context, the military have manufactured a threat discourse since the beginning of Suharto’s regime in order to create images of ‘*serem*’ (‘*serem*’ can be translated as ‘horrifying’). In the Indonesian context, if a person looks *serem* he (the majority are male) has the power to instil fear. It can be reflected in the body such as being very muscular, hard facial characteristics, a crew cut, a thick moustache, a military jacket or pants and some other military attributes. Thus it is very convenient to use military symbolism on the body in order to gain ‘the power of horror’ because it is looks clearly *serem*. Moreover, the killing of PKI members in 1965 and the killing of *preman* in the ‘mysterious killings’ of the 1980s are judiciously chosen techniques supporting the more pervasive discourse of threat that the regime fostered in the Suharto era.

**D. Jagoanisme : Idealizing the Military Image**

This section analyses the relationship between military culture and the civilian populace in the practices of everyday life. I argue that the reproduction of

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\(^{15}\) This account is based on James R. Rush (1990), *Opium to Java, Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia 1860-1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

\(^{16}\) Peter Carey explores the mutual relationships between the elites in the opium economy. He shows that before the Java war, Diponegoro’s followers were addicted to opium, and when the drug traffic was disrupted they fell sick. See Peter Carey (1984), “Changing Perception of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825” in *Indonesia* (April 1984, 33). According to this argument, the practices of state/economy/politics become parasitic rather than functioning as a state that is a mirror image of its people.

\(^{17}\) For further analysis concerning the relationship between the black market economy and the politics of opium among the Dutch officers, indigenous bureaucrats and local gentry, and Chinese captains in colonial Indonesia see James R. Rush (1990), *Opium to Java, Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia 1860-1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
authoritarianism in Indonesia is not managed solely by the military but that, to an extent, civilians also contribute to this reproduction.\textsuperscript{18} To embark on this argument I would like to seek an answer to the question of how and for what reason civilians imagine the military ideal, and how it effects the emotional dimensions of politics. To answer these questions, I would like to treat the authoritarian state as an iconography where the people to a significant extent rely on it and reproduce both the military ideal and the authoritarianism discourse in everyday life practices.

In order to understand its reproduction among the civilian population, I commence with the most common statement that often uttered by people in Indonesia. That is the expression ‘Saya punya kawan tentara yang saya kira bisa menyelesaikan masalah seperti itu’ (I have military friends who can solve that kind of problem). The Indonesian military is very often used by civilians to solve problems they encounter with the businesses run by state — for example, dealing with bureaucratic procedures in order to gain permission for something: dealing with police in order to get a driving license, or to avoid a court appearance due to traffic offences. The police usually take the person’s driving licence or registration card in cases of traffic infringements. The way of ticketing the person who has broken the road rules is not by checking the traffic and parking areas, but by stopping the vehicles on a carefully selected spot on the road. This moment is called as ‘tilang’ (tindakan langsung). Around 15 police are usually involved in one of these checkpoints. Some of them are in the middle of the road, some block the narrow streets around that spot in order to prevent the drivers escaping the tilang, and the rest either write tickets (for anyone who doesn’t want to bribe) or receive the bribery money.

However, just as the military and the police can levy arbitrary imposts, so too can they come to the aid of their friends. This mutually beneficial relationship between the military and certain civilians, including even certain wong cilik, provides a popular foundation for the reproduction of an idealized representations of the military. Through daily discourse, people have become increasingly informed about such processes, and have internalised some of the military’s mythology.

\textsuperscript{18} The term ‘military’ in this paper refers to the general armed forces consisting of ground forces (\textit{Angkatan Darat}), air forces (\textit{Angkatan Udara}), sea forces (\textit{Angkatan Laut}), and the police force. However, most of the data used in this paper is based on the ground forces that are very influential in Indonesian politics.
Within the context of power relations between military and its subjects, civilians subscribe to a certain kind of military cultural code which is then internalized. It is evident in the following conversation between two people:

Mr Y (about twenty years old): Tentara, nang kene ki menangan, wong podo wedi. (the army here are going to be the winners, people are afraid of them)

Mr X (Teenage boy): Wong, nek duwe konco tentara, biasane dadi kemaki, koyo koncoku nang Malang. Deweke duwe konco sus, gawene gelut, motore dipreteteli tapi polisi ra ono sing wani nyekel, sebabe nek nyekel motore mesti dekweke ngajak koncone Kopassus, terus polisi mesti ngeculake. Padahal, biasane nek koyo ngono kuwi kudu nganggo duit, paling ora satus evu, nek ora nganggo pengadilan. (People who have friend(s) in the military usually become kemaki (‘smart-asses’), like my friend in Malang. He has Kopassus friends, then he often fights with people. His motor cycle has no muffler, no mirror, no indicators but the police don’t dare charge him, because when he was arrested before by the police, he asked his Kopassus friend to secure the release of his motor cycle from the police, so now the police always release it. Usually, one has to use bribery, at least around Rp 100.000,00 for no court process involvement).

Mr Y: Yo, ngono kuwi nek sok jagoan (Yes, it’s like that if you act like a jagoan)

If people have act opportunistically, as in this case, in order to access power from the dominant state it could be interpreted as practicing a fetishism of the state in order to win personal benefits from this source. They, the dominated, thus become the vehicles of the dominant discourse. In this case people absorb symbolic power produced by the dominant agents, then publicly display it through a certain kind of language in order to find or create a replica of this power. Through this power, they position themselves in the social configuration and also hope to use these discursive strategies to construct their own personally advantageous power relationships. This kind of strategy is also used by the preman/gali to enter the dominant power circles or at least to become a shadowy but effective part of it. For example, by creating close mutual relationships with the police or the military they feel that they are backed up by state apparatuses and at the same time they are able to flaunt that state symbolism and use it for their own

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19 This conversation is based on daily notes from my research. This conversation took place on the bus during a trip from Surabaya to Malang on 15 April 1998. I was sitting behind the people who were talking about the military. At that time the brutal military action toward the student protests in Jakarta had already been broadcast on TV. At that time the event and the military became a very hot topic of conversation in everyday life.
purposes.

By reproducing the military ideal in the bodily forms of representation, and using this through discursive practice and language games, the jagoan tap into the power of horror, which originated from the military, in their general social life. For example my informant met with one of the prominent premans from one of the Islamic parties. This criminal went to the bank in Yogyakarta. The preman put his revolver on the desk of the teller and asked her to watch out for his gun. Then he took Rp 50,000,000.00 from his leather bag to be deposited in that bank. The teller asked him: ‘Kenapa bawa senjata kemana-mana? (Why you have to bring this gun everywhere?)’ Then the preman answer the teller: ‘Ini untuk perlindungan, karena tantara meminta saya untuk ke Aceh seminggu yang lalu jadi mereka kasih saya senjata ini. Mereka meminta saya untuk melakukan negosiasi dengan GAM di salah satu wilayah di Aceh, karena saya kenal pemimpin GAM di wilayah yang saya kunjungi.’ (This is for protection, because the military asked me to visit Aceh a week a go so they gave me this weapon. They asked me to negotiate with GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka = ‘The Free Aceh Movement’, the secessionist party in Aceh] in one area in Aceh, because I knew the leader of GAM in that area I visited). The relationships between preman and the military, interestingly, need to be displayed publicly to be fully effective. The gun, and his alleged involvement in Aceh, are palpable symbols of the closeness he claims with the military.

As for the military itself, soldiers also tend to show the symbol of otherness especially cultivating looks that are regarded as serem. These intimidator displays are made routinely in front of public. Military exercises, for example, are routinely conducted publicly, in front of people on the street. To an extent, what they want to achieve is to show that the street can become an arena for the reproduction of power/horror images. One of the very specific examples of routinisation of power/horror can be seen in the early morning scenes in Yogyakarta suburbs. On certain given mornings around 05.30, hundreds of army members (Angkatan Darat, ‘land forces’) exercise (jogging) on the street. This is a regular weekly exercise. They wear singlets, military cargo pants and the military boots of course. Whilst running on the street, the rhythmic percussion of their boots give a kind of relentless musical background; they sing loudly and sometimes shout. Beyond the visual and aural impact
of these fit and disciplined warriors, the sound and the vigour and concentrated power that they project are focussed in a relentless, rhythmic pulse of menace. One of the songs they often sing is entitled ‘Pok Ami-Ami’. It is a surprising choice at first, because this is a song that is usually sung by a mother, father or elderly relative to a young baby aged from 6 months to 30 months. Then it becomes apparent that the military have changed the words of the song into a sexually explicit chant about a young woman’s body.

Pok, Ami-Ami (Clap, Ami-Ami)
Belalang, Kupu-Kupu (Grasshopper, butterfly)
Siang Makan Nasi (At day time eat rice)
Kalau Malam Minum Susu (At night drink milk)
Susunya susu nona (the ‘milk’ is a girl’s breast)
Kanan kiri sama saja…. (right or left just the same….)

At that time of day, most of the men (becak drivers, gudeg buyers, and some people waiting for transport) on the sidewalk were laughing. The military seemed happy and very proud of that song though they did not laugh. On the other hand the women (mostly housewives who were buying vegetables and other raw foods from women street traders) just grumbled saying ‘Ugh, opo kuwi njijiki. Iso isone, wong lahir soko wong wedok kok sio-sio’ (Ugh, what the hell is that! disgusting! How can they do that, they were born from a woman, but now they deride her?)

It seems that this scene has become another field for contestation between the sexes. The military show of force and their song in this case becomes a language game to manufacture the power of horror through the objectification of women’s bodies. Indeed, that song is a threat in itself, a threat to the women. Women’s bodies in this sense can be a symbol for the ‘rakyat’ or someone’s daughters or wives who can be victimised by the state apparatuses of violence. By using, or misusing, a woman’s body, they assume that they will be able to overpower the male rakyat. Here the creation of a macho discourse among the military is not merely to show that the military are strong males, but also to display that they are not rakyat. Discursive assertions of separation and privilege are reproduced among civilians, especially by the gali or preman, to create

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20 Information concerning the military exercises and songs is based on my daily notes of 1996. For comparison, see the study of Thanh-Dam Thruong (1990), *Sex, Money, and Morality: Prostitution and Tourism in Southeast Asia*. She analyses the morality of macho culture of American soldiers within the context of prostitution and tourism in Thailand. She quoted an American soldiers slogan saying: ‘this is my rifle and this is my gun, the one is for killing and this is for fun’. This slogan has significant similarity in terms of macho culture to the song mention above.
a replica of power symbolically associated with the state apparatuses. It is a replica of state symbolism, but one that is not strictly part of the state. Yet it is directed at the *wong cilik*, and it produces a sort of symbolism that can be disseminated through everyday life practices.

This arena has become a space for the symbolic reproduction of the dominant power, which in turn effects the image of the armed forces. This social situation allows the military to maintain the distinction between the civilians and the military through the symbolism of the body, the uniforms, the housing system or the barracks, and specifically through their military education system which is also socially exclusive. Furthermore, their physical displays as expressed by their muscular bodies and sweat which are publicly displayed in their routine exercises in the morning, the appearance of their military haircuts, the cut of the camouflage military cargo pants and uniforms, and their many specific shibboleths, and the routines such as their morning exercise rituals, are all manufactured to emphasise difference with civilian social life. They are encapsulated in their own world, the military barracks and their hierarchical order of military ranks. The distinction between the military and the civilians in Indonesia is not only exclusive sociologically but also confers an image of ‘menace’. This kind of image is not merely constructed and reproduced by the military themselves, but also sociologically by the civilians, especially by the *preman*, but also by ordinary citizens. The power of horror and of otherness can find room creatively to reproduce its images in everyday life practices.

This macho culture affects the male civilian’s perspective on how they give meaning to the military through their impersonal relationships. In addition, the militarised ethos is not merely disseminated because their machismo ritual is publicly displayed nor because the non-military civil servants within the corporate state structure are forced by certain kinds of rules to practice militaristic ritual.21 (These requirements on civil servants are usually implemented through ministerial decree). It is rather that the civilians themselves also reproduce it in their everyday life practices. They

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21 The government implemented a new regulation in the mid-1990s for the ‘new state apparatus’ (civil servants) to do military training. They had to be trained by the military for 1 month in order to exercise their body in a military mode. They also had to take major courses on state ideology (Pancasila) and some minor ones such as office administration. It is obvious that the penetration of the military within the civilian body has become one of the arenas for disseminating the idea of militarism in the civilian population.
reproduce the military ideal by empowering themselves to access or utilise state symbolism for their own benefit, politically and economically. The dissemination of macho culture in this case lies not merely in the military’s hands, but it is also disseminated by civilians in everyday life and it has become a process of nationalization of the military ideal and power/horror. The nationalization of militarism and the power of horror in all levels of society operate through the duplication of the military ideal in civilian branches of the state and by the extra-state jagoan. To a great extent, it has become an important source for the New Order Indonesia regime and its tentacles to seize the discourse through the fabrication of state symbolism and its replicas at the wong cilik.

E. Dodo's Life, Death and His Funeral: An Example of Threat Discourse

Dodo was a ‘street kid’ living on Malioboro Street in Yogyakarta. He did not have a home and his family simply ignored him before he took to the streets. He earned money along Malioboro Street by polishing shoes from dusk to midnight for those people who ate snacks at a Malioboro street warung. Besides this job, especially after he realized that he was not a child any more, he also worked as a street singer, earning money from this kind of work. Dodo originally lived in a small town named Gombong, Central Java, before he lived on the streets. He was born there and lived in an impoverished and unhappy family. One day, when he was three years old, his mother brought Dodo to a cigarette seller and asked him to take care of Dodo while she tried to earn money. She promised that she would come back in the afternoon, but her she never

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23 A senior Pemuda Pancasila branch leader in Yogyakarta told me that in 1998 his organisation sent 6000 members to the ground forces and the navy to be trained. It is not the first time they were trained, according to him. All members of Pemuda Pancasila are trained by the military. It seems that this kind of training has become their ritual to reproduce the idea of militarism among the civilians especially the jagoan ones in which --as claimed by the leader-- it give an effect of discipline.

24 I would like to thank to Bambang Ertanto Cahyo Dewo who allowed me to use his data about Dodo's background and Dodo's burial. However, my interpretation of the information is mine alone. This section is a revision of my paper that was presented as a different perspective of Cahyo Dewo's paper about Dodo's burial in the seminar Posisi Anak-Anak dalam Konteks Sosial Indonesia. In this seminar Bambang Ertanto Cahyo Dewo through his article ‘Kere ki ra sah mati yan mati ngrepoti’, analyses the Dodo case within the context of social changes and the position of children in society. See B.Ertanto Cahyo Dewo (1995), "Kere ki ra sah mati, yen mati ngrepoti" presented in the Seminar Posisi Anak-Anak dalam Konteks Sosial Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Unpublished. I would also like to thanks Heddy Ahimsa Putra who gave some comments on my paper on Dodo’s burial.
returned. Thus, Dodo became parentless and was moved from one person to another until finally he was adopted illegally by a driver named Soemedi until he was 13 years old.

When he was 13 years old, his mother came to visit Dodo at the cigarette seller's kiosk, but he had not taken care of Dodo since his mother broke her promise to return for him. The cigarette seller informed her that the driver named Soemedi now took care of him. Finally she asked Soemedi to give her son back to her. Soemedi loved Dodo very much but he did not hold any legal rights over Dodo. Of course, Dodo was very sad, because he believed that Soemedi's family was his real family. This reality deeply shocked Dodo psychologically because after that he didn’t know who was his biological father and furthermore his relationship with his mother was very impersonal.

Dodo moved to Kotagede, Yogyakarta, with his mother and met his stepfather there, but he felt that the warmth of this family was incomparable to Soemedi’s family. He tried to contact Soemedi’s family, but Soemedi refused to engage with him for ethical reasons. Soemedi felt that Dodo’s mother was the person who had rights over Dodo, not him. For Dodo this refusal was deeply wounding. Even though Soemedi explained that he loved him very much, it still shocked Dodo. Consequently he ran away. He found that Malioboro Street was the best place for him and he started to earn money there.

Dodo lived on the street with other street children under the protection of his senior on the street. After he earned enough money to continue his studies, which had been interrupted while he was away from his home, he went to Junior school (SMP BOPKRI VII) until he graduated. Subsequently he applied to study at the senior high school for art (SMSR= Sekolah Menengah Seni Rupa). He felt ashamed of his profession as shoeshine boy, and as he felt that there was more pride (especially for a senior high school student) in being a street singer, so he pursued that path.

As a street kid who was away from his house and ignored by his family, Dodo was already uprooted from his kinship networks. He had no kin socially, even though biologically he had a mother, father, and relatives. This positioning placed Dodo in that particular space to which society attributes a negative meaning. This is due to the fact that people often associate the street children with crime, or as potential contaminators.
of the *kampung*. Furthermore, in such a hierarchical context, the position of street children lies outside even the mainstream hierarchy itself, somewhat akin to untouchables in the caste system. So, Dodo just had street children for friends and, for him, his friends meant more than his family did. This kind of familial substitution met his needs to a certain degree, and he did not try to contact his family any more.

His life as a street kid was not a long one. He died in a shopping centre just behind the Ver Den Bergt fort on 27 January 1992 — another youth had stabbed and sadistically tortured him. His death was tragic not only in itself but also in that Dodo’s death was a case of mistaken identity. It just so happened that Dodo was wearing the same jacket and clothes as the intended target of the attack. The killers wanted to take revenge on that other person because he usually wandered around the shopping centre area causing trouble and had punched one of the youth gang members. Unfortunately, Dodo became a victim of mistaken identity and suffered a revenge meant for another.

As Geertz\(^25\) (1980) noted in his interpretation of Paidjan’s burial, theoretically the Javanese bury the dead as soon as possible. Otherwise, *kampung* dwellers feel uncomfortable because they believe that the soul of the dead will wander around the *kampung* and create trouble. The central aim of Geertz’s analysis on the disruption of Paidjan’s funeral is to criticize functionalism and argue a new perspective — one which utilizes history as an important tool in understanding social and cultural change. Geertz’s analysis is based on the socio-political situation of the rapid, local social change in Modjokuto (actually Pare, one of the middle-sized towns in Kediri, East Java) which influenced socio-political conflict. He argued that problems with the rapid change from rural to urban, from traditional political processes into modern political party systems (including party conflict), and the process of the cosmopolitanisation of Modjokuto itself, stemmed from incompatibility in the range of interpretative responses to this very rapid change. These factors were the major causes of the delay of Paidjan’s funeral that demonstrated the cultural contradictions of Javanese life.

In the case of Dodo’s burial, even though it was delayed like Paidjan’s body in Geertz’s analysis, the Indonesian situation of the 1990s is very different from that of the 1950s when Geertz did his main research in East Java. In this section, I would like to


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argue a different point of view based on a different politico-societal background. In Dodo's case, I would argue that New Order authoritarianism, rooted in the threat discourse practiced throughout society, constituted the main cause for the delay in Dodo's burial. In addition, the hierarchies that are part of the authoritarian form of Indonesian pemerintah (government) exacerbated the difficulties of the case.

Dodo, who lived on the street and got food from the rubbish bins (the ‘hoyen’), was classified by society as occupying the lowest rung of the Javanese hierarchical order. For those classes above street children, eating hoyen is not really "wong" (human), because in their eyes only cats, chickens, dogs or other animals seek food there. The street children are cognizant of this perception and they say "Wah dadi cap kampung ki penak, mangan kari nyiduk bedo karo kere yen mangan rebutan hoyen." ("Ah, kampung kids are comfortable, when [they] want to eat [they] just take it, this is different from the poor, when [we] want to eat we have to compete to get hoyen.").

This expression demonstrates an awareness of their class position — that they are subjugated poor people at the bottom of a very hierarchical social structure. Furthermore, almost all street children, like Dodo, were uprooted from their kinship context, and because of this, Javanese society – which recognises the concept "durung wong" (not yet a person in a social sense) – categorized Dodo (and other street children or people who are of the same class) as "not a person" in a socio-cultural sense. The street children are aware of these perceptions held by higher class people — that they are the ‘scum’ of the city — an attitude that is made quite clear when the President, Vice-President or other important Ministers want to visit Yogyakarta — Malioboro street must be "cleaned" of these people (and street traders as well). This kind of discrimination and marginalization has acted to heighten their political consciousness against the social and political elites. When the Dodo’s burial was delayed, they expressed their feelings through the statement "Kere ki ra sah mati yen mati ngrepoti"

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27 The concept of "durung wong" in Javanese society has very wide socio-economic significance. The person who is already "wong" means he/she holds an established social and economic status. It is related to the concept of ‘bibi-bebet-bobot’ (the origin-the status-the quality) in the social context. Due to this, the people who do not possess a valuable social-economic status can be ignored socially, or in Javanese terms are "ora diwongke" (not considered as a person).
(the poor should not die, if [they] die s/he will trouble everybody). This not only expresses their consciousness as poor people but also it constitutes resistance against the upper classes who are usually dismissive of the poor — this is clear in the phrase ‘should not die’. Socio-linguistically it means that the higher classes should consider the poor because they always have and will always exist in this world, and cannot be swept away as inconsequential by the upper class.

In this context and social configuration, Dodo's death was not meaningful, even for his kin. To a significant extent, his death was not a deeply traumatic event for the family. The reason for this is that, even before Dodo died, he was already existing outside the hierarchical order of kinship. This was made clear when Dodo’s body was still in the morgue of hospital. The person (considered to be one of his family) who was contacted by the police would not agree to bury Dodo’s body, and nor would the hospital. This person said that Dodo was not one of his relatives, so he felt that he did not have the right to decide over Dodo’s body. Dodo had been uprooted from his kin, and was considered not to be ‘wong’. Due to this social stigmatization, economically and socially Dodo’s dead body just represented trouble for his kin and for the wider society. Sociologically his existence in this world was ignored, his death was neglected (at least by the non-homeless) and he was meaningless to his biological kin. The only group that took care of his body were Girli NGO and his street friends. After three days in hospital, nobody had claimed Dodo’s dead body, these groups decided to bring the body to the Girli office in kampung Teroranpuro. They hoped that Dodo’s body could be buried in the kampung cemetery.

The neglect of Dodo’s existence and rejection of his dead body by his kin was not the only harsh treatment. After the Girli NGO and street children brought the body to their office, the local pemerintah apparatus of the Ketua RT (Rukun Tetangga=literally means ‘the harmony of neighbourhood’), the headman of the Neighbourhood Organization of the kampung where he was to be buried, also rejected Dodo’s body. He argued that Dodo did not have an ID card that showed his residence as Teroranpuro. In order to emphasize his denial he stated:

28 See B. Ertanto Cahyo Dewo, ‘Kere ki Ra sah Mati,...1995
29 Teroranpuro is located in Yogyakarta. This is a pseudonym for the kampung where the dispute happened

("Teroranpuro graveyard is the land of kampung members that is the agreed purpose of cemetery, only kampung members have right to be buried in that place. Even though the children [street kids] live in this kampung, they do not have the right to be buried in that place because they are not real people").

The concept of warga asli ("the real people") in the above passage refers to the hierarchical structure existing among kampung dwellers. According to this, the only people who could be buried in that cemetery are members of the hierarchy, not those outside of it. The headman’s consciousness of this hierarchy resulted in his dismissal of the relationship between the street children who lived in that kampung and the RT headman. Even though he frequently visited the street kids, it did not mean that he would take care of them as if they occupied an equal status on the hierarchy. This caused him not to bear in mind their close relationship, but merely to be aware of his position in the kampung hierarchy and place primacy on the maintenance of the hierarchy itself. It meant that the existence of street children in that kampung was believed to contaminate the hierarchical order of the kampung’s ‘real people’. It can be seen from his statement which utilizing the name of kampung members (society as an institution of the hierarchy) that street children had no rights to kampung property.

In order to buttress his decision, he tried to involve other hierarchical arms of the kampung organization. He asked the ketua (headman) RW (Rukun Warga = literally meaning the harmony of the kampung members organization), and the youth organization from the mosque to support his decision. The RW headman in this case, indeed, was supportive of the RT headman. Furthermore, in order to deny Dodo’s burial he said that as a pemerintah apparatus he always obeyed the rule of law (‘sebagai seorang aparat yang selalu tunduk pada aturan’). The rule of law here means the kampung rule that is already agreed upon by kampung members. In fact, the term ‘warga asli’ in his reference to rule of law (it is actually unwritten law), was (is) never clear enough, because some kampung dwellers who died before Dodo were buried in

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30 See B. Ertanto Cahyo Dewo, ‘Kere ki Ra sah Mati...1995
31 Ertanto Cahyo Dewo, ‘Kere ki Ra sah Mati... 1995

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that cemetery, without any question as to whether they were ‘warga asli’ or not.

Following the head of RT and RW, the head of Mosque Youth Club also rejected Dodo’s burial in an indirect manner. He reasoned that he had never met Dodo in the mosque, and as Dodo had no ID card, he never knew Dodo’s religion, even though one of the Girli members explained to him that Dodo was in fact Muslim (despite the fact that they themselves were unsure of Dodo’s religion). This Girli strategy was just to force the person who was in charge of the mosque club to announce Dodo’s death from the Mosque’s loud speaker and the burial of his body in the kampung cemetery as soon as possible. This was because his body was already decaying and its odour was very disturbing. Now the dispute was already two days old and the kampung apparatus still stood on their decision not to bury Dodo in the kampung cemetery. The housewives of the kampung tried to use the mosque as a vehicle to approach other segments of the kampung organization, but unfortunately, they did not succeed.

The word ‘aparat’ and ID card (as something very official from the pemerintah, or something that can be seen as a representation of the pemerintah in terms of official records) here, meant that the local apparatus utilized the name ‘pemerintah’ (‘government’) in order to show that his position was part of the established hierarchical order. By using this he felt that he had authority to threaten the street children and the NGO, GIRLI which supported street children in general, and which had specific desire to bury Dodo in the kampung cemetery. Furthermore, the rule of law here did not mean the rule of law itself but rather represented a bluff to show they were part of the Indonesian pemerintah apparatus on the kampung level. Once again the image of the state is invoked by members of the wider society as a way of asserting authority. The rule of law here means ‘aturan birokrasi kampung’ (regulated by the kampung bureaucracy) which can be used as a means of domination rather than as a means of giving service to the people as members of the nation state. In addition, by utilising the word ‘pemerintah’ instead of kampung dwellers, it seems that the pemerintah apparatuses realized that the name ‘kampung dweller’ was not strong enough to threaten the group that supported Dodo’s burial. This was because the kampung apparatus never

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32 This NGO’s office was located in kampung Teroranpuro and organised the street children there for years. The denial by Kampong apparatuses showed that their visit to the street children and the NGO’s office was not based on a relationship of mutual recognition and respect but rather on deeply held mutual suspicions.
consulted the *kampung* members or the housewives who protested against their decision.

The name ‘*pemerintah*’ utilized by the *kampung* apparatuses in this case acted to recall the memory which all those people shared. In the dispute between the *kampung* apparatuses, the dominant individuals used a very powerful threat discourse and their subordinates felt the apprehensions arising from their memory of threat. This scenario is a type of psycho-politics whereby forces of fear and threat, domination and subjection operate simultaneously whilst power relations are being reconstituted. Indeed, this kind of psycho-politics is a crucial dimension of power relationships on the social stage.

The complicated dispute between the groups intensified after the dead body started to decompose and the smell became really offensive. Theoretically this was contrary to Javanese burial traditions, because two days had already elapsed and the body was not yet buried. By the second day of the dispute in the *kampung*, the housewives’ feelings deepened. They said that Pak RW and RT were inhumane. In addition, one old woman said that ‘*laaahh...laiuhh, cah ra duwe wong tuwo, matine kok ya ra no sing ngopeni*’ (ooh....God, the poor kid without parents and no one takes care of his death). The reaction of the housewives and the old woman reflected the fact that the traditional kinship relation between mothers and children is generally positive, and the denial of the state apparatuses on the *kampung* level can be seen as representative of the relationship between fathers and children which is generally negative. Additionally, these reactions also related to the lack of adherence to Javanese tradition regarding burials.

The reaction from the women, of course, also opposed the position of the regime’s apparatuses linguistically. They expressed the notion that Pak RT and RW were not human anymore. The phrasing of this accusation was very strong because it positioned the local functionaries outside of the hierarchical order recognised by Javanese tradition. Furthermore, it also confronted the masculinity of a *pemerintah* that always employed threats to repress the dominated in a paternalistic way. Due to this, it can be said that women’s reaction in this case can also be seen as a response against male domination. This is because they increasingly realized that they were already

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dominated and repressed by the males from the pemerintah apparatuses. This temporary consciousness became an energetic source of resistance on the part of the housewives. Of course the pemerintah officials in that kampung were troubled by these responses. At the same time as they faced the attack from the housewives, the ketua RT and RW asked the Girli NGO about the official letter of permission to reside in that kampung. Of course street children never have one because in order to obtain that kind of letter and also an ID card, they must hold a letter of reference from their previous residence. In that case the street kids never hold official residence, because they constantly move from one place to another. This shows that the reaction from the pemerintah apparatuses at the local level, obviously using their authority and power that included symbols of jagoanism (machismo) embedded in authoritarianism, was merely to subjugate the dominated more strongly than before. Even though they felt troubled by such opposition, they could utilize the semi-sacred aura of the pemerintah’s name to defeat their adversaries.

