STUDIES

MAO IN MUFTI:
NEWLY IDENTIFIED WORKS BY MAO ZEDONG*

John Fitzgerald

Ziren as an Alias of Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong was a prominent Guomindang (GMD) official in Guangdong for about a year between September 1925 and mid-1926, but little has been revealed about his activities during this period because his association with Chiang Kai-shek has remained a source of some embarrassment to historians on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. As the relevant files in the archives of both the GMD and the Communist Party of China (CPC) are closed to researchers, progress in mapping Mao’s early years has inevitably taken the form of discoveries of his speeches and writings in places readily accessible, but hitherto overlooked.1 It is well known that during his stay in Guangdong Mao edited the GMD magazine Zhengzhi zhoubao (Political Weekly), from which a number of articles have been culled for inclusion in compendia of his collected works.2 I shall argue that Mao’s most important contributions to this magazine have, however, been overlooked to date through failure to recognise that five additional articles published in this magazine under the name Ziren (子任) were also written by Mao Zedong.

My attention was first drawn to the possibility of Ziren being an alias of Mao Zedong while leafing through the earliest issues of the GMD Propaganda Bureau’s Zhengzhi zhoubao and noticing that the back cover publication details listed the responsible person at the magazine’s Guangzhou head office as Mao Ziren. The magazine’s Guangzhou editor was in fact Mao Zedong. Could their shared surname have been mere coincidence? In pursuing this question a number of other coincidences came to light. In order to demonstrate that there was but one Mao in the Guangzhou office, I shall interweave the known facts about Ziren with relevant data on Mao Zedong, and assess the significance of these coincidences.

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The second coincidence to emerge was that, although two Ziren articles were published in *Zhengzhi zhoubao*, Issue 4 (10 January 1926), Ziren was in fact listed as the responsible person for Issues 1, 2 and 3 (5, 13 and 20 December 1925) only, of the fourteen issues published. Mao Zedong’s generally acknowledged contributions to the magazine, both under his given name and under his style, Run, also ceased with the third issue. (The appearance of a piece by Mao Zedong in Issue 6/7 may be discounted, as it was not written in his capacity as editor but as a reprint of his speech to the Second National GMD Congress published alongside many other such speeches in an issue devoted exclusively to that congress.) Hence, before the fourth issue went to press, both Mao Zedong and Ziren had left the offices of *Zhengzhi zhoubao*.

The third point of coincidence is that Mao Ziren, like Mao Zedong, was no mere letter-opening functionary in the magazine’s head office. The name Ziren is attached to five substantial articles over the first four issues, in a magazine otherwise devoted almost entirely to reprints of various speeches and party reports and to brief editorials by Mao Zedong under another alias. Furthermore, Mao Ziren’s equivalent in the Shanghai branch office of the magazine, as listed in the publication details, was the prominent GMD and CPC activist, Yun Daiying. It would appear that Mao Ziren and Yun Daiying held similar rank. As it happens, Yun was to the propaganda of the GMD Shanghai Executive Branch as Mao Zedong was to the propaganda of the GMD Central Executive Committee: each was at one time nominally second in command to Wang Jingwei in his respective GMD propaganda bureau, and each in fact ran the show.

The fourth and subsequent points of coincidence emerge in textual comparison of articles by Ziren and contemporary works by Mao Zedong. In the first place, four of the five pieces by Ziren are concerned primarily with the split within the GMD between the Guangzhou Central Executive Committee and the Western Hills Faction — that is to say, between the left and right wings of the party. (The exception is the text listed below as Ziren 2.) This topical concentration is significant, for if we exclude the articles previously attributed to Mao, then of the twenty-eight titles appearing in the first four issues only seven broach the topic in any substantial way: Ziren’s four account for over half of this seven, although his articles make up less than one-fifth of the twenty-eight in question. Lest these figures appear to cloud rather than clarify the issue, let me say that they are meant simply to demonstrate that Mao Ziren showed a characteristic partiality for writing about the split in the GMD. There is no doubt that Mao Zedong did likewise. On the whole, the brief editorials published under his style, Run, either deal with specific aspects or personalities of the split, or approach it indirectly by defending the presence of CPC members within the GMD. It appears that Mao Zedong, like Mao Ziren, saw his role in the
GMD as defender of the two-party alliance against attack from the GMD right wing.