By the third day the smell of Dodo's body was rife in Girli’s office, and the dispute still continued and a journalist from Bernas (Berita Nasional) newspaper became involved. Actually, the news of Dodo's death was published on the first day of his death in the criminal news section, but not the dispute over his burial. The involvement of the journalist in this case came about because of the standing good relationship between the Girli NGO and the journalist. In the meeting between the Girli, the journalist and the local apparatus, the journalist, supported by the Girli NGO, said that Bernas would publish the story of the dispute over the burial if the local apparatuses continued to deny Dodo's burial. Moreover, in order to be more convincing, the journalist suggested that such publicity would unnecessarily embarrass the Camat (the district headman), the Walikota (city mayor) and even the governor of Yogyakarta province. Clearly this kind of threat also employed the name of pemerintah higher up on the hierarchy. But now these symbiotic threats are redeployed by civilians in a strategy calculated to discipline the local apparatuses.

On that day, the local functionaries stood firm on their decision not to bury Dodo in the kampung cemetery. By the following day when Dodo's body was even more putrid, the journalist reissued the same threat even more vehemently. This threat from the journalist was extremely effective in cornering the local apparatuses. The local
apparatuses were really afraid if the Camat, the Walikota or even the Governor inquired about the case. They would not only be embarrassed but risked the ruin of their positions as local leaders. This resulted in the Ketua RT and RW and the head of Mosque Youth Club deciding to allow the Girli NGO to bury Dodo’s body. Finally the kampung apparatuses asked the Modin (the person in charge of prayers before the burial) to come to that cemetery to bury Dodo in the Islamic way. The presence of the Modin was ordered by the Ketua RT and RW to reinvigorate the standing of their social position among the kampung members.

F. Uniforms, Pride and Ritual: An Example of Loyalty and Discipline

The New Order regime, has attempted to politically develop Indonesia through ‘stabilitas nasional’ (national stability) and ‘pembangunan ekonomi’ (economic development). To achieve this, the twin instruments of developmentalism, the military and civil servant organizations, were reorganized after the fall of the ‘Old Order’ of President Sukarno and the massive collapse of the PKI through massacres and political actions from the mid to late 1960s. Following this, the party system was also reorganised changing from a multiple party system to only three government sanctioned and tightly regulated parties in the 1970s. Moreover, military and civil servants were established as the twin backbones to operate stabilitas nasional and pembangunan ekonomi. The military in this case has become a kind of ‘phantom’ in the popular imagination: their presence represents and produces terror, violence, and a discourse of threat in order to maintain their power in intentionally frightening ways.

The restructuring of the civil service since the 1970s also shows a significant degree of cultural engineering to support developmentalist ideas through bureaucratic channels. The census data from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, for example, highlights interesting political phenomena. This census shows the increasing number of pegawai

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34 These twin vocabularies are very commonly uttered by the military elites and the pejabat (high level of bureaucrats) at almost every public occasion. Very often, these terms can become part of the threat discourse to create order.

negeri year by year and an increasing complexity of bureaucratic functions. The restructuring of the bureaucracy in the mid-1970s allowed the New Order regime a significant political role in the management of economic development and stability up to the late 1990s. This restructuring process facilitated the discourse of authoritarianism — which is founded in jagoanisme more than anything else — and allowed it to transform and expand in its potency at the state level as an expansion of the ego politics of bapak and jagoan. The foremost bapak, of course — and perhaps also the most powerful jagoan — was President Suharto.

This expansion can be seen not only at the top level of the state structure but also at the kampong and village level. At this level, the state organised Ibu (housewives) through mass organisations such as PKK (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga= the Education of Family Welfare), Dharma wanita, IKKA/IKKH, Dasawisma. There was no equivalent organisation for the bapak (husbands). On the other hand, the regimentation of bureaucracy at the kampung and village level, such as RW (Rukun Warga= lit. The institution for members’ harmony) and RT (Rukun Tetangga= lit. The institution for neighbourhood harmony) became the representation of the political domain of the bapak. Therefore, the state did not necessarily organise bapak at the wong cilik level in the same way as the state organised the ibu. In this kind of politics, the position of ibu becomes a frontier in the maintenance of political stability. The census data before 1977, shows that New Order regime had no prior census data about the number of pegawai negeri (civil servants). At that time the Central Bureau of Statistics only compiled data on the general labour force. In 1977 the New Order pemerintah started to compile information about the number of civil servants by sex and location (province and district) only. The total number of pegawai negeri at that time was 1,760,418 (male: 1,379,815 and female: 380,604) which subsequently increased almost 3 times by the middle of the 1990s.

36 The total number of pegawai negeri from 1977-1987 has been increasing in a spectacular manner: 1,760,418; 1,829,397; 1,953,231; 1,956,864; 2,047,080; 2,628,474; 2,785,646; 2, 956,082; 3,159,652; 3,403,408. These numbers increased yearly, and by the 1990s the civil service had reached around 4 million. Since about 1977 until 1997 almost all of them had to support Golongan Karya (Golkar) as the ruling party; however, after Suharto’s resignation in the 33rd year of his presidency (on May 21, 1998), they had the opportunity to vote for one of the 48 parties of their own choice. The effect of ‘reformasi’ in the election of June 1999 shows that Golkar party lost its many of its voters but still remained remarkably strong (Golkar was placed second after PDI Perjuangan in the national elections of 1999.)
This increase in the number of civil servants was not only related to the increase of job seekers, but also to the image that a civil servant is someone ‘real’, a person to be honoured. One of the taxi drivers in Yogyakarta had a chat with me about his monthly salary. He explained that before the monetary crisis he usually earned around Rp 600,000.00 (AU$300) but during the monetary crisis in 1998 he just got around Rp 350,000.00 - Rp 400,000.00 (AU$100). He said it was just small amount of money not like civil servants. He imagined that a civil servant’s wage far outweighed his own. Then I said to him that I am a civil servant working for a State University as a lecturer. For that job (which is very prestigious in his point of view) I just earned around Rp 400,000.00 (around AU$200.00 before the crisis and AU$60.00 - 90.00 after the crisis). He was surprised, because he earned significantly more than me. Then he said that I have many opportunities to teach in a second job in a private university, or to pursue some privately funded project. I said that I was not teaching in a private university, but that I also taught in an Islamic state university. In that institution I earned just Rp 20,000.00 (AU$5) per semester.

I explained to him that besides teaching, I also had to engage in some research so I can adequately support my family. Again he did not believe that he earned more than me. Finally, he said that a civil servant is an honourable position (posisi terhormat) not like taxi drivers. To emphasize his point, he said that he would still prefer to be a civil servant than a taxi driver and accept a lesser salary even in a low-ranking position. After all, he continued: ‘tapi kan pegawai negeri bisa dapat uang banyak, apa lagi kalau posisinya basah’ (Civil servants can earn a lot of money though, especially if [their] position is dealing with money), meaning that being a civil servant opens up opportunities for corruption. I replied, ‘yes, I could steal a box of chalk’ — then he laughed.

If this point of view is examined more closely, it can be seen to relate to the phantasm of being ‘manusia seutuhnya’. To be a civil servant for his point of view, means possessing the prestige of state symbolism which makes the state functionary an honourable person. This concept originates from the government, as exemplified by its advertising of the development program. It is the regime’s belief that manusia seutuhnya means people who submit to the government to pursue the success of its program whether through education, or as a civil servant. In Javanese mysticism, to be
manusia seutuhnya means ‘dadi wong’ (being a real human) which originated from the dichotomous states of ‘durung wong’ (not yet human) and ‘wis wong’ (already human). Sociologically it means to attain a certain social status in order to be honoured as a person. To fulfil this kind of ideal, they imagine that to be a civil servant is a sure path to that end. This resulted in some people trying to become a civil servant through ‘fair means or foul’. Due to this, there is the expression of ‘saya punya koneksi’ (lit: ‘I have connections’, referring to nepotism and cronyism) to become a civil servant.37 Through these connections they channel their fantasy to be a ‘real human’ (dadi wong). For the people who do not have any ‘koneksi’ they must use bribery (uang pelicin = lit. lubricating money) with the very influential officers in order to melicinkan (lubricate) access for their daughter/son to enter the circuitry of the civil service cum subscribing state symbolism.38

In the 1978 census categories for pegawai negeri were more complicated than before. Data was compiled on the number of pegawai negeri by sex, by type of employment, by educational level, and by rank. These categories show that hierarchy is an important concept in the civil servants’ cognitive map. Through this hierarchical system reported by the census, the New Order regime was able to control the pegawai negeri more systematically than before. The New Order regime become cognizant of changes in rank, improvements in education and was even able to manipulate the pegawai negeri through bureaucratic rituals in order to maintain fear and the threat discourse. Because of this style of rule, the lowest ranking person able to lead in government rituals is someone who holds an III/B rank. He/she controls and is responsible for staff with a rank of I/A up to III/A, and the III/B up to IV/D are under the control of the people who are of a IV/E rank. All of these ranks are fully controlled

37 The common expression of: ‘wuah kalau pegawai negeri itu enak, bisa main di belakang’ (‘Wow, as a civil servant is cool, they can play around behind the scenes’). The term ‘enak’ (in colloquial English means ‘cool’) in this case highlights the situation of civil servants who usually enjoy privileges from the state (including corruption), and who also can play a significant role in recruiting family members who seek employment. Accordingly, it can be said that corruption of power and nepotism in the New Order regime are the expressions of asking or taking money or power from bapak for his extended family,-which is in this case is manifested in the state administrative system.

38 For a nice analysis of bapak, generosity and corruption see Saya S. Shiraishi (1997) Young Heroes, the Indonesian family in Politics. Ithaca: SEAP Cornell University. In this book the author analyses the role of the bapak figure in bureaucracy, in which generosity (even though this generosity involves giving out money coming in from corruption) of the father toward his staff, or to some private organisation that asks for money, expresses the notion of family at state level.
by the ‘extraordinary’ rank (golongan luar biasa), such as the Ministers, the Vice President and the President. The promotion of rank in this context allows state apparatuses/state personnel to don a specific uniform not allowed to lower ranks. The effect of the uniform allows them an opportunity to reproduce and manipulate state symbolism for their own political purposes beyond realm of the state.

According to the hierarchical order previously explained, those of the highest rank have ample opportunity to accumulate authority that stems from state symbolism and deploy it in the constitution of power relations. The important point in this case does not concern power in a particular individual’s hands but how the efficacy of the highest rank holder’s power is tested through encounters with lower ranking individuals and people outside the civil service. The case of Dodo’s burial I described above demonstrates this kind of power relationship, in which the hierarchy of the bureaucratic system is powerful as a dominant discourse when it is employed to subject the rakyat. This kind of power relation between state and society is emphasized through the practice of such rituals and in the rank asserted by the uniform worn by civil servants. The practice of discipline not only has a given effect on the civil servant but through uniform and ritual it is publicly displayed and so also permeates into people’s imaginings, even among the wong cilik.

The hierarchical civil service in this case is not only concerned with authority in the sense that the highest rank has more power than the lower ranks. It also constitutes the signification of state symbolism in a hierarchical perspective where unchallengeable

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39 This is similar to the military attribute system, the ‘safari’ uniform of civil servants is only worn by rank IIID or above. Below this rank, it is not permitted.

40 One remarkable ceremony which is compulsory for civil servants and military members is the upacara tujuh belasan (the ceremony of the seventeenth) which is conducted monthly. In most state offices in Indonesia this ceremony is still conducted. However one month after Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, the rector of Gadjah Mada University (Prof. Ichlasul Amal Ph.D) announced that the university staff should not engage in this ceremony any longer. This decision made this university become the only state institution that does not conduct the tujuh belasan ceremony in Indonesia. Prof. Ichlasus Amal was actively involved in supporting student movements which sought Suharto’s resignation from his long reign. Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X was also active at that time especially on 20 May 1998 by allowing a peaceful rally in front of the sultanate palace. Even though he supported students’ movement, when he became a governor of Yogyakarta special province, the ceremony of seventeenth was still conducted in the province every month
authority figures occupy the apex.\footnote{Suharto’s position has been analyzed by Benedict Anderson as akin to a Javanese king aware of his position on the apex of the hierarchical order. This awareness made Suharto used the term ‘lengser keprabon, madheg pandito ratu’ (to resign from kingship, to become a priest) to express his intention before he resigned. See Benedict Anderson and Ben Abel ‘A Javanese king talks of his end’, \textit{Inside Indonesia} 54, April-June 1998. Habibie’s position is quite different from that of Suharto. His background as a person from Sulawesi, Western educated and having lived for many years in Germany affected his character as President. But the state structure remains hierarchical, it is even the same under Abdurahman Wahid, even though he is more open than Suharto.} This kind of signification allows the highest-ranking individuals to control key social rituals. The meaning of these discourses also confirm the ‘place’ —relative to those below as well as those above — of the lower ranks of the hierarchy. Ultimately structure, discourse and symbolism are fashioned to control the people, with quite deliberate invocations of the traditional state of Java and core socio-cultural foundations as exhibited in \textit{bapak’s} political privilege in the social microcosm of the family.

The evidence shows that this ritual is a technique employed to discipline the state’s subjects as explained below. On 15 December 1997, just 5 months and 8 days before Suharto’s resignation from the Presidency, one of the senior lecturers (rank IVA/Lektor) in a Javanese university received a rejection letter for his rank promotion to a professor (rank IVB/\textit{Profesor madya}) from the faculty senate.\footnote{This data is based on confidential documents, therefore the name of the university and the actors involved remain confidential. The abbreviation KORPRI is \textit{Korp Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia} (Corps of Civil Servants of the Indonesian Republic), and DP3 is the abbreviation for \textit{Daftar Penilaian, Pemantauan, Pegawai negeri sipil} (The assessment list and monitor of Civil Servants Performance).} The refusal letter stated that:

3. \textit{Sangat disayangkan bahwa dari pengamatan para anggota senat fakultas DP3 Saudara khususnya untuk tahun 1997 tidak memenuhi persyaratan untuk kenaikan jabatan/pangkat.} (Regrettably, according to the faculty senate members’ observation on your DP3 (list of performance marks) especially for the year 1997, [your DP3] is not adequate to fulfill the requirements for your promotion in rank.

4. \textit{Penilaian tersebut pada butir 3 berdasarkan fakta bahwa selama ini Saudara dianggap telah mengabaikan hal-hal yang bersifat wajib bagi seorang Pegawai negeri Sipil, meskipun sudah berkali-kali diingatkan. Sikap mengabaikan itu dapat disebutkan sebagai berikut:} (This judgement on point 3 is due to the fact that you neglected your duties as a civil servant despite repeated requests. The attitude of negligence is outlined below:)

4.1. \textit{Tidak pernah mengikuti upacara-upacara yang diselenggarakan oleh universitas pada setiap bulan, teristimewa pada tanggal 17 Agustus...}
The word of ‘regrettably ...never follow the ceremonies’ and ‘never wears the uniform’ mentioned in the rejection letter are vocabularies that invoke authority — state symbolism is utilised to discipline and punish civil servants who are not perceived to be loyal to the state as the centre of authority. Physical punishment even applied in the case of civil servant in the Pati residency, another exemplary instance of punishment for failure to conform to state rituals. Discipline and punishment in the bureaucratic environment of New Order Indonesia in this case, seems more to reflect the phenomena of channelling fear and the threat discourse through the hierarchical order than the promotion of the efficient functioning of the bureaucracy in a Weberian sense. Furthermore, the refusal letter is somewhat ironic in that it is implemented within an academic context where the promotion of rank should be judged on creativity and productivity in academic work, an environment that should ideally embrace academic freedom. The consequence of this kind of punishment is that academic promotion can be achieved through the loyalty and obedience rather than through academic achievement. To a great extent, this condition has dwarfed the intellectual life of Indonesian academics because promotion by rank is not a matter of reward for merit but

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43 See "Sejumlah Karyawan Sesalkan ‘Hukuman’ Cara Bupati Pati" in Kedaulatan Rakyat. July 9, 1992: p 6. See also "Kasus Hukuman Tiara: DPRD Berencana Sampaikan Nota Kepada Bupati Pati" in Kedaulatan Rakyat. July 11, 1992. This newspaper reported that some civil servants in Pati (a city on the North Coast of Central Java) were punished by being made to lie face down in front of the Resident’s office by the Bupati because they did not follow the Monday ceremony.

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for conformity and disciplined behaviour. This discourse is laden with demonstrable threats and functions as an instrument of domination.\footnote{44 For further comparison and further understanding on discipline and punishment see Michel Foucault (1977) \textit{Discipline and Punish, the Birth of the Prison}. London: Penguin Books. In this book he shows the techniques of the dominant powerholders — represented through prison apparatuses — in disciplining prisoners. Even though subjugation through discipline and punishment is very strong, the subjects have an ability to engage in clandestine moves against those who dominate.}

In this kind of environment, a broad and strategically loaded social and institutional arena disseminates from its privileged social space an atmosphere of fear. Uniforms and ceremonies are made into instruments for enclosing civil servants within a shared political universe, the polity of \textit{jagoan-bapakism}. However, this kind of uniformisation is not merely an instrument to subject civil servants to state ideology, but it also opens up for them profitable opportunities to utilise state symbolism for their own ends. This can be used to empower themselves to face non-state institutions and to discipline the lower ranking adjuncts of the regime. Hence they encapsulate themselves, to a great extent, in a closed social environment or, at the very least, within social boundaries that they create and defend to distinguish themselves and to try to bend the world beyond to their vision. This kind of imposition operates through the naturalisation and internalization of symbolic violence in everyday life. It is further enhanced and facilitated by the hierarchical order of the civil service ranking system. Within the arena of dominant discourses, this kind of discipline can be expressed in many forms, for example the rejection letter that I quoted above.

The dissemination of the ‘ideologi negara’ (state ideology) or Pancasila in Indonesia during the New Order mostly relied on bureaucratic networks and its routine rituals. These rituals may be held monthly (such as the rite of \textit{tujuhbelasan}), yearly (such as \textit{penataran P4}) or on specific occasions, such as the ‘temu wicara’ (a kind of talk show) between the former president Suharto and those he called ‘the rakyat’ (people). This ritualised public contact between state and people, President and people, emphasizes that the Indonesian people predominantly share the meanings and the values projected by state symbolism. The civil servants’ uniforms which are usually displayed in everyday life have become one of the instruments in mastering the discourse itself.\footnote{45 The term \textit{rakyat} in Javanese society originated from the concept \textit{keluarga} (family), where the father usually act as \textit{kepala keluarga} (the leader of family) and the family members other than \textit{kepala keluarga} are called ‘\textit{rakyat’}. Indeed, it is a paternalistic form of defining the term \textit{rakyat}. This signifies that the...
All of them were ritualised within the discourse of jagoan-bapakism that defines the fundamental hierarchies, rights and obligations of authoritarianism. Indeed, like many rituals in other societies, the condensation of meaning, the internalization of the dominant discourse, the recognition of self within the dominant discourse, the objectification of state, and the dissemination of state symbolic power all entice the followers to participate and thereby to reproduce the dominant ideal.\(^46\)

In this case the Indonesian bureaucrats (pegawai negeri) also fabricate and reproduce the so-called ‘bahasa birokrat’ or ‘bahasa pejabat’ (bureaucrat’s language) which has become their distinctive idiom. This language can be distinguished as a sub-dialect (an exemplar is given in the document I quoted above refusing academic promotion) they employ in controlled encounters between state functionaries and the people. Shibboleths such as ‘ketertiban’ (order), ‘stabilitas’ (stability), ‘wawasan nasional’ (national perspective) and jati diri (self identity) for example, are tried and tested bureaucratic clichés whose effectiveness has been in innumerable contested encounters between state and rakyat. However, in general, most of the vocabulary utilised by the bureaucrats of the New Order regime are based on developmentalist vocabularies. In addition, specific terms such as ‘daripada’ (lit: ‘then’, but which becomes ‘of’ when used by Suharto improperly) for example, has subsequently become widely employed by bureaucrats almost everywhere in Indonesia. This kind of language is somewhat influenced by the hierarchical order of the bureaucratic ethos. Under the


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New Order regime, the resemblance of priyayi modalities in Indonesian language has been brought systematically into this language to become the language of bureaucrats, or the so-called bahasa pejabat.

**G. Bahasa Pejabat: the Dissemination of Phantom and its Struggle**

The difference between bahasa pejabat and demotic or vernacular languages can be seen not only in the divergent vocabularies they use, but also in significant semantic interpretations that are given, especially for words that bureaucratic language has in common with ordinary speech. The dissemination of bahasa pejabat within and from the Indonesian state, and the stilted, standardized language it employs can also be observed as these meanings are disseminated through the electronic and print media. For an example of its inculcation within the state, we can see that in a small province like the Special Province of Yogyakarta, the civil servants are obliged to hear the governor’s (in this case, the Sultan’s) speech on the 17th of every month, as civil servants must do in Provinces across the nation. In the provincial capital, the governor has to give the speech directly and copies of speech have to be read by Bupati and camat (regency and district heads) in parallel ceremonies that are held at the kapubaten (regency) and kecamatan (subdistrict) levels. At the kecamatan level, the ceremony must be attended by all the village heads from all the villages in the kecamatan. On that day, all of the civil servants are compelled to hear the speeches of high-ranking bureaucrats. It displays the hierarchical vision of bureaucrats and also shows that they have their own social space from which they can reproduce the dominant discourse.

In this section I will not discuss the ceremony itself (I have discussed this in a previous chapter) but rather I will look at the effect of speeches delivered in bahasa pejabat and in particular their contribution to the constitution of relations of power. The bureaucratic oration projects its own definitions of the proper relations between state and society, and these assertions are made to look imposing, if not ineluctable, by

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47 Demotic or vernacular language in this case are sub-dialects of the Indonesian language that not used in official language. They might be blended with the local languages and are very often less hierarchical, and are used in sarcastic ways. This is different with the meaning of vernacular in Ahmat Adam’s (1995) definition, which is refers to distinctions between major languages like bahasa Melayu or bahasa Indonesia.

48 At the provincial level the ceremony of 17th of every month is still held by Pemda (Pemerintah Daerah=District governance).
impressive ceremonial rituals, and the associated displays of economic, administrative and coercive potency. Moreover, I would also observe that what is communicated are not only overt political messages, but also consistent reminders of the state’s capacity to unleash terror. The effect of this dimension of threat in bahasa pejabat is not only to elevate awareness of the state’s potency and capacity for ruthlessness, but also to construct a fear of malevolent dark forces held back only by state vigilance. These notions enter the very grammar of state discourse, and conjure up the presence of a ‘phantom’ threat, ever present, ever threatening. The imagery of phantoms was predominantly given credence by the civil servants and the military under the New Order regime. Some of the common people have absorbed these beliefs, but many more remain sceptical.

The speech I quote below is one example of bahasa pejabat under the New Order regime that shows the phantom imagery, and some of the discourses internal contradictoriness:


(However, we realise, that there are parties and groups which utilise that lack [the lack of development] as an argument to claim that the Government is not capable, is not open and certain other [negative] issues. Besides that, there are parties and certain groups who exploit [the incapacity of government, and the lack of openness] to confront Government and people, to create conflict between government and society, and also to break the unity of nation. By confrontation and conflict, they hope that they can make people doubt their government, therefore their role in the development process is becoming weak. After all that, a chaotic situation will emerge everywhere and in many manifestations. This is the attempt of certain groups who want to weaken our country. Accordingly, we have to increase the awareness of any kind of Problems and issues. Then we have to avoid to trap on it. To face this condition, we expect government apparatuses especially those who have the duty of dealing with society directly, including [state apparatuses] at the village level, to have to constantly open their eyes and watch out for the groups who want chaotic and disorderly situations to happen, and especially who provoke the people to withhold support for the government.)

This was one of the speeches disseminated by the New Order regime in the Special province of Yogyakarta in 1996. This speech was delivered by Pakualam VIII as the vice-governor of this province. This speech shows the construction of a discourse that sees the state in jeopardy and under constant threat. The interesting aspect of this speech is how the rhetoric of the state apparatus takes as axiomatic the ‘imagery of the phantom’ menace. Among its several implications is the warning to the population not to commit offences against or to disturb the programs of the state. Moreover, the concept of the state as an institution of governmental power (pemerintah) very often overlaps with the concept of country (negara). Thus an offence against the state is unpatriotic. This is because the concept of negara as it is fantasized by state officials becomes the signifier for a unified construct, the manifestation of the nation, an integral sacred unity. The political outcome of this discursive fantasy is to suppresses ‘subversive’ ideas, or any activity that is seen to disturb the dynamic unity of state-society relationships.

The text of the above speech deserves scrutiny too, at the textual level. In this text, the aural reception by the listening audience does not reveal the status given to key words by the use of capital letters and small case in the text, except to the extent that it

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30 For further comparisons concerning this kind of speech, see Himpunan Pidato Gubernur kepala Daerah istimewa Yogyakarta Tahun 1996. Yogyakarta: Biro Hubungan Masyarakat Setwilda Propinsi DIY.
can be vocally emphasised by the speakers. In the text I bolded above there are some specific capital letters and words in small case that might reflect the state’s construction of the significance of various entities. At the textual level, the first letter of the word *Pemerintah* is capitalised, but the first letter of *rakyat* (people) is kept in small case. Subconsciously perhaps, the person who made this speech gave *Pemerintah* an emphasis as something important that must be respected, since it occupies the peak of the hierarchical order. On the other hand, *rakyat* treated as an entity that does not have comparable significance in the hierarchical order.

There is no doubt that it had become very important for the New Order regime to inculcate an unquestioning acceptance of the existence of the shadowy phantom menace from within society through the politics of language. To a great extent it was similar to the remarkable concept of pre-colonial Javanese kingdoms called *manunggaling kawulo lan gusti* (the unification of subjects and the ruler), a powerful integralist political cosmology.\(^{51}\)

This political cosmology was manipulated by New Order bureaucrats for their own political purposes. However it creates another paradox within their political fantasy. The distinction between *Pemerintah* and *rakyat* taps into the parallel cultural precedent so that *kawulo* represents the *rakyat*, and *Gusti* represents the bureaucrats or *Pemerintah*. This is contradictory because the speech adopts a posture of threat to the people, yet the same people are claimed to form an organic totality with the government. In reality the resort to threat arises from a fear of people rather than from an effort to unite them together. Moreover, at the practical level, the disciplining of the people – which is actually based on the ranking, or hierarchical, system that we have been discussing – was a necessity for the New Order regime, but it is also to a great


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extent incompatible with the flux of democratisation and the post-modern cultural currents that celebrate plurality. In addition, the democratic, pluralist aspects of modern Indonesian culture promote a relationship between people and government that is much more fluid, and exhibits multi-faceted perspectives, that contrast totally with the hierarchical and monolithic perspective promulgated by the New Order state.

Undoubtedly, the distinction between the so-called *Pemerintah* and *rakyat* has influenced the entrenched patterns of power relation between the bureaucrats and people. Within this context, the *wong cilik* who had lived for more than 30 years under the New Order regime were constantly immersed in the modes of thought inculcated through the dominant state discourse. Yet the *wong cilik* kept alive their ability to recognize whether the dominant discourse had reached its limits of plausibility. When the main public spaces for the creation of political meaning were already saturated by *bahasa pejabat* (bureaucrat language) the *wong cilik* created other arenas within which counter discursive practices could continue through the use of their own demotic languages. These allowed alternatives cast within demotic languages to corrode the modes of ‘legitimate’ power relations defined by the state. On the side of the *rakyat*, subaltern discourses continued to flourish. Because of this they have their favoured times, milieus and spaces where they were able to contest the dominance of *bahasa pejabat*. It is difficult to measure with precision how far *bahasa pejabat* saturated popular thought, and how far it failed. Examples of sardonic expressions, parody, subversive uses of humour, irony and satire are widespread, and are evidence of innumerable subtle attempts to contest the dominant discourse, and to sap the efficacy of *bahasa pejabat* as a dominant discourse. This can only happen when they have a consciousness of the distinction between *bahasa pejabat* and its counter-part languages. Moreover they also have an ability to recognize the *pejabat* and *rakyat* in cynical sense. The expression of ‘*wah kamu sudah seperti pejabat saja*’ (Gee, you are already like a *pejabat*) or ‘*Hey, jangan kayak Suharto dong*’ (Hey don’t be like Suharto) to someone who utilises the wording system of *pejabat*’s speech — such as using the word *daripada* (than) incorrectly, wearing *pejabat* uniforms (safari), and even for

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52 In this case there is no exact terminology for the counter discursive language as the opposite of *bahasa pejabat*. Very view academic people call it as *bahasa rakyat*. However, it does not mean that the underclass grassroots utilise that terminology. At the underclass level, we can find the similar expression of that one, that is *omongan orang biasa* (the utterance of common people).
anyone exhibiting a tendency to monopolise talking. There are numerous examples of this kind that show that the linguistic battle is still alive and well.\(^{53}\)

**H. Summary**

I have described above the regimentation of power relations between the public and the state apparatuses, and the idea that state symbolism is distributed and reproduced through publicly staged rituals, symbols and discourses.\(^{54}\) The state apparatuses hold the authority to employ state symbols, and the government’s interpretations of their meanings, to manage political interpretations in the public sphere over against localised *wong cilik* interpretations. However impressive these powers might be, is the regime’s projects have not always been successful. The production and reproduction of state symbolic power not only uses the direct coercive aspects of state power, and the obvious institutional chains of power at their disposal, but they also display their orientations through the body, and even by meanings mediated by fashion in the form of uniforms. The body and the uniform in this case have become further instruments of political language, which in turn assert the state apparatuses’ de facto monopoly over politics as the controller and dominator in their diligently promulgated ‘regime of interpretation.’

The construction of dominant discourse does not only emanate from dominant national institutions, but also emerges from, and is socialized, practiced and interiorised in, the simple life of the family. From this mundane life, comes a kind of grammatical thought pattern in which the dominant discourse operates and disseminates itself through language usage. Threat, in this case, is a linguistic technique used by the dominant class to subjugate the subordinate. Threats can be manifested in many ways;

\(^{53}\)The expression of ‘*Hey jangan kayak Suharto dong*’ (this is in the Jakartan dialect) was also used among the students, especially in the discussion when some one tended to dominate discussion.

\(^{54}\) The duplication of militaristic camouflage jackets and cargo pants by members of *Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Panca Marga, Banser NU,* etc and the building of *Posko (Pos Komando = Command Post)* *PDIP,* show that utilising powerful symbolism stemming from violent state apparatuses can also increase their legitimacy politically. Furthermore, even thugs can also be utilised by state apparatuses — they carry state symbolism which bestows on them legitimate authority making them a very powerful tool to terrorize the population. For further analysis concerning the role of thugs and the like in the Indonesian Revolution and in politics, see Robert R Cribb (1991) *Gangsters and Revolutionaries.* Honolulu: University of Hawai Press. For a more recent analysis see James T Siegel (1998) *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta, Counter-Revolution Today.* Duke University Press. See also Joshua Barker (1998) ‘State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s New Order’ and Loren Ryter (1998) ‘Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free men of Suharto’s Order?’ in *Indonesia.* No.66, October 199
in this case it emerges in *jagoanism, bapakism, militarism, bureaucratic hierarchy and the rituals that validate them*. This threat then becomes regimented and embedded within the hierarchical construction of state symbolism which has become a regime of interpretation. Even though it seems successful, the popular discontent it cannot efface constantly challenges the dominant state in any available mode. The next chapter will discuss how the contestation between the state and *wong cilik* is constructed through the practices of everyday life. In this penultimate chapter we will see how state symbolism is also challenged by the *wong cilik* through their contestation of the state’s nationalist imagination, showing that the nationalist idea itself has become a contested terrain.
Chapter Five

Housewives and Children Decentring ‘Father’

A. Prologue

This chapter will discuss *wong cilik* social relationships in a kampong in Surabaya during the 1997-1998 monetary crisis where the customary social position of the father in Javanese families was tested because of difficulties in providing food for families. At the same time the government, through the rice distribution agency named Dolog (Depot Logistik, ‘Logistical Depot’), also failed to provide food for the people. This analysis is not about the monetary crisis at the national level affecting family life, but rather an explanation concerning the meaning of ‘the centre’ (in this case the father immediately and the state more generally) which became problematic. I am going to depict instances of power relations within families principally those between father, housewife and children within the communal context of the broader contestation between state and society that had intensified in that period of crisis. First of all I will analyse the function of the state in food provision which was culturally framed in the moral economy that drew on the bread-winners role as the ‘father’ in the Javanese family. Secondly I will examine the housewives’ discursive practices in decentring both the father and the state in the discursive practices of every day life. Thirdly, I will demonstrate how the network of housewives and children within a kampong were able to creatively interpret the prevailing state and father centred discourses to fashion a counter discourse to challenge the state while simultaneously decentring the boundaries of political and socio-economic responsibility linked to cultural and discursive meanings of ‘father’.

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1 I used some parts of this chapter for the conference in the year 2000 entitled ‘Indonesia: A Neighbour in Transition’ held by Centre for Development Studies, The Flinders University of South Australia. This paper published as conference paper series with title ‘House Wives & Children against the Father: Rethinking Authoritarianism In Indonesia’ in Indonesia: A Neighbour in Transition, Centre for Development Studies, The Flinders University of South Australia. Conference Paper Series No.11 1 May 2002.

Aris Arif Mundayat
B. The Failure of Food Provision: The Breakdown of ‘Father’

Power relations between the New Order regime and society can be seen through the politics of rice by understanding the problem how this regime managed rice distribution. This managerial system has important similarities with the cultural role of the ‘father’ in the Javanese family which reflects the figure of the breadwinner. To understand the systems of ‘father-like’ food provision, I will discuss the chronological diagram which traces the succession of food provision institutions from the colonial period until the New Order regime. As can be seen from the diagram below (figure 4), these food management institutions have been a substantial political instrument since their creation by the colonial state of the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies from 1939 up to now. The Dutch colonial government created the VMF (Voeding Middelen Fonds, Food Intermediary Foundation) charging it with buying and distributing foodstuffs (i.e. rice, fried oil, sugar, flour) to the people and with controlling prices for these essentials. This institution operated between 1939 and 1942 when the Japanese invaded. After the Dutch surrendered colonial rule in Netherlands Indies to Japan, the function of this institution continued under a new name, Sangyobu-Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha (1942-1945) which had the same role as VMF. After three years of Japanese occupation, this rice agency was handed over to the Indonesian government which was in the transition of the armed struggle for independence between 1945 - 1950, fighting against the return of the Dutch. VMF operated within the regions controlled by the Dutch (such as West Papua), whereas the PMR (Pengawas Makanan Rakyat, People Foods Monitoring) agency controlled the regions under Indonesian government. In 1950, the Netherlands Indies was handed over to the Indonesian government and the VMF and PMR merged into BAMA (Yayasan Bahan Makanan, The Foundation for Foodstuffs). BAMA only operated for two years, and then changed into YUBM (Yayasan Urusan Bahan

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2 I would like to thank to Fachry Ali, director of LSPEU Indonesia (Lembaga Studi dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Usaha Indonesia) who supported me in conducting research on Dolog in Surabaya during the economic crisis in 1998. Some data that I gathered from Surabaya incorporated in this section are used with LSPEU Indonesia permission. I am solely responsible for the interpretation of the data I used in this chapter. My field observation was conducted between April and August 1998.

3 The account concerning Bulog in this chapter based on my interview with Dolog personnel who were in charge of the Public Relations of Dolog office in Surabaya. The short history of Bulog also can be accessed through http://www.bulog.go.id/profil/sejarah/html/.

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Makanan, The Foundation For Food Affairs) in 1952. This institution operated until 1956, and operated to ensure that the price of rice was, as far as possible, kept stable.
FIGURE 4: Historical Diagram of Food Institutions in Indonesia

The Historical Diagram of Food Institutions in Indonesia

1939-1942
VMF (Voeding Middelen Fonds)

1942-1945
Sangyobu-Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha

1945-1950
PMR (Pengawas Makanan Rakyat)

1949-1950
VMF (Refunction)

1950
BAMA

1952-1958
YUBM

1956-1964
YUBM-YBPP

1964-1966
BPUP

1967-1969
KOLOGNAS

1967-1969
BULOG

1969-1978
Reorganization of BULOG

1969-1978
Sophistication of BULOG

Indonesia’s Territory

Dutch Territory

Source: This Scheme was drawn by the Dolog Officer who is in charge of the public relations section in Surabaya.
In 1956–1964 the agency was again re-evaluated and the Indonesian government added an additional institution to support YUBM, namely YBPP (Yayasan Badan Pembelian Padi, The Foundation and Institution for Rice Purchasing). These two institutions not only stabilized the price of rice, but also bought, sold, transported, collected and distributed grain. Now the involvement of the state was getting deeper into the total post-harvest management of rice and indeed, it had made the rice into something of a political commodity. The overlapping duties between YUBM and YBPP created confusion so that in the 1964–1965 period both of those institutions were merged into BPUP (Badan Pelaksana Urusan Pangan, The Institution for Foodstuff Affairs) which had the same function as before, but under a single management group.

After the 1965 political turmoil, which was marked by the killing hundreds of thousands, up to million, of PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) members who were allegedly involved in September 30, 1965 actions and the economic crisis of the mid-1960s when the inflation rate defeated government attempts to control the price of rice, the BPUP changed its name into KOLOGNAS (Komando Logistik Nasional, National Logistic Command). The choice of name shows a militaristic orientation, especially the use of the term ‘command’. This reflects the interest that the military regime of the New Order had in using that institution to continue to control rice prices. Militarism was not only shown by the militaristic nomenclature but also in the nomination of chairpersons to this institution. They were always appointed from the military, especially from the army. For example in the period of 1967-1973, when the name of KOLOGNAS changed into Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik, Logistic Body), it was led by Lieutenant General (Ret) Achmad Tirtosudiro. He was an army general who had formerly commanded Kostrad (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat, Strategic Comand for Ground Forces) the elite strike force previously commanded by General Suharto. He then handed over control to Lieutenant General (Ret) Bustanil Arifin for the period 1973-1996. Bedu Amang was in charge for the period 1997-1999. Then the institution was reformed, as part of the post-Suharto political reforms in Indonesia which started in 1999. It has not monopolised rice and sugar after the year 2000. Bulog ceased to function at the national level but Dolog (Depot Logistik, logistic depot) continued to
function at the provincial level.

This militaristic style of administration operated after 1966 and continued up to the end of the New Order regime in 1998. Through the politics of rice, the New Order government attempted to be a ‘father’ and accept the responsibility of food provision for the family. Thus what might appear to be a social democratic, even quasi-socialist, state intervention in the provision on household necessities, was actually cast within a paternalistic-authoritarian cultural framework, enhancing the regime’s vision of ‘traditionalised’ power relations founded (as suggested in the 1948 constitution) on uniquely Indonesian understandings of kekeluargaan (the family principle). The state mobilised the metaphor of ‘father’ adding the people through the invocation of the of ‘children and housewives’. This is very similar with the way Javanese father considers himself as the leader of his family, asserting his authority over the housewife and children who the father considers as ‘people’ (rakyat). The rice distribution agencies function politically to reduce the resentment of the people by keeping the rice price low and affordable for the working class because their wages are very low. For example, in the year 1998, the regional minimum wage in Surabaya was Rp 4,000.00 per day, or around Rp 160,000.00 / month. This wage increased in the year 2000 to Rp 326,000.00 per month. This wage was still not enough to fulfil their monthly needs. This situation contributed to the broader social and economic discrepancies between the wong cilik and wong gede, as can be seen from the table of monthly expenditures below:

5 Based on broad observation in my country and on specific interviews with some fathers in a Surabaya kampong. Pak Ceking, for example, calls his wife and children rakyat (people), and he consider himself as kepala keluarga (the head of family) which shows hierarchical power relation. These understandings are very general among kampong people.

6 ‘UMR di Jawa Timur Perlu Dinaikkan’ in Kompas. March 2, 1998. This news reported that the regional minimum wage needed to increase because it was not enough to fulfill the labourers’ needs, especially during the crisis.
### TABLE 6: Monthly Income & Expenditure for Households, ranked by levels of annual income (Surabaya Municipality 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Expenditure Groups by annual income</th>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Monthly Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,000–99,999</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>2,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,000–14,999</td>
<td>7,725</td>
<td>16,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150,000–199,999</td>
<td>25,212</td>
<td>39,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>200,000–249,999</td>
<td>39,243</td>
<td>56,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250,000–299,999</td>
<td>58,124</td>
<td>71,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300,000–349,999</td>
<td>65,737</td>
<td>74,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>350,000–399,999</td>
<td>62,350</td>
<td>64,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400,000–449,999</td>
<td>60,667</td>
<td>48,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>450,000–499,999</td>
<td>44,958</td>
<td>39,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500,000–549,999</td>
<td>40,258</td>
<td>34,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>550,000–599,999</td>
<td>31,582</td>
<td>23,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600,000–649,999</td>
<td>24,264</td>
<td>23,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>650,000–699,999</td>
<td>21,635</td>
<td>19,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700,000–749,999</td>
<td>19,210</td>
<td>14,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750,000–799,999</td>
<td>21,635</td>
<td>14,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>800,000–849,999</td>
<td>11,956</td>
<td>11,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>850,000–899,999</td>
<td>12,413</td>
<td>7,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>900,000–949,999</td>
<td>8,287</td>
<td>7,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>950,000–999,999</td>
<td>9,091</td>
<td>6,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;1000,000</td>
<td>65,253</td>
<td>53,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>631,024</td>
<td>631,024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: BPS, Surabaya 1997*

The economic problems experienced by the urban *wong cilik* in Java can be seen from the monthly income and expenditure levels in Surabaya as illustrated in the table above. This table shows that the groups with an annual income below Rp 400,000.00 had an expenditure that exceeded the income they received. On the other hand, the groups with an income above Rp 400,000.00 spent less than their income each month. This economic disparity between the social classes is one of the urban contradictions that contributes to the emergence of class-consciousness. The politics of rice can only
temporarily dilute the effects of economic contradictions upon the grassroots; it has failed to enable the *wong cilik* to generate a noticeable level of savings. According to the survey research (unpublished SUSENAS\(^7\) data, 1998) of 38 families in *Kelurahan* (the lowest unit of government within the district level) Keputran, where Dinoyo Kampong is located, Surabaya shows that 13 families have incomes around Rp 150,000.00. 18 families have income between Rp 150,000.00 and Rp 399,999.00. Moreover, only seven families have incomes of more than Rp 400,000.00 per month. Compared to increasing prices of foodstuffs, most of them almost could not afford the cost of basic necessities. This account is from raw data from unpublished SUSENAS 1998, Statistical Office in Surabaya\(^8\). The people with income less than Rp400,000.00 are, therefore, less than secure within the urban economic system, which has already globalized by capitalist culture.

For the *wong cilik* living in big city like Surabaya, the important thing for them is whether they can afford to feed their family. If they cannot do this, then the problems will inevitably emerge. This has been historically proven during economic crises in Indonesia, for example within the period from 1966-1998 there were at least three major crisis and two of them created political turmoil. The first was in 1966 which was followed by political turmoil leading to the resignation of president Soekarno and the entry of the New Order regime. The second, under the New Order regime, during the period from 1975-1983, while the government was striving for self-sufficiency in rice. This was in fact achieved after 1984-1989.\(^9\) The third, from mid-1997 to 1999, Indonesia faced a national economic crisis, which contributed to a food crisis (there was also a serious drought at that time). Like the previous food crisis in 1966, the crisis beginning in 1997 was followed by mass demonstrations demanding that the government lower the price of rice. During the crisis in 1997-1998, demonstrations not only demanded a lower price for rice, they also demanded political reforms that helped

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\(^8\) See footnote 7.

\(^9\) This account based on my interview with the Dolog (Logistic Depot) officer who is in charge as public relation in Surabaya.

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topple Suharto from his 32 years in the presidency.\footnote{10}{The problems of monetary crisis has analyzed by political scientists and economists. Anne Booth, ‘The impact of the Crisis on Poverty and Equity’ in H.W Arndt and Hal Hill (ed), *Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis. Origin, Lessons, and the Way Forward*, Singapore: Allen &Unwin. 1999, p. 129-139. This article demonstrates the fact that the number of people under the poverty line increased due to the economic crisis in Indonesia. In 1997, the percentage of people below the official poverty line was 10.1% (11.3% below official estimation in 1996). According to her account based on the World Bank data, the percentage of poverty could rise up to 14.1% or 29 million people in poverty. (p. 131-132). See also Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Political Institutions and the Economic Crisis in Thailand and Indonesia’ in H.W Arndt and Hal Hill (ed), *Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis. Origin, Lessons, and the Way Forward*, Singapore: Allen &Unwin. 1999, p. 142-156. This article examines various factors in the crisis in Thailand and Indonesia. In Indonesia, he notes that the crisis was caused not only by economic predicament but also the inadequacy of political institutions to implement and initiate policy.}

Since the New Order regime established Bulog nationally and Dolog at the provincial level as political machinery for rice distribution and pricing, this regime possessed an instrument to manufacture the chains of power and dependency connecting farmers, brokers, markets, consumers and housewives with the regime, either directly or indirectly. Bulog and Dolog as the state political instruments functioned not only to control the people but also to win the political consent of the people. At the local level, beyond Bulog and Dolog bureaucracies, this authority manufactured itself autonomously.

There was an instance of this in the kampong in Surabaya. The son of one of the Dolog officers, whose name was Boby, who was involved in selling ‘DOs’ (Delivery Orders — licenses to transport, distribute and sell the rice controlled by Dolog) to certain people within the kampong, including the independent rice traders. This happened, before Bulog was restructured in an attempt to eliminate this kind of petty corruption — the idea was to allow farmers to sell directly to the rice-traders or to Bulog via Dolog.

This pattern of paternalistic-bureaucratic economic activity creates some economic space for the local kampong people to earn extra money by using the power that the state wields over its agencies. Boby in this case used his father’s authority to access these potentials. If he could not find outside buyers for licenses, he could use his connections to get rice or sugar from Dolog and then simply sell them direct to the *warungs*.\footnote{11}{This account is based on my interview with the Boby himself in Surabaya. He also told me that after}
women, and such practices tended to be a male dominated domain. Women’s contact with the flow of foodstuffs is mostly anchored in their role in domestic spaces and certain limited public domains such as the warung and the pasar (market) within the kampong. The participation of females in these circuits of male power is restricted. This male dominated domain has significant political influence on the power relations between the ‘father’, housewives and children both directly and indirectly. This is because rice politics is not only controlled by the state but is also replicated by the male ‘head of household’ at the family level.

At the societal level, this bureaucratic means of managing the rice economy consolidated a network of interested parties who all sought to optimise their benefits from the system of rice distribution. The grocer shops, the pasars, and warungs and other outlets of these commodities all developed ways of benefiting from the regulated prices, provided they could add on their own margins and costs of transportation and other expenses. In these complex circuits of petty trading, people like Boby were the ones who benefitted most. All he had to do was just use his father’s authority to get licences (DO) and then sell them to some one else. By such means he could simply and efficiently translate bureaucratic power into money. In this case, Boby involved some kampong people in his racket, so he also contributed extra cash for jobless people. This market system of rice has been institutionalised not only in the big markets but also on the small scale, in kiosks (warung) within the kampong for years. Beyond that, these economic practices also create a networking system to gather information on rice trading. It was especially a rich source of identifying ways to trick and to collude Dolog officers in order to get licenses or other cash generating opportunities from the rice distribution system.

Bulog restructured in 1998 more people became involved in distributing rice because Bulog no longer monopolized rice distribution, which means DO which could be sold to someone else, so now it is not difficult to get money anymore through such shady means.

12 Wong cilik in urban areas are dependent on the rice supply from Dolog flowing on to local rice distributors. If they said that the stock of rice is empty then the price will increase. In such cases the wong cilik in the kampong believe that Dolog’s oknum (malicious, shadowy figures) are playing the game in order to get money, sharing the profits with the distributors. For further information, see ‘Harga Melonjak, Barang Kosong’ in Surabaya Post 8 June 1998. This newspaper reported the increasing price of foodstuffs and the lack of stock held by Dolog.

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The long chain of the politics of rice from Dolog to the local level, tended to have more political impact on the urban wong cilik than the rural ones. In rural areas many villagers can fulfil most of their own subsistence needs and, in particular, produce or acquire food. Rural Javanese rice producers are not really dependent on the government rice agencies for the production of rice, though they depend on them to sell rice, since the rice price is still determined by the state. Even during the monetary crisis the price of rice fixed by Bulog was lower than the open market price. In this case, it was not advantageous for farmers to sell to Bulog. Because of this, during the early part of the crisis, the farmers did not want to sell their rice because the cost of production had increased due to the sudden steep rise in the price of fertiliser. Thus they tended to hoard their rice until prices stabilised.

During the economic crisis of 1998, the urban wong cilik faced real difficulties in affording rice. These difficulties, and the very real anxieties that arose from them, generated revealing informal discussions and rumours among the wong cilik about the ‘real’ source of the rice price problem. In speculative conversations about the rice problem in warung, whether in Yogyakarta or Surabaya, the people in the warung were suspicious that there was a ‘permainan kotor’ (dirty game) going on among the rice distributors. This included DOLOG personnel who, it was believed in all this informal gossip, had dramatically increased the price of rice. This kind of point of view was not only evident in Surabaya, but also had become a warung rumour in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. This was unsurprising because wong cilik face the same problem everywhere because of their dependence on Dolog’s control of rice distribution. This speculative analysis made by the wong cilik elucidates certain aspects of the operation of internally-oriented information networks. In the warung angkringan in Malioboro street for example, if one of the customers brought a newspaper, then once he had finished reading, it would move on to be read by another customer. With the newspaper turning from one to another, this finally would stimulate a discussion about the rice problem. In kampong Dinoyo, Surabaya, the same situation also occurred. I bought a newspaper then within an hour the people who were also there read the newspaper and started to discuss the rice problem.

The kind of underclass analysis that develops in these circumstances is based on information they have gathered through talking among themselves, from television and
newspapers and from rumours gathered by housewives in the pasar and warung. Housewives, here, act as important agents in the information system. While very few of them buy newspapers, they access them through newspaper boards provided in public places by the newspaper companies. Housewives also enjoy access to fresh rumours from rice traders in the pasar. From such sources of information, the housewives were led to conclude that high rice prices were not only caused by the economic crisis, but also by the dirty games practised by personnel within the DOLOG apparatuses and within the networks of rice distributors. The housewives’ conclusions here are based on information coming directly from the pasar rice sellers, who deal on a daily basis with rice distributors. These distributors are backed up by patrons in DOLOG who supply them with DOLOG licenses that give the distributors the lucrative ability to manipulate the distribution and pricing of rice. The rumours often place the blame upon ethnic Chinese rice traders and those corrupt state personnel who are at the top of the rice distribution chain, people known as orang-orang DOLOG (‘DOLOG people’).

The housewives also gather a lot of information regarding the discrepancies between their lifestyles and those of the rich, as I explained in Chapter Three; they comment that the rich do not face difficulties in affording rice, despite the fact that the price has been skyrocketing. According to rumour, the rich already had rice stored in their homes before the economic crisis. The rich referred to in these rumours are mostly ethnic Chinese rather than wealthy indigenous Indonesians. Their source of information is most often newspapers such as Jawa Pos, Surabaya Pos and Surya (in Surabaya), Bernas and Kedaulatan Rakyat (in Yogyakarta). The information from the pasar, the warung and newspapers are often similar in that they suspect DOLOG and the distributors as the parties involved in manipulating the supply and distribution of rice. When the rice price reached around Rp 2,000.00, the wong cilik talked about DOLOG’s failure to properly control the rice price. The rice price on the 8th of June 1998 in a Dinoyo pasar reached Rp 2,000.00 per kg for the IR64 variety and Rp 2,300.00 per kg for Bengawan Super, while in Hero supermarket the Bengawan variety reached Rp 12,000.00 per 5kg bag. In the Mega M department store, the same variety cost Rp 16,700.00 per 5kg bag. Housewives talked about these prices because, according to the newspapers they read, DOLOG still had 350,000 tons of rice stockpiled in their warehouses and ready for distribution in order to lower the price. DOLOG had stated
that they would distribute rice stocks at a price of Rp 1,300.00 per kg when in fact they
continued to withhold much of their stock and, therefore, did not force the price down
as they had promised.

Based on what they read in the newspapers and the rumours they heard, the
housewives believed that DOLOG was involved in what was termed *permainan kotor*,
or, a ‘dirty game’ of rice distribution.\(^{13}\) Although unproven, the housewives belief in the
idea of *permainan kotor* manufactured a consciousness of opposition to the state. In
August 1998, when the rice price increased to Rp 3000.00–Rp 4500.00 per kg.,
expressions of discontent and anger increased among housewives. Their anger and
emotional expressions were influenced by various rumours and newspaper reports. This
anger towards the *permainan kotor* of BULOG fed into a counter-discourse against the
state itself. The following is an example of such an expression by one housewife:

> ‘Mana operasi pasar yang mereka janjikan. Paling dijual pada tengkulak-
tengkulak. Itulah yang membuat harga terus naik’

(‘Where is the market operation they promised? Indeed, [the stockpiled
rice] has been sold to brokers. They are the ones who make the price
keep rising’).\(^{14}\)

Further expressions of discontent are evident in the following discussion
between a group of neighbours in kampong Dinoyo, Surbaya. Pak Ceking, Pak Agus,
Pak Yanto and his niece were talking on the porch of Pak Ceking’s house; together they
were reading the *Jawa Pos* (June 8\(^{th}\) 1998 edition), and later two newspapers which I
had brought, that is, the *Surabaya Pos* and the *Surya* newspapers both from June 9\(^{th}\),
1998.\(^{15}\) They were worried by the news of the increasing price of rice, given that their
own incomes remained unchanged. They were trying to contain their worries when Pak

\(^{13}\) See ‘Harga Beras Rp 2,300.00’ in Surabaya Post 8 Juni 1998. See also ‘Dolog akan OP beras Rp
1,300.00/kg’ in Surya 9 Juni 1998. This news story reported that the increasing price of rice was making
people increasingly worried and that due to this situation, the state institution DOLOG would attempt to
lower the price through the operation of so-called ‘market mechanisms’. If necessary, DOLOG claimed it
would sell rice at a reduced price in order to lower the market price.

\(^{14}\) See Jawa Pos 20 Agustus 1998, p 9, ‘Dulu Rp 5 Ribu Komplet, Sekarang Cuma untuk Beras’ in Ibu-
ibu Pusing Mengatur Uang belanja. This news report about how house wives faced some difficulties in
managing family finance.

\(^{15}\) Pak Agus was a *becak* driver, but after he feel weak because his lung problem, then he chenage his
profession into more casual. His jobs is depend on the people who need his service, for example painting
wall, repairing house problems, repairing bird cage and selling it.

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Ceking stated:

‘Ah paling-paling DOLOG mung ngomong arepe operasi pasar, cobaen engko rak gak ono realisasine, janji-janji wae’. 

(Ah, DOLOG are just saying that they are going to initiate a market operation, you will see that this will not be realised, [it is] just [empty] promises).

All of the neighbours who were listening agreed with Pak Ceking. The feelings expressed here by Pak Ceking and his friends constitute a counter discourse resulting from the accumulation of discontent, anger, racism and hatred manifested through social tensions and violent outbursts in urban areas during the economic crisis. Moreover, these feelings reflected the class contradictions between members of society and between society and the state.

The people were angry, not only because they felt economically endangered, but because they also understood that while the rice price was approaching Rp 2000.00 per kg., the rice producers in rural areas, such as the Malang and Ponorogo regions, were holding back the sale of their produce both to the brokers and directly to the market. This was not always the case, as there many cases of rice producers selling their rice directly to urban dwellers suffering economically because of the economic crisis. There was, for example, a consideration on the part of many rice producers not to withhold their rice from the urban poor. Many of the urban poor still have close ties with rice producers in rural areas through family and friendship networks. Through such connections, many rice producers also benefited from the sale of rice. For example, if the rice producer sold to DOLOG, the price they would receive would be Rp 850.00 to Rp 961.00 per Kg depending on quality. If on the other hand they sold the rice privately to friends and family, they would often get a better price at around Rp 1,000.00 per Kg after milling irrespective of the quality. The high cost of rice was caused not only by a reduced rice yield in May 1998, but also by the hesitation of rice producers to sell their crop, which encouraged the distributors to hold back their stocks. Rice producers made

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16 The price of rice between 7<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1998.
17 This information is based on an interview with the owner of a rice mill in Ponorogo during a visit to his relatives in Malang on the 14<sup>th</sup> of May 1998. This is also based on an interview with a farmer in Mendit, Malang on the 10<sup>th</sup> of June 1998.

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a rational calculation not to sell all of their crop, so as to disrupt the perceived ‘dirty
game’ played by DOLOG and its distributors, a game which increased the market price
of rice, and also effected the rice producers, who were in certain cases also partially
dependent on the market for their consumption of rice.

In a rural area of Yogyakarta, for example, a farmer named Pak Mintoko was
involved in a share of the village bengkok land, land worked by poor villages on a
crop-sharing basis. The total area of this bengkok land was 2 ha, which was divided into
20 kotak each of around around 1000 m2. This bengkok land provided share-cropped
rice fields for 20 people, with the owner of the land taking 50% of the total rice
production. According to Pak Mintoko, the harvest from a 1000 m2 rice field was
enough to meet a family’s subsistence rice needs for a period of three months. However he needed extra cash to meet other family needs, and to earn this he also was
involved in a maro in a relative’s rice field. From this rice field he earned around Rp
800,000.00 net profit every three months. With intensive maintenance, one kotak can

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18 In rural Java, there is still a plurality of land tenure systems. Land held under the gogol-bengkok system
cannot be alienated. Bengkok land in particular was reserved for the support of the village leaders, a
system extending back into colonial times, but preserved in some places until now, where the village
leaders were remunerated in this way rather than by salary. Bengkok land is often some of the best in the
village and, of course, it may be share-cropped. See Clifford Geertz Social History of an Indonesian

19 Maro is a strategy of sharing the output of rice fields between owners and share croppers. In the maro
(lit. ‘half’ or 50:50) system, the owner of rice field allows the labourer cultivate his rice field. The tenant
in this case has to pay all the expenses of production and share 50% of the yield with the land owner.
Landless peasants and villagers, or those living in urban areas and working as industrial labourers, for
example, may become involved in a maro arrangement for a three-month period to offset the cost of
living. For example, during the economic crisis many people who lost their job in urban areas became
involve in maro arrangements in their home villages, such as the villages of Argomulyo, Kecamatan
Kemusuk and Dusun Sengon Karang (a hamlet in the urban fringe of Yogyakarta where land ownership is
highly fragmented, with land ownership varying from around 500 m² up to 2000 m². Such involvement is
not merely a response to the economic crisis. In many cases, some of these urban residents have also
inherited land from their parents, and the system of maro enables them to maintain their connection to
their village. Indeed, there is no doubt that they also benefit from this. Rural-urban networks show the
mutual benefit accruing from these relationships, especially for village people who share their land with
their relatives from urban areas in order to maintain their agricultural activities and generate income. In
this relationship, the urban people provide a means of production with the crops divided in two. To a
significant extent, maro helps both sides in that it enables urban people to have rice without buying it
from the market, while rural people do not have to outlay any money in order to increase their rice
harvest. This account based on observations and discussions with local people in Kemusuk village in the
Yogyakarta region.