The fifth point of coincidence is Ziren and Zedong’s shared concern about the deviant behaviour of the GMD Shanghai newspaper, *Minguo ribao* (Republican Daily). This paper’s publicity on behalf of the Western Hills Faction was quite properly the concern of Mao Zedong, who as acting head of the GMD Propaganda Bureau was empowered to censure wayward publications. He did in fact deliver a report on the paper to the Second National Congress of the GMD, and is said to have been personally involved in a short-lived venture to establish a newspaper entitled the *Guomin ribao* (Republicans’ Daily) to challenge the *Minguo ribao* in Shanghai. As it happens, the rightist deviations of *Minguo ribao* form the title and subject of one of Ziren’s five articles, listed below as Ziren 3.

The sixth point of coincidence lies in the roughly simultaneous attempts by Ziren and Zedong to fit the received categories of Chinese urban and rural groups into a classical Marxist framework. Each published his attempt in January or February 1926, Ziren with the article ‘The reasons underlying the secession of the GMD rightist faction and its ramifications for the future of the revolution’ (Ziren 5) in *Zhengzhi zhoubao*, and Zedong in his two justifiably celebrated articles, ‘An analysis of the various classes of the Chinese peasantry and their attitudes towards revolution’ (Zedong 1), and ‘Analysis of all classes in Chinese society’ (Zedong 2), which appeared in Issues 1 and 2 of *Zhongguo nongmin* (Chinese Peasant). These three articles are similar not only in their general aims, but also in their specific detail, both Ziren and Zedong making use of the five quasi-Marxist categories of ‘big bourgeoisie’, ‘bourgeoisie’, ‘petite bourgeoisie’, ‘semi-proletariat’ and ‘proletariat’ to classify some fifteen to twenty different Chinese socio-economic groupings. Despite minor variations in their classification, notably the addition of ‘small merchants’ and ‘lower intellectuals’ to the petit-bourgeois class in Zedong 2, each chose to divide China’s agreed population of 400 million between the five categories in exactly the same way (see table). If Ziren and Zedong deserve to share the credit for attempting such an analysis, then they must also share the blame for its shortcomings. Mao Zedong’s two articles have been thought to show that his grasp of Marxist theory at this time was highly deficient, and Ziren reveals precisely the same deficiencies.

The seventh point of coincidence centres on the stress placed by Ziren and Zedong, in the same three articles, upon the political postures of each of the classes under analysis and upon the practical implications of these postures for revolutionary action. It has been argued elsewhere that it was Mao Zedong’s concern with the practical implications of particular class attitudes which distinguished his analysis of Chinese rural society from that of his contemporaries, most notably from earlier class analyses by Chen
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* Zedong 1 appears to represent a transition between Ziren 5 and Zedong 2, listing 'share-croppers' and 'poor peasants', but explaining that they were simply sub-categories of 'tenant farmers'.

Duxiu. Ziren demonstrates an identical concern when he assigns each class under analysis a specific attitude towards revolution, mirroring Zedong even to the point of sharing his obsession with the role of the vacillating intermediate class in revolution. The small-landlord element of the 'bourgeoisie' is typified by Mao Zedong and Ziren alike as caught between the forces of revolution and those of counter-revolution, yet obliged by circumstances to come down on one side or the other; there was, as both insist, no middle way.