20 Interview with Pak Mintoko Suharjo, a small farmer living in Dusun Sengon Karang, Argomulyo

21 Pak Mintoko told me that the cost of production during the economic crisis increased 100%. A 100 m²
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produce around 700 kg rice before milling or between 350 kg and 400 kg after milling. The cost to mill the rice per 100 kg was Rp 5,000.00 during the economic crisis (before the crisis it was Rp2,500.00). From one rice field Pak Mintoko could earn around Rp 400,000.00 every three months after sharing half with the land owner, if he chose to sell the rice directly. If he chose to sell it after milling in the local pasar, he would get around Rp 1,650.00 per kg, whereas if he were to buy rice from pasar he would have to spend Rp 2,000.00 for the same variety of rice (IR 64). As it was, Pak Mintoko chose to give the rice yielded from his one 1000 m² rice field to his son who is working in Yogyakarta, because his son covers the cost of production. Pak Mintoko takes a share of the rice grown to meet his own subsistence needs. The only rice he sells is rice from a rice field (2,000 m²) which he inherited from his parents. This rice he sells to get money. In term of his rice-based income, this is not affected by the permainan kotor of DOLOG. It is, however, affected by the price of rice fixed by this agency.

The case described above demonstrates the extent to which farmers in the village lost some of their buying power due to the increased cost of production. For example, the price of fertiliser increased by a ratio of 72% against the price of unmilled rice during this time. This was compounded by the general inflation in the price of basic commodities. This is in contrast to a general falling off or levelling off of the cost of living prior to the monetary crisis. For example, according to a BPS study of Java, Bali and the other 19 provinces outside Java, the ratio of expenditure on foodstuffs and the instruments of production fell by 0.3% from 1988-1996.\(^{22}\) The increasing price of rice was not only caused by a lack of rice production, peasant resistance in the villages, and

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speculative market operations by distributors and speculators, but also by a broad-based inflationary crisis which increased transportation costs due to the increasing price of gasoline and diesel fuel during the monetary crisis. For many of the *wong cilik*, the causal relationship between the inflationary crisis and the above factors was unclear. They relied more on the information of rice traders in the *pasar*, which explained the high cost of unpopular low grade rice as the fault of DOLOG, a *permainan kotor*, and the rice price speculation of traders who only wanted to sell medium to high quality rice, such as *Bengawan Biasa*, *Bengawan Super* and IR64.  

In this way, discursive practices which take place at the grassroots level affected power relations both within families and between society and the state. For example, the perceived failure of the state to provide food led housewives to express their resentment in their everyday lives in the ways as I will discuss in the next section.

C. Housewives’ Counter Discourses: Decentring ‘Father’

This section discusses the role of housewives in kampong life and their counter discourse toward the figure of the ‘father’. Housewives in the kampong are the primary agents in stimulating communication at the household and kampong levels, often acting as the principal circuitry of information flows within the kampong and family. While it is commonly assumed that their roles are restricted to the domestic arena or within the domain of family-related matters, housewives in fact are central contributors to economic and political processes at the micro-level, that is, within the kampong. This comes about through their predominant involvement in the *pasar* (or traditional market) economic system. Alexander (1987) demonstrates the extent to which women are the key actors in traditional market economic activities in Javanese society. As Alexander argues, women ‘predominate among both vendor and customers, although many of larger traders and all market administrators are men’.  

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23 This information is based on interviews with the rice traders in *pasar* Dinoyo, Surabaya, on the 5th of June 1998.


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which women are active. This is not entirely true, especially in terms of local economic activities and in the circulation of information within the kampong which is controlled by women as discussed by Alexander.

In terms of life beyond market networks, while the Javanese man is culturally defined as the bread winner, that is as the main source of family income and having responsibility for providing for the family’s needs, the circulation of money and its management is mostly under the control of housewives. As Hildred Geertz notes:

‘men frequently express the belief that they are incapable of handling money carefully, whereas women are supposed to have thrift and foresight; for this reason most men give all or the greater part of their earning to their wives and are forced to ask for spending money as they need it’. 25

This shows that the dynamics of economic flows at the domestic level, at the kampong level, and even in urban areas of Java, have concrete roots within women’s everyday lives rather than in men’s. Related to this matter, men are usually not very influential in kitchen or domestic decisions. These are the arenas in which housewives exercise almost entirely the management of money from their husband’s income.

Husbands in this case have created an image of the masculine world that does not belong in the ‘kitchen arena’ (wilayah dapur), but rather in the world of masculine life which includes activities like smoking, drinking coffee, and hanging out in the warung, playing chess on the veranda, gambling on bird racing, or in illegal lotteries, involvement in the neighbourhood watch (ronda malam=’security patrols’) at night, womanising, and drinking alcohol (the latter, mostly youths). 26 This is the world where men spend their time after work and until late at night (16.30 - 24.00). It is through these activities that men define their masculine role within social life. Moreover, it is considered shameful for men to hang around the kampong during the day, a time the kids are playing and women are talking and busy with household work. If a man idles


26Cigarette and coffee advertisements also shore up this kind of ideal. For example, the advertisement coming from Gudang Garam cigarettes utilises a macho male figure and the words ‘Kopi ku kental, musik ku keras, Gudang Garam seleraku’ (My coffee is thick and black, my music is hard, Gudang Garam is my taste’ ) The same theme is also used in advertisements of Jarum cigarettes, which emphasise Selera Pria or ‘men’s taste’.

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around the kampong during women-dominated times (around 08.00 - 16.00), housewives will usually tell him to go find some money for his family. Indeed, in the Javanese context it is shameful for a husband if his wife ask him to do so. This accounts for why many men will hang out in the warung beyond the kampong in order to avoid such a demand from their wives.

This kind of spatial gender segregation locates housewives closely with household sustenance matters and, indeed, the kitchen, and gives women real control over kampong life during these times. On the other hand, men are closer to issues such as the price of cigarettes or a cup of coffee in the warung, bird racing gambling, and money-making schemes such as knowing how to get a Delivery Order (that is, a licence to distribute rice and sugar) from DOLOG, all of which are part of the men’s world. During the economic crisis, men were mostly concerned with the issue of how to earn more money rather than being directly concerned with fluctuations in the price of rice. However, this does not mean that men did not care about the price of rice but rather that saw this problem as lying in women’s hands. As Pak Ceking and Pak Bejo stated:

‘Urusan beras niku urusan mbok wedok, tiang kakung mboten ngertos masalah dapur, nek sumber duwit blonjo niku urusan tiang kakung’ (Rice matters are the business of housewives, men do not know about kitchen business, but looking for money for food shopping is men’s business).

This kind of situation shows the way in which social roles emerge out of gendered discourses on masculinity and femininity. In particular, it demonstrates the way in which a discourse of masculinity (jagoan) is created and recreated in order to avoid forms of behaviour that are deemed to feminine (or medok-medoki in Javanese and kewanita-wanitaan in Indonesian). As one kampong resident in Surabaya said:

\[\text{See Jawa Pos 20 Agustus 1998, page 9, ‘Ibu-ibu Pusing Mengatur uang Belanja’ and also ‘Harga menu pun berganti-ganti’. These news stories reported how housewives suffered headaches as a result of trying to manage the household expenses during the monetary crisis when prices were constantly changing.}\]

\[\text{Pak Bejo and Pak Ceking both have casual jobs. Pak Bejo relies mainly on his work as a professional musician. However, as his band only occasionally plays in the five star hotels in Surabaya, he does not really earn enough money from this. To supplement his income, he also tried to set up a warung but failed to manage it. The tension within his family and the uncertainty of income made him move to Bali in order to get a better job in the tourism sector. Pak Ceking’s family is relatively settled economically because his wife works for a bakery nearby Dinoyo kampong, and he himself works casually when called upon to paint house or repair electronic goods.}\]

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'penghasilan Rp 350,000.00 pokoke moso bodo mbok wedok’ (‘whether enough or not, this Rp 350.00,00 income is up to the wife'). The husband’s utterance indicates not only that there was little he could do to increase his monthly income, but also the extent to which this man locates the responsibility of food provision as a ‘kitchen matter’ and therefore part of a woman’s domain rather than a man’s. For many men, there is a concern that if they are seen to be too involved in their wife’s domain, that they may be stigmatised by the social system and branded as somewhat feminine or dominated by their wife. As a Javanese man and the bread-winner, Pak Ceking did not want his wife to dominate him. This is a very common idea as reflected in the following rhyme from a traditional form of Javanese theatre or _ludruk:_

```plaintext
Telek bojo sak dalan-dalan  
Tapi nek telek jodho rodok kangelan  
Ojok nggaywe cara serampangan  
Akhire oleh wong wedok sing jagoan  
Olebo bojo tepak wong wedok sing nggak neriman  
Mula gawene wani mbarek wong lanang  
Wong wedok ngono iku nggak kenek gawe pedaringan
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To find a wife can be from anywhere  
But to find a soul mate it’s difficult  
Don’t ever pick up randomly from everywhere  
After all [you] will get a thug (jagoan) woman  
Having a wife who is not subdued  
Her habit is to just challenge her husband  
A woman like that is not good at saving money for the household.

This rhyme mirrors the ideals of masculinity and femininity discussed above, and in particular, the notion of the ideal wife as one who has the ability to save money for the family and to manage _duwit wedok_ (female money) or the main source of monthly income from her husband. Managing the household budget is a key

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29 In September 1998 family expenditure on basic household items in kampong Dinoyo (Surabaya) was around Rp 160,000.00 per month. This was almost half the amount of ‘minimum cost of living’ (_Kabutuhan Hidup Minimum_, KHM) set by the government at Rp 330,666.00 per month and the regional minimum wage (_Upah Minimum Regional_, UMR) at Rp 326,000.00 in the year 2000. The UMR later increased to Rp 330,700.00 in November that year. (See ‘Upah Buruh di Surabaya Akan Naik Jadi Rp 330.000’ in _Kompas_, 20 November 2000).

30 This account is quoted from Henri Supriyanto, _Lakon Ludruk Jawa Timur_ Jakarta: PT Gramedia. 1992, p.27.

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The notion *duwit wedok* indicates that there is also *duwit lanang* (male money) which is out of the hands of housewives. This money is generated from the street economy, such as through gambling, the black market, or some other informal activity. Success in this area is considered as an arena of *jagoan* (or machismo), and is an area in which only men participate. Income earned in this way is additional to their main source of income and is available to men to spend in any way they prefer without consulting their wives. From the perspective of men’s talk in the *warung*, the division between *duwit wedok* and *duwit lanang* is often made somewhat unwillingly by housewives, even though some of the *duwit lanang* is often given to the wife, especially during periods of economic crisis when the income of the *wong cilik* is not enough to meet the needs of the family.

The talk in the *warung* and the kampong during the monetary crisis was predominantly occupied with the issue of government failure to manage rice distribution. People blamed the government for this mismanagement and suspected Dolog and private distributors of having colluded on this issue (that is, as *main mata* or ‘playing eyes’). From this point view, they interpreted price fluctuations in relation to the nine ‘essential foods’ as related to corruption, collusion, and nepotism (or KKN) – issues which had become topical during the *reformasi* (reform) era – within the distribution of rice. In this way, the urban *wong cilik* although poor and with limited access to the printed media nevertheless developed their own critical knowledge of relation to the government, particular in relation to its failure to control the prices of the nine essential foods. For the urban *wong cilik*, this failure also reflected the limited degree of concern the government felt towards the people. It was evidence of the indifference the government showed in taking care of the people. This was because, according to the *wong cilik*, the rocketing price of rice was not a pressing problem for
the rich but mostly for the poor people, such as labourers who had lost their jobs.31

During the crisis in 1998, when many labourers lost their jobs, very few of the displaced male labourers tried to do anything practical in the kampong, and large numbers of them went outside the kampong everyday in order to avoid the sense of shame that they would have felt if they had stayed at home.32 Beyond the kampong, they would talk in the warung to release their stress, especially by discussing how difficult it had become to afford food. In spite of the fact that they were experiencing problems having lost their jobs, the culturally endorsed image of men’s primary responsibility as that of the main income provider was maintained. This made their position very difficult and their sense of masculinity somewhat shaky. The anxiety resulting from this was often expressed through bodily symptoms, such as ngelu (headache) as well as psychological symptoms, such as feelings of judeg (tension, tiredness, feeling fed-up, and with no way out). Some men reported that they had simply given up (pasrah) and just hoped that the government could solve the monetary crisis immediately.33 However this pasrah attitude did not really help them economically, so many had to involve themselves in the street economy including illegal economic activities, such as bird racing and other forms of gambling. When successful, this enabled the kampong people in Dinoyo to generate extra cash or duwit lanang (male money). But reliance on this form of income was seen in a negative light by some – including the imam at the local mosque. However, this form of income was in keeping with ideas of masculinity, which had to be maintained constantly, because during the crisis they had to face housewives’ requests for money. If they could not provide extra money to cater for household needs, then their position as bread winner --which reflects masculinity-- would be shameful, but not their morality. Within this contradictory situation, many became involved in gambling through bird racing and perkutut bird

31 This information is based on my observation and interview with the housewives in Kampong Dinoyo, Surabaya.

32 Kompas newspaper reported that in 1998, 7,867 labourers in three cities in East Java lost their job due to the monetary crisis. Companies retrenched workers as a way of cutting their costs. 85% of these retrenched workers were from Surabaya, and 15% each from Sidoarjo and Malang. (See ‘7000 buruh di Jatim kena PHK’ in Kompas, 10 February 1998)

33 The expression pasrah does not only mean to give up in a negative sense. For example, in the Jum’at (Friday) pray, the imam of Dinoyo Kampong used this term to express the positive value of giving up to God, that is of pasrah (submitting) to Allah.

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contests even though it had made housewife resentful. They usually imagined that they could earn money from these contests. It was not only from the gambling money, or giving hand to the players, but also from the possibility of increasing the price of the bird if the winner’s bird was to be sold.

The meaning of birds in this case is not merely one of being livestock for cash, but also represents masculine pride in front of the public. Bird racing and contests in this area functioned as an illusion, by foregrounding masculine pride. For example, when Pak Ceking’s wife asked him to sell his bird to get some extra money, he was somewhat hesitant to comply. The idea of selling his bird gave him the illusion that it may win a contest, and if the dream really came true he might be able to fulfil wife’s needs by selling the bird at a high price. This illusion and the wife’s request to sell his bird exposed the fragility of his masculinity, because if he really sold his bird he would not have any bird to talk about in public. This kind of illusion was manufactured through Pak Ceking’s stories of his birds. He often stated in front of people hanging around on his veranda that his perkutut birds came genetically from a good bird, one which had won a number of competitions. He emphasized that it developed from eggs laid by a mate of the prized ancestral bird, and had not been incubated by a bird trader. Because of this, his perkututs could create the prized ‘koong’ voice, and indeed an extra ‘koong’, thereby indicating that they were good perkutut birds, thus greatly enhancing their monetary value. However, for many reasons, he did not want to sell his birds. Because they were still young, he wanted to wait for them to develop a better sound. In this condition he said that the price of his birds were around Rp 350,000.00 up to Rp 450,000.00 (or around AU$60 - $80) each. Besides that story, he also said that to find a good perkutut bird was very difficult, however he would find another one if he sold his birds. His reluctance to sell his birds shows a lack of confidence in his masculinity. He had to fulfil his wife’s request and as a man he had to do it, but in fact if he sold his birds he might lose those precious public symbols of his masculinity and forsake his illusion of making extra money. The bird for him was the way to show the public that he

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34 Perkutut contests are very common in Javanese society. This contest is to find the best voice of perkutut bird in singing. Winning in this contest makes the price of bird rise up extremely high, for example up to Rp 120,000,000.00 (AU$ 20,000). This is because behind the contest there is gambling arena comparable to horse racing.

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had an amount of imagined ‘money’. It was imagined because that money existed only in the discursive level and would not materialize unless he was able to sell his birds.

Beside *perkutut* birds, people in the Surabaya kampong also like to domesticate pigeons, and they use these pigeons for gambling through pigeon racing. Pigeon racing was very popular in Surabaya during the crisis, involving some of the kampong men of between forty and fifty years old, but otherwise dominated by youngsters. This arena reflects the realm of masculinity to an even greater extent than that of *perkutut* bird caging. This activity has become a means of knitting masculine pride into the wider social context. Youngsters in the kampong in Surabaya, who were not able to continue to study and who had just become unemployed, made the pigeon race their domain. There they showed their masculine existence within the kampong, and indeed also generated some income from this *'jagoan economy'* (machismo dominated economic arena). Male pigeon racing had become a very popular quest to earn money, not only from the gambling itself, but also from assisting in the race organisation which involves a complicated division of labour. For example, some men take the pigeons 10 - 15 km away from the arena; others work as a *gong* man to give the sign of whose bird is coming first to the owner’s hand; some are gambling managers (usually the senior and the trusted ones); and yet others work as security to watch out for possible raids by the police. Each division may earn around Rp 10,000.00 per bird-racing event, plus extra gambling money if they bet and win.

This arena was free of any sense of female discourse; it was a purely masculine one. The birds used for the race are male pigeons, with the female pigeon merely the object to trigger the male pigeon’s instinct to return to the owner, who holds the female pigeon on his hand. To start the pigeon race, some of the youngsters had to travel 10 - 15 km from the kampong carrying some pigeons, after which they let the pigeons fly home, and then make their own way back to the kampong. The first pigeon to reach its owner’s hand is the winner, and the owner of the winning pigeon receive some money from gambling. The race not only gives the unemployed people extra money from gambling; it also gives them pride as men of the kampong. A man of the kampong becomes a topic of conversation, especially when his pigeon has just won a race, and he has just come into money. Indeed, he becomes like a *jagoan*, which also contributes to *jagoan* discourse within the kampong.
The gambling itself involved up to Rp 1,000,000.00 (around AU$135) per day, depending on the persons involved in the particular pigeon race. An interesting expression common to this male dominated arena was ‘duit lanang’ (male money), which was money that should not be given to the wife but rather kept for male purposes such as smoking. In some cases they might give it to their wives, but only if they actually asked for it. This male money was also considered as ‘duit panas’ (lit. hot money, meaning money which comes principally from a source that goes against religious teaching). It was not good to give ‘duit panas’ to the family because of their concept that duit panas ora dadi daging (hot money will not be flesh, meaning there was no blessing on this money). As duit lanang this money offered a lot of freedom for men to manufacture the web of male discourses and assert their dominance within the social context. It can be seen that the owner of a winning pigeon was proud of his existence within the kampong, and socially he was viewed as a jagoan. This kind of phantasm obsesses the kampong youngsters with the need to define their position as a man and jagoan of the kampong. This arena socializes male youngsters into the realm of masculinity or jagoanism (machismo), and therefore they become very impersonal in their attitudes to the kitchen world, which is seen solely as a domain for woman.

In spite of the fact that men construct their masculine world, at the kampong level the social roles of women demonstrates that their positions in everyday life discourse were very important. From 8am until 4 o’clock every afternoon, women (especially housewives) dominated kampong life. This arena for talking has become a bridge between families. For example, in the morning around 05.30 up to 06.00 o’clock there is a special event where the vegetable traders (mbok/pak bakul sayur) usually sells his/her vegetables and other foods in the kampong, which is located far from the market. These vegetable traders have an important role in circulating information between places and between families, information that indeed includes rumour and gossip. The most important role of these traders is disseminating the local knowledge of the market economy from one block of housing to another. For the kampong near by the market (traditional market) the idea of market economy originates from the market itself, and there is no doubt that these kampong dwellers are not only talking about the price of goods and foods but also about politics.
The role of women shows that they were not merely controlling domestic issues, but that they took control of the whole social realm of the kampong. Moreover, shopping in the market also shows the significant public role of women in terms of making the local political economy operate effectively. This demonstrates how the market was the centre of information where wong cilik get their knowledge concerning the market economy and its political aspects. The illiterate women and the people who do not have access to the newspapers and magazines nonetheless have the ability to get secondary information through the pasar (market) and the warung. This shows the public role of women in contributing toward the movement of micro and mezzo economy and information. The contribution of women as the family economic manager is basically not only involvement in the flow of money from one to another in the market network, but it has also--in many cases--become the motor for the movement of information at the grassroots level. The information they got from the market was recirculated in the kampong, and within the kampong it spread out freely. At the wong cilik level, this information was rolling from one person’s ears to the next. Indeed, the warung where the people congregated was very important media--beyond the electronic and printed media--in circulating oral to oral information. The flow of information usually started each day when the domestic or household jobs were complete (around 11.00 up to 15.30). Any kind of information in this circuitry became ‘hot peanuts’ within everyday social activities.

Based on the information they got from everyday discussions, a lot of people on low salaries were trying to find economical channels to circumvent the distributors and Dolog, by trying to contact directly rice-mill owners in rural areas. Housewives in the kampong usually informed their friends or family within the kampong of their intention to do this, then bought rice from the rice mill, sharing the transportation cost among them. Pak Ceking and his family and friends did this during the crisis. Indeed, to solve a problem that the state could not handle, or because it had failed to fulfil its implicit duty as ‘father’—namely to provide rice for the family—is an initiative that engages not merely the moral economic tradition, but also prevailing political ideas. In the same

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35 It is often assumed that women’s role is limited, whereas in fact they have very wide and significant social role.

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circumstances many *wong cilik* husbands had lost their jobs and their daily incomes. They, too, also failed to provide rice for their family, and now the women showed they had the ability to solve the problem for themselves by gathering information through their networks. Through this strategy they not only cut the chain of rice distribution but also saved some of their money for other pressing needs. For example for the variety of rice named *Bengawan Super*, the price in the market was Rp 1,500.00, whereas from the rice mills they had bought it for only Rp 1,000.00 up to Rp 1,200.00, meaning they could save around Rp 300.00 to Rp 500.00 per kilogram, which was in turn used to buy marinated fish to get protein.

According to this calculation, women were asking their husbands to buy rice from the rice mill in the village, as Pak Bejo’s wife asked him in front of others by saying:

‘Wis kono tuku beras nang penggilingan, daripada saben esuk tengut-tenguk nang teras nek sore dolanan judi doro koyo ra duwe gawean wae. Wis ngerti nek krismon podo ora duwe gawean malah seneng-seneng nonton lomba doro, wong lanang-lanang podo ora ngaraske wong wedok mumet ngurus duwit omah opo piye yo’

(‘OK, its better you just go buy rice from the rice mill, rather than hanging out on the veranda every morning and gambling on pigeon races in the afternoon, like you have no job to do. You already knew that during monetary crisis all of you do not have a job but you just watch the bird races. Do men not feel that housewives get a headache taking care of the household economy?’)

Saying ‘*koyo ra duwe gawean wae*’ (‘like no job to do’) somewhat irritated Pak Bejo confronting his masculinity and his former position as breadwinner. Her technique impelled him to go out and buy rice, because it was uttered in front of other men and women, so all men are targeted which also functioned to reduce direct fingerpointing to her husband. On that afternoon, Pak Bejo asked his relative Pak Ceking, who was also hanging out on the veranda, to go together to get rice from village. At that time Pak Bejo said ‘*Ayo mangkat penggaweane wong lanang golek beras*’ (‘Lets go, it is the man’s job to get rice’) while smiling, which means he ridiculed himself in that awkward situation. Both of them then rode Vespas to contact some others in the kampong, then they pooled their money to borrow a car in order to transport rice from the rice mill.

His wife asked him to go for two reasons. First she wanted her husband to get
some extra money, not just sit around on the veranda. Secondly, if her husband could not get extra money he had to find low-priced rice to save money, because if she bought it from *warung* or in the *pasar* (traditional market) or in the grocery stores in the urban areas, the price would be markedly higher than in rural areas. This condition was not only evident in Pak Bejo’s family; all the housewives in Dinoyo kampong had similar problems. In response to this situation, Pak Bejo, his relatives and his neighbours shared money to rent a car to transport rice from a rice mill in a rural village. This strategy helped *wong cilik* family in the kampong, but this situation was only temporary because whenever their money ran out they would be in the same trouble again. This kind of threatening economic insecurity among *wong cilik* encouraged housewives to become involved in demonstrations against local government to lower the price of rice and some other foodstuffs. I will explain in the next section how this is a significant example of how housewives express their feelings through extending their challenge to the male dominated order to confront the state.

**D. Housewives’ Demonstrations in Surabaya: An Example**

Based on the description above, the day-time political world of the *wong cilik* in urban kampongs is actually controlled by women rather than men. They are the main players within the whole networking system of communication among kampong members and even between kampongs. Moreover, this kind of communication system works through the *pasar* (traditional market). It transmits information orally, in a domain where women are the predominant organizers. Women who were actively involved in the *pasar* within the kampong and cities had pressing and immediate experience of the economic crisis. The *pasar* is their space where they exchange information, and even they themselves have become the conduits of information within the kampong. These housewives moving around the alley-ways and around the market stalls constituted what Murray defined as ‘*ibu* (housewives or mother) networks’. The operation of these networks reflected an autonomous urban culture characterised by the high level of ‘mutual cooperation’ and ‘internal cohesion’ of their informal sector activities and their
lower status, homogenous culture and lack of education.\textsuperscript{36}

This institutionalised informal role of women at the grassroots level shows that they had a significant effect in economic and political activities at the localised, mundane level of local social life. But when it comes to their participation in state organisations which support development programs, they seemed to conform to the prescribed protocols of state corporatism as it existed within the kampong. This was because state organisations at the local level have effectively manufactured a compliant regimentation at the grassroots level, thus successfully implanting the regime’s interests at the local level.\textsuperscript{37} This regimentation represents not merely the existence of the state at the local level, but also state’s masculinity. Consequently, it conditions women into accepting their relative confinement to domestic rather than public discourses. On the other hand, the men’s roles within the kampong were not significant enough to be regarded as the motor of the \textit{pasar} political and economic system. In practice given the challenges of the national economic crisis of the late 1990s, women proved to be more creative in making and utilizing spaces in which they could participate effectively in the public domain, turning it into an arena of their material and discursive struggle.

This underlines the significance of the women’s role within the kampong and the market. Ironically, they have suffered during the economic crisis under the masculine regime of the New Order Indonesia. It could be said that they were suppressed in three ways. First of all, domestically, they were victimized by the discourses of female domestication stemming from men reinforced and backed by the state symbolism. Secondly, they were victimized by the market mechanisms, especially rice and foods distribution system, which was characterized by a male dominated networking system. Thirdly, they have been coopted and regimented by the state through its bureaucracy whose tentacles reach down to the \textit{wong cilik} level through institutions such as PKK, \textit{Dasawisma} (the organization of ten houses set up by the New order regime), RK, RT and other state prescribed institutions. Through this regimentation, the state controlled


\textsuperscript{37} This regimentation still exists even now, even though the devolution of power at the national level through political reform has occurred since 1998.
and oppressed women culturally, especially through the personification of the masculine (such as father) figure at the level of local state apparatuses such as RT and RW.

During the economic crisis the suffering and oppression felt by housewives was seen as a product of the state’s unjust male-dominated political structure. For example, the multiple suppression I outlined above appeared very real when they watched TV broadcasts of the military shooting students, killing some students instantly and injuring many others. Indeed it was not only housewives who were emotionally touched by that brutality, but also fathers at the wong cilik level. The sentiment that was felt helped to manufacture a politics of emotion in which the people (children/students) were treated badly by the jagoan father (militaristic state). The picture of the unjust male political structure which emerged as an oppositional idea coming from housewives was the total opposite of bapakism and jagoanism. They could therefore easily disseminate this idea through the pasar communication system. This idea has corroded the hegemonic power of the masculine state through students’ activities and through a process which has arisen within the emerging civil society that expands along with the weakening of the regime's power. During this process, they used ideas of nationhood or civil society to oppose the ‘dominant father’ which was embedded so emphatically in the New Order regime.38

In Surabaya, for example, the students and the mothers on the sidewalk shouted at the army units when their trucks passed the front gate of UNAIR (Airlangga University) at high speed. Through their shouts they crystallized a target that in turn become their opponent, in this case being the masculinity (jagoan-bapak) represented by military. In Yogyakarta, on April 3, 1998, an ibu (mother) selling cigarettes near the place where demonstrators had gathered said that: ‘Mahasiswa niku rak mung bocah-bocah sing arep mbantu rakyat sing susah, kok malah digebugi tentara, niku rak jenenge sanes manungso’ (Students were just children who helped people who were suffering. Why were they beaten by the army? That was not human).39 The term ‘sanes

38 Ben Anderson argues that there was a turning process from the ‘state’ to the ‘nation’ and back to the ‘state’ to explain the transition from colonial state to Soekarno regime and then Suharto’s new Order. See Benedict R.O.G. Anderson (1983) ‘Old State, New Society : Indonesia’s New Order in comparative historical perspective’, Journal of Asian studies 42:477-496.

39 This information is based on my conversation with the some cigarette traders and some food traders Aris Arif Mundayat
manungso’ (not human) shows the cultural implication that people who commit violent acts against other human beings are ‘sanes manungso’ (not human) because to be a human they should be wise.\textsuperscript{40} Conceptually, the term sanes manungso in this case can be seen as opposing to the concept of ‘durung wong’ (not yet human). Conceptually, durung wong describes a phase when a person is trying to be wise, to be honoured, to be respectable, to be ruling class, to be settled, to be established. Sanes manungso meant a person who has failed to be wong and has failed to pass through that phase. Consequently they have instead become sanes manungso totally. People have continually experienced both real violence and symbolic violence, and at the same time they could also create the concept of dudu wong and thus were able to manufacture the idea that the jagoan regime should be challenged because they are not human (dudu wong). This oppositional idea is an example of how the people utilised any means of mockery as a weapon against the regime, including that of the former President Suharto himself. However, it does not mean that all people were against Suharto. Some people at the grassroots level refused to insult Suharto personally, even though they agree that the New Order state should be reformed or replaced.

As an addition to support the argument explained above, I will use the case of a housewives demonstration in Surabaya.\textsuperscript{41} This demonstration was mobilised by women students from that kampong. They asked the lurah’s wife as a chairperson of PKK (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, The Education for Family welfare, an organization promoted by the New Order regime) to demonstrate, and to demand from the Camat (subdistrict official leader) that he arrange to lower the price of rice once the

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\textsuperscript{40} The term of ‘sanes manungso’ is high Javanese language, in low Javanese call as ‘dudu wong’.

\textsuperscript{41} This illustration is based on the demonstration that was held on 8 July, 1998 by the members of PKK from kelurahan Sawahan. PKK (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, or PKK, The Education for Family Welfare) is a women organisation at the village level and it is organised by the state. This organisation is projected to involve the participation of women at the kampong level in national development. In practice most of the activities of this organisation are about domestic role activities, such as cooking, knitting, and handcrafting. The goal for these activities is creating household economy, but very often they cannot reach its goal, and it causes the idling of PKK activities itself. The leader of PKK is always the wife of village headman. To some extent, this is not a genuine civil society institution because it involves the state functionaries. However, the movement itself also depends on initiatives from the local people as the members of the kampong who suffered because the state involved in permainan kotor of rice distribution.

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rice price reached Rp2,300.00 per kg. The students in this kampong also asked their mothers to support the lurah’s wife (wife of the village headman), because she had agreed to demonstrate at the Camat’s (the head of district) office. This cooperation between female students, PKK as a state organisation, and housewives indicates that they did not want to push their husbands who were also suffering during the economic crisis. Because of this, they transferred the energy of household conflict into a demonstration of women facing the state. The students in this case had to use the state symbolism, through PKK as their fashion in facing the regime with the higher authority than village level. This demonstration itself also reflects the unity of the mothers and children as members of family (and, as the ‘rakyat’) against the ‘father’ as the head of family. In order to get support from the people they need the state symbolism associated with the PKK as an authorised state instrumentality at the village level, in order to neutralise any possibility of violence from the military. However, through this kind of strategy they realised that they were corrodng the dominant state by using the symbolism of the state itself.

Once they had resolved that they would demonstrate in front of the Camat’s office, they went the next morning to the kecamatan (district) office at 10.00 o’clock. Thus their domestic work such as washing, preparing breakfast for their husband and children and shopping was finished but they had yet to cook lunch. They had to wait around in front of the kecamatan for two hours, because the Camat was busy, so outside the kecamatan office they yelled and showed the banner displaying demands to lower prices. Around 12.30 in the early afternoon, the Camat showed himself in front of the housewives. At this stage the Camat explained to the demonstrators that as a Camat he did not have any power to lower the prices, but that he would try to ask to the Walikota (mayor) to help the people to have the price reduced.

After explaining this, the housewives said that: ‘Sebaiknya pemerintah tidak hanya omong saja, tetapi harus melakukan tindakan nyata’ (‘the government should not just talk, they have to do something real’). The revealing ‘solution’ given by the Camat came after they had passed through a long negotiation with no real result in sight. The Camat remarked: ‘Sebaiknya ibu-ibu pulang saja, karena nanti jika suami pulang ke rumah dan tidak ada masakan nanti suami bisa marah’. (It is better if all of the housewives here just go home, because if your husband comes back home [from work]
and there is no food for their lunch they might be angry [to you]). At that time some housewives just said ‘huuu,, kita semua sudah masak dari pagi, jadi kita perlu kepastian bahwa harga beras akan diturunkan’ (woo, we already cooked since morning, so we just need the certainty that rice prices will be lowered). The demonstration did not produce any results which satisfied both sides. Soon after that, or around 14.00 the housewives went home and continued their domestic work as usual.

The Camat here used the assumptions of male dominated discourse to ‘threaten’ the housewives while at the same time he was positioning himself as the manifestation of an androcentric state. Housewives and children legitimate bearers of state symbolism through PKK in this case employed a weak counter discourse because they had to rely on state symbolism, and thus stay within its discursive structure. Nevertheless, this situation shows how the housewives and children were able to challenge the somewhat vulnerable position of state, much as they had exposed the weakness of the position of father-breadwinner in the kampong. It shows that the role of women within the kampong is central and important, and not wholly constrained within the domestic arena.

The case of housewives’ demonstration in front of kecamatan office in Surabaya shows that the oppositional ideas that they create in opposing the state were able to devise strategies of resistance through innovative uses of the state symbolism created by the New Order regime. The state symbolism was not only used to empower themselves, but was even directed to challenge the regime. The day after they demonstrated the Camat’s office, the housewives were engaged with their usual work within the kampong, yet at the same time 14 students (men and women) were trying to use PKK funds (Rp 500,000.00) to acquire a supply of cheap rice for the poor in that kelurahan. In addition to that PKK funding, they also collected some contributions from the ronda malam (night-time neighbourhood watch) fund. Kampong collective duties like the night watch could raise money by collecting donations from its members, but most effectively they could demanding cash from kampong residents who had chosen no to join the ronda malam. Better-off residents can commute their collective responsibilities with cash. Poor residents are asked to pay whatever amount of money they can spare voluntarily (which is usually nothing), but the rich have to pay Rp 25,000.00 per head. In this kampong, the rich people prefer to pay the ronda malam organisation rather than
join in with the *ronda malam*. The rich in this kampong are mostly Indonesian Chinese; very few are indigenous Indonesian.

This situation relies on a stereotype that Indonesian Chinese do not want to join with the *ronda malam* which is dominated by indigenous Indonesians. It is not a matter of racism, but reflects rather the situation that the rich are businesspeople who are busy during the daytime, and need to rest at night? In spite of the fact that this situation also creates the stereotype about Chinese, the *ronda malam* organisation can collect money from the rich to donate to the students’ rice-buying expedition, thus providing cheap rice for the community. And the rich Indonesian Chinese have also contributed to that activity. The rice expedition funds came from many sources. They were successfully used to buy rice from rice mills in the rural areas. It was then sold at around Rp 1,500.00 per kg (the quality of the rice was precisely the same as the rice costing Rp 2,300.00 in the markets), and the rice from Dolog was then selling at around Rp 1,000.00 (they got from Dolog at a price of Rp 1,650.00). The rich were not allowed to buy in this *‘pasar murah’* (cheap market); if they wanted to buy they had to pay the market price, so they can cross-subsidise Dolog’s provision of rice for the very poor. This strategy diluted the tension between housewives and husbands within the households and within the kampong itself.

Accordingly, the relationships between children and the housewife at the kampong level shows the idea of *keluarga* (family) as a reflection of the nation. This consists of children and the mother, which reflects an idea of *rakyat* (people). The generation that created a kind of abridgment between both of them in finding the alternative way to handle the economic crisis, temporarily at least, consisted mostly of the youngsters studying at university level. The female students were more active in the kampong rather than participating in the university demonstrations. Demonstrations in almost all universities in Indonesia are usually dominated by male rather than female students. Indeed, it is an extension of the public understanding of gender and domestic roles. These ideas have defined gender separation in Indonesian society more generally.

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42 This information is originated from the taxi driver named Hamam during my observation in Surabaya on 8 July 1998 at 09.00 o’clock. He is living in Kelurahan Sawahan, so he is the member of the kampong where the demonstration occurred. His wife also involved in that demonstration. I observed Kelurahan Sawahan in which I met with some people to talk about the demonstration.

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The children’s role within the household, kampong and university, shows the connection between the figure of mother (as the one who suffers the most during the economic crisis), kampong community (as an arena in circulating the information or knowledge that might oppose the dominant father) and the extra-local represented by the existence of university. The university in this sense has become the political representation of family or nation. Almost all demonstrations in Indonesia were supported by housewives, especially by providing food for the students. These ‘off-stage’ activities and discursive practices constitute an arena that should be considered as an alternative discourse beyond the dominant one. Moreover, it is also an attempt at decentring the centre, shifting power from its prescribed male-dominated locus to respond to urgent realities in the local and domestic arenas.

E. Summary

The politics of rice from the time of the colonial state through to the post-colonial state displays a continuity that remains very significant for the political purposes of any regime. Food provision in cities is fundamental to public tranquillity. The government agencies have contributed to the creation of an image in which the state represents itself as the ‘father’ who takes responsibility for the provision of food to families, and housewives and children are represented as the people. This kind of political process in the vital matter of food supply reveals the image of state ‘fatherism’ where all who participate contribute discursively and thereby provide fertile ground for authoritarianism as I have argued in previous chapters. Interestingly, the economic circuits of the ‘rice players’ (pemain beras) are also dominated by males.

Rice is the main food of the Indonesian people. It has been politicised by the New Order regime in order to lubricate state programs and dilute the people’s discontent. It has always been, even in colonial times, and in all likelihood before that, an extremely sensitive issue in urban areas. However, corruption within these rice management institutions has meant that the distribution of rice to the people failed. From the discussion above, we can see the discursive construction of paternalistic ideas buttressing male domination within the family which in turn becomes extended to the regime itself. According to this line of reasoning, the dominant discourse manifests
itself as father figure in the family, as an analogue for authority in local state apparatuses, and in such institutions as those controlling rice distribution, in the state more broadly, all the way to the projected role of the president. It exist no less assertively in the jagoan ethos of the underworld and the street economy. However, women, once exposed to the exigencies of the economic crisis show that they are have become able to voice their discontent about economic and political affairs more broadly, showing particular lack of confidence due to the failure of the masculine regime to solve, or even realistically face up to, its problems. At the kampong level as in Dinoyo (Surabaya), this situation also triggered a movement of housewives’ resistance. This emerged locally first of all, in rejection of the irresponsibility (or unwillingness to recognise the urgency of the situation) of men who retreated into fantasies of windfall earnings from bird racing or gambling, which only further disturbed the family economy at the kampong level. These wong cilik discourses adopted creatively to construct ways of opposing male dominated discourses of the ‘jagoan fathers’— both those in the household and those in the public arena represented by the state — who failed in providing the basic needs of families. This situation stimulated the housewives to try to challenge the jagoan father’s fruitless and wasteful (but face-saving) recourse to the jagoan economy.

This condition impacted on household relationships, such as those between father/mother-in-law and son/daughter-in-law or between husband and wife, which became somewhat elevated in tension. Within the local context or at the kampong level, household disharmony also contributed indirectly towards wider social unrest beyond the family and community. If we treat an urban area as if it were a compact kampong, the social unrest of the urban areas during the economic crisis could be seen, to an important degree, as a reflection of household disharmony caused by the failure of fathers to provide for their families. At the same time the state, which had always claimed to act as a responsible father, also failed the people, which stimulated demonstrations against the state, but the most spontaneous, immediate and effective protests from among the wong cilik came from housewives. These were the decentring processes which unsettled the chain of power that ran from the father in the household through to the state as a traditional paternalistic centre of power, particularly as it has constituted itself within the practice of authoritarianism as a cultural discourse. The
power relations between father and Mother/children as state and society discussed in this chapter will also be examined in the next chapter, through the underclass’ contestation of the nationalist imagination of the state.
Chapter Six

The Politics of Nationalist Imagination: ‘Contesting Textuality’