The eighth point of coincidence relates Ziren 5 to sketchy reports of a speech delivered by Mao Zedong to the First Guangdong Provincial Congress of the GMD in October 1925. Ziren ended his analysis of the vacillating intermediate class with a call for those wavering in the path of revolution to come over to the side of the revolution. In the terms of Ziren's explanation, the GMD right faction represented the bourgeoisie which, since the founding of the Republic, had hindered the progress of the revolution by trying to pursue an impossible middle way. Ziren argued that with the lines of battle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution now clearly drawn, there could be no option for representatives of the intermediate class but to join the party of revolution, or break away from it. The general framework of this argument foreshadows that of Zedong 1 and 2, but its specific application to the history of the Chinese revolution and the evolution of the GMD right faction appears to have no parallel in Mao Zedong's written work. Mao was, however, an orator as well as a pamphleteer, and the outline in contemporary newspaper reports of his speech to the GMD Provincial Congress indicates that he was concerned, like Ziren, with the indecisiveness of the 'middle-roaders' in the GMD. The central theme of Mao Zedong's speech to the congress was that the middle faction would have to make up its mind to move to the left or to the right, for under present circumstances it could no longer remain a middle faction. It is thus clear that Ziren 5 drew its central theme from a speech by Mao Zedong, and borrowed its analytical framework from articles Mao Zedong was drafting at the time.

The recurrence of key phrases and passages in Ziren 5 and Zedong 1 and 2 seals the case for their identity. Such recurrences are best illustrated by the passage in all three articles which explains the dilemma confronting the intermediate class at the current stage of the revolution. The argument, simply put, is that the bourgeoisie needs a revolution because its ambition to attain the status of big bourgeoisie is frustrated by a counter-revolutionary alliance of imperialists, militarists and the big bourgeoisie itself. Yet although it needs a revolution, the bourgeoisie is terrified of one occurring because the main forces lining up on the side of revolution are the national and international proletariat. Herein lies its dilemma. The similarity of argument and choice of words in the relevant passages of Ziren 5 and Zedong 1 and 2 suggest that they must have been written by the one hand (see texts overleaf).
TEXTUAL COMPARISON OF ZIREN 5 AND ZEDONG 1 AND 2

Ziren 5, from Zhengzhi zhoubao, 4 (10 January 1926), 12.

那些站于中间的中产阶级（小地主，小银行家及钱庄主，国货商，华资工厂主）其欲望本系欲达到大资产阶级的地位，为了帝国主义买办阶级大地主官僚军阀的压迫使他们不能发展，故需要革命。然因现在革命，在国内有本国无产阶级的勇猛参加，在国外有国际无产阶级的积极援助，他们对之不免发生恐惧，又怀疑各阶级合作的革命。


盖小地主为中国的中产阶级，其欲望为欲达到大资产阶级地位，建设一个一阶级统治的国家，然受外资打击军阀压迫不能发展，故需要革命。但因现代中国的革命运动，在国内有本国无产阶级的勇猛参加，在国外有国际无产阶级的积极援助，对于其欲达到大资产阶级地位建设国家主义国家的阶级的发展及存在，感觉着威胁，又怀疑革命。


这个阶级的欲望为欲达到大资产阶级的地位，然受外资打击军阀压迫不能发展。这个阶级对于民族革命乃取了矛盾的态度。即其受外资打击，军阀压迫感觉痛苦时，需要革命，赞成反帝国主义反军阀的革命运动。但因，现在的革命运动，在国内有本国无产阶级的勇猛参加，在国外有国际无产阶级的积极援助，对于其欲达到大资产阶级地位阶级的发展及存在，感觉着威胁，又怀疑革命。
Significance of the Discovery

What little is known of Mao’s activities in Guangdong has left an over-riding impression of Mao as a peasant movement theorist and advocate. He became acting head of the GMD Central Propaganda Bureau, and edited its Zhengzhi zhoubao, but he is thought to have spent most of his time in the Peasant Bureau across the corridor, teaching the fifth class of its Peasant Movement Training Institute, taking charge of its sixth class, joining its Peasant Movement Committee, and publishing his two seminal works of class analysis, Zedong 1 and 2, in the January and February 1926 issues of the Peasant Bureau’s journal, Zhongguo nongmin.8