A. Prologue

This chapter offers a crucial discussion of state-society relationships through an examination of the discourse of the nationalist imagination. This has become a contested terrain not only within the state but also among the *wong cilik* in imagining Indonesia through text. The understanding on the nature of this contestation will be based on interpretations of the texts produced by *wong cilik* and the dominant *wong gede*. In understanding these problems, I discuss firstly how the *wong cilik* subvert the language of high-ranking state personalities I reveal this contestation as it is found in texts produced by *wong cilik*, texts in which the dominant discourse is turned away from its control functions and towards resistance. The texts that will be examined consist of *bahasa pejabat* (high-ranking bureaucratic language), official speeches or texts from the President, songs, and poems. In sum, I will also discuss the idea of democracy from the *wong cilik*’s point of view and the ways in which their ideas are used to ridicule the authoritarian state. Secondly, I will discuss state nationalist projects and how they are contested by the *wong cilik* in various textual manifestations. These reflect the *wong cilik*’s nationalist imagination of Indonesia at the turn of the 21st century, as their well as discontent with the state sanctioned nationalist project. This textual analysis is mostly based on cases that I encountered in urban areas where the urban *wong cilik* are located. Through these texts I will demonstrate that various desperate imaginings give distinct meaning to the nationalist imaginary, in which difference and contestation are dynamic. The important contradictions that emerge from the construction of state nationalist discourse can also be observed in the power relations between the state and society that are active in the specific arena of these encounters.
B. Bahasa Pejabat, Democracy and the Wong Cilik

B.1. Subverting the Bahasa Pejabat

In this section I will examine the experience of wong cilik in constructing a subaltern space through language. This is a space where the wong cilik’s existence takes form as an outgrowth of the dynamics of social differentiation discussed in the Chapter Three.

The example below of satirical short fiction, published by the Jawa Pos newspaper in January 1999 demonstrates a cynical stance, adopted towards state symbolism. It was published during the political euphoria after the collapse of the New Order regime collapse, or what is called the beginnings of ‘Era Reformasi’ (Reformation Era).


(Now, the safari uniforms seem frightening and make him sad. He still remembers the incident he faced a week ago, when Pak Syafri and some other friends of the members of parliament, were surrounded by thousands of students who came suddenly like angry bees buzzing around his office while shouting in a frightening way. His dark coloured safari uniform, complete with the emblems of local parliament, was easily detected by the demonstrators. ‘This is the one, people’s money sucker. How dare [you] declare yourself as a representative of the people. Which people?)

This fictional tale expresses a feeling of resentment against the New Order state’s symbols and rapid loss of efficacy, as in the failure of the uniform of parliament

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1Jawa Pos newspaper published a short viction about safari uniform in a cynical way. See “Baju Safari Pak Syafri” by: Harris Effendi Thahar in Jawa Pos. 3 January 1999. This short story tells about the state symbolism which is used by the state apparatuses (the member of local legislative body) to show that the person who utilize it becoming more powerful, but then when the students demonstration had become a people power to down sized the state power and force the state to reform then all of state symbolism lost its efficacy and the person how utilized it too.
members command defence anymore. It describes how the people claimed back their political right as citizens of Indonesia by demonstrating outside the local parliament building. The uniform here had become a signifier for the students to identify the person being the symbols of state as the one who had to be blamed for Indonesia’s crisis. For the Member of Parliament himself that uniform became a phantom that should be banished if he was to avoid those who ran amok against state symbolism. The cynical evaluation of a state symbolism that has been used excessively during the New Order regime, were actually not now. They had been widely disseminated since the 1980s. It is evident in Wiji Thukul’s poem entitled *Peringatan* (Warning). He used to read this poem to the factory labourers in his town, Solo (Central Java) during the break time. He also worked in the factory. Wiji Thukul’s lyrics show an interesting counter discourse against an apparently omnipresent state domination. This poem does not simply oppose the state but rather encourages listeners/readers to beware of state suppression. He uses the word ‘*kita*’ (‘we’) in this poem to urge listeners through the linguistic message that ‘we’ have to be aware of the ruling class (*penguasa*).

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**Peringatan** (Warning)

*By: Wiji Thukul*

*Jika rakyat pergi* (If the people go away)  
*Ketika penguasa pidato* (when the ruling class give a speech)  
*Kita harus hati-hati* (we have to be careful)  
*Barangkali mereka putus asa* (perhaps they have given up)  
*Kalau rakyat sembunyi* (if the people hide)  
*Dan berbisik-bisik* (and whisper)

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2 Wiji Thukul was a political activist --a member of PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik = People Democratic Party) from Surakarta (Solo, Central Java). He was kidnapped --then declared to be missing and never found-- under Suharto’s regime in early 1998. He was very active in labour and encouraged them to have political consciousness. As a laborer living in an industrial area he was very often read his poem in front of his friends during the break time or even in the kampong alley ways around the textile factory. Before he was kidnapped he experienced physical torture by the military and police so that one of his eyes had become half blind. His lyrics quoted here are still be remembered as one of the important expressions of resistance that contributed to the toppling of Suharto (*Hanya satu kata kata Lawan!*).

3 (We) in the inclusive sense, unlike *kami*, also meaning ‘we’ but excluding the person(s) addressed.

4 This part of poem is quoted from his poem entitled ‘Peringatan’ (‘warning’) which was created in Solo in 1986. The wording of ‘...maka hanya ada satu kata: lawan!’ (‘...then there is only one word: resist!) was very popular among the PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik=Democratic People Party) when they were involved in demonstrating for Suharto to resign from his presidency in May 1998. For further reading on his works of art, see Wiji Thukul, *Mencari Tanah Lapang*. Leiden: Manus Amici. 1994.
Ketika membicarakannya masalahnya sendiri (when they are talking about their own problems)
Penguasa harus waspada dan belajar mendengar (the ruling class have to be aware and learn to listen)
Bila rakyat tidak berani mengeluh (if the people do not dare to complain)
Itu artinya sudah gawat (it means the conditions are already critical)
Dan bila omongan penguasa (and if the speech of the ruling class)
Tidak boleh dibantah (cannot be debated)
Kebenaran pasti terancam (the truth must be in jeopardy)
Apabila usul ditolak tanpa ditimbang (if aspiration is refused without consideration)
Suara dibungkam kirtik dilarang tanpa alasan (voices are shut up, criticism is banned without reason)
Dituduh subversi dan menggangu keamanan (accused of subverting and disturbing security)
Maka hanya ada satu kata: lawan! (Then, there is only one word: resist!)

Wiji Thukul’s poem encouraged the wong cilik to distinguish between bahasa pejabat (the language of high-ranking bureaucrat) and bahasa rakyat (people’s language) or between bahasa wong gede (the language of big man) and bahasa wong cilik (the language of little people). By recognizing the ‘ruling class’ speech’ (penguasa pidato) this poem shows the audience that the ‘ruling class’ have the privilege of giving speeches whereas the labourers do not. To emphasize this contrast the poem states: ‘if the people hide and whisper when they are talking about their own problems the ruling class have to be aware and learn to listen’. The idea here is to contrast the character of wong cilik and the wong gede verbally. It is a shared meaning, by which Wiji Thukul in this case shared his ideas with the labourers during lunch time at a factory in Solo. Sharing meaning through discursive practice in everyday life, as Wiji Thukul did, has given the wong cilik an ability to distinguish the language of the wong cilik from that of the wong gede and also to mock bahasa pejabat. The idea of separating out bahasa pejabat is not only accepted by the labourers who heard Wiji Tukul poem. This is an idea also found in the utterance of wong cilik in the informal seats too. For example the owner of a warung angkringan in Yogyakarta, Pak Man, described bahasa pejabat as follows:

‘Bahasa pejabat itu kan bahasanya pegawai negeri golongan atas yang dipidatokan dan yang dipakai untuk pertemuan antara pejabat dengan rakyat seperti tema wicara antara Suharto dan rakyat yang telah diseleksi seperti yang ditelevisikan di jaman Suharto. Itu juga ada di pernyataan pejabat yang
(Bahasa pejabat) is a language uttered by the high-ranked civil servants on ceremonial occasions and on the official encounters between pejabat and rakyat as such occasions as the temu wicara (talk show) between Suharto and selected people, as shown on TV during the Suharto era. It can be found in bureaucrats’ statements published by newspapers, TV, radio and official speeches. The term which invaluably mentioned is pembangunan (development), but in fact they were corrupt, so the language of the high-ranking bureaucrat is a ‘language of nothing’ (bahasa omong kosong). During the Suharto era, Harmoko, the Minister of Information of the New Order regime, was called as Hari-hari Omong Kosong (an acronym of Harmoko which means ‘days of talking nothing’), and he gave Suharto the name Bapak Pembangunan (the father of development), which to people like us became bapak perngacengan (the father of erections) because every morning our ‘bird’ (penis) wakes up. Ha...ha...

The recognition of bahasa pejabat or bahasa wong gede in this case stimulated the wong cilik to celebrate and creatively adopt their casual colloquial language, bahasa rakyat or bahasa wong cilik, used among ordinary people, in everyday life. The differences between these languages are not based so much on vocabulary or grammatical structure (though those are present) but rely more the image or connotative meaning of any the characteristic expressions uttered by the high-ranking bureaucrats. These bureaucratic neologisms are distinctively different from the vocabulary and the semantics of the bahasa rakyat (people’s language). For example, the term pembangunan (development), was used in the title Bapak Pembangunan (Father of Development) formally awarded by parliament to Suharto in the early 1980s. It was used incessantly by the high-ranking bureaucrats, and signalled the central value of state power under the regime. ‘Bapak pembangunan’ was turned into colloquial Javanese by the wong cilik a way which changed the connotative meaning, to become the ‘father of erection’.

The techniques of the wong cilik’s in mocking the distinguishing expressions of bahasa pejabat shows their ability to objectify it as a target to be contested and
subjected to ridicule linguistically according to the context. For example, in the context of the economy, the preference of bureaucrats for the term ‘penyesuaian harga’ (the adjustment of prices) of ‘kenaikan harga’ (price increases) was promulgated extensively through the media to explain the economic crisis. It was recognised as a ‘fake language’ that failed to explain economic inflation. To a warung owner in Yogyakarta (Pak Yanto, who has warung angkringan near Sosrowijayan Street) it is a fake language (in Javanese language as basa ngapusi) because the wong cilik actually knew that prices really were increasing and not just ‘adjusting’. This official pronouncement meant that ‘pemerintah ngapusi rakyat’ (the government lied to the people). For him ‘pemerintah kuwi ra entuk ngapusi rakyat, sebab nek ngapusi berarti ono sing ora bener nang deweke’ (‘governments are not allowed to lie to the people because when they lie there must be something wrong with them’).

Moreover, he also said that ‘Rakyat ki pinter kok diapusi, aku ki nek dodol panganan ya bingung kudu njawab opo nek langganan takon kenopo regane mundak terus, paling aku mung njawab regone pancen gonta ganti sebabe nggone aku kulakan ya ganti rego terus, sing ora ganti sing dodolan, pemerintahe yo ora ganti-ganti.’ (‘People are smart, why do they have to be tricked? When I trade my foods, I also become confused. What answer will I give when my customers ask me why prices are increasing? I just answer that the price is changing because the groceries where I bought food stuffs also always put up their price. The one who never changes is the seller, and the government also not changed yet’). This kind of was common during the economic crisis in early 1998 when Suharto remained in power. This utterance from a warung owner explains the customer shift from an economic explanation (‘the one who never changes is the seller’) to political account by saying that ‘pemerintahe yo ora ganti-ganti’ (the government also not changed yet). It is the technique of the warung owner to create discussion with the customers which function to theft the blame for price increases onto the government.

According to the expressions above, the wong cilik actually sense that the idea of neutralising the import of language originates from within the state apparatuses; it shows the weightlessness or emptiness of bahasa pejabat. The ability to recognize bahasa pejabat as empty speech should be understood within the context of the feeling of freedom that is secured in spaces such as warungs and the street, in which persons
like Pak Yanto and his customers are involved in playing around with the language, exposing ‘the adjustment of prices’ as a political issue. Within this situation, the intersecting relationships between classes within social spaces where the feeling of freedom is relatively high we can observe that the discursive practices that are shaped among the intersecting worlds begin to free themselves from the states hegemonic project. As these discursive freedoms are secured, bahasa pejabat gradually loses its cultural significance and at with that the authoritarian regime’s effectiveness is diminished.

A good example of counter discourse against the authoritarian regime within this context can be seen from the much celebrated nationalist declaration of 1928, the Sumpah Mahasiswa, (Oath of youth):

Kami Mahasiswa Indonesia mengaku bertanah air satu, tanah air tanpa penindasan
Kami Mahasiswa Indonesia mengaku berbangsa satu, bangsa yang gandrung akan keadilan
Kami Mahasiswa Indonesia mengaku berbahasa satu, bahasa kebenaran.

(We Indonesian students declare that we have one homeland, a homeland free of oppression.
We Indonesian students declare that we are one nation, a nation madly in love with justice.
We Indonesian students declare that we have one language, the language of

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5 This ‘student oath’ deliberately invokes and subvets the universally celebrated… against the colonial regime.

6Bold inserted by me to emphasise that the word “gandrung” is drawn from colloquial language. It comes from lower Javanese language and is used to express the feeling of ‘madly in love’. The standard term of gandrung in Indonesian language is cinta (love) which stems from Melayu language.

7 This student pledge is also analysed by Keith Foulcher, “Sumpah Pemuda: The Making and Meaning of a Symbol of Indonesian Nationhood” Seminar paper given at Monash University, 1999. He explains that Student Pledge is a form of counter discourse against the official Sumpah Pemuda. In this section I would like to analyse it in different way. My quotation of Sumpah Mahasiswa is based on my note from my experience when the students declared it at Gadjah Mada University complex in 1995. However, it also can be found in Keith Foulcher’s work. According to Keith Foulcher, this “counter Youth Pledge” called Sumpah Mahasiswa (student pledge) was declared first time by students movement in Jogjakarta in 28 October 1988. Then it has become well known after the commemorations of youth Pledge in 1988. In 1995 it was declared again in 28 October 1995, in order to challenge the glorification of 50 years anniversary (gold anniversary that was counted from the year of independence, 1945) of Indonesian independence. After that, they declared it every year up to the “Reformasi” era (Reformation) in 1998. It was also printed on T shirts worn widely by students.
The students’ version of the original youth pledge can be mapped as a form of ‘language battle’, a confrontation between the language of the people and the *bahasa pejabat*. *Bahasa pejabat*, as shown on the governor speech and some other state texts in Chapter Four, is here characterize as injustice, untruth, and oppressive, as can be seen on the chart below:

**FIGURE 5: Satire, Linguistic Inversion, and Counter-Discourse**

The idea of counter-discourse, as seen on the chart above, functions simply by contradicting the official language as the form of communication used by the dominant official caste. *Tanpa penindasan* (free of oppression), *gandrung akan keadilan* (devoted to justice), and *bahasa kebenaran* (language of truth) are characteristic of the language

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8This translation is principally similar with Keith Foulcher’s work. However on the second pledge I translated the word of *gandrung* as madly in love. In this case Keith Foulcher translated gandrung as “devoted”. See Keith Foulcher, “*Sumpah Pemuda: The Making and Meaning of a Symbol of Indonesian Nationhood*” Seminar paper at Monash University, 1999.
of the people, invoked by the students to subvert bahasa pejabat and the sumpah pemuda (youth pledge) that without fail was orchestrated by the New Order state annually. Students in this case recognised that bahasa pejabat always consists of penindasan (oppression), ketidakadilan (injustice), and kebohongan (untruth). Therefore, they have to challenged the state by utilising youth pledge already taken by the state in an inverted way to make more people aware. Moreover, the language used by students in this pledge gives the sense of jiwa kerakyatan (the spirit of the people) and deliberately chooses terms from vernacular language rather than the language of pejabat. For example, the word gandrung from the Javanese language is originally a ngoko (lower Javanese language) expression. It is a symbol of the people. For the students this kind of tactic is important, because by providing simple contradicting language they display an idea that subverts the dominant language publicly. It then functions also to undermine the nationalist Sumpah Pemuda remembrance that had been monopolized by the New Order state at a time when people had no opportunity to glorify it spontaneously, even though historically it did come from the people. The reproduction and dissemination of this kind of idea through the aesthetic and connotative aspects of discursive practice challenges the dominant discourse of the regime and became the modus operandi of their project of subversion.

Like the students, underclass artists and intellectuals, and the wong cilik themselves devised many linguistic responses to counter authoritarian rule. What Wiji Thukul was doing with the labourers strove to manufacture a subaltern space in which workers could advance their consciousness. For example, the sickness of bahasa pejabat and the boredom of being deemed meaningful political participation is also expressed by Wiji Thukul through the lyrics entitled ‘Aku Lebih Suka Dagelan’ (I Prefer Joking):

9To a great extent, the glorification of Sumpah Pemuda during the New Order regime has made the Sumpah Pemuda become a part of state symbolism.
Aku Lebih Suka Dagelan (I Prefer Joking)  
By: Wiji Thukul

Di radio aku mendengar berita (From the radio I can listen to the news)
katanya partisipasi politik rakyat kita (our people’s political participation)
sangat menggembirakan (is delightful)
tapi kudengar dari mulut seorang kawanku (but I hear from my friend’s mouth)
dia diinterogasi dipanggil gurunya (that he was interrogated, called by
his/her teacher)
karena ikut kampanye pdi (for being involved in a pdi campaign)11
dan di kampungku ibu RT (and in my kampung, the RT’s wife)
tak mau menegor sapa warganya (does not want to ask he people)
hanya karena ia golkar (just because she/he votes for golkar)
ada juga yang saling bertengkar (some of them quarrel)
padahal rumah mereka bersebelahan (whereas they are next door neighbours)
penyebabnya hanya mereka berbeda ([quarrels] caused only by their differences)
tanda gambar (over signs)
ada juga kontestan yang nyogok (there are also contestants who bribe)
tukang-tukang becak (the pedicab drivers)
akibatnya dalam kampanye banyak (consequently many people in the campaign)
yang mencak-mencak (are grumbling)
di radio aku mendengar berita-berita (from the radio I hear the news)
tapi aku jadi muak karena isinya (but, I am sick and tired because of the content)
kebohongan yang tak mengatakan kenyataan (lying and not relating the facts)
untunglah warta berita segera bubar (fortunately the news will finish soon)
acara yang kutunggu-tunggu datang: dagelan (the program I have been waiting
for: humor)

These lyrics seem more like daily notes than a poem. They are easy for
labourers to understand, but they also deeply reflect the sickness of the language of
‘news’ broadcasts, which usually uses only official language. This kind of news is
stamped by people as ‘corong pemerintah’ (‘government voice’) because all media
under the New Order regime are controlled by Department of Information (Departemen
Penerangan). Thukul’s lyrics claimed this department is always telling falsehoods
(kebohongan yang tak mengatakan kenyataan) to the people. Wiji Thukul in this case is
simply criticising bogus participations in politic such as the practice at election time of


11The word of ‘pdi’ in small case letters as I quoted from his work, it is an abbreviation of PDI = Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia = Indonesian Democry Party) before it split into PDI P (led by Megawati) and PDI
(led by Suryadi and subservient to the regime).
giving money to the *wong cilik* to campaign for the political parties. These paid retrieval performances are not the participation that people have been waiting for. They wait for something that is more democratic, reflecting *bahasa rakyat* (language of the people), and emancipating people as happens in the *dagelan* (humour), a form of Javanese traditional play which involves the audience and the actors interactively, and which reflects a form of participation and emancipation of people in accessing politics through their own language rather than through *bahasa pejabat*. This is the way *wong cilik* formulate *democracy* through their own meanings and references I will explain some of there in the next section.

**B.2. Wong Cilik and Democracy: Decentering the State**

The idea of democracy that has been disseminated at the grassroots level has, to a great extent the potency to decentre the authoritarian state in peoples minds. It provides alternative ideas and creates counter-discourses to corrode the dominant discourse. For example the lyrics of songs written by street musicians. The song cited below, shows a plurality of ideas used in understanding Indonesianess.

**Demokrasi Kita (Our Democracy)**  
By: Buthel & Serikat Pengamen Indonesia

Kita sadari (We realise)  
kita hayati (We internalise)  
*negara* itu milik siapa (Who owns the country)  
Dari mulut penguasa (From the mouth of the ruling class)  
yang terus ngomongkan pembangunan (who always talk about development)  
untuk menduduki kursi jabatan (in order to occupy high-ranking positions)  
sehingga *rakyat* jadi korban (so that the people are victimised)  
Kita mengerti, kita pahami (We conceive, we understand)  
ternyata politik milik siapa (who actually owns politics)  
Jika hanya milik penguasa (if only owned by ruling class)  
lebih baik bubarkan saja (its better to dismiss it)

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12 *Serikat Pengamen Indonesia* (Indonesian Street Musicians Association) is an independent association to unite street musicians who live on the street. This group has good relationships with the student movement affiliated with PRD (People Democratic Party). The author of this song did not record the year he created it, he just remembered that this song was created in early 1997. It is common for the street musicians not to put the years of production because the important thing for them is context. The context of this song is development and democracy, which means in around the 1990s.
sehingga *rakyat* damai (so that people live in peace)
dan tenang hidupnya (and have a serene life)

reff:

Satu nusa beribu pulau kita (we are in one area with thousands of Islands)
Satu bangsa berjuta *rakyat* kita (we are one nation with millions of people)
Akankah terus jadi tumbal sejarah (would they be victims of history?)
untuk berdirinya demokrasi (to give rise to democracy?)
Indonesia satu kata berjuta maknanya (Indonesia, one word, millions meaning)
Satu teriak belum tentu bangkit semuanya (one [person] screaming might not be followed by all)
Mari kita hapuskan omong kosong belaka (let us sweep away talking about nothing)
Sehingga *rakyat* tak jadi korban (so, the people will not be the victim)

This song's lyrics were created by street musicians using vernacular Indonesian language. This is less formal, blunt in meaning and less strict in grammar. Because of this, some sentences used are grammatically confusing and incorrect. However, the meaning and its messages can be easily grasped by *wong cilik*. This song was created in 1997, and is usually sung on city buses in Jakarta, or on the sidewalk of Yogyakarta’s Malioboro street, Yogyakarta.

An important aspect of this song is its process of creation. The street musicians usually have their own communal contemplation and jam sessions when they create song lyrics. In this space, they usually congregate while drinking coffee or tea and smoking cigarettes on the sidewalk or in a *warung* until late in the night. Their creativity is palpable in the way they playing guitars and various other instruments while singing many kinds of spontaneous songs. Most songs in jam sessions relate to the experiences of living with uncertainty. This place is their arena for giving value to the sentiments of anti-dominant discourses. It is also a space that creates solidarity among the street musicians. The way they create songs merely depends creativity of those present.. If they all agree that one of the spontaneously written songs is fun, but also has a critical edge, is easy to understand and good to listen too, then they replay it many times until it is memorised. Most of the lyrics created in this way are unlikely to be written. Only after some people ask about the lyrics will they dictate it to be written down.
This song is not only addressed to the common people but also to themselves. It is expected to be heard or at least to be realised that something is going wrong in the state of New Order Indonesia.\textsuperscript{13} That at least, it is their fantasy, because if it is sung in a city bus in Jakarta, where the climate is very hot and humid and the bus is speeding, and the sound of the engine is very noisy, and people are in a rush, then perhaps the passengers are not listening to it. Even though this song specifically criticises \textit{wong gede} or \textit{pejabat negara} (high-ranking bureaucrats) who victimise people to advance their own career, perhaps there are different responses from listeners. As some street musicians said ‘\textit{Indonesia satu kata berjuta maknanya}.

\textit{Satu teriak belum tentu bangkit semuanya}’(In Indonesia one word has a million meanings. It is uncertain that one cry will awaken all of them). The bus passengers might have similar experiences of suffering under the authoritarian regime, but it does not mean that they support the views expressed by the musicians. Some of the responses can be just ‘\textit{masuk telinga kanan keluar telinga kiri}’ (‘enter the right ear, then come out of the left’).\textsuperscript{14} It is understandable if the passengers just give money to the street musicians and then the interaction is over. Even so, counter discourse expressions have been disseminated and perhaps will be reproduced by other people in different ways. The responses are different, when they sing among them selves in their jam session near the \textit{warung}. The \textit{warung} customers will listen and some of them will even memorize some of the street musicians songs. In this situation the audience has ample opportunity to internalise it.

The interesting expression about the dismissal of the state, ‘\textit{Kita mengerti kita pahami ternyata politik milik siapa. Jika hanya milik penguasa lebih baik bubarkan}

\textsuperscript{13}This argument is based on my discussion with various street musicians in Yogyakarta.

\textsuperscript{14}This account based on my interviews in November 1998 in Jakarta. The expression ‘\textit{masuk telinga kiri keluar telinga kanan}’ was uttered by passenger of the city bus in Jakarta. When I did a research in Surabaya, I went from Tunjungan Plaza to Kampong Dinoyo. There was a bus poem delivered on that city bus. Before he read his poem, the poet commenced with a statement that he was not begging for money, he just want to read about himself., Then he read a story about his suffering, economic and social, living in the city of Surabaya. He was talking about inequality through his experience of living in urban areas. The story was somewhat too long, and thus he apparently lost the passengers attention. However, some of them listened carefully to what he said. After he finished, some of them gave money some of them not.
saja sehingga rakyat damai dan tenang hidupnya ('We conceive, we understand who actually owns politics. If politics only belong to the ruler it is better dismissed so what people are peaceful and have a serene life'). This shows their fantasies in expressing a feeling of freedom rather than the convention that things will be different. This phantasmasmagoria, a presentation of the mind in the form of image, here expresses a passionate aspiration for an egalitarian rather than a hierarchical relationship. The concept *penguasa* (power-holder, ruler or ruling class) in this case is viewed as hierarchical barrier preventing the people from having access to politics. They believe that if the power-holder is ousted, hierarchies would be minimised and people would have opportunities to access the state, and the state would no longer be exclusive and impersonal. From this perspective, we can see the endeavour of embedded within these vernacular language usages to corrode hierarchy to become more egalitarian.

To a significant extent this kind of fantasy is based on the pictures of everyday life rather than on abstract ideals of universal democracy. It also areas from their relationships among themselves or at least these found within the same social class. These are is relatively egalitarian. The term ‘democracy,’ which was mostly voiced by students or some other ‘agencies,’ was just a trendy term that would be appropriated by street musicians not only because it is fashionable but also in order to show that they can make the idea of democracy easy to understand by uneducated *wong cilik*. Furthermore, an important perspective reflected in such lyrics is the feeling of freedom. This exist among the *wong cilik*. In this social environment, it is an attempt to construct a shared liberty rather than freedom in a liberal sense. Accordingly, the construction of freedom here is located in the imagination where they feel relatively free from state control, or at least where they imagine that they are safe beyond state-structured

15During my interviews with the street musicians very often they do not really like to admit that they appropriated the language and ideas of students. They always claim that all of the ideas in the lyrics from their intellectual capacities. For them to have relationships with the students does not mean that student activist are their idols, because from their point of view students or intellectuals mostly only make analysis become more complicated and difficult to understand by the people in general. They usually assest that intellectuals have its own language, one that people do not understand and even find confusing. On the other hand they always say that their lyrics are simple lyrics which are easy to understand by the people. This kind of claim shows that they have a strong identity. They do not want to be judged as just copying students or using the name of people to criticize the regime in the manner that NGO. For them they *are* the people.
hierarchies. This is important for them, as through this they have found an arena where they can develop counter discursive practices, and in the process work to corrode the influence of state authoritarian power.

The contestation of language between wong cilik and the language of high-ranking bureaucrats explained above shows that the semantic efficiency of authoritarian regime loses its force within the diurnal subaltern space of wong cilik. The language of bureaucrats here is reduced to meaningless or empty chatter (omong kosong). However, it is not only the vacuity of the administrative obfuscations of the bahasa pejabat that they ridicule. The discourses of the wong cilik also erode a deeper, if more abstract, foundation of the regimes legitimacy, its attention to the sole interpretation of the meaning of the Indonesian nationalist project. The nationalist project which is more abstract than bahasa pejabat.

C. State Nationalist Project vs. Vernacular Nationalist Imagination

This section will discuss the contestation of the nationalist imagination, the cognitive dissonance between state nationalist projects and of the wong cilik the nationalist ideas. Rather than a cognitive and emotional given I will reveal the constant struggle to give meaning to the so-called nation as an imagined political community. The term ‘nationalist imagination’ should be broken down into at least two distinctive categories i.e. ‘State nationalist imagination’ and ‘vernacular nationalist imagination’. It is important to acknowledge that nationalist imaginings are plural and contested. The differences between the two are mostly based on the technology of mediation that they employ. Print and electronic capitalist media have become the main instrument in disseminating ‘state nationalist imagination’ as a core element of state discursive practice. The vernacular nationalist imagination by contrast, is disseminated orally by wong cilik in their everyday social relationships. This discursive practice also functions

16 In this section I am using Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined community’. ‘It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. See Benedict R.O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. 1991, p. 5-7.
to advance their consciousness which might be used to subvert the dominant power. Within this, *wong cilik* construct a vernacular nationalist imagination which is mostly mediated by their colloquial language. This vernacular nationalist imagination coexists with the state nationalist imagination. Linguistically, it exists in the *wong cilik*’s practice of colloquial languages — as the language beyond the demeanour of the states official one’s. These vernacular imaginings can be expressed through songs, poems, and other forms, as I will further discuss.

### C.1. State Nationalist Project

Before Suharto’s resignation, there was a national banknote (Rp 50,000.00) which was printed with the pictures of Suharto and of state projects such as the development of tollways, plane, boats, urban areas, agriculture, education, industry, and depicting the harmony of religious relationships in the plural society of Indonesia. (See figure 6 below) All of these developmentalist projects are ‘miniaturized’ into small piece of paper, which functions as Indonesian currency.\(^\text{17}\) *Wong cilik* in Malioboro Street call this money as ‘Suharto mesem’, a Javanese term meaning ‘Smiling Suharto’.

At the *wong cilik* level ‘Suharto mesem’ had a pejorative sense rather positive or even neutral one. This is because this money was often used to bribe police officers to release any street kids after they had been captured in Malioboro Street, or even to bribe in order to get driving license. For example, one of the street wanderers named Heri asked me ‘*Bang punya Suharto mesem kagak, aku mau cari SIM untuk perbaiki nasib*? (‘Big brother do you have smiling Suharto? I want to get driving licence to improve my fate’). I replied ‘*untuk apa?* (what for?), to which he said: ‘*Biaas bang untuk bikin polisi mesem juga*’ (As usual big brother, just to make the police smile too’). However, during the political reforms of 1998, *wong cilik* who had this money were not smiling because they predicted that this money soon no longer be valid. Because of this they rushed to

\(^{17}\) This money was issued in 1993 right on the 27 years anniversary of his presidency, in which this money became the commemoration of the ‘27 Tahun Indonesia Membangun’ (27 Years Developing Indonesia) as noted on the right corner of the figure below. This currency was no longer valid just a few months after his resignation.

*Aris Arif Mundayat*
exchange it for money without picture of smiling Suharto.¹⁸

FIGURE 6, Smiling Saharto, The Rp 50, one Banknote

When Wong cilik gave meaning to this money they were more focused on the ‘Smiling Suharto’ picture, which could make someone else ‘smile’ too, rather than on the smaller background pictures of ‘development’. The picture represented Suharto as the central theme on the currency pictorial, remembering that the New Order government called him Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia (the Father of Indonesia’s Development), as is stated under his picture. On this banknote there are also written the words saying ‘27 Tahun Indonesia membangun’ (‘27 years developing Indonesia’), which celebrates how he already ruled Indonesia for 27 years, and how this brought a swathe of development projects that sprang from Saharto’s nationalist imagination. These are represented in miniature and surround his smiling face.

The role of Suharto in development projects is pictured in a miniturized scene of a meeting between ‘the people’ and himself, which was a favourite moment for Suharto’s ‘talk show ritual’, the ‘Temu Wicara’ (Talk Show), which commenced around the late 1980s and became a stable element of the ‘peers’ made thereafter. As can be

¹⁸ Heri is a street wanderer who moves constantly between Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta. When he felt tired wandering around from street to street he decided to finish his ‘career’ on the street. He took car driving course in Yogyakarta in order to get driving licence. He planed to be a driver and improve his life.
seen from the picture on the bank note, Suharto sits in front of the people, and the audience behave politely. That can be seen from their hands covering their midriff and the uniformity of their posture in the picture. One person in the audience is also standing politely, again by positioning his hand covering his belly, while asking Suharto some questions. In reality this ritual is rehearsed and organized by the Sekretariat Negara (state secretariat), after which the instructions are passed down the state hierarchy to provincial, kabupaten, kecamatan, and village apparatuses. They must prepare this talk show before Suharto arrives on stage in order to ensure its success and, indeed, to satisfy Suharto once he left the stage. Moreover, the number of people who were expected to be invited to sit in front of Suharto, the number of audience members who would ask Suharto pre-prepared and agreed upon questions, was orchestrated by the Sekretariat Negara. There was no doubt that it was all very well prepared. The important symbolic codes were the stage and the placement of higher-ranking government functions. First, the stage had to be built around 1.5 meters high. The audiences were seated in front of Suharto, below the stage. The upper stage had to be occupied by some of his ministers, the personal governor and invited Bupati (Heads of Regency), Camat (the Heads of Districts) where the temu wicara was held.19

The idea of temu wicara here seems very close to the ideal pretentation of Suharto as an enlightened ruler as pronounced in a book edited by his daughter named Herdiyanti Rukmana and published in 1990, as we can see below:


19 This account is based on the information I gathered from the local state apparatuses in Wonogiri just a month before Suharto’s temu wicara was held these. It was in the early 1990s.

20 This quote is from Suharto, Butir-Butir Budaya Jawa, Hanggayah Kasampurnaning Hurip Berbudi Bawaleksana Ngudi Sejatining Becik edited by H. Rukmana, Herdiyanti. Jakarta: Yayasan Purna Bhakti Pertiwi 1990. p 116-117. Before it was published Suharto explained its content at the Javanese Language Congress in 1987. This book also mentions that most of the sources originate from the classic literature of Aris Arif Mundayat.
A country is strong because, among other things, its army is strong and its people faithful. A strong country enjoys the blessing of God Almighty. Meanwhile, the ruler of the country must have a noble mind and generous heart. (A country which is strong only owing to its army and its subdued people, may not be strong forever as the people are subdued out of fear of the army. However, if a country is strong because its people are subdued although the army is not very strong, this is due only to the blessing of God Almighty. It will be all the more so if the ruler has a noble mind and a generous heart)

The formulation of the ‘negara kuwat’ (strong country) and ‘kawulane suyud’ (subdued people) as shown in the text above is followed by an idealized depiction of the country’s leader. This presents the regime’s construction of the nationalist imagination, which also consists of a desire for subjugation a particular type of mess achievable through processes of disciplinization. This is an attempt to emphasize state symbolism in which the people’s obedience is constructed as an aspect of their naturalist duty. Moreover, the disciplinization process under this regime was conducted not only through particular rituals and commemorations of national days, such as independence day, commemoration of heroes, the youth pledge, the Monday ceremony for Kindergarten to High School children, etc. It also was evident in civic education in the curriculum system which indoctrinates students and teachers, in the implementation of Pancasila as the sole ideology of all social institutions, and at the ceremony of flag-raising every Monday in every pre-university level school. This kind of discipline is designed to reinforce the construction of the state nationalist imagination, and much of it is condemned after the political reform of post Suharto Indonesia (1999-2004); the dissemination of state ideology through curricula from primary school to university degree still exists and participates in the construction of the state nationalist project.

The importance of state symbolism in supporting many kinds of state nationalist discursive practices seems connected to the threat discourse where the state represents itself as a regime that has the right to interpret what the nationalist idea should be. This kind of threat discourse, as related to state symbolism, was evident for example in a
speech given by Suharto (as keynote speaker) to Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha, the elite special forces corps) members during its 28th celebration on 16 April 1980.\(^{21}\)

‘Kemudian marga kedua: Kami Patriot Indonesia pendukung serta pembela Ideologi Negara yang bertanggung jawab dan tidak mengenal menyerah. Jadi dalam keadaan bagaimanapun juga bilamana Pancasila dasar negara itu terancam, maka kita digugah harus bangkit sebagai patriot untuk tidak hanya mendukungnya saja, akan tetapi harus membela dengan tidak kenal menyerah. Yang berarti kita harus menggunakan segala kemampuan yang ada pada kita untuk dapat mempertahankan Pancasila sebagai dasar ideologi negara itu. Ancaman kekuatan senjata harus kita hadapi dengan kekuatan senjata pula yang kita miliki.\(^{22}\)"

(Then the second way: We, the supporters of Indonesian patriotism and guardians of state ideology, are responsible and don’t know how to surrender. Thus, in any kind of situation when Pancasila, the state philosophy, is threatened, we are awakened to stand up as patriots not only to support it, but also to defend it without surrender. Which means we have to use any force necessary to protect Pancasila as a state ideology. The threat of armed force must be also addressed with our weaponry).

The first sentence above (derived from Sapta Marga Prajurit)\(^{23}\) embodies a militaristic ideal that reflects of a syndrome militaristic powers. Possibly its a universal phenomenon associated with militarism throughout the world. This sentence, then, was tied to nationalist ideas by utilizing state ideology in order to create the spirit of the state nationalist imagination and to expand Suharto’s desire for power. Suharto suggested that the nation state was endangered as shown in quotation below:

\[^{21}\text{The text quoted is from the Merdeka newspaper, 4 August 1980, but the celebration itself was held on 16 April 1980. The biggest newspaper company, Kompas, published an incomplete version of the speech and the report of the Kopassandha 28th celebration on 17 April 1980 as did some other newspapers. Suharto’s speech became a source of dispute between Petisi 50 and Suharto. Indeed, it then involved DPR (presumably) members because Petisi 50 asked the DPR to request that Suharto be held responsible for that speech. Petisi 50 argued that Suharto’s personal problems should not be mixed up with the state ideology and constitution (Pancasila and UUD 1945) because any disturbance to Suharto’s political position also might mean disrupting Pancasila and UUD 1945. The dispute was not concluded by the time Suharto resigned in 1998. That was why Merdeka newspaper published the full text four months after Suharto delivered it.}\]

\[^{22}\text{Quoted from ‘Sambutan Presiden pada HUT Kopassandha’ in Merdeka, 4 August 1980. This paragraph comes from Sapta Marga (Seven Ways) of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces).}\]

\[^{23}\text{“Sapta Marga Prajurit” is a Sanskrit name used by ABRI in order to maintain their hierarchical system}\]
Akan tetapi kita mengetahui bahwa ancaman ideologi Pancasila tidak semata-mata dari kekuatan senjata, artinya dipaksa kita merubah, mengganti Pancasila dengan ideologi lain tidak semata-mata dengan kekuatan senjata akan tetapi juga bisa dengan kekuatan subversi, infiltrasi bahkan sampai menghalalkan segala cara untuk menghilangkan Pancasila dan memaksanya mengganti Pancasila sebagai dasar daripada negara itu. Suatu misal saja jalan-jalan yang yang akhir-akhir ini ditempuh, bahkan selalu akan terjadi bilaman kita mendekati kepada pelaksanaan Pemilihan Umum, akan timbul isyu-isyu yang sebenarnya adalah tidak pada tempatnya lagi.24

(However, we recognize that the threats toward Pancasila ideology come not merely from armed powers, which would mean we would be forced to modify, to change Pancasila with another ideology. However such attempts are made not merely by force of weaponry but also by the use of subversive forces, infiltration, even any legitimate attempts to dismiss Pancasila and demand that Pancasila be replaced (by another state philosophy). For example, the recent tactics that [they] have been using, are always apparent close to the general elections, and the issues that emerge are misplaced.)

The image of an ‘endangered’ state is typical of the state nationalist fantasy of the New Order that was disseminated through discursive practices in numerous everyday occasions. This kind of idea has become a locus of horror for the subjects framed within state - society power relations. This is because Suharto creates an image of ‘threat as a phantom’ constructed through a specific reading of history and glorified by the state, such as in the annual ceremony to celebrate ‘Kesaktian Pancasila’ (the sacredness of Pancasila) every October 1st. As the commemoration of the six army generals who were slain in the 1965 political turmoil called G 30 S/PKI (Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia = September 30 Movement/ Indonesian Comunist Party). This day also become a commemoration of the fall of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia). The commemoration not only aims to glorify the victory of the New Order regime over Sukarno’s regime and the demolition of the communist party in Indonesia (PKI), but also to entrench the ‘true’ state nationalist discourse and consolidate its axiomatic standing through state - society power relations,

and the unity of corps.

24 Quoted from ‘Sambutan Presiden pada HUT Kopassandha’ in Merdeka, 4 August 1980. This paragraph comes from Sapta Marga (Seven Ways) of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces). Suharto’s language on this speech was grammatically incorrect.

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in which the term ‘Kesaktian Pancasila’ (the Sacredness of Pancasila) has become as much part of the discourse of threat as it is a celebration of national unity. As Heryanto argues, the New Order regime constructed grand narratives that functioned to maintain the bloody history as a deep social trauma and acted continuously to terrorize the populace psycho-politically. The effect of the ‘grand narrative’ of the September 30 1965 coup as evidence of the urgency of defending ‘Kesaktian Pancasila’ leads to its annual ritualization. The obligatory observance of these public rituals aim to discipline society under the hegemony of the New Order regime. Heryanto describes nicely in his thesis how, every year, children of various school grades were compelled to watch the lavish, state produced movie (after paying with their own money) about Kesaktian Pancasila, entitled ‘Penghianatan G 30 S PKI’. This is a state sponsored movie directed by Arwendo Atmowiloto.

Moreover, Suharto as president for the period of 1966-1998, also tried to establish a connection between the nation and his family and even between state ideology and his family. In the late 1980s, it was rumoured that he had a love affair with a movie star named Rahayu Effendi. His wife was also said to be involved in underhanded relationships with business people. These dealings are related in Bimbo’s song entitled ‘Tante Sun’ (Aunty Sun). Suharto’s speech sought to counter such gossip at the Kopasandha anniversary:

Mereka menghalalkan segala cara untuk menimbulkan isyu untuk mencapai tujuannya. Tidak hanya sekedar mendiskreditkan pemerintah, Pejabat-pejabat, tetapi akhir-akhir ini pula bahkan kemarin saya bertemu dengan kolega saya

25 From late March until May 2000, Abdurahman Wahid proposed to review the MPR decree concerning the banning of the communist party in Indonesia. See ‘MUI Tolak Tap MPRS XXV/1966 dicabut. Komunisme akan Merobohkan Indonesia’ in Media Indonesia March 3, 2000. See also ‘Pencabutan Tap MPRS No.XXV/1966 Terus Ditentang. Demo Antikomunis Makin Marak’ in Media Indonesia, April 8, 2000. It is still disputed whether to abolish it or not.


27 In the late 1980s, the music group called Bimbo wrote a song entitled ‘Tante Sun’ (Aunty Sun) that described how this ‘Aunty’ was involved in almost all the large projects in Indonesia and took large amounts of money from cukong (Chinese entrepreneurs)and tauke. An example of cynical lyrics that show how business people were under the control of Suharto’s wife was: Cukong-cukong dan tauke, direktur dan makelar, tekak lutut di bawah tante Sun. (Bourgeois, capital owners, directors and brokers, knelt before Aunty Sun).

Apa ini semua maksudnya? Maksudnya adalah tidak lain karena mungkin mereka itu menilai kalau saya itu menjadi penghalang utama dari kegiatan politik mereka itu.karena itu harus ditiadakan. Mereka lupa, andaikata bisa meniadakan saya, lupa bahwasanya toh akhirnya akan timbul mungkin lebih daripada saya,warga negara prajurit-prajurit anggota ABRI termasuk pula dari Korps Kopassandha Baret Merah akan tetap menghalang-halangi kehendak politik mereka itu, lebih-lebih jelas bilamana ingin mengganti Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar ’45 itu.29

(They make every possible means legitimate in order to raise issues and thus to gain political goals. It is not merely discrediting the government, the high level state officials, but recently, even yesterday I met my colleagues Mr Kusno, and Utomo, who also heard about such issues which could not only be applied to me, but also to my wife, Bu Harto. As usual, there are rumours that Suharto’s wife is accepting commissions, that she determines the winning of tenders, which creates the image that Cendana Street (the address of the Presidential palace) is the headquarters for winning tenders and commission etcetera. This absolutely never happens. Not even the thought of it Thinking about social activities does not even allow enough time any more. And even recently I was accused in one rumor that originated from the students’ circle and circulated among the housewives who usually easily disseminate rumours widely. One issue said that I have a concubine (selir), that I have a mistress (istri simpanan) who is the famous film star, Rahayu Effendi. This is an old issue but at the moment it has been reawakened. However, I do not even know her, I have never met her. But it is already spoken of as an issue.

What does it all mean? It means, perhaps, they think that I am the main handicap for their political activities; therefore they have to dismiss me. They forget that if

28 See, ‘Sambutan Presiden pada HUT Kopassandha’ in Merdeka, 4 August 1980. Kopassandha is the abbreviation for Komando pasukan Sandi Yudha. It is the lite armed force, which now has changed the name into Kopasus, Komando Pasukan Khusus.

29 See, ‘Sambutan Presiden pada HUT Kopassandha’ in Merdeka, 4 August 1980.
[they] evict me, there might be a person who is more than me, the soldier citizen of ABRI including the corps of Red Beret Kopassandha who will besiege their political desires, and even more so if they want to change Pancasila and Undang Undang Dasar ’45 (1945 constitution).

This speech was published by most of the newspapers and by TVRI (the only state-owned TV station in late 1980s). Print and electronic media, in this case, also became an important channel of the New Order to disseminate throughout Indonesia their state nationalist project. The interesting point in the above speech is that the techniques of the New Order regime constituted power relations between the regime and its subjects by providing them with an idea that there was no difference between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation state’ or between the ‘regime’ and the ‘country’. Accordingly, any act against the New Order regime constituted an act against the country. In the extreme, attempts against Suharto’s family and himself also translated into acts against the country and against the army which was what Suharto imagined them to be. In addition, the creation of the phantom of threats to ‘national stability’ also in practice suppressed the people and warned them not to act against the state, which in turn assured investors of the security of their investments in Indonesia.  

All of these factors I explained above contributed to the regime’s sustained project of creating and unchallengeable nationalist imagination among the people. It became a ‘macro-interventionist discourse’ --as I explained in theoretical review-- by which the New Order regime tried to create a ‘benchmark for political interpretation’ based on that project. In fabricating this vision of the nation, the dominant forces constructed a standard interpretation which accorded exactly with the regime’s political interests. The project identified what kinds of interpretation were permitted to be taken up by society both discursively and materially and deemed the exclusive right of the only true reading of Indonesian nationalism. In practice, it operated not only through discursive practices among the state functionaries but also through its 

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institutionalization, throughout society with the aim of deciding and defining the true nature of the nationalist imagination. The institutionalization of this regime can be seen in the existence of BP7 and Bakorstranas (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas nasional = The Coordinating Body for Establishing National Stability) which had become necessary for the establishment of the ‘regime of interpretation’. This regime was not only institutionalized at the political level but also at the cultural level as hegemonisation.

In the 1980s the New Order State set up a military body called Bakorstranas. It was established to monitor any subversive political activities that were assumed would endanger the country’s stability a task previously undertaken by a very similar extra-judicial military body called Kopkamteb, whose leadership had fallen out with Suharto. It had branches in every province, called Bakorstrada (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Daerah = The Coordination Body for Establishing Regional Stability).

At the curriculum level, university students have to take a Wawasan Nusantara (lit: Indonesian View) course to indoctrinate them with a sense of the nationalist idea. This kind of course actually begins in primary school with the PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila = The Education of Pancasila Morality). The concept of national stability is emphasized in this system, and in political practice. State officials also stressed the concept of jati diri (self-identity), in which every region should also emphasize their local identity as an expression of the nationalist idea. This idea is merely a political construction of nationalism defined by the state rather than people’s expression of their

31 According to the news article entitled ‘Bakorstranas Resmi Bubar 10 April’ at Tempo Online (http://www.tempo.co.id) April 5th, 2000, 18:37 PM, Bakorstranas would be dismantled by President Abdurahman Wahid through a presidential decree (keppres No 38 Tahun 2000) on April 10th, 2000. On that day, the institution dismissed officially. Because of this, the branches (Bakorstrada), litsus (Penelitian Khusus=Special Investigation), and Posko Kewaspadaan (Alert Task forces) in every Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer=Military District Commando) also were to be dismantled. Historically, this body was set up to replace Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban=The Command for Safety, Recovery and Order) through presidential decree (Keppres No. 29/ 1988) by President Soeharto. Due to dissatisfaction with the previous general (General Sumitro) who led this body and failed to prevent the Malari incident (15 January 1974), Suharto appointed General Ali Murtopo to lead this body. Four years later another decree was issued (Keppres No. 253/ 1988) to expand its function. This decree appointed General Try Soetrisno as the chairperson of Bakorstranas. This institution is structured by Bakorstranas according to a letter of statement coded: Kep/01/Stanas/XI/1988 dated 4 November 1988. This letter was authorized by another letter of statement from the highest commander in ABRI, No. Skep/962/XII/1988 dated 9 December 1988.
own ‘imagined community’. However, the state nationalist imagination has become popular among the state functionaries. Within this political atmosphere, the official interpretation of nationalist ideas was monopolized by the regime and constructed centrally by the state. In practice this doctrine concerning the centre is also emphasised through another form of state award called *Adipura* (it is a Sanskrit term meaning beautiful palace). This award is given to the city that displays criterion such as cleanliness, neatness, serenity, and beauty. When a city gets the award it is celebrated by an elaborate ritual, as took place in Yogyakarta in 1993. This doctrine can also be seen from the fact that most of the historical events which have been devoted to a national feast day are used by the state to construct its vision of Indonesian-ness and is the celebrations are carefully ritualized by the state.

Moreover, the glorification of such events has become an act of hegemonisation and the construction of state symbolism which can be called – borrowing Widodo’s terminology – ‘the rites of hegemonisation’.  

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32 See Aris Arif Mundayat & Kunharibowo (1993) ‘Ritual *Adipura*: Sebuah Kontradiksi antara Demokrasi dan Hierarki’ in *Bernas* 14 June 1993. This article discussed a phenomenon of state ritual practice by the provincial government in expressing the idea of the state as a ‘centre’. through notions of hierarchy. In this ritual state officials, especially those from local government had to wear traditional Javanese dress. They rode in a traditional horse cart and paraded across the city ending up in governor’s office in Malioboro street. This ritual was to show to the people that this city won an award from the central government in Jakarta.

33 According to the information I gathered, people feel that since the mid-1970s, the celebration of Indonesian Independence every August 17 has been taken over by the government. Almost all activities such as sport, games, painting fences, cleaning up streets and alleyways, and *[selamatan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selamatan)* (Javanese communal feasts) around that time are handled by state apparatuses rather than by the people. Before that period, people felt involved in the preparations for the celebration. Due to this, people feel they have lost their right to fully participate in the celebration of Indonesian Independence Day.

34 Amrih Widodo (1995) has an interesting argument concerning the Tayuban dance in Blora. He shows that the Department of Education and Culture provides *pembinaan* (guidance) for the participants before the performance, *penataran* (training courses) for the dancers and issues them with an annual license. This state orchestration transforms the ritualized and officialised dance into a participatory event where the participants become spectators. This kind of *penataran* shows them how to dance in a way which is not considered immoral and which reflects the *jatidiri* of Indonesianess. See Amrih Widodo, ‘Stages of the State: Arts of the People and Rites of Hegemonization’, *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, Vol. 29. Winter and Summer 1995. I was visiting Amrih Widodo when he did his research in Blora in 1991 and I was involved in (the official rather than ritual) *Tayuban* dancing at the village level. In the official dance I was just a spectator. At the village level the *Tayuban* dancing is quite different to the official one, even though the dancer also carries a license to perform it — to some degree the participants...
The dissemination of nationalist ideas through rites in this case will be defined as the discursive practice of ‘state nationalism’ to construct Indonesia-ness according to the state’s perspective. The regime’s political desire to construct Indonesia-ness through development has placed the state at the center and at the peak of the hierarchical regimentation process. Bureaucratic corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism as a chain of power in this case has taken control over the political machinery in New Order Indonesia under Suharto, and its residue to some extent still exists in the post New Order regime which is still using the national day to construct ‘uniform’ nationalist imagination. Culturally this form of modern politics has been interwoven with the residue of old political cosmology that located the state as the centre of political orientation.\footnote{For further discussion concerning state-society relations and the position of the traditional state see Soemarsaid Martono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series, 1963. See also Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.}

Within the political context of New Order Indonesia as previously explained, the state nationalist imagination was disseminated through the state apparatuses within the circuit of bureaucratic corporatism. State rituals are the main arena for the dissemination of this nationalist conception. Indeed, it permeates down to the grassroots level, and to some degree influences the grammatical imagination which they use to imagine their community. However, it will never completely coopt the vernacular discourse, as I will discuss latter in this chapter.

Monthly rituals such as the one practiced on the seventeenth day of every month by civil servants show how the capillaries of power reach downwards, and attempt to transmit their meaning through the hierarchical tradition of social relations.\footnote{In Gadjah Mada University this ceremony was discarded a few weeks after Suharto resigned from power, but it is still practiced in some other state institutions.} To an important extent, the ‘positive’ meanings of unity are also clearly bound to messages of symbolic threat. This can be seen at least in the obedience of civil servants, who allow themselves to be the vehicle of the dominant figures of the regime. On the seventeenth day of every month, for example, we can see the people wearing marine blue batik uniforms, called *seragam Korpri* (*Korpri Uniform*, *Korpri* means *Korps Pegawai negeri* not only become spectators but they are also actively involved in the dancing.
republik Indonesia = Corps for Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia.\(^{37}\) They walk; ride bicycles or motorcycles, take public buses, private or *dinas* cars (government cars for the higher-ranking *pegawai negeri*) on that day, with the differences in modes of transportation reflecting their different social ranks. They go to work to engage in the ritual of *tujuhbelasan* held in the front yards of their offices. The scene on the street when the civil servants pass by also constitutes power relations between the subjected and the dominant, in which it has become a threat, as reflected through the example below:

‘Setiap tanggal 17 tiap bulan, saya selalu melihat ke jalan lewat jendala, hanya untuk meyakinkan bahwa masih banyak pegawai negeri memakai seragam KORPRI yang lalu-lalang di depan rumah saya. Itu tandanya saya tidak akan terlambat ke kantor dan bisa ikut upacara’ \(^{38}\)

("Every seventeenth of the month, I always look at the road through the window just to make sure that many pegawai negeri who wear the Korpri uniform are still passing in front of this house. It means that I won’t be late to my office to take part in the ceremony ‘")

The ritual itself, shows a kind of hierarchical order and state symbolism, as happens on the Monday morning ceremonial in government offices in Yogyakarta. In the ritual arena when high-ranking civil servants walk together with others of the same

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\(^{37}\) The colors of the uniforms are not really the same, some being bright and others bleached. Sometimes the differences of color indicate the differences of rank. A bleached color indicates low rank, because they do not spend their money, which is distributed annually by the government, on a new uniform. They usually think that such ‘uniform money’ is more usefully spent on family necessities or savings than on buying a new uniform. Usually the *pegawai negeri* prepare all the things needed for the ritual uniforms the night before. To a great extent, this uniform has become a part of subjection, not only for the people who wear it, but the subjugation is also multiplied in the domestic arena. Frequently, the husband who did not prepare his uniform before going to attend the ceremony hurriedly asks to his wife to iron his batik Korpri and blue pants. She also prepares the Korpri emblem, the dark blue hat embroidered with *Abdi Negara* and the logo of Korpri. In spite of his wife’s help, sometimes he was angry with her if she is unable to find some of the ritual attire or if he wasn’t satisfied with her efforts especially her ironing. Usually, the gender dynamic of this situation is almost the same, this situation stems from the male dominated culture which is re-emphasized in *Panca Dharma Wanita* (The Five Principles of Women Action) which was created by the New Order regime. See Aris Arif Mundayat, * “The Rite of ‘Tujuhbelasan’: Ideological Dissemination under Suharto’s Regime.” Ideology in the New Order Workshop, Conference on Indonesian Democracy, Monash University December 21, 1992.*

\(^{38}\) Aris Arif Mundayat, * “The Rite of ‘Tujuhbelasan’: Ideological Dissemination under Suharto’s Regime.” Ideology in the New Order Workshop, Conference on Indonesian Democracy, Monash University December 21, 1992.* This paper analyses state ceremony as an arena for ideological dissemination through ritual. This ritual constitutes a pattern of power relations among various ranks of civil servants and hierarchical relations with the state.

*Aris Arif Mundayat* 268
rank, for example, the governor will walk with others of high rank and his adjutant, in the university ceremony the lecturers usually walk with lecturers, and administrative staff walk together, they walk group by group depending on their position or rank. After they enter the ceremonial arena, the highest rank stands in the front line, and the lower ranks follow. There might be around twenty rows standing around the flagpole that is in the centre of ritual arena facing the office building. The important people, such as the governor, his vice-governor, high-ranking officers under the governor, and the administrators, will occupy special lines that point away from the office building but face the lower ranking civil servants. Hierarchy is important in this case and this is the locus where the hegemony operates and is reproduced.

After the people find their right lines, the ritual begins, and the announcer invites the governor (or the leader of ceremony) to get up on a small podium in the centre of the ritual arena. He walks to the stage and stands on the small podium, the ritual participants become quiet, and follow the ritual. In spite of the fact that the ritual looks serious, many people standing in the back rows talk softly, and only become serious when they must sing the Indonesian anthem, or read Pancasila or Sapta Prasetya Korpri (Seven Loyalty Vow for Indonesian Civil Servant).\(^{39}\) The important thing in this ritual is to raise the flag whilst simultaneously singing the Indonesian anthem (Indonesia Raya). Next is the reading of Pancasila (the state ideology of Indonesia) and the reading of Sapta Prasetya Korpri (the seven loyalty Vows of Indonesian Civil Servant) which are repeated by the participants. Then there is a moment of silence to remember the struggle of the heroes who died in the Independence War, or who died in other historical events. Finally the inspector of the ritual gives a twenty minute speech, consisting of two parts; ten minutes reading the text of the speech written by the governor’s staff, and

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\(^{39}\) There are a consequences if someone does not take the bureaucratic ritual seriously. On July 6, 1992, the Bupati of Pati (Central Java), Sunarji, punished one of his official employees since he assumed that his employee was undisciplined in the flag raising ritual, because he did not follow the reading of Pancasila. Accordingly, the Bupati ordered him to lay face downward in the yard under the intense sun for twenty minutes. This punishment elicited a reaction from the members of DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – Regional Council of Representatives) Kabupaten Pati. They promised the official employee of Kabupaten Pati that they would issue a warning to the Bupati. See "Sejumlah Karyawan Sesalkan 'Hukuman' Cara Bupati Pati" in Kedaulatan Rakyat. July 9, 1992: p 6. See also "Kasus Hukuman Tiarap: DPRD Berencana Sampaikan Nota Kepada Bupati Pati" in Kedaulatan Rakyat. July 11, 1992: p8
ten as a commentary on the text. The local government or provincial officials write this text, which then has to be read at the regency level, which then followed by a text prepared by the head of regency. So it is a uniform speech that can be found in a Monday ceremony across the regencies in Yogyakarta. Furthermore, the content of the message focuses on loyalty to the government; the importance of national stability; national identity (jati diri nasional) national development and the importance of office, such as the discipline in wearing uniforms and following the monthly ritual as I have explained in the previous chapter concerning the spectra of domination.

Within the context of the state nationalist imagination project, the idea to find the ‘authenticity’ and ‘jati diri’ (self-identity) has become a national effort to formulate the so-called ‘puncak-puncak kebudayaan’ (the peaks of civilization) as part of constructing Indonesia-ness. The Department of Culture and Education has become the master of the project, and the university and state research institutions have become the clients in conducting research to find its ‘puncak’ (peak) and explaining how it contributes to the nationalist state projects. This is a consequence of bureaucratic corporatism in channelling this kind of state nationalist imagination, which, to some degree, succeeded in creating a discourse of the state nationalist imagination at the academic level. The research concerning puncak-puncak kebudayaan as a research project reported by Sunarti (1995) entitled Wujud, Arti dan Fungsi Puncak-puncak Kebudayaan Lama dan Asli bagi Masyarakat Pendukungnya di Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta: Sumbangan Kebudayaan Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta terhadap Kebudayaan Nasional (The Manifestation, Meaning and Function of the Old and Original Cultural Peaks for the People in the Special Region of Capital City Jakarta: Contributions of Local Culture for the Special Region of the Capital City Jakarta toward National Culture) is evidence of the discursive practice of the state nationalist imagination. This research report identifies the authenticity of the cultural aspect in

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41 One of the examples of the state project to find the “puncak-puncak kebudayaan” through the research funded by the New Order government see Sunarti et al (1995), Wujud, Arti dan Fungsi Puncak-puncak kebudayaan Lama dan Asli Bagi Masyarakat Pendukungnya di Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta: Aris Arif Mundayat
Jakarta based on remnants of the ancient high culture that still exists in society.

The nomenclature *puncak-puncak kebudayaan* and *jatidiri* are aspects of the state nationalist project that reflect an interesting socio-political fantasy among state officialdom about ‘high culture’. In practice this kind of ‘culture’ relates to ideas about authenticity and identity. Socio-politically, this discourse has of the potential of being utilized to support the state nationalist project. To be effective, though, it must be displayed publicly. Under the New Order for more than 30 years, the nationalist project has had an impact on power relations between state and society. In this political context, the state (represented by the bureaucrats) had significant resources to construct the dominant discourse of the nationalist idea. Indeed, bureaucratic corporatism lubricated this project, as happened in the research project concerning *puncak-puncak kebudayaan*, which used the department of education and culture to channel the money to academics in universities throughout Indonesia. In this situation, the state nationalist imagination became popular among the civil servants, the military, and other organizations which were prepared to ascribe ‘truth’ to the state nationalist imagination. However, there are already in the real world different imaginations of nationalist ideas that are found at the level of very mundane life, sustained by vernacular nationalist imaginations. Through counter-discursive practice, the people at the grassroots express their visions in everyday life praxis. These vernacular discourses of nationalism act subversively against the state nationalist imagination. Importantly, they have become an alternative source for counter-discourses.

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*Sumbangan Kebudayaan Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta terhadap Kebudayaan Nasional. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Bagian Proyek pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta.* This kind of long title signifies a national research project to explore the *puncak puncak kebudayaan*. This title can be found in research and publications on different areas in Indonesia. The difference lies only in the name of the research location, the name of province.

43 John Pemberton demonstrates the significance of *keaslian* (authenticity) in cultural practices in Java. This idea is not only invoked by common people but also by politicians in their efforts to claim that every political practice shows authenticity. See John Pemberton, *On the Subject of “Java”*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1994
Within this largely regulated context, the vernacular nationalist imagination cannot be dominated by the state entirely. Moreover, there is a contradiction in the state nationalist imagination itself. The idea of *puncak-puncak kebudayaan*, often fails to satisfy the people since it is conceived in ways that satisfy state functionaries and to rationalise their desires to control the exercise of power relations. This is merely because the state nationalist imagination as reflected in the concept of *puncak-puncak kebudayaan* is based on a set of beliefs in that assume a kind of Darwinist cultural evolutionism. The category of *puncak* (the top or the peak) indicates the existence in the subsidiary levels of stages of cultural evolution. Their idea reflects a devaluation and even a fear of the ‘lower cultures’ that flourish among the *wong cilik*, or *rakyat* (people). These are placed at the opposite side of *puncak kebudayaan* (high culture), and become objects of suspicion, denigration and fear.

This fear demonstrates the state’s desire to marginalise lower culture that retains a degree of autonomy far from the centre of the regime’s power. In addition, this also reflects the state’s fear of alternative notions that originate among the *rakyat* (people), the vernacular nationalist imagination, and its potential to jeopardize the state’s symbolic power. Because of this, the state’s nationalist imagination, that has become popular among state functionaries, has become very elitist. In reality, this project showed a contradiction between the state fantasy of popularizing the state nationalist imagination, while at the same time also seeking to maintain their elitism through a hierarchy that is essential to their political cosmology. Accordingly, I would argue that Suharto’s regime presented a nationalist vision that was flawed by its claim to speak for the nation whose people it neither trusted nor valued on their own terms. In turn the counter-discourses stemming from the vernacular language of the has a substantial potential to corrode the state promulgated visions of the nation.

**C.2. Wong Cilik and the Vernacular Nationalist Imagination:**
**Subverting the State Nationalist Project**

At 22.00 O’clock in April 1998, around a month before the resignation of Suharto as the president of Indonesia, some street musicians sung ‘Indonesiaku’ (‘My Indonesia’) loudly on the sidewalk where the street traders, *becak* drivers, and
customers of Pak Yanto’s Warung angkringan sat near the intersection of Malioboro and Sosrowijayan Streets. They did not sing to get money at that time, but were just playing guitar with friends as a jam session, to kill time, and to improve their guitar playing abilities. The song ‘My Indonesia’ was created by Papa T Bob, a famous producer of children’s songs. This song was sung firstly by Enno Lerian on TV and has been recorded on cassettes and CDs. She is one of the famous children singers of the early 1990s. When I listened to the song from the street musicians I noticed that the lyric was totally different to that sung by Enno Lerian. The differences are apparent if we compare the two lyrics:
## FIGURE 7: *Indonesiaku* (‘My Indonesia’): Two Versions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Indonesiaku</strong> (My Indonesia)</th>
<th><strong>Intro:</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By: Papa T Bob (original Version)</td>
<td>Batik Solo, empek-empek Palembang, peuyem Bandung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau makan direstoran Padang, bukan berarti harus ke Padang (Want to eat in Padang Restaurant, it does not mean [we] have to go to Padang)</td>
<td>(Solo Batik, Palembang empek-empek, Bandung peuyeum)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cukup ada disini dekat kita sendiri (It is close enough to us)</td>
<td>Kalian kesana juga tidak apa-apa, Indonesia kaya kok ada 27 propinsi mau berlibur mau tamasya lengkap deh.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita tinggal menikmati (We just enjoy it)</td>
<td>(All of you going there It is alright, Indonesia is rich, [we] have 27 Provinces, [if] you want to go for holiday its very complete)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau makan nasi Gudeg Jogja, bukan berarti harus ke Jogja (Want to eat Gudeg Jogja, it does not mean [we] have to go to Jogja)</td>
<td>Mau makan buah pisang ambon (want to eat Ambon Banana)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cukup ada disini dekat kita sendiri (It is close enough to us)</td>
<td>bukan berarti harus ke ambon (It does not mean [we] have to go to Ambon)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kita tinggal menikmati (we just enjoy it)</td>
<td>cukup ada disini dekat kita sendiri (It is close enough to us)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reff:</td>
<td>kita tinggal menikmati (we just enjoy it)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai Indonesiaku...hai Indonesiaku (Hi my Indonesia...my Indonesia)</td>
<td>dua makan buah jeruk Bali (want to eat Bali orange)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah subur rakyat makmur (Fertile soil people wealthy)</td>
<td>bukan berarti harus ke bali (It does not mean [we] have to go to Bali)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai Indonesiaku...hai Indonesiaku (Hi my Indonesia...my Indonesia)</td>
<td>cukup ada disini dekat kita sendiri (It is close enough to us)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aku sayang kepadamu (I care for you)</td>
<td>kita tinggal menikmati (we just enjoy it)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanam salak tumbuh salak (Plant salak grow salak)</td>
<td>Reff:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanam duren tumbuh duren (Plant durian grow durian)</td>
<td>Hai Indonesiaku...hai Indonesiaku (Hi my Indonesia...hi my Indonesia, tanah subur rakyat makmur (Fertile soil people wealthy))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanam padi tumbuh padi (Plant rice grow rice)</td>
<td>hai..Indonesiaku..hai Indonesiaku.. (Hi my Indoensia...hi my Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eno cinta kepadamu (Eno love you)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tanam jagung tumbuh jagung (Plant corn grow corn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tanam singkong tumbuh singkong (Plant cassava grow cassava)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Indonesiaku (My Indonesia)

| Lyric: Street Musician Version                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ref:                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|---|---                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |---|---                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| **Ingin makan uang rakyat.... banyak** (Want to eat people’s money....a lot)                                                                                           | E.. Indonesiaku **(Hey...my Indonesia)**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| **Bukan berarti harus memaksa** (it does not mean you must force them)                                                                                                    | Tanah subur rakyat ngangur **(the soil is fertile the people are jobless)**                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| **Cukup dengan korupsi semua terpenuhi** (just through corruption, it will be fulfilled)                                                                               | E...Indonesiaku **(hey ...my Indonesia)**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| **Kamu tinggal menikmati** (you just enjoy it)                                                                                                                                   | Sawah rakyat kamu gusur **(You displace people from their rice fields)**                                                                                                                                                       |
| **Ingin gusur tanah rakyat.....desa** (want to displace people from their land.... village)                                                                                 | Tanam padi tumuh pabrik **(Planting rice growing factories)**                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| **Bukan berarti harus ke desa** (it does not mean you have to go to the village)                                                                                              | Tanam jagung tumuh gedung **(Planting corns growing buildings)**                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| **Cukup dengan kolusi semua terpenuhi** (just through collusion, it will be fulfilled)                                                                                      | Tanam modal di korupsi **(Planting capital being corrupted)**                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| **Kamu tinggal menikmati** (you just enjoy it)                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

Papa T Bob’s version of ‘My Indonesia’ is categorised by street musicians as the song for the rich or *wong gede*. According to them it needs to be subverted in a different direction which matches the actual conditions they are familiar with and is suitable for the poor. When I asked who created the new lyric for that song they just said that the song’s lyric had already been long recognized by street musicians in Malioboro street and it belongs to the street musicians. However, one of them said that this lyric might have been created by SPI (*Serikat Pengamen Indonesia* = The Indonesian Street Musician Union)) members. Then when I discussed this song with an SPI members they said that they created these lyrics. When I then asked about plagiarism, they