This one-dimensional portrait of Mao as a peasant movement activist is fairly faithful, but not quite complete. Professor Stuart Schram has added a second dimension to the portrait by emphasising Mao’s simultaneous pre-occupation with problems of organisation and discipline within the GMD.9 Nor, in the same vein, should Mao’s role as GMD propagandist be overlooked in the search for the roots of his thinking on peasant revolution. Mao served the longest period of continuous tenure of any head or acting head of the GMD Propaganda Bureau over the critical period from its inception to the start of the Northern Expedition. He took charge of the Propaganda Bureau in the first week of October 1925, by decree of the 111th session of the GMD Central Executive Committee, and effectively ran the Bureau until the last week of May 1926, a period of eight months in all.10 The Propaganda Bureau had never known such continuity, having staggered through six brief spells of directorship over the twenty months leading up to Mao’s appointment, under Peng Sumin (two months), Dai Jitao (three months), Liu Luyin (one and a half months), Wang Jingwei (two months), Chen Yangxuan (six months), and again under Wang Jingwei (five and a half months). Such continuity, co-ordination and discipline as the Propaganda Bureau managed to achieve all fell within the period of Mao’s directorship.11

Ziren is the name Mao chose to go by when wearing the hat of GMD propagandist. Thus the five Ziren pieces help to delineate the features of Mao the propagandist, haranguing the GMD right wing, summoning support from its left, and offering an explanation of the course of the Chinese revolution in terms of class composition and conflict. As GMD propagandist, Mao was obliged to broach subjects which had little bearing on the Guangdong peasant movement and, in particular, to address the emerging split within the ranks of the GMD.

At the same time, as we assemble the mosaic of Mao the GMD propagandist, we find that some pieces fit just as neatly into the portraits of Mao the party organiser and peasant movement activist. In Ziren 5, for example, he ascribes left and right divisions within the GMD to class
differences between a rural 'big bourgeoisie' and vacillating 'bourgeoisie', on the one side, and 'petite bourgeoisie/semi-proletariat/proletariat' on the other, in a framework all but identical to his concurrent writings on the peasant movement (Zedong 1 and 2). The real significance of the find may lie not in how far the writings of Ziren the propagandist differ from those of Mao Zedong the peasant movement activist, but rather in how closely they resemble one another. The text of Ziren 5, although published in 1926, in fact dates from 1925, as indicated by Ziren's reference to the 1924 First National Congress of the GMD as having taken place 'last year'. Ziren 5 may in fact have been based upon Mao's speech of October 1925. It is identical in theme, it is similar to a speech in its highly repetitive format, and it ends with a terse slogan ('Revolutionary factions of the entire country, unite!') very similar to the one with which Mao is said to have ended his speech ('Long live the unity of the revolutionary faction!'). Having been written in 1925, it is quite likely that Ziren 5 predates Zedong 1 and 2, and if it is indeed based upon the text of Mao's October speech then it precedes them by quite some time. This in itself is significant, for it follows that Ziren 5 is Mao Zedong's first comprehensive attempt at a Marxist analysis of all the classes comprising Chinese society. For this reason a complete translation is appended below.

The five Ziren pieces show that the similarities were greater than the differences between Mao the peasant movement activist, Mao the party bureaucrat and Mao the GMD propagandist. Their discovery adds a third dimension to the customary portrait of Mao, but rather than alter its basic features brings them a little closer to life.

The Ziren Texts in Zhengzhi Zhoubao

Ziren 1 'GMD party members of the revolutionary faction arise en masse to oppose the meeting of the rightist faction in Beijing', 2 (13 December 1925), 5-11.

Synopsis: A brief introduction to numerous communications from the 'revolutionary faction', all of which support the Guangzhou GMD headquarters in condemning the defecting rightists.

Ziren 2 'The GMD selects students for Moscow Sun Yat-sen University', 2 (13 December 1925), 14-16.

Synopsis: Lenin and Sun Yat-sen shared a warm admiration for one another and an intense distaste for imperialism. Soviet respect for Sun lives on in the new university set up in his honour to train leaders for the Chinese revolution. (Includes lists of courses, students and teachers at the university, a summary of a speech by Wang Jingwei and the text of a speech by the Soviet adviser, Borodin.)
Ziren 3  ‘The reasons underlying the reaction of the Shanghai Republican
Daily, and the punitive measures adopted against it by the GMD
Central Executive Committee’, 3 (20 December 1925), 4-5.
Synopsis: At this critical juncture in the national revolution, the Republican
Daily has fallen victim to its own historical ties and class affiliations, and has
defected to the side of reaction.

Ziren 4  ‘Opponents of the meeting of the rightist faction are spread
throughout the entire country’, 4 (10 January 1926), 19-29.
Synopsis: In this second introduction to numerous telegrams from
opponents of the rightist faction (see Ziren 1), Ziren argues that the leftists
have the numbers on their side.

Ziren 5  ‘The reasons underlying the secession of the GMD rightist faction
and its ramifications for the future of the revolution’, 4 (10
January 1926), 10-12 (unabridged translation).
Some people say that a rightist faction has once again broken away
from the GMD through the machinations of the leftist faction, and that
this is unfortunate for the GMD and for the national revolution. This
opinion is incorrect. Such a split should occur at this time in a political
party of national revolution within semi-colonial China. It is an
inevitable phenomenon and, although no cause for rejoicing, it is
certainly no cause for regret. If you want to know why, then you need
only take a look at the current situation and at the history of the GMD
since the days of the Revive China Society and you will fully
understand.

The late eighteenth to early nineteenth century democratic
revolutions in Europe, America and Japan, in which the bourgeoisie
overthrew the feudal aristocracy, are completely different from the
late nineteenth to early twentieth century colonial and semi-colonial
national revolutions in which the petite bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat
and proletariat co-operate in resisting the imperialists and their
lackeys in the bureaucrat, militarist, compradore and landlord classes.
What is more, the 1911 Revolution was not the same as the current
one. The earlier bourgeois revolutions in Britain, France, Germany,
America and Japan were revolutions of the bourgeoisie alone, their
opponents being the national feudal aristocracy and their aim being to
set up nationalist states governed solely by the bourgeoisie. Talk of
liberty, equality and fraternity was a ruse on the part of the bourgeoisie
for deceiving and taking advantage of the petite bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. The immediate result was the attainment of their aims and
establishment of nationalist states, and the ultimate outcome was the
development of colonics and semi-colonies throughout the world and
the creation of international capitalist imperialism.
Modern colonial and semi-colonial revolutions are co-operative revolutions of the petite bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat and proletariat, in which the big bourgeoisie associated with imperialism makes up the force of counter-revolution, the bourgeoisie wavers uncertainly between revolution and counter-revolution, and the real force for revolution is made up of a revolutionary alliance formed by the three classes of petite bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat and proletariat. Its opponent is international imperialism and its aim is to establish a state governed by the revolutionary masses in co-operation. Its slogans of 'people's rights' and 'people's livelihood' are not ruses whereby one class deceives and takes advantage of another, but are joint political and economic demands of all revolutionary classes laid down in the platform of their political party by their representative Sun Yat-sen. The immediate result will be to establish states governed by the revolutionary masses, and the ultimate outcome will be the elimination of imperialism throughout the world and the establishment of a genuinely free and equal world alliance, of the kind Sun Yat-sen proposed in the words 'human equality and world harmony'.

Let us look now at the differences between the 1911 Revolution and the present one. Although the 1911 Revolution should have been directed essentially against international imperialism, the majority of party members failed to realise this at the time. Rightist leaders such as Huang Xing, Zhang Binglin, Song Jiaoren and so on, recognised only one enemy, the national Manchu aristocracy, and so their revolutionary slogans were confined to the simplistic 'Out with the Manchus!'. The organisation and make-up of the party was extremely elementary and its fighting ranks extremely thin, because there were no organised worker and peasant masses. Within China there was at the time no CPC to represent the interests of the proletariat and, beyond China, no international assistance for the revolution because there was no proletarian country, only capitalist countries, and no revolutionary alliance of oppressed classes, only an anti-revolutionary alliance of oppressive classes, in a world totally dominated by a few major powers. The situation today is the reverse of 1911: the target of revolution has already switched to international capitalist imperialism; party organisation has been gradually tightened with the addition of elements from the worker and peasant classes which have themselves become a force to be reckoned with in society; there is now a CPC, and on the international front there have arisen a proletarian country in Soviet Russia and a revolutionary alliance of oppressed classes in the form of the Third International to provide powerful support for the Chinese revolution from behind the lines. For these reasons, only a few revolutionary party members from among those who took part in the
1911 Revolution still forcefully advocate revolution, the great majority having either abandoned the revolutionary enterprise for fear of the current revolution, or defected to the ranks of counter-revolution to do battle with the GMD in its present form. Hence, as the revolution has developed and the GMD has progressed, the old and the new rightist factions have split off one by one like bamboo shoots from their stem.