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44 SPI (*Serikat Pengamen Indonesia* = The Indonesian Street Musicians Union) is formed in Jogjakarta, early 1990s by street musicians in Malioboro street. In the beginning the member of SPI were six persons and it seems the members have never increased after this union formed. After all this has become a name of a group, rather than a union. This group has a person who often writes the song lyrics then they compose it with music together. The writer of the lyrics and the song composer is named Joko. This group was among the street musicians who were actively involved in students discussions and political activism, especially by creating political lyrics against the New Order government. In post Suharto political reform period in Indonesia (2001-2004), they were often invited by students’ movements to sing songs in students discussions or seminars. They remain critical even towards the post-authoritarian government.
expressed an interesting argument as quoted below:

‘Menjiplak irama musik tidak masalah, siapa yang mau menuntut orang miskin macam kita ini, yang penting adalah ide untuk membalik lirik asli ke arti yang berlawanan dan kemudian dinyayikan untuk umum. Ini penting karena lagu asli ditujukan untuk anak orang kaya, dan ini kan mempromosikan Indonesia yang ideal. Faktanya, kenyataaan yang ada justru berbalik dengan kondisi sosial yang nyata yang ada di Indonesia di bawah pemerintahan Suharto. Jadi penting untuk membalik arti dari lirik asli, dengan cara ini anak-anak miskin dikampung tahu bahwa yang indah-indah dari orang kaya itu tidak selalu benar. Kalau lagu ini dinyanyikan untuk orang kaya yang makan di warung lesehan Malioboro mereka juga akan merasakan bahwa ada orang miskin yang menderita’

(‘Plagiarizing the rhythm of music is not a problem for us. Who will sue the poor people like us? The important thing is the idea to turn the original lyrics into the opposite meaning and sing that song publicly. The original song is for rich children, and it promotes an ideal image of Indonesia. In fact, the situation [described in the song] is the opposite of the actual social conditions which exist in Indonesia under Suharto’s regime. So it is important to turn the meaning of the original lyrics into its opposite. Tis the his way the poor kids in kampongs will understand that the beautiful things the rich [talk about] are not always correct. If this song is sung in front of the rich who eat in the warung lesehan in Malioboro they would feel that there are some poor who are suffering’)

From the idea of subverting the lyric of the song, we can see that this is a conscious attempt to encourage the poor children to become more politically critical toward the state. Moreover, not claiming that they created the lyric can be seen as an assertion that this song belongs to every one, which means that all wong cilik share the same problem. By copying music which is already familiar to them it is easy for the audience to follow the new lyrics created by SPI members. Their political agenda in this case is obviously one of subverting the state by creating an alternative discourse addressed to the wong cilik. The musicians want to encourage poor children to sing the new lyrics whilst still using the original music that so familiar and easily remembered. The street musicians sing this song in the kampongs, on the buses, on the sidewalk, and on the street so the people will be just as familiar with the subversive rendering of the song as they are with the original.

Through the sharp contrasts they set between the two lyrics, the street musicians and some other wong cilik have devised simple means of dramatising the social and economic disparities around them. The song is then reproduced by many other street
musicians who sing it in numerous places where the poor live in Yogyakarta. The original song of Papa T Bob is full of the self-congratulation of the *wong gede* and shows how easy it is for the *wong gede* to live in Indonesia, because everything is just around us, waiting to be enjoyed. For the street musicians who are economically marginalised, living in Indonesia is indeed not that easy at all, quite to the contrary. From their point of view the original song indicates that everything is already in the supermarket. As they said:


(’Buying local food from other place we don’t have to go to the place where the food originated, because it is already in supermarket around us. Yes the Malioboro Mall supermarket is in front of us but we cannot afford it. We just can buy foods from *warung angkringan* from Pak Yanto or Pak Man. People like us buy rice and cloth from Beringharjo market not from the Malioboro Mall which provides imported rice and cloths. Everything is already in the supermarket, indeed. But we cannot afford it and because of this we have to love Indonesia? What kind of Indonesia? Eno’s song shows what Indonesia is like for the rich, and is very influenced by the New Order. As for the people like us, our Indonesia is the one in the song.’)

From this we can see how their critical consciousness is developed as part of their craft and disseminated through the space where they hang out in their everyday lives, and the streets, *warungs*, buses and kampongs where they struggle to earn a living. This is their space, and from it they draw their political ideas and let them crystallize spontaneously into an oppositional discourse. Papa T Bob’s song is

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45 This account based on my observation in 1998 --it was around 22.00 at night-- which involve discussion with the street musicians in Malioboro street sidewalk. It was in the warung pak Yanto, and the situation was very informal. At that time people hanging out together and listening what the street musicians argued about the meaning of Indonesia for the *wong cilik*. Some people involve in this warung
categorised as belonging to the dominant groups, the rich or wong gede, and it is ‘very influenced by the New Order’ (‘dipengaruhi oleh Orde Baru banget’). For the wong cilik, the dominant state and its discourses have become an object to be subverted through any available means of contestation until it loses its efficacy and its meanings are problematized. This is the way they work against the state by providing an alternative mode of imagining Indonesia as a rejection of the state nationalist imagination.

Nationalist imaginings found among originated from the wong cilik are distinct from the state nationalist imagination. This state nationalist idea issues ceaselessly from the vast means of communication commanded by bureaucratic corporatism. By contrast, wong cilik vernacular nationalist ideas utilize vernacular languages and oral communication, and are disseminated through innumerable, localised, interpersonal exchanges in everyday life. This vernacular language can be identified to some extent by its vocabulary and grammatical usages. But it also employs particular expressions that might be a bilingual mixture of mother tongue and Indonesian, or of a vernacularised Indonesian. The boundaries are subtle, because the schooling system already acts to adjust grammar and vocabularies and to incorporate many popular usages into the official Indonesian language. People use this evolving, blended, national language (Indonesian), but still maintain their localised mother tongue as well. The street vernacular is also influenced by the fact that street musicians are not drawn from one ethnic group but rather from the many ethnic groups across Indonesia. Their language is blended and constantly evolving in a dynamic relationship with people’s lived experience — a process clearly beyond the prescriptive reach of the state.

Opportunities for the construction of vernacular nationalist imagination involving street musicians and other ‘organic intellectuals’, merging with the blend of

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46 In the Indonesian dictionary published by Department of Education and Culture many of the words come from vernacular language without the dictionary indicating mentioning whether they are colloquial or not. It only mentions place of origin of the word. To a great extent, even though much of the vernacular language can be found in the Indonesian dictionary it does not mean it has lost its vernacular spirit. This dictionary tended to officialise most of the vernacular expressions. See Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa (1991) Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan
spectators around the warung, readily and naturally develop as a ritual arena for the wong cilik to synthesize their own imaginings concerning their identity. Their sense of ‘keindonesiaan’ (‘Indonesianess’) goes in the opposite direction to the design of the state nationalist project. The way the wong cilik give meaning to so-called ‘Indonesia’ is based on their actual experiences, and these especially include experiences of facing the police and military. Such experiences have already been expressed as a song entitled ‘Mengadu pada Indonesia’ (‘Complaining to Indonesia’). 47

FIGURE 8: ‘Mengadu Pada Indonesia’ by Joko Nugroho

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mengadu Pada Indonesia</th>
<th>Complaining to Indonesia (Translation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oleh: Joko Nugroho</td>
<td>By Joko Nugroho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hari ini sengaja aku mengadu padamu Indonesia</td>
<td>Today I intend to complain to you Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tentang sistem Orde Baru yang menyikaku, o.. tentu kamu tahu Bayangkan ulah mereka</td>
<td>About the New Order system that tortures me, o...you know about that Imagine their act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mereka sok berkuasa</td>
<td>They are really over-acting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mereka suka menyiksa</td>
<td>They like to torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahkan membunuh sudah biasa</td>
<td>They even get used in killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aku melihat tindakan aparat</td>
<td>I witness the apparatuses act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukul sana, pukul sini sampai rumah sakit</td>
<td>Hit [some one] over there, hit [some one] over here until hospitalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aku melihat kekejaman aparat</td>
<td>I witness the cruelty of the apparatuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendang sana, tendang sini sampai ke akhirat</td>
<td>Kick [some one] over there, kick [some one] over here to death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialan-sialan</td>
<td>Damn, damn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Aparat kayak preman | The apparatuses are like preman (lit: freeman, negative connotations meaning ‘criminal’)
| Rakiat kecil dijadikan bahan percobaan | The lower class people are for exercise |
| Sialan-sialan | Damn, damn |
| Aparat kurang ajar | The impolite apparatuses (kurang ajar literally means less educated) |
| Kuasanya melebihi kuasanya Tuhan | Its power more powerful than God |

Kebudayaan, Balai Pustaka.

47 The author of ‘Mengadu pada Indonesia’ is Djoko Nugroho, a member of Serikat Pengamen Indonesia, he wrote this lyric in 1994. (SPI).

Aris Arif Mundayat
This text originates from their experiences of state violence — either directly or as witnesses. These are the experiences that they share among themselves. They then reflect upon it as the collective experience of those they call rakyat kecil (lit: little people or wong cilik). This song is performed in front of the warung customers, in buses, in their jam sessions and also in university discussions especially when invited by student activists to sing in front of the audience of a seminar or discussion. The arena used by street musicians are not restricted to the street. There are a range of venues where they perform. Their music goes beyond that space. The language they employ in this song’s lyrics includes colloquial swearing. The SPI members also often face difficulties when they sing this song in the warung, because this is a space where the preman also hang out. The preman ask them to stay away from them when they are spending time in the warung.

One interesting point about the song’s title, Mengadu Pada Indonesia, is that it imaginatively addresses Indonesia as ibu pertiwi (mother nature). They explain that this expresses their complaint to their ibu (mother) because they are abused by the bapak (father) figure here represented through police, military, and preman. This kind of idea also reflects the experience of the street dwellers who were mostly abused by their fathers rather than their mothers. In this case, the allegory of the regime is imagined as a jagoan bapak figure rather than as the mother. From this understanding, complaining about brutality of the regime’s behaviour to the people shows that the imagination of Indonesia runs in parallel with ideas of the proper relationship between a mother and her children rather than a father and his children one. This song stresses the children’s complaints to their mother, expressing their sadness and anger that their father always abuses them, while their mother cannot do anything but witness the abuse. The factors that might also influence this situation are their experiences of life before they left their home and family. The way they imagine the regime is affected by their own personal

48 The stories of everyday life violence occurred among the street dwellers are described by Heri Bongkok. This is based on a personal experience that shows how the people on the street endure struggle and suppression and how they have to suppress each other in order to survive. Heri Bongkok is illiterate. This personal story is transferred into a book through the help of recorder technology provided by Girli NGO members. See Heri Bongkok, Perjuangan dan Penindasan. Yogyakarta: YLPS. Humana. 1995

49 For further discussion about the experiences of street dwellers see Kirik Ertanto (1994), “Ora Ono Aris Arif Mundayat
experiences in facing police or other state functionaries which are invariably figured as a male (father). In contrast, they imagine their nation as female (mother). This is also parallel to the concept of ‘ibu pertiwi’ (lit: Mother Nature, meaning mother country, or specifically nation).

Linguistically, this verse is in total opposition to the state nationalist imagination. It is the opposite because the state nationalist imagination refers to patriotism originating from a male militaristic perspective: the discourses of bapakisme (fatherism) and jagoanisme (machismo) are embedded in the state as I have explained earlier. From this we can note that state nationalist imagination tends to unify state and nation as a single entity that cannot be separated and which has a ‘male-centric’ image.

On the other hand, the vernacular nationalist imagination stems from the idea of ibuism (matrifocality) which reflects a non-violent symbolic power and tends to construct ‘mother/children-centric’ image. In this case, we can see that the attempts of the wong cilik to connect nation with the figures of mother/children rather than father and they position themselves as rakyat or people.

The idea of ‘mother/children-centrism’ in the vernacular nationalist imagination stems from wong cilik propensity to draw on their own experience in giving meaning to Indonesian nationhood rather than summoning up images of an exotic classical past to construct their nationalist discourse. Their memorized history or experiences of violence from state functionaries or even from their own fathers, contributes to ‘mother/children-centrism’ and thereby has become quite the opposite to the state nationalist imagination project. The experience of traumatic violence among the wong cilik, for example, can be seen in the text and picture below:

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Bapak-Bapakan Kabeh Bapak Bajingan”, a seminar paper on *Keluarga, kekerasan dan Perubahan Sosial di Indonesia* (‘Family, Violence and Social Change in Indonesia’) Yogyakarta, December 3, 1994. Kirik Ertanto’s real name is Bambang Ertanto Cahyo Dewo, he is an officer from Girli NGO in Yogyakarta. Kirik Ertanto quoted this expression in his seminar paper which originated from the street children who experienced domestic violence. When this seminar was held, and Kirik Ertanto finished his presentation, one of the audience emotionally said “jika semua bapak-bapak bajingan, maka bapak pembangunan juga bajingan” (if all fathers are bastards, then the father of development is also a bastard). This expression referred to Suharto who was nominated by a sycophantic parliament as the “Bapak Pembangunan” (the father of development).

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50 This is an interview between Bongkok and Ji’i. It is interesting that Bongkok already assumed that Ji’i
**Bongkok:** Kenapa kamu bisa masuk penjara? (How can you be jailed?)


(First of all, I was jailed because I helped a friend. He is my closest friend. He told me that he had a problem. Then I helped him, but suddenly the police arrested me. When I entered the police station, I was bashed up, hit up by the police. I had to say where my other friends were, I said that I did not know because they are the street kids as well. After that I was jailed in Wirogunan prison house.)

**Bongkok:** Digebukin pakai apa aja itu... (Bashed up with what ...?)

**Ji’i:** Ya..., pakai shock breker, pakai shock breker. Sampai dua minggu ngga bisa jalan. Abis itu proses udah selesai saya di bawa ke LP Wirogunan. Setelah saya sampai sana itu....

(Ya..., with a shock breaker, with a shock breaker. For two weeks, I couldn’t walk. After that was over, I was brought to Wirogunan prison house.)

**FIGURE 9: Peri’s Sketch: Mother’s World and the World of the Street**

Source: Jejal, Edisi Mei/VI/1998, the size of picture is reduced 50% from the original

was bashed up before Ji’i told him. This assumption also comes from Bongkok’s experience who faced a similar situation many times. Quoted from “Disana saya digebukin digebukin Polisi saya” in Jejal, Edisi Mai/VI/1998. Yogyakarta: YLPS Humana. This kind of experience is not only faced one time in their life but many times.
The absence of a mother figure in their real life and the existence of a dominant ‘father’ (which may appear as police, military or preman) figure who preys on them violently has become a contrast in figuring out their nationalist imagination. The image of ibu (mother) has become an important figure as drawn in the picture above, it drawn by a street kid in Malioboro Street. He missed his mother and his home but he does not want to go home for fear of his father. This picture shows the figure of a mother (ibu), the kid himself named Peri, a house with an Indonesian flag on the roof, a TV and stereo — electronic devices he cannot afford — and a bus as his space (with other street kids) — for material and discursive struggle. All of these display the street kid’s imagination about home, street, and mother as the ones he misses most. In imagining home and mother, the street kids often behave strangely during the month of Ramadhan (fasting month) and Idul Fitri (The final day of Fasting month) by travelling to their home town in order to find their mothers. They rarely find them, and they grieve for their loss. Moreover, they also wish to have a settled life. Accordingly, we just can say that this picture reflects a kind of fantasy world that they miss, the world of ‘mother’ or the world without a father figure, who is clearly absent from this picture. It also means that this is a picture of denial or rejection of the father figure, as most children who become street dwellers experienced abuse from their father which made them run away from home, as in Dodo story in the previous chapter.

Our examination of the project of the state nationalist discourse under Suharto’s regime reveals that it tends to connect Indonesia with an ideas of militarism and a classical past. In addition the project tends to promote something ideal, something that can engender public pride, that can justify the use of authority, and is compatible with the idea of ‘negara kuwat’ (strong state) and a leader who has the character of ‘berbudi bawa leksana’ (wise and charismatic). The classical past in the nationalist idea is reflected in the Butir-butir Budaya Jawa used by Suharto to expose the idea of militarism, and also to invoke to ‘the blessings of God’ as I explained previously. His idea also shows how he connected himself and his family with the nation through state ideology and the maintenance of national stability. Suharto’s ideas, which served as the blueprint for many dominant power-holders in society, seek to juxtapose ‘family’ and ‘country’ to stress the primacy of the goal of preserving unity, and fusing the ideal
unification of the nation with the unity and inviolability of the state. The street musicians actually also utilise the concept of ‘family’ but not in harmonious terms but rather the trauma of broken homes, dysfunctional families where the father abuses the family members, where those who suffer are the mother and children (the rakyat). This understanding has become a source of oppositional discourses against the state.

A hatred against the father is expressed in Ertanto’s paper entitled ‘Ora ono bapak-bapakan kabe bapak bajingan’ (‘There is no father, all fathers are bastards’). When this seminar was held, and he finished his presentation, one person in the audience emotionally said ‘jika semua bapak-bapak bajingan, maka bapak pembangunan juga bajingan’ (if all fathers are bastards, then the father of development is also a bastard). This response referred to Suharto who had been nominated as the ‘Bapak Pembangunan’ (the father of development). The hatred against pemimpin (leaders) or pejabat (high-ranking bureaucrats) among the wong cilik living on the sidewalk of Malioboro is often expressed through mockery. For example:

‘Pemimpin awake dewe ki parah ra iso di arepke, kelakuanne malah koyo celeng mangkane pas Suharto arep lewat Malioboro, cah-cah ngomonge: ‘celeng arep lewat ayo minggir-minggir’

(‘Our leaders are terribly hopeless, the way they act is just like swine, so when Suharto was passing Malioboro street, they said: ‘swine will pass here, come away from there’).

51 Kirik Ertanto (1994), “Ora Ono Bapak-Bapakan Kabe bapak Bajingan”. A seminar paper on Keluarga, kekerasan dan Perubahan Sosial di Indonesia. Yogyakarta, December 3, 1994. Kirik Ertanto’s real name is Bambang Ertanto Cahyo Dewo, he is an officer from Girli NGO in Yogyakarta. This NGO works in empowering the street kids. His paper explaining how the street kids experiencing violence from their father, and this experience creates hatred against father. Kirik Ertanto quoted this expression in his seminar paper from the street children who experienced domestic violence. I would like to thanks to Kirik Ertanto who allow me to interprete his data in different point of view. My interpretation of his quotation is based on the situation of seminar and I responsible solely with this interpretation.

52 This occurred when president Suharto and his ministers paraded through Malioboro Street in the late 1990s. The local government had asked that the side walk of Malioboro street be cleared of street traders, street children and becak drivers who were usually around there. This account is based on the information from Pendekar in Malioboro Street in 1998. Pendekar is a pseudonym of one of the street dwellers in Malioboro. He is one of the senior street children in that area. He also told me that the street children on Malioboro sidewalk do not like some academics researching them, but they will accept them if the academics establish good relationships with them. For them, the relationships are of primary importance rather than any interviews.
Wong cilik in Malioboro street characterised Suharto as a swine based on the understanding of the character of swine, as greedy animals who destroy farmers’ crops. When the local officials asked the street dwellers and traders not to have any activities on the sidewalk, they felt like they lost their income on the day Suharto passed Malioboro street. It was just like swine destroying farmers’ crops. The concept of pejabat (high-ranking bureaucrats), wong gede, bapak, ibu and rakyat, from the wong cilik’s point of view are not only representations of the family as a miniature of the state, but also an invocation of morality. For the wong cilik, a good pejabat or wong gede is the one who does not practice violence and who does not act like swine. The vernacularised language such as ‘ora ono bapak-bapakan, kubah bapak bajingan’ (There are no fathers and as such, all fathers are bastards), and celeng (swine) are not only a matter of opposing the dominant groups, but also a strong assertion of alternative ideas that define morality, truth and nationalist idea itself, beyond the official meanings provided by the regime. The idea of ‘ora ono bapak-bapakan, kubah bapak bajingan’ in this case can be viewed as an idea that breaks the hierarchical order established by Suharto’s regime, a hierarchy both of power and moral authority, in which the figure of bapak (father) is positioned at the apex.

The expressions uttered by street dwellers are actually instances of the attempts by an of the underclass which is marginalised by the regime to gain some power through the arenas of contestation they have created. Through this space –which is not only located on the concrete territories but also in imaginative space– they manufacture their own social world subversively against the dominant regime. Vernacular languages, which are already equipped with alternative ideas that come from a plurality of sources, subvert the wong gede creatively and continually through any kind of opportunity that lends itself to public performance or to the construction of meanings among their groups’ members.53 This situation not only reflects the condition of subjection but also

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53 Most of the street musicians are educated at least up to High school. Moreover, the interaction between students and people at the grassroots level in everyday life to a great extent influences their ideas in formulating their language. The stores which display televisions and public newspapers also disseminate information to street dwellers. Some street musicians and street children often try to send their works of art (song lyrics, or poetry) to the newspapers. Moreover, some street dwellers in Jakarta for example, were offered free health checks in the clinic by the ‘Angkatan 66 exponen’ (the exponent of 66). In 1995 for example, Golkar, through KUKMI (Kerukunan Usaha Menengah Indonesia = the association of
the sophisticated process of consciousness formation whereby through their choice and interpretation of social categories (such as bapak, jagoan, celeng) street dwellers are able to identify who is the suppressor, the target that must be subverted.

The creativity of the urban wong cilik in expressing ideas and in challenging the wong gede is manifest in many ways. It highlights the process of continual marginalisation of the wong cilik in urban areas which has, to a significant extent, made them more reliant upon their own resources—it has made them more self sufficient, more independent and more resourceful in their own struggle. This lies in direct opposition to the condition of the dependent middle class who rely on the state project and who depend upon the related socio-political and normative bonds that result in their dependence upon the state. The degree of independence and the feeling of freedom, has made people like street musicians, street children, becak (pedicab) drivers, taxi drivers and street traders draw upon their creativity to develop their own robust political consciousness which lies beyond the state design.

D. Summary

The contestation between the state and the wong cilik through their contrasting constructions of the nationalist imagination shows political phenomena in which the state, which is considered as the manifestation of a dominant regime, could not succeed in imposing its project over the entire society. It is only fully realized within the circuitry of the state, but is deflected among common people such as wong cilik at the grassroots level, who even ridicule such state projects. The attempt of the state to use the nationalist imagination to unify state and nation as an inseparable political unit also faces some failures when it is elaborated publicly, because it is logically and

middle entrepreneurs of Indonesia) also approached them for its own political purposes but they refused to cooperate because they would have to wear a yellow T Shirt and yellow equipment provided by Golkar.

K.R. Young, ‘Middle Peasant, Middle Bureaucrats: Middle Class?’ in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990. Young analyses this type of dependent middle class in which the majority depend on the connection to state apparatuses that has made them middle class.

54 K.R. Young, ‘Middle Peasant, Middle Bureaucrats: Middle Class?’ in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990. Young analyses this type of dependent middle class in which the majority depend on the connection to state apparatuses that has made them middle class.
normatively contradictory, and because the *wong cilik* have the ability to detect this and to deconstruct to yield different and even oppositional meanings. This shows that in these contestations there are no truly ‘dominant discourses’ but rather ‘contingent discourses’. They are contingent because all parties involved in this contestation struggle to give meaning to public symbols. There are many ways in which the discourses of the powerful can be disputed. The dominant social elements lose the efficacy of their discourse, yet the *wong cilik* texts also do not dominate in this contestation. This situation does allow subaltern spaces to form and to challenge dominant ideas. It allows the subaltern actors, here the *wong cilik*, to show their inventiveness in rejecting the *wong gede*, and the state and its projects of domination.

The regime has attempted to construct nationalist projects based on the perceived authenticity that is associated with the classical pre-colonial past. These constructs utilise a symbolisation of the state which embodies ‘male-centric’ ideas that they insist should be honoured by people. Moreover, this state of inherited nobility is glorified through public rituals. In everyday life practices, this was shown to involve a cleavage of discursive practices within the bureaucratic apparatuses. In this environment, the *pejabat tinggi* (high-ranking bureaucrats) and the lower-ranking bureaucrats reflect distinctions among themselves as well as towards the people. This discourse has been reproduced and disseminated widely through the practice of bureaucratic corporatism and its rituals. Furthermore, it was backed up by the stronghold of the military in politics in which created a pervasive aura of authoritarianism, state terrorism, and threat. In this environment, the vernacular discourse led a, more or less, subaltern existence. However, the *wong cilik* have been able to construct their own cultural productions, which they disseminate in the exchanges of mundane life, thereby opening discourse formation to processes of dynamic contestation.

According to the evidence I discussed in this chapter, when the two textual constellation contest each other, as between state nationalist project and vernacular nationalist idea, the dominant codes lose much of their efficacy and their meanings are rendered contingent rather than axiomatic. When meaning is contingent, the *wong cilik* has the opportunity to extend their subaltern space and to continuously produce counter
discursive ideas.

The techniques used by the state are deliberately ingrained in the dominant bureaucratic circuits. It is disseminated through state rituals in order to construct a social blueprint of the state nationalist imagination. The subaltern code uses a ‘mother/children’ nationalist fantasy based on such things as street kids cultural experiences. The Wong cilik have used their network through their spaces, such as warungs, sidewalks, jam sessions, and another subaltern spaces to disseminate their ideas and thus to counter the dominant discourses.

The role of vernacular language here has empowered the wong cilik’s creative capacity to subvert dominant projects, and to fashion their own vernacular nationalist imagination. The meaning of Indonesia as a political society is sited in a contested terrain in which the state and the rakyat both possess significant potency in cultural production and the means to construct their own nationalist imagination through dynamic discursive practices.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

This thesis started with questions of how power relations between *wong cilik* and *wong gede* have been constructed through discursive contestation, and how the *wong cilik* crystallize their ideas into oppositional discourses which counter the representations of the *wong gede* (the ruling classes and the rich). The empirical illustrations provided in this thesis were mainly taken from discursive exchanges in everyday life. I have examined discursive contestation between *wong cilik* and *wong gede* during the transition from Suharto’s authoritarian regime toward a more democratic polity. The thesis examined theoretical premises of power relations continuously negotiated through contestation. Unlike state-centric descending analyses, which lead us into particular understandings of state and bourgeois domination, and ascending analyses, which guide us into an understanding the procedures of internalization and systematization of domination through dominant discourses, contestation analysis is better equipped to elucidate epistemologically the dynamic and contingent nature of power relations. The theoretical inadequacies of both descending and ascending analyses (reviewed in chapter one) can be overcome in contestation analysis by advancing the concept of ‘contingency of meaning’ in the processes of discourse and counter-discourse formation. However, we should recognize theoretically, as well as from our field experiences, that the *wong gede*’s desire — represented by elements of the ruling class, such as the police, and state officials — to dominate, to assert the exclusivity of their version of truth and to define the legitimate forms of power relations, can never be totally realized. On the other hand, the oppositional consciousness of *wong cilik* is often manifest episodically. It tends to surge into the public arena in crisis situations like the late 1990s economic crisis. However, it is an enduring aspect of *wong cilik* communities, since it is deeply rooted within their own discursive constructs and moral outlook, and because it arises from practices of everyday life.

The class consciousness of the *wong cilik* is operationalized primarily through the manifest social differences they are constantly confronted with, and the specificities of their
historical backgrounds. It crystallizes and materializes in discursive terms mainly through the ongoing daily experiences of contestation with wong gede discourses in subaltern spaces, of which the warung is a salient arena, a paradigmatic space where the different social worlds intersect. The wong cilik have their own historical experiences and these are sharply different from those of the wong gede. The underclasses always emphasize, through their distinctive and class specific discourses and class specific rituals enacted in places like the warung, that they are different. The discursive and normative ruptures thus achieved mean that the dominant discourses stemming from the wong gede — primarily ritualized through state ceremonies — have diminished influence on wong cilik consciousness. The acquisition and production of subaltern space is essential to their material and discursive struggle. Warungs, and certain other public places are the best examples of subaltern spaces, as already discussed throughout the thesis. The construction of spaces by the wong cilik secures the fundamental base in the urban terrain for their distinctive cultural productions. Once the subaltern space is constructed it permits continual struggle and challenges against the attempts to implement dominant values from above. These struggles allow the wong cilik to contest such normative and epistemological concepts, rendering them contingent. This situation creates opportunities for them to decode and fashion different meanings from public sources, making them more meaningful for the wong cilik, and more consonant with their lived experience.

Warungs and other street venues in this thesis are important subaltern spaces where socially diverse groups gather. These sites are not merely milieux. Wong cilik spaces such as the warung and the street are actually manifestations of the creation of frontiers for material and discursive struggle. In the milieux of the warungs and the streets, power relations are relatively fluid. This gives the people feeling of freedom which in turn releases their creativity and their capacity to construct oppositional ideas that decentre wong gede discourses.

This contestation not only reflects power relations between the upper classes and the underclass, but also the contestation between the wong cilik and the state nationalist projects, and various attempts of state domination. We saw that the state, which is considered as the instrument of the dominant regime, could not succeed in imposing its
conceptual and normative projects over the entire society. It works principally within the
circuitry of the state apparatuses, especially among the civil servants. Wong cilik here have
their own creative responses which ridicule, negate, and decode such state projects. They
are able to do this because they have their own nationalist imagination based on the
cognitive, experiential and normative aspects of their own social experiences. The capacity
of wong cilik to decode dominant discourses shows that they have an ability to
deterioralize the wong gede, and the state: the bureaucrats, the rich, the thugs (preman)
and others who are perceived as members of the dominant groups. These urban subaltern
spaces secure arenas in which the wong cilik can manufacture oppositional ideas, while,
like the warung, they overlap and intersect with dominant worlds and allow connections to
be made between classes and spaces, but connections that are made somewhat more on the
underclasses’ own terms than those that the powerful seek to impose.

While wong cilik set up such protocols to decode the discourses of the wong gede
through their experiences, the state lays emphasis on the nationalist imagination as the key
to unifying the state and nation as an inseparable political unity, a fusion of state and people
revealed and venerated in the historical mythology constructed and disseminated by the
state itself. Such state attempts struggle in part because its nationalist project is built from
contradictory ideas. This is because the attempt by the state to dominate the wong cilik
under a state discourse that celebrates the unity of the people, actually, at the same time,
marginalizes them discursively. Because of such manifest imperfections, the wong cilik
have their own ability to deconstruct and decode the dominant discourse and to introduce
different meanings that correspond better with their lived experience thus making the
dominant values appear contingent rather than axiomatic. In these contestations there is
therefore no dominant ‘regime of truth’; perhaps even the truth itself becomes contingent.
Even though the dominant discourses lose much of their efficacy, it does not follow that
wong cilik discourses displace them totally in the language game of contestation.

The regime’s attempt to construct nationalist projects based on the authenticity of
the political and cultural ‘golden ages’ of the past reveals a propensity to use ‘male-centric’
symbols that are glorified in state rituals and that are designed to construct and assert the
general truth of this nationalist discourse. Moreover there is an internal cleavage between
the *pejabat* (high-ranking bureaucrats) and the lower-ranking bureaucrats, and this discourse also emphasises distinctions of power, status and knowledge toward common people. This discourse has been reproduced and disseminated widely through the practice of bureaucratic corporatism and its associated rituals. Furthermore, it was backed up by the coercive stronghold of the military in politics in which created a pervasive aura of authoritarianism, state terrorism, and threat.

However, vernacular discourse is a pervasive resource that, more or less, gives latitude to subaltern existences and allows the *wong cilik* to construct their own relatively autonomous cultural productions. These are created as part of real mundane life and are a key resource for dynamic underclass contestation of dominant discourses. When the two texts contest each other, as between state nationalist project and vernacular nationalist idea, according to the evidence I discussed in this thesis, the dominant codes fail to achieve the axiomatic status they assert, and their efficacy is seriously eroded. The nationalist project established by the state becomes once again contingent, as do certain other attempts to dominate the *wong cilik*. When dominant values are shown to be contingent, the *wong cilik* have the scope to advance their subalternal values and to continuously produce counter discourses within the spatial, economic and discursive fields they have established in *warungs* and on the streets. Various crucial meanings remain disputable and do not become secure beyond further challenge, and thus are never entirely fixed. These conditions have stimulated the creativity of the *wong cilik* and made the contestation of textuality become more dynamic.

The crucial problems of contestation discussed in this thesis, can be formulated into various forms of discursive struggles. First, the *wong cilik* counter discourses developed out of resentments against the dominant regime imposed and represented by the *wong gede* (state functionaries such as the police, kampong officials, etc.; and the rich, represented by such people as shop owners, encountered directly in their daily struggles). They have devised ways of negating the attempts to establish uniform value systems based on the dominant class point of view. Secondly, *wong cilik* counter discourses arose from and could be fashioned in the context of subaltern spaces created and secured by the socio-economic and discursive struggles of the *wong cilik*. The underclasses secured important degrees of
freedom in these urban spaces. These were arenas that are not completely dominated by the authoritarian state. These spaces were their arenas, their base, places where they could articulate their consciousness in ways that were consonant with their everyday life practices. The discursive potency of these urban spaces is evident in specific moments such as in the jam sessions of the street musicians. These are their own distinctive rituals that provide a means through which the wong cilik can improve their solidarity, and disseminate the songs they create to articulate their own representations of the social order, and, in various complementary ways, continually create counter discourses. Thirdly, their consciousness of being wong cilik and their historical memory as marginalised and oppressed social groups, were effectively mobilized to inspire their own formulations which openly challenge dominant discourses. These kinds of identity and their associated discourses have become basic resources in the ongoing struggle to secure stable power relations between wong cilik and wong gede. Fourthly, everyday life, and the kinds of thematic and episodic events of contestation that we have examined, ground the discursive opposition of the underclass in the realities of their daily struggles and lived experience.
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