If we want to understand fully the reasons for this split, we must also take a look at the social class affiliations of GMD members since the days of the Revive China Society. We know that the source of Sun Yat-sen’s earliest thinking on revolution was Hong Xiuquan, who led the rural proletariat in a peasant revolution against the Manchu aristocracy and the landlord class. In terms of organisation, the Revive China Society was a secret society which drew exclusively upon the proletarian éléments déclasseés. The Alliance Society was made up partly of overseas Chinese workers, partly of secret societies in China, and partly of overseas students of small-landlord background, and local students of small-landlord and owner-cultivator background. In all, the composition of the Alliance Society was a collection of four classes – the proletariat (secret societies), semi-proletariat (overseas Chinese workers), petite bourgeoisie (one section of local students), and bourgeoisie (overseas students and the other section of local students). At that time, leading the class of large landowners was the Emperor-Protection Party of Kang Youwei’s faction, standing in opposition to the Alliance Society of Sun Yat-sen’s faction which led the Chinese proletariat, semi-proletariat, petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie.

Following the initial success of the 1911 Revolution, one faction within the Alliance Society, representing small landlords, disapproved of the implementation of Sun Yat-sen’s proposals for equitable distribution of land titles and for restrictions upon capital, and in consequence disbanded the revolutionary Alliance Society, reorganised it into an unrevolutionary Nationalist Party, and brought together many political groups which represented the interests of the small-landlord class, thereby enabling the small-landlord class to form an absolute majority among Nationalist Party supporters. It had virtually no revolutionary character, even though it occupied a position in opposition to the representative of the large-landlord class, the Progress Party (the Progress Party grew out of the late Qing imperial provincial assemblies, which were organs of the large landlords in each province in exactly the same way that the Republican provincial assemblies are the organs of large landlords in every province today). Sun Yat-sen was furious on this account, and decided to organise the Chinese Revolutionary Party. He courageously adopted the word ‘revolutionary’
for the title of his party, and without any regrets broke away from the leader of the small-landlord class, Huang Xing, in order to preserve the integrity of the revolution. After declining to join the Chinese Revolutionary Party for fear of revolution, and thus breaking with Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing and the other leaders of the small landlords set up another organisation – the Society for the Study of European Affairs. In time, with the recruitment of many large and small landlords, this expanded into the Political Study Society. We need only note that virtually every single person in the Political Study Society is a member of the landlord class in order to understand why it is that they inevitably severed relations with Sun Yat-sen; why they have abandoned revolution; why they have gradually come to regard as their chief rival the Research Clique, which has evolved from the Progress Party and represents the large-landlord class; why they have finally come to form the Federation Faction (an as yet unformed political party which the landlord class in all southern provinces has been trying to organise for the past four years); why they support Zhao Hengti, Chen Jiongming, Tang Jiyaol and Xiong Kewu in wielding power over the southern provinces and in using the provincial and county assemblies and the armed might of the popular militia offices as tools for placing the rural owner cultivators, tenant farmers and farm labourers and the urban workers, peasants and small merchants under extreme oppression; and why they thus stand wholly on the side of counter-revolution.

When the Chinese Revolutionary Party was transformed into the GMD, a non-revolutionary faction of the bourgeoisie again entered the party, together with elements representing the compradore class. These occupied the managerial positions in the party, with the result that Sun and the minority revolutionary faction were still unable to carry out revolution. Then, in January last year, [Sun] boldly convened the party’s First National Congress, which decided in no uncertain terms to uphold the interests of the worker and peasant classes, to expand the organisation of the GMD by drawing upon the worker and peasant masses, and to allow communist elements to enter the party. When Mao Zuquan raised a note of dissension and opposed the admission of CPC elements at the reception for First National Congress delegates held at the Changti Asia Restaurant in Guangzhou in January of last year, Sun Yat-sen rose and delivered a long speech in which he said:

Over the past twenty years party members have consistently prevented me from carrying out revolution and have consistently cast aside the principle of ‘people’s livelihood’. There are many who follow me, but they always want to make their own decisions; there would not be more than twenty people who, like Wang Jingwei, genuinely follow me to carry on the revolution. Now today, you also want to prevent me accepting revolutionary youth!
Everyone who attended the First National Congress heard what Sun had to say.

The first to be offended by this action were the leaders of those representing the compradore class, Feng Ziyou and Ma Su, who were also first to team up with the imperialists and militarists, leave the GMD and set up another organisation — the Comrades' Club. Through the work of the GMD left faction in Guangdong over the past two years we have offended the imperialist compradore class by supporting worker unity and strikes, have offended the landlord class by supporting peasant unity and rent reductions, and have offended such tools of imperialism and representatives of the compradore and landlord classes as Wei Bangping, Chen Jiongming and Xiong Kewu by using forceful measures to respond to the reactionary clique and defend the revolutionary base. Hence we have activated a new rightist clique, which has already held a gathering in Beijing and which plans to break away from the GMD led by the left faction, in order to set up another GMD of the right faction. We have heard that during the meeting in Beijing the views of the faction representing the small-landlord class and native industrial and commercial bourgeoisie clashed with those of the faction representing the compradore class, with the former proposing to leave Beijing for the south before the meeting had drawn to a close. We believe this phenomenon to have been inevitable as well.

China has already reached the time of fixing bayonets for close combat: standing to one side is a counter-revolutionary united front made up of the big bourgeoisie of compradores, great landlords, bureaucrats and militarists, all under imperialist leadership; and on the other side a revolutionary united front consisting of the petite bourgeoisie (owner cultivators, small merchants, handicraft industry proprietors), the semi-proletariat (part-owner cultivators, tenant farmers, handicraft workers, shop assistants, small peddlars) and the proletariat (industrial workers, coolies, farm labourers, proletarian éléments déclassés). Those bourgeois classes standing in the middle (small landlords, small bankers and money-lenders, dealers in Chinese goods, and native industrialists) basically just want to attain the status of the big bourgeoisie, but are unable to develop because of the oppression of the imperialist compradore class, large landlords, bureaucrats and warlords, and so need a revolution. Yet as the current revolution enjoys the forceful participation of the national proletariat at home and the active assistance of the international proletariat abroad, they cannot help growing afraid and harbouring suspicions about a revolution in which many classes co-operate.

The Chinese bourgeoisie (excluding its left wing, that is, those members of the bourgeoisie who by virtue of special historical or
environmental circumstances are able to co-operate in revolution with other classes; they are very few in number) is still dreaming to this very day of an old-style Western democratic revolution, still dreaming of practising nationalism, still dreaming of an ‘independent’ revolution achieved under the leadership of the bourgeoisie alone, without assistance from abroad and through cheating the workers and peasants, still dreaming of being able to develop itself after this successful revolution into a very big bourgeoisie and of setting up a state governed by one class alone. Their starting point for revolution is completely different from the other classes’ starting point for revolution: they want revolution in order to grow rich, while other classes want revolution in order to relieve distress; they want revolution in order to prepare the way for a new oppressive class, while other classes want revolution in order to obtain their own liberation and to ensure that never again will anyone oppress them.

Members of this bourgeois ‘independent’ revolutionary faction (most of them children of small landlords) are still masquerading in Sun Yat-sen’s name, claiming that his ‘principles’ and ‘doctrines’ do in fact represent their own faction. Was Sun Yat-sen really like this? Sun’s principles and doctrines are definitely for ‘relieving distress’, and certainly not for ‘growing rich’; definitely for liberating people from oppressive classes, and certainly not for preparing the way for a new oppressive class. No matter how Sun’s principles and doctrines may be misconstrued, this point will never change. They believe that situated between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary factions they can achieve an independent revolution, but in fact this is impossible. They are jealous of the rise of the worker and peasant classes and jealous of the assistance offered by the political parties of the national and international proletariat. They have cast aside the masses and cast aside those helping them, and so have no hope of achieving revolution in a twentieth century semi-colonial China weighed down by mighty forces from within and without.

To speak in terms of population figures, the compradores, large landlords, bureaucrats and warlords comprising the big bourgeoisie make up at the most one person in four hundred (one four hundredth), totalling one million, while the small landlords and native-goods producers and merchants comprising the bourgeoisie make up about one person per hundred (1 percent), or four million. The number remaining covers all other classes: the owner cultivators, small merchants and handicraft proprietors comprising the petite bourgeoisie make up about 150 million; the part-owner cultivators, tenant farmers, handicraft workers, shop assistants and small pedlars comprising the semi-proletariat make up the largest tally of around 200
million; the industrial workers, urban coolies, rural labourers and éléments déclassés comprising the proletariat number about 45 million. By this reckoning, how numerous is the mass of people in China who want revolution in order to relieve distress and seek self-liberation? – 395 million, or 98.75 percent. How many enemies have they? – one million, or 0.25 percent. How numerous is the intermediate faction? – four million, or 1 percent.

Under these circumstances we may conclude without the slightest doubt that the split of the GMD rightist faction, which represents the bourgeoisie, will certainly not suffice to impede the development of the GMD, nor suffice to halt China's national revolution. Their split is rooted in their class nature and in the particular circumstances of the present which have left them no option but to break away, and is certainly not due to any machinations on the part of the left faction. The machinations of the so-called left faction (which refers to the GMD left faction and not to the CPC: CPC members in the GMD make up the communist faction, not the GMD left faction) consist of such revolutionary work as pacifying Yang and Liu, pacifying Zeng Mou, pacifying the East River, the Southern Route and the North River and giving Chen Jiongming, Deng Benying and Xiong Kewu a thorough hiding, and of upholding the Guangdong-Hong Kong strike and so giving the British imperialists a thorough hiding. These actions are similarly rooted in the class nature of the revolutionary faction and in the particular circumstances of the present, such that this faction has no option but to struggle and to make revolution. It is not a question of whether or not there are machinations, for struggle and revolution are the only way out.

In times as urgent as these, not only is there no hope in delay, but it is also certain that this urgency will not subside. We can predict that in the near future the intermediate faction will have but two routes between which to choose: either to step right, into the counter-revolutionary faction, or to step left into the revolutionary faction (which remains possible for its left wing). There is no third route. Should they remain in the GMD now, they would indeed be a 'phoney revolutionary faction', as Wang Jingwei has put it, not only failing to benefit us, but actually harming our cause. On account of their departure and on account of their reactions to the revolutionary faction (left faction) and their attacks upon it, the revolutionary faction will be able to achieve a greater measure of unity. Hence, wherever we go, the slogans we hear at the moment almost all take the form: 'Revolutionary factions of the entire country, unite!'.
NOTES

1 Angus McDonald, for example, uncovered several lost works of Mao Zedong while undertaking research in Japan. Ronin, 14 (December 1973), 37-47.
3 Wang Zhong, 'Diyici guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi zhongyao de geming baozhi yu qikan' [Important revolutionary newspapers and magazines of the First Revolutionary Civil War], in Lai Xinxia and Wei Hongyun (eds), Diyici guonei geming zhanzheng shilun ji [Collected Historical Essays on the First Revolutionary Civil War] (Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, Wuhan, 1957), pp.47-51.
5 Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p.47.
6 Philip C.C. Huang, 'Mao Tse-tung and the middle peasants, 1925-1928', Modern China, 1:3 (July 1975), 271-96, 280.
7 Guangzhou minguo ribao [Guangzhou Republican Daily], 28 October 1925.
8 Philip C.C. Huang, op.cit., 276.
10 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 14 October 1925. The background to Mao's resignation is given in Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang [From the Communist Admission to the Party Purification] (Taipei, 1966), pp.507, 512.
11 See my forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Kongyan [hollow words]: propaganda and the development of the GMD mass movement, 1919-26, Department of Far Eastern History, Australian National University